Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10216/65314
Author(s): João Correia-da-Silva
Carlos Hervés-Beloso
Title: General equilibrium in economies with uncertain delivery
Issue Date: 2012
Abstract: We consider a general equilibrium model of trade ex ante with differential information in which agents choose plans of state-contingent lists of bundles. Being unable to verify that the state of nature is s and not t, an agent has to accept the delivery of any bundle in the list for delivery in state s or in the list for delivery in state t. Under the assumption that each state of nature can be verified by at least one agent, we establish existence of equilibrium and we show that the equilibrium allocation satisfies a notion of coalitional incentive compatibility.
Subject: Economia e gestão
Economics and Business
Scientific areas: Ciências sociais::Economia e gestão
Social sciences::Economics and Business
URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10216/65314
Document Type: Artigo em Revista Científica Internacional
Rights: openAccess
License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
Appears in Collections:FEP - Artigo em Revista Científica Internacional

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