U.PORTO

FLUP FACULDADE DE LETRAS
UNIVERSIDADE DO PORTO

2 Ciclo

MESTRADO EM HISTÓRIA RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS E COOPERAÇÃO

A Comparative study of debate strategies of France and Portugal at the United Nations,

on the question of Algeria (1955-1957), and situation in Angola (1960-1962).

Chi Han

Ano: 2026



Chi Han

A comparative study of debate strategies of France and Portugal at the United Nations, on the question of Algeria (1955-1957), and situation in Angola(1960-1962).

Dissertação realizada no âmbito do Mestrado em Historia, Relações Internacionais e Cooperação, orientada pelo Professor Doutor Manuel Loff

Faculdade de Letras da Universidade do Porto

Ano: 2026



Este trabalho está licenciado ao abrigo de uma licença CC BY 4.0

Dedicatória (facultativo)

Sumário

Declaração de honra 5
Agradecimentos 6
Resumo 7
Índice de Figuras 8
Introdução.....9
1. The United Nations and Decolonisation (1945–1961).....18
1.1. The United Nations, establishment process, and Institutional Composition 18
1.2. The United Nations Charter and Non-Self Governing Territories.....19
2. French Colonialism in Algeria.....25
2.1. French Colonialism in Algeria.....25
2.2. The Arrival of the French and the process of invasion in Algeria.....25
2.3. The Mission Civilisatrice and Assimilation Policies in Algeria.....27
3. Portugal Colonialism and Angola 36
3.1. The Arrival of Portugal in Angola and its invasion.....36
3.2. Estado Novo: Law, Race, and Exclusion.....36
3.3. From Mística Imperial to Lusotropicalismo.....38
4. Portugal and France at the United Nations: Countering the Anti-Colonialist Tide.....45
4.1 France at the United Nations 45
4.1.1. 1955: Attempts to bring the debate on Algeria to a close 45
4.1.2. 1956: Another attempt by the French at interception, and their final decision not to stop the meetings about Algeria in the United Nations 61
4.1.3. 1957: Continuous meetings on the question of Algeria in the United Nations 78
4.2 Portugal at the United Nations 95
4.2.1. Portugal's accession to the United Nations, and Angola's inclusion on the agenda 95
4.2.2. Portugal in the United Nations from 1961 to 1962.....99
4.2.3. "Politically, it is a clear victory of Portugal."....123
5. A comparative study of France and Portugal at the United Nations.....166
Referências Bibliográficas 188

Declaração de honra

Declaro que a presente dissertação é de minha autoria e não foi utilizada/o previamente noutro curso ou unidade curricular, desta ou de outra instituição. As referências a outros autores (textos, trabalhos, ideias) respeitam escrupulosamente as regras de atribuição de autoria e encontram-se devidamente indicadas no texto e nas referências bibliográficas, de acordo com as normas de referenciação. Tenho consciência de que a prática de plágio e auto-plágio constitui um ilícito académico.

I hereby declare that this dissertation is of my authorship and has not been used previously in another course, degree, curricular unit or subject, at this or any other institution. References to other authors (statements, ideas, thoughts) scrupulously respect the rules of attribution and are duly indicated in the text and bibliographical references, in accordance with the rules of referencing. I am aware that the practice of plagiarism and self-plagiarism is an academic offence.

Declaro, ainda, que não utilizei ferramentas de inteligência artificial generativa (chatbots baseados em grandes modelos de linguagem) para realização de parte(s) da/o presente tese/dissertação/relatório, encontrando-se todas as interações (prompts e respostas) transcritas em anexo ao trabalho.

I further declare that I have not used generative artificial intelligence tools (chatbots based on large language models) to carry out part(s) of this thesis/dissertation/report, and that all interactions (prompts and responses) have been transcribed in the annex to this work.

Porto, 29/09/2026

Chi Han

Agradecimentos

This dissertation was completed under the guidance and care of my supervisor, Professor Manuel Loff. Your persistent and patient guidance has continually honed my ability to write academic works, made me to produce, in the end, a complete and outstanding piece of work that I could never have imagined myself. I would like to express my sincere respect and heartfelt thanks.

I would also like to thank the Scientific Committee for providing such a wealth of learning resources, which enabled me to spend a wonderful academic time at FLUP as a Master student. As a former PhD student, the Scientific Committee likewise offered me assistance and supported my decisions when I found myself in difficulty. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to you all once again.

Furthermore, I would like to express my gratitude to my family for the resources and love you have invested in me, letting me to study and live in such a beautiful country. Then, I would also like to thank my friends: Guo, Han, Chen, and 54, who have constantly encouraged me to move forward, filling myself with determination. My thanks also go to Larian Studios and Warhorse Studios for the wonderful works that delight my life. In the end, I would like to thank Q. B. 3 Cafetaria SnackBar for the service it provides from the mornings to the evenings.

Resumo

With the end of the Second World War, the problem of colonialism increasingly became one of the issues that could not be ignored by the international community, and the Unite Nations which was established near the end of the WW2 provided a platform for discussing the descolonisation. This dissertation will use comparative studies to conduct a comparative analysis of the defence strategies used by France regarding the Algerian question between 1955 and 1957, and by Portugal regarding the Angola question between 1960 and 1962 in the meetings at the United Nations. The dissertation found that the voting outcomes of France and Portugal at the meetings depended not only on their debating strategies , but also were influences by the two countries' positions within the United Nations and by geopolitical factors (the United States and Nato in the dissertation).

Palavras-chave: Portugal, France, United Nations, Descolonisation, Foreign Policy

Índice de Figuras

FIGURE 1: TYPES OF RHETORICAL ADAPTATION 174

Introdução

The subject of decolonisation has always occupied a significant place in the study of world history. With the end of the Second World War, the question of colonialism increasingly became one of the issues that the international community could no longer ignore. However, the conclusion of the Second World War was also marked by the establishment of a new international organisation designed to prevent the recurrence of a world war, the United Nations. In 1945, the United Nations adopted the Charter of the United Nations and established the Fourth Committee of General Assembly (the Special Political and Decolonisation Committee) to address the issues of Non-Self Governing Territories and Trust Territories following the Second World War. In 1960, the *Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples* was adopted by General Assembly, further affirming the right of colonial peoples to self-determination and independence. During this period, which was from the mid 1950s to the early1960s, as an increasing number of Third World countries gained independence and joined the United Nations, the wave of decolonisation within the organisation grew ever stronger, making the United Nations' stance on decolonisation increasingly evident.

However, as time went on, the increasingly evident stance on decolonisation within the United Nations did not mean that the colonial powers had accepted the concept of decolonisation within this international organisation, on the contrary, the United Nations became a platform for the struggle for influence between the colonial powers and the Third World countries during this process. France and Portugal provided two case studies on this issue and within this process.

These differences raise questions, and consequently, the research poses the following question: in the face of increasingly strict decolonisation norms from United Nations, how did France and Portugal defend the legitimacy of their colonial actions at United Nations meetings? What are the similarities or differences between France and Portugal in terms of the defense approches and strategies?

Although the official narrative of the United Nations states that its aim is to "end war and promote peace, justice and better living for all mankind" (United Nations, n.d.), the *Charter* of the United Nations, as an international treaty, empowers the Organisation to "take action on a wide variety of issues due to its unique international character and the powers vested in its Charter" (United Nations, n.d.). However, researches on the United Nations indicate that, as an intergovernmental organisation comprising sovereign states, the UN utilises the authority granted by these states to exercise power and influence the world. However, this authority derived from the mandate of sovereign states, which means the UN's autonomy is in fact limited, and it "rarely engages in policies that run counter to the well-defined interests of powerful states" (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004, p. 154). Specifically regarding the United Nations' handling of decolonisation, it is similarly argued that in its early years, although the organisation itself stated that one of its founding objectives was to eradicate colonialism, in practice the early United Nations continued to serve the interests of colonial powers and their allies within the organisation (Haas, 1953). However, further research indicates that, whilst the early United Nations adopted a colonialist stance, this stance was not immutable. Subsequent research has suggested that, although the anti-colonial movement predated the establishment of the United Nations, and the struggle for most non-self governing territories to become independent states is generally considered to have taken place without direct intervention by the United Nations as an international organisation (Emerson, 1965), the United Nations is nonetheless regarded as having "provided one of the arenas within which colonial issues have been raised and debated" (Rowe, 1964, p. 209). Furthermore, as time progressed and an increasing number of Third World countries joined the Organisation, this trend that disrupted the balance of its membership, which was the United Nations' original colonialist context, combined with the exploitation of ambiguities in the wording of the Charter, shifted the mainstream opinion within the Organisation towards anti-colonialism (Carty, 2011; Jacobson, 1962).

Last paragraph illustrates how the United Nations, having begun as an international organisation dominated by colonial powers and their allies and

characterised by imperialist tendencies, gradually shifted towards an anti-colonialist stance as a result of the wave of decolonisation and the continuous accession of Third World countries. It is precisely for this reason that, during this process, it became increasingly difficult to exclude the colonial issues of France and Portugal from discussions within the United Nations. However, while a great deal of research has focused on the legal and diplomatic means employed by Portugal and France within the United Nations to resist decolonisation, there has been a lack of comparative research on analysis of the specific content of their statements.

With regard to French colonialism and the Algerian question, researches indicate that, whilst implementing assimilation policies in Algeria, France regarded itself as bearing a "mission civilisatrice" (Lorcin, 1999, p. 667). This mission presupposed the superiority of French culture and the perfection of the human race, and entailed a significant responsibility to civilise the indigenous peoples under its control (Lorcin, 1999). However, researches indicate that this Eurocentric ideology (Ladjal & Bensaid, 2012) meant that France never regarded the local indigenous peoples as equals, but always viewed them as inferior. This not only led France, driven by essentialist thinking, to forcibly assimilate the local Algerian people using French culture as the benchmark, whilst simultaneously implementing discriminatory racial policies (Betts, 1960). This approach of treating Algerian territory (rather than its people) as part of France (Prochaska, 1990) has been interpreted in scholarship as having effectively created an identity conflict between "the French" and "the Algerians" during the implementation of France's assimilation policies in Algeria (Zack, 2002). As discussions on the Algerian question continued at United Nations meetings, most studies have placed France within the framework of international history to examine its conduct at these meetings, focusing on the interpretations of international law and diplomatic manoeuvering between France, its allies and Third World countries on the platform of the United Nations regarding the Algerian issue (Connelly, 2002; Saeed, 2021; Thomas, 2001; Gillissen, 2008; Smouts, 1995).

With regard to Portuguese colonialism and the Angolan question, much like France, the assimilation policies implemented by Portugal in Angola were likewise rife with systematic discrimination and inequality against the indigenous peoples of Angola. However, in order to resist the pressures of decolonisation, the *Estado Novo* era under Salazar began to invoke the concept of *Lusotropicalismo* developed by the Brazilian sociologist Gilberto Freyre. In the propaganda surrounding *Lusotropicalismo*, the Portuguese people's capacity for cultural integration in the tropical colonies was attributed to the hybrid nature of their own nation. The Portuguese people's innate adaptability was said to stem from their mixed racial heritage, their geographical position between Europe and Africa, and the history of contact with Muslims and Jews on the Iberian Peninsula during the early centuries of Portugal's founding (Castelo, 2017). However, the rhetoric of *Lusotropicalismo* employed during the New State period promoted national unity and racial harmony (Antunes, 2020). This notion of Portuguese exceptionalism is regarded in postcolonial studies as having constructed Portuguese identity (Mendonça, 2021; Mendes, 2020), it also obscured the fact that Portugal was, in essence, a racist colonial state during the New State period (Rocha, 2017; Bender, 1978; Bastos, 2019). When the question of Angola came to the attention of the United Nations, many studies of the debates concerning Portugal and Angola at the UN have focused on framing the discussion within the context of Cold War history (Freixo, 2018), within the framework of bilateral relations between Portugal and the United States (Telepneva, 2014; Marcos, 2014), or within the framework of Portugal's multilateral relations with its allies (Teixeira, 1995; Alexandre, 2017). A further body of literature has focused on Portugal's interpretation of international law during the sessions, as well as its resistance to norms (Reis, 2013; Nogueira, 2013). These studies illustrate the process of internationalisation of the Algerian and Angolan issues and discuss specific sessions of United Nations meetings. However, their focus typically centres on debates concerning international law and the diplomatic situations of the two countries, accompanied by descriptions of changes in their policies towards Algeria and Angola. Existing research still lacks a systematic comparative analysis of how France between 1955 and 1957, and Portugal between 1960 and 1962, employed strategies of

meeting statements, UN procedures and extra-parliamentary diplomacy, how these actions were coordinated, and a detailed examination of the content of their statements beyond matters of international law, which will be the innovation of this study.

Then regarding to this study, it is first and foremost significant in terms of comparative research. The existing literature has already conducted relatively thorough research into the Algerian War, the Angolan War and the decolonisation process at the United Nations. However, such studies typically examine the colonial resistance strategies of France or Portugal at the United Nations separately, and there is a scarcity of literature in this area, as well as a lack of research comparing the two within a single framework. This study compares the Algerian issue between 1955 and 1957 with the Angolan issue between 1960 and 1962. Both cases represent the more intense years when the issue of Non-Self Governing Territories came under discussion at the United Nations; the former spans the final years of the Fourth French Republic, whilst the latter spans the period when the United Nations' attention to and discussion of the Angolan issue were at their peak, with both the number of participating Member States and the number of votes cast reaching their highest levels. By comparing these two cases, this study aims to reveal the similarities and differences in the defence of their colonialism adopted by two distinct European colonial powers in the face of decolonisation pressures, whilst also examining the impact of the gradual institutionalisation and normalisation of the wave of decolonisation within the United Nations on the actions of colonial powers.

Secondly, this study's analysis of the content of the two countries' statements at United Nations meetings will be conducted within the framework of rhetorical adaptation proposed by Dixon (2017). This analysis will not only test previous theories of rhetorical adaptation but also demonstrate that, when faced with international norms, a state is not confined to a binary choice between resistance and acceptance. Moreover, there exists a degree of flexibility between these two extremes. Furthermore, the study can provide a more detailed analysis of the specific content of the two countries' statements at the meetings from the perspective of rhetorical adaptation, previous

research on resistance to United Nations norms has rarely adopted this approach, and this study can thus offer new perspectives to the relevant field. Finally, this study contributes to research on the relationship between defence strategies and voting outcomes in the United Nations' meetings. The findings reveal that the statements made by colonial states at the meetings did not significantly influence the voting outcomes on relevant draft resolutions at United Nations meetings. By comparing the two countries' statements, diplomatic actions and the outcomes of relevant votes, this study will demonstrate that the voting outcomes of France and Portugal at the meetings depended not only on their debating strategies, but were also influenced by their position within the United Nations, and geopolitical factors. Consequently, this study establishes a link between the history of decolonisation and the history of the United Nations, exploring the connections and impacts arising from the advocacy of decolonisation at United Nations meetings.

The study aims to compare the strategies employed by France regarding the question of Algeria between 1955 and 1957 and by Portugal regarding the question of Angola between 1960 and 1962 during sessions of the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council. The study adopts an comparative study as the method, whilst the analysis of meeting statements draws upon the perspective of international normative studies. Finally, the study defines defence strategies as the discourses, procedures and diplomatic actions employed by colonial powers to uphold the legitimacy of their colonial rule, to limit intervention by the United Nations and other countries, and secure international support. The analysis of discourse draws primarily on the framework of rhetorical adaptation proposed by Dixon (2017), which categorises states' responses to pressure from international norms into norm disregard, norm avoidance, norm interpretation and norm signalling. In addition, this dissertation compares the strategies of France and Portugal in three respects: firstly, in terms of discourse, this aspect will primarily examine the two countries' statements at United Nations meetings regarding colonial status, colonial nationalist organisations, acts of violence during the war, as well as reform and self-determination. Secondly, in terms of procedure: it will examine the attitudes and actions adopted by the two countries

regarding United Nations jurisdiction, agenda setting, participation in meetings and voting on resolutions. Finally, at the diplomatic level, examines how the two countries sought international support and intervened to influence voting outcomes. The explanation for the differences in trench and Portuguese strategies will primarily examine four factors: the position of the state within the United Nations as an international organisation, and the geopolitical environment, which in the study is especially with US and Nato.

The study primarily employed a comparative research methodology and conducted a qualitative analysis of the literature. The primary sources used in the study were drawn mainly from four official websites. The first was the United Nations Digital Library System, which houses the verbatim and summary records of the First and Fourth Committees of the General Assembly, and the Security Council, as well as draft resolutions, amendments, voting records and correspondence from Member States. These documents were used to examine and analyse the content of statements made by national representatives during the meetings, as well as to study the specific content of official documents; secondly, the collection of French diplomatic documents *Documents diplomatiques français* from 1955 to 1957, housed in *Gallica*, which is the Bibliothèque nationale de France (BNF) that allow us to examine the guiding principles behind the French government's internal decision-making and external actions during United Nations debates and diplomatic engagements during this period; thirdly, *Digitarq* of Portugal, the official online archive retrieval and digitisation management system used by *DGLAB* (*Direção-Geral do Livro, dos Arquivos e das Bibliotecas*) and other regional archives, which provides official records of the Portuguese Government. The content of these documents which can be accessed was used in the study to examine the guiding principles behind the Portuguese Government's internal decision-making and external actions during this period, both in United Nations debates and in its diplomatic engagements; finally, the fourth source is the *The Foreign Relations of the United States*(FRUS) series, compiled by the Office of the Historian in the United States. This website contains official historical documents recording major US foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activities. In this study, we shall examine and

analyse the decision-making content on this website relating to US policy towards France and Portugal, as well as UN votes, during the periods 1955 to 1957 and 1960 to 1962.

With regard to the collection of secondary literature, this was primarily carried out via Discovery@U. Porto, Library of University of Porto, RCAAP, JSTOR, Scopus and Google Scholar, amongst other databases. The reference lists of the collected literature were then re-analysed using Connected Papers. This encompassed monographs, journal articles and theses on the history of the United Nations, as well as the colonial histories of Portugal and France in Angola and Algeria. These academic resources were utilised to provide historical context and to interpret and understand the motivations behind the behaviour of Portugal and France during the relevant periods. However, the official documents examined in this study, such as statements made by Portugal and France at conferences, meetings and in public forums serve to defend and promote their own positions and do not accurately reflect their internal decision-making processes or thoughts. Consequently, this study does not regard the statements made by both countries at the United Nations and in other public forums as descriptions of historical facts, but rather as official narratives within specific historical and political contexts, as well as propaganda tools employed in response to international scrutiny and pressure, these are analysed in conjunction with perspectives drawn from secondary sources.

Following this introduction, the dissertation is divided into four chapters. Chapter One focuses on the history of the United Nations and the development of the decolonisation movement within it; Chapters Two and Three respectively outline the colonial histories of France and Portugal in Algeria and Angola, and the assimilation policies implemented in both colonies; Chapter Four concentrates on analysing the statements made by the French and Portuguese representatives regarding the Algerian and Angolan issues within the international community, specifically during United Nations meetings. And, in the final chapter, analyses the strategies underlying these statements.

1. The United Nations and Decolonisation (1945–1961)

1.1. The United Nations, establishment process, and Institutional Composition

After the First World War, the League of Nations was established in 1919 according to the Treaty of Versailles, with the aim of "promoting international cooperation and achieving world peace and security". This international organisation was ultimately dissolved in 1946, prior to which all assets, books, and archives of the League of Nations were transferred to the United Nations (UN), established in 1945 (United Nations, 1945).

In October 1945, following ratification by the five permanent members of the Security Council and a majority of signatory states, the *United Nations Charter* formally entered into force, marking the official establishment of the United Nations. Initially, the United Nations comprised 51 founding member states, with France, which will be the object of study in this dissertation, was one of the permanent members of the Security Council. And in the mean while, another object of study, Portugal, although showed interest and had applied for the membership of the UN since it established, Portugal was not until 1955 that it was admitted, due to the Soviet's veto (Castaño, 2015).

At its inception, the United Nations established six principal organs that continue to this day: the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice, and the Secretariat (United Nations, n.d.). With regard to the decolonisation, which is one of the subject of this study, in the early years of the United Nations, decolonisation matters were primarily overseen by the Fourth Committee, a subcommittee of the General Assembly. Subsequently, in 1961, the General Assembly established the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of

Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (the Special Committee of Twenty-Four) (United Nations, n.d.), which also addressed decolonisation issues.

1.2. The United Nations Charter and Non-Self Governing Territories

In 1945, after the conclusion of the Second World War, the United Nations was founded. At that time, nearly 750 million people (United Nations, n.d.) worldwide resided in territories subordinate to colonial countries. Expectations for the nascent United Nations were divided between upholding imperial rule and advancing colonial independence. However, in its early years, the United Nations maintained an ambiguous stance on this issue (Pearson, 2020). Today, United Nations bodies have repeatedly affirmed their commitment to eradicating colonialism and supporting the aspirations of peoples under colonial rule to exercise their right to self-determination (United Nations, n.d.). Nevertheless, research indicates that the UN initially played little substantive role in the decolonisation process: the anti-colonial movement commenced before the UN's establishment, and the fledgling organisation was largely absent from many independence campaigns. Even where it participated, it remains difficult to demonstrate whether resolutions passed in the General Assembly or negotiations held at the UN explicitly influenced outcomes (Emerson, 1965). Nevertheless, the overall assessment of the UN's role in this context is that it "at the very least, the UN has provide one of the arenas within which colonial issues have been raised and debated (Rowe, 1964)."

Although the United Nations did not initially adopt a firm stance on colonial issues upon its establishment, the United Nations Charter, as one of the cornerstones upon which the organisation was founded, provided a framework for both those seeking to preserve imperial rule and those advocating for colonial independence to engage in dialogue and take action. Consequently, to comprehend the role played by the United Nations in the decolonisation process, a thorough analysis and understanding of the specific provisions within the United Nations Charter is of paramount importance.

The United Nations Charter was signed in June 1945 at the conclusion of the United Nations meeting on International Organisation in San Francisco, and formally entered into force in October 1945. Although the Charter has undergone several revisions since its promulgation, its fundamental content has remained substantially unchanged. In Article 1, Paragraph 2 of Chapter I, the United Nations states its purpose: "To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace" (United Nations, n.d.). Herein lies the incorporation of the principles of national equality and self-determination into the founding United Nations Charter. Beyond this, three chapters of the Charter devoted detailed provisions to Non-Self-Governing Territories and the international trusteeship system: Chapter XI: Declaration Regarding on Non-Self-Governing Territories; Chapter XII: International Trusteeship System; and Chapter XIII: Trusteeship Council. Based on these sections of the Charter, it is evident that the United Nations categorised contemporary colonies into two distinct groups: Non-Self-Governing Territories and Trust Territories.

The Non-Self-Governing Territories were defined as "whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government" (United Nations, n.d.). Trust Territories were defined as "territories placed under the mandate of the League of Nations after the First World War"; "territories separated from "enemy nations" as a result of the Second World War"; and "territories voluntarily placed under this system by nations bearing administrative responsibility" (United Nations, n.d.). Centred on these Trust Territories, the United Nations established the International Trusteeship System.

The United Nations holds that Non-Self-Governing Territories should be administered by individual Member States, in compliance with the requirements of the Charter, respecting and developing the cultural, political and economic life of the peoples of these Territories, along with their welfare. The Charter declares that Member

States bear the responsibility to submit annual reports on Non-Self-Governing Territories to the United Nations, designating this obligation as a “sacred trust”.

The relevant sections of the United Nations Charter ostensibly convey universal values promoting peace and human rights, incorporating the future of non-self-governing territories and their peoples into the Charter's considerations. Within the framework of maintaining international peace and security, it seeks to advance the welfare and progressive self-government of the peoples of these territories. However, research suggests that despite the Charter's greater emphasis on global cooperation following the UN's establishment, its handling of colonial issues remains fundamentally rooted in the politics of kinship, which is based on the authority model found in kinship relations that taking Westen Europe families in particular as an example, the colonial ruler as rational, masculine and patriarchal possessing a natural and legitimate right to rule, just like the father in a family, and the colonies as irrational, feminine and childlike (Patil, 2008, p. 3). This implies the Charter does not fully align with the interests of colonial peoples, on the contrary, colonial countries engineered its design to legitimise colonialism.

A cursory examination of selected Charter provisions reveals that while concepts such as “equal rights of peoples” and “self-determination” are invoked, the Charter's phrasing effectively positions colonies and their populations as entities requiring administration and subject to colonial power oversight. For instance, the Charter characterises colonial administration of non-self-governing territories as a ‘sacred trust’. In effect, the United Nations Charter explicitly recognised colonialism as a form of trusteeship through treaty, while deliberately maintaining ambiguity in the designation of non-self-governing and trust territories. This ambiguity provided colonial countries with considerable operational latitude (Muschik, 2022a). Chapter XI: Declaration on Non-Self-Governing Territories is widely regarded as a fundamental compromise with the European colonial empires (Stahn, 2010). Chapter XI contains no provision explicitly defining the ultimate trajectory for the future development of non-self-

governing territories, save for Article 73(b). To develop self-government in accordance with the particular circumstances of each territory and its people and the stage of its evolution; to pay due regard to the political aspirations of the people concerned; and to assist in the progressive development of free political institutions (United Nations, n.d.) . Throughout this chapter, all references to self-government are described as gradual, appropriate, and not intended as a final objective. Moreover, no explicit mention is made of the term “independence”. Regarding this point, Huntington Gilchrist explains in his article *Colonial Questions at the San Francisco Conference*:

"Independence" was not mentioned as a goal, for the single reason that no colonial power except the United States looks upon it as a normal and natural outcome of colonial status, and it must be remembered that the Conference was a conference of governments and not of dependent peoples (Gilchrist, 1945).

Although Gilchrist also noted that the phrase “to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions “ (United Nations, n.d.) in Article 73(b) might imply a potential trajectory towards “independence”, the wording itself remains highly ambiguous, precisely the key that enabled colonial countries to evade explicit commitments.

Moreover, Article 73(e) of the Charter sets forth the obligations of Member States and the supervisory duties of the Secretary-General of the United Nations: Subject to the restrictions of security and constitutional law, Member States shall furnish to the Secretary-General, for information purposes, statistical and specialised information on the economic, social and educational conditions within the territories for which they are respectively responsible (United Nations, n.d.). This clause appears to establish a fundamental oversight mechanism for the United Nations regarding non-self-governing territories. However, a review of the Charter reveals a lack of concrete institutional support. The Charter contains no binding provisions regarding the obligations of either

the United Nations or Member States. It does not specify precise deadlines for Member States to submit reports, nor does it designate a particular body to process and evaluate the content of these reports. Consequently, this provision functions more as a moral declaration than an enforceable international legal obligation. As such, the declaration is fundamentally regarded as virtually unenforceable (Ayouty, 1971). This stands in stark contrast to the trusteeship system established under Chapters XII and XIII of the Charter. These chapters are more detailed in their provisions, explicitly introducing "independence" as one of the developmental objectives for trust territories. They also establish specific mechanisms, such as the Trusteeship Council, for inspection, deliberation, and receiving petitions, thereby imposing robust institutional constraints upon administering powers. These features are particularly evident in Articles 76 and 87 of the Charter.

However, the limitations of the Charter are also reflected in the delineation of the United Nations' sphere of authority. Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter further states: "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter" (United Nations, n.d.), this clause directly denies the United Nations the right to interfere in any matter essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State (Emerson, 1965). This significantly constrains the United Nations' capacity to address international affairs. In Rules for the World (Barnett & Finnemore, 2012), to explain the autonomy of the United Nations (and similar international organisations), the authors adopt a sociological perspective, conceptualising the United Nations as a bureaucratic institution.The authors contend that although the UN is an institution established by sovereign states, its capabilities and functional scope cannot fundamentally transcend the authority of sovereign states. However, during its formation, the UN was endowed with qualifications that grant it a degree of "autonomy" relative to sovereign states, other organisations, and individuals.This "autonomy" leads the authors to contend that international organisations like the UN

also possess “authority”. This “authority” lends the UN a measure of prestige even before the sovereign states that established it, despite the organisation's frequent inability to match its intentions with its capabilities when handling relevant affairs.

Thus, we can discern that whether viewed from the perspective of regulatory frameworks or the institutional architecture of international organisations, the design of the United Nations Charter exhibits pronounced structural limitations when confronting colonial issues, demonstrating a lack of efficacy. On the one hand, the Charter repeatedly invokes values such as “human rights”, “peace”, and “self-determination” throughout its text. This reflects a post-World War II reflection on past “atrocities” and a global commitment to rectifying such “wrongs”(Spijkers, 2012). Yet, on the crucial matter of independence for colonial peoples, the Charter's provisions remain ambiguous, lacking concrete and enforceable stipulations while failing to impose robust constraints upon colonial countries. This reveals an inherent contradiction within the Charter's approach to colonialism: while its principles fervently champion concepts like human rights and self-determination, its structural framework accommodates and even perpetuated the legitimacy of the colonial system (Criddle, 2024, p. 626).

