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https://hdl.handle.net/10216/73644Registo completo
| Campo DC | Valor | Idioma |
|---|---|---|
| dc.creator | Fabio Verona | |
| dc.creator | Manuel Mota Freitas Martins | |
| dc.creator | Inês Drumond | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2019-02-02T02:56:11Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2019-02-02T02:56:11Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2011 | |
| dc.identifier.other | sigarra:40270 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://repositorio-aberto.up.pt/handle/10216/73644 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | This paper is motivated by the recent nancial crisis and addresses whether a too low for too long interest rate policy may generate a boom-bust cycle. We suggest a model in which a microfounded shadow banking sector is included in an otherwise state-of-the-art DSGE model.When faced with perverse incentives, financial intermediaries within the shadow banking sector can divert a fraction of stockholders' profits for their own benets and extend credit at a discounted rate. The model predicts that long periods of accommodative monetary policy do create thepreconditions for, but do not cause per se, a boom-bust cycle. Rather, it is the combination ofa persistent monetary ease with microeconomic distortions in the financial system that causes a boom-bust. | |
| dc.language.iso | eng | |
| dc.rights | openAccess | |
| dc.rights.uri | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ | |
| dc.subject | Economia, Economia e gestão | |
| dc.subject | Economics, Economics and Business | |
| dc.title | Monetary policy shocks in a DSGE model with a shadow banking system | |
| dc.type | Trabalho Académico | |
| dc.contributor.uporto | Faculdade de Economia | |
| dc.subject.fos | Ciências sociais::Economia e gestão | |
| dc.subject.fos | Social sciences::Economics and Business | |
| Aparece nas coleções: | FEP - Trabalho Académico | |
Ficheiros deste registo:
| Ficheiro | Descrição | Tamanho | Formato | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 40270.pdf | Cef.up Working Paper nº. 2011-01, February 2011 | 1.13 MB | Adobe PDF | ![]() Ver/Abrir |
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