Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://hdl.handle.net/10216/65314
Author(s): | João Correia-da-Silva Carlos Hervés-Beloso |
Title: | General equilibrium in economies with uncertain delivery |
Issue Date: | 2012 |
Abstract: | We consider a general equilibrium model of trade ex ante with differential information in which agents choose plans of state-contingent lists of bundles. Being unable to verify that the state of nature is s and not t, an agent has to accept the delivery of any bundle in the list for delivery in state s or in the list for delivery in state t. Under the assumption that each state of nature can be verified by at least one agent, we establish existence of equilibrium and we show that the equilibrium allocation satisfies a notion of coalitional incentive compatibility. |
Subject: | Economia e gestão Economics and Business |
Scientific areas: | Ciências sociais::Economia e gestão Social sciences::Economics and Business |
URI: | https://hdl.handle.net/10216/65314 |
Document Type: | Artigo em Revista Científica Internacional |
Rights: | openAccess |
License: | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ |
Appears in Collections: | FEP - Artigo em Revista Científica Internacional |
This item is licensed under a Creative Commons License