Despite the vague provisions of the Charter, Chapters XII and XIII are more detailed in content and institutional design than Chapter XI, particularly in setting “independence” as the developmental goal for non-self-governing territories and establishing more specific oversight mechanisms. However, this does not imply that Chapters XII and XIII of the Charter produced more effective decolonisation outcomes than Chapter XI. Indeed, a deeper examination of the international trusteeship system reveals its inherent flaws, as previously indicated. It is therefore necessary to trace the historical evolution of this system, uncover its true function and limitations within the United Nations Charter, and scrutinise whether it genuinely contributed to dismantling the global colonial order or merely legitimised its continuation under new guises.

2. French Colonialism in Algeria

2.1. French Colonialism in Algeria

In the history of France's colonial expansion, Algeria occupies a very special position.The French invasion of Algiers in 1830 led to Algiers becoming a colony, whilst the *Constitution de 1848* enacted in the year 1848, changed Algiers' status from that of a colony to that of a "territoire français", which made algeria regarded as a province of France, an integral part of French territory, "French Algeria" as the *L'Algérie française*. Then, between 1848 and 1962, France's direct rule over Algeria evolved from military rule to civilian rule, accompanied by assimilation policies implemented locally.

2.2. The Arrival of the French and the process of invasion in Algeria

Algeria's history dating back to the 3rd century BC. The original inhabitants were Berbers. The modern form of Algeria emerged in the early 16th century as the Regency of Algiers under Ottoman Empire. France had previously launched an expedition against Algiers but failed to succeed. For a long time thereafter, France and Algiers maintained primarily economic and trade relations (McDougall, 2017). The relatively peaceful coexistence deteriorated in the 19th century due to trade and debt disputes. This culminated in the coup d'éventail[1] (the "blow with the fly-whisk") of 1827, prompting the government of which Charles X to impose a prolonged naval blockade on Algiers and launch another military expedition in 1830 (Frémeaux, 2019, p.27). In addition to trade and debt disputes, one of the reasons France launched an expedition against Algiers was to enhance the government's domestic prestige (Esquer, 1957).

[1] The coup d'éventail (the "blow with the fly-whisk") refers to a conflict that occurred in 1827. At the time, Hussein Dey, the Ottoman governor of Algiers, struck French consul Pierre de Val with a fly swatter due to a debt dispute. This diplomatic insult was later used by France as a pretext to invado Algeria in 1830. (Frémeaux, 2019; Esquer, 1957).

However, after the initial conquest of Algiers, the government's prestige did not rise as expected, and subsequently, a *coup d'état* known as the “Trois Glorieuses” occurred in France in 1830. When the “Trois Glorieuses” ended, Charles X abdicated, the Bourbon dynasty was overthrown, and the new July Monarchy was established, with King Louis-Philippe I ascending the throne (Barjot, Chaline and Encrevé, 2014, pp. 174-178).

Despite the change of dynasty, and discussions on how to deal with the results of the previous dynasty's expeditions. France's conquest of Algiers did not stop there. After the new government withdrawing part of its troops, the French forces remaining in Algiers attempted to advance gradually from the coastal areas towards the interior. Despite resistance from the local population during the advance, the French government did not halt its military conquest ((Frémeaux, 2019, pp.42-43). On 22 July 1834, after a comprehensive assessment of Algiers, King Louis-Philippe and the newly appointed the Minister of War, Étienne Maurice Gérard, comte Gérard, jointly issued the *Ordonnance royale du 22 juillet 1834* (Government of France, 1834). This decree confirmed that France would formally establish a territory known as the “les possessions françaises dans le Nord de l’Afrique” (Government of France, 1834, p.122), to be led by the gouverneur général, and endowed with both military and civilian power. Following this, France's colonial presence in Algeria transitioned from the time of “Anarchy” to a phase of limited occupation (Li, 2023, p. 24).

In response to the Algerian people's resistance, such as that led by the Islamic leader Abd el-Kader from western Algeria, who became a jihad leader in 1832 and was known as the Amir, quickly gained the support of many tribes. He then began to build an army and resist the French military invasion. Faced with this situation, France adopted a dual strategy of conflict and compromise. After several years of conflict, France opted for a phased compromise and negotiated with the Amir in May 1837, ultimately signing and ratifying the *Treaty of Tafna*. The *Treaty of Tafna* was drafted in both Arabic and French, and the differing interpretations of the treaty by both sides eventually led to its breach. In 1839, Abd al-Kader launched a new jihad war against

France, while Thomas Robert Bugeaud, who had participated in the treaty negotiations, no longer favoured a conciliatory stance. In 1840, the French government appointed General Bugeaud as the new governor, and thereafter, France shifted its policy towards Algeria from “occupation” to “Total war”.

Before becoming Governor-General of Algeria, Bugeaud had already participated in numerous wars and gained extensive experience. When facing Kader's guerrilla tactics, Bugeaud applied the counter-guerrilla warfare experience he had gained during the Peninsular War in Spain from 1808 to 1814 to the situation in Algeria (Evans, 2012). In his strategy for the “total war” against Algeria, Bugeaud extensively employed the tactic of *razzia* (a military terminology that conduct a surprise raid against an enemy settlement) (Porch, 2010).

Under the leadership of Bugeaud and the French military offensive, Kader finally surrendered to France in 1847. Ten years later, France conquered the Kabylia region. By this point, under France's military expansion, most of Algeria was under direct French rule. France's conquest of Algeria had made progress, but just one year after Kader's surrender, in 1848, the February Revolution erupted in France, overthrowing the July Monarchy, and Louis-Philippe I abdicated, ushering in the Second French Republic. In the same year, the Second Republic promulgated a new constitution, which stated in Article 109 of Chapter 10: “The territory of Algeria and the colonies is declared French territory and shall be governed by special laws until a special law places them under the regime of the present Constitution.[2] ” (Government of France, 1848). This meant that, starting in 1848, Algeria was divided into three provinces (Algiers, Oran, and Constantine) and formally became part of France in this form. This status was highly exceptional, as no other colonies had previously been incorporated into French territory.

2.3. The *Mission Civilisatrice* and Assimilation Policies in Algeria

[2] Original text: “ Le territoire de l'Algérie et des colonies est déclaré territoire français, et sera régi par des lois particulières jusqu'à ce qu'une loi spéciale les place sous le régime de la présente Constitution.”

Assimilation theory is not exclusive to France, but assimilation is an important part of France's traditional colonial theory. At the time, there were many interpretations of assimilation theory in France, with different people offering varying interpretations of the details of "assimilation". For example, some argued that assimilation meant the integration of colonies into the political system of the mother country while maintaining autonomy; others saw it as the transformation of non-Europeans according to European "civilisational" standards, still others interpreted it as racial equality, or the spread of the French language in non-European countries (Lewis, 1962). The main disagreements over the definition of "assimilation" focused on cultural assimilation versus administrative and political assimilation. However, from an essential and outcome perspective, assimilation meant transforming distant, disconnected colonies into part of the "mother country" 's (Betts, 1961, p. 8) territory, with their societies and populations being reshaped as much as possible to align with the "mother country" 's (Betts, 1961, p. 8) image. Although Betts, in his book *Assimilation and Association in French Colonial Theory, 1890–1914*, defined assimilation as the integration of the colonies into the French "mother country", Betts and other studies on French assimilation also pointed out that such policy did not truly forge a link between the colonies and the colonial power, but was instead employed to serve France's colonialism (Betts, 1961; Loyal, 2009).

In addition, the term "civilisation" originates from the French word "civilisé", which in turn derives from the Latin word "civilis". It is used to describe a state of social and cultural development, as well as the process of achieving this state. The French believed that they had a special *mission civilisatrice*. This mission assumed the superiority of French culture, and entrusted the French with the important responsibility of civilising the indigenous peoples under their control. In the dictionary 1848's *Dictionnaire politique : encyclopédie du langage et de la science politiques*, under the entry for "Colonie", colonialism is associated with expansion and instinct for a powerful nation. It declared that "Colonisation is the most praiseworthy and glorious form of conquest; it is the most direct means of spreading civilisation. It is always useful, but

there are circumstances that make it particularly necessary[3]" (Garnier-Pagès et al., 1848, p. 243). Thus, the promotion of the "mission civilisatrice" ideology attempted to soft the aggressive imperialism and colonialism of France (Conklin, 1997).

The assimilation policy was implemented based on this concept. France's assimilation policy was mainly implemented through legal, economic, and cultural means.

In the question of Algeria's sovereignty, France gradually established the fact that Algeria was part of French territory through war, treaties, and the adoption of a new constitution at the official legal level. This annexation process was advanced by the later governor-general Thomas Robert Bugeaud (period in office from 1840 to 1847), whose tactical arrangements enabled France to gain control of Algeria. Although Bugeaud employed brutal war strategies, such as the scorched earth policy, to suppress the Algerian resistance, he also sought to unite the population through peaceful means during this period. He believed that, beyond military conquest, the key to French rule in Algeria lay in demonstrating to the Algerian people the benefits that France's arrival could bring, including economic, medical, and religious advantages (Thoral, 2015). Medical teams accompanying the French army provided healthcare services to both French troops and local residents in exchange for the support of the indigenous population. These medical teams carried out a partially civilising mission. During their time in Algeria, they not only engaged in medical activities and the dissemination of French culture but also participated in colonial political affairs, including contact and observation of the indigenous population. Their research on the indigenous population enhanced French society's understanding of Algeria and provided a foundation for the implementation of assimilation policies. However, the research they did also foster negative stereotypes toward the Algerian people and Islam (Lorcin, 1999).

---

[3] Original Text: "La colonisation est la forme la plus louable et la plus glorieuse de la conquête; c'est le moyen le plus direct de propager la civilisation. Elle est toujours utile , mais il est des circonstances qui la rendent particulièrement nécessaire."

In Algeria, before it became part of France, the indigenous population was primarily Berber, with a significant Arab population and a smaller Jewish community (McDougall, 2017). When French medical teams arrived in Algeria and began interacting with the local population, they observed that, compared to the smaller, more easily communicative Berber and Jewish communities, the Arab population, which adhered to Islam, was much larger, and difficult to engage with and assimilate (Lorcin, 1999). This led France to prioritise the implementation of its assimilation policies on the Muslim population.

Starting in 1840, France began to encourage immigration of French settler at official level. For a period of time, a large number of immigrants arrived in Algeria. By 1876, the European immigrant population in Algeria had reached 344,000, accounting for one-tenth of the total population of Algeria (Zhao, 2006). In the early stages, the number of immigrants from other European countries exceeded that of immigrants from France, but over time, the number of French immigrants gradually increased, and these European immigrants gradually settled in Algeria.

In 14 July 1865, the French Senate adopted a resolution on the status of persons and naturalisation in Algeria, which was the *Sénatus-consulte du 14 juillet 1865 sur l'état des personnes et la naturalisation en Algérie* (France, 1865). The legislation granted French nationality to Muslims and Jews in Algeria, allowing them to apply for French citizenship (McDougall, 2017). In the *Sénatus-consulte du 14 juillet 1865 sur l'état des personnes et la naturalisation en Algérie* (Government of France, 1865), a distinction was made between the French nationality and citizenship of Muslims and Jews in Algeria: "Native Muslim are French; nevertheless, they will continue to be governed by Muslim law… they may, upon application, be granted the rights of a French citizen; in that case, they are governed by the civil and political laws of France. Indigenous Jews are French; nevertheless, they continue to be governed by their personal status… They may, upon application, be granted the rights of a French citizen; in that case, they are

governed by French law[4] (Government of France, 1865)". The research pointed out that the condition for applying for citizenship to Muslims was that they must renounce their *statut personnel*, which effectively meant abandoning their original faith and the legal protections afforded by their respective religions. This legislation separated nationality from citizenship, meaning that those who did not renounce their religious faith remained French nationals but not French citizens, and were thus excluded from the rights and benefits of French citizenship. Although it was possible to choose to become a French citizen, almost no one did so (Evans, 2012, p. 22).

To overcome opposition to naturalisation, a decree was issued in 24 October 1870 under the impetus of Adolf Crémieux, the Jewish-born Minister of Justice, directly granting French citizenship to Jews in Algeria. However, the *Décrets Crémieux* (Government of France, 1870) only applied to some Jews in Algeria, leading to divisions within the Jewish community (McDougall, 2017, p. 115). Furthermore, this decree did not apply to Muslims at all, and "placing Muslims below Jews" (Evans, 2012, p. 16). Compared to the Jewish population, the Muslim population was much larger. To further expand the French population in Algeria and assimilate the large Muslim population, France enacted new laws in 26 June 1889, the Loi du 26 juin 1889 sur la nationalité (Government of France, 1889), requiring all descendants of foreigners residing on French territory to automatically naturalise as French citizens upon reaching adulthood.

In addition to legal assimilation, France also strengthened the cultural assimilation of Algeria, primarily through its education system. In 1881 to 1882, the Third Republic enacted the Lois Jules Ferry (Government of France, 1881; Government of France 1882), which mandated free, compulsory, and secular primary education for all children.

---

[4] Original text: "L'indigène musulman est Français ; néanmoins il continuera à être régi par la loi musulmane…Il peut, sur sa demande, être admis à jouir des droits de citoyen français ; dans ce cas il est régi par les lois civiles et politiques de la France;L'indigène israëlite est Français ; néanmoins il continue à être régi par son statut personnel…Il peut, sur sa demande, être admis à jouir des droits de citoyen français ; dans ce cas il est régi par la loi française."

As part of French territory, Algeria also began implementing this law in 1883. In 13 February 1883, Décret relatif à l'organisation de l'instruction primaire en Algérie (Government of France, 1883) was issued. However, the law was not mandatory for Muslim children, who could choose to participate voluntarily, as a result, the literacy rate among Muslim children was significantly lower than that of other ethnic groups, which made Muslim people being implicitly excluded from Algeria's development process in terms of their right to education (Belmessous, 2013). Additionally, the schools established in 1908 specifically for the local indigenous population were of poor quality. Despite state-level support for assimilation, most Algerian settlers refused to implement assimilation policies towards the indigenous population, fearing that educated indigenous people would demand rights and thereby undermine the settlers' interests (Belmessous, 2013, p. 147). At this point, the Muslim community had been excluded from French society both legally and educationally, and was unable to participate in the assimilation process either actively or passively. Additionally, the racially discriminatory indigenous policies implemented in Algeria starting in 1881 severely undermined the interests and rights of indigenous groups, exacerbating tensions between Algerian settlers and indigenous communities. To a certain extent, the efforts to integrate Algeria into France through assimilationist in fact exacerbated the tensions between the white settlers and the indigenous people in Algeria (Zack, 2002).

In World War II, the trend of national liberation influenced Algeria, but France completely ignored the Algerian people's request for independence (Connelly, 2002). In 1945, the Sétif and Guelma massacres[5] and the subsequent violent suppression by France became the trigger for the Algerian War of Independence. The Algerian War

[5] On 8 May 1945, Germany unconditionally surrendered, marking the end of World War II in Europe. Across Algeria, people celebrated the victory over the war. Among them, Algerian democrats called for demonstrations in many towns across Algeria to oppose French colonialism. In the eastern Algerian city of Sétif, police opened fire on demonstrators participating in a march. In response, demonstrators attacked and killed many French settlers. Over the next few days, spontaneous uprisings broke out in other cities, with casualties rising steadily. At the behest of the French government, Algerian local authorities brutally suppressed the uprisings in these regions. This event is generally regarded as the true beginning of the Algerian War of Independence (Prochaska, 1990, p. 237).

broke out in 1954. The Algerian resistance forces were mainly composed of the Algerian nationalist organisations that had previously existed in Algeria, united to form the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN), conducted by Larbi Ben M'Hidi, Didouche Mourad, Rabah Bitat, Krim Belkacem, Mohamed Boudiaf, and Mostefa Ben Boulaid, with Hocine Ait Ahmed, Ahmed Ben Bella, and Mohammed Khider outside Algeria (Stora, 2001, p. 47). During the war, France underwent many government reorganisations, as well as the end of the Fourth Republic and the establishment of the Fifth Republic in 1958. However, France maintained a repressive policy in Algeria, employing military force to quell the insurgency, while engaging in disingenuous negotiations with the FLN concerning self-determination.The turning point in the Algerian War came in 1958, when Charles de Gaulle returned to power[6]. Although Charles de Gaulle was a defender of the French colonial empire, there were calls in France for a negotiated settlement to the Algerian issue, and the Algerian War had dragged on for so long that there was little hope (Naylor, 2000). For these reasons, on 18 March 1962, France and the National Liberation Front signed the *Évian Accords*, and the Algerian War ended the following day.

As a traditional European great power, France boasts a long history (Rieker, 2018). However, ever since its defeat in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, signs of the decline in France's status as a great power have continued to trouble French leaders. As a result, French leaders resolved to uphold the empire, thereby restoring France to its former prominence on the international stage (Smith, 1974). During the period from

---

[6] In 1946, the Prime Minister of the Provisional Government of France, Charles de Gaulle resigned in disagreement with the Constituent Assembly on the conception of the State. Later, France gradually transitioned from a provisional government to the Fourth Republic. However, during the reconstruction process, the French government underwent frequent changes amid turbulent domestic and international circumstances. Meanwhile, conflicts in colonial wars and the French military's defeats in these conflicts (the Battle of Dien Bien Phu in Vietnam in 1954) further eroded public confidence in the French government. In 1958, the unstable cabinet and the immense pressure from the Algerian crisis pushed the Fourth Republic into a severe crisis. Amid calls from all sectors of French society, following negotiations between the French government and Charles de Gaulle, the National Assembly voted in June to appoint de Gaulle as Prime Minister of the Fourth Republic. In September of the same year, de Gaulle submitted a draft constitution for a new republic. After the draft constitution was adopted, the Fourth Republic came to an end, and the Fifth Republic was officially established.

1955 to 1957, whilst the Fourth Republic was engaged in discussions on the Algerian question, the country was in a state of political turmoil (Naylor, 2002), however, even amongst the elite decision-makers within France, there was no consensus regarding national identity (Demker, 2026). In other words, although during the Fourth Republic, Algeria had been firmly institutionalised as an integral part of France, it remained unclear whether French national identity was based on territorial boundaries (Lustick, 2002). Consequently, on the issue of Algeria, until 1956, successive governments and political parties had reached only one consensus: that Algeria could not become independent, and that a future of independence was "unthinkable and unmentionable" (Pickles, 1963, p. 21). Amid a turbulent political climate, the sole consensus on the Algerian question and the absence of a consistent, firm policy (Quermonne, 1957), which according to Smith, as the result of France's "multiple parties and weak executive" (Smith, 1974, p. 218) , and exacerbated the vacillating nature of French policy-making regarding the question of Algeria. In Raoul Girardet's book *L'idée coloniale en France de 1871 à 1962* (Girardet, 1972), he broadly categorised attitudes towards Algeria within France during this period into two types: one being the preservation of sovereignty, the core of which "focuses primarily on maintaining the *status quo,* defending the established order and existing institutions, with the aim of prohibiting or curbing any change, reform or development[7]" (Girardet, 1972, p. 362); another thought was reform-minded, accepting criticism of France's policies in Algeria at the time and acknowledging the colony's evolution, whilst seeking a new order that could be implemented in Algeria on this basis (Girardet, 1972, p. 362). Amidst the tension between upholding sovereignty and opting for reform, reformist thought and political constructs filled the gap left by sovereignty-oriented thinking, which, beyond military action, offered little else in terms of safeguarding French sovereignty in Algeria, and this finally lead to the enactment of the Loi-Cadre (Smith, 1974).

[7] Original text: "s'attache essentiellement au maintien du statu quo, à la défense de l'ordre établi et des institutions existantes, qui vise à interdire ou à freiner toute mutation, toute réforme, toute évolution".

However, in the implementation of its colonial policy in Algeria, France did not engage in official propaganda specifically targeting anti-colonial resistance, as seen in *Lusotropicalismo*. Instead, it adopted a singular French model based on territorialism: "Within the territory, the same culture, way of life and language must be observed, in accordance with the principle of homogeneity… Under this republican model, ethnic differences are viewed as a violation of equality and social solidarity, and as a breach of the principles of the French Republic. Consequently, France's so-called openness and tolerance are, in reality, methods for eradicating ethnic particularism" (Ma, 2012, p. 30) . Consequently, whether in France's official narrative or in its actual actions, French colonialism was "aimed at forcibly changing the identity of the natives into one that would align as closely as possible with the identity of their oppressors" (Renzo, 2019, p. 32). This meant that, although France regarded Algeria as an inseparable part of its territory, it lacked a sense of cultural identification with the country. On the contrary, the implementation of colonial policies served to further cement the boundaries between the French and the Algerians: "'French' and 'Algerian' were associated more with the above political orientation (different political stances regarding whether to maintain French domination over Angola, or to seek reform, self government or even independence) than with a clear set of social groups or cultural attributes" (Zack, 2002, p. 83).

3. Portugal Colonialism and Angola

3.1. The Arrival of Portugal in Angola and its invasion

In 1483, Portuguese navigator Diogo Cão sailed to the west coast of Africa and reached the Kingdom of Kongo. After making contact with the local people, the Portuguese established a settlement in the Luanda region of present-day Angola. From there, Portugal engaged in trade and cultural exchange with neighbouring countries. As trade continued to grow and develop, the Portuguese expanded their influence beyond their initial settlement, defeating the Kingdom of Ndongo and the Kingdom of Kongo, among others, and establishing numerous settlements. Over the next two centuries, Portugal engaged in slave trade as the primary economic activity in Angola, expanding inland from the coast through a series of military campaigns. The Berlin Conference from 1884 to 1885 established, what would become approximately the modern borders of Angola, and by the mid-1920s, Angola's borders were finally defined through military conquest (Ball, 2017).

3.2. *Estado Novo*: Law, Race, and Exclusion

The coup d'état in May 1926 brought an end to the First Portuguese Republic. In the same year, Portugal enacted the *Estatuto dos Indígenas,* the old class gradations of colonial society was legally replaced by a simple, two-way barrier between “citizens” and “natives” (Birmingham, 2015, p. 64). However, the enactment of this law transformed the previous divisions based on skin colour and ethnicity into a binary classification of “civilizado” and “indignato”. To become a Portuguese citizen, Black and mixed-race individuals were required to sit an exam presided over by colonial official, which lacked central oversight and had no uniform standards (Ball, 2017, p. 10), which was extremely difficult and complex. Under the new law, Angolans could

only be recognised as “civilizado" if they met a series of strict cultural and moral standards. These standards included proficiency in Portuguese, adherence to monogamy, use of European social manners, and wearing Western-style clothing. Those who failed to meet these requirements, regardless of their Catholic faith or social background, were classified as “indígenas" (Birmingham, 2015, p.80).

However, most Africans had no access to education, so most were unable to meet these conditions. As a result, people in Angola were artificially divided into a small minority of “citizens” (mainly white elites and a very small number of African “assimilados”) and a large number of African “natives”. Under these circumstances, according to the Article 5 of the *Estatuto dos Indígenas* (Secretaria Geral, 1926, p. 23), it guaranteed freedom of contract in labour relations of “indígenas”, however, this was merely a façade designed to conceal forced labour (Bender, 1980, pp. 141-142). During this period, many “indigenas” suffered abuse, while the small number of Africans deemed assimilated continued to face discrimination in the workplace and daily life, with the system remaining biased toward European settlers (Bender, 1980, p. 153). Under the *Estatuto dos Indígenas*, Angola's population was artificially divided into classes and carried strong undertones of racial discrimination: the possibility of the vast majority of Africans obtaining citizenship was legally excluded. This selective assimilation severed the racial ties among the people living in Angola, making racial discrimination and prejudice more overt, and further fuelling the wave of Angolan nationalism.

Following the coup d'état in 1926, António de Oliveira Salazar was appointed Minister of Finance. In 1930, he participated in the drafting of the *Acto Colonial* as acting Minister for the Colonies. Two years later, in 1932, Salazar was appointed Prime Minister of Portugal. The following year, Portugal came under the authoritarian rule of the Estado Novo regime established by Salazar. During the period of the regime of Salazar, Portugal has always placed great emphasis on overseas territories, and during Salazar's tenure, there was significant focus on overseas territorial politics, economics, and colonial ideology (MacQueen, 1997).

In 1930, Salazar participated in the drafting and promulgation of the Acto Colonial, which not only redefined the relationship between Angola and other overseas territories but also changed the previous administrative model for overseas territories. Article 3 of the Act defined the relationship between Portugal and its overseas territories, stating that Angola and other overseas territories were colonies of the Portuguese Empire: "Os domínios ultramarinos de Portugal denominam-se colónias e constituem o Império Colonial Português" [8] (Government of Domingos da Costa Oliveira, 1933, p. 1).

Furthermore, the decree stipulated that absolute administrative unity would be enforced over the colonies, as stated in Article 12: "O Estado terá em vista a completa unificação administrativa da colónia[9] " (Government of Domingos da Costa Oliveira, 1933, p. 3). This meant the centralisation of colonial administration and was a legal manifestation of centralised control over the colonies. Economically, the government also exercised control over the colonies, including the establishment of trade barriers to transform Angola into a commodity market and raw material supplier for Portugal (Ball, 2017).

3.3. From *Mística Imperial* to *Lusotropicalismo*

In addition to economic and administrative aspects, the Estado Novo also sought to justify and legitimise Portugal's colonial activities through its choice of ideology and propaganda. The importance of colonial ideology during the consolidation of the regime is obvious; it was one of the pillars on which the Estado Novo was built (Barros, 2024). Between the 1930s and 1940s, the main guiding ideology of Portugal's colonial policy and propaganda was the "Mística Imperial".

According to Mendonça's *PORTUGUESE IMPERIAL IDEOLOGY: DOMINATION AND MENTALITY TOWARDS AFRICA (1910–1945)*, the term "Mística imperial" is

---

8 "The overseas territories of Portugal are called colonies and constitute the Portuguese Colonial Empire."

9 "The State shall aim at the complete administrative unification of the colony."

believed to have originated from General Azevedo 's article of the same name, *Mística imperial* in 1939 (Mendonça, 2010). Following further verification by the *Biblioteca U. Porto* and *DGLAB/Livro*, it can be established with greater certainty that *Mística imperial* was published in 1936 and that its author, Alves de Azevedo[10], was a writer and journalist. At the beginning of the book, Azevedo mentions a quarterly magazine published by the Mozambican colonial government called *Moçambique*, in which he discovered the term *Mística imperial*. He then explains the term and uses it to praise the unique Portuguese imperialism, which was completely different from other European imperialisms:

"Por isto Portugal possuiu desde sempre uma mistica imperial sui-generis... O patriotismo sincero, o espirito de iniciativa afirmativo da nossa raça que prefere poupar e estimular o desenvolvimento das raças nativas a uma politica negativa de segregação, a convicção de que a obra colonial é de sacrifício, antes um dever do que um direito, dão ás qualidades especificas da grei lusiada o verdadeiro cambiante dessa mistica que em plena justiça mais do que a ninguem nos pertence" (Azevedo, 1936, P.6).

In his book, he describes Africa as a magical and fascinating place waiting to be discovered by the Portuguese, and refutes the view that Portugal's colonial activities amounted to the racial and civilisational annihilation of the local population. He states that, unlike the colonial activities of other nations, Portugal aimed to transform the local regions into places akin to the Metropolis and gradually integrate the local population into Metrópole civilisation, thereby elevating their status. According to Azevedo, the Portuguese were the ethnic group that contributed most significantly to the rise of African nations. In addition to Azevedo's views in his book, in Angola, this 'Mística' was seen as having rational roots. Military heroes and Angolan assimilated individuals of that period believed that the Portuguese possessed special talents to civilise Africa,

[10] Francisco Alberto de Almeida Alves de Azevedo, a writer and journalist. studied for the Colonial Higher Education Course, which he completed in 1931. From 1936 to 1950, he held the posts of librarian and officer at the Ministry of Overseas Territories, working in the Departments of Political Affairs and Personnel and in the Secretariat of the Higher Inspectorate of Overseas Administration. Between 1946 and 1949 he was seconded to the State of India, where he served as Head of the Information Section of the Statistics Department. From 1950 to 1953 he served at the Embassy of the United States of America (DGLAB/ Livro, n.d.).

bring civilisation, adapt to Africa, and lead Angolans forward along the path of Portuguese-African integration (Wheeler & Pélisser, 1973). This "Mística" was imbued with the notion of European civilisation and white superiority, emphasising the so-called special talents of the Portuguese, leading them to believe they had a mission and obligation to bring civilisation to Africa, enabling Africans to develop under Portuguese guardianship (Alexandre, 2000). This perspective was also enshrined in legal terms, as stated in Article 2 [11] of the colonial act.

These words formed the moral basis of *Mística imperial*, portraying colonial rule as a sacred duty to continue Portugal's history and religious traditions. The pride of the Portuguese people and their sense of duty to defend their colonies were mobilised. By emphasising this sense of obligation and voluntariness, not only were Portuguese nationalism and pride enhanced, but Portugal's colonialism in Africa was also glorified.

However, after the end of the Second World War in 1945, the global landscape underwent significant changes. Anti-colonial movements emerged, and independence movements in Africa and Asia gained momentum. Additionally, international institutions and organisations, such as the United Nations, began to focus on the issue of colonialism and exerted increasing pressure on Portugal. *Mística imperial* was no longer effective in governing the colonies. To continue colonialism and maintain its rule in Africa, Portugal needed a new rhetoric to legitimise its colonialism. In this context, Luso- tropicalismo emerged in the Portuguese government's vision.

