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|Title:||Animality and rationality (on how John McDowell's Kantian view of moral experience could accommodate research on emotion)|
|Description:||My main goal in this article is methodological: I want to spell out how a Kantian perspective could accommodate current empirical work on cognition, and in particular on emotion. Having chosen John McDowell as a guide, I try to characterize his view of moral experience and underline its Kantian traits (McDowell 1998a, 1998b, 1998c, 1998d, 1998e, 1998f). I start by identifying the conception of freedom as exemplified in the rational wolf thought experiment in Two Forms of Naturalism as the main Kantian trait. I then go through the characterization of two other crucial aspects of our moral experience - (responsiveness to) reasons and value. I suggest that McDowell's approach to moral experience, although not itself strictly Kantian in all of its details, is an instance of a transformative view of rationality, as defended by Matthew Boyle (Boyle 2016) and that such transformative view is the key to accommodate empirical research on cognition within a Kantian perspective.|
|Document Type:||Artigo em Revista Científica Internacional|
|Appears in Collections:||FLUP - Artigo em Revista Científica Internacional|
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