ABSTRACT

The importance of the role of ideology in the Portuguese social formation over the past fifty years or so is striking. From the pronouncements of Salazar's "Estado Novo" on the "true" nature of the peasant to Marcello Caetano's vision of Portugal's role in the world, this is so. This dissertation is, above all, an attempt to specify the role of ideology in Portugal between the military coups of 28 May 1926 and 25 April 1974, to explain its importance in the social formation. This specificity is established through an analysis of the Portuguese state. Such an analysis will be able, hopefully, to locate and differentiate conjuncturally the "exceptional form" of "capitalist" state that existed in Portugal during the above period.

A crucial aspect of the analysis is the emphasis placed on ideology as a key condition of the process of social reproduction. Through the concept of "popular democratic struggle" it is hoped to get a purchase on the importance in the social formation of sectors not participating directly in dominant production relations. The growing importance of ideological struggle within the general arena of class struggle will then become evident.

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INTRODUCTION

Situating the Problematic

This dissertation sees itself situated in what has come to be called the "neo-Gramscian" school. Therefore it stresses, like Gramsci, the importance of theory in the analysis of social formations. In addition, certain problems and concepts are privileged, both epistemologically and in terms of investigation. Central, for example, is the problem of political and ideological hegemony. The Gramscian concept of hegemony is crucial to this dissertation for it allows an analysis that keeps the levels of the social formation distinct yet held in combination. Ideological dominance and subordination can be understood therefore not in isolation but as an aspect of the relations of classes and class fractions at all levels - economic and political, as well as ideological/cultural. Also, implicit in the concept of hegemony is a notion of the specific autonomy of "democratic interpellations". As we shall see in the course of development of the dissertation, this notion allows for class struggle in the domain of democratic ideology, from which it has been largely excluded in the past. This results because the state is situated on the terrain of the social formation rather than on that of a pure mode of production.

In fact, no pure mode of production exists in pure form in the real world, and not only are there variant forms of each mode of production, but also a given mode of production is always inserted into a social formation in which its conditions of existence are more or less successfully realized and in which it co-exists and interacts with other modes of production. Thus the analysis of a pure mode of production must be concretised and complexified if it is to prove adequate to the analysis of a specific social formation. It is the concept of hegemony that enables
one to concretize and complexify modes of production analysis through the analysis of specific conjunctures, thus giving a much-needed specificity to the Marxist theory of politics.

Democracy, being a determination of the state, must be analysed on the conceptual terrain of the social formation rather than on that of a pure mode of production. At the level of the social formation it is the balance of political forces involved in the struggle for the appropriation and exercise of state power and the reconstitutions of the state apparatuses that is determinant of democracy. Thus at the heart of any analysis of democratic ideology is a struggle that Laclau has termed "popular democratic struggle." For hegemony to exist the support of the dominated classes and of other social forces must be secured by the dominant bloc. This support does not reside in a form of illusion, of misrecognition, of "false consciousness", but is rooted in the incorporation of certain interests and aspirations of the "people" into the dominant ideology.

The state in this dissertation is viewed neither as an originating subject, in the sense that it has an essential unity, nor as a necessarily neutral instrument, but rather as a system of apparatuses and institutions that have definite effects on political struggles and are in turn affected by those struggles. This does not mean that the state as a system of apparatuses and institutions is merely representative of class power. This would lead to an implicit conception of the state as a "quality", i.e. that "everything" serving to maintain the cohesion of the social formation. Rather, as stated above, the state is situated on the terra firma of the social formation, and as such is an objective structure with its own power, state power. The state is seen as playing a vital role in unifying and organizing the political and ideological hegemony of the dominant forces, it being implicit that the unity of the
social formation depends on the existence of particular forms of organization and representation. The ability of the power bloc, 'a fairly stable alliance of dominant classes or class fractions, whose unity depends on a modicum of mutual self-sacrifice of immediate interests and on their commitment to a common world outlook',\textsuperscript{10} to maintain its hegemony depends on its success in articulating "popular democratic struggle" into an ideology that sustains its power. For the dominated classes to establish a counter-hegemony, and so isolate the power bloc, they must be able to articulate "popular democratic struggles" into their own ideology thus enabling them to take advantage of dominant sectors incapable of neutralizing popular-democratic interpellations, possibly because they have gone too far in absorbing the contents of the ideological discourse of the dominated classes thus allowing the latter to impose their own articulating discourses within the state apparatuses.

**General Aims and Form**

The aim of this dissertation, broadly, is to analyse the ideological, as a structural level of the social formation, in the specific context of Portugal in an attempt to develop theoretically the notion of relative autonomy, and in so doing open up regions hitherto defined as the domain of bourgeois ideological discourse.\textsuperscript{11} Hopefully, this will allow for the incorporation of formerly classified "bourgeois" elements of discourse into socialist ideological discourse.\textsuperscript{12} Portugal has been chosen for study, a) because it has undergone unique changes both in terms of productive relations and in terms of relations of domination (at the level of the state) over the last few decades, and b) because it presents an interesting case in the sense that it is neither a "developing" country in the third world sense, nor a member of the club of advanced industrial nations. Thus, it provides "laboratory conditions" for an examination of relative autonomy in all its complexity.
The very notion of "relative" autonomy at first sight seems absurd; you either have autonomy or you don't. However, in fact, "relative autonomy" plays an important role in that it allows for complexity and it bridges the gap between the abstract and the concrete. In both these senses it is a concept akin to the concept of "hegemony", discussed above. Abandoning "relative autonomy" presents serious problems, for example, if one does so what exactly does material causality mean? Thus, this dissertation will attempt to further theorize the notion, rather than abandon it, in the hope that it will then be possible to avoid what Athar Hussain has termed the "social functions of education approach" which tends to treat all phenomena not related to technical competence as explainable in terms of either "control" or "legitimation". Finally, it should be noted that in the dissertation there are two sources of relative autonomy: a) a source that stems from the fact that social classes cannot be reduced to their dominant fractions - a fraction of the bourgeoisie in power must always take into consideration the mass base of the bourgeoisie that it needs socially and politically, and b) a source which is the separation of the state from production relations. Both these sources will be expanded in the body of the dissertation.

Ideology is very much thought of in terms of its practico-social effects in cementing a ruling bloc beneath a dominant ideology. Consequently, part of the analysis will consist of looking at the transformation of ideological discourses - that is, the process of articulation and disarticulation of discourses. It will be argued that this process is unintelligible so long as ideological elements are pre-assigned to essential paradigms. The meaning of ideological elements must be sought rather in the structure of which they are a moment. Classes are defined as the poles of antagonistic production relations having no necessary forms of existence at the political and ideological levels. The form of an ideology results from the principle of articulation of its
constituent interpellations. Thus, the class character of an ideological discourse is revealed in what Laclau terms its "specific articulating principle". 16

"Fascism" in Portugal

The focus of analysis is the discourse of "fascism" in Portugal. Through specifying the nature of the Portuguese state during a large part of this century, it is hoped that some light will be shed on the discourse of fascism in Portugal, a discourse that still retains considerable importance in the social formation even after the overthrow of the so-called "fascist" regime. The important role of ideology in the social formation should become apparent as a result of this analysis.
Notes

3) Mode of production is defined as an integrated complex of social production forces and relations linked to a determinate type of possession and separation from the means of production.
4) As used by Gramsci, and not, for example, by Poulantzas, who "functionalizes" the concept by reducing it to the domination of a ruling class alliance.
6) Jessop (1978, p. 12) points out that treating the state as a real (as opposed to legal) subject is to exclude from consideration political struggles within and between state apparatuses as well as the effects of its institutional structure on political struggles in general - such struggles are crucial to the analysis in this dissertation.
7) Does the state have to be a priori repressive?
8) The Althusserian concepts of Repressive State Apparatus and Ideological State Apparatuses will be employed in this dissertation because of their analytical power. However, it should be noted that Althusser's rejection of Gramsci's "civil society/state" distinction for the concept of ISAs, which makes no distinction between apparatuses organized by the state and those organized privately, is not accepted. The reason for this, of course, is that in a specific conjuncture it can make a difference whether the apparatuses are directly coordinated by the state or not.
11) Discourse is used throughout this dissertation in the sense of a meaningful totality. The "discourse" is a connotative unity with rules
12) This will be developed in the text by way of a critique of Poulantzas's work.

13) First, for example, never explains what material causality means. As both T. Benton (1978) and G. McLennan (1978) have shown, reality, contradiction and epistemology all creep back into the work of those who recently rejected the concept of relative autonomy (reference is made here to Cutler, et al., 1978). A Marxist problematic certainly underlies both conclusions contained in Vols. I and II of Marx's Capital and Capitalism Today. If Cutler, et al., choose certain concepts over others, it is not just because they are "socialists", but because the world is in some sense like the way they present it.


15) a la Althusser and Poulantzas.

CHAPTER I: "Salazar's Portugal"

The Portuguese state, up to April 25, 1974, was generally termed a "fascist" state by the Liberal press of the Western world and by the political Left. In addition during the last 10-15 years several analyses from contrasting theoretical positions have appeared pronouncing the Portuguese state, at at least some time during the period between the military coup of 28 May 1926 and the second military coup of 25 April 1974, fascist. The aim is to examine the bases of the above analyses, to point out their shortcomings, and to then present a case for the specificity of the Portuguese state between the aforementioned dates.

António de Figueredo, in Portugal: Fifty Years of Dictatorship, and Hugh Kay, in Salazar and Modern Portugal, construct typically Liberal analyses of an historical period. By "typically Liberal" one is referring to a) the way they enter their material, i.e. through the psychology of its subject - thus they concentrate on drawing-up a portrait of the "dictator" Salazar, and through that portrait they attempt to develop the underlying themes of Portuguese culture and politics - and, b) to their methodological empiricism - their analyses are descriptive, the "facts" provide the classifications and sub-classifications; the regime is determined through its practice.

Figuereido's account sets out to establish the "fascist" nature of Salazar's rule, to show how oppressive it was, while Kay's is more concerned to explore critically Salazar's personality and policies. The analysis of Figueredo is an attempt to specify the nature of Salazar's regime; Kay's is more a comment on it.

How, then, does Figueredo explain the emergence of fascism in Portugal, and how does he characterize fascism itself? Being a historiographical
analysis, Figuereido's traces the historical events leading up to the military coup of May 28th 1926, two years after which António Oliveira Salazar entered the government as Finance Minister and which, a further two years later, resulted in the establishment of the "Estado Novo" and the beginnings of "fascism" in Portugal. The transition from the "Republican Period", which began with the overthrow of the Monarchy in 1910 and terminated with the already mentioned coup of 1926, to the Salazarist period is mostly taken-for-granted by Figuereido. There are some comments and statistics about the unrest of certain layers of the population, mainly the working class, the internal economic and political instability of the period, and the contradiction between the libertarian ideals of the Republic and the conservative ideals of the Catholic Church, but the transition is mainly treated as the continuation of what are described as almost permanent features of Portugal's past: 'the authoritarian character of the government, the intimate connection between state and church, the decisive role of the military'. The Republican Period in this light comes to be almost an aberration in the normal course of history in Portugal.

This authoritarian character of Portugal's history is a major element in Figuereido's portrait of Salazar. Salazar, 'conditioned by his upbringing to accept the inherited nationalist ideology', can only add to it. It is through Salazar's character that we can understand Portugal's past and her future; thus at one moment Salazar is simply the product of his country's history, while at the next he is the subject of the present and the future, literally 'controlling the destinies of millions of people for generations virtually single-handed'. Salazar, the seminarist, the nationalist, the misogynist, the supreme upholder of "law and order" - 'Having been deprived as a child of a youthful and relaxed environment, Salazar was always the opposite of the romantic liberal' - contributes to Portugal's authoritarian past by making it even more authoritarian;
by setting up a fascist dictatorship. Portuguese fascism is characterized by Salazar himself.

In concrete terms Salazar's fascism meant, according to Figueréido, such things as far-reaching censorship, a security police which came to have almost total power, a Portuguese youth movement modelled on "Hitler's Youth", a new social order laying the foundations for vertical "sindicatos" (trade unions) which were designed to be the beginnings of a Corporativist state. The "sindicatos" became simply bureaucratic instruments of social discipline, argues Figueréido, having at most only an advisory role. It was a regime controlled by a capitalist oligarchy - a form of "authoritarian capitalism" - with the discipline imposed on the working class the essential element in Salazar's plans for the rebuilding of Portugal. The "Portuguese Colonial Empire", the official title given in May 1930, was the key economic element in Salazar's reconstruction plan, argues Figueréido, "the Portuguese would become the Herrenvolk in the colonies, to ensure that there would be a "division of work" whereby some ten million black "natives" would produce raw materials necessary for the industrial development of Portugal."

Why was Salazar successful as the interpreter of Portugal's past and the Subject of her present and future? Because he was "brilliant", "mysteriously" charismatic - due to his infrequent appearance (Kay sees it slightly differently, however - he suggests that Salazar simply 'lacked the warm appeal of a national hero...') - more practically, because he had the technique to keep 'the archaic and ruinous military caste happy', through consistently maintaining a high defense expenditure (for the years 1928/9 double the percentage spent by Great Britain), and finally because he expressed Portugal's past.

Hugh Kay, contrary to Figueréido, raises doubts about the "fascist" nature of Salazar's regime. He does this through a comparison of Salazar's
theory of his "Estado Novo" with Mussolini's "Corporativism". He maintains that Salazar's system, in theory at least, differed considerably from Mussolini's both in its structure and in its essence. He establishes these differences at the empirical level, for example through the use of the Portuguese Constitution of 1933, and through Mussolini's writings on the Corporate State. Summed up, Kay's location of the crucial structural difference between the two conceptions is in Salazar's recognition of the personality of the corporation. Briefly this means that the political structure of the "Estado Novo" presupposed that subordinate bodies would initiate ideas and enterprises whose effects would rise from below to permeate, change and regenerate the whole community, including the government and legislature. The Salazarist system differed in essence from Mussolini's fascism in the sense that the state was not considered to be the 'sovereign nation-state through which "freedom" would be achieved, but rather a "superior unifying moral power", 11 that is, a co-ordinating agent regulating group life.

Kay suggests, although he doesn't confirm it, that indeed the practice of the Salazarist state may have been something else, that it may have acted as if it were "sovereign". Nevertheless, he begins to make matters more complex by, in effect, challenging Figueredo's portrait with the theory of Salazar himself.

