Animality and rationality (on how John McDowell's Kantian view of moral experience could accommodate research on emotion)

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10216/121916

Author(s):	Miguens, Sofia
Title:	Animality and rationality (on how John McDowell's Kantian view of moral experience could accommodate research on emotion)
Issue Date:	2019
Description:	My main goal in this article is methodological: I want to spell out how a Kantian perspective could accommodate current empirical work on cognition, and in particular on emotion. Having chosen John McDowell as a guide, I try to characterize his view of moral experience and underline its Kantian traits (McDowell 1998a, 1998b, 1998c, 1998d, 1998e, 1998f). I start by identifying the conception of freedom as exemplified in the rational wolf thought experiment in Two Forms of Naturalism as the main Kantian trait. I then go through the characterization of two other crucial aspects of our moral experience - (responsiveness to) reasons and value. I suggest that McDowell's approach to moral experience, although not itself strictly Kantian in all of its details, is an instance of a transformative view of rationality, as defended by Matthew Boyle (Boyle 2016) and that such transformative view is the key to accommodate empirical research on cognition within a Kantian perspective.
Subject:	Filosofia Philosophy
DOI:	10.5281/zenodo.3253121
URI:	https://hdl.handle.net/10216/121916
Document Type:	Artigo em Revista Científica Internacional
Rights:	openAccess
Appears in Collections:	FLUP - Artigo em Revista Científica Internacional

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