Espelhos, escadas, paradoxo e Nonsense : o que há de comum a Kierkegaard e Wittgenstein

Abstract

Based on a structural comparison between Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Wittgenstein 1986 [1921]) and Kierkegaard's Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the Philosophical Crumbs (Kierkegaard 2009 [1864]), I claim that Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein have a common understanding of the nature of philosophical method. In order to spell out such common understanding I focus on the concepts of mirror, ladder, paradox and nonsense, taking James Conant's interpretations (Conant 1992, 1997, 2004) as reference. I end by identifying the implications of Kierkegaard's and Wittgenstein's ethical-aesthetic conception of philosophy as an activity.