In summary, it can be said that both the above authors are prisoners of their own subjectivism. Neither can explain the emergence of the regime they are analysing; it appears to emerge naturally, the conditions of its emergence aren't explained, and as for its specificity: it is either a very authoritarian regime within a capitalist context, or it is an authoritarian Christian regime. This tells us very little about fascism, or about fascism in Portugal.
Notes


2) Foucaultas in Fascism and Dictatorship distinguishes between the growth and the origins of fascism, the former emphasizing the process of transition. Historiographical accounts confuse this problem, he argues. 1974.

3) Figueiredo, 1975, p. 34.

4) Ibid.

5) Ibid., p. 35.

6) Ibid., p. 51.

7) The lack of sociological theory in Figueiredo’s account leads to confusions of the following kind in his attempt to analyse the state:

"The "Estado Novo" (Salazar's "new state"), although in practice it reflected an elitist contemptuous approach to industry and a pre-judice against manual labour, was based upon a theory of the state which is basically concerned with worker’s rights. The doctrine was an attempt to resuscitate the principles behind the ancient corporacões de arte e oficios (crafts and trades' corporative) which prevailed in certain European kingdoms in medieval times. Ignoring the experience of centuries that had gone by -- including the whole of the industrial revolution and the emergence of the technological age -- "corporativism" appealed to Salazar’s lack of creative imagination as the kind of solution for which everybody was waiting to stop the "frightening threat of Bolshevism"." p. 70.

There are, in fact, many different accounts of the corporate state in Portugal, most tending to agree that "corporativism" in Portugal was anything but pure. L. S. Graham, for instance, argues that Salazar’s state was "administrative" rather than "corporativist"; Kay argues that it was a synthesis of the Pluralist and Italian Corporativist states. (Graham, 1975; Kay, 1970).

8) As. cit., p. 76.

9) As. cit., p. 81.

10) Figueiredo, p. 63.

11) Ibid., p. 62.
CHAPTER II: Fascism as a "Power Elite"

A more sophisticated, sociological, analysis of Portuguese "fascism" is given in two articles by Hermínio Martins. Using Weberian concepts, Martins, in the first article, sets out some of the ideological roots of Portuguese "fascism" and makes a case for what he terms 'the process of fascistization' of the regime. In the second of the articles he concentrates on the way Portugal has been stratified territorially and sociologically and draws some conclusions of such stratification for the "modernization" of Portugal.

As above, two questions are put to Martins's analysis: how did fascism emerge and what characterized it? No answers are given by Martins to the first question — although some are indirectly suggested through his analysis of stratification — almost all of his analysis is concerned with the second one. This is largely explained by the fact that he does characterize the regime as a kind of "power elite", in C. Wright Mills fashion. Thus, his major concern becomes one of identifying that elite and explicating the ideology which it embodies. Consequently, he is drawn away from a concept of criseis which could help provide an answer to the emergence of "fascism" in Portugal.

Martins locates the origins of his, in effect — although he doesn't use the term — "power" elite in the "counter-revolutionary" movement of the extreme Right (during the Republican Period) named Integralismo Lusitano. He identifies at the time of Salazar's seizure of power five clusters of integralists from the standpoint of their relation to international fascism and the "New State's" own ideological options: 1) the "old guard"; 2) the integralist-fascists; 3) the national-syndicalists; 4) the new state integralists; and 5) the "neo-integralists". The general ideology of the integralists was nationalist, authoritarian, anti-Semitic, and embodied the so-called traditional heritage of Portugal.
(negating totally the 19th Century) in values that were 'messianic, pastoral, and hierarchical'. There were strong links with the Action Française movement and Neurraism, with its loathing for "demo-liberalism". The political style of the integralists, and their lesser known but influential, particularly among academic circles at the University of Coimbra (Salazar was strongly influenced by them), Centro Académico de Democracia Cristã (CADC), earned them the reputation of the "Jacobins of the Right". Their social origin was typical of the Portuguese elite, that is, made up of representatives of the influential and distinguished landowning families — particularly from the Latifundist region of the Alentejo — and of representatives of the financial bourgeoisie.

The 1933 Constitution marks the beginnings of the implicit fascist character of the regime, for Martins, in that it was "thoroughly "anti-liberal, anti-parliamentary, anti-democratic". Although the Constitution allowed for an elected body, and a President of the Republic elected through direct suffrage, the power of the; in practice, appointed members of the Corporative Chamber steadily increased through the years until in 1959, when direct suffrage for the Presidency was abolished; the members were then made a substantial part of the electoral college that formally chose the President. Elections, anyway, were conditioned by franchise — literacy, sex, and property restrictions limiting the size of the electorate. The Head of State, the President, implicitly was deemed to be the place of a high-ranking officer of the armed forces, while effective power lay with the Prime Minister. Martins refers, like Figueredo, to the corporate character of the regime and its function to control the industrial working class.

With the political character of the regime defined by the Constitution the process of "fascistization" of the regime was put into progress as the organizational requisites of its existence were established. Martins notes that the institutionalization of the regime differed from "historic
fascist regimes" in that the leadership was not charismatic in the usual
sense (this is rather ambiguous), and in the lack of mobilization for
political support on a large scale. (We shall see later how this latter
factor which Martins does not develop becomes central to locating the
specificity of the Portuguese state.) Essentially the process of fas-
cistization consisted of the strengthening of the repressive apparatus
of the regime — much as described by Figuereido above. Martins emphasizes
that the process took place under the guidance of the "elite segments" —
in all their homogeneity, viz. in terms of education and occupation.

The economic policies of Salazar's regime are examined empirically —
it being noted that the legitimization base of the regime shifted in the
sixties from the ideological to the economic as political obligation was
made conditional on satisfactory economic growth. The colonial empire
occupied most importantly an ideological role, as opposed to Figuereido's
— and Salazar's — insistence on its economic role. Martins argues that
the empire became a generally accepted symbol to achieve status. Later
the advent of the colonial war was effective in providing the regime with
'the moral equivalent of full-scale ideological renewal and manifest
"refascistization"'.\(^5\) The regime is, finally, briefly situated in an
imperialist context: Martins suggests that Portuguese "fascism" can not
be regarded simply as a stage of industrialization, i.e. in terms of some
developmental model, but must be considered in relation to other deter-
minants such as the fast-rising influx of foreign capital during the 50s
and 60s.

Martins's characterization of "fascism" in Portugal is, like Figuereido's
and Kay's, largely descriptive. He, rightly in the view of the conclusions
that will be reached in this dissertation, emphasizes the ideological as-
psects of the Portuguese situation, but he doesn't explain them; he merely
situates them. Martins's analysis differs markedly from the former ones in
that his characterization is conceived through concepts like "elite", "legitimation", "status", etc. which belong to a theoretical problematic. However, its similarity with the others lies in its explanations which ultimately are founded on motivations of conduct of individual actors. It is with the concept of "elite", which forms the backbone of Martins's characterization of fascism, that this becomes most evident. The, in fact, "power" elite which makes up the Salazarist state is reducible to that state, and that state, therefore, is reducible to the interpersonal relations of the "elite". The state apparatus thus appears neutral and we are left with an "instrumentalist" conception of the state, that is the state is considered as a mere object or instrument capable of being manipulated by the elite of which it is the emanation. In addition, or rather, in consequence, we are back once again on the terrain of the state as a subject, not in essence the gigantic personality of Salazar, but rather an "elite".

Martins, in effect, takes the Portuguese state, fascist or not, as a given. In essence the political apparatus is reduced to the repressive apparatus and denied any autonomy from the individuals who compose it. What is its specificity? It can only have an historical specificity due to its instrumental nature. Theoretical specificity is problematic since political/ideological components are separate and autonomous from economic ones. Implicitly, ideas are "in the last instance" irreducible to social structure. Thus, indeed, it becomes difficult for Martins to distinguish analytically between the regimes of Hitler in Germany and Stalin in the Soviet Union.

To sum up, liberal analyses, historiographic or sociological, tend to reduce the complex contradictions which caused the emergence of fascism to relatively contradictions. Their characterizations are mostly descriptive and, as such, devoid of much theoretical interest.
CHAPTER III: "Economism" and Fascism

Curiously enough, Martins's political elite and its domination of the state apparatus can be interestingly compared with the orthodox position of communists on "state monopoly capitalism" where increasingly interpersonal relations between monopolies and members of state apparatuses result in the fusion of the state and monopolies into a single mechanism. The state, here also, becomes an instrument – the instrument of big capital. Whereas one might argue that Martins's position is "politician" in orientation, the "state monopoly capitalism thesis" has been characterized as "economist".¹ "Economism" results in the simplification of the analysis of the relationship between the state, as part of the superstructure, and its economic base. Such simplified analysis has been applied many times to fascism, particularly by Marxist writers during the late 1930s and 40s (e.g., the analyses of the Comintern²). There continue to be elements of this strong economist tendency in the analyses of most of the leading theoreticians of Europe's Communist Parties, for example in Santiago Carrillo's recent book Eurocommunism and the State and in Alvaro Cunhal's A Revolução Portuguesa: O Passado e o Futuro we find technicist readings of Marx and we find versions of the "state monopoly capitalism" thesis.³ With respect to the subject of fascism, a recent analysis of "fascism" in Portugal by Manuel Villaverde Cabral, although attempting to take in all the various complexities involved in emergence and characterization, ultimately reduces fascism to a relatively simple contradiction: i.e. that of monopoly capital's dominance over the rest of society. Thus, although in a sense the converse of Martins – where Martins grants the political/ideological autonomy, Cabral grants it none – Cabral tends to situate the distinctive "fascist" character of the Salazarist regime in its repressive nature, just as Martins does. This dissertation, on the contrary, will eventually try to argue that the most distinctive
aspect of fascism, once it has been situated in a certain form of state, is its character as a *mass regime*.

Within Cabral’s lengthy title one finds the words "On Fascism and its Coming to Portugal"⁴, so one would expect certain answers to the two questions relating to fascism’s emergence and its characterization. Cabral states at the beginning of his article that his aim is to provide, by way of some recently published books and articles on "fascism" in Portugal, a global interpretation of the origin of "fascism" in Portugal and an analysis of the roles played by different social classes in fascism. Working of course within a Marxist perspective, he begins by raising the question of the form of state that was present in Portugal from 28 May 1926. Could it have been something other than fascism, for example, some other form of "exceptional state" such as a military dictatorship? Cabral thinks not and proceeds to set out what he sees as the essential elements of "fascism" in Portugal. He thus looks for causes and effects, characterizing "fascism" in Portugal where it took root.

Cabral argues that it was the intensity of the economic-financial crisis during the latter years of the Republican period that permitted the emergence, and the force with which it emerged, of the "Salvation of the Country" ideology⁵ that accompanied the military coup of 1926 and the implantation of the Salazarist regime beginning in 1928 when Salazar accepted a post in the government as Finance Minister. This ideology entered a gap, a space, left vacant by the incapacity of the worker’s movement to produce a real alternative to the crumbling power structure of the bourgeoisie. Catholicism, from an ideological point of view, was the cohesive force of the political recomposition of the classes opposed to the working class, and its force came from the countryside. From the countryside, after the fall of "Sidonismo"⁶ and the final defeat of attempts to restore the Monarchy, the force that emerged was the "Catholic Center". In addition within Republican institutions
Salazar carried out his fight against those very institutions with the support of the ascending star of the church, Dr. Gonçalves Cerejeira. These two later participated in the setting up of the "União dos Interesses Económicos" (Union of Economic Interests) – an organization that claimed to be revolted by the "low" politics of Parliament and told workers that all the economic problems of the country were the responsibility of professional politicians.

The working class's incapacity to fill the gap was not only a result of the internal contradictions of the country but also due to the international conjuncture – one in which globally the worker's movement was exhausted as witnessed by the collapses in both Germany and Italy. Cabral admits that this argument needs to be analysed in much greater depth, but still feels that there is enough evidence to at least relate the collapses of the worker's movements in various countries at more or less the same time.

Cabral argues that much can be drawn from a comparison of the regimes of Mussolini and Salazar, as Kay did earlier. The revolutionary working class movement, for example, although not occupying factories in Portugal as it did in Italy, did paralyze the normal functioning, especially that not economic, of bourgeois society. The proof lies with the decapitalization carried out by different fractions of the bourgeoisie, and even the peasantry. Millions of escudos were sent abroad. The violent reaction of the state against the strikes and occupiers was not enough in itself to destroy the working class movement, argues Cabral (what did in fact destroy it is never explained). Fascism came to Portugal not in the form of a bloody violent reaction of a dispossessed bourgeoisie nor as a preventative counter-revolution, but rather as the occupation of a space left empty by a worker's offensive that could only paralyze the functioning of the state without effectively substituting it. It came to Italy in the same way; thus Cabral takes what he terms the "strong
empirical" position — as opposed to Poulantzas's scholastic theorization9— that Salazar's regime matched in so many respects Mussolini's that it merits the name "fascist". He goes on to draw a distinction between the "fascism" of Italy and Portugal and the "Nazism" of Germany: while the former rests on the temperance of corporativism, the latter rests on "total violence". This distinction is tied to the fact that Portugal and Italy occupied the same socio-economic conjuncture, Nazism coming some years later when the international capitalist crisis had reached its apogee.

Portuguese "fascism" arrived to save the bourgeoisie, or at least certain fractions of it. It was characterized by the hegemony of private big capital and the deliberate systematic repression of the working people, of the working class in particular. And contrary to Poulantzas, as we shall see later, Cabral (via the work of Emanuel Lucena 10) supports the thesis that the petty-bourgeoisie actually benefitted from fascism in the Portuguese case — in the sense that it was saved from a death that was threatened even before the 1929 crisis from the concerted pressures of both the working-class movement and big capital (which seems doubtful when one considers the small size of the working class at that time). In fact, states Cabral, the petty-bourgeoisie in union with the bourgeois elements of the "integralismo lusitano" movement essentially was fascism.11

As far as big capital was concerned, it is argued that in Portugal's case, monopoly capital — i.e. industrial capital — was hegemonic over banking capital in the combination of financial capital that resulted from the process of centralization and concentration of capital; the state emerged as a permanent subject of economic development, as a permanent organizer of capitalist accumulation, in spite of its relative dependence on foreign capital. "Fascism" embodied, in effect, the dictatorship of financial capital, monopoly capital being hegemonic — this "old thesis" of the Comintern, in Portugal's case due to the late and dependent
development of her industry and the consequent earlier link between big industrial capital and the apparatus of the state, and the earlier process of economic monopolization, meant the early "fascistization" of the state, and, of course, new currency for the thesis.