The concept of *Lusotropicalismo* did not originate in the context of Portugal's colonial rule in Africa. In 1933, Brazilian sociologist Gilberto de Mello Freyre published a book titled *Casa-Grande & Senzala*, which was a study of Brazilian society. In the book, Freyre argued that Portuguese people possess a natural and unique tropical adaptability and cultural inclusivity, enabling them to integrate more easily with non-European ethnic groups in tropical regions. In the opening section, he wrote:

[11] "É da essência orgânicada Nação Portuguesa desempenhar a função histórica de possuir e colonizar domínio sultramarinos o de civilizar as populações indígenas que nêles se compreendam, exercendo também a influência moral que lhe é adstrita pelo Padroado do Oriente (Government of Domingos da Costa Oliveira, 1933, P1)."

“A singular predisposição do português para a colonização híbrida e escravocrata dos trópicos, explica-a em grande parte o seu passado étnico, ou antes, cultural, de povo indefinido entre a Europa e a África. Nem intransigentemente de uma nem de outra, mas das duas (Freyre, 1933, P. 66). ”

In Freyre's description, the Portuguese ability to assimilate cultures in tropical colonies stemmed from the mixed nature of their own ethnic group. Portuguese people are often considered to have innate adaptability, which stems from their diverse ethnic origins, including mixed racial backgrounds, their geographical location between Europe and Africa, and their early contact with Muslim and Jewish communities on the Iberian Peninsula. *Lusotropicalismo* is primarily manifested through miscegenation and cultural interpenetration (Castelo, 2017). Compared to the colonial activities of other nations, the Portuguese were mild-mannered, benevolent, and free from prejudice toward the local indigenous populations, which had also been identified as a means of glorifying colonialism, allowing racial discrimination to be expressed in a covert form (Vala et al., 2008).

After Freyre's ideas were discovered by the Portuguese government, the Portuguese government invited him to visit Africa. During his travels, he wrote two additional books, *Aventura e Rotina* and *Um Brasileiro em Terras Portuguesas*, which were dedicated to the practical application of Lusotropicalismo in Portugal's African colonies. This theory resonated with Portuguese sentiments, reinforcing their belief in the uniqueness of Portuguese colonialism and the absence of racial prejudice in Portuguese colonialism. This provided a scientific justification for Salazar’s dictatorship to defend its colonial mission and Portugal's presence overseas (Barros, 2017). In this context, Lusotropicalismo became the official form of colonialism. Through Lusotropicalismo, Salazarism constructed a narrative portraying Portugal as a “multiracial and multiethnic nation”, and promoted this narrative at the international level to continue legitimising Portuguese colonialism.

When the United Nations and other major international powers exerted pressure on Portugal to liberate its colonies, the Salazar government responded to this pressure by shifting its ideological stance from the Mística Imperial to Lusotropicalismo to justify colonialism. Legally, decreto-lei 2048/51 revised the *Acto Colonial* of Constituição de 11 de Abril de 1933, which stated that "Portugal's overseas territories are known as colonies and together form the Portuguese Colonial Empire" (Government of Portugal, 1933, p. 47), the main modifications of decreto-lei 2048/51 regarding the legal status of colonies were introduced in Article 134[12] of it, which turned those colonies into overseas provinces.

This marked Portugal's adjustment of the legal status of its colonies. The newly revised decree constitution abolished the references to Angola and other territories as colonies in the 1933 *Acto Colonial* and redefined these territories as *províncias ultramarinas*. At the same time, the Portuguese government officially abandoned the term *Império*, using *Portugal* as the sole designation for both its mainland and overseas provinces. This move effectively erased any legal or linguistic traces of colonialism. This change in legal terminology, and the characterisation of the overseas provinces (which were colonies actually) as part of the Portuguese territory, provided Portugal with a legitimate legal pretext for rejecting criticism from the international community regarding its colonial policies (Bender, 1980, p. 10).

In addition, Portugal continued to strengthen its identity ties with its overseas provinces through legislation in the 1950s as the Decreto-lei No. 39666 enacted in 1954. However, in 1961, and the war started in Angola, the Portuguese government formally abolished the Estatuto dos Indígenas through decreto-lei No. 43897, eliminating the distinction between *assimilados* and *indígenas* and granting all Africans formal citizenship. Nevertheless, obtaining formal citizenship did not automatically grant all civil rights. For instance, the decree continued to restrict the scope of citizens eligible to

[12] "Os territórios ultramarinos de Portugal indicados nos n. os 2.° a 5.o do artigo 1.° denominam-se genericamente «províncias» e têm organização político-administrativa adequada à situação geográfica e às condições do meio social" (Government of Portugal, 1951) .

vote, effectively denying most African residents full citizenship in practice (Gusmao, 1972).

Despite the Portuguese government's legal reforms and amendments between the 1950s and 1960s, which altered the legal and linguistic distinctions between the colonies, which were renamed as overseas provinces, and Portugal and granted all Africans citizen status, these policies did not fundamentally alter their status in practice. Formal equality could not mask the ongoing exclusion and discrimination in reality. In Angola, the majority of local residents remained excluded from access to education, economic resources, and political rights (Bender, 1980, pp. 173-175; MacQueen, 1997, p. 28). At the same time, this exacerbated divisions and resistance among Angolans, as well as growing resentment toward assimilation.

In Angola, nationalist forces were growing increasingly aware of their identity. In 1961, armed uprisings broke out in Luanda, Angola, against Portuguese colonial rule. This event marked the official beginning of the Angolan War of Independence. The Portuguese Salazar government responded with large-scale military repression and economic measures to maintain colonial rule.

The nationalist movement in Angola was led by three major organisations: the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA), the Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), which was established only in 1966, five years after the war starts. These three groups operated independently and did not form a united front, while also maintaining among them conflicts and rivalries.

However, this protracted colonial war did not conclude with a direct military victory by Angolan nationalist forces, throughout the many years of war, Portuguese forces maintained control over most of Angola, it was changes in Portugal’s domestic political landscape that prompted negotiations between the two sides, which in turn led to Angola’s independence (Ball, 2017, p. 19). In 1974, the Carnation Revolution erupted in Portugal, overthrowing the Salazar regime, which had been succeeded by Marcelo Caetano. Under the influence of multiple factors such as regime change, agreement

negotiations, and international pressure, the newly established democratic government of Portugal finally decided to end the colonial wars in Angola. In 1975, Angola formally gained independence, but it soon plunged into a prolonged civil war due to power struggles among the MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA.

4. Portugal and France at the United Nations: Countering the Anti-Colonialist Tide

4.1 France at the United Nations

4.1.1. 1955: Attempts to bring the debate on Algeria to a close

"From 1945 to 1962 French governments and diplomats took a remarkably uniform view of their rights as a colonial power at the UN. The defence of Article 2(7) of the UN Charter meant a rejection of General Assembly competence in matters of internal colonial policy " (Thomas, 2001, P. 92) . The Article 2(7) of the Charter reads as follows: "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter" (United Nations, n.d.).

According to the analysis of the United Nations Charter in Chapter One, we observe that this provision effectively indicates that the UN could not interfere in matters pertaining to the internal affairs of individual nations. Under traditional political and legal frameworks of colonial powers, to protect their own interests, colonial affairs were unquestionably regarded as internal matters (Emerson, 1971, P. 771). Thus, how should one delineate whether a particular matter falls within a nation's internal jurisdiction? This characterisation was primarily asserted and interpreted unilaterally by colonial powers during the United Nations' formative years, who classified colonial affairs as falling within their domestic jurisdiction. The emphasis placed by Article 2 of the Charter on the principles of sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction provided colonial powers with significant grounds to argue at United Nations meetings that colonial matters constituted matters of domestic jurisdiction and should not be subject to external interference. This provision of the Charter, while protect national sovereignty through domestic jurisdiction provision, conflicts with the spirit the Charter itself

sought to embody (Jensen, 2016, P. 27). Consequently, it became a pretext for colonial states to assert that external interference in their colonial affairs was impermissible, on the grounds that such matters constituted internal affairs.

As time progressed and an increasing number of newly independent states joined the United Nations, alongside the growing strength of anti-colonial forces, pressure mounted for the adoption of new instruments. France also began to realise that invoking this provision of the Charter to evade international accountability was becoming ineffective, since any matter could be placed on the agenda for discussion through a majority vote by member states (Smouts, 1995, P. 187).

The matter concerning Algeria was formally raised at the United Nations in 1955. In January of that year, the Saudi Arabian delegation submitted a letter to the President of the Security Council. In this correspondence, the Saudi representative reported to the Security Council on the grave situation in Algeria and requested the President to convene a meeting of the Council to discuss the matter (Security Council, 1955).

This marked the beginning of Algerian nationalists' efforts to internationalise the Algerian crisis, seeking support from Arab nations (Thomas, 2001). By 14 September 1955, the Algerian question had been included as one of the proposals within the memorandum A/BUR/141 of General Assembly (General Assembly, 1955).

On the 22nd of the same month, the tenth session of the United Nations General Assembly formally commenced deliberations on the agenda and items assigned to committees, including Memorandum A/BUR/141 (General Assembly, 1955) dated the 14th. During the session on 22nd, when the topic of the Question of Algerian arose, French representative Hervé Alphand, speaking on behalf of the French Government, requested that the Algerian question not be included on the General Assembly agenda. In presenting his position, Alphand's principal argument was that under Article 2(7) of the Charter, the United Nations possessed no authority to interfere in France's internal affairs, namely matters pertaining to Algeria. The rationale supporting the French government's stance was that pursuant to *Une ordonnance royale du 22 juillet 1834*, Algeria had long been incorporated into France and constituted an inalienable part of

French territory. Furthermore, all Algerians were French citizens entitled to equal representation rights with mainland subjects (General Assembly, 1955). When confronted with demands and queries from United Nations and other state representatives, France continued to invoke 2(7) of the Charter as justification, which appeared to remain effective: that day, the General Committee of the United Nations General Assembly voted by a margin of 8 in favour, 5 against, and 2 abstentions to recommend that the Question of Algeria not be included on the formal agenda of the session (General Committee, 1955). France's minor victory proved short-lived, however. Despite the General Committee's vote against including the Algerian question on the Assembly's agenda, following intense debate prompted by the efforts and requests of Asian and African nations, On 30 September 1955, during the 530th plenary meeting of the Tenth Session of the United Nations General Assembly, at the request of the representatives of France and Iraq, a further vote was taken on the earlier motion concerning the inclusion of the Question of Algeria in the Assembly's agenda. This roll-call vote ultimately resulted in 28 votes in favour, 27 against, and 5 abstentions, formally placing the Question of Algeria on the agenda of the Tenth Session (General Assembly, 1955a).

In the vote, the following 28 countries opposed the proposal not to include the “The question of Algeria” in the General Assembly’s agenda:

Liberia, Mexico, Pakistan, the Philippines, Ukraine, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand, Ukraine, USSR, Uruguay, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Argentina, Bolivia, Burma, Byelorussia, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Greece, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq and Lebanon.

The 27 countries expressing support were:

Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Peru, Sweden, Turkey, South Africa, UK, USA, Venezuela, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France, Haiti, Honduras and Israel.

The countries that abstained were:

Paraguay, China (ROC), El Salvador, Ethiopia and Iceland (General Assembly, 1955, p. 196).

On 1 October 1955, the day following the conclusion of the 530th meeting, Alphand, France's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, sent a telegram to Foreign Minister Pinay (Alphand, 1955). Unlike the telegram of 30 September, which reported on the voting results of the 530th meeting, this telegram focused more on the views and analysis of the French Permanent Mission to the United Nations regarding the outcome of the meeting. In the telegram, Alphand argued that the outcome of the vote was not a coincidence and, offered insights into France's future approach to the question of Algeria. Furthermore, Alphand emphasised in the telegram that the United States could have performed better in this vote.

Firstly, in response to the voting result, Alphand did not focus superficially on the narrow margin of 28 votes against and 27 in favour, but rather saw through this margin the shifting balance of power within the United Nations. Regarding Foreign Minister Pinay's statement prior to the vote[13], Alphand admitted that his speech was highly persuasive but "was unable to have a decisive influence on the final vote "[14] (Alphand, 1955, p. 588). In this regard, Alphand attributed the outcome of the vote, which was "neither unforeseeable nor unexpected" [15](Alphand, 1955, p. 587), to the growing

---

[13] At the 530th meeting, prior to the vote on the proposal that "The question of Algeria should not be included in the agenda", the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Pinay, once again solemnly reiterated the French Government's position in an appeal to the members: since 1830, Algeria "has been an integral part of French territory" (General Assembly, 1955, p. 193). In the latter part of his statement, Mr Pinay vehemently and repeatedly used rhetorical questions to challenge the raising of the issue of Algeria at the United Nations, warning that such interference in France's internal affairs would set a precedent that would undermine the international order and the authority of the United Nations: "In my country's opinion, the decision to be taken by the Assembly will be far more serious for the United Nations than for France. The future of our Organisation will be at stake… The territorial unity of any State and all frontier treaties, old or new, could, at any time, be called into question. That would spell the end of security for many and of independence for the weakest" (General Assembly, 1955, p. 194).

[14] Original text: "il n'a pu modifier d'une façon décisive le vote final."

[15] Original text: "n'étaient ni imprévisibles, ni imprévus."

influence of the emerging Third World powers within the United Nations, as well as the impact on the established order within the organisation brought about by the Soviet bloc's leadership. In his telegram, he noted:

"… that a majority comprising the states belonging to the Bandung Group and the Soviet bloc, joined by a few Latin American states, can more easily than in the past impose its will on the United Nations General Assembly. Yes, this is a serious situation which reveals the lack of European solidarity within this organisation, whilst at the same time highlighting the growing influence of young and inexperienced nations which the USSR can easily manipulate" (Alphand, 1955, P. 587).[16]

At the beginning of his telegram, Alphand stated that, during his discussions with the Philippine representative, he had learnt that the Philippine delegation had received instructions from the Philippine authorities to vote against the motion concerning Algeria. These were votes that could not be secured through skilful oratory at United Nations meetings, and Alphand believed that this situation would become increasingly apparent in future sessions. In the latter half of the telegram, Alphand shifted his focus from an analysis of the votes against to an analysis of the support from France's allies. Regarding support from allies, Alphand focused in the telegram on the positions taken by Britain and the United States on the matter. Concerning the former, he stated that Britain and the Commonwealth nations generally expressed clear support for France; as for the latter, Alphand explicitly expressed his dissatisfaction, arguing that the United States could have used its influence to assist France in this vote, but "tant dans les couloirs qu'à la tribune, a été beaucoup moins agissante" (Alphand, 1955, p. 588).

As for the course of action to be taken in response to France's stance on the Algerian issue at the United Nations, Alphand continued to put forward a series of proposals, such as France's complete withdrawal from the United Nations; not

---

[16] Original text:"… qu'ùune majorité formée des états appartenant au groupe de Bandoung et au bloc soviétique, auxquels s'ajoutent quelques états latino-américains, peut plus aisément qu'autrefois imposer sa loi à l'assemblée des Nations Unies. Oui, c'est là une situation grave qui révèle l'insuffisante solidarité européenne au sein de cette organisation, en même temps que l'influence grandissante de nations jeunes et inexpérimentées que l'U.R.S.S. peut facilement manœuvrer." (Alphand, 1955, p. 587)

withdrawing from the United Nations but refraining from participating in debates concerning Algeria; not attending the current (10th) session of the United Nations General Assembly; and recalling the delegation to the General Assembly whilst retaining the Permanent Mission and the delegation to the Security Council. However, in short, having ruled out most passive approaches, Alphand ultimately concluded that the most appropriate course of action at present was:

"The French delegation to the tenth session has been recalled. The permanent delegation, whilst remaining in New York, is not to be seen in the corridors of the United Nations" (Alphand, 1955, P.590).[17]

In contrast to France's previous approach to the Tunisian and Moroccan issues at the United Nations, which consisted simply of not attending the relevant meetings, a more passive response that France adopted a relatively more proactive and strategic approach to the Algerian issue. On the one hand, France signalled its non-recognition of the General Assembly's decision on the question of Algeria by recalling its delegation to the General Assembly and temporarily abstaining from participating in the 10th session; on the other hand, France refrained from openly urging countries friendly to France to boycott the Algerian issue at UN meetings, so as not to be perceived by the outside world as manipulating UN procedures behind the scenes: "Until further notice, we shall remain aloof from these manoeuvres, which we must under no circumstances be seen to be instigating" [18] (Alphand, 1966, P. 590).

Information available in the *Documents Diplomatiques Français 1955* (1988) published by the French authorities shows that, in the days following the vote at the 530th session, discussions continued regarding the outcome of the session, namely, the inclusion of the question of Algeria on the agenda of the United Nations General

---

[17] Original text: "La délégation de la France à la dixième session est rappelée. La délégation permanente, tout en demeurant à New York, n'apparaît pas dans les couloirs des Nations Unies."

[18] Original text: "Jusqu'à nouvel ordre, nous resterons à l'écart de ces manoeuvres que nous ne devons en aucun cas paraître susciter."

Assembly. Not only did the French Government conduct repeated assessments of the voting results and carry out numerous analyses of France's subsequent course of action within the United Nations, but it also engaged in multiple contacts and negotiations with the United States regarding the outcome following the session.

In the follow-up assessment of the outcome of the 530th session, regarding France's subsequent strategy at the United Nations, on 1 October, the same day that Alphand sent the telegram to Pinay, there was another *Note du Seecrétariat des conférence-Assemblée générale des Nations Unies Question algérienne* (Secrétariat des Conférences, 1955) similarly did not advocate that France adopt the extreme measure of a complete withdrawal from the United Nations as a means of resisting the resolutions adopted at the United Nations General Assembly. Although this note stated that, whilst France could under no circumstances accept any interference by the United Nations in Algerian affairs, withdrawal from the United Nations would be "runs counter to our views and even to the law, would be contrary to our dignity as well as to the spirit of international relations"[19] (Secrétariat des Conférences, 1955, p. 591) , and also, would run counter to France's interests, particularly given that France regarded its position as a

[19] Original text: "opposée à nos vues et même au droit, serait contraire à notre dignité comme à l'esprit international."

permanent member of the Security Council within the United Nations [20] "a particularly valuable means of influence and action that contributes to our international standing" (Secrétariat des Conférences, 1955, p. 591).

These two documents present essentially the same view of the incident. On 4 October, Pinay, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, formally issued instructions to de Guiringaud, the French Deputy Representative to the United Nations Security Council, and requested that French personnel at the United Nations, when speaking with representatives of other countries or officials behind closed doors, adopt a reserved attitude during any discussions they might have, regarding "suggestions that might be put forward… to persuade the Assembly to reverse its decision" [21], to "maintain a reserved demeanour during any discussions they might have" [22](Pinay, 1955, p. 609).

Meanwhile, French diplomats, including Minister Pinay, Alphand and Couve de Murville, the French Ambassador to Washington, engaged in a series of discussions

---

[20] "…mais également, en raison surtout de notre appartenance au Conseil de sécurité en qualité de membre permanent et du droit de veto que nous y possédons en cette qualité… (but also, above all, because of our status as a permanent member of the Security Council and the right of veto that we hold in that capacity…)" (Secrétariat des Conférences, P. 591).
In accordance with Article 27 of the Charter:

1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.
2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members.
3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting."(United Nations, 1945)

As a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, France held this right of veto. However, within the French Government, it was believed that withdrawing from the United Nations would not only result in the loss of this status, and thus the inability to exercise this right of veto, but would also lead to the loss of valuable influence and means of action within the Organisation: "Moreover, upon its withdrawal, France would lose its best safeguard against interference by the Organisation; I mean its right of veto (Au surplus, à partir de son retrait, la France perdrait sa meilleure sauvegarde au regard des ingérences de l'Organisation, je veux dire son droit de veto)" (Alphand, p. 588). Furthermore, France did not believe that the United States or the United Kingdom would exercise their veto on matters concerning France (Alphand, 1955). In short, France believed that remaining within the United Nations would allow it to express its policy positions on an equal footing with the superpowers (Smouts, 1995, p. 212).

[21] Original Text: "à l'égard des suggestions qui pourraient être formulées… pour amener l'Assemblée à revenir sur sa décision."

[22] Original Text: "maintenir un comportement réservé lors des entretiens qu'ils pourraient avoir."

with their American counterparts, primarily to convey France's position on the Algerian issue. During these discussions, the French side not only conveyed to the Americans the reaction of the French public following the conclusion of the 530th meeting, which had been "moved and hurt"[23] (Couve de Murville, 1955, p. 603), but also directly and face-to-face "made clear in the strongest possible terms the French Government's disappointment" [24](Pinay, 1955a, p. 62), and signalling that France would not withdraw from the United Nations, in order to gauge the US position and draw its attention to "the seriousness of the situation" [25](Couve de Murville, 1955, p. 603).

In response to France's probing, or, its accusations, the United States, whilst offering some reassurance, did not, however, accept that it bore full responsibility for France's failure to secure a vote at the United Nations, as France had unilaterally portrayed. On 5 October, a telegram from the US State Department to the French Embassy described France's reaction to the Algerian incident as "dignified and understandable", and in the latter part of the telegram stated: "You can count on us to seek at the UN to do everything practical to try and repair the damage wrought." (Dulles, 1955, p. 228). The following day, in a letter to US Ambassador to France Dillon, Lodge, the US representative to the United Nations speaking on behalf of the United States at the 530th meeting, described the situation on the ground at the UN at the time: the French themselves were ill-prepared for this matter, and the Americans could not take the place of France in handling everything at the UN. Lodge stated: "In fact, the French were apparently unprepared for the unfavourable vote, although it was certainly a possibility for which they should have been ready." (Lodge, 1955, p. 229), adding that "The United States can help those who help themselves, but it cannot carry the load all by itself, and it is not fair to blame the United States for everything that goes wrong at the United Nations"(Lodge, pp. 229–230).

---

[23] Original text: "avait été émue et blesse."

[24] Original text: "marqué de la façon la plus nette la déception du gouvernement français."

[25] Original text: "la gravité de la situation."

Lodge's views were also raised in subsequent exchanges between the United States and France. However, the American assertion that France had committed "technical errors" [26](de Guiringaud, p. 631) in "the corridors of the UN" [27](de Guiringaud, 1955, p. 631) did nothing to allay French dissatisfaction. France did not accept the US attribution of the main reason for the failed vote to its own insufficient lobbying outside the meeting hall; rather, it was more inclined to emphasise that the US had failed to exert the influence it ought to have had over other nations in support of France's actions. In his analysis of the composition of the vote on 30 September, de Guiringaud emphasised that the French delegation, acting alone, would have found it difficult to alter the course of the against votes, whereas if the US delegation had provided stronger support at the time, the positions of some countries might well have changed. Perhaps this is the reason for France's dissatisfaction with the United States: France was unable to emulate the American approach. In a telegram sent to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 8 October, de Guiringaud candidly admitted:

"In conclusion, without American support, we could not have achieved much more in the corridors of the UN. Admittedly, in our dealings with our colleagues, we do not employ, and we are now being criticised for this, as the method known in local jargon as 'arm twisting' (my telegram No. 2279). This is obviously neither in our nature nor in our tradition. However, there are also certain means at our disposal. We appeal to reason, to the general interest and to the feelings of friendship that France continues to inspire, particularly in South America, and this is not compatible with that" [28](de Guiringaud, 1955, p. 633).

---

[26] Original text:"erreurs techniques."

[27] Original text:"les couloirs de l'O.N.U."

[28] Original text: "En conclusion, privés de l'appui américain, nous ne pouvions, dans les couloirs de l'O.N.U., faire beaucoup mieux. Sans doute, dans nos démarches auprès de nos collègues, n'employons-nous pas, et l'on nous en fait grief maintenant, le procédé que, dans le jargon local, on appelle arm twisting, torsion du poignet (mon télégramme n° 2279). Cela n'est évidemment ni dans notre tempérament ni dans notre tradition. Mais il est également certains moyens dont nous ne disposons pas. Nous faisons appel à la raison, à l'intérêt général et aux sentiments d'amitié que la France continue d'inspirer, notamment en Amérique du sud, et ceci n'est pas compatible avec cela."

Following several days of review and analysis of the voting results from the 530th meeting on 30 September, France immediately turned its attention to the next issue: How to remove the question of Algeria from the agenda of the United Nations General Assembly.

In a telegram dated 8 October addressed to French diplomatic representatives in New York, London and Buenos Aires, Pinay summarised the solutions proposed by the representatives that were friendly to France. However, regardless of the nature of the proposals, Pinay emphasised the need to avoid at all costs the risk of acknowledging "the recognition of the Assembly's competence"[29](Pinay, 1955b, p. 638).

Meanwhile, on 3 October, Roland de Margerie, Director-General of Political and Economic Affairs of the French Foreign Ministry, and Bernard de Menthon, Minister Plenipotentiary in the Conference Service of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, exchanged views in Geneva with Mr Douglas MacArthur, Senior Adviser to the US Secretary of State, and David W. Wainhouse, Assistant Deputy Secretary of State for International Organisations, as well as J. T. M. Pink, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for International Organisations at the British Foreign Office, on the removal of the Algeria agenda item from the agenda of the United Nations General Assembly.According to feedback from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated 4 October 1955, the United States and the United Kingdom indicated that they would "give their full support to the action that is to be taken" [30] to assist France in removing the Algerian issue from the agenda, but at the same time stated that "they cannot take responsibility for it themselves, and their influence alone is not sufficient to ensure its success"[31] (Département, 1955, p. 771).

Compared with the efforts of the United States and the United Kingdom, they

---

[29] Original text: "une reconnaissance de la compétence de l'Assemblée."

[30] Original text:"apporteront leur appui le plus entier à l'action qui sera entreprise."

[31] Original text:"ils ne peuvent en prendre eux-mêmes la responsabilité et leur influence n'est pas suffisante à elle seule pour en assurer le succès"

hoped that France would, whilst maintaining a low profile on the surface, participate swiftly, actively and proactively in the proceedings under Alphand's leadership, whilst maintaining close cooperation with delegations friendly to France (such as Colombia and Peru), in order to maximise France's influence: " It is essential that France does not give the impression in New York that it is disinterested in the matter, as this would risk discouraging its closest allies" (Département, 1955, pp. 771–772) [32].

In a meeting note dated 21 October, it was proposed that, in accordance with Rule 22 of the General Assembly's Rules of Procedure, a delegation from a third country should table a motion in the First Committee to remove the issue of Algeria from the agenda of the United Nations General Assembly. However, under the proposed scenario, the relevant action was to be spearheaded by South American countries such as Chile, Colombia, Cuba and Ecuador, and carried out in coordination between the Colombian representative, Mr Urrutia, and the President of the General Assembly, Mr Maza, whilst France was to remain behind the scenes to avoid any appearance that this was an action directly orchestrated by France.

However, the implementation of this initiative was hampered by opposition from the Arab-Asian bloc, nevertheless, Aplhand stated in a private letter dated 19 November to Massigli, Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in which he reported on the progress of the matter and the allies' stance: "our closest allies are showing an increasingly evident concern not to directly offend Arab and Asian sensibilities"[33] (Alphand, 1955a, p. 833). He noted that, within the United Nations, the parties involved in discussions on this matter were seeking "a tendency to seek compromise solutions likely to be accepted unanimously" [34] (Alphand, 1955a, p. 833). But, "Under such

---

[32] Original Text:"Il est essentiel que la France ne donne pas à New York l'impression de se désintéresser de la question, ce qui risquerait de décourager ses meilleurs amis"

[33] Original text: "nos meilleurs amis montrent un souci de plus en plus évident de ne pas heurter directement les susceptibilités arabes et asiatiques."

[34] Original text: "une tendance à rechercher les solutions de compromis susceptibles d'être acquises à l'unanimité."

circumstances, it is likely that a solution will be found"[35] (Alphand, 1955a, p. 833), Alphand stated at the end of his letter. Finally, on 25 November 1955, at the First Committee of the Tenth Session of the United Nations General Assembly, the Indian representative, Menon, tabled a procedural motion stating: "Decides not to consider further the item entitled 'The question of Algeria' and is therefore no longer seized of this item on the agenda of the tenth session." (General Assembly, 1955a, P.203). In the detailed text of the motion, it was stated that "In supporting the motion, none of those who had been concerned with the question would be altering his position", which was also a point that Alphand regarded as "It's the best outcome we could have hoped for." [36](Pinay, 1955b, P. 853), and that "the decision would apply only to the tenth session of the General Assembly" (General Assembly, 1955a, p. 203).

No delegation objected to the motion put forward by the Indian representative. Ultimately, the General Assembly voted unanimously to discontinue discussion of the question of Algeria at the Fourth Session of the United Nations General Assembly (General Assembly, 1955a, p. 203). In other words, in the final days of 1955, although the question of Algeria had been placed on the General Assembly's agenda thanks to the efforts of Asian and African nations, France had temporarily suspended discussion of it, whilst there was still nearly a year to go before the issue was formally placed on the General Assembly's agenda once again.

