Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10216/156593
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dc.creatorMiguens, Sofia
dc.date.accessioned2024-04-15T23:31:34Z-
dc.date.available2024-04-15T23:31:34Z-
dc.date.issued2024
dc.identifier.issn0167-7411
dc.identifier.othersigarra:655942
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10216/156593-
dc.description.abstractThe aim of the present article is to identify and analyze three particular disputes among current proponents of perceptual realism which may throw light on tensions present in the history of direct realism and current discussions. Starting from John Searle's conception of direct realism, I first set McDowell and Travis's approaches in contrast with it. I then further compare Travis' view with McDowell's. I claim that differences among the three philosophers are traceable first to methodological conceptions of the approach to perceptual experience (whether philosophical naturalism implies dealing with the sub-personal level), then to what makes for the particularity of a perceptual experience (whether it involves consciousness and a task of unity or not), and finally to what makes for the determinacy of an experience of things in the world (whether such determinacy characterizes the world itself or, as such, involves language and thought).
dc.language.isoeng
dc.rightsrestrictedAccess
dc.titleBeing a direct realist: Searle, McDowell, and Travis on 'seeing things as they are'
dc.typeArtigo em Revista Científica Internacional
dc.contributor.uportoFaculdade de Letras
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s11245-023-09965-8
Appears in Collections:FLUP - Artigo em Revista Científica Internacional

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