The large landowners, it is argued, supported wholeheartedly the position of the most extreme right of the epoch. With the advent of the civilian government in 1926, the leader of the main and most traditional landowner's association was appointed as Minister of Agriculture. The regime was quick to respond to the interests of the landowners: agrarian reform was put off for more than 50 years; the worker's union movement of the Alentejo was smashed; good prices were guaranteed for wheat; etc. On the political/ideological plane the agrarian fraction of the big bourgeoisie played a decisive role in the unchaining of the fascistization process. This was followed by the unification of the landowners and the monopoly bourgeoisie in their search for extra-parliamentary solutions for the monopolistic expansion of the state. Once again, in this unity, despite the backwardness of the Portuguese industrialization process, Cabral maintains that the monopoly capital fraction was hegemonic. He gives as an example of this hegemony the "Wheat Campaign" of 1934, which in spite of its apparent protection of Portuguese agriculturalists, filled the pockets of one of Portugal's biggest monopolies (C.U.F.).

The Constitution of 1933, said to be in effect a contradiction due to its manifestation of temperance in the juridical sphere, clashing thus with the dictatorial nature of the regime, is explained as a political/ideological "compromise". A compromise effected between the National and Comprador fractions of the bourgeoisie. While the advent of "fascism" in Portugal represented a political recomposition of the bourgeoisie favourable to the National fraction, the interests of the Comprador fraction were so considerable and extensive in terms of the organic
structure of capitalism in Portugal that concessions had to be made to it. Vital to Portugal's economy were mercantile interests inherited, in fact, through the colonial empire (in this sense it is argued that Portuguese "fascism" was imperative from birth; it had no mission to conquer, only defend, conserve, the inherited empire—therefore Salazar took all care not to present any major new power with any excuse for a warlike activity against Portugal; thus he demarcated himself clearly from the territorial expansionism of Germany and Italy)—all the big and small commerce of import-export, navigation, banking, insurance, etc. And this inheritance was dependent on the power of Great Britain. The "imperialist anti-imperialism" of Mussolini had to be moderated in Portugal's case; Great Britain could not be offended. This "compromise" was operationalized through the Constitution of 1933.

Mussolini, as well, made compromises, particularly when the National Fascist Party took power, according to Cabral. Both regimes, Mussolini's and Salazar's, were characterized by a similar corporativism (as we have seen Kay, for one, would strongly object to this) and by a similar political economy; in the case of the latter—identical orthodox deflationary financial policies and identical state intervention to limit competition; measures destined to soften the impact of the world economic crisis not just at the level of production but also at the level of employment (emigration reduced the number of unemployed and guaranteed the inflow of foreign exchange). The major programmes of both regimes, between the years 1926–36 (Cabral admits that in the initial and later stages of "fascism", Portugal and Italy differed profoundly), could be described as programmes of 'stagnation designed to secure social and political peace'.

Finally, Cabral tackles, very unsatisfactorily, the elements relating fascism to its political party and to its popular impact. He remarks, tellingly, that certain theorists, like Poulantzas, would want to ask not
only 'was there a fascist party in Portugal?', but also, 'is it legitimate to talk of fascism without a party?'. The "União National" (National Union), the only political party permitted by the Salazarist regime certainly had neither the origins nor the militancy of the Italian Fascist Party. However, it did embody a similar ideology expressed through a charismatic leader. Another possibility to be considered, suggests Cabral, is that the role of the Party was carried out by the armed forces, "substituting" in some sense for the Party. We shall return to this theme later.

As for the popular impact of "fascism" in Portugal, the divergence from the Italian model becomes blatant. There was very little popular involvement in the emergence of the Salazarist regime in Portugal - "fascistization" was promoted from top to bottom, i.e. from the state and under the direct command of the military. It is true that the masses were largely disaffected from the parliamentary apparatus but this was not promoted through the organizations of those masses. This has crucial political and ideological effects. As we shall see in the next section of this paper these effects play a major role in determining the degree of autonomy the state maintains from the economically dominant classes or fractions of classes. They also will influence greatly the importance of the Ideological State Apparatuses.

Cabral terminates his article defending his characterization of the regime, from the time of the military coup of 26 May 1926 to the beginnings of the 2nd World War, as fascist. He believes that the rapid political eclipse of the army through its bungling of financial affairs, and the quick unification of forces allied in power in one party under the tutelage of the Minister of Finances (Salazar) confirm the thesis that Portugal was close to the Italian model and far from the military dictatorship one. However, the so-called "Historic Compromise", a result of Portugal's colonial heritage, and the end of the world economic crisis just before the 2nd World War, which allowed a certain expansion to take
place, enabled the "Estado Novo" to abandon "fascism", 'if not in its matrix at least in terms of its dynamic'. Unfortunately, this is left unexplained.

One is immediately struck by the absence of any theorization of the state in Cabral's analysis. This is particularly striking in light of the fact that he begins his article with the provocative question about the nature of the Portuguese state: i.e. "fascist" or "military dictatorship"? It is never suggested how we might differentiate the two. Rather we are given a number of elements that in themselves "prove" that the Portuguese state, during 'x' years, was "fascist" because of its similarity with the Italian state (which we already "know" was "fascist" - as others have shown). In effect, then, Cabral takes the fascist form of state as given, adopting as his major task the spelling out of its historical specificity in Portugal - the end result is thus given at the beginning. As a result, although he confronts the problem of the emergence of "fascism" in Portugal, the dynamic of the emergence - the "crisis" - is not explicated, nor theorized, but rather reduced to a simple economic contradiction. Hence, the ideology that fills the gap left by the failure of the working-class movement is not analysed but rather simply accounted for in an "enumeration of themes". Thus, the absence of a fascist party and the absence of popular impact become secondary in importance to the mere presence of a "reactionary ideology" in the social formation. Cabral can go on to suggest, and does, reasons that might account for the lack of a party and popular impact, for example he shows how the possibility of a fascist party lost its space by the precocious implantation of the Republic and by the contamination, ab initio, of the dictatorial reaction of the monarchic element, on the one hand, and of the catholic element on the other; and he argues that the rise and failure of the reactionary dictatorship of Sidónio Pais in 1919, at one time both nationalist and populist, and the defeat of the monarchic restoration
leading to a political recomposition of powerful classes from the top, might explain the lack of popular impact (i.e. the impact was pre-empted), but he fails to theorize the effects of these factors in terms of a "crisis" that would explain their specific effects on the form of state. He totally ignores, therefore, the major theoretical problem of class interests and their political representation. The consequence of this is, of course, that the relative autonomy of the state is obliterated. In spite of the complexity of the analysis, in terms of historical data, the state is presented as a direct expression of monopoly capital. This is very problematic, not only because of the collapse of the state to a fraction of interests, but also because of the concrete difficulties in determining the dominant mode of production in Portugal in the 1920s and 30s (how dominant the dominant mode was, etc.).

There is, in addition, the related problem in Cabral's analysis of the identification of the state and inter-personal relations. As we have seen, the state in his analysis tends to become an economic subject, composed solely of the members of the classes, or factions of classes, that make it up; it thus ceases to be a relation with political, ideological and economic conditions of existence. The Portuguese state becomes, in essence, "fascist" by way of the 'petty bourgeoisie and certain bourgeois elements of the "integralismo lusitano" movement' that make it up.

They are fascism. The inclusion of the petty-bourgeoisie contradicts, in fact, the fusion of the state with monopoly capital; Cabral recognizes this and tries, in the article, to resolve the problem through stressing the importance of the "hierarchization" of political and economic powers.

In summary, Cabral, although obviously aware of the "pertinent effects" of the political and the ideological in the determination of the form of the state, explains them away in order to account for the historical specificity of a state that he has apparently pre-judged fascist.
1) a. by, for example, Poulantzas, 1976.
b. *Economism* has been defined as 'giving priority to the "productive forces" at the expense of the "relations of production", accompanied by an economicistic-technologistic conception of the production process'. Poulantzas, 1974, pp. 39-40. Kilibard argues the term 'has been made to cover a multitude of sins', but argues basically that it implies an exaggerated importance to the economic sphere in the shaping of social and political relations - leading to "economic determinism". 1977, p. 9.

2) Laclau suggests that this may have been due to the policy of the Popular fronts initiated in 1935 that led to the incorporation of broader and broader sectors of the bourgeoisie in the anti-fascist struggle. The result was that fascism was presented as the political expression solely of the monopoly capital franchise of the bourgeoisie. 1977, ch. 3.

3) Both Carrillo and Cunhal give primacy to productive forces. Carrillo, 1977; Cunhal, 1976.


6) Major Sidónio Pais gained power through the coup of December 1977; he was assassinated 1 year and 9 days later.

7) In 1921 Salazar was one of three Catholic Deputies elected to Parliament. Cabral, 1976, pp. 207-209.

8) *Ibid*.


10) Cabral's article reviews some of Lucena's recent work.


12) Alentejo is the large southern province of Portugal where many large landowners held sway. At present it is the main focal point of the
"Reforma Agraria" (Agrarian Reform).

13) The "National bourgeoisie" is defined as 'that fraction of indigenous bourgeoisie which, on the basis of a certain type and degree of contradiction with foreign imperialist capital, occupies a relatively autonomous place in the ideological and political structure, and exhibits in this way a characteristic unity'; the "Comprador bourgeoisie" as 'that fraction without its own base for capitalist accumulation, which acts in some way or other as a simple intermediary of foreign imperialism and which is thus truly subordinated - economically, politically, and ideologically - to foreign capital'. Poulantzas, 1975.


15) Ibid., p. 897.

16) An important contribution to a clarification of this problem is made by Laclau with his distinction between modes of production and economic systems. 1977, ch. 1. Foster-Carter also sheds light on the "Modes of Production Debate" in NLR 107. These issues will be discussed further in chapter VI of this dissertation.

CHAPTER IV: The Theoretical Specificity of Fascism

Nicos Poulantzas in *Fascism and Dictators* produces a powerful and persuasive critique of economism. He locates economism at the root of the errors and deviations which led to the crisis of the worker's movement in Germany and Italy in the 1920s and 30s; his critique of it attempts to explain the incapacity of the worker's movement to solve "the crisis of the power bloc"—one of the central elements in the emergence of fascism. He thus attempts an explanation which escapes Manuel Cabral. Poulantzas's account presents fascism as the result of a very complex over-determination of contradictions. It contains numerous theoretical insights, the weight of the analysis being directed towards the theorization of political crisis and the "exceptional state". Poulantzas wants to specify fascism as one type of regime among others of the "exceptional capitalist state." The focus on fascism as a political phenomenon is carried out through the analysis of concrete situations (in Germany and Italy).

It is because Poulantzas attempts to theorize the "exceptional state" and its emergent political crisis that his analysis is vital to specifying the Portuguese state. Up to this point we have seen three different types of analysis that have one major interest in common: specifying the Portuguese state during a certain period historically, that is, according to its particular, specific history; in the case of Cabral, a Marxist theoretical framework is subordinated to the connotative articulations of a particular political discourse. Poulantzas, however, wants to specify the fascist state theoretically, that is, he wants to find the paradigmatic whole, the inter-relation of concepts, that expresses it. To do this he must periodize the capitalist formations within which occur the political crises from which fascism emerges, and the form of state that resolves the crisis. The kinds of political crisis producing any given form of exceptional regime will have features
which vary according to the period in which it arises, thus: 'Nineteenth-century differs from twentieth-century Bonapartism, and the same is true of military dictatorship and fascism'.

Fascism belongs to the imperialist stage of capitalism. Imperialism represents monopoly concentration, the fusion of banking and industrial capital into financial capital and it means export of capital and the search for colonies. It is not simply, or solely, an economic phenomena but a new articulation of the capitalist system producing major changes in politics and ideology. The "interventionist state" is the outcome of this new articulation - an intervention that is doubled in fascism because the role of the state in the imperialist stage is joined with the specific role of the state in a transitional phase between stages. In fascism the state plays a decisive role in the transition between two stages in a single mode of production - in the transition to the establishment of monopoly capitalism. There are profound changes in ideology in the imperialist stage leading to the formation of an imperialist ideology of which fascit ideology is a variant. Imperialism at the international level results in the imperialist "chain" and the uneven development of its links; development that is determined by political, ideological, and economic factors. The concrete form and degree of strength of politics within each national formation depends on its "historical" position as a link in the chain. Whereas revolution occurred in the weakest link in the chain (a weakness determined not by a chronological evolution of economic advance or backwardness but by an accumulation of political/ideological/economic contradictions: 'The imperialist chain itself determines the homology of effects - i.e. weakness of links - which in each case has different causes'), that is, in Russia, fascism occurred in the two links, Germany and Italy.

Because incorporates political and ideological elements in the characterization of the process of development, Poulantzas concludes
that 'fascism can only be explained by reference to the concrete situ-
tion of class struggle, as it cannot be reduced to any inevitable need
of the "economic" development of capitalism'. The mistake of the Third
International and the Comintern, which was a result of its economism,
was to underestimate, theoretically and politically, the role of the class
struggle in the speed and direction of the development of imperialism.
Thus, for the Comintern fascism emerged as a result of either the back-
wardness or advancement of the economic sector of a society - class strug-
gle is reduced, consequently, to a mechanical economic process that is
attributed primacy in historical development.

To situate fascism in a certain stage of capitalist development is
not enough to explain it, argues Poulantzas; the "interventionist state"
does not necessarily take the form of fascism. Fascism is a form of
state and of regime at the extreme "limit" of the capitalist state - it
therefore corresponds to a specific conjuncture of class struggle, that
is, to a specific political crisis. There are two problems in conceptu-
alizing this crisis: 1) that of grasping "crisis" as a general concept
which will allow the determination of the special peculiarities of the
exceptional state, and, 2) that of determining the different and parti-
cular variants of crisis each leading to specific forms of the exception-
al regime (Bonapartism, Military Dictatorship, and Fascism). Poulantzas
seeks help from past theorists in confronting these problems. Thalheimer
and Gramsci, for example, argued for a "relative autonomy" of the state
from the dominant classes which they saw arising when the two main class
forces were "in equilibrium". For Thalheimer fascism is essentially a
particular form of Bonapartism where the dominant classes sacrifice po-
itical domination for the benefits of a "master/saviour" to maintain
their "socio-economic" dominance. Gramsci, however, defines a specific
case of political crisis, that of the crisis of hegemony, within the
more general framework of political crisis. "Catastrophic" political
crisis of this kind leads to the phenomenon of "Caesarism" - fascism is a case of "Caesarism", while Bonapartism, at most, is only a special case of it. The essential feature of both Thalheim and Gramsci's analyses is their formulation of the thesis of fascism as a specific form of relative autonomy of the state from the dominant classes.