From the beginning, France had strenuously opposed the inclusion of the question of Algeria on the agenda of the United Nations General Assembly. It was on 5 January 1955 that the French government took actions after the Saudi representative at the United Nations submitted the "Question of Algeria" to the President of the Security Council and requested that the matter be discussed. On 7 January, the French Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs Mendès- France reported on this incident in a memorandum addressed to the Minister for the Interior, Mitterrand. France's stance on the matter was unequivocal: "In any event, we shall challenge the Council's jurisdiction

[35] Original text: "Dans de telles conditions, il est vraisemblable que l'on arrivera à une solution."

[36] Original text: "C'est la meilleure réparation que nous pouvions espérer."

by refusing to engage in any substantive discussion, in whatever form it may take."[37](Mendès- France, 1955, p. 38).

In the document, the France authority made it clear that it would under no circumstances recognise the United Nations' jurisdiction over matters that "fall exclusively within our sovereignty"[38] (Mendès- France, 1955, p. 37). Consequently, in addition to raising a plea of lack of jurisdiction in United Nations meetings on the basis of Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter, the French delegation at the United Nations should also request further necessary materials, so as to enable France, both within and outside the United Nations, "either to answer questions put to it directly, or to refute or have the most pernicious allegations refuted" [39](Mendès- France, 1955, p. 37).

As for the voices within the United Nations and on the international stage supporting Algeria, the report refers to this as"a cause which external supporters claim is a national cause"[40](France, 1955, p. 38). The French side sought to redefine the nature of the Algerian events from France's perspective: "We must be able, if necessary, to restore the truth" [41](France, 1955, p. 38) . Although the document claims that France's aim was not to engage in "counter-propaganda"[42] but rather to "recognise, objectively, the facts that actually exist" [43] and, where necessary, to "restore the truth"[44] (France, 1955, p. 38), this "restoring the truth" was not, in reality, a clarification of the events' authenticity as the French side suggests, but rather an interpretative strategy

---

[37] Original text: "Quoi qu'il en soit, nous récuserons la compétence du Conseil en nous refusant à toute discussion de fond, de quelque manière qu'elle se présente."

[38] Original text: "relèvent exclusivement de notre souveraineté."

[39] Original text:"soit répondre aux questions qui lui seraient directement posées, soit réfuter ou faire réfuter les allégations les plus pernicieuses."

[40] Original text: "une cause que les appuis de l'extérieur prétendent être une cause nationale."

[41] Original text: "nous faut pouvoir, le cas échéant, rétablir la verité."

[42] Original text: "contre-propagande."

[43] Original text: "reconnaître dans leur objectivité les faits qui existent vraiment."

[44] Original text: "rétablir la vérité."

adopted from France's perspective. In other words, France did not entirely deny the existence of armed violence and social problems in the Algerian events, moreover, it sought to assert that "the cause of these events and their scope are not what our adversaries would want believe[45]"(France, 1955, p. 38) , thereby denying that these events were of a national liberation and self-determination nature, and instead describing them as internal French affairs in which the United Nations could not intervene. In this way, France sought to define the Algerian issue as a matter of domestic affairs and sovereignty, thereby preventing the topic from being redefined within the United Nations, especially by Algeria's self- determination supporters and other forces, as a colonial issue or a matter of international security.

In 1955, between the time the Saudi representative referred the question of Algeria to the Security Council in January and the suspension of discussions on the matter at the Tenth Session of the United Nations General Assembly in November, France intervened on two occasions. The first occurred in September 1955, when the 10th session of the United Nations General Assembly began its formal consideration of the agenda and the items allocated to the various committees. During the session, the French delegation based its arguments primarily on Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter, arguing that Algeria was part of France and that Algerian affairs constituted an internal matter for France. In the final vote, they succeeded in preventing the Algerian issue from being included on the agenda. Although the French side believed that a majority would not be achieved in the Security Council that lead to the Saudi request being placed on the General Assembly's agenda, France was also aware that if the Algerian issue were to be brought before the General Assembly, which was already by then a body with a more complex composition and stronger anti-colonial sentiment, France would face a far more unfavourable political and public opinion climate both within the United Nations and on the international stage. Consequently, whilst France engaged in debates at the meetings, its delegation had prepared comprehensive documentation and was actively

[45] Original text："la cause de ces faits et leur portée ne sont pas ce que nos adversaires voudraient faire accroire."

responding to and refuting external allegations regarding the situation in Algeria on the sidelines of the United Nations meeting.

Initially, France's stance proved effective, and at the September session it succeeded in blocking attempts to include the question of Algeria on the General Assembly's agenda. However, driven by the efforts of African and Asian nations, the question of Algeria was once again included on the agenda of the Tenth Session of the United Nations General Assembly. On this occasion, France chose to passively avoid discussing matters relating to Algeria within the United Nations, whilst simultaneously rallying its allies outside the organisation to intervene in the agenda once more. Although France ultimately succeeded in suspending discussion of the matter at the First Committee of the Tenth Session of the United Nations General Assembly on 25 November 1955, this outcome did not mean that France held an absolute advantage on this issue within the United Nations[46] (Alphand, 1955b, p. 981):France became increasingly aware that, within the United Nations, "a majority had rallied to the anti-colonial cause" (Alphand, 1955b, p. 979). The influence of Asian and African nations and the anti-colonial tide were increasingly becoming key factors shaping the UN environment, and were also influencing the stance of its allies on the question of Algeria.

---

[46] In a telegram from Alphand to Pinay dated 22 December 1955, it was stated that France's attempt to suspend discussions on the question of Algeria on this occasion had implications for future discussions on the subject at the United Nations: " Il n'est pas douteux enfin que la décision prise par le gouvernement français de quitter l'Assemblée générale à la suite de l'inscription de la question algérienne à son ordre du jour, ainsi que les conditions dans lesquelles nous sommes revenus, n'aient produit un effet durable sur les Nations Unies. M. Krishna Menon va jusqu'à prétendre que l'on hésitera une autre fois à inscrire à la légère des problèmes dits « colonialistes », dont aucun, d'ailleurs, n'a donné lieu à un débat, mais qui tous ont contribué à gaspiller inutilement les efforts de nos collègues, en tendant à saisir puis à dessaisir l'Assemblée de questions qui échappent à sa compétence" (Alphand, 1955b).

(Translation: "There is no doubt, finally, that the decision taken by the French Government to walk out of the General Assembly following the inclusion of the question of Algeria on its agenda, as well as the circumstances under which we returned, have had a lasting effect on the United Nations. Mr Krishna Menon goes so far as to claim that there will be hesitation in future to include so-called 'colonialist' issues lightly on the agenda – none of which, incidentally, gave rise to any debate, but all of which contributed to a pointless waste of our colleagues' efforts, by seeking to refer matters beyond the Assembly's jurisdiction to it and then to withdraw them.)

4.1.2. 1956: Another attempt by the French at interception, and their final decision not to stop the meetings about Algeria in the United Nations

Although for most of 1956 there were no items on the General Assembly's agenda entitled "The Question of Algeria", nor were any items closely related to Algeria discussed at the United Nations, this does not mean that France's involvement in the matter at the United Nations was uneventful that year.

In a report dated late 1955, in which Alphand summarised the proceedings following the conclusion of the Tenth Session of the United Nations General Assembly to Foreign Minister Pinay, he analysed the current state of affairs within the United Nations. In his report, Alphand stated that three main blocs coexisted within the United Nations: the Soviet bloc, comprising only nine members but fully coordinated and highly effective： "a vast, still hesitant mass composed chiefly" [47](Alphand, 1955, p. 979) of emerging nations, primarily from Africa and Asia, with India playing a leading role; and the Western bloc, comprising fourteen European nations, the United States, four former Commonwealth countries, Israel and the majority of Latin American nations. In Alphand's view, France should endeavour to unite this "poorly organised and difficult to manage"[48] Western bloc in order to "exert a greater influence, which is even more necessary than before" [49](Alphand, 1955, p. 980) over the other two blocs, particularly the Afro-Asian bloc.

Although in the report Alphand stated that the purpose of this approach was merely "to consult us on our intentions, on the positions we intend to adopt regarding the issues raised at the United Nations, to assist us where possible, and to persuade our friends in the various other groups to which each of us belongs, the European Group, the Latin

---

[47] Original text: "une vaste masse encore hésitante composée surtout."

[48] Original text: "mal organisé et difficile à controller."

[49] Original text: "d'exercer une influence plus grande et encore plus nécessaire qu'auparavant."

American Group, the Commonwealth, etc."[50] (Alphand, 1995, P.980), he also made it clear that he would not commit to following the majority view. Nevertheless, Alphand described this action as an essential "defence of our common interests"[51] (Alphand,1995, p. 980). In reality, this was an attempt to link France's interests with those of the Western bloc: France sought to convince the West that its interests were in the West's best interests, and that they shared a common destiny.

This was evident not only in the negotiations at the United Nations concerning the Question of Algeria, but also outside the United Nations,

After 1954, faced with the deteriorating situation in Algeria, the French government's initial response was to carry out a large-scale conscription drive (Alexander & Keiger, 2022). Among the military forces redeployed to participate in the repression in Algeria were some NATO troops originally stationed by France in Central Europe to fulfil defence responsibilities. When notifying the United States and NATO of this matter, France sought to rationalise its actions by describing the redeployment of its NATO forces and the repressive measures taken in Algeria as serving the interests of NATO and the West, on the grounds that the stability and security of French North Africa were in their best interests. On 26 May 1955, prior to France's redeployment of its NATO forces to Algeria, Pinay briefed the US Ambassador on the matter. In his telegram to Couve de Murville, French Ambassador to Washington, Pinay described the military crackdown in Algeria to US Ambassador as "to prevent problems"[52], and stated that if France were to allow those problems to develop, it would "jeopardise the security of a region for which was responsible within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation" [53](Pinay,1955, p. 691).

---

[50] Original text:"de nous consulter sur nos intentions, sur les attitudes que nous comptons adopter devant les problèmes posés aux Nations Unies, de nous aider éventuellement, de persuader nos amis dans les divers autres groupes dont chacun de nous fait partie groupe européen, groupe latino-américain, Commonwealth, etc."

[51] Oroginal text: "la défense de nos intérêts communs."

[52] Original text: "pour prévenir les troubles."

[53] Original text: "compromettraient la sécurité d'une région dont il avait la responsabilité vis-à-vis de l'organisation du traité de l'Atlantique Nord."

In the following reports to the United States and the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, France repeatedly emphasised that the actions it had taken within NATO "was being pursued in the general interest of the Atlantic Alliance"[54] (Alphand, 1955, P.691). More specifically, only a France that enjoys territorial integrity and regional stability can be of benefit to NATO: "it is clear that France could make no useful contribution to NATO if its positions in Africa were to be undermined"[55] (Massigli, 1955, pp. 702–703).

"The vital importance of French North Africa in supporting European affairs"[56] (Parodi,1955, p. 23), in order to secure the understanding of the United States and NATO regarding France's North African policy, France consistently sought to portray its repressive actions in Algeria as necessary measures to maintain regional stability and safeguard the common defence interests of Europe.

However, France's military crackdown in Algeria, together with the Special Powers Act passed on 12 March 1956, which "endowed the French military with police authority and virtually unrestricted power to bring an end to the rebellion in Algeria"(Le Sueur, 2001, p. 163), soon attracted greater attention from Asian and African nations, prompting them to raise their voices once again on the platform of the United Nations. On 16 April 1956, Afghanistan and 16 other Asian and African countries addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council (S/3589), stating that "the French Government, however, persisted in ignoring the legitimate demands of the Algerian people and the appeals of the Bandung Conference" and that this "endangered the maintenance of international peace and security" (Thailand, pp. 1-2). Citing Article 35,

---

[54] Original text: "se poursuivait dans l'intérêt général de l'Alliance atlantique "

[55] Original text: "il est clair que la France ne pourrait apporter aucune contribution utile à l'O.T.A.N. si ses positions africaines se trouvaient ruinées."

[56] Original text: "de l'importance primordiale que revêt l'Afrique du Nord française pour l'appui des affaires européennes."

paragraph 1, of the Charter[57], they drew the Security Council's attention to the grave situation in Algeria, though they did not request a meeting of the Council.

This move by the Asian and African nations was in line with the assessment of the US representative. In a telegram from Alphand to Pineau, the new Minister for Foreign Affairs, dated 10 April of 1956, he reported on the actions of the Asian and African nations at the United Nations regarding the Question of Algeria, as well as the US position on the matter. France was keeping a close watch on the actions of the Afro-Asian Group at the United Nations, and during Alphard's discussions with the US representative, Lodge, regarding the Afro-Asian Group's meeting on the Question of Algeria held earlier on 6 April, the US side expressed the view that the Question of Algeria would not be placed on the agenda of the United Nations General Assembly so soon: " despite their threatening attitudes, the representatives of the Afro-Asian Group have no intention of referring the Algerian affair to the Security Council"[58](Alphand,1956, p. 565). However, during the discussion, Lodge nevertheless cautioned Alphand, stating that if France were unable to restore order on Algerian territory and begin to formulate a political solution by the end of 1956, then in a United Nations that had, by the end of 1955, been joined by many new member states holding anti-colonialist positions, "we are unlikely to be able to avoid registration[59]" (Alphand, 1956, p. 566).

Over the following two months, as France continued to monitor the movements of the Asia-Africa Group closely, the French Mission to the United Nations sent a steady stream of information from various sources regarding developments within this Group. Most of the information indicated that no consensus had been reached within the Asian-

---

[57] Article 34
The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.
Article 35
1. Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly. (United Nations, 1945)

[58] Original text: "dépit de leurs attitudes menaçantes, les représentants du groupe afro-asiatique n'ont pas l'intention de saisir le Conseil de sécurité de l'affaire algérienne."

[59] Original text: "nous ayons peu de chances d'éviter l'inscription."

African Group on the Question of Algeria: The Arab states were eager to take action, whilst the more moderate members of the Group were inclined to proceed with caution, so as not to risk jeopardising the opportunity for negotiations between France and the Algerian nationalists (Alphand, 1956a). In a telegram sent by Alphand to Pineau on 26 May, Alphand once again provided an update on the progress of internal meetings within the Asia-Africa Group, stating that although the internal contradictions within the Group had not been resolved, but:"It does not follow from all this that the Algerian issue will not be referred to the Security Council" (Alphand, 1956b, p.857).

In the final part of his telegram, Alphand stated that the Arab states would persist in their request to have the Question of Algeria placed on the Security Council's agenda, as they could make such a request without the participation of Asian or African states. However, given the current situation facing the Arab states, "In any case, everyone here believes that a request to have the Algerian issue placed on the Council's agenda would be rejected[60]"(Alphand, 1956b, p. 857).

As the likelihood of the Asia-Africa Group taking action at the United Nations in the near future grew, the French side also began to devise countermeasures. On 28 May, in a note from the conference secretariat, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued clear instructions to the delegation to engage in extensive behind-the-scenes intervention regarding the raising of the Algerian issue at the United Nations:

"As soon as news of the proposed extraordinary session of the Assembly had become known, the Department had instructed all our missions (with the exception of just a few) in United Nations member states to take steps to thwart this manoeuvre. It will arrange for representations to be made to the governments of the Security Council member states as soon as the occasion arises.[61]" (Conferences Secretariat, 1956, p. 865)

---

[60] Original text: "Tout le monde, au reste, estime ici qu'une demande d'inscription au Conseil de l'affaire algérienne serait rejetée."

[61] "Dès que le projet d'une réunion extraordinaire de l'Assemblée avait été connu, le Département avait prescrit à tous nos postes (à l'exception de quelques-uns seulement) dans les pays membres des Nations Unies des démarches pour déjouer cette manoeuvre. Il fera procéder à des interventions auprès des gouvernements des pays membres du Conseil de sécurité aussitôt qu'il y aurait lieu."

Although France anticipated that the issue of Algeria, which was to be raised at the United Nations Security Council on this occasion, might not be placed on the agenda, it nevertheless sought the support of other countries, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Australia and Peru at the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council, and hoped that Yugoslavia and China would adopt a more moderate stance (Conferences Secretariat, 1956, p. 865).

On 13 June, Afghanistan and twelve other Member States wrote to the President of the Security Council(Afghanistan et al.,1956), requesting, pursuant to Article 35, paragraph 1 of the Charter, that a meeting of the Security Council be convened to consider the grave situation in Algeria. Furthermore, the letter from the 13 countries stated that as early as April, 17 countries had written to the Security Council (S/3589) to draw its attention to the situation in Algeria. The current letter also noted that the situation in Algeria had deteriorated further as a result of recent military action by France.

In response to the letter sent to the Security Council by the Asian and African states, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs reacted swiftly on the same day. In a top priority telegram from Pineau to Alphand, detailed instructions were given regarding France's subsequent response strategy. In addition to focusing primarily on references to the Charter and the wording used by the Asian and African states in their letter to describe the situation in Algeria, Pineau's instructions in the telegram also required the delegation to endeavour to prevent non-members of the Security Council from invoking the Charter or the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council to intervene in procedural debates before the Security Council had placed the Question of Algeria on its agenda.

The reference to the Charter primarily served to support France's longstanding position within the United Nations, namely that the Question of Algeria was an internal affair of France, the citations of relevant Charter provisions were largely centred on this argument. In his telegram, Pineau stated that France could still, on the basis of Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter, maintain that the Question of Algeria was essentially an

internal affair of France, and thereby refuse any intervention by the United Nations in the Algerian situation. Although Pineau acknowledged that, from a political perspective, there was indeed a tendency within the United Nations to disregard Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter, he argued that France could not, by virtue of this tendency, disregard the provision itself, because: "Nevertheless, this article remains the rule governing the division of powers between the Organisation and its Member States[62]"(Pineau, 1956, p. 981). Furthermore, in his telegram, Pineau sought, drawing equally upon Articles 34 and 35 of the Charter, to deny that the Question of Algeria fell within the scope of the "situation" mentioned by the Asian-African Group in its letter to the President of the Security Council, a matter which could be discussed in the Council, and, on this basis, to deny that the situation in Algeria constituted a threat to international peace and security. Conversely, he defined the actions of the Asian and African states as interference in France's internal affairs. In response to the Asian and African states' characterisation of the Algerian issue as a "situation", Pinay emphasised that the Algerian issue "is not, in and of itself, a dispute between states[63]", but rather "a situation existing within the French State[64]" (Pineau, 1956, p. 982). Consequently, France denied that the issue constituted a dispute between states, and also denied that it met the conditions set out in Article 34 of the Charter regarding a threat to international peace and security. Pineau therefore defined the intervention of a third state as the very source of the issue's internationalisation, stating that "the only cause of international dispute here could only be this very interference by a third state[65]" (Pineau, 1956, p. 982). Through this line of argument, France sought to reframe the anti-colonial demands of Asian and African states as interference in France's internal affairs.

Following the request made by Asian and African countries in their letter of 13 June, the Security Council convened its 729th and 730th meetings on 26 June to discuss

---

[62] Original text: "cet article n'en subsiste pas moins comme règle de la répartition des compétences entre l'Organisation et les états members."

[63] Original Text: "n'est pas, par elle-même, une contestation entre états."

[64] Original Text: "une situation existant à l'intérieur de l'État français."

[65] Original Text: "la seule cause de différend international ici ne pourrait être que cette ingérence même d'un état tiers."

whether to include the issue concerning Algeria, as reported by the Asian and African countries, on the Council's agenda.

At the 729th meeting of the Security Council, the Council did not initially address the proposal put forward by the 13 countries regarding whether to include the Question of Algeria on the Council's agenda, but instead dealt first with a motion tabled by the Soviet representative. At the start of the meeting, the Soviet representative, Mr Sobolev, stated that the Question of Algeria was of great importance and that Security Council members required more time to consider the matter and gather relevant information. Consequently, prior to discussing the items on the agenda, Mr Sobolev, in accordance with Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure of the Security Council[66], formally proposed "to postpone discussion of the question indefinitely" (Security Council, 1956, p. 1).

The Soviet representative's proposal was immediately opposed by Alphand. In Alphand's statement, he argued that a meeting whose agenda had not yet been adopted could not be adjourned, and called for the Soviet representative's proposal to be put to a vote immediately at that meeting. Alphand's objection to the Soviet representative's proposal to adjourn the discussion was supported by the representatives of the United Kingdom and Belgium. Ultimately, the Soviet representative's proposal was rejected by a vote of 7 against (Australia, Belgium, Cuba, France, Peru, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America), 1 in favour (the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) and 3 abstentions (China (ROC), Iran and Yugoslavia).

---

[66] **Rule 33**
The following motions shall have precedence in the order named over all principal motions and draft resolutions relative to the subject before the meeting:

1. To suspend the meeting;
2. To adjourn the meeting;
3. To adjourn the meeting to a certain day or hour;
4. To refer any matter to a committee, to the Secretary-General or to a rapporteur;
5. To postpone discussion of the question to a certain day or indefinitely; or
6. To introduce an amendment.

Any motion for the suspension or for the simple adjournment of the meeting shall be decided without debate.

After France together with other allies, successfully blocked the Soviet representative's request to extend the meeting indefinitely, the focus of the meeting returned to discussions on the motion submitted by 13 countries to place the Question of Algeria on the Security Council's agenda.

Following the vote on the proposal put forward by the Soviet representative, Alphand made another brief statement, arguing that "The French Government considers that Algerian affairs are matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of France" (Security Council, 1956, p. 5) and requesting that the Security Council should not include the Question of Algeria on its agenda. This was opposed by the Iranian representative, Abdoh. However, in his statement, he did not adopt a hostile stance but, in a moderate tone, expressed his request that the Question of Algeria be included on the agenda: "we firmly believe that a Council debate on the matter would help the French Government, as well as the Algerian people, to find a just and equitable solution…" (Security Council, 1956, P.6). In his subsequent remarks, the Iranian representative set out the reasons why the Question of Algeria should be included on the agenda, drawing on historical trends, the gravity of the situation in Algeria, an analysis of official French statements, and an interpretation of the Charter.

Firstly, Abdoh stated that the Algerian affair was not an isolated incident, but rather an integral part of the wave of struggle for national self-determination and independence sweeping across Asian and African nations, adding that "France cannot remain indefinitely unmoved by the struggle of the Algerian people for the right to self-determination"(Security Council, 1956, p. 6). Secondly, Abdoh cited reports in the French daily L'Express regarding the gravity of the Algerian situation, indicating that the situation in Algeria was no longer merely a domestic French issue, but a serious matter worthy of discussion in the Security Council: "we can but conclude that we are faced with a full-scale war, with all its consequences at both the national and international levels" (Security Council, 1956, p. 10). Furthermore, the Iranian representative refuted France's earlier assertion that Algeria was part of French territory, stating that the Question of Algeria was essentially a colonial issue and that France's historical conquest could not erase Algeria's own history and political identity:

"Nevertheless, we must not lose sight of the fact that when France conquered Algeria, the sovereignty vested in the Algerian people did not disappear" (Security Council, 1956, p. 13). At the conclusion of his address, Abdoh stated that the situation in Algeria had become serious enough to affect the harmonious relations among the Member States of the United Nations, and that the United Nations did in fact have the right to intervene in matters of this nature. Furthermore, Abdoh highlighted the legitimacy of placing the Question of Algeria on the Security Council's agenda from another perspective, namely that the act of doing so did not constitute interference in France's internal affairs, as it did not hinder France's actions: "The act of including the Question of Algeria on the agenda of the Security Council, or of examining it, or even of making recommendations on it, can in no case constitute interference in the affairs of France." (Security Council, 1956, p. 15).

In his subsequent statement, the French representative, Mr Alphand, responded to the views expressed by the Iranian representative at the meeting. Judging by Mr Alphand's remarks, France's position continued to be based on the premise that Algeria was part of French territory.

In his address, Alphand refuted the attempt by the Iranian representative Abdoh, to distinguish between France and Algeria based on ethnicity, culture and religion, stating that France exercised sovereignty over Algeria solely because Algeria was French territory: "The notion of domestic jurisdiction is dear; it is a concept of law" (Security Council, 1956, p. 16). Consequently, in his subsequent remarks, Alphand sought to legitimise France's military repression in Algeria: "The notion of domestic jurisdiction is dear; it is a concept of law" (Security Council, 1956, p. 16). In the French representative's statement to the meeting, the allegations made by Asian and African nations regarding France's violent acts against the Algerian people were transformed into a narrative justifying the exercise of sovereignty. In his subsequent statement, Alphand continued to portray France as the victim of the situation rather than its instigator: "It is endeavouring to maintain public order which has been disturbed by rebellious citizens; it is trying to prevent, or, if that has proved impossible, to punish the killings…" (Security Council, 1956, p. 16). Within this narrative, Alphand, drawing

upon Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Constitution and citing Articles 34 and 35 of the Charter, asserted that the Question of Algeria did not fall within the scope of interference as described by the Asian and African states. As for the issues of human rights and self-determination raised by the Iranian representative, Alphand stated that these did not fall within the remit of the United Nations Security Council. At the conclusion of his statement, Alphand refuted the Iranian representative's allegations regarding French "colonialism", stating that France was committed to promoting socio-economic reform and achieving the progress of all nations through peaceful means, and that this freedom and progress were being violently undermined by terrorists in Algeria.

The vote on the request submitted by the 13 countries was ultimately held that same afternoon, amidst a dispute between the representatives of France and Iran. During the second meeting, which was the 730th meeting, the representative of Iran refuted, point by point, the remarks made by the representative of France at the 729th meeting, whilst the representative of France offered only a brief response after the vote, without addressing the substance of the matter. Apart from the lengthy statement by the representative of Iran, this meeting consisted mainly of statements by representatives of other countries. With the exception of the representative of Iran, who explicitly supported the inclusion of the Question of Algeria on the Security Council's agenda, the majority of countries expressed opposition to this to varying degrees. Whilst China (RoC) and Yugoslavia abstained, the representatives of the United Kingdom, Belgium and Cuba expressed explicit opposition to the inclusion on the agenda, either on the basis of Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter or in support of the position that Algeria was part of France. The United States, meanwhile, opposed the motion primarily on the grounds that it had "concluded that consideration by the Security Council of this situation at this time would not contribute to a solution" (Security Council, 1956a, p. 13).

Ultimately, the request by the Asia-Africa Group was not adopted, with the result being 7 votes against (Australia, Belgium, Cuba, France, Peru, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America), 2 votes in favour (Iran and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) and 2 abstentions (China (RoC) and

Yugoslavia). Although not all delegations opposing the inclusion of the Question of Algeria on the agenda supported France's interpretation of Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter during the meeting, only two countries voted against the motion. In the two meetings held over the course of a single day, the failure to include the Question of Algeria on the Security Council's agenda as sought by the Asian and African states, was regarded within France as "un succès (a success)" (Alphand, 1956c, p. 1071).

Two days after the results of the vote were announced, Alphand reviewed the proceedings of the meeting. In this telegram dated 28 June, addressed by Alphand to Foreign Minister Pineau, Alphand spoke positively of the atmosphere at the two meetings, stating: "The discussion, at last, remained within narrow bounds and proceeded in a moderate tone; substantive issues were not addressed, and it was possible to avoid any statements of a provocative nature[67]" (Alphand, 1956c, p. 1071). Whether in the instructions issued by France to its delegation prior to the meetings or in the statements made by the French representatives during the proceedings, France consistently sought, in these procedural meetings, to confine discussions on the Question of Algeria to matters of interference in internal affairs and international peace and security. Viewed from another perspective, this meant avoiding focusing the meeting's attention on French colonialism and the Algerian people's right to self-determination. In summary, during this session, in addition to opposing the Soviet Union's motion to extend the debate indefinitely, France made every effort to minimise the interval between the two sessions, thereby limiting the opportunities for African and Asian states to discuss the French representative's statements outside the formal proceedings.

Although the French side expressed satisfaction with the outcome of these two meetings, the summary contained in this telegram did not stop there. As with previous meeting summaries, this telegram also reported on the reactions of representatives from other countries during the meetings and expressed concern regarding the future of

---

[67] Original Text: "La discussion enfin est demeurée dans un cadre limité et s'est déroulée sur un ton modéré; les problèmes de fond n'ont pas été abordés et l'on a pu éviter toute déclaration de caractère provocateur."

Algeria's status within the United Nations. In reviewing the statements made by other delegations at the meeting, particular attention was paid to the stance of the American representative, Lodge. Notably, Lodge's vacillating and ambiguous position during the meeting, which stood in stark contrast to the statements made by the British and Belgian representatives, who supported "the thesis of lack of jurisdiction[68]"(Alphand, 1956c, p. 1072) was specifically highlighted by Alphand in the telegram:

"Mr Cabot Lodge did not address the issue of jurisdiction either, but he also refrained from expressing a favourable view of our stance and, justifying his vote on grounds of expediency, he stated that his government did not consider it appropriate for the Council to take up the matter of Algeria at this time[69]." (Alphand, 1956c, p. 1072)

The fact that the US representative showed virtually no clear bias towards either side during this meeting also gave rise to French concerns regarding the discussions at the next session of the United Nations General Assembly. Given the differences in the membership composition of the General Assembly and the Security Council, "the Arabs and Asians, allied with the people's democracies, control more than a third of the votes[70]"(Alphand, 1956c, p. 1072). Alphand stated that although France currently finds itself in an optimistic position regarding the Question of Algeria at the United Nations, without explicit assistance from the United States, France's position in the General Assembly would be highly unfavourable.

