What some philosophers wouldn't dream of counting as part of their job

Abstract

Cora Diamond's view of the materials admissible in moral philosophy (Diamond 1991h, Diamond 2006) is bound to strike many analytic philosophers as too broad: they wouldn’t dream of thinking of them (namely of literature) as 'part of their job'. This, of course, assumes a conception of the nature of the such job, one in regard to which Diamond expresses doubts of several kinds. In this paper I will (i) search for different reasons for those doubts (Diamond 1991d, 1991e, 1991f, 1991g, 1991h) and then (ii) try to make the connection clear between Diamond's proposal of a change in 'the way we want to do moral philosophy' and her reading of Wittgenstein on ethical nonsense (Diamond 1991a, 1991b, 1991c, 2000). Finally, I suggest that although Diamond has a strong case defending that the dismissal of literary materials in moral philosophy marks an untenable 'neutrality ideal' (Laugier 2006), not every aspect of her view of the role of literature in moral philosophy is equally compelling. In fact, she recruits literature for two different purposes: countering the prevailing 'blindness to blindness' and countering the lack of awe in moral thinking, which she wants to connect with 'the dark and sinister in the human heart' (Diamond 2000), 'unspeakability' and 'difficulty of reality' (Diamond 2008). Since these are different purposes, 'philosophers who wouldn't dream of counting literature as part of their job' might be rejecting any of various things.