Trotsky, argues Foulantzas, is careful to distinguish between Bonapartism, based on the equilibrium between two forces, and fascism. He identifies two main characteristics of the political crisis: 1) there is a "civil war" by the bourgeoisie against the "insurgent" working class which produces a revolutionary counter-offensive, and, 2) the bourgeoisie in decline obtains the support of the petty-bourgeoisie. Neither of these characteristics, however, leave room for any autonomy on the part of the state and in fact neglect the specific political crisis which characterizes fascism.

From the above analyses Foulantzas sets up an analytical framework for investigating fascism. He hopes to justify two major theses: 1) fascism does not correspond to the kinds of political crisis of "equilibrium" (characteristic of Bonapartism) - they are therefore not characteristic of general political crisis, and, 2) the essence of a political crisis that leads to the emergence of an exceptional form of state lies in the particular characteristics of "the field of class struggle - the field of "social relations"." The political crisis is associated with profound fissures in the state apparatus. This results from the class struggle. Therefore Foulantzas's starting point for characterizing the political crisis of fascism is the explication of the features of class struggle. Having analysed the field of class struggle, and therefore the political crisis causing the emergence of fascism, he then examines the institutional forms taken by that state.

Fascism, it is argued, is a very complex phenomenon that can only be explained by elucidating its correspondence to the deepening and
sharpening of internal contradictions between dominant classes and class fractions. This "deepening" and "sharpening" is characteristically revealed in fascism by an extension of the contradictions of the power bloc over the political and ideological planes resulting in a) a deep crisis of party representation, and b) a deep ideological crisis. In effect, the class struggle is politicized by the power bloc. There is a "crisis of hegemony" - no dominant class or class fraction seems able to impose its "leadership" over the other classes and fractions of the power bloc, either through its own methods or through the "parliamentary-democratic" state - both within the power bloc and in relation to the social formation as a whole. Fascism corresponds therefore to a complete and specific reorganization of the power bloc. This involves a) changes in alliance and weight of forces, and b) establishment of a new hegemonic class fraction by fascism: finance capital, or big monopoly capital. This reorganization takes place through a political crisis that involves a split in the relations both of representation and of organization: there is a crisis of party representation. It is significant, says Poulantzas, that the political parties of the bourgeoisie and its allies never adopted fascism completely and even tried at times to oppose its rise to power. They were not followed in this by the classes they were supposed to represent. The political disorientation of the power bloc, rather than bourgeois support, made it possible for fascism with the open support of the monopoly capital fraction to fill the void left by the breaking of representational ties of the classical political parties. 'The bourgeoisie stood by and watched the elimination of these parties by the fascist party'.6 The bourgeois parties were, however, radicalized by the growth of fascism towards a form of exceptional state - they would have liked a solution, argues Poulantzas, where they could have maintained their political leadership, for example a military dictatorship.
The breaking of the representational ties has two effects: 1) there is a duplication of the parties by a whole series of hidden parallel networks of communication — pressure groups, private militias, para-state networks, and 2) a growth in the role of the state apparatus itself (i.e. army, police, courts, administration), short-circuiting to some extent the role of formal government, reversing established juridical order, displacing real power from Parliament to the state machinery proper.

The reorganization of the power bloc is also effected during a crisis of the dominant ideology in the social formation. The "cement" of the social formation is attacked by the masses, the very element it is designed to keep in check. This crisis affects not only the dominated classes (and the crisis is general in the sense that even the ideologies of the dominated classes themselves — e.g. Marxist-Leninist ideology — are in crisis) but also the relation of the bourgeoisie and its allies to its own ideology. The effects of this crisis are a break between the political representation of the bourgeoisie (parties and politicians) and its ideological representatives ("watchdogs" and "ideological spokesmen") such that the latter begin to use fascist ideology against their former bosses.

During the rise of fascism the bourgeoisie steadily takes the offensive, argues Poulantzas. Its political crisis does not correspond to a weakness, at least not in the sense that the working class has strength in relation to it. In the end the political crisis becomes an offensive strategy.

Poulantzas identifies three main "misconceptions" of the relationship between the dominant classes and class frations and fascism: a) the "instrumentalist" view which views fascism as the dictatorship of monopoly capital — this view allows no autonomy to the state at all; b) the Thalheimer "equilibrium between equals" view — a view which gives
autonomy to the fascist state in such a quantity that the relations between big capital and fascism can't be defined (a result of the neglect of the primary difference between Bonapartism and fascism, namely the existence of the fascist party and its objective role in relation to big capital); and c) the social democratic view which sees fascism as the dictatorship of the petty-bourgeoisie and attempts to establish the autonomy of the fascist state like b) above, i.e. by granting autonomy to the political sphere.

His own position is that the "relative autonomy" of fascism (both the party and the state) from the power bloc and the hegemonic fractions of big monopoly capital stems from two sets of factors: 1) the internal contradictions among classes and fractions of classes within the power alliance - i.e. from its internal political crisis, and 2) the contradictions between the dominant classes and fractions and the dominated classes, i.e. from the political crisis of the ensemble of the social formation, and from the complex relation between fascist and the dominated classes.

With regard to the relationship between fascism and the working class, 'the beginning of the rise of fascism presupposes a significant series of working-class defeats'. In spite of them, though the working class is seen to have achieved real political and economic gains against the bourgeoisie in the period preceding the growth of fascism. As the struggle of the bourgeoisie against the working class assumes an increasingly political character, the economic struggle progressively assumes the dominant role in the struggle of the working class (no longer are struggles directed towards "direct action" - mass demos, factory occupations, etc. - but rather towards the wage struggle).

Additionally, the rise of fascism corresponds to an ideological crisis, as already mentioned above, for the working class, and a crisis for its revolutionary organizations. Bourgeois ideology (trade unionism and
reformism) and petty-bourgeois ideology (anarchism, spontaneism, and "putchist jaquerie") invade the void left by the retreat of Marxist-Leninist ideology.

Fascism in power is characterized by organized physical repression and ideological mobilization. This latter characteristic operates through the "anti-capitalism" of petty-bourgeois fascist ideology. It becomes particularly effective when authentically proletarian themes are taken up — e.g., rationalization. During the rise of fascism the working-class side of fascist ideology is strong; later it declines giving over to the petty-bourgeois "corporatist" ideology. The "corporatist" ideology presents several aspects: a) authentic residues of feudal ideology; b) "illusions" aroused by the conditions of life of small producers in the manufacturing period ("nostalgia for a mythical past in the face of the threat of proletarianization"); c) reformist, class-collaborationist policies; d) the "illusion" of the factory as the seed-off economic unit (appeal to syndicalism). This ideology, in fact, never gained a mass base inside the working class in Germany and Italy, argues Poulantzas, but it did obtain a foothold.

The petty-bourgeoisie have a major part in the rise to power of fascism. The class nature of the petty-bourgeoisie cannot be determined from economic relations of production alone — it must be located with the aid of political and ideological relations. This is because the two ensembles of petty-bourgeois agents, the traditional small-scale, in terms of production and ownership, ensemble, and the new, non-productive, salaried employee ensemble have economic positions which, although different, have the same effects at the political/ideological levels. Poulantzas maintains that petty-bourgeois ideological discourse can only be that of one of the two basic classes in society: the bourgeoisie or the proletariat. However, there exist sub-ensembles of petty-bourgeois ideologies that are formed by the influence of dominant
bourgeois ideology. They are also composed of elements of the petty-bourgeoisie's own ideology and some borrowed from the working class. Because of the ideological effects of its class position - i.e. caught between the bourgeoisie wanting to crush it and the proletariat which attacks its attachment to small property - the main elements of its ideology are: a) status quo anti-capitalism ("equality of opportunity", "fair competition"); b) the myth of the "ladder" (aspirations to social mobility); c) "power fetishism" - i.e. fetishism of the neutrality of the state ("statolatry"). The political effects of the class nature of the petty-bourgeoisie are such that it finds it difficult to organize politically into a specific party of its own; it therefore often organizes through other apparatuses of the state which it may see as its own political representative. In addition, its political nature - that of both the new and traditional - is very unstable.

Consequently, 'the petty-bourgeoisie literally feeds on the ideology that cements it'.

Ideology has a unifying function because the petty-bourgeoisie is particularly prone to the "illusion" of its economic position. Therefore, Poulantzas argues, one can understand why it supported fascism en masse to the end, even though 'fascism bled it white' (by indirectly using it to accelerate the concentration of capital).

Finally, the rise of fascism corresponds to an acute ideological crisis of the petty-bourgeoisie - as it does for all classes - as part of the generalized ideological crisis of the social formation. The elements of petty-bourgeois ideology become dissociated from bourgeois discourse - the "anti-capitalist" aspect becoming most important, because of its implicit opposition to bourgeois ideology. More and more ideological elements are taken from working-class ideology. Thus, 'the petty-bourgeois ideological sub-ensemble, modified in this way, "replaces" the dominant bourgeois ideology, thereby cementing back together the
social formation in question. Bourgeois ideology, of course, continues to be present, but in indirect or disguised form. This is the specific characteristic of "fascist ideology": the indirect domination of imperialist ideology, via the direct dominance of petty-bourgeois ideology.

Fascist ideology is therefore 'an amalgam of contradictory elements'. Imperialist ideology is in harmony with the actual class position of the now fraction of the bourgeoisie (the technocratic aspect of the ideology), but there are big tensions with the large remnants of feudal ideology, represented by large landowners. Some of the points of collusion between the ideologies are listed by Poulantzas: "statolatry" (cult of the neutral state), anti-juridical aspect (cult of the leader), elitist aspect, anti-Semitism, nationalism, militarism, anti-clericalism, important role of the family, role given to education (regimentation), obscurantism and "anti-intellectualism", corporatism.

To sum up, Poulantzas's analysis of fascism attempts to 1) characterize the exceptional state, and 2) to characterize fascism as a special form of the exceptional state. In terms of 1) it is characterized by its capitalist nature, the fact that it is an "interventionist" state, and the particularly significant fact that its "relative autonomy" results from the political crisis that brings it into being. It leads to a modification in the relationship between the Repressive State Apparatus and the Ideological State Apparatuses such that there is a limitation or suppression of the relative autonomy of the latter (stemming from the reorganization of the power bloc, and the ideological crisis which accompanies the political crisis - this will be looked at in more detail later). Thus a paradoxical feature of the exceptional state is that it is characterized by both an increased autonomy from the hegemonic class or class fraction, and by a limitation of the relative
autonomy of the ISAs.\textsuperscript{12}

In terms of 2) above, the specificity of the fascist form of the exceptional state is as follows: fascism is characterized by a) the permanent mobilization of the masses and by a particular kind of mass party within the ISAs, b) the fact that it is originally and essentially "exogenous" to the RSA (the RSA is "invaded" from the outside) – in the first period of fascist rule the fascist party dominates the branches of the RSA (army, police, judiciary), and in the second period of fascist stabilization the state apparatuses, suitably transformed, dominate the fascist party (there never is any fusion between them), c) the reorganization of the state apparatus so that the political police branch comes to dominate, d) a hierarchy within the state apparatus: police, administration, army, e) the reorganization of the relation between the ISAs, one from another, and all from the RSA – their relative autonomy is undermined vis-à-vis the RSA (Party, Family and Propaganda is the trinity dominating the ISAs)\textsuperscript{13}, f) a coming to power in a perfectly constitutional manner in collusion with the state apparatus and with a dislocation between formal power and real power in the state throughout the rise of fascism (i.e. a dislocation between the political force and the hegemonic force).

A final word on Poulantzas's contribution is the point that he makes that crises and exceptional regimes often appear in reality in combined forms. They have features of various forms but are dominated by a single form. He gives as an example the concrete case of Spain, where a concrete form brings fascism and military dictatorship, the latter being dominant, into being. Thus "articulation\textsuperscript{14}" is possible not only at the level of modes of production, but also at the level of the form of the state. This obviously will be of interest later in the dissertation.
Certainly Poulantzas has completed the task he set himself in terms of a critique of economism as a reduction of fascism to a simple contradiction. He has introduced a wealth of theoretical determinations that explain fascism as a complex over-determination of contradictions. The roles of political and ideological factors are emphasized to the point that they play the central role in the emergence of fascism. In addition Poulantzas has given a specificity of a theoretical kind to fascism. It can be specified both as an exceptional form of the capitalist state and as a specific form of exceptional state. Nevertheless, there is a certain "formalism" about Poulantzas's work (Cabral, as we have seen, identifies it as "scholastic theorization" which he struggles against by trying to fill out what he takes to be Poulantzas's "ideal-type" model with specifically Portuguese data; this only leads him, as we have also seen, to a reduction of many contradictions to a main one, because he fails to construct concepts that will allow him to introduce history into his analysis). It is a formalism that makes his work unsatisfactory. It indeed makes it impossible for Poulantzas to provide an answer to the first of the two questions consistently posed throughout this dissertation, namely, how does one explain the emergence of fascism.

Poulantzas can't provide an answer to the question because his analysis in all its complexity operates only at a descriptive level when it confronts process, that is when it attempts to explain change. As a result, he is left simply putting together constitutive elements, thus only describing the overdetermination of contradictions which results in a crisis. Laclau has identified the reason for this in Poulantzas's reduction of all superstructural phenomena to "class determination". This, it is argued, leads Poulantzas to a limited and ambiguous conception of ideology.

Essentially, Poulantzas's "class reductionism" is characterized by his breaking ideology into its constitutive elements according to their
class belonging. Social classes have "pure", "necessary", or "paradigmatic" ideologies. Thus, for example, Marxist-Leninist ideology is the ideology of the working class, Liberalism is bourgeois ideology of the competitive stage of capitalism, etc. All ideological content has a class connotation and any contradiction can be reduced to a class contradiction. Why is this? Because the central relation between ideologies and class struggle is seen to be located at the level of the mode of production. The antagonistic production relation is constituted through the extraction of surplus value, therefore, 1) classes only exist in struggle, and 2) the level of analysis which can make this relation intelligible is the mode of production.

In fact, all superstructural forms express class relations according to Poulantzas. For example, in discussing political apparatuses Poulantzas says that they are 'never anything other than the materialization and condensation of class relations'. Thus the state is not an "entity" with some intrinsic instrumental essence, but rather is itself a relation, or 'more precisely the condensation of a relation'.

