Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10216/138084
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dc.creatorTravis, Charles
dc.date.accessioned2022-09-07T22:05:45Z-
dc.date.available2022-09-07T22:05:45Z-
dc.date.issued2021
dc.identifier.issn0165-9227
dc.identifier.othersigarra:517826
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10216/138084-
dc.description.abstractThis essay outlines a certain 20th century Oxonian tradition in epistemology, contrasting it with another line of thought set out by Michael Ayers. The tradition begins with Cook Wilson and the idea that knowing is never having evidence, no matter how strong. It takes a turn in J.L. Austin, introducing two ideas into philosophy: disjunctivism and occasion-sensitivity. The last section considers whether either can really live without the other. The first part of the essay is a general consideration of the relation between two forms of awareness: perceptual, and 'propositional' (awareness-that), and of how the first may furnish proof of the second. The second part considers Ayers' view of the relation, particularly as expressed in his idea of primary and secondary knowledge, and its relation to disjunctivism about knowledge.
dc.language.isoeng
dc.rightsrestrictedAccess
dc.subjectFilosofia
dc.subjectPhilosophy
dc.titleAt work in the fields of the true
dc.typeArtigo em Revista Científica Internacional
dc.contributor.uportoFaculdade de Letras
dc.identifier.doi10.1163/18756735-00000149
Appears in Collections:FLUP - Artigo em Revista Científica Internacional

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