Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10216/100759
Author(s): Fernanda A. Ferreira
Flávio Ferreira
Alberto A. Pinto
Title: Price-setting dynamical duopoly with incomplete information
Issue Date: 2011
Abstract: We consider a price competition in a duopoly with substitutable goods, linear and symmetric demand. There is a firm (F 1) that chooses first the price p 1 of its good; the other firm (F 2) observes p 1 and then chooses the price p 2 of its good. The conclusions of this price-setting dynamical duopoly are substantially altered by the presence of either differentiated goods or asymmetric information about rival's production costs. In this paper, we consider asymmetric information about rival's production costs. We do ex-ante and ex-post analyses of firms' profits and market prices. We compare the ex-ante firms' expected profits with the ex-post firms' profits. © 2011 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
Description: We consider a price competition in a duopoly with substitutable goods, linear and symmetric demand. There is a firm (F 1) that chooses first the price p 1 of its good; the other firm (F 2) observes p 1 and then chooses the price p 2 of its good. The conclusions of this price-setting dynamical duopoly are substantially altered by the presence of either differentiated goods or asymmetric information about rival's production costs. In this paper, we consider asymmetric information about rival's production costs. We do ex-ante and ex-post analyses of firms' profits and market prices. We compare the ex-ante firms' expected profits with the ex-post firms' profits.
Subject: Matemática
Mathematics
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10216/100759
Source: Nonlinear Science and Complexity
Document Type: Capítulo ou Parte de Livro
Rights: restrictedAccess
Appears in Collections:FCUP - Capítulo ou Parte de Livro

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