Is seeing judging? Radical contextualism and the problem of perception

Abstract

Charles Travis basic claim regarding perception is that perception does not have representational content: the senses are, in the Austinian metaphor he favors, silent. 1 More often than not this claim is considered within the framework of ongoing discussions in the philosophy of perception, where one central question is whether perception has representational content. 2 Yet pursuing the discussion in terms of the representational content of perception risks begging the question of the nature of representation in general, which is one central question that Travis radical contextualism addresses. Also, restricting the discussion of the proposal to the field of philosophy of perception makes one disregard the fact that the silence of the senses view of perception comes off as an application of a general radical contextualist outlook. Radical contextualism is an approach to a range of questions regarding truth, thought and language, and a case built in several fronts. Globally it amounts to a view of representation as it is pursued by thinkers such as ourselves, a view which is currently formulated by Travis around a particular reading of Frege. 3 Such a view of thinkers and how they represent is the background against which the silence of the senses view of perception should be understood.