Poulantzas's critique of economism inevitably suffers from his class reductionism. By stressing the importance and specificity of the superstructure yet assigning its forms a class belonging, he can't explain the origins of economism. And, specifically, he cannot explain why economism was a basic ideological component of the worker's movement in the period of the emergence of fascism. He tries, as we have seen, to overcome this difficulty by adding political and ideological criteria into the determination of classes. This, however, gets him into all sorts of trouble particularly when he tries to determine the nature of that vital group, the petty-bourgeoisie. He argues the two fractions of the petty-bourgeoisie, which he calls "traditional" and "new", occupy clearly different places in the production process, but act in a relatively unified manner; from a political and ideological
point of view, therefore, they are a separate class. This, of course, goes against the Marxist view that economic relations are the basic criteria for the determination of classes. As Laclau says, Poulantzas seems to go 'from saying that economic relations cannot be the only criteria to excluding them totally.' 19

To combat economism by calling for more weight to be given to political and ideological criteria is obviously not enough. It is necessary to go further, to deepen the analysis at the political and ideological levels. This means locating the relation between ideologies and the class struggle not only at the level of the mode of production but also at the level of relations of domination, that is by locating antagonisms not only at the economic level but at the political and ideological levels as well. In the context of fascism this means situating the root and origin of the crisis that leads to its emergence.
Notes

2) Ibid., p. 16.
3) Ibid., p. 27.
4) Ibid., p. 34.
5) Poulantzas makes a distinction between "relations of production" and "social relations of production" (i.e. class struggle) in Political Power and Social Classes, 1973. Classes do not exist inside the structure of the social formation; they are the "global effect" of the structures of social relations. Cutler, et al., 1977, critique this as an "intersubjective" field of relations.
6) op. cit., p. 74.
7) Ibid., p. 159.
8) Ibid., p. 166.
9) Ibid., p. 246.
10) Ibid., p. 249.
11) Ibid., p. 251.
13) Marx wrote on the phenomenon of Bonapartism: 'the greater the relative autonomy of the state from the hegemonic class or class fraction, the stronger is its internal "centralization".' Quoted in Poulantzas, 1974, p. 316.
14) Referred to as an 'anatomical metaphor to indicate relations of linkage and effectivity between different levels of all sorts of things', in Foster-Carter, 1978, p. 54. Foster-Carter discusses the various aspects of "articulation", and critiques of it. NLR 107.
15) As termed by Laclau (Economy and Society, 1975), meaning that the elements of analysis are established in a descriptive way so that
CHAPTER V: Historical Specificity Through "Popular Democratic Struggle"

A. The Problem of the Synchronic/Diachronic.

Before expanding and extending the critique of Poulantzas it seems appropriate at this point in the paper to make a few comments about a central problem running through it: how to combine a structural and a developmental analysis. Perry Anderson, in a footnote to his article entitled "Portugal and the End of Ultra-Colonialism", writes:

'Any study of imperialism faces one of the key dilemmas of the social sciences: how can a diachronic and a synchronic perspective be combined? The reconciliation of history and sociology is easy enough in principle, but extremely hard in practice. It will be remembered that de Saussure defined a diachronic order as one in which each "moment" can only be understood in terms of all those which have preceded it; thus in a bridge game, the meaning of any trick depends on all the tricks before it and cannot be understood without knowledge of them. In contrast, a synchronic order is one in which the meaning of every moment is visible in the present: it is co-extensive with the relationship of all the existing data to each other. Thus, at any one move, a game of chess is always comprehensible without any knowledge of the previous moves. It is clear that any society has both these dimensions: it is at once a structure which can only be understood in terms of the interrelationship of its parts, and a process which can only be understood in terms of the cumulative weight of its past. The difficulty is to synthesize the two aspects in any actual study.'

This comment nicely summarizes the problem. In this paper it has been posed, of course, in terms of the attempt to specify historically and theoretically the nature of the Portuguese state during a certain period of its history. Anderson finds an answer to one of the "key dilemmas of social science", somewhat naively it would now seem in light of current, and past, debates, in Marxism. Already we have seen in this dissertation the great difficulty that two Marxists, Cabral and Poulantzas, have had in finding that synthesis which Anderson so readily locates.

Part of the problem, certainly, centers around different conceptions of history. For example, in Figueiredo's and in Martins's analyses, and in Cabral's, we have seen history proceeding in a teleological
fashion, as Althusser puts it: 'merely reflecting the essence of the social totality of which it is the existence', whether that essence be psychological as for Piguera, ideological as in the case of Martins, or economic as in the case of Cabral. Society is here an historical result; a result inseparable from its genesis.

Opposed to this view of history was Durkheim's, which was basically genetic in character, as it seems was Freud's. Durkheim argued that the higher the social scale the less important the characteristics developed by a people, as compared to its borrowed cultural traits. The sociologist must go back to see what the past has bequeathed society — but this study must be comparative, and thus able to detach the forms that a social phenomenon takes from the chronological series to which it belongs. In this way the phenomenon can be studied in its relation to other social phenomena and hence not be reduced to psychological or economic factors.

Marx, most writers argue, managed to combine developmental and structural views of history, but there is much debate over the "dialectics" which made this possible, and over which of his works contain the real Marxist method. Certainly in some of his more important works primacy is attributed to the contemporary structure - the "body" - of society, thus making it possible for him to state: 'Human anatomy contains a key to the anatomy of the ape'.

In the analyses of the two Marxists looked at so far in this dissertation, we find that Cabral subordinates the "synchronic" side of his analysis, the analytical conceptual structure, to the "diachronic" aspects which manifest themselves as the unfolding of an economic essence; while Poulantas, on the contrary, maintains an overwhelmingly synchronic-type analysis where societies are taken as results and analysed in terms of their contemporary structures — any historical material that appears is, in his words, "illustrative in nature". From here let's move on to
the recent contribution made by Ernesto Laclau that attempts to take into account process, change, without losing itself in a kind of "self-fulfilling diachronic prophecy". Laclau starts with a critique of Poulantzas.

B. The Function, and Importance, of Ideology.

The crux of Laclau's critique of Poulantzas is located in the historical process of the "purification" of concepts which, argues Laclau, culminated in the illusion that 'beyond common sense discourse, concepts separated from any connotative articulation could, by a simple exposition of their logical qualities, reconstruct reality as a whole'.

Poulantzas's class reductionism, cited above, which results from a postulation of paradigmatic relations designed to escape the effects of ideological discourse has lead to a hierarchical system in which all contradictions can be directly or indirectly reduced to a class contradiction. Consequently, theoretical practice becomes redundant; it has no need to correct the connotative articulations of political discourse for they all express the unfolding essence of the class subject.

Laclau poses the question: 'What happens, on the other hand, if we accept a scientific approach and keep as the essential task of theoretical practice the "purification" of concepts - that is to say the elimination of any connotative articulations - whilst asserting the impossibility of rearticulating into necessary paradigmatic wholes?'

Three things occur: 1) not every concept has a necessary relation with others; 2) it is not possible to establish necessary relations between different conceptual structures but only the conditions of possibility of their articulation; and 3) any approximation to the concrete presupposes increasingly complex conceptual articulations and not the mere exposition of the logical properties of a simple conceptual whole. Therefore the more concrete is the analysis, the more theoretical determinations that
must be included in it.

Fascism, Poulantzas has said, emerges from a crisis. A crisis occurs when, in Althusserian terminology, all component elements and conditions fuse, as a whole, into a ruptural unity. The concept Althusser uses to express this event is "condensation", a concept borrowed from psychoanalysis. It implies that the analysis of any crisis has twin objectives: 1) an analysis of the constituent elements in the condensation; and 2) analysis of the process of condensation itself. As we have seen, Poulantzas's analysis fulfills objective 1) but not objective 2).

As stated above, for Poulantzas social classes have "pure", "necessary", or "paradigmatic" ideologies. Laclau states unequivocally that that attachment of elements of concrete ideologies to classes is purely arbitrary. It fails to construct its object and it presupposes empirical knowledge of it. Rather than positing the class belonging of ideologies through the overdetermination of contradictions, Laclau suggests we should accept that ideological "elements" taken in isolation have no necessary class connotation, that the connotation that exists is a result of the articulation of those elements in a concrete discourse. Thus, the precondition for analysing the class nature of an ideology is the conducting of an inquiry through 'that which constitutes the distinctive unity of an ideological discourse'. We must ask then, what comprises the unity of an ideological discourse, and secondly, what is the process of transformation of ideologies?

The function of ideology, says Laclau somewhat perilously, is to constitute individuals as subjects. This function he takes, of course, from Althusser who terms the process interpellation. Precisely, interpellation is the mechanism by which individuals live the relation with their real conditions of existence as if they themselves were the autonomous principle of determination of that relation. It is the
interpellation, and thus constitution, of a subject through a discourse that comprises the unifying principle of ideological discourse. The first task of analysis, therefore, is to reconstruct the interpellation structures which constitute a determinate social formation.

A period of generalized ideological crisis such as Poulantzas locates at the origin of fascism is characterized by a dissolution of the unity of the dominant ideological discourse. This occurs when neutralization of contradictions by displacement fails, allowing contradictory elements to come to the surface. Since ideology's function is to constitute individuals, a crisis at the level results in a "crisis of identity" of the social agents. In the ensuing struggle each sector will try to reconstitute the ideological unity— a resolution means a sector has established a hegemony that excludes it to deny all interpellations but one. The resolution itself will depend on historical factors; a possible resolution with the ideological level in a central role might occur when for example: 1) the social sector is considerably separated from the dominant relations of production, its "objective interests" being diffuse and its "mass instinct" less developed; 2) this type of social sector holds a central role in the social formation.

How are ideologies transformed? If it is accepted that there is a central relation between ideologies and class struggle that can be posed at the political and ideological level— at the level of relations of domination — where classes may be said to be in struggle, as opposed to being engaged in class struggle, then we may identify an antagonistic relation vis-à-vis the dominant bloc that is of a different kind from that of class struggle (located at the use of production). Different in that it does not constitute classes as such and in that it is only intelligible at the level of the concretesocial formation. For Poulantzas, of course, there is only class struggle and thus what Laclau
terms "popular democratic interpellations" that go beyond the ideolo-
gies comprising the past - such as "democratic tasks" - are treated as
bourgeois tasks as yet unfulfilled as a result of "combined and unequal
development". To this reductionist thesis, Laclau proposes: 1) class
struggle is only that which constitutes classes as such; 2) not every
contradiction is a class contradiction, but every contradiction is over-
determined by the class struggle. Thus, if the antagonism at the level
of the mode of production is expressed on the ideological level in the
interpellations of agents as a class, the second antagonism is expres-
sed through the interpellation of agents as the people: the first
sphere is that of class struggle, intelligible at the abstract level
of the mode of production; the second that of "popular democratic strug-
gle", intelligible at the level of the concrete social formation.

Laclau argues that due to the fact that the level of production
relations maintains the role of"determination in the last instance",
class struggles have priority over popular democratic struggles. This
is revealed in the sense that popular democratic ideologies only exist
articulated with class ideologies. Every class struggle tries to give
coherence to its ideological discourse by presenting its class objec-
tives as the consummation of popular objectives - thus the overdeter-
mination of non-class interpellation by class struggle consists in their
integration into a class ideological discourse. Ideologies are trans-
formed therefore 'through class struggle, which is carried out through
the production of subjects and the articulation/dissarticulation of dis-
course'.

Previously a serious fault was located in Poulantzas's con-
ception of the petty-bourgeoisie; how, might this be resolved?

Laclau argues that the "traditional" and the "new" fractions of
the petty-bourgeoisie that Poulantzas has constructed are, in fact, two
different classes, or fractions of existing classes, due to their dif-
ferent places in production relations. However the category "middle
classes", "intermediate strata", etc., does present a basic common feature: its separation from the dominant relations of production. Therefore its contradictions with the dominant bloc are posed at the ideological/political levels and not at the level of productive relations. Thus, in these sectors, the popular democratic ideology of the middle sectors is insufficient to organize its own discourse and only exists within the ideological discourse of the bourgeoisie or the proletariat; hence, "the struggle for the articulation of popular democratic ideology in class dominated discourses is the basic ideological struggle in capitalist social formations".  

Fascism provides proof of the fact that popular democratic interpellations have no precise class connotation — that they can be incorporated into quite distinct political discourse. Because rather than being the typical ideological expression of the most conservative and reactionary sectors of the dominant classes, fascism, in Germany and Italy, was one of the possible ways of articulating popular democratic interpellation into political discourse. Fascism arose from a dual crisis: 1) a crisis of the power bloc which was unable to absorb and neutralize its contradictions with the popular sectors through traditional channels; 2) a crisis of the working class, which was unable to hegemonize popular struggles and fuse popular democratic ideology and its revolutionary class objectives into a coherent political and ideological practice. The moment of rupture came when the people/power bloc contradiction failed to be neutralized, and it produced Jacobinism: the "people" emerges not with isolated demands, nor as an organized alternative within the system, but as a political alternative to it. Popular democratic interpellations, from being an ideological element in bourgeois discourse, come to acquire the maximum possible autonomy from it within the limits of class society.

The four "elements" of the crisis may be summarized as: a disar-
articulation of the traditional mechanisms of control and political neutralization; a paralysis of the dominant bloc feeding a hegemonic crisis; the collapse, thus, of "transformism" (a method of neutralization); and the "jacobinization" of the petty-bourgeoisie. In effect, monopoly capital relies on a mass movement to solve its hegemonic crisis. The mass movement must be radical, to produce an effective break, and it must be mobilized through interpellations that will not allow any identification between radical popular objectives and socialist objectives - for the "jacobinization" of the "people" can go either way, left or right. In fact, fascism accomplished its task in Italy and Germany mainly through two subjects of popular interpellation: Rasse (particularly in German Nazism) and Corporativism, the latter denying the meaning of struggle at the political level (people and class are separated so that no common ground is tolerated between them). To understand why the "jacobinization" of the "people" took a right turn rather than going left it is necessary to examine the second major factor of the crisis, i.e. the crisis of the working class.

Why was the "jacobinization" of the petty-bourgeoisie not articulated with socialist discourse? To put it very succinctly, because of the "economism" that was a basic ideological component of the worker's movement. It, consequently, had no answer for the radicalization of the "middle classes" and the crisis of transformism that confronted it--the working class was a prisoner of its own class perspective. Foucault hints at this but he can't explain it. Laclau explains it as follows: the working class in the 19th century was busy constructing a class ideology (through organization of trade unions and economic struggle); it could not allow the exposition of diffuse popular democratic ideologies to corrupt that process and at any rate it was thought, a) that the dynamic of capitalist accumulation would lead to the proletarianization of the middle sectors and of the peasantry - thus leaving the
working class to defend the interests of society as a whole, and b) that the economic contradictions inherent in capitalist accumulation would provoke, by the simple unfolding of its internal mechanism, the downfall of the system.

