Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Author(s): Henrique Lopes Cardoso
Eugénio Oliveira
Title: Risk tolerance and social awareness: adapting deterrence sanctions to agent populations
Issue Date: 2009
Abstract: Normative environments for multi-agent systems provide means to monitor and enforce agents' compliance to their commitments. However, when the normative space is imperfect, contracts to which norms apply may be Unbalanced, and agents may exploit potential flaws to their own advantage. In this paper we analyze how a normative framework endowed with a simple adaptive deterrence sanctioning model responds to different agent populations. Agents are characterized by their risk tolerance and by their social attitude. We show that risk-averse or socially concerned populations cause lesser deterrence sanctions to be imposed by the normative system.
Subject: Ciências da computação e da informação
Computer and information sciences
Scientific areas: Ciências exactas e naturais::Ciências da computação e da informação
Natural sciences::Computer and information sciences
Source: Progress in Artificial Intelligence: Proceedings of the 14th Portuguese Conference on Artificial Intelligence, EPIA2009
Document Type: Artigo em Livro de Atas de Conferência Internacional
Rights: openAccess
Appears in Collections:FEUP - Artigo em Livro de Atas de Conferência Internacional

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
58562.pdf352.42 kBAdobe PDFThumbnail

This item is licensed under a Creative Commons License Creative Commons