In addition to paying close attention to the positions of the United States and Asian and African countries on the Question of Algeria, during the second half of 1956, discussions regarding the attitudes of other nations on this issue began to appear frequently in internal French documents, as evidenced by the three volumes of *Documents Diplomatiques Français* that are currently accessible. In 1956, France began

---

[68] Original text:"ont soutenu sans équivoque la thèse de l'incompétence."

[69] Original text: "M. Cabot Lodge n'a pas non plus traité le problème de compétence, mais il s'est aussi abstenu de porter un jugement favorable sur notre attitude et, justifiant son vote par des considérations d'opportunité, il a précisé que son gouvernement ne pensait pas qu'il convînt que le Conseil se saisît maintenant de l'affaire d'Algérie."

[70] Original text: "Arabes et Asiatiques, alliés aux démocraties populaires, y contrôlent plus du tiers des voix."

to face the Soviet Union's increasingly open opposition to its position on the Question of Algeria (Dejean, 1956), whilst also attempting to secure Spain's support for its stance on the issue within the United Nations (de La Tournelle, 1956). However, the Suez Crisis, which unfolded in the second half of 1956, further undermined the ability of both the United States and the United Kingdom to support France (Thomas, 2001).

Against this international backdrop, France's arrest of five FLN leaders, including Ben Bella, placed France in an even more disadvantageous position in the eyes of international public opinion. In a telegram dated 27 October 1956 from Cornut-Gentille, Head of the French Permanent Mission to the United Nations, to Pinay, the adverse impact on France of a growing number of international and domestic events was clearly highlighted: "Serious cases are piling up[71]" (Cornut-Gentille, 1956, p. 53). With specific reference to the events in Algeria, Cornut-Gentille noted that, following the arrest of the five Algerian leaders, France had actually found itself at a disadvantage both psychologically and in terms of international public opinion， for whilst these individuals were regarded as " rebelles (rebels)" under French law, in the eyes of international public opinion they were "(combattants de l'indépendance) independence fighters"(Cornut-Gentille, 1956, p. 53) .

In his telegram, Cornut-Gentille pointed out that these events affected not only hostile nations but also the attitudes of France's allies and neutral states, as foreign powers did not understand French policy. Moreover, France's actions to safeguard its own interests, its actions in Algeria,were viewed by foreign powers as reactionary: "All this, which is understandable from the French perspective, appears incomprehensible to most international observers, who see in it nothing but weakness and uncertainty[72]" (Cornut-Gentille, 1956, p. 53).

Finally, on 13 November 1956, in a circular telegram sent by Pinay to French diplomatic representatives in Latin America, it was stated that, for policy reasons:"The

---

[71] Original Text: "Les affaires graves s'accumulent."

[72] Original Text: "Tout ceci, qui s'explique du point de vue français, apparaît incompréhensible à la plupart des observateurs internationaux qui n'y voient que faiblesse et incertitude."

government has decided not to object, this year, to the inclusion of the Algerian question on the agenda of the United Nations General Assembly"(Pineau, 1956a, p. 292). However, this concession did not imply that France recognised the United Nations' jurisdiction over the Question of Algeria, nor did it signify a welcome for other states to engage in active discussion of the matter, rather, it was intended to prevent any substantive debate from arising at the meeting. These two points were repeatedly emphasised in telegrams to representatives abroad: "This stance in no way alters our position regarding the Organisation's lack of jurisdiction[73]" (Pineau, 1956a, p. 292). In addition, France decided to endeavour to postpone the debate.

It is evident from the relevant telegrams that France's strategic adjustment was not intended to accommodate the anti-colonial tide within the United Nations and thereby engage in serious discussions on the Algerian people's right to self-determination. On the contrary, it was a tactic to maintain France's international standing within the United Nations by adopting an attitude of active engagement, thereby winning the favour of the majority of delegations, before adopting a strategy of striking back to turn a passive position into an active one, and thus controlling the direction of the discussions when the actual meeting took place[74].

Judging by the information available in publicly accessible documents, France's strategy was primarily based on the following considerations. Firstly, France hoped to buy time through delaying tactics, in the hope that the situation in Algeria might take a turn for the better during this period:"The aim of these provisions was to finalise the liberal solution that Paris had always envisaged[75]" (Alphand, 1956d, p. 618), thereby alleviating unfavourable public opinion within the United Nations. Secondly, France

---

[73] Original Text: "Cette attitude ne modifie en rien notre position concernant l'incompétence de l'Organisation."

[74] "Nous laisserons passer l'inscription pour les raisons que vous connaissez. Notre représentant aura soin d'indiquer, cependant, au moment qu'il estimera le plus opportun, que nous ne reconnaissons pas pour autant la compétence des Nations Unies, mais que l'inscription de la question nous permettra de poser comme nous l'entendons le problème des interventions étrangères." (Pineau, 1956, P.292)

[75] Original Text: "Il est visible que nos amis se sont sentis soulagés de n'avoir pas, comme l'an dernier pour l'Algérie, et comme les années précédentes pour le Maroc et la Tunisie, à assumer en notre absence la défense de nos thèses et de nos intérêts."

hoped that an "active" stance would win the support of more countries. The report indicates that such a stance did indeed win the favour of some countries: "It is evident that our friends felt relieved not to have had to, as was the case last year with Algeria and in previous years with Morocco and Tunisia, defend our positions and interests in our absence[76]" (Pineau,1956a, p. 293). However, this did not secure particularly strong support from the United States. At France's request, the US side stated that it "will cooperate with French efforts to have the Algerian item postponed to the latter half of the General Assembly session" (Hoover, 1956, p. 252). As for France's desire to know the US position during the formal debate, the telegram on 31 December 1956 from Alphand to Pineau, once again recorded the US side's ambiguous attitude: "Mr Dulles had found the French plan very encouraging, but wished, before providing France with the requested assistance, to know precisely the French Government's intentions regarding Algeria" (Alphand, 1956d, p. 618). Judging by US official records, the United States' core stance on the French position regarding Algeria had not undergone any significant change since late 1955, which is, the US was willing to offer support whilst avoiding becoming too closely tied to the Algerian issue: "In all this there is one thing which the US should avoid, by every means within its power, and that is to become the so-called "muscle man" who is required to lead a strong fight in defence of French colonialism"(Lodge,1956, p. 230). By the end of 1956, faced with a France seeking its strong backing, the United States was unwilling to "give a blank cheque for support for the new French government's policy, which may turn out to be a meaningless and unworkable formula." (Hoover, 1956, p. 253)

In 1956, France underwent a marked shift in its stance regarding the Algerian question at the United Nations. Whereas in the first half of 1956 France had been more actively working behind the scenes to prevent the Algerian question from being placed on the agenda, in the second half of the year it shifted its position and ceased to obstruct discussions on the matter at United Nations meetings. However, this did not mean that France had shifted towards supporting intervention by the United Nations or other UN

[76] Original Text: "Il est visible que nos amis se sont sentis soulagés de n'avoir pas, comme l'an dernier pour l'Algérie, et comme les années précédentes pour le Maroc et la Tunisie, à assumer en notre absence la défense de nos thèses et de nos intérêts."

member states in the Algerian question. An analysis of archival materials and publicly available official documents reveals that all of France's actions during that year were geared towards avoiding the further complication of the Algerian question within the United Nations (Smouts, 1995). Whether it was its earlier efforts to obstruct discussion of the Algerian issue at the United Nations and to court other states outside the UN to secure votes in favour of France's position in relevant ballots; or, in the later stages, by not opposing the inclusion of the Algerian issue on the UN agenda (although France continued to delay the convening of relevant meetings), and by repeatedly reaffirming its position since 1955 during the debates, which primarily by emphasising Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter, that is, the repeated denial of the UN's jurisdiction, France consistently sought to prevent further substantive discussions on the Algerian issue from taking place at the UN. On the one hand, France sought to uphold its image as a major power within the United Nations and was unwilling to find itself in a passive position due to passive resistance on this issue; on the other hand, France sought to win the favour of allies and countries holding a middle ground by demonstrating a posture of active participation, rather than manipulating the course of UN meetings behind the scenes. During this period, France displayed a certain degree of vacillation: whilst portraying itself as a victim of the Algerian crisis and failing to implement constructive changes in response to international concerns, it sought to manipulate other nations, particularly the United States, behind the scenes to exert their utmost efforts on France's behalf regarding the Algerian issue; yet it also hoped to remain independent of the influence of countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, whilst actively controlling the development of the issue within the United Nations. Towards the end of 1956, France ultimately chose to participate more proactively and directly in the meetings. By 1957, as international attention on the Algerian crisis continued to grow, France's ability to influence the agenda at this stage diminished, whilst the number of meetings it faced increased.

4.1.3. 1957: Continuous meetings on the question of Algeria in the United Nations

At the 578th meeting of the First Committee of the Eleventh Session of the United Nations General Assembly, held on 15 November 1956, the question of Algeria was listed as item 62 on the agenda. As no one requested a vote, the question of Algeria was placed on the Assembly's agenda. (General Assembly, 1956) On 3 January 1957, in a telegram from Georges-Picot, Head of the Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations, to Pineau, it was stated that the Asian and African Group had not made a serious attempt to secure priority for the question of Algeria, although, in the view of the majority of delegates, the question of Algeria was of considerable urgency, the Soviets and Americans were more concerned with the issue of disarmament[77], with the result that, in the final agenda, the question of Algeria was placed third on the agenda of the First Committee of the General Assembly, following The Korean Question and the issue of disarmament (Georges-Picot, 1957). Ultimately, the debate on the question of Algeria took place between 4 and 13 February 1957, comprising a total of 17 meetings.

By the end of 1956, tensions between European settlers in Algeria and Algerian Muslims had reached a near-breaking point (Stora, 2004), and the a brutal military operation launched by the French army to dismantle the network of the National Liberation Front (FLN) led by Yacef Saadi which was known as the "Battle of Algiers" had reached a fever pitch by the time the United Nations General Assembly reconvened (Thomas, 2000). In late January, to coincide with the UN debates, the FLN organised a general strike among Algerian Muslim workers in an attempt to bring the question of Algeria to the fore in the UN and on the international stage (Alexander, Evans & Keiger, 2002).

On the Question of Algeria, France had been maintaining contact with the United Kingdom and the United States in an attempt to secure their strong support on this

[77] Which was the Agenda item 22 of United Nations General Assembly 11th session: Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments; conclusion of an international convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction: report of the Disarmament Commission

matter. From 1957 onwards, in publicly available documents, "the nature and extent of Communist intervention in Algeria" (Department of State, 1957, p. 258) began to be emphasised by the French side during negotiations. Indeed, in French reports, the American emphasis on Communist interference in French North Africa did have a certain effect: "On the other hand, the details provided during these various discussions regarding the role of the Communist Party in the rebellion drew attention to a factor which the Americans inclined to give every insurgent the benefit of the doubt, had hitherto largely underestimated[78]" (Alphand, 1957, p. 102). As for the British, Cold War considerations were also a factor in their support for France: "British policy towards French North Africa was formulated with an eye to the Western alliance, European integration and the Cold War in Africa and the Middle East" (Thomas, 2000, p. 133). Faced with a new round of discussions on the question of Algeria at the United Nations, compared with last year's strategy, which involved signalling a willingness to reform in order to secure UN support. This year, France's rhetoric in seeking the support of its allies placed greater emphasis on the interference of communist forces in the question of Algeria. In other words, France's strategy on this issue at the United Nations showed a tendency to link the question of Algeria to the Cold War context.

It was for this very reason that, Pineau in his telegram dated 29 December 1956 to France's diplomatic representatives abroad, he not only reiterated France's rejection of the United Nations' jurisdiction, but also introduced a new strategy. On the one hand, it maintained that the question of Algeria remained "an internal French matter outside the remit of the United Nations[79]" (Pineau,1956, p. 609); on the other hand, it emphasised that France's actions in Algeria were not "a war of extermination[80]"or "a military solution[81]" (Pineau,1956, p. 609), but rather aimed at creating the conditions for a peaceful political settlement following the ceasefire. At the same time, the telegram

---

[78] Original text: "D'autre part, les précisions apportées au cours de ces divers entretiens sur le rôle du parti communiste dans la rébellion ont appelé l'attention sur un facteur que les Américains, enclins à accorder à tout insurgé le bénéfice du doute, ont jusqu'ici largement sous-estimé."

[79] Original text: "un problème intérieur français hors de la compétence des Nations Unies."

[80] Original text: "une guerre d'extermination."

[81] Original text: "une solution militaire."

specifically instructed diplomatic representatives abroad to highlight the aspects of foreign interference and Communist involvement in the Algerian issue, incorporating "interference by other countries in Algerian affairs[82]", Egyptian aid and Communist participation in "terrorist act[83]" (Pineau, 1956, p. 609) into their arguments.

In this way, France sought to divert attention from the issues of colonialism and self-determination, which were the focus of widespread concern within the United Nations regarding the question of Algeria, and instead frame the issue as one of foreign interference and terrorism, placing it within the broader context of the Cold War. On 22 January 1957, on the eve of the conference, a memorandum from the conference secretariat stated that, for the forthcoming meeting, the French delegation was required to express its position of non-recognition of the United Nations' jurisdiction at every stage of the proceedings, rather than requesting a vote on the issue of jurisdiction. Consequently, France would not participate in the drafting of any of the resolution's clauses. Finally, should a resolution prove unavoidable, France would be inclined to accept a moderate resolution one that recognised the liberal measures adopted by the French Government and brought the continued deliberations on the question of Algeria to a close. (Conferences Secretariat, 1957)

At the 830th meeting of the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, which began on 4 February 1957, and at the 16 meetings that followed, the Agenda Item 62: The Question of Algeria was formally discussed.

During these 17 meetings, the French representative did not miss any of the discussions. However, he did not take the floor at every session, nor did he participate in the debates on or the voting on the draft resolutions. The statements made by the French representative, Mr Pineau, were concentrated mainly at the 830th and 831st meetings, during which he delivered lengthy speeches to systematically set out France's position on the question of Algeria.

Pineau's remarks at these two meetings centred on the following points:

---

[82] Original text: "l'ingérence d'autres pays dans l'affaire algérienne."

[83] Original text: "terrorist act."

1. Citing Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter of the United Nations, and emphasising the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, France stated that it "never admitted and would never admit any competence on the part of the United Nations" (830, 99), as, in France's view, the question of Algeria constituted "an essentially domestic matter" (General Assembly, 1957, p. 99).

2. Emphasising the reforms carried out by France in Algeria in the areas of infrastructure development, agricultural development, improvements to healthcare and education, labour protection and administration, claiming that these measures reflect France's "efforts to improve the living conditions of the Algerian population" (General Assembly, 1957, p. 100).

3: Pineau described Algerian nationalist armed organisations such as the FLN as terrorist and insurgent forces, stating that "the rebels had been the first to resort to force" (General Assembly, 1957, P.102), and characterised the FLN as "a totalitarian organisation representing a tiny fraction of Algerian opinion" (General Assembly, 1957, p. 103). At the same time, Pineau stated in his speech that these organisations were subject to interference from external powers, in particular receiving encouragement and aid from Egypt, the Soviet Union and certain Arab states. He argued that such interference not only hindered the implementation of French reforms in the region but also undermined peace in Algeria.

4: Pineau claimed that France's military operations in Algeria were aimed at "the maintenance of order and the protection of life and property", rather than "destroying the Algerian population" or "engaging in the practice of genocide" (General Assembly, 1957a, p. 105), and that France was "dealing with the rebels alone and ensuring the protection of those French Muslims who did not wish to be involved in the conflict" (General Assembly, 1957a, p. 105). With regard to any isolated instances of abuse of power that may have occurred, the French side claimed that investigations had been carried out and disciplinary action taken.

5. With regard to the proposal for outright independence put forward by organisations such as the FLN, Pineau argued that “Independence pure and simple was not, in all cases, the only solution” (General Assembly, 1957a, p. 107), advocating that, following a ceasefire, free elections and political discussions should take place, that was, “a ceasefire, then elections, and then discussion” (General Assembly, 1957a, p. 108), in order to “ensure strict equality of rights on the political, economic and social levels for all inhabitants of Algeria, regardless of origin or religion” (General Assembly, 1957a, p. 107). At the conclusion of his remarks, Pineau further stated that if Algeria were to participate in the Franco-African and Euro-African integration envisaged by France, it would “benefit greatly by participation in Eurafrica” (General Assembly, 1957a, p. 108).

With regard to the position set out by the French representative, Mr Pineau, in his statement, apart from the British representative, who expressed very clear support, no other countries fully endorsed France’s statement at the meetings. Representatives of other countries expressed partial agreement with the content of Mr Pineau’s statement, but did not engage extensively in direct discussion of core issues such as colonialism, self-determination and the war situation in Algeria. Instead, they focused primarily on supporting France’s position based on Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter, or endorsing the French representative’s proposal for peace negotiations in Algeria following a ceasefire, and in the final vote, supported a draft resolution that was more moderate and favourable to France. For example, at the 835th meeting, the US representative, Lodge, supported France’s proposal for a negotiated settlement of the Algerian issue and maintained that this process should proceed without external interference: “the French programme for a cease-fire, elections and consultations is a hopeful step forward. The First Committee must, at the very least, do nothing which would interfere with the prospect of a peaceful evolution” (General Assembly, 1957b, p. 136). Furthermore, the Colombian representative, Umaña Bernal, maintained that no solution could operate outside the framework of the Charter, as a result, although he understood the Algerian people’s desire for independence, “Article 2, paragraph 7, must be taken into account above all other considerations”(General Assembly, 1957c, p. 187).

Regarding the handling of the Algerian issue, the Colombian representative held that "The best possible solution for the moment was that proposed by France" (General Assembly, 1957c, p. 188).

In contrast to the arguments put forward by representatives of countries supporting France and those adopting a more neutral stance in their statements, the representatives of countries opposing the French position (comprising mainly Asian and African nations) focused their counter-arguments on refuting, from a historical perspective, the legitimacy of French sovereignty over Algeria, emphasising that Algeria had already possessed its own political entity prior to the French conquest (General Assembly, 1957b). At the same time, by invoking Articles 10 and 14 of the Charter, they asserted that the Algerian people had the right to exercise self-determination (General Assembly, 1957d). In addition, they cited data to highlight the dire situation of the Algerian people under French repression and further criticised the limitations of France's assimilation and reform policies (General Assembly, 1957e). Some delegates also linked France's military operations in Algeria to the support provided by the United States, NATO and the Western bloc, arguing that this external backing had perpetuated France's atrocities in Algeria (General Assembly, 1957f). Consequently, they called for the United Nations to intervene in the Algerian issue (General Assembly, 1957d).

During these 17 meetings, a total of three draft resolutions were tabled: draft resolution A/C.1/L.165, submitted by the Asia-Africa Group, draft resolution A/C.1/L.166, submitted by Japan, the Philippines and Thailand, and draft resolution A/C.1/L.167, submitted by Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Italy and Peru (Hammarskjöld, 1957). In France's view, a moderate draft resolution favourable to France should greatly downplay, or even avoid, references to negotiation and self-determination (Pineau,1957). Consequently, of these three draft resolutions, France favoured the last one, A/C.1/L.167 the most. The text of this draft resolution was very brief, unlike the draft resolutions put forward by the Asian and African Group and the three countries, Japan, the Philippines and Thailand (whose draft resolution merely advocated negotiations), which included references to negotiations and self-determination, it was purely procedural in nature: "Expresses the hope that a peaceful

and democratic solution of this question will be found" (Argentina et al., 1957, p. 1). In France's view, the advantage of this moderate and vaguely worded draft resolution over the others lay in the fact that "it did not imply an affirmation of the Assembly's competence; moreover, it had received the unofficial

At the 846th meeting (General Assembly, 1957g), a vote was taken on these three draft resolutions. Ultimately, the eighteen-Power draft A/C.1/L.165, proposed by Asian and African States, was not adopted following vote by sections on the first and second operative paragraphs, which yielded the results of 34 votes against, 33 votes in favour and 9 abstentions[84], and 34 votes against, 33 votes in favour and 10 abstentions respectively.The meeting ultimately adopted draft resolutions A/C.1/L.167 and A/C.1/L.166 respectively by roll-call vote, and, following deliberations, ultimately produced Draft Resolution 1012 (XI). This formal draft resolution likewise made no mention of any matters relating to negotiations or self-determination. In the view of the French Government, this outcome and this resolution represented an avoidance of the worst-case scenario and constituted "an undeniable moral and political victory" (Gillissen, 2008, p. 156).

Following this victory in the parliamentary debate, the French Government continued its efforts in the days that followed to secure a favourable environment for France in the forthcoming United Nations discussions on the question of Algeria. Through its diplomatic representatives abroad, its Permanent Mission to the United Nations and special envoys, the French Government lobbied in the run-up to the forthcoming round of discussions on the question of Algeria at the United Nations. The scope of its diplomatic engagements was quite broad, encompassing not only the United

---

[84] In favour: Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Ceylon, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Greece, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, , Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Tur-key, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Against: United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Finland, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Laos, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Peru, Portugal, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

Abstaining: Bolivia, Cambodia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Liberia, Mexico, Paraguay, Philippines, Spain, Thailand.

Kingdom, the United States, Ireland, the Nordic countries and Latin American nations, but also the Asian and African Groups and other states. In these negotiations, France's objective was to secure support from various nations regarding its position on the question of Algeria, or to persuade them, particularly certain Asian and African states, to maintain a neutral stance, thereby ensuring that these countries would not subsequently participate in the Asian and African Group's discussions concerning France's approach to the question of Algeria (Hauck, 1957; Pineau, 1957a; de La Tournelle, 1957; Le Ministère des Affaires étrangères, 1957; Georges-Picot, 1957; Vauthier, 1957).

However, feedback from ambassadors posted abroad indicated that the international community's focus on the Question of Algeria centred primarily on France's forthcoming policy towards Algeria. The majority of diplomats who provided feedback believed that the moderation of the draft resolution ultimately submitted for discussion on the question of Algeria at the next United Nations General Assembly would be closely linked to the actions France subsequently took in Algeria: "Only a proposal that does not represent a step backwards from last year's proposals, which called for a ceasefire, elections and negotiations and were regarded as a peaceful, democratic and just solution, would enable this goal to be achieved[85]"(Georges-Picot, 1957, p. 198). In the eyes of the outside world, and in response to demands from the United States for "a plan or constructive step towards a solution" (Department of State, 1957a, p. 266), whilst resisting these demands, France adopted more direct measures to isolate Algeria (Connelly, 2002) and made it clear in the report that external public opinion would not influence the formulation of its policy towards Algeria: "any considerations unrelated to the specific facts of the Algerian issue, which was, in essence, an internal French matter, could not be decisive with regard to the content of this framework law[86]" (Georges-Picot,1957, p. 199).

---

[85] Original text:"seul un projet ne marquant pas un recul par rapport aux propositions de l'année dernière prévoyant un cessez-le-feu, des élections et des négociations[1] et qui ont été considérées comme une solution pacifique, démocratique et juste, permettrait d'atteindre ce but."

[86] Original text: "toutes considérations étrangères aux données propres du problème intérieur français qu'était le problème algérien ne sauraient être déterminantes en ce qui concernait le contenu de cette loi-cadre."

In the end, just as in the previous year 1956, France did not oppose the inclusion of the question of Algeria on the United Nations agenda. In November 1957, during the First Committee of the Twelfth Session of the United Nations General Assembly, Agenda 59: The Question of Algeria was debated over a period of ten days, comprising a total of 14 meetings.

Compared with early 1957, during the First Committee of the Eleventh Session of the United Nations General Assembly, the debate on the question of Algeria between France and those countries opposed to its position covered a wide range of issues, including history, sovereignty, reform, external forces and the nature of the conflict. Towards the end of 1957, during the First Committee of the Twelfth Session of the United Nations General Assembly, discussions on the question of Algeria not only continued the statements and rebuttals from the previous session but also focusing more intently on in-depth discussions regarding France's loi-cadre and whether France's reforms could resolve the question of Algeria.

During the first debate on the question of Algeria, at the 913th meeting on 27 November 1957, the French Foreign Minister, Mr Pineau, once again attended in person and delivered a lengthy statement setting out the French position. In addition to reiterating the views France had expressed at the previous session, Mr Pineau devoted a considerable portion of his remarks to describing the policy France would be pursuing in Algeria going forward.

Firstly, Pineau denied that the FLN (the National Liberation Front) or any other political party was the sole representative of the Algerian people, and attributed the failure of France's calls for a ceasefire and its policy initiatives to the FLN's refusal to negotiate and the terrorist activities it was carrying out within Algeria. In his speech, Pineau stated that France could not accept the FLN's proposal to make Algerian independence a precondition for negotiations between the two sides, arguing that "the political demands which continued to be made as preconditions for the opening of negotiations had the effect of rendering such negotiations futile." (General Assembly, 1957h, p. 254). He further alleged that this "rebellion" (General Assembly, 1957h, p.

254) taking place in Algeria was undermining the internal unity of the Algerian people, "creating undying hatred between the Muslim and European communities" (General Assembly, 1957h, p. 254). Furthermore, Pineau used the FLN's refusal to negotiate to shift the blame for France's atrocities in Algeria onto the FLN, whilst portraying the French government's efforts to engage in dialogue as evidence of a responsible great power willing to communicate: "the French had had to choose between two courses of action… The French Government had chosen the second alternative, thus demonstrating the sincerity of its intentions and its confidence in the future" (General Assembly, 1957h, p. 256).

Secondly, Pineau elaborated on the results of France's reforms in Algeria to date, as well as the French Government's vision for the future of Algeria. In his address, he also outlined the loi-cadre currently being planned, in order to demonstrate to representatives of other nations France's determination to foster peace and stability. Pineau stated that the most significant reform in recent years had been "to transfer to the local authorities some of the broad powers that the central administration in Algiers had exercised" (General Assembly, 1957h, p. 256), as well as to expand the existing specialised administrative sections and implement municipal reform, thereby enabling the people of all ethnic groups in Algeria to participate extensively.

On this basis, Pineau stated that, by drawing on France's loi-cadre, more far-reaching reforms could be implemented in Algeria. In his subsequent exposition of the basic concepts and objectives of the loi-cadre, Pineau actively outlined France's forthcoming actions in Algeria. According to Pineau's remarks, the loi-cadre was a legal framework that merely laid down core principles, namely: "a law which, in French terminology, established principles but did not go into all the details of implementation" (General Assembly, 1957h, p. 257). The content of this framework law encompassed provisions on universal suffrage and a single-member constituency system, the decentralisation of administration, and the development of Algerian institutions. It was stated that, under amendments made by the new French government "without narrowing its scope" (General Assembly, 1957h, p. 257), "a draft electoral law had been added, embodying the principle of proportional representation as a guarantee of minority

representation" (General Assembly, 1957h, p. 257). Pineau considered that this framework law "set up the practical machinery required for the threefold aim of 'a ceasefire, elections and negotiations'", and that it "would facilitate the rise of a new elite to govern the country and was in complete conformity with United Nations principles" (General Assembly, 1957h, p. 257).

Finally, in his speech, Pineau emphasised that intervention in the Algerian situation "would be likely only to delay the solution of the problem" (General Assembly, 1957h, p. 258), and stated that France's involvement in North Africa "had no intention of establishing a neo-colonial system in the desert"(General Assembly, 1957h, p. 258), but was instead aimed at the future development of North Africa.

In his address, Pineau focused the bulk of his remarks on France's efforts to build and reform Algeria, expressing a positive attitude towards dialogue. However, in his speech, Pineau continued to disregard the Algerian people's legitimate demands for self-determination, denied accusations of colonialism, and distorted the facts, portraying France as the victim in the Algerian affair. Furthermore, although France expressed a willingness to reform, its objectives were not grounded in Algeria's independence, but rather in the preservation of France's own rule over Algeria. Moreover, on the platform of the United Nations, just as in its statements to the United States and NATO, France emphasised its own importance to North Africa, conveying the message that France's territorial integrity in Algeria was conducive to the development of North Africa.

With regard to the views expressed by the French representative at the meeting, the representatives of countries that explicitly opposed France's position such as Syria, Morocco, Indonesia and the Soviet Union, comprising mainly Asian and African nations, focused their arguments on criticising France's military operations in Algeria and questioning France's reforms and the loi-cadre. Whilst the majority of countries held firm objections and expressed a clear anti-colonialist stance, the tone of their statements was relatively moderate, reflecting a desire to resolve the Algerian issue through negotiation (General Assembly, 1957i, p. 265): "an effort to reconcile the

aspirations of the Algerian people with the legitimate interests of the French Republic" (General Assembly, 1957j, p. 276).

The representatives of these countries categorically rejected France's assertion that its involvement in North Africa was for the benefit of the region's development, pointing out that this dependency was in fact "an arrangement imposed upon African countries with a view to continuing old conditions under superficial changes of form" (General Assembly, 1957i, p. 267), and that Algeria was not part of France but rather "part of the Arab homeland" (General Assembly, 1957j, p. 273). As for the proposals put forward by France, it was pointed out that they were not genuinely in the interests of the Algerian people, but rather that "The proposals outlined by the French representative continued to be based on the premise that Algeria was a part of metropolitan France" (General Assembly, 1957j, p. 277), since the latest framework law "had been drafted without any consultation with Algerian representatives and its opening words". In his speech, he called upon the French Government to recognise the Algerian people's right to self-determination, to cease its actions, and to enter into negotiations with the representatives of the Algerian people (General Assembly, 1957k, p. 295).