Fascism, then, to put it briefly, came into being partly as a result of the abandonment of the arena of popular democratic struggle by the working class. The working class was unable to present itself as a hegemonic alternative. Of course the extent to which the working class has the material conditions available to present itself as a hegemonic alternative will depend partly on the popular democratic traditions available to it. For example, we can see how important the Carabaldi/Mazzini tradition in Italy was for the potential development of socialist discourse in Italy, while, alternatively, we can suppose how negative must have been the effects for the development of such a discourse of Portugal's tradition of "authoritarianism and nationalism", as outlined by Figueiredo above.

Summing up this section, one can see through Laclau's contribution how important and decisive a role ideology plays in contemporary political phenomena. This, of course, as he states, has very much to do with the growing social and political weight of middle sectors where popular interpellations play a more important role than class. The process of social reproduction, as he puts it, 'is not just the reproduction of the dominant mode of production but also of its conditions, one of which is ideology; and (that) the greater the importance in a social formation of those sectors which do not participate directly in dominant production relations, the greater will be the importance and relative autonomy of ideological processes for social reproduction as a whole'. 17
Notes

1) Perry Anderson, MLR 17, p. 113.


3) Kolko, 1964, argues that for Max Weber ideas autonomously create and then fuse with material interests ultimately forming an inseparable synthesis – thus, “in the last instance” ideas are irreducible to social structure. Martins adopts a Weberian problematic.

4) At least Freud can be read that way. For example, Freud quotes approvingly James Sully who wrote: ‘the dream discloses beneath its worthless surface-characters traces of an old and precious communication’; our “archaic heritage”. S. Freud, 1967, p. 135.

5) E. Durkheim, 1964.


8) Ibi., p. 10.

9) Other writers such as Hirst and Hindess, 1977; A. Giddens, 1971; G. Burchell, have suggested the same.

10) op. cit., p. 99.

11) "somewhat perilously" due to specific problems relating to Althusser’s conception of ideology, and to general problems of ideology in Marx’s works.

12) Obviously there are problems with this concept, some of which Laclau does appear to take for granted. For example, Althusser talks about the subject as if it were a homogeneous entity, i.e. it takes a subject to identify itself as a subject, yet he also argues that fundamentally humans are not subjects, they are not present to themselves as consciousnesses. Hirst, 1976, presents several criticisms.

13) From Althusser who takes the concept from Freud, referring to the transference of psychic energy from a particularly potent thought to
CHAPTER VI: The Theoretical and Historical Specificity of the
Portuguese State

The objective of this chapter is to attempt through the concept
of the exceptional form of the capitalist state and through the
Gramscian distinction between the domination of a ruling class alli-
ance over a social formation, by force and coercion, and the "direction"
or leadership of such an alliance by consent, thus through its hegemony,
to characterize and periodize concretely different moments and forms of
the Portuguese state from 28 May 1926, the date of the military coup
that led to the establishment of the "Estado Novo", to 25 April 1974,
the date of the second major and lasting intervention by the Portuguese
armed forces this century. Further it is hoped to show that such an
account can explain the "displacement" in Portugal of ideological
forces from the "people" and its Jacobin potential for popular demo-
cratic struggle to the dominant sectors of the social formation. Thus,
an explanation is offered for the relative lack of relative autonomy
of the state, which differentiates it from the fascist form. It is
implicit, however, that as an exceptional form of the capitalist state
the Portuguese state enjoyed a greater autonomy from economic deter-
minants than is the case with the "democratic form" of capitalist state.

The Imperialist Context

Due to, among other factors, its location on the periphery of
Europe and its history as a colonial power, and its relationship with
Great Britain, it is most important to set an analysis of the Portuguese
state in its imperialist context. Portugal has been, and continues
to be, dependent in a special way on imperialist metropolises, formerly
on Great Britain and more recently, on the United States. The de-
pendence has been special in that it has had two essential aspects to
it: 1) the aspect of an old-established primitive accumulation of capital deriving from the exploitation of its colonies, and 2) a blockage of an endogenous accumulation of capital. The principal dividing line between the metropolitan countries and the dominated and dependent ones was formerly one of essentially that between industry and agriculture, or between town and country. The capitalist mode of production dominant in monopoly form in the imperialist metropolises had not yet succeeded in incorporating and dominating the relations of production within the dependent countries themselves. Thus inside countries such as Portugal the feudal mode of production, for example, displayed a remarkable persistence and had substantial effects on the socio-economic structure of the country and on the political structure. These effects were characterized by a preponderant role of agriculture and the extraction of raw materials, combined with a marked delay in the process of industrialization. The consequences of this were, on the one hand, a power bloc where big landed proprietors had very substantial weight, and a comprador big bourgeoisie, whose own economic base in the country was weak and who was clearly dependent on foreign capital, and on the other, dominated classes composed of a relatively small working class, a large peasantry largely subordinated to precapitalist relations of production, and a petty-bourgeoisie within which could be distinguished an important sector in manufacture, handicrafts and commerce, and a substantial state petty-bourgeoisie as result of the growth of state bureaucracy characteristic of a dependent situation.¹

In later decades dependent relations changed considerably. The correct emphasis, from the metropolises' point of view, was to be the export of capital to valorize monopoly capital on a world scale by turning to profit every relative advantage in the direct exploitation of labour. Dependence in Portugal thus changed to industrialization under the aegis of foreign capital - most Portuguese economists mark
the turning point in Portuguese industrialization at around 1958, although the first government plan of action was launched in 1953, and the first influx of foreign capital in substantial amounts from about 1960. The phenomenon of "dependent industrialization" has been characterized by Poulantzas, among others, as exhibiting basically the following features: 1) the country is confined to forms of industry based on low-level technology; 2) labour productivity is low maintaining the bipolar tendency of qualification/disqualification of labour-power characteristic of monopoly capital - the disqualification aspect is, of course, exported to dependent countries; 3) the profits directly realized from the production of surplus-value by labour-power in the dominated countries are to a large degree expatriated. This "dependent industrialization" has led to the growth of a fraction of the bourgeoisie, termed by Poulantzas the "domestic" fraction; we shall return to it later in this chapter.

As just stated, the process of industrialization in Portugal was a long drawn-out affair. The "bourgeois democratic revolution" of 1820 took decades to consolidate itself and the new social group that substituted the absolutist landed aristocracy was very weak. The country at the end of the 19th century and during the early part of the 20th is characterized by most Portuguese political-economists as capitalist, the capitalist mode of production being dominant, but strong elements of feudalism obviously were present. Portugal was fragmented territorially and politically, the industrial coast was cut off from the "feudal" interior, and the small land-holdings of the North from the large estates of the South. The historical importance of commercial and banking capital along with the ties with Britain (dating from the Methuen Treaty of 1703 under which Portugal was to accept industrial imports from Britain in exchange for exports of wine and agricultural produce, to the detriment of her own fledgling textile and other
industry reinforced the tendency for monopolistic concentration in Portugal. The specific character of development could, in fact, be characterized by its unevenness — between industrial development through the growth of comprador capital so linked, on the one hand, with the colonies, and on the other, with Britain, and the rural sector where the absence of agrarian reform and landowner’s feudal exploitation retarded capitalist accumulation thus deepening the breach between the interior and the coast.

In 1910 the Constitutional Monarchy was overthrown and a Republic was born, in a precarious state, one might add, since the bourgeoisie was weak economically and was caught up in the contradiction of not having decisive political weight over the large landowners, the "Lati-fundista" element. The urban petty-bourgeoisie supported the Republic and gained considerable strength within a growing state apparatus, already large, that was trying to maintain the unity of the Republican discourse in the face of opposition from rural sectors, landowners and peasantry. Symptomatic of this contradiction was the "Law of Separation" that separated the church and the state legally. This law was hated by a large part of the rural population which was often dominated by the local padre or "cacique" (local boss). The working class, very well organized, and with considerable political weight in spite of its relatively small size, supported at first the Republic which restored the right to strike and introduced legislative reforms which favoured the reorganization of trade unions. But support was short-lived, only six months after the Republic was founded, on 13 March 1911, Republican guards killed two workers on strike and the disillusionment that was produced as a result of the Republic’s failure to solve massive economic problems became manifest. The labour magazine Terra Livre ("Free Land") pronounced: 'the 13th of March 1911 is the date that marks the divorce between the Republic and the working class".
The military throughout the Republican period was never very far in the background. The first attempt to establish a dictatorship occurred in January 1915 and lasted for only four months; the second was led by the Major Sidônio Pais in December 1917 and lasted for one year, abruptly ending when the dictator was assassinated. The military contained its own contradictions, being split between Monarchist and Republican officers. As we shall see later, the splits in the military, which were, at least in part, representative of the splits in the wider society (although they cannot be reduced to those splits) greatly contributed to the extreme importance of the ideological level of the social formation in the Salazarist regime. On May 28, 1926 the military took over and met little opposition, although, as Hermínio Martins has pointed out, there was a great deal of instability in the wider framework of the military after the coup - plots, conspiracies, etc. General Carmona took charge, balancing the Republican and Monarchist factions through the distribution of key posts among them.

Thus far it can be seen that the principal contradiction in the power bloc was located at the abstract level of the mode of production, i.e. the contradiction generated by the articulation of capitalist and feudal modes of production within the same social formation. The character of the social formation reflected not only the dynamic of capitalism but also that of the feudal mode - it was constituted by their articulation. Portugal was, and is, with certain other countries like Spain, exceptional in the sense that it neither fit the European model of capitalist development, with capitalism rising internally - feudalism acting thus as a 'cocoon for embryonic capitalism' - nor the third-world model, where capitalism was more imposed from the outside. It is for this reason that it is particularly important to look at the mode of production dominant before the intrusion of capital, and hence at paths of transition from one mode to another, to fully understand
the complexity of the social totality. Such an analysis lies outside
the scope of this dissertation. Earlier some of the complexities involv-
ed in carrying out such an analysis were mentioned—clearly the specific-
ity of the precapitalist mode of production in Portugal needs establish-
ing.14

The contradiction between the bourgeoisie and the working class,
which due to the marginal dominance of the capitalist mode of production
was the main class contradiction, reached its apogee15 in the 1920s and
then suddenly abated. Cabral, as we have seen, puts down the defeat of
the working class to the international economic crisis and the successes
of National Socialism and Italian Fascism. However, Martins refers to
the neutral attitude of working-class organizations such as the trade-
unions, anarchists, anarcho-syndicalists, communists, to the military
coup of 1926. He states, 'despite increasing persecution, the revolu-
tionary parties attempted to divorce themselves from "bourgeois politi-
cal quarrels"'. Unfortunately, 'by 1932, they had ceased to exist as
legal organizations'.16 Following this to its logical conclusions, it
would be possible to draw parallels with the analyses and policies of
the Comintern in Germany and Italy with the analyses and policies of
working-class organizations in Portugal; to quote Laclau's remark,
'...the working class abandoned the arena of popular democratic strug-
gle'.17 Might the same be said of the working class in Portugal?

The Lack of a Mass Movement in Portugal

Cabral argues, as noted earlier, that it was through the "gap" left
by the defeat of the working class that reactionary ideology rushed in.
But this assumes that there existed a movement to carry it in, and in
Portugal, unlike the German and Italian cases, there existed no such
movement. Rather there existed, i.e. was available, an apparatus through
which the dominant sectors could attempt to resolve the crisis they con-
fronted, namely, the military. Obviously the lack of a mass movement and a party to represent it needs some explaining if one is to arrive at a specificity of the nature of the regime. In order to escape class reductionism this explanation must be constructed at the level of the concrete social formation, that is, at the level of what Laclau terms "relations of domination". As said earlier, according to Laclau fascism arose from a dual crisis: 1) the crisis of the power bloc, unable to absorb and neutralize its contradictions with the popular sectors through traditional channels, and 2) the crisis of the working class, unable to hegemonize popular struggles and fuse popular democratic ideology and its revolutionary class objectives into a coherent practice. In Portugal, the fact that an apparatus was available - the Portuguese military apparatus contained contradictions but nothing like the ones within the Junker-influenced "Wehrmacht" or the monarchy-supporting Italian army - for the radical alteration in the form of the state required by monopoly capital to guarantee and increase the strength of its hegemony in the power bloc, meant that the existing political system could be transformed from within. And, importantly, the popular democratic interpellation that appeared in Germany and Italy with the economic and subsequent hegemonic crises, which in turn produced a disarticulation of the traditional mechanisms of control, did not occur in Portugal. The "right-wing Jacobinism" that Martins identifies in Portugal never evolved into a mass movement, never distanced itself from bourgeois discourse to the extent that it became an alternative to the system itself. Rather it remained subsumed in bourgeois discourse. The dominant sectors, from their point of view, were not forced to pay the price of fascism, thus there was less need for the extreme repression and reactionary interpellations, characterized for example by "race", that occurred in Germany and Italy.

The lack of a mass movement in Portugal in the 1920s, and the low
degree of dissociation of popular democratic interpellations from dominant bourgeois discourse (and thus their lack of potential for incorporation in socialist discourse) can only be explained through examining Portugal's past. The articulating principles of bourgeois discourse, authoritarianism, expressed through "corporativism", and nationalism, that were manifested in the state apparatus and thus hindered democratic development must find a major part of their origins in, on the one hand, the geographical location of Portugal, its homogeneity as a nation, and its history as a mercantile nation with a glorious past of "Discoveries" and a resulting large colonial empire, and, on the other hand, in the special weight of "feudal" elements (correlating in some manner of course to the "comprador" nature of the bourgeoisie) in the countryside which meant a very large peasantry and a very powerful role for the Church. The very bureaucratic state apparatus and the important historical role of the military as part of that apparatus can both be derived certainly in large part from the aforementioned factors. They played an important part in the development of the link between large sections of the "people" and the dominant bloc.

The colonial empire, in a sense Portugal's "cultural capital", was politically taken-for-granted before the 1920s. It was part of Portugal's "great national past" and as such played an indispensable ideological role. This was later recognized by Marcello Caetano, the "brilliant" professor of law, who became Prime Minister after Salazar suffered a stroke in the sixties, and who was an important element in the construction of the "Estado Novo". He once stated (in the 1950s): '...Africa is for us a moral justification and a raison d'être as a power. Without it, we would be a small nation; with it, we are a great country.'

