Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10216/82218
Author(s): Fernanda A. Ferreira
Alberto A. Pinto
Title: Bertrand model under incomplete information
Issue Date: 2008
Abstract: We consider a Bertrand duopoly model with unknown costs. The firms' aim is to choose the price of its product according to the well-known concept of Bayesian Nash equilibrium. The chooses are made simultaneously by both firms.In this paper, we suppose that each firm has two different technologies, and uses one of them according to a certain probability distribution. The use of either one or the other technology affects the unitary production cost. We show that this game has exactly one Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We analyse the advantages, for firms and for consumers, of using the technology with highest production cost versus the one with cheapest production cost. We prove that the expected profit of each firm increases with the variance of its production costs. We also show that the expected price of each good increases with both expected production costs, being the effect of the expected production costs of the rival dominated by the effect of the own expected production costs.
Description: We consider a Bertrand duopoly model with unknown costs. The firms' aim is to choose the price of its product according to the well-known concept of Bayesian Nash equilibrium. The chooses are made simultaneously by both firms.In this paper, we suppose that each firm has two different technologies, and uses one of them according to a certain probability distribution. The use of either one or the other technology affects the unitary production cost. We show that this game has exactly one Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We analyse the advantages, for firms and for consumers, of using the technology with highest production cost versus the one with cheapest production cost. We prove that the expected profit of each firm increases with the variance of its production costs. We also show that the expected price of each good increases with both expected production costs, being the effect of the expected production costs of the rival dominated by the effect of the own expected production costs.
Subject: Matemática
Mathematics
Scientific areas: Ciências exactas e naturais::Matemática
Natural sciences::Mathematics
URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10216/82218
Source: NUMERICAL ANALYSIS AND APPLIED MATHEMATICS: 6th International Conference on Numerical Analysis and Applied Mathematics 2008
Document Type: Artigo em Livro de Atas de Conferência Internacional
Rights: openAccess
License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
Appears in Collections:FCUP - Artigo em Livro de Atas de Conferência Internacional

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