With regard to the views expressed by the French representative, Mr Pineau, and the statements made by countries opposing him, France's allies and friendly nations expressed varying degrees of support for the French position. For example, the United Kingdom, Portugal and Belgium (General Assembly, 1957l; General Assembly, 1957i; 922) expressed support for the vast majority of the content of Mr Pineau's statement at this session, whilst countries such as the United States and Spain did not fully accept France's arguments regarding domestic jurisdiction, preferring instead a peaceful resolution to the situation in Algeria and the drafting of a text acceptable to France: "In the meantime, the United States believed that France should be given a further opportunity to foster political evolution towards the common objective of stability and peace in Algeria in a way which would satisfy the aspirations of all the Algerian people" (General Assembly, 1957n; General Assembly, 1957k, p. 295).

At this session on the question of Algeria, two draft resolutions were submitted: draft resolution A/C.1/L.194, submitted by 17 Asian and African countries, and draft resolution A/C.1/L.195, submitted by Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Spain, Italy, Peru and the Dominican Republic, at the instigation of the French delegation (Service des Nations Unies au Département，1957，P.921). Whereas draft resolution A/C.1/L.195 sought to find a solution to the question of Algeria through appropriate means, the draft resolution put forward by the Asian and African countries primarily reviewed Resolution A/RES/ 1012 (XI), adopted by the General Assembly in the first half of the year. It once again directly expressed the request that "Recognising that the principle of self-determination is applicable to the Algerian people" (Argentina et al., 1957a, p.1) and advocated a negotiated settlement to the question of Algeria.

During the period from the 924th meeting on 5 December to the 926th meeting the following day, discussions on the draft resolution continued. However, Asian and African states generally considered that the draft resolution put forward by the seven countries sidestepped the Algerian people's demands for self-determination and negotiations, and, compared with the resolution adopted in the first half of the year, "offered no prospects of further progress"(General Assembly, 1957o, p. 335). Subsequently, at the instigation of the United States, Canada, Ireland and Norway tabled amendment A/C.1/L.196 to the draft resolution submitted by the Asian and African countries, replacing the phrase "Recognising that the principle of self-determination is applicable to the Algerian people" (Argentina et al., 1957a, p.1) to "Recognising that the people of Algeria are entitled to work out their own future in a democratic manner" (Canada, Ireland and Norway, 1957, p.1), and replaced the Asian and African countries' call for "negotiations" (Afghanistan et al., 1957, p. 1) with "proposes effective discussions" (Canada, Ireland and Norway, 1957, p. 1). This amendment once again modified the demands for self-determination and negotiations put forward by the Asian and African states, to be precise, it softened and obscured the wording of A/C.1/L.194, seeking to weaken the strength of the Asian and African states' demands and to achieve unilaterally the broadest consensus between Algeria and France: "No one could conceivably object to the new wording, which referred to the principle of self-

determination in more conciliatory, flexible and practical terms" (General Assembly, 1957r, p. 339).

However, this attempt was not accepted by the Asian and African countries. In the final vote, draft resolution A/C.1/L.196 was adopted by a roll-call vote with 37 votes in favour, 36 against and 7 abstentions[87], whilst the amended draft resolution A/C.1/L.194 failed to pass with 37 votes in favour, 37 votes against and 6 abstentions[88]. Draft resolution A/C.1/L.195 was ultimately not put to the vote.

Ultimately, at the 726th plenary meeting of the United Nations General Assembly on 10 December, the Assembly unanimously adopted the negotiated, moderate resolution A/RES/1184 (XII) with 80 votes in favour. The text made no mention of self-determination and called for preliminary negotiations in a circumspect manner. The view on the question of Algeria within the United Nations remained unchanged (Gillissen, 2008), and the final outcome of the meetings held at the United Nations on

---

[87] In favour: Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Finland, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Laos, Luxembourg.

Against: Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Ceylon, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Greece, Haiti, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Malaya (Federation of).

Abstaining: Philippines, Turkey, Bolivia, Cambodia, Guatemala, Liberia, Mexico.

[88] In favour: Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Portu-gal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Finland, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Laos.

Against: Libya, Malaya (Federation of), Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Sovlet Socialist Republic, Ceylon, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Greece, Haiti, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia.

Abstaining: Mexico, Philippines, Turkey, Bolivia, Cambodia, Guatemala.

the question of Algeria in late 1957 was "unanimously interpreted as a success for the French delegation[89]"(Service des Nations Unies au Département, 1957, p. 924).

In 1957, in addition to the war being waged by France and Algeria on Algerian soil, the United Nations was increasingly becoming another important, silent battleground for both sides. In a telegram dated 24 July 1957 from the Algerian Minister Robert Lacoste to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Bourgès-Maunoury, reference was made to the FLN's activities. It was stated that the FLN had abandoned the military approach to resolving the Algerian issue and was instead concentrating its propaganda efforts on the United Nations General Assembly, with the aim of securing a condemnation of France through the UN this year, thereby forcing France to make concessions and resolving the conflict (Lacoste, 1957, p. 131). However, judging by the outcome of the vote at the end of 1957, Algeria's plan had clearly not succeeded. In the final vote, the Asian and African nations collectively voted against the amended draft resolution, resulting in the failure of this moderated draft resolution to pass.

"With the exception of the statements made by the French delegates, the arguments put forward by various parties brought nothing new to the table; indeed, it has long been the case at the United Nations that speeches no longer sway votes[90]" (Service des Nations Unies au Département, 1957, p. 918). This statement is taken from a French document (most likely from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) summarising the year's proceedings on the question of Algeria in the First Committee of the Twelfth Session of the United Nations General Assembly. This indicates that France believed speeches at the United Nations did not actually alter the voting patterns within the Assembly, on the contrary, they served primarily to articulate the positions of France and other nations, whilst the final outcome was determined by France's diplomatic manoeuvres outside the UN framework, and this approach led to France's brief "victory"on the Algerian issue within the United Nations at the end of 1957. Between 1955 and 1957, the number of

[89] Original text: "fut unanimement interprétée comme un succès pour la délégation française."

[90] Original text: "Exception faite des interventions des délégués de la France, l'argumentation développée par les uns et par les autres n'a rien apporté de nouveau; il y a d'ailleurs longtemps qu'aux Nations Unies, les discours ne déplacent plus les votes."

UN member states increased from 60 to 82. Of these 22 new member states, 12 were Asian and African nations, the majority of which were Third World countries. In internal reports by the French government, the continuous accession of Asian and African nations to the UN was consistently viewed as altering the existing balance of power within the organisation and strengthening anti-colonialist forces there. However, 1957 was still in the early stages of Third World countries joining the United Nations, and anti-colonialist forces had not yet grown strong enough to alter the overall political climate within the organisation. Consequently, during the early stages of discussions on the question of Algeria at the United Nations, votes on resolutions concerning Algeria frequently ended with a very narrow margin, resulting in a stalemate on this issue. Despite internal contradictions within the Asian-African Group, faced with the relatively unified voting stance of Asian and African nations, France chose not to fight alone but instead sought its own allies and supporters within the United Nations. Since 1871, France had consistently sought to avoid international isolation:"the possession of powerful friends and membership of alliances became a cornerstone of French geostrategy.The crisis in Algeria at first seemed unlikely to deviate from this pattern" (Alexander, Evans and Geiger, 2002, p. 28). In France's view, the United Nations was "a threat to avoid, an opportunity to seize, an instrument to use" (Smouts, 1995, p. 187), and France believed that it was only by remaining within the United Nations that it could exert its greatest influence to safeguard its interests. However, in order to avoid isolation within the United Nations, France sought support outside the UN framework. When confronted by the United States, the United Kingdom and NATO and even during debates at UN meetings, France chose to situate the Algerian issue within the broader quagmire of the Cold War and Euro-African relations, attempting to convince the outside world that Algeria was, in North Africa, "in any real sense a front-line of the Cold War" (Thomas, 1995, p. 142), thereby making the question of Algeria a central issue in France's partnership with its Western allies (Thomas, 2000). Although the attitudes of the US and British governments had been wavering between supporting France and recognising the Algerian people's right to self-determination since 1957, in a

vote at the United Nations towards the end of 1957, both the UK and the US nevertheless chose to support France.

However, the argument that the question of Algeria constituted a front line of the Cold War did not, in fact, occupy a central position in France's debates at the United Nations. Between 1955 and 1957, as France moved from initially blocking the inclusion of the issue on the agenda to no longer obstructing its discussion in the General Assembly, apart from emphasising from the outset and throughout that Algeria was part of France from both a historical and legal perspective, the focus of France's statements at the meetings gradually shifted from a detailed analysis of the United Nations Charter, to the rejection of the UN's jurisdiction over France's internal affairs, and finally to the vigorous promotion of France's reforms in Algeria and the loi-cadre. Statements concerning the links between the question of Algeria, the Cold War and communism were confined solely to the discussions held during the 1957 session.

Consequently, during the period from 1955 to 1957, France's strategy regarding discussions on the question of Algeria within the United Nations must be analysed from both internal and external perspectives. Outside the meetings, France sought the support of other states. Initially, it blocked the inclusion of the question of Algeria on the agenda, and later, during votes, it utilised its votes to prevent the adoption of draft resolutions that took a hard line against France. Within the United Nations, the question of Algeria was primarily discussed in the Security Council and the First Committee of the General Assembly, rather than being referred to the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly, which was responsible for matters relating to Trust Territories and Non-Self-Governing Territories. The First Committee of the General Assembly dealt chiefly with disarmament, threats to peace and other matters of international political and security affairs. As a result, the atmosphere of anti-colonialism was not particularly pronounced during the relevant meetings, and discussions by the various parties focused more on the situation in Algeria and security issues in North Africa: "There is not a single speaker， even among those who argued that the United Nations lacked jurisdiction, that has not expressed or hinted at their concern regarding the risks that the

prolongation of the crisis poses to the future stability of North Africa[91]" (Service des Nations Unies au Département,1957,p. 919).

For France, its interpretation of the Charter was a recurring theme throughout the sessions, and it repeatedly denied the United Nations' jurisdiction over its internal affairs (the Algerian issue). In the early stages of the session, emphasis on the Charter was more frequent, after that, as the Algerian crisis continued to escalate and the focus of external attention shifted, the centre of France's arguments in the session underwent constant adjustment. Issues such as foreign interference, the Cold War, reform, and Franco-African and Euro-African relations were gradually incorporated into France's defence.

It is thus evident that France's strategy within the United Nations between 1955 and 1957 was not static. On the contrary, whilst consistently upholding the core position that the Algerian issue was a matter of French internal affairs and denying the United Nations' jurisdiction, France continually adjusted both the content of its defence during the meetings and the focus of its diplomatic activities outside the United Nations, in line with developments in the Algerian situation and shifts in the focus of external attention.

4.2 Portugal at the United Nations

4.2.1. Portugal's accession to the United Nations, and Angola's inclusion on the agenda

Unlike France, which was a founding member of the United Nations and one of its permanent Security Council members from the outset, Portugal applied for UN membership in 1945 but did not formally join until late 1955. Although Portugal showed interest and had applied for the membership of the UN since it established, it

[91] Original Text: " Il n'est pas un orateur, même plaidant l'incompétence, qui n'ait exprimé ou laissé entendre son inquiétude quant aux risques que comporte pour la stabi- lité future de l'Afrique du Nord la prolongation de la crise."

was not until 1955 that it was admitted, due to the Soviet's veto (Castaño, 2015).. Moreover, unlike the United Nations established in 1945, which relied solely on the United Nations Charter to interpret non-self-governing and trust territories, the UN of 1955 had undergone significant developments: the establishment of the Special Committee on Information transmitted under Article 73e of the Charter and the Human Rights Committee through A/RES/332 (IV) (General Assembly, 1949), the adoption of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* through E/RES/9 (II) (Economic and Social Council, 1946) and E/56/REV.1 (Economic and Social Council, 1946) , and the accession of numerous newly independent nations. Within the United Nations, an anti-colonialist atmosphere had begun to take shape, and it was precisely within this context that Portugal joined the organisation.

Following Portugal's accession to the United Nations, on 24 February 1956, when confronted with the Secretary-General's request to submit information on its overseas territories, the Portuguese Government responded on 8 November 1956 that "Portugal does not administer Territories which fall under the category indicated by Article 73 of the Charter of the United Nations" (General Assembly, 1956, p. 3). According to the Portuguese Government, pursuant to *Lei n. 2048, de 11 de Junho* (Government of Portugal, 1951) of 1951, all Portuguese overseas territories were not non-self-governing territories but overseas provinces. As a unitary state, Portugal's overseas provinces constituted an integral part of the nation (Barros, 2017, P.122). Similarly, Portugal invoked Article 2(7) of the Charter to assert that the United Nations lacked authority to intervene in its internal affairs. Should the United Nations challenge this interpretation of the amended Charter, it would constitute a flagrant violation of Charter provisions and produce adverse consequences (Nogueira, 1963, p. 79). It is evident that the Salazar government sought to repackage its colonialism in a legitimate manner (MacQueen,1997, P.11).

In addition to denying the existence of any non-self-governing territories, Portugal invoked Article XVIII, Paragraph 2 of the Charter, stipulating that resolutions on important matters require a two-thirds majority of Member States to pass in the General Assembly (American Committee on Africa, 1958). Portugal capitalised on the discourse

within the anti-colonial bloc at the United Nations, which asserted that Portugal's rejection of being a colonial power posed a grave threat to the global peace, which enabled Portugal to block the passage of all resolutions concerning its territories, at a time when the anti-colonial bloc had not yet amassed sufficient strength within the United Nations.

Portugal's minor "victory" at the United Nations proved short-lived, as the organisation did not cease its deliberations on the matter merely because Portugal asserted it possessed no non-self-governing territories, only overseas provinces. On 9 December 1959, following numerous deliberations and consideration of submissions from various nations, the Fourth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly finally presented report A/4343. Within this draft resolution, the Fourth Committee proposed establishing a criterion to determine whether Member States were obliged to submit reports on their non-self-governing territories under Article 73(e) of the Charter. According to the report A/4343, his criterion was not directed solely at Portugal, though the report summarised certain Portuguese positions held during the discussions. When other nations questioned Portugal's failure to submit a list of its non-self-governing territories to the Committee, the Portuguese representative merely "reserved the position of his government" (General Assembly, 1959, p. 3). Beyond employing this reserved stance as a passive response, the Portuguese representative advanced further justifications: "the political and constitutional unity of Portugal was such as to preclude the application of Chapter XI to any part of it" (General Assembly, 1959, p. 11) .

Subsequently, the draft resolution VII that the Fourth Committee proposed establishing a especial committee to determine Member States were obliged to submit reports on their non-self-governing territories under Article 73(e) of the Charter was put to a vote at the 855th plenary meeting of the Fourteenth General Assembly on the 12th of the same month. During the vote, Portugal again cast a dissenting vote. In this debate concerning the establishment of the Special Committee of Six on the transmission of information under Article 73e of the Charter, the Portuguese representative once more articulated the basis for his country's position. Firstly, the Portuguese Government reiterated its view that Portugal possessed no Non-Self-Governing Territories, and once

more directed the resolution towards the requirement for a two-thirds majority to negate the resolution's outcome, thereby rendering it invalid. Moreover, the Portuguese representative noted that this reinterpretation of Article 73(e) of the Charter contradicted Article 2(7) of the Charter. This decision would be unlawful under international law, and the establishment of such a committee would undermine the internal unity of the United Nations as an institution for international cooperation, leading to the formation of factions (General Assembly, 1959).

The resolution adopted on 12 December 1959 with 54 in favor, 5 against and 15 abstaining (General Assembly, 1959), was regarded as having dealt a significant blow to Portugal's attempts to obstruct progress on the relevant agenda through agenda-setting (Reis, 2013). The 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples further articulated the United Nations' unequivocal anti-colonial stance, explicitly calling for the immediate cessation of all colonial activities. Regarding the specific critique of Portuguese colonialism, Resolution 1542 on 15 December 1959, adopted during the 15th session of the General Assembly that same year, stands as the most significant. This resolution explicitly rejected Portugal's prior justification of “overseas provinces”, asserting that the sole constitutional consideration under Article 73(e) of the Charter pertained to territories constitutionally linked to their administering Member State. It further stipulated that territories geographically separated from the administering state and differing racially and/or culturally from it were eligible for application of 73(e) under this provision. Yet Portugal's *Lei n. 2048, de 11 de Junho* merely replaced the term “colony” with “overseas province”, while the rights enjoyed by the populations in these territories remained unequal to those on the mainland. Consequently, the resolution concluded by classifying nine Portuguese-administered territories, including Angola (with the Cabinda Enclave), as Non-Self-Governing Territories (General Assembly, 1961) .

At this juncture, Angola was formally incorporated into the United Nations legal framework for study as a Non-Self-Governing Territory (Santos, 2012).

4.2.2. Portugal in the United Nations from 1961 to 1962

The traditional European powers such as France, United Kingdom, Italy and other countries emerged from the Second World War severely weakened by the conflict, while the rise of the United States and the Soviet Union, coupled with the onset of the Cold War between them, shifted the global order from multipolar to bipolar (Gaddis, 2007). While the US and Soviet Union were engaged in this confrontation, several European nations also maintained a close watch on developments at the UN. In December 1960, the Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado (P.I.D.E.) of Portugal submitted a report to Portugal's Presidency of the Council, Ministry of the Interior, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning discussions held by the foreign ministers of European Economic Community member states during their October 1960 meeting in Paris (P. I. D. E., 2008) . Although the discussions touched upon assessments of the problem of Berlin at the UN General Assembly, this document reveals that European nations had already developed a certain pessimism regarding relations between the Soviet Union, the United States, and Asian and African nations. Within the report, the Foreign Ministers of the EEC members expressed concern that the Secretary-General's actions might gradually exhibit an anti-Western bias. Beyond this, they observed that certain Asian and African nations were oscillating between anti-imperialist impulses and apprehension towards the Soviet Union. Alongside the disunity among Western nations and their reliance on meeting procedures, they became increasingly conscious of the fact that Asian and African nations would assume a dominant position within the United Nations (P. I. D. E., 2008, p. 1).

This report was submitted in late 1960, yet the wave of decolonisation had already profoundly impacted European colonial powers prior to the meetings referenced herein. Colonial powers such as Britain, France, and Belgium had commenced their ‘withdrawal’ from African colonies, whereas Portugal maintained a hardline stance in this regard, despite expressing astonishment at the actions of other colonial nations (Oliveira, 2013).

During the rise of the decolonisation movement, Portugal's attitude and approach towards its colonies at the United Nations not only diverged increasingly from other European colonial powers, but also gradually eroded their support for Portugal within the organisation (though this support had not yet been entirely lost by 1961). Furthermore, Portugal's relations with its Western ally, the United States, grew progressively strained (Reis, 2013). As a neutral nation during the Second World War and an authoritarian regime, Portugal was invited by the United States to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in the early Cold War period due to its significant geopolitical position (the Azores). Subsequently, Portugal signed the Military Facilities in the Azores: Agreement Between Portugal and the United States, September 6*, 1951*(Portugal and United States of America, 1951), successfully integrating into the Western bloc. However, while the alliance fostered cooperation between Portugal and the United States on Atlantic affairs, their perspectives diverged sharply regarding colonial matters (Marcos, 2014). This continued until 1961, when the Kennedy administration succeeded Eisenhower's. Driven by the Cold War imperative to counter Soviet influence in Africa, the United States shifted from a stance of 'tolerance' and 'benign neutrality' towards Portugal's colonial policy to one of explicit opposition. It began supporting the self-determination and independence movements of African colonies (Rodrigues, 2013).

By late 1960, faced with dramatic shifts in both the African and international landscapes, Portugal urgently needed to chart a course for the nation's forthcoming actions (Alexandre, 2017). On 30 November 1960, Salazar delivered a speech entitled Portugal e a Campanha Aticolonialista (1960) to the National Assembly, aiming to outline Portugal's position within the anti-colonialist movement (Salazar, 1960, p. 959). In this address, Salazar contended that the sole path forward for Africa lay in "advancing towards multiracial societies where races intermingle or coexist, with leadership and command falling to the most capable and worthy[92]" (Salazar, 1960, P.961). White people, in Salazar's speech, were cast in the role of bearing responsibility

[92]Original Text: "enveredar no sentido de sociedades plurirraciais em que as raças se misturassem ou convivessem, vindo a pertencer a direcção e o mando aos mais hábeis e melhores."

for the development of the African continent. Faced with the ‘retreat’ of other European colonial powers from their African colonies, Salazar characterised this behaviour as both immoral and unwise: " It strikes me as a crime more against the Negro whom one purports to elevate than against the White, even if the latter faces expulsion and the loss of all his possessions." (Salazar, no date, p. 962)

In his address, Salazar attributed the current state of Africa in 1960, which Portugal was forced to fight with the anti-colonialist movement, to the communist forces opposing the West. He contended that communism was sowing discord, forcibly severing the bonds and solidarity between African and European peoples through the mere distinction of race and skin colour, rather than genuinely aiding Africa's development. Yet in doing so, communist forces could “in their struggle against the West... seek to diminish or defeat it by disintegrating Africa and removing it from its guidance and influence[93] (Salazar, 1960, p. 963).”

Salazar, in the speech, firmly believed in the just cause of the Portuguese in Africa, proclaiming the unique nature of the multiethnic, multiracial equality and brotherhood established by Portugal on the continent. He called upon all Portuguese to unite against any external threats or disputes. Regarding Portugal's position within the United Nations, Salazar contended that the organisation was deviating from its founding principles, having become a forum where ideological and political factions engaged in power struggles. He deemed the tendency of UN committees and assemblies to internationalise all issues and conflicts as a grave and illegitimate interference in Portugal's internal affairs. In his address, Salazar did not express any intention to withdraw from the UN. On the contrary, he emphasised Portugal's continued participation as a member state, while maintaining an unyielding stance on the “overseas provinces” issue: Portugal rejected any equating of its overseas provinces with UN Non-Self Governing Territories, and refused demands for Portugal to “account” to the UN for its governance methods. Salazar viewed such demands as interference in Portuguese sovereignty and a misinterpretation of the *Charter*. To this

[93] Original Text: “na sua luta contra o Ocidente…espera diminuí-lo ou vencê-lo, desintegrando a África e subtraindo-a à sua direcção e influência. ”

end, he stated: “The position we have taken, and will maintain, does not stem from any desire to conceal anything, but rather from the fact that it is impossible for us to accept for our overseas provinces, which are part of the nation, a situation equivalent to that of territories under UN trusteeship and destined for subsequent secession, as well as to account there for how the Portuguese intend to govern themselves in their own home[94] (Salazar, 1960, p. 967) .”

Regarding Portugal's role in Africa, Salazar's account of the matter is somewhat disjointed. Initially, he emphasised the importance of Portuguese in Portuguese Africa, presenting Portugal's colonial activities as a mission and responsibility whereby “branco (whites)” (Salazar, 1960, p. 962) guided and protected “racism negro” (Salazar, 1960, p. 962). Yet in subsequent addresses, Salazar invoked Lusotropicalismo[95] to justify Portugal's unique and legitimate presence in Africa, distinguishing it from other European colonial powers' actions on the continent. This framed all Portuguese colonial activities in Africa within the fairy-tale narrative of fraternal unity among “multinational” and “multiracial” peoples (Alexandre, 2017).

But most significantly, after articulating the importance of colonies to Portugal, Salazar naturally outlined the nation's subsequent strategy within the international community and the United Nations: maintaining the existing position denying the Portuguese overseas provinces were non-self-governing territories, highlighting communist interference, and presenting a united front against external excessive scrutiny of Portugal’s “disagreements” and "destructive tendencies” (Salazar, 1960, p. 970) .

---

[94] A posição que havemos tomado, e manteremos, não vem pois de pretendermos ocultar seja o que for mas de que nos é impossível aceitar para as nossas províncias ultramarinas, que fazem parte da Nação, situação equivalente à de territórios tutelados pela 0. N. U. e destinados a subsequente secessão, bem como prestar contas ali de como os Portugueses entendem governar-se na sua própria casa.

[95] Lusotropicalismo, a concept proposed by the Brazilian sociologist Gilberto Freyre, was adopted by the Estado Novo in the 1950s as a means of resisting the anti-colonial tide sweeping the international community. Lusotropicalismo emphasised the mixed heritage and cultural fusion of the peoples of the Portuguese colonies, and asserted that the innate adaptability of the Portuguese stemmed from their mixed racial heritage, their geographical position between Europe and Africa, and the history of contact with Muslims and Jews on the Iberian Peninsula during the early centuries of Portugal’s founding. However, it should be noted that this narrative served merely to whitewash and obscure the reality of Portuguese colonial aggression and racism (Castelo, 2017).

Following the adoption of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1542(XV), Angola was classified by the United Nations as a Non-Self-Governing Territory. Discussions between Portugal and the United Nations specifically concerning Angola, as recorded in United Nations proceedings from 1961 to 1963, centred on the situation in Angola (Security Council meetings and UN General Assembly) and non-compliance of the Government of Portugal with Chapter XI of the Charter of the United Nations and with General Assembly resolution 1542 (XV) (UN General Assembly Fourth Committee).

The first specific discussion concerning Angola arose on 15 February 1961, following the adoption of General Assembly resolution 1542, during the 934th meeting of the Security Council (S/PV.934). At the request of the Government of Liberia, the Liberian representative sought to include an item on the situation in Angola on the Security Council's agenda to address atrocities occurring in Portuguese Angola (Security Council, 1961). Although Liberia's request received support from the representatives of the Soviet Union and the United Arab Republic, the President rejected the Liberian representative's motion to add an item to the agenda during the meeting, citing procedural illegality under Rules VI and VII[96] of the Provisional Rules of

---

[96] Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council
Rule 6: The Secretary-General shall immediately bring to the attention of all representatives on the Security Council all communications from States, organs of the United Nations, or the Secretary-General concerning any matter for the consideration of the Security Council in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.

Rule 7: The provisional agenda for each meeting of the Security Council shall be drawn up by the Secretary-General and approved by the President of the Security Council.
Only items which have been brought to the attention of the representatives on the Security Council in accordance with rule 6, items covered by rule 10, or matters which the Security Council had previously decided to defer, may be included in the provisional agenda.

Rule 10: Any item of the agenda of a meeting of the Security Council, consideration of which has not been completed at that meeting, shall, unless the Security Council otherwise decides, automatically be included in the agenda of the next meeting. (Security Council, 1946)

As the representative of Liberia made a new request at the meeting to add an item to the provisional agenda, but in accordance with Rules 6, 7 and 10, this action by the representative of Liberia did not comply with, nor did it fall within, the procedure for adding items set out in Rule 6; nor did it comply with the procedure under Rule 7, which requires the Secretary-General to draft the item for inclusion, followed by approval by the President of the Security Council; nor was it a matter covered by Rule 10, that is to say, it was not an agenda item left unfinished from the previous meeting. In the end, at the 943rd meeting of the Security Council, the President rejected the request made by the representative of Liberia.

Procedure of the United Nations Security Council. On 20 February 1961, in a letter to the President of the Security Council (S/4738), the Liberian representative again requested the inclusion of the situation in Angola on the Council's agenda for early discussion, citing the deteriorating situation in Angola and the violation of the human rights and various rights of the Angolan people (Liberia, 1961). However, in response to this request initiated by the Liberian Government to the President of the Security Council, the Portuguese Government expressed strong protest, contending that the Liberian representative had "requested the inscription in the Council's agenda of a matter which is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Government of Portugal, i.e., the maintenance of internal public order" (Garin, 1961, p. 1). In a letter dated 7 March from the Permanent Representative of Portugal to the President of the Security Council (S/4760), Portugal contended that the introduction of this item violated Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter and exceeded the Council's authority. The Portuguese representative contended that any discussion of matters pertaining to Portuguese Angola served "a very serious precedent of the gravest consequences for all the Members of the United Nations", and would "open the door to discussions of problems of internal public order, making possible the internationalization of any problem of that nature for purposes of pure political propaganda " (Garin, 1961, p. 1). In concluding the letter, the Portuguese representative requested permission to reiterate his delegation's position during the formal deliberations on the provisional agenda S/Agenda/943 (Garin, 1961, p. 1).

The strong protest and warning conveyed by the Portuguese representative in his letter did not prevent the project from being placed on the agenda of the Security Council meeting. Subsequently, on 10 March, Afghanistan and other 33 countries[97] jointly addressed a letter (S/4762), expressing support for the request made by the representative of Liberia. The President of the Republic of Ghana also sent a telegram to the President of the Security Council (S/4764), and the representative of the Congo

[97] They were: Burma, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Kinshasa), Dahomey, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, Upper Volta and Yemen.

(Brazzaville) submitted a letter, both requesting participation in the Security Council's deliberations on the situation in Angola (Afghanistan et. al, 1961c). During the 943rd and 944th meetings of the Security Council held on the same day, Portugal was only able to comment on the agenda after the vote in the 944th meeting[98].

