Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10216/91369
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dc.creatorFernanda A. Ferreira
dc.creatorFlávio Ferreira
dc.creatorMiguel Ferreira
dc.creatorAlberto A. Pinto
dc.date.accessioned2019-02-08T13:21:54Z-
dc.date.available2019-02-08T13:21:54Z-
dc.date.issued2009
dc.identifier.othersigarra:48228
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio-aberto.up.pt/handle/10216/91369-
dc.descriptionIn this paper, we consider a Stackelberg duopoly competition with differentiated goods, linear and symmetric demand and with unknown costs. In our model, the two firms play a non-cooperative game with two stages: in a first stage, firm F 1 chooses the quantity, q 1, that is going to produce; in the second stage, firm F 2 observes the quantity q 1 produced by firm F 1 and chooses its own quantity q 2. Firms choose their output levels in order to maximise their profits. We suppose that each firm has two different technologies, and uses one of them following a certain probability distribution. The use of either one or the other technology affects the unitary production cost. We show that there is exactly one perfect Bayesian equilibrium for this game. We analyse the variations of the expected profits with the parameters of the model, namely with the parameters of the probability distributions, and with the parameters of the demand and differentiation.
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, we consider a Stackelberg duopoly competition with differentiated goods, linear and symmetric demand and with unknown costs. In our model, the two firms play a non-cooperative game with two stages: in a first stage, firm F 1 chooses the quantity, q 1, that is going to produce; in the second stage, firm F 2 observes the quantity q 1 produced by firm F 1 and chooses its own quantity q 2. Firms choose their output levels in order to maximise their profits. We suppose that each firm has two different technologies, and uses one of them following a certain probability distribution. The use of either one or the other technology affects the unitary production cost. We show that there is exactly one perfect Bayesian equilibrium for this game. We analyse the variations of the expected profits with the parameters of the model, namely with the parameters of the probability distributions, and with the parameters of the demand and differentiation.
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofIntelligent Engineering Systems and Computational Cybernetics
dc.rightsrestrictedAccess
dc.subjectMatemática
dc.subjectMathematics
dc.titleQuantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly
dc.typeCapítulo ou Parte de Livro
dc.contributor.uportoFaculdade de Ciências
dc.subject.fosCiências exactas e naturais::Matemática
dc.subject.fosNatural sciences::Mathematics
Appears in Collections:FCUP - Capítulo ou Parte de Livro

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