Caetano later changed his mind about the colonies, in the late sixties, for by then rather than playing a "neutralizing role" they had come to play a central role in the disarticulation of bourgeois discourse.
"Military Dictatorship"

Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to analyse in any great detail the analyses and policies of working-class organizations in Portugal during the period leading up to the coup d'état of 23 May 1926, nevertheless it can be argued that the working class would have been unable to hegemonize a popular democratic struggle under any circumstances. Its small size plus the lack of a strong tradition of struggle are just two factors that would have severely limited the potential of its revolutionary class ideology. Ideological practice always works with raw materials constituted by prior interpellations which on being disarticulated from the class discourse into which they were formerly integrated, lose any necessary class belonging. In effect, therefore, one is saying that these raw materials were scarce, although as we shall see the situation was considerably different in the late fifties, and again in the sixties and seventies. The raw materials that were available at the time of the coup in the 20s, i.e. those constituting the Republican discourse (such as for example a form of representative democracy; worker’s rights to organize; child-centered education; etc.) were still articulated to the discourse of the bourgeoisie, and therefore unable to interpellate popular democratic struggle.

The seizure of power by the military did not necessarily mean that the state apparatus would have to be, and remain, filled with military officers operating a specifically military programme for it to be characterized as a "military dictatorship". Hobsbawm has argued this21, and Cabral implies it in reference to Portugal’s case when he identifies fascism itself with elements from the "Integralismo Lusitano" movement and the petty-bourgeoisie. What is at stake is a form of characterization, not a question of who occupies the state. Reference was made earlier to Poulanças’s distinction between real power and formal
power, here we can see the former in the hands of the military, the latter in the hands of the petty-bourgeoisie. For Poulantzas, in Portugal the petty-bourgeoisie always acted simply as a class in charge of the state, never as a ruling class as it did in Germany and Italy during the first period of fascist power. However, this is not to argue that the withdrawal of military personnel from the state apparatuses had no effects; certainly this withdrawal plus the success of Salazar and the Church in interpellating the mass of the people through the principles of corporativism and nationalism had important effects at the level of the social formation, particularly in terms of degree of repression. In addition, the strong role of the petty-bourgeoisie in the state apparatus, particularly in the promotion of corporativism, can be interpreted as part of the ideological battle by the ruling bloc to keep the "people" and the working class apart; as we have already seen this denote an element of fascism. But the lack of a fascist party to represent the petty-bourgeoisie and right-radicalized sectors of the working class (if there were any) is surely connected with the lack of disarticulation, previously emphasized, of the discourse of the "middle sectors" from the discourse of the bourgeoisie; as both Cabral and Poulantzas have pointed out, the military acted as the de facto party of the dominant bloc, representing therefore the interests of, most importantly, monopoly capital and large landowners.

The economic policy of the Salazar government was generally aimed at cementing the alliance between the comprador bourgeoisie and the large landowners. Additionally, there was what Cabral has termed the "Historic Compromise" of the Salazar regime, i.e. the compromise effected between the national and comprador fractions of the bourgeoisie. Both of these acts were contradictory in the sense that while trying to regulate and control the development of the domination of monopoly capital over medium capital and landed property, they attempted to accelerate
it. In fact, for two decades there appears to have been a "stand-off" with neither monopoly capital nor the large landowners able to gain clear-cut dominance, such that a kind of "imobilismo" resulted, which, contrary to fascism in Italy and Germany which stimulated economic growth, produced economic stagnation and, if anything, a political and social dominance by the landowner element. The "Military Dictatorship" was simply unable to establish the dominance of capitalism in agriculture the way fascism had done in Italy. And, indeed, perhaps it didn't want to. This factor contributed greatly to what one might term a slow process of "radicalization" of the "people" which finally burst out into the open in the late 1950s. Of course, great effort was needed during the latter twenties and the decade of the thirties to maintain political and ideological unity to guarantee the conditions of the state. This meant a growth in the importance of the ideological state apparatuses both in terms of an offensive against working-class ideology, and, more importantly, to cope with the internal disarray of the power bloc. The strength of the landowner element within the power bloc can be witnessed through the resurgence of reactionary "feudal romanticism" – a medieval kind of corporativism extending from the peasantry – that characterized the ideology of the "Estado Novo". This ideology is typified by the fundamental lines of future educational politics of the "New State" as set out by the First Congress of the National Union (1934): there should be 'a reduction of programmes to allow for concentration on "fundamentals"; and emphasis on applied knowledge' – i.e. on design and manual work for boys and domestic activities for girls; and 'all principles are to indicate ideas of country, family, and the love of birthplace'. Later, in the forties and fifties, as monopoly capital began to assert itself, the ideology of the state switched to a more technocratic emphasis with slogans such as, "the neutral technical state" and "organized capitalism", etc.
Summing up so far, it can be seen that the Portuguese state from the advent of the military coup and during the first couple of decades of Salazar's rule had much less autonomy from the dominant bloc - comprador bourgeoisie/large landowner interest - than would have been the case under a predominantly fascist state with its accompanying mass popular movement, political organizations, etc. Hence its characterization as a "military dictatorship", as an exceptional form of capitalist state thus belonging to the era of attempts by monopoly capital to concentrate and thus taking the form of a state at the extreme "limit" of the capitalist state; and, as argued previously with modes of production, and now at the level of the state, not a pure military dictatorship, but rather one articulated with elements of fascism. The so-called fusion of monopoly capital with the apparatus and resources of the "fascist" state, which Cabral points to, and the characterization of the "fascist" dictatorship as a "terrorist government of the monopolies and landowners" as expressed by Cunhal, merely help confirm this view. It should be quickly pointed out, however, that the "military dictatorship" form with its relative lack of "relative autonomy" (vis-à-vis the greater autonomy of fascism) still maintained, as an exceptional form of state an increased autonomy from the hegemonic class fraction(s) - the whole phenomenon of "imobilismo" bears witness to this, not to mention the policy of the government with respect to the colonial empire in the sixties.

As for the central role of ideology in the social formation this can be attributed to, as we have seen, on the one hand, the contradictions within the power bloc - the struggle of the feudal element, the splits in the military, which without a "unifying apparatus", i.e. a "fascist party" or a "parliament", must do the job of unifying through other parts of the state apparatus - and, on the other, the composition of the state apparatuses, particularly the petty-bourgeois nature of
the government and the absorption of petty-bourgeois discourse into bourgeois discourse; the former presenting a certain autonomy to the state on the basis of a contradiction at the level of the mode of production, and the latter presenting a certain autonomy to the state at the level of the relations of domination as a result of the separation of the conditions of existence of the state from production relations. It is in light of the latter contradiction that we find the source of the relative lack of "relative autonomy" of the Salazarist state. In other words, the contradiction located at the level of the mode of production where a pre-capitalist mode is, in effect, fiercely resistant to the spread of capitalist relations overwhelmingly predominates over the "people"/dominant bloc contradiction (almost non-existent for all the reasons outlined throughout the preceding sections) at the level of the social formation. Thus, in effect, the ISAs during the first two decades of the "military dictatorship" found themselves playing a crucial role in Portugal as a result of their displacement to an effective role at the abstract level of the mode of production. In this sense their role could be called largely "repressive": there was very little separation between the Repressive State Apparatus and the ISAs functioning together to maintain the unity of the dominant discourse.

The Repressive State and the Growth of Popular Democratic Struggle

In the fifties and sixties the situation began noticeably to change. The growing strength and unity of the Repressive State Apparatus, initiated in the late thirties through the creation of the Legion Portuguesa, a para-military organization, and the decree-laws of 1945, 1949 and 1956 which allowed special penalties for political crimes and granted the political police (PIDE) a wide range of powers, plus the creation of the Guarda Nacional Republicana (to control moral disturbances) and the Polícia de Segurança Pública (to break up meetings and demonstrations),
on the one hand, and the increasingly hegemonic and dominant position of monopoly capital, exemplified by the "First Plan of Expansion" of 1953 and the big influx of foreign capital from 1960\textsuperscript{29}, on the other, created a new set of conditions. A gradual separation of the Repressive State apparatus and the ISAs took place. The ISAs began a process of displacement from their previously mentioned fundamentally important role at the level of productive relations to a fundamentally important role at the level of relations of domination; in other words there was a major change in the form of the state, and in the level of its effectivity. As capitalist relations asserted their dominance at the level of the mode of production, the state occupied increasingly the terrain of relations of domination performing its functions of organiser and unifier of political and ideological domination. However, due to the lack of a political apparatus through which the state could represent the "people", and attempt to "neutralise" its discourse, the above mentioned process of displacement of the state also involved a process of disarticulation of popular interpellations from the dominant discourse. And, in fact, as the social base for the popular movement increased so the maintenance of the limits of the dominant class necessitated a higher degree of ideological homogenisation which was only made possible through repression.

The first clear example of the breakdown of the dominant discourse - a discourse which, as we have seen, was always problematic for the bourgeoisie due to its difficulty in establishing its hegemony within it - was with the mass movement that developed around the Presidential campaign of General Humberto Delgado in 1958.\textsuperscript{30} This movement marked the first sign of the development of the new faction of the bourgeoisie, termed by Poulantzas "the domestic bourgeoisie"\textsuperscript{31}, and its growing contradiction with the comprador and agrarian bloc (later this was to manifest itself in a "crisis of representation" between the state form of
"military dictatorship" cum "police state" and the domestic bourgeoisie). It also marked the increasing importance of the administrative sector and the increase in the size of the urban working class. Combining these factors, it above all marked the beginning of a "popular democratic struggle" - a struggle reinforced by the raw materials of interpellation provided by the democratic tradition of the Republic and therefore important aids to the attempt by popular democratic interpellations to dissociate themselves from the dominant discourse.

The radicalization of the "people" continued during the sixties with the advent of colonial war. The opposition of specifically the domestic bourgeoisie increased as its interest was in endogenous industrial growth and it saw the state in an economic role that devoted money to a colonial war in the interests of the comprador bourgeoisie - Portugal's "paleo-capitalists", as Kenneth Maxwell has termed them.32 (In the seventies some sectors of the comprador bourgeoisie began to desert the government's position on the war supporting the neo-colonialist position as advanced for example by Spínola33 - the Champalimaud group took this position for example.34) The wars made no sense economically. There was a definite move towards European markets and away from the colonies by Portuguese industry - for example between 1960 and 1969 the percentage of Portugal's exports to her overseas territories fell from 43 to 25%, and by 1973 only 10% of her trade, both in terms of imports and exports, was with the colonies, while 45% was with the EEC.35 Additionally, of course, Portugal spent an enormous amount of money keeping the wars going.

Why were the ruling sectors so determined to hang on to the colonies? The answer to this question would seem to lie in: 1) the specific structure of the regime and its apparatuses - i.e. its strong hierarchical ordering, its extraordinary rigidity, which as Poulantzas has noted, was both its strength and its weakness; 2) in what may be
called the "cultural chauvinism" of the ruling sectors; and 3) at least in the early stages in the support for the wars by the comprador fraction of the bourgeoisie (some sectors did, in fact, support the wars right up to the coup of 25 April 1974, for example the "Espírito Santo" group — banking — which had strongly rooted interests in Angola). In addition, as noted earlier, H. Martins has argued that the colonial wars acted as a "full-scale ideological renewal" for the regime — a process he characterizes as "refascistization". While this does not provide in itself sufficient explanation for the determination of the regime to keep its colonies, it does suggest how the regime attempted to neutralize contradictions within the social formation, namely through the "rearticulation" of the interpellations of the "people" by way of the principle of nationalism.

All these factors largely account for the inability of the regime to solve the contradictions created by the increasing strength of monopoly capital combined with a form of state that could only respond to any contradiction with repression. The demands of the domestic bourgeoisie for a certain liberalization/democratization of the regime (due to its interest in endogenous industry and its alliance with the "people" — representative of this alliance were the CDE, "democratic election commissions", that existed throughout Portugal; they were principally used as an opportunity for criticism and debate since the opposition groups regarded the electoral system as a fraud) and a "meritocratization" of education did finally make some headway in the late sixties and early seventies under Marcelo Caetano. In 1971, for example, there surfaced the Veiga Simão Reform in education. However, this reform, representing all the complexities of the alliance of the "people" — i.e., domestic bourgeoisie, petty-bourgeoisie, working class (urban and rural), anti-fascist groups cutting across class boundaries, etc. — and thus in part a response to demands for equality of educational opportunity, in part
a response to demands for "alfabetização" (mass literacy programmes),
encased within the strictures of an outmoded corporativist state struc-
ture, never made much headway. In fact, instead of resolving contra-
dictions the whole short process of liberalization/democratization ar-
ticulated through the largely discredited principles of corporativism
and nationalism, the latter principle still being linked to the main-
tenance of a hierarchical-authoritative system of a traditional type
(rather than expressing, it should be noted, the new "anti-comprador"
nationalism of the "people"), mainly increased the gap between the
"people" and the ruling sectors thus opening up the way for mass popu-
lar discontent, which clearly exploded onto the scene on the day of
"liberation", the day of the military coup d'état, April 25th, 1974.

Summary
The location and form of the ideological level's functioning in
the social formation was different in the fifties, sixties, and early
seventies from what it had been in the thirties and forties. Whereas
during the latter period it provided mainly a class function, acting
out a crucial role at the level of the mode of production in a form
that can be described as mainly repressive, during the former period
it came to provide a much wider function that cut across class bound-
daries as a result of its separation from production relations, that
is, as a result of its "relative autonomy" from relations of produc-
tion. With the growth of the Repressive State Apparatus in the form
of the police the ideological level became less repressive. The dis-
placement occurred because of the increasing dominance of capitalist
relations of production in the social formation, monopoly capital be-
ing hegemonic. The Portuguese state, and consequently the ideological
level, did of course maintain a certain autonomy from production rela-
tions in the 1930s and 40s, and in fact it has been argued in this
dissertation that it enjoyed a greater autonomy at that time than in
the 1950s, 60s and 70s due to the struggle between capitalist and "feudal" relations. However, paradoxical as it may seem, the decreasing autonomy of the state in the 50s, 60s, and 70s provided an increasing autonomy for the ideological in its apparatuses as the economic became increasingly able to unify the social formation and as a strong Repressive Apparatus developed, thus able to ensure relations of domination. The development of that strong Repressive Apparatus was, as we have seen, primarily a response to the growing social base of popular democratic struggle.
Notes

1) See Poulantzas, 1976.

2) Ibid.

3) As characterized by, for example, Maria Filomena Mónica, 1976.

4) Thus we can see at least two forms of agricultural economy operating within the social formation.

5) A. Cuné Frank, 1974.