At the 943rd and 944th meetings, the views expressed by countries supporting the inclusion of the item on the agenda, such as Liberia, the Arab Republic and the Soviet Union, primarily centred on:

1. Emphasising that Portugal's actions in Angola had undermined fundamental human rights within the country, contravened *the Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, and posed a threat to world peace (Security Council, 1961) (934th meeting), and invoking Article 34 of the *Charter*: "The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security"(United Nations, 1945), calling for Security Council intervention. It was emphasised that placing the matter on the Council's agenda constituted a lawful procedural exercise of the UN's investigative authority under Article 34 of the Charter, rather than interference in Portugal's internal affairs.

2. Refuting the assertion of Portugal that Angola was part of Portugal, and rejected Portugal's prior invocation of Article 2(7) of the *Charter*: "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorise the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present *Charter*; but this principle shall not

[98] At the 943rd meeting, the President proposed： "In his letter of 7 March 1961 [S/4760], the representative of Portugal has asked to be heard in the discussion on the inscription of the item on the provisional agenda. 1 understand that it has been standard Council practice for non-members not to participate in the discussion of the adoption of the agenda. 1 therefore suggest that we should follow the Council's procedure at its 851st meeting, when it received a similar request on an item related to the Union of South Africa. Should the Council voteto adopt the agenda, the representative of Portugal would be recognized after the vote to speak in connexion with the agenda. After that, the Council would begin its discussion of the substance of the question before it. " (Security Council, 1961c, P.2)

prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII" (United Nation, 1945) as justification for refusing to cooperate with the UN investigation, asserting this was Portugal's unilateral interpretation. It is contended that Portugal merely changed Angola's designation from 'colony' to 'overseas province', while Angola's status as a colony remained unchanged.

3. Emphasising the right of the United Nations and the Security Council to address the question of Angola, invoking General Assembly resolution 1542 (XV), noting that Angola has been recognised by the United Nations as a Non-Self-Governing Territory pursuant to that resolution, and stating that Portugal is under an obligation to transmit information concerning Angola in accordance with Chapter XI of the *Charter*(Security Council, 1961d; Security Council, 1961e).

At neither of these meetings did any Council member explicitly defend Portugal. However, while the United Kingdom, France, Chile and several other nations did not oppose the inclusion of the Angolan situation on the Security Council agenda, their statements during the proceedings indicated a preference for the Council to approach the matter with caution. They contended that invoking Article 34 of the *Charter* as the sole basis for adding the Angolan issue to the agenda was insufficient. In particular, the representative of UK, Patrick Dean and the representative of France, Bérard, in the 944th meeting of the Security Council, contended that the Angolan situation did not constitute a threat to international peace and security: "All I would say is this: My Government (the Government of UK) has not so far seen any convincing evidence that these events can properly be represented as constituting a situation likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security…. But are those incidents really such as might lead to an international dispute? (Security Council, 1961e, pp. 3-4)."

In response to the views expressed by other nations' representatives during the meeting, and following the adoption of the agenda, the Portuguese delegate continued to

invoke Article 24(2)[99] of the *Charter*, maintaining that matters concerning Angola and Portugal fell outside the Security Council's remit. He reiterated Article 2(7) of the *Charter*, insisting that the situation in Angola constituted an internal Portuguese affair, no different from disturbances occurring within other nations; emphasising that Portugal constituted a unitary state and " an equal multiracial society" (Security Council, 1961e, p. 20), composed of persons of different races, colours and religions, and denying the existence of any form of colonialism within its borders: "These efforts by the parties to which I refer are dictated by their failure in denting the wall of resistance which the solidarity of the Portuguese people, of all races, offers to attempts of subversion from the outside (Security Council, 1961e, P13)."

Furthermore, the Portuguese representative, Garin, characterised the atrocities alleged by other nations' representatives as disturbances of the peace, portraying Portuguese actions as routine measures to uphold public order. Finally, the Portuguese representative hinted that the "existence in the world of a system of ruthless colonialism and imperialism (which was Soviet that Garin hinted in the meeting) " (Security Council, 1961e, P22), was involved in the international subversive activities launched in Angola, constituting the true culprit behind the Angolan situation.

The Liberian representative expressed profound astonishment at the Portuguese delegate's remarks during the proceedings, while the Soviet representative stated unequivocally: "I should like to point out to the representative of Portugal that he must

---

[99] The *Charter* 24(2): In discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. The specific powers granted to the Security Council for the discharge of these duties are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII (United Nations, 1945).
At the 944th meeting of the United Nations General Assembly, Garin cited Article 24(2) of the Charter, asserting that the Security Council did not have jurisdiction over the Angolan question. According to Article 24(2) of the Charter, the Security Council's responsibilities are limited to Chapter VI: Pacific Settlement of Disputes; Chapter VII: Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression; Chapter VIII: Regional Arrangements; and Chapter XII: International Trusteeship System. However, according to Garin's statement in the meeting, he stated that there was no evidence to suggest that the Angolan question endangered international peace and security, and therefore it did not fall within the scope of Chapters VI and VII of the Charter; the Angolan issue did not involve any regional treaties and therefore did not fall within the scope of Chapter VIII of the Charter; nor was Angola a colony, a Non-Self-Governing Territory or a Trust Territory, and thus it did not fall within the scope of Chapter XII of the Charter either (in order to resist pressure from the anti-colonial movement, the Portuguese Government amended its Constitution in 1951 through Decreto- Lei 2048/51, which transformed the legal status of all Portuguese colonies from colonies to overseas provinces. Then, after Portugal's admission to the United Nations, when the Secretary-General requested information on its overseas territories, the Portuguese Government replied that there were no Non-Self-Governing Territories.)

live not by the laws of the seventeenth century, but by the laws of the second half of the twentieth century. And the second half of the twentieth century, by its very nature, spells the end of colonialism, including Portuguese colonialism (Security Council, 1961e, P23). ” Four days later, on 14 March, Ceylon, Liberia and the United Arab Republic jointly submitted draft resolution S/4769 to the Security Council. citing General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV), 1541 (XV) and 1542 (XV), calling upon the Portuguese Government to urgently consider measures and reforms in Angola to implement General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, and proposed to appoint a subcommittee to examine the necessary statements of the Security Council concerning Angola, to conduct such investigations as it deemed necessary, and to report to the Security Council as soon as possible (Liberia, Ceylon and United Arab Republic, 1961). During the two Security Council meetings held on the 14th and 15th of March (S/PV.945 and S/PV.946), in response to the detailed accounts of violent incidents in Angola and allegations of systematic oppression and inequality against the Angolan people presented by nations supporting the draft resolution, the Portuguese representative cited their own sources, and categorically denied the allegations, declaring them to be fabrications and political propaganda. Furthermore, the Portuguese representative emphasised that the Security Council had no legitimate grounds for intervention, directing blame towards the communist bloc and asserting that external forces were instigating subversive activities within Angola, while Portugal's actions constituted legitimate maintenance of public order (Security Council, 1961f; Security Council, 1961g). At the 946th meeting, the British representative Crowe maintained that the situation in Angola did not meet the criteria of Article 34[100] of the *Charter* as described by Liberia and other nations. He further contended that the requests contained in the submitted draft resolution would exceed the Security Council's functional scope, thereby preventing the Council from focusing on its primary mandate of maintaining international peace and security (Security Council, 1961g).

---

[100] Article 34 of the Charter: “The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security (United Nations, 1945).”

However, at the conclusion of the meeting, legal arguments prevailed, and the proposal ultimately failed to persuade a majority of Security Council members (Silva, 1995). The draft resolution was ultimately put to a show of hands and failed to pass. The result was five votes in favour (Ceylon, Liberia, USSR, United Arab Republic, USA), zero votes against, and six abstentions (Chile, China (ROC), Ecuador, France, Turkey, UK).

On 20 March, thirty-nine[101] States collectively submitted a letter (A/4712) requesting the inclusion of an additional agenda item entitled "Situation in Angola" on the agenda of the United Nations General Assembly. In their explanatory memorandum, these States requested the immediate consideration of the situation in Angola by the General Assembly, as the deteriorating circumstances there, if left unchecked, would constitute a grave threat to international peace and security (General Assembly, 1961).

On the 22nd, the General Committee of the General Assembly unanimously decided to recommend that the situation in Angola be placed on the agenda for discussion in plenary without being submitted to the Committee for consideration (General Assembly, 1961a).

At the 966th plenary meeting of the Fifteenth Session of the United Nations General Assembly the following day, after reiterating the views previously stated in the meeting, the Portuguese representative declared that he was protesting vehemently on behalf of the Portuguese Government against the proposal to include the relevant agenda item and was "registering the firmest reservations on any related resolution or development arising therefrom" (General Assembly, 1961c, p.44). The Portuguese delegation finally declared that, in the interests of justice and equity, it would no longer participate in discussions on this item and immediately withdrew from the meeting. The

---

[101] They were: Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Cyprus, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, United Arab Republic, Upper Volta and Yemen

motion to include this item on the agenda was adopted by a roll-call vote requested by the Liberian representative, with 79 votes in favour, 2 against, and 8 abstentions[102].

Resolution 1603 (XV) (A/RES/1603 (XV)), which was adopted on this occasion, was almost identical in content to proposal S/4769, which was submitted to the Security Council on 14 March but failed to be adopted. However, the resolution 1603(XV) was more explicit regarding the establishment of the subcommittee: the President of the General Assembly established the subcommittee and appointed its members in accordance with the resolution. Furthermore, the body to which the subcommittee reports was changed from the Security Council to the General Assembly.

On 27 May, the Soviet representative sent a letter (S/4813) to the President of the Security Council condemning Portugal in even stronger terms and requesting an immediate investigation into the situation in Angola(USSR, 1961). The following day, Afghanistan and other 42 countries[103], sent a further letter (S/4816) to the President of the Security Council, stating:

"The massacres are continuing… This and the armed suppression of the Angolan people and the denial of political rights and self-determination to them are in contravention of *the Charter* and of the General Assembly's resolution on Angola and constitute a serious threat to international peace and security" (Afghanistan et al., 1961,

---

[102] In favor: Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania, Argentina, Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroun, Canada, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, China (ROC), Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Denmark, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Finland, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea (Conakry), Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Liberia, Libya, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United States of America, Upper Volta.

Against: Spain, Union of South Africa.

Abstaining: Australia, Belgium, Dominican Republic, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Panama, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (General Assembly, 1961b, p. 44).

[103] They are: Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Cyprus, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea (Conakry), India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, United Arab Republic, Upper Volta, Yemen and Yugoslavia. (And judging by the distribution of member states of the vote, they were all Global South and/ or Non- Aligned countries.)

p. 1).

The letter requested that the Security Council convene a meeting to address this as a matter of urgency. On 5 June 1961, the Portuguese representative, Garin, again argued that those requests were inconsistent with the provisions of *the Charter* and international law. On behalf of the Portuguese government, he wrote to the President of the Security Council (S/4821) to lodge a strong protest, stating that the current issue was that "a group of countries merely desired to follow a course of political propaganda and international agitation" (Portugal, 1961, p. 2). During the subsequent 16th session of the Security Council, other nations, in response to Portugal's alleged atrocities in Angola, began to cite the recently adopted General Assembly Resolution 1603 (XV) as a basis for further discussion and pressure, and submitted a new draft resolution S/4828 prior to the meeting.

This discussion attracted the attention of many Asian and African countries, and during the subsequent sessions, further countries wrote to the President of the Security Council requesting to participate in the Council's discussions on the Angolan issue. Although during the 954th and 955th meetings, the representatives of France and the United Kingdom continued to express doubts as to the legality of raising the issue as a threat to international peace and security (Security Council, 1961a; Security Council, 1961b). The two countries did not directly defend Portugal's military actions in Angola, but, they provided indirect support to Portugal by questioning whether the proposals put forward by the Asian and African nations constituted a threat to international security. What's more, they did not explicitly take Portugal's side, but instead hoped that Portugal would cooperate with the Committee's work.

On 9 June, during the final meeting, which was the Security Council's 956th session, three roll-call votes were held on draft resolution S/4828. The relatively moderate revised amendment S/4833/Rev.1 of S/4828, which was proposed by Chile and inserted an additional paragraph "Express the hope that a peaceful solution will be found to the problem of Angola in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations"

(Chile, 1961, p. 1) ,was adopted by a vote of 9 in favour, 0 against and 2 abstentions[104], whilst the more hardline and radical amendment S/4834, proposed by the Soviet Union, failed to pass with 4 votes in favour, 3 against and 4 abstentions[105]. Following the first two votes, the amended final draft resolution was adopted with 9 votes in favour, 0 against and 2 abstentions[106]. Judging by the voting results, the US, the United Kingdom and France either supported or abstained on the draft resolution and the amended final draft resolution promoted by the Asian and African nations, whilst almost unanimously and explicitly opposing the more radical draft proposed by the Soviet Union (with France abstaining). This demonstrates that, during the meeting, even Portugal's allies in Nato, refrained from taking a stance that explicitly opposed the Asian and African nations in support of Portugal's position, while, at the same time, Portugal's allies would still block the passage of the hardline text promoted by the Soviet Union at critical moments, thereby ensuring that the final resolution remained within a relatively moderate scope that would not impose greater coercive pressure on the Portuguese government.

In Resolution S/4835, which was the final text of S/ 4828, adopted at the 966th meeting of the 16th session of the Security Council on 9 June, following the reaffirmation of the recently adopted United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1603 (XV), the Security Council reinforced its call for the Sub-Committee to visit Angola, demanded that the Group on the Situation in Angola take immediate action, and

---

[104] In favor: Ceylon, Chile, China(ROC), Ecuador, Liberia, Turkey, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United states of America.
Against: None.
Abstaining: France, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

[105] In favor: Ceylon, Liberia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic.
Against: Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United states of America.
Abstaining: Chile, China(ROC), Ecuador, France.

[106] In favor: Ceylon, Chile, China(ROC), Ecuador, Liberia, Turkey, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United States of America.
Against: None.
Abstaining: France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

urged the Portuguese authorities to act in accordance with the resolution, to cease repression immediately, and to cooperate with the Sub-Committee's activities (Security Council, 1961c).

In response to the outcome of the Security Council vote on 9 June, and in light of the ongoing friction between the United Nations and Portugal's overseas provinces since Portugal's admission to the UN. Salazar delivered a speech on 30 June at a special session of the National Assembly, entitled, *O Ultramar Português e a ONU* (Salazar, 1961).

In his speech, Salazar systematically reviewed the voting results on several key resolutions since Portugal joined the United Nations, pointing out that many countries continued to express their support for the principle that *the Charter* does not permit the United Nations to interfere in Portugal's internal affairs, by voting against or abstaining. Furthermore, Salazar noted that the majority of votes in favour were attributable to the participation of communist states and nations from Asia and Africa. In his view, it was precisely this group that persistently convened meetings at the United Nations that exceeded the scope of *the Charter*, thereby interfering in Portugal's internal affairs. However, unlike in his speech, *"*Portugal e a Companha Anticolonialista" (Salazar, 1961) delivered to the National Assembly in late 1960, Salazar placed greater emphasis on attributing the international attention drawn to Portugal's overseas territories to communist forces in opposition to the West. In this address, rather than condemning communism, Salazar devoted more space to focusing on the US, a fellow member of the Western bloc. As for the US' steadily waning support for Portugal within the United Nations, which culminated in March 1961 when the US began to explicitly support the Asian and African Group and publicly opposed Portugal's overseas policy, Salazar stated that such remarks, coming from a country with an anti-communist stance, would have a significant impact, yet, he added: " It did so, and unfortunately[107]" (Salazar, 1961, p. 979).

Salazar, in the speech, once again emphasised the indivisibility of Portugal's overseas territories. However, on this occasion, he demonstrated a willingness to

[107] Original text: "Houve-as e infelizes."

reform: “We are faced with societies that are evolving at a necessarily slow pace, and I believe it is in our best interests to save them and help them progress [108]”(Salazar, 1961, p. 987). Nevertheless, such reform differed from those advocated by the Asian and African Group at the United Nations meetings, as well as from the demands made to the Portuguese government in the UN resolution. The “reform” did not imply recognition of the possibility of self-determination or independence for Portugal’s overseas territories, but merely adjustments to administrative and governance methods. It was, “It all comes down to the nature and strength of the bonds that bind the various parts into a single national whole[109].” (Salazar, 1961, p. 988), all of which served to reinforce the concept of the Empire (Silveira, 2019, p. 186). On the subject of the United Nations, Salazar repeatedly questioned the UN’s interpretation of Article 73 of *the Charter*, opposed UN initiatives regarding self-determination for Portugal’s overseas territories, and maintained that the General Assembly and the Security Council had failed to fulfil their obligation to prevent “foreign terrorists” from carrying out subversive activities within Angola. Although Salazar believed that Portugal was in a disadvantageous position within the United Nations, he denied that this meant Portugal was truly isolated internationally, and viewing UN votes as the product of bloc politics and emotional mobilisation rather than a fair judgement on Portugal’s overseas issues (Salazar, 1960, p. 988). Consequently, in the official Portuguese narrative, Portugal on the one hand denied the authority of the United Nations, while on the other hand portrayed the UN as a key instigator of anti-Portuguese violence overseas, and this became a central tenet of official Portuguese discourse (Reis, 2013).

Such arguments, which use *the Charter* to deny the scope of the powers and responsibilities of the General Assembly and the Security Council, also appeared in a letter dated 20 June from the Permanent Representative of Portugal to the United Nations to the Chair of the Sub-Committee. On 9 June, around the time of the adoption of resolution S/4835 at the 966th meeting of the 16th session of the Security Council,

---

[108] Original text: “Estamos em face de sociedades, em evo lução forçosamente lenta, que eu creio há o maior interesse em salvar e fazer pro gredir.”

[109] Original text: “Só tem que ver com a natureza e a solidez dos laços que fazem das várias parecelas o Todo nacional.”

the Sub-Committee sent two letters, via its Chair, to the Permanent Representative of Portugal, in the hope of establishing cooperation with the Portuguese Government to gather information on the situation in Angola (Salamanca, 1961). In response to the Sub-Committee Chairman's request, the Permanent Representative of Portugal to the United Nations forwarded the Portuguese Government's reply, in which the Government continued to deny the validity of the new resolution S/4835, stating that the outcome of the resolution's result "were not authorised by *the Charter*", and maintaining its long-standing position that the situation in Angola was "of no concern to the United Nations" (Salamanca, 1961, p. 9), and did not recognise the Sub-Committee's authority. However, at the end of the letter, the Portuguese Government invited the Chairman of the Sub-Committee, Carlos Salamanca, to visit Lisbon in a private capacity. Having received the invitation from the Portuguese Government, the Sub-Committee, following deliberations, ultimately decided that the Chairman should visit Portugal in July, thereby securing an opportunity to travel to Angola.

However, despite Resolution S/4835, Salazar adopted a hardline stance in the National Assembly: " (The United Nations) attempted to strip us of that sovereignty would therefore be an unjust act and, moreover, one devoid of practical wisdom[110]" (Salazar, 1961, p. 983). This indicated that, publicly, the Portuguese government maintained its previous stance regarding its overseas territories, namely that Angola was not a colony but part of Portuguese territory. However, J.M. Fragoso, a Foreign Ministry official of Portugal who participated in the UN Security Council meeting on the Angolan issue at the time, highlighted the crisis in Portugal's position within the UN in his report on the meeting.

The report was submitted on 22 June 1961, which focused on the choice of stance taken by Portugal at the meeting, revealing a sense of crisis within Portugal regarding its position in the UN. In this report, Fragoso devoted the majority of his account to highlighting a major flaw in Portugal's defence during the meeting, namely that the Portuguese side's accusations regarding the "the role of the communists in the events in

---

[110] Original text: "Tentar despojar-nos dessa soberania seria pois um acto injusto e, além de injusto, desprovido de inteligência prática."

Angola[111],” and “our allegations of foreign interference[112]”, Fragoso pointed out that those accusations, “although true, it failed to convince either friends or foes[113]” (Fragoso, 1961, p. 1). Furthermore, he noted with a degree of pessimism that the situation in Angola had already attracted considerable attention from the outside world, adding that “The Afro-Asian group will not drop the matter; the only question is when the next meeting will take place[114]” (Fragoso, 1961, p. 5). This suggested that Lisbon no longer needed to consider whether it could prevent the issue of Angola from being placed on the agenda of the General Assembly or the Security Council, but rather how to delay the onset of a new round of debate by refusing to cooperate with the UN subcommittee or through procedural delays (Fragoso, 1961, p. 5). At the same time, in his analysis of Portugal’s current situation at the United Nations, J.M. Fragoso also noted that Portugal should adopt a more realistic approach to adjusting its public relations and information strategy, and consider selectively easing restrictions on foreign journalists entering Angola in order to foster a more favourable international public opinion environment (Fragoso, 1961, p. 5).

This internal report indicates that, although the Portuguese government continued to maintain a hardline and non-negoting stance in public, and keep insisting that Angola was part of Portuguese territory, those representing Portugal at United Nations meetings had gradually come to realise that, on the issue of Angola, Portugal faced not merely a divergence of positions and interests with other nations, but rather a comprehensive crisis involving international public opinion and procedural pressures within the United Nations. However, this sense of crisis was not confined to Fragoso, the author of the report, it was also present in the Portuguese government’s assessment of its own position within the United Nations, including that of Salazar himself (Pereira, 2022). In

---

[111] Original text: “responsabilidade dos comunistas nos acontecimentos de Angola,”

[112] Original text: “nossas alegações de interferência estrangeira,”

[113] Original text: “se bem que verdadeira, não convenceu nem inimigos nem amigos.”

[114] Original text: “o groupo afro-asiático não deixará cair a questão e a dúvida apenas surge quanto à data de nova reunião.”

April 1961, when Salazar invited Franco Nogueira[115] to serve as the new Minister for Foreign Affairs, he confided in Nogueira that, according to Nogueira himself, whilst Salazar had no doubts regarding Portugal's overseas policy, he did not know how much longer it could be sustained; however, in terms of politics, public opinion and the state, Portugal was determined to remain confident and would persevere (Nogueira, 1986, p. 15).

However, this internal awareness of the crisis did not prompt the Portuguese Government to make any substantive concessions in response to the United Nations' concerns. On the contrary, the Portuguese Government continued to impose strict restrictions on external visits to and investigations in Angola. Furthermore, it began to be more proactive in providing the outside world with information that had been screened and controlled by the government, in order to project an image of cooperation. In July 1961, the Chairman of the Sub-Committee, accompanied by his secretary, paid a visit to Lisbon at the invitation of the Portuguese Government (General Assembly, 1961, p. 9). Yet by the end of the visit, apart from receiving written material from the Portuguese government concerning Angola and the events there, the Chairman had not secured the Portuguese government's consent on the opportunity to visit Angola. Ultimately, members of the Sub-Committee travelled to the Congo (Léopoldville) to gather information for the drafting of the report (General Assembly, 1961, p. 9).

Although the meeting in Lisbon with the Chairman of the Sub-Committee was considered to have taken place in a cordial atmosphere, and during the meeting Portugal considered that it had provided, without reservation, a substantial amount of written material concerning Angola, although maintain that this material was not provided under Article 73 of *the Charter*. Following the meeting, Portugal's Permanent Representative to the United Nations also submitted to the Sub-Committee details of recently enacted reform measures within Angola, to demonstrate the adjustments and improvements Portugal had made in this regard (General Assembly, 1961, p. 9). In the

[115] Alberto Marciano Gorjão Franco Nogueira, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Portugal between 1961 and 1969.

final report, the Sub-Committee's report on the situation in Angola did not adopt a wholly one-sided stance of condemnation of Portugal, owing to pressure from USA and France and Spain (Santos, 2014, p. 141). However, none of this could prevent Portugal from facing the next round of meetings at the United Nations. On 9 August 1961, the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations wrote to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, proposing that this item be included as a supplementary item on the provisional agenda of the sixteenth session of the 4th Committee of the General Assembly under the title *Non-compliance of the Government of Portugal with Chapter XI of the Charter, and resolution 1542 (XV) of the General Assembly* (JHA, 1961).

During the 1196th meeting on 3 November 1961, Portugal adopted a passive stance, maintaining the same line of argument it had taken at previous meetings: it denied that Article 73 of *the Charter* and Resolution 1542 (XV) applied to Portugal; it rejected the allegations of atrocities committed in Angola; and it also rejected the new interpretation of *the Charter* put forward by African and Asian nations, viewing it as a form of political coercion that was neither reasonable and constituted discrimination against Portugal (Thant, 1962). Furthermore, when representatives of other nations took the floor, Portugal "reserved his delegation's right to reply to some of the comments made" (General Assembly, 1961, p.249).

Although, unlike previous moments, Portugal was willing to provide information on the situation in Angola, although denying that it was fulfilling its obligations under Article 73 of *the Charter*. However, this does not imply that Portugal was willing to cooperate with the work of the United Nations, rather, it is because Portugal wishes to maintain its own sources of information. At the 1208th meeting of General Assembly, Portugal strongly opposed the proposal put forward by the representative of Senegal to hear statements from two residents of Portuguese Guinea (Conakry) (A/C.4/504). Although France, Portugal, South Africa, Spain and the United Kingdom voted against the proposal, and Belgium abstained, this did not prevent the petitioners from attending the 1209th meeting.

Of course, this also did not prevent the resolution from being passed in the vote at the 1208th meeting. Prior to the vote on the resolution, Asian and African nations at the

meeting not only revisited the topics previously discussed but also broadened the scope of the debate more explicitly, focusing in particular on NATO's military aid and the silence of Western nations. They pointed out that Portugal's continued perpetration of atrocities in Angola was not an isolated act but was supported by external aid, and demanded that Western nations such as the US, the United Kingdom and France take a clear stance. They also called for NATO to cease its assistance to Portugal, such as arm supplies (General Assembly, 1961a).

During these sessions, most of Portugal's key supporters did not explicitly endorse Portugal's position in their public statements, but instead sought to soften the language in the draft resolution that was unfavourable to Portugal. However, these attempts a amendment failed and were all rejected by the General Assembly(General Assembly,). The final draft resolution at the 1208th meeting was adopted by 83 votes in favour, 3 against (Portugal, South Africa, Spain) and 2 abstentions (Bolivia, France). From start to finish, only Spain and South Africa expressed open support for Portugal, whilst the US, the United Kingdom and France demonstrated selective support for Portugal, particularly the US and the United Kingdom.

Ultimately, the Assembly inevitably adopted Resolution 1699 (XVI). This resolution, in addition to declaring that the Portuguese Government was obliged to submit information regarding the Non-Self-Governing Territories under its administration in accordance with Article 11 of *the Charter* and demanding its immediate implementation, condemned the Portuguese Government's continued failure to comply with Chapter XI of *the Charter* and Resolution 1542 (XV), as well as its refusal to cooperate with the Committee on the Review of Information on Non-Self-Governing Territories. And in the resolution's conclusion, requested other Member States of the United Nations to withhold from Portugal any aid, support or assistance that might be used for the benefit of the peoples of its non-self-governing territories. Furthermore, the resolution decided to establish a new Special Committee of Seven to examine the existing information concerning the Portuguese territories and to prepare a report for consideration by the General Assembly and any other organ established by it (General Assembly, 1961c).

However, this was not the only dispute Portugal faced at the United Nations. At the same time, Portugal was involved in a dispute with India over the issue of Goa. In this dispute, Portugal likewise failed to secure strong support from its allies. Portugal found itself in a clear predicament at the United Nations.

In response to the outcomes of two Agendas: *Non-compliance of the Government of Portugal with Chapter XI of the Charter*, *and resolution 1542 (XV) of the General Assembly* in the Fourth Committee of the 16th session of the United Nations General Assembly, and the *Letter dated 18 December 1961 from the Permanent Representative of Portugal to the President of the Security Council*[116] *(S/5030)* before the United Nations Security Council, on 3 January 1962, in a new speech delivered to the National Assembly under the title "Invasão e Ocupação de Goa Pela União Indiana" (Salazar, 1961), Salazar expressed, on the one hand, his dissatisfaction with the lack of support from Portugal's allies, Britain and the US, and on the other hand, his appreciation and gratitude for the support of Spain and the South American nations.

In his speech, Salazar no longer made a strong call for unity within the Western bloc, but instead began to reflect on Portugal's role within the United Nations. Regarding Portugal's position within the UN, Salazar continued to express his determination to defend it (despite his claims that he intended to withdraw from the

---

[116] On 18 December 1961, the Portuguese representative, Mr Grain, at the request of the Portuguese Government, wrote to the President of the Security Council calling for an immediate meeting of the Security Council on the issue of Goa with India. In the letter, the Portuguese Government stated that this constituted a "full-scale unprovoked armed attack by the Indian Government on the territories of Goa, Damão and Diu, comprising the Portuguese State of India" (Garin, 1961, p. 1), and considered itself "a victim of unprovoked aggression on the part of the Indian Union" (Garin, 1961, p. 2). At the end of the letter, Garin, on behalf of the Portuguese Government, called for an immediate meeting of the Security Council to discuss the matter, on the grounds that the Indian Government's actions constituted "a grave threat to peace and security" (Garin, 1961, p. 2). At the 987th and 988th meetings of the Security Council held on the same day, a draft resolution (S/5032) submitted by Ceylon, Liberia and the United Arab Republic characterised the matter as a colonial issue involving Portugal in India, the draft rejected Portugal's allegation that India had committed acts of aggression, and called on Portugal and India to cooperate as soon as possible to resolve the issue. Then, the draft was rejected by a vote of 4 in favour (Ceylon, Liberia, USSR, United Arab Republic), 7 abstentions (Chile, China (ROC), Ecuador, France, Turkey, UK, USA) and 0 against. At the same time, the draft resolution (S/5033) tabled by France, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States, calling for a ceasefire between the two sides and the withdrawal of Indian government forces, was rejected by the Soviet Union, because of its identity of a permanent member of the Security Council, with 7 votes in favour (Chile, China (ROC), Ecuador, France, Turkey, UK, USA) and 4 against (Ceylon, Liberia, USSR, United Arab Republic) (Security Council, 1961d, pp. 26–27).

organisation[117]), but, at the same time, Portugal also began to adjust the direction for its future within the UN: " We may be bold enough to revolutionise entire continents at any cost, but we must seriously ask ourselves whether we are on the right path[118]" (Salazar, 1961, p. 988).

