Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10216/15130
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dc.creatorHerique Lopes Cardoso
dc.creatorEugénio Oliveira
dc.date.accessioned2019-02-05T17:30:26Z-
dc.date.available2019-02-05T17:30:26Z-
dc.date.issued2009
dc.identifier.othersigarra:58288
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio-aberto.up.pt/handle/10216/15130-
dc.description.abstractNormative environments are used to regulate multi-agent interactions. In business encounters, agents representing business entities make contracts including norms that prescribe what agents should do. Agent autonomy, however, gives agents the ability to decide whether they fulfill or violate their commitments. In this paper we present an adaptive mechanism that enables a normative framework to change deterrence sanctions according to an agent population, in order to preclude agents from exploiting potential normative flaws. The system tries to avoid institutional control beyond what is strictly necessary, seeking to maximize agent contracting activity while ensuring a certain commitment compliance level, when agents have unknown risk and social attitudes.
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartof2009 IEEE/WIC/ACM INTERNATIONAL JOINT CONFERENCES ON WEB INTELLIGENCE (WI) AND INTELLIGENT AGENT TECHNOLOGIES (IAT), VOL 2
dc.rightsopenAccess
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
dc.subjectCiências da computação e da informação
dc.subjectComputer and information sciences
dc.titleAdaptive deterrence sanctions in a normative framework
dc.typeArtigo em Livro de Atas de Conferência Internacional
dc.contributor.uportoFaculdade de Engenharia
dc.identifier.doi10.1109/wi-iat.2009.123
dc.identifier.authenticusP-003-SWE
dc.subject.fosCiências exactas e naturais::Ciências da computação e da informação
dc.subject.fosNatural sciences::Computer and information sciences
Appears in Collections:FEUP - Artigo em Livro de Atas de Conferência Internacional

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