Can conversational AIs testify? Challenging the conservative view

Abstract

The conservative view on testimony rests on the assumption that a testifier must (1) believe or know the propositional content of the testimony, (2) intend to deliver the testimony, (3) be a responsible epistemic agent, (4) be an object of trust, and (5) be capable of making assertions. According to this view, such conditions apply exclusively to human beings (or minded agents), not to technological artifacts or instruments. For this reason, conversational AIs are typically not considered or classified as testifiers. However, in this paper, I argue that some of the conditions posited by the conservative view - namely (1) and (2) - do not constitute necessary conditions for an entity to qualify as a testifier, while others - (3), (4), and (5) - can plausibly be satisfied by conversational AIs. Therefore, there are no compelling reasons to reject the claim that conversational AIs can testify.