How can embodied cognition naturalize bounded rationality?

Abstract

The paper discusses how research on embodied cognition in cognitive science can contribute to the naturalization of rationality. The investigation takes place in two steps. First, we provide a conceptual map of possible new ideas of rationality inspired by embodied cognition. Given the plurality of theories of embodied cognition, we distinguish different approaches according to their increasing degree of radicalism. We consider ecological rationality as currently the best candidate for naturalizing rationality, and, after identifying its descriptive and normative building blocks, we provide an increasingly radical embodied interpretation of them. The outcome is four new concepts of rationality, in increasing order of embodied radicalism: embodied bounded rationality, body rationality, extended rationality, and radical embodied rationality. We emphasize that while less radical concepts currently align better with the idea of methodological naturalism, radical concepts are best conceived of as instances of ontological naturalism. The second step of our investigation concerns comparing the four embodied rationality concepts in light of three meta-criteria: internal epistemic values, empirical success, and intertheoretic compatibility. While empirical success currently favors less radical concepts, intertheoretic compatibility demonstrates the promises of rationality's embodied radicalism.