7) Mónica expands on this, 1976.

8) A. Figueiredo, 1975, p. 41.

9) Ibid.

10) Hobsbawm refers to the unifying element in the military hierarchy in terms of the "solidarity of the officer class." New Society, 1975.


12) The concept of feudal mode of production is employed in a very loose and admittedly unsatisfactory way throughout.


14) Rey in particular stresses the need for such specificity. In Foster-Carter, 1978.

15) In terms of manifest struggle.


19) Martins, 1971, elaborates on this factor. For example, he states, 'Portugal is not a plural society... A comparative study of European societies shows that it is characterized by an unusually high degree of national homogeneity... whether racial, ethnic, linguistic, religious or cultural homogeneity aspects are considered.' p. 61.

Laclau points out that social homogeneity is indeed an important
factor in the process of constituting a unified popular-democratic language at national level (chap. 4, 1977), or, as is the case in point here, of constituting the discourse of the dominant bloc when populist discourse has no social base.


22) N. Poulantzas, 1976.

23) Krest, in "Althusser's Theory of Ideology" (Economy and Society, Vol. 5, No. 4), argues that the concept of representation is very unstable due to the fact that it is so easily derivable from that which it is representing. Here, consistent with the argument put forth throughout, the military acting concretely in the state apparatus cannot be automatically articulated as a concept into a necessary paradigamic whole, thus making it expressive of the essence of the ruling class.


25) Poulantzas, 1974. Also Schmitter in "Liberation by Colpo" states: 'Portugal throughout the 1930s and well into the 1950s had the lowest rates of urbanization, improvement in literacy, industrialization, and general economic modernization of any European country.' p. 14.

26) Maria Filomena Konica, 1976.

27) Álvaro Cunhal argues the institutionalization process of monopoly capital began in Portugal about 1945 with the "Law of Industrial Reorganization" which promoted the concentration and centralization of capital. 1976, p. 30.

28) Ibid., p. 11.

29) Cunhal states that in the decade of the sixties there appeared in Portugal elements typical of "state monopoly capitalism"; e.g. the redistribution of surplus value through the budget, fiscal bias
and advantages, credits, to monopolist groups, enlarging of the market for monopolies through the raising of public consumption, the nationalization of non-profit sectors, economic planning, and participation in large enterprises. 1976, p. 29.

30) See N. Soares, 1975. Salazar abolished direct suffrage for the Presidency after the campaign (Decree-Law no. 43528).

31) The "domestic bourgeoisie" is not a genuine "national bourgeoisie", i.e. a bourgeoisie that is really independent from foreign capital, and its development coincides with the internationalization of labour processes and production. Nevertheless, since it is interested in industrial development and extension of the home market, it tends to be polarized against the exploitation of the country by foreign capital. Poulantzas, 1976, p. 43.


33) A. Spinola, Portugal and the Future, 1974.


37) Maxwell states that the GDE comprised "anti-fascist" forces, mainly middle-class liberals, social democrats, Catholic radicals, independent Marxists, and the Communists (PCP). 1974, p. 32.
Conclusion

The starting point of this dissertation was the very noticeable fact of the importance of ideology, both as a level of the social formation and as an integral part of all social practices (i.e. as "interpellator"), in Portugal during the Salazar/Caetano regimes and then after the 24th of April 1974. The original intention was to concentrate on educational ideologies in Portugal in much the same manner as Finn, Grant, and Johnson in their recent article on what they term "social-democratic ideology". That is, the intention was to locate educational ideologies, as expressions of particular versions of what schools are for, how they work, and what it is possible for them to achieve, in Portugal and then to analyse their social bases and effects by tracing their origins historically. As Finn, Grant, and Johnson point out, educational ideologies have, through policies and through the practice of teachers, real effects upon the education system, and, as such, they are part of the general political discourse (in a hegemonic state) and thus a regional instance of the process of bidding for the consent of the governed. However, as we have seen, the Portuguese state has not over the last fifty years enjoyed long periods as a "hegemonic" state, and, in addition, there have occurred over the last ten years very significant changes both within the power bloc of that state and within the state apparatuses. As a result it is difficult without some empirical research based on the concepts used throughout this dissertation to know: a) what educational ideologies operate within the present social formation, and b) what educational ideology might be dominant at government level and if, indeed, that same ideology does in fact predominate within the educational apparatus. We know, of course, what ideologies are espoused in the Constitution of the Republic, but how do those ideologies match up to the ideologies
operating within the educational apparatus?

However, before researching ideologies in Portugal it is necessary to have the concepts that can account for them, and it is necessary to specify and conjuncturalize the state in which they operate so that general determinations can be known. For example, we saw that during the early Salazar regime of the "Estado Novo" an educational ideology characterized as "feudalist" in nature was imposed on the masses, whereas during the late Salazar/CASTRO regime a "liberal" educational ideology, in the form of the previously mentioned Veiga Simão Reform, took shape at the level of the state as a response, at least partly, to the popular mass movement and its demands for the expansion and democratization of education. This dissertation has demonstrated, if it has been successful, that in the first case the ideological level of the social formation was dominant, while in the second case the economic level held a position of dominance (dominance being defined by the criterion of "unifier" of the social formation). The effects of dominance are such that in the thirties and forties the dominant educational ideology was all-pervasive, manifesting little internal contradiction, partly as a result of the state's considerable autonomy from productive relations; while in the sixties and seventies the effects of the dominant educational ideology were, and are, diffuse due to the effects of popular democratic struggle and the relative lack of autonomy enjoyed by the state. Thus, this dissertation having attempted to specify the ideological and the role of ideology, it would now be possible to trace the development of particular educational ideologies and to analyse their social bases — including forms of alliance in struggle — and their effects.

The Discourses of "Fascism" and "Revolution"

The two political discourses which have dominated the stage in Portugal for most of the twentieth century have been the discourses of
"fascism" and "revolution". Yet, as we’ve seen with fascism, these discourses are problematic in terms of their application to real events in Portugal (which seems to point, again, to the importance of ideology in the social formation). Why do political parties on the Left continue to articulate these terms if they do, as is frequently the case, clash with the theory of these parties? The conclusion to be drawn, based on the arguments presented so far, is that the discourses have acted as articulating principles for popular democratic interpellation by forces on the Left. They have served, so far, as rallying points for struggle.

A schematic outline of the development of popular democratic struggle up to 25 April 1974 has been given in this dissertation in the course of developing the specificity of the ideological. The task remains to amplify that development and to construct the specificity of the struggle that took place after the coup d'état of 25 April 1974, in order to problematise the discourse of "revolution" so that its role as interpellar becomes clear and to specify and conjuncturalise the Portuguese state during that period. This would enable us to specify the general determinations of the period which in turn would inform the process of determining the nature of the social bases of educational ideologies in the present conjuncture and the nature of the struggles taking place within the ISAs.

Discussion of the period after the coup of 25 April 1974 up to the "counter-coup" of 25 November 1975 has centered on the question of whether or not there existed a "revolutionary situation", i.e. was there the beginning of a process of transition to socialism - that is a transition from capitalist relations of production to socialist relations of production - or, was the struggle confined within the limits of democratic struggle? Was, in fact, the coup itself, and the struggle that followed, and which continues in certain respects (see below), a
result primarily of the problem that has plagued the bourgeoisie in Portugal ever since it came into existence, namely, the inability of the bourgeoisie to establish a bourgeois ideological discourse with a hegemonic character which would enable it to have secure forms of political organization? Obviously, no answer can be given to these questions in this final chapter; however, just to pose such questions suggests certain answers, for example, that what might have been at stake during that period was the hegemony and leadership of the democratization process by the popular masses. Certainly the conjuncture was dominated by political events that had their effects both in terms of form and content on both the ideological and economic spheres.

The Constitution of the Republic, drawn up by an elected constituent assembly in 1975/6, embodies precisely the effects of the hegemony and leadership of the democratization process by the popular masses. The breakdown of the discourse of "revolution" for certain of the forces making up the alliance of the "people" occurred after the domestic bourgeoisie had lost its hegemony over the "revolutionary" (in fact "democratization") process. It was then that popular democratic struggle, disarticulated largely from bourgeois discourse, began to exhibit the influence of proletarian discourse. As an example here are the first two articles from the new Portuguese Constitution:

1 - Establishes a Republic 'sovereign, based on the dignity of the human person and popular will and pledged to the transformation of present society to a society without classes';

2 - The new Constitution of the Portuguese Republic defines as an objective of the Portuguese state 'securing the transition to socialism by way of the creation of conditions for the democratic exercise of power by the working classes'.

After the 25 November 1975, the night of the so-called "counter-coup", or, as some term it, the night of liberation from Left-wing totalitarianism, the domestic bourgeoisie appeared to regain its hegemony within the alliance of the "people" - an alliance which at that
point began to crumble. Since then the bourgeoisie has struggled to establish its ideological discourse with a hegemonic character. There has been a mixture of fierce resistance and passive acquiescence to this process.

**ISA in Crisis**

Within the educational apparatus there has been, in some sectors — particularly in higher education and in some areas of secondary education — very strong resistance to the rearticulation of popular democratic struggle into bourgeois discourse. This hasn't been unexpected for several reasons: 1) the establishment of a hegemonic state with its "socialist" Constitution and Law system has displaced the struggle to the educational apparatus and to other ISA; 2) popular democratic struggle articulated to proletarian discourse had particular effects both in terms of form and content on the educational apparatus after the 25 April 1974 — the structure was democratized, new curricula were introduced, new forms of pedagogy were instituted. In short, all the effects of the process that resulted from overthrowing an educational system largely still "feudalist" in nature; 3) the inability of social democracy to separate the "people" from "class" — that is, socialism was still conceivable to the popular classes as a possible political alternative and those classes were already mobilized around principles such as "equality of opportunity", "mass literacy programmes", etc. that they expected to see take a concrete form; and 4) with the expanding economic role of the state in advanced capitalist societies, and with the particularly important economic role of the state in Portugal due to the aforementioned factor of dependent industrialization on a weak base of endogenous capitalist accumulation, there has been a strong response by the ruling sectors to the economic problems inscribed on the educational apparatus, such as the manpower requirements of the economy — this has led to many contradictions, to name but one: the development of technical training pro-
grammes at the expense of mass literacy programmes.

Contrary to the above, there has been considerable popular support, particularly among the petty-bourgeoisie - and within the educational apparatus among primary school teachers particularly - for the rallying cry of a return to "strict discipline and positive learning" after the "chaos" of the "revolutionary" period. Social democratic and liberal forces have attempted to contain this cry within the bounds of their familiar articulating principle "equality of opportunity within education". This principle, as we have seen, was manifest in Portugal during the "liberalization" period by way of the Veiga Simao Reform. Witness, for example, these words from the programme of "General Reform of Education in Portugal":

"The programme of projected reform expresses 'a philosophy of education which would embody the double principle that the education of the individual is the main aim of the educational system and that all, on the basis of equal opportunities, should find in any such system the paths that will guarantee their inalienable rights to be educated. From this we may conclude that the educational system should not be directly subordinated to the demands of economic development.' 6 (sic.) (emphasis added)

As Finn, Grant, and Johnson have pointed out, the principle of "equality of opportunity" is best understood as an economic goal. It is based on the conception of education as a "good" which ought to be more fairly shared, the use and consumption of which has pertinent economic effects. The ultimate point of reference... has been an essentially liberal conception of society as a market, within which individuals compete. The point according to this "philosophy" is to enable them to compete more fairly. 7 Nevertheless, without doubt the principle articulates far more than simply fair competition in the market place. For many people it represents expansion of educational resources and expansion of educational opportunities. 8 However, of course, there is a contradiction between the base the principle has for the bourgeoisie - a base in production relations - and the articulation of that principle by way of the masses - at the level of the social formation - where it takes on a
social and political content. In a situation where there is a good
deal of mass mobilization, such as in Portugal, and where there is such
a deficiency in basic educational provision, the contradictory nature
of principle becomes blatant. Portugal's Constitution expresses pre-
cisely an attempt to reconcile contradictory goals, for example:

Article 73 - 'The state will promote the democratisation
of education and conditions that will permit education to con-
tribute to the development of the personality and progress to
a democratic and socialist society.'

74 - Guarantees all citizens the right to educa-
tion and to "equality of opportunities" in education.

75 - Suggests positive discrimination to socially
dominated cultural groups - the state must 'stimulate the for-
modation of scientists and technicians from members of the work-
ing classes'.

76 - and further - access to the university should
'stimulate and favour the entrance of workers and the sons of
the working classes'.

Does the Portuguese Constitution therefore pose objectives that can
not be achieved by the means proposed? Will it, consequently, fail in
its political purposes?

Researching Educational Ideologies

To attempt an answer to the above questions it is necessary to con-
struct a history of the three main educational ideologies present in
the social formation in Portugal: 1) the "feudalist" educational
ideology dominant in Salazar's "Estado Novo", with its articulating
principle of "Deus, Patria, Autoridade" ("God, Country, Authority");
2) the "liberal/social democratic" educational ideology present in
Veiga Simão and in the policy of the present Socialist/Conservative
government, with its articulating principle of "equality of opportuni-
ty"; and 3) the "popular/socialist" educational ideology expressed in
the Constitution and in the programmes of certain political parties
(in the Portuguese Communist Party's for example), with its articula-
ting principle of "alphabetization" (i.e. a principle encapsulating
mass literacy programmes, a drive towards equalization). Searching out the agencies and coalitions which construct and produce educational ideologies will inform the process of constructing alliances. Thus the raw materials constituted by prior interpellations will be available for appropriation by socialist forces in their attempts to articulate popular democratic struggle.
Notes

1) There is, however, a reductionist tone to the Finn, Grant, and Johnson article. Raymond Williams has pointed to this, for example his comment, "It is wrong to reduce the historical alliance which we call social democracy to one of its components". Finn, Grant, and Johnson appear to contradict their own just criticism of Althusser's "monolithic" conception of the dominant "universally reigning ideology of the school" when they proceed to talk of "social-democratic" ideology in precisely that manner. Another problem is the class belonging which they attach, for example, to the principle of "equality of opportunity". (R. Williams, 1979)

2) Finn, Grant, and Johnson, 1977.


4) The Constitution of the Portuguese Republic.

5) See Jean Pierre Faye, 1976, for an interesting interpretation of the events of 25 November 1975. One of Faye's central themes is how the narrative function can work to the advantage of a very definite political operation and prolong the political duel or the class war by other means.


7) op. cit., p. 184.

8) R. Williams suggests this. 1976, p. 5.

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