On 4 January 1962, one day after Salazar had delivered this speech to the National Assembly, the Assembly passed a motion recommending that the government adjust Portugal's foreign policy where necessary and in the national interest (Macedo et al., 1962, p.260). On 12 January 1962, a note responding to this motion discussed in further detail its third point: "3) To propose that the Government review its foreign policy where this appears necessary in the interests of the nation[119]", considered that the reason for Portugal's international isolation lay not in its foreign policy, but fundamentally in the fact that Portugal's overseas policy "failed to find acceptance or understanding on the world stage[120]"(Pereira, Pinto and Fragoso[121], 1962, p. 2). In response to this, authors recommended that the government make appropriate adjustments to its overseas policy to address international concerns, whilst also making corresponding adjustments to its foreign policy.

Given the current macro-level situation facing Portugal, authors considered that, regardless of future international developments, the US would "continue to act in the

---

[117] In " Invasão e Ocupação de Goa Pela União Indiana"(Salazar, 1962), Salazar described the United Nations as an organisation that was no longer capable of safeguarding Portugal's rights, and openly hinted that Portugal might withdraw from the UN. In his speech, he stated that Portugal might not be the first country to leave the UN, but it would certainly be among the first to do so, and Portugal would refuse to cooperate with the UN on matters that did not serve its immediate interests (Salazar, 1962). However, judging by subsequent speeches, Portugal did not actually intend to withdraw from the United Nations, but was merely adopting a threatening stance.

[118] Original text: "podem ser ousados sem custo a revolucionar continentes, temos de interrogar-nos a sério sobre se vamos pelo bom caminho."

[119] Original text: " 3) Formular a sugestão de uma revisão eventual, pelo Governo, da política externa nos casos em que a mesma se afigure necessária ao interesse da Nação."

[120] Original text: "não encontrar aceitação nem compreensão no plano mundial."

[121] In Ditarq's document *Notas Sobre A Política Externa Portuguesa*, the authors were not named. Following a search of other sources, it had been broadly established, through Bernardo Futscher Pereira's book *Orgulhosamente SóS – A Diplomacia em Guerra (1962–1974)*, that the authors of this document are André Gonçalves Pereira, Luís Teixeira Pinto and José Manuel Fragoso (Pereira, 2022, p. 32).

spirit of anti-colonialism[122]" (Pereira, Pinto and Fragoso, 1962, p.4), and that the United Nations would continue to influence Portugal's bilateral relations. Furthermore, the aim of international anti-colonial pressure, at least in Angola and Mozambique, was not military victory but "the fall of the regime[123]" (Pereira, Pinto and Fragoso, 1962, p.5).

In terms of foreign affairs, and specifically regarding Portugal's relations with other nations, the note argued that Portugal should reduce its dependence on the Western bloc and take a more proactive approach in seeking support within the international community. It stated that Portugal should no longer rely primarily on its Western allies, particularly the US and NATO. Instead, the note advocated that, Portugal should shift from a relatively passive reliance on the Western allies' votes to actively leveraging its own strategic importance within NATO, as well as that of the Azores base, to secure the support of its Western allies. The note specifically forecasted the future stance of the US, noting: "under no circumstances is an alignment with the current Portuguese position to be expected[124]" (Pereira, Pinto and Fragoso, 1962, p. 3). Based on this assessment, the note argued, on the one hand, that Portugal needed to strengthen ties with countries such as Spain and South Africa in order to secure their support; on the other hand, it also advocated seeking to establish links with certain Asian and African nations with which Portugal had no direct conflict, in order to reduce their hostility.

As for the United Nations, authors were not optimistic about the future prospects of Portugal, yet it cannot simply abandon its position; rather, it believed that whilst maintaining its stance, it should act with greater flexibility, namely: "Whilst a blanket recourse to the principles and rules of the UN is to be rejected, the public affirmation of the principle of self-determination does not appear tactically desirable, although it cannot be ruled out that circumstances may make its recognition advisable in limited sectors. In any case, it seems appropriate to consistently reaffirm our adherence to the

---

[122] Original text: "não deixará de se exercer no sentido do anticolonialismo."

[123] Original text: "a queda do regime"

[124] Original text: "em caso algum é de prever uma coincidência com a actual posição portuguesa"

historical principle of the sociological evolution of Portugal's multiracial communities[125]" (Pereira, Pinto and Fragoso, 1962, p. 7).

With regard to adjustments to overseas policy, given Portugal's current political, economic and military resources, the note advocated abandoning the approach of integrating the overseas territories with mainland Portugal, and instead seeking individualised solutions for each territory, in order to avoid a rupture that would lead to the complete and total loss of these territories. (Pereira, Pinto and Fragoso, 1962)

Although the note revealed a recommendation to alter its diplomatic stance, this attempt to reform foreign policy did not stem from the genuine intention to change its overseas policy in order to align with the "the tides of time". However, it was based on the view that, "Now, the foundations of Portuguese overseas policy, though logical in their principles and consistent with the lessons of history, are not in harmony with the Western world in which we are compelled to live[126]"(Pereira, Pinto and Fragoso, 1962).The note offered a pessimistic assessment of Portugal's current position within the international community, but Salazar found it difficult to accept a future in which the overseas provinces were destined for independence, thereby blocking any shift in Portugal's stance on this matter (Pereira, 2022, p. 33).

4.2.3. "Politically, it is a clear victory of Portugal."

At the United Nations, a new round of debates on the situation in Angola is

---

[125] Original text: "Sendo de rejeitar um recurso global aos princípios e regras da ONU, não se afigura tácticamente desejável a afirmação pública do princípio de autodeterminação, embora não seja de excluir que as circunstâncias tornem aconselhável o seu reconhecimento perante sectores limitados. Em qualquer caso, parece indicado reafirmar-se sempre a nossa adesão ao princípio histórico da evolução sociológica das comunidades portuguesas plurirraciais."

[126] Original text: "Ora as bases da política ultramarina portuguesa, ainda que lógicas nos seus princípios, e coerentes com a lição da história, não se coadunam com o Mundo Ocidental em que somos obrigados a viver."

imminent. In accordance with General Assembly Resolution 1603 (XV) of 20 April 1961, the United Nations would discuss the final report (A/4978) submitted by the Sub-Committee on Angola at the 16th session of the General Assembly.

The session took place between 15 and 30 January 1962, with a total of 15 meetings held. Portugal, however, participated only in the first of these, namely the 1088th plenary meeting of the 16th session of the General Assembly. Following his statement, the Portuguese representative declared that he "will not take part in the illegal, pointless and wasteful debate that is to follow" (General Assembly, 1962a, p.1189), reserving the right to speak only when necessary to provide clarification or to respond to accusations.

At only session in which the Portuguese representative took part in the debate, Garin delivered a detailed statement. In his address, Garin categorically rejected the legitimacy of discussing Angola and other Portuguese overseas provinces at the United Nations General Assembly, and portrayed Portugal as a victim of terrorism in Angola, rather than as a colonial oppressor in the region. Firstly, Garin described this meeting as yet another "sinister move" by certain Member States, the ultimate aim of which was "the disintegration of my country" (General Assembly, 1962a, p.1181), and once again cited Article 2, paragraphs 4 and 7, of *the Charter*, reiterating that the situation in Angola was a matter of Portugal's internal affairs in which the United Nations had no right to interfere.

Furthermore, Garin described the atrocities that took place in northern Angola as localised acts of terror perpetrated by "gangs of terrorists coming from outside", emphasising that the Portuguese government had only "8,000 military and police personnel" (General Assembly, 1962a, p.1183), and that "the terrorists continued to attack these forces and the latter naturally acted in legitimate defence" (General Assembly, 1962a, p. 1184), whilst the outside world and the United Nations had deliberately exaggerated the scale of the incident and its impact on international peace. In response to external allegations of repression, extermination and atrocities, Garin denied them in his statement. He described the claims as "tendentious, exaggerated, and false", and emphasised that the allegations were "completely false" (General Assembly,

1962a, p.1181). At the same time, the Portuguese representative stated, on the one hand, that Portugal had cooperated with the Sub-Commission's investigation and provided the necessary information; on the other hand, he maintained that the establishment of the Sub-Commission and its investigative work itself violated *the Charter* and the practice of the United Nations General Assembly, and that its report had been biased against Portugal from the outset. At the conclusion of his statement, the Portuguese representative further enumerated Portugal's achievements in Angola in the fields of education, health, industry and other areas, as well as the reforms undertaken in other respects. These included the repeal of the previous *Estatuto do Indígena* and other measures, ensuring that all Portuguese citizens, including those in the overseas provinces, enjoyed equal political rights[127]. In addition, through reforms such as the restructuring of local administration, Portugal advanced its reform philosophy of a "multiracial society without any sort of discrimination" (General Assembly, 1962a, p.1188).

Reactions to the Portuguese representative's statement and position varied from country to country. Only the representatives of Spain and South Africa, whose government had requested intervention, which was itself facing accusations at the United Nations for the Apattheid regime, expressed explicit support in their statements (Santos, 2014, p. 169) . Their national representatives defended Portugal by, respectively, opposing the radical decolonisation stance of other UN representatives and emphasising Portugal's indispensability to Angola's development at that stage (General Assembly, 1962b) , and by invoking Article 2(7) of *the Charter* to oppose interference in a state's internal affairs (General Assembly, 1962c). Furthermore, whilst other countries, such as Brazil and France, expressed anti-colonialist positions during the debate and supported the Angolan people's right to self-determination, they likewise emphasised Portugal's positive influence on Angola in their statements and expressed a

[127] On 6 September 1961, the Portuguese Government repealed the Decreto-Lei No. 39666 (Ministério do Unltramar, 1954) promulgated on 20 May 1954, which was known as the Estatuto do Indígena,and issued Decreto-Lei No. 43893 (Ministério do Unltramar, 1961). This Decreto law abolished the classification system established by the previous Decreto-Lei, which had divided the indigenous population of the overseas provinces into three categories: indigenous, assimilated and white, and granting the entire population, at least in principle, equal political status.

friendly stance towards Portugal. As far as the discussion of the draft resolution was concerned, in the final vote on the draft resolution they tended to support the version more favourable to Portugal and opposed the adoption of the most hard-line approach towards Portugal (General Assembly, 1962a; General Assembly, 1962c). In addition to those countries hoping for a resolution to the Angolan issue in a way favorable to Portugal, there were others who sought a swifter and more forceful resolution. For example, Poland, which, together with Bulgaria in 1089th meeting of General Assembly, submitted draft resolution A/L. 383, directly refuted the statement made by the Portuguese delegation during the debate, asserting that the United Nations had the power to bring about the self-awareness and independence of all peoples living under colonial regimes, and, citing Resolution 1514 (XV), stated that the United Nations had the right to intervene in Angolan affairs. The Polish representative also pointed out that the Portuguese representative's account was a whitewashing of Portugal's colonial actions in Angola, whereas the reality was that Portugal was carrying out colonial exploitation in Angola rather than normal law enforcement activities. Finally, the Polish representative stated that Portugal's colonial activities in Angola could not have been carried out without the assistance of NATO, and submitted a strongly worded draft resolution recommending that the General Assembly should once again solemnly recognise Angola's long-overdue right to self-determination and independence, and impose sanctions on Portugal in accordance with Articles 41 and 42 of *the Charter* (General Assembly, 1962III, p. 1195).

However, in order to prevent the Angolan issue from becoming polarised and dominated by Cold War factors (Santos, 2014, p. 167), the majority of Member States were more inclined to support the relatively moderate and pragmatic 45-nation draft resolution (A/L. 384/Rev. 1 and Rev. 1/Add. I) put forward by Asian and African nations. Whilst reaffirming the Angolan people's right to self-determination and independence, the draft called upon Portugal to cease repression, release political prisoners, and implement wide-ranging reforms to transfer power to the Angolan people. Although Western nations sought to weaken the draft proposed by the Asia-

Africa Group through split voting, on 30 January 1962, at the 1102nd meeting of the 16th General Assembly of the United Nations, the draft submitted by the Asian-African Group was overwhelmingly adopted as Resolution 1742 (XVI) by a roll-call vote of 99 in favour, 2 against (South Africa, Spain) and 1 abstention (France). This demonstrated that, despite Portugal's attempts to influence the outcome of the vote by rallying other nations. Portugal's influence was waning, and it was no longer able to alter the situation at United Nations meetings, where the anti-colonial sentiment held the majority. Resolution 1742 (XVI), adopted on this occasion, solemnly reaffirmed the inalienable right of the Angolan people to self-determination and independence, and urged the Portuguese Government to implement far-reaching political, economic and social reforms and measures without delay, in particular to establish a representative political system based on free elections, with a view to transferring power to the Angolan people (General Assembly, 1962d). Although the draft submitted by the Asian and African bloc was watered down under pressure from Western nations, this resolution was regarded as a compromise reached between the two sides on matters of principle. It incorporated the broadest possible interpretation of the concept of self-determination, thereby achieving consensus on this issue (Santos, 2014, p. 170). Consequently, Resolution 1742 (XVI) represented both a principled victory for Asian and African nations and the outcome of a compromise between different interest groups at the meeting.

Compared with France's staunch support for Portugal and Britain's generally moderate stance during the meeting, the US' position towards Portugal, particularly its attitude towards Portugal on colonial issues, was far more complex (Lopes, 2011). This complexity stemmed not only from the NATO alliance between the US and Portugal, but also from the US government's shift in policy on decolonisation in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Between Portugal's accession to the United Nations in 1955 and the time the Angolan issue was discussed at UN meetings, there was a change of administration in the US government. With regard to colonial issues, the outgoing Eisenhower administration (1953- 1961) generally favoured gradual decolonisation with European support, whereas the newly appointed Kennedy administration (1961- 1963)

believed that the US should engage with African nationalist leaders in order to win over the Asian-African Movement and bring them over to the side of the free world (Telepneva, 2014).

The Kennedy administration's emphasis on decolonisation did not imply that the US would unconditionally support the positions of Asian and African nations within the United Nations. On the contrary, within the United Nations, the US' stance on Portugal's overseas policy was influenced by a variety of factors, including its alliance relationships, its own political leanings and its international image. In a document submitted by P.I.D.E. on 23 January 1962, titled Opiniões do Embaixador dos Estados Unidos da América em Lisboa, acerca da Política do Seu País na O.N.U. em Relação a Portugal (P.I.D.E., 1962), the US Ambassador to Lisbon refuted the Portuguese view that the decline in Western nations' standing within the international community and Portugal's dire situation were attributable to the US, and that the Portuguese harboured "many illusions[128]" regarding America's ability to influence the UN (P.I.D.E, 1962, p.2). According to P.I.D.E, he also outlined the US perspective on Portugal's current situation: the US would not place itself in a minority position merely to show high-profile support for Portugal, but would instead vote with the majority and coordinate with them: "os americanos procuram conciliar-se com a maioria e por consequência votam com ela. [129]." (P.I.D.E, 1962, P.2). However, the US did not overlook Portugal's position within the UN, nor the potential policy adjustments the Portuguese government might make towards the US in the future. Towards the end of the document, the US side also anticipated that, when renewing the Azores Base Agreement with Portugal at the end of 1962, the Portuguese government would, given the strategic location of the Lages base, demand some form of "political compensation[130]" from the US in its foreign policy (P.I.D.E, 1962, p. 3).

---

[128] Original text: "muitas ilusões."

[129] Original text: "The Americans will press for amendments and votes on individual paragraphs to be accepted, but in the end they will have to give in, just as they did in committee."

[130] Original text: "compensação política."

However, rather than the US drafting a moderate version of the resolution on Angola at the meeting, the Portuguese Government would have preferred the Americans to adopt a clearer stance in the United Nations in support of Portugal's overseas policy. Although, in a telegram from the Portuguese Ambassador of Portugal to the US State Department on 12 January 1962, the US side expressed the hope that Nogueira would attend the plenary session of the 16th session of the United Nations General Assembly on 15 January 1962 to deliver a statement on overseas policy reforms and his future intentions. The US side thought it "would make it possible for Portugal's friends to offer some support against attacks by extremists"(Elbrick, 1962, p. 919), and considered that boycotting the UN meeting would serve no purpose, as it would not only lead to greater isolation but also provoke more fierce attacks from certain UN member states. However, this aroused Nogueira's displeasure, as he believed that "the US has been constantly pushing Portugal to take various and successive steps in connection with overseas territories, but so far had offered nothing in return" (Elbrick, 1962, p. 919).

Although Portugal acknowledged in the telegram that it could not "got it alone" (Elbrick, 1962, p.919) with any success, and would therefore take other measures to defend its interests, it declined to disclose specific details. During a "personal and informal" (Elbrick, 1962a, p. 919) conversation between Nogueira and Elbrick, Nogueira adopted a very hardline stance, seeking to deter the US from continuing to exert pressure on colonial issues through force and threats. He firmly rejected the US economic aid package, thereby expressing his distrust of the US. The US, meanwhile, sought to persuade Portugal to adjust its colonial policy without entering into direct confrontation, as "the US has always held firmly to a policy of self-determination, and it would be illusory to think that any change to such a policy within the UN is possible" (Elbrick, 1962a, p. 922).

The deadlock, with neither side willing to concede, saw a turning point on 14 May during a conversation between Nogueira and US Secretary of State Dean Rusk at the

US Embassy in Athens. During the conversation, Nogueira addressed the terminology surrounding self-determination in Angola and other Portuguese overseas provinces, emphasising that the self-determination recognised by Portugal was not the same as that recognised by the United Nations and the US. For Portugal, the term "self-determination" was more conducive to the American public's understanding. However, for Portugal, this did not signify any new policy orientation, but rather a continuation of traditional policy, equivalent to "autonomia" or "descentralização". During the conversation, Nogueira further emphasised with great seriousness that Portugal's confidence in the US had reached its limit, saying: "Now I would like to tell you, very clearly and very firmly, that we have reached the point of saturation and that further American pressure would be futile[131]" (Nogueira, 1962, p.8). When Rusk subsequently asked Nogueira for his views on the tactics adopted by the US at the United Nations, Nogueira did not hesitate to state bluntly that a moderate draft was merely the starting point for an extreme one. Rather than the US delegation investing considerable political capital in the meeting to secure a moderate draft resolution, Portugal would prefer a strongly worded draft resolution, provided the US clearly expressed its opposition to it, rather than adopting a moderate stance (Nogueira, 1962).

At the end of the conversation, Nogueira solemnly told Rusk:

"I must tell you that we have completely lost confidence in the American Government and its good faith, and we are convinced that, as part of America's imperialist policy of seeking markets and raw materials, the American Government wishes to drive us out of Africa as quickly as possible[132]" (Nogueira, 1962, p.18).

Nogueira's remarks during the conversation, and the position of the Portuguese

---

[131] Original text: "Well, I wanted to tell him, very clearly and very firmly, that we had reached the point of saturation and that further pressure from the Americans would be pointless."

[132] Original text: "Sinto ter de lhe dizer que perdemos por completo a confiança no Governo americano e na sua boa-fé, e estamos convictos de que, dentro da política imperialista americana na busca de mercados e matérias primas, o Governo americano deseja expulsar-nos da África tão depressa quanto possível."

Government he represented, made the American side even more acutely aware of the crisis of trust in bilateral relations. The day after the conversation, when Rusk met with Nogueira again, he expressed a strong desire to rebuild trust between the two governments (Nogueira, 1962), and stated that negotiations on the renewal of the Azores agreement needed to begin immediately. Meanwhile, having received the transcript of the talks, the US Ambassador to Portugal, Elbrick, expressed his frustration regarding the content of the discussions in a letter to Taylor, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs. Having recognised the Portuguese government's excessive tactics, and in light of Portugal's recent political turmoil, Elbrick hoped that instructions for negotiations would be issued as soon as possible, as "this would be very unhelpful to us, to NATO, and to the Western world" (Burke, 1962, p. 929).

Although the US' support for the principle of self-determination is fundamental in UN, and the US firmly believed that national self-determination was an inevitable process, it has no intention of making the political concessions that the Portuguese Government is seeking. However, beyond the negotiations, the US also wished to ensure that the talks were not confined solely to bilateral relations between Portugal and the US, but to incorporate them within the framework of NATO, thereby encouraging Portugal to adopt a constructive attitude towards the renegotiation of the Azores base agreement (Rusk, 1962). Within the US government, there was a desire during the negotiations to do everything possible to help Portugal extricate itself from its predicament, because: "the combination of their outmoded colonial policy and the strongly-expressed anti-colonial policy of their Afro-Asian critics" (Rusk, 1962a, p. 945) made Portugal in the corner.

In order to help Portugal alleviate its predicament at the United Nations, at the NATO Council meeting on 26 September 1962, some NATO member states took the view that Portugal should refrain, to a certain extent, from explicitly opposing the principle of self-determination at the UN General Assembly. This would avoid direct

conflict with the demands for self-determination put forward by Asian and African nations during the debate, and would also facilitate Portugal's own defence, and that of its allies at the UN General Assembly. During the meeting, as a country that had just emerged from the Algerian War and had agreed to grant Algeria full independence, the French representative stated: "It was the only viable option in today's world, and we could not remain insensitive to the invocations of the principle of self-determination[133]" (Fragoso, 1962, p.5); and the Belgian representative hoped to make the following statement at the UN meeting: "Look at the efforts made by Portugal to develop the territories and raise the standard of living of the populations. The path that Portugal has in fact been following in Africa is in line with self-determination[134]." At the same time, however, Belgium also hoped that "they were merely asking Portugal not to contradict this[135]" (Fragoso, 1962, p.10).

However, at the meeting, Fragoso remained firmly opposed to the use of such a compromise approach at the United Nations, and he once again emphasised to the other NATO countries that Portugal and the United Nations had different definitions of self-determination. In Fragoso's view, Portugal was more concerned with the welfare of the local African population than the United Nations, because for Portugal, self-determination "meant what was in our statements[136]", that is to say, "which mean exactly what they say" (Fragoso, 1962, p. 8). And for the United Nations, self-determination was merely: "an outward appearance of self-government: provided there were ministers and a pretence of independence, the United Nations ceased to concern

---

[133] Original text: "era a única viável no mundo de hoje, e não podia ser insensível às invocações do princípio de auto-determinação."

[134] Original text: "Vejam o esforço feito por Portugal para desenvolver os territórios e elevar o nível das populações. O caminho que Portugal vem de facto seguindo em África está na linha da auto-determinação."

[135] Original text: "Apenas pediam que Portugal não o desmentisse."

[136] Original text: "significava o que constava das nossas declarações."

itself with the well-being of the populations[137]" (Fragoso, 1962, p. 8).

This means that, Fragoso was not simply opposed to the term "self-determination" as such, but rather to the United Nations' interpretation of it. Portugal was attempting to reinterpret self-determination as a process of gradual reform and social development led by Portugal, rather than a path towards independence and the transfer of sovereignty to its overseas provinces. Consequently, at the NATO Council, Fragoso made it clear that Portugal would not yield an inch on the question of whether to issue a statement at the United Nations accepting the right to self-determination, as this would imply that the Portuguese Government would acknowledge the eventual independence of overseas provinces such as Angola. However, Fragoso did not entirely reject assistance from NATO allies at the United Nations. Regarding the current situation at the United Nations and the proposals put forward by NATO allies, whilst rejecting them, Fragoso put forward an alternative suggestion: that the meeting should proceed to a split vote, so that "as a means of safeguarding the principle of self-determination without at the same time endorsing false and extravagant accusations against an allied and friendly country[138]" (Fragoso, 1962, p. 10).

At the second NATO Council meeting on 10 October, the Portuguese representative responded in turn to two issues left over from the previous meeting: firstly, the request made by the Belgian representative that the Portuguese representative refrain from publicly denying that Portugal's reforms would lead to self-determination for its overseas territories; and secondly, Portugal's proposal that allies adopt a system of vote by division during UN votes. During the meeting, Fragoso argued that if Portugal were to acknowledge at the United Nations that its policies would lead to self-determination, this would "integrate us into the mechanism for implementing the UN concept of self-

---

[137] Original text: "uma aparência exterior de governo próprio: desde que houvesse uns ministros e uma ficção de independência, as Nações Unidas deixavam de preocupar-se pelo bem-estar das populações."

[138] Original text: "como meio de salvaguardar o princípio da auto-determinação sem ao mesmo tempo subscrever acusações falsas e extravagantes contra um país aliado e amigo."

determination[139]" (Fragoso, 1962a, p.8). Building on remarks made by himself at the previous NATO meeting regarding the differing interpretations of the concept of "self-determination" between Portugal and the United Nations, Fragoso reiterated at this meeting that if Portugal were to acknowledge self-determination in order to secure assistance from its allies, the outcome would inevitably be detrimental to Portugal. This was because, within the United Nations framework, "the concept of self-determination necessarily implies a transfer of sovereignty, whether through the independence of the 'self-determined' territory or its annexation by an entity other than that which previously held sovereignty[140]" (Fragoso, 1962a, p.6). What Portugal sought at the meeting, however, was not to recognise "self-determination" as defined by the United Nations, but rather to ensure that the international community understood and recognised the concept of 'self-determination' as defined by Portugal itself.

Consequently, at the NATO meeting, Fragoso, as an alternative approach, not only reiterated the use of split voting on resolutions concerning Angola within the United Nations, but also supported the proposal put forward by the US for "international rapporteurs[141]".

In Portugal's view, and in Fragoso's view, Portugal was not unwilling to cooperate

---

[139] Original text: "nos integraria no mecanismo da execução do conceito de auto-determinação da ONU."

[140] Original text: "o conceito de auto-determinação implicava necessàriamente uma transferência de soberania, quer pela independência do território "auto-determinado" quer pela sua anexação por entidade diferente da que anteriormente detinha a soberania."

[141]
Before the 17th Session of United Nations, and also ahead of this second meeting of the NATO Council, the USA endorsed the UK's proposal regarding the Rapporteur and held consultations with the Portuguese Government on the Rapporteur system. In the United States' view, the rapporteur system reflected both "US position on self-determination for Angola peoples is constant" and "new spirit of moderation Portugal has displayed at this GA (General Assembly)" (Rusk, 1962c, p. 564). At the 1196th meeting of the 17th session of the United Nations General Assembly, the system was publicly explained in draft resolution A/L.420, tabled by the United States: " Request the President of the seventeenth General Assembly to appoint two United Nations representatives, one for the purpose of gathering information on Angola, the other for the purpose of gathering informations on conditions in Mozambique, in both cases including information on Political economic and social conditions, by visiting those two Territories and other places as they may deem necessary; Requests the Government of Portugal to extend to the United Nations representatives such assistance as they may require pursuant to their mandate " (General Assembly, 1962y, pp. 1166- 1167).

with the United Nations from the outset, but rather rejected those provisions within the UN that ran counter to Portugal's position, as well as accusations that Portugal deemed unfavourable. Fragoso also stated that the system of international rapporteurs and the method of split voting[142] could provide a means of addressing Portugal's issues at the UN, particularly the former, the system of international rapporteurs would be advantageous to Portugal in terms of "fact-checking"（Fragoso, 1962a, p.12）.

Although the Deputy Secretary-General of Nato stated at the close of the meeting that: "the issue of Angola was not just a problem for Portugal, but also a problem for NATO[143]" (Fragoso, 1962a, p. 16). Fragoso's report on the meeting noted that NATO allies expressed differing views on Portugal's two proposals. Regarding the proposal for the international rapporteur, the US, Belgium, the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands and other nations generally adopted a positive stance. However, on the proposal for split voting, certain differences emerged amongst NATO nations, with the United Kingdom and Turkey expressing support. The United Kingdom even stated: "We were familiar with all voting techniques and would seek, as far as possible, to make use of the one we advocated[144]" (Fragoso, 1962a, p. 15), while the Netherlands expressed opposition to this.

As regards the section concerning Portugal's inability to accept Belgium's proposal, the differences between the various countries became even more apparent. Belgium maintained that the proposal would enable countries to assist Portugal without

---

[142] From Rules procedure (United Nations, n.d.), XII. Plenary Meetings, Rule 89: "A representative may move that parts of a proposal or of an amendment should be voted on separately. If objection is made to the request for division, the motion for division shall be voted upon. Permission to speak on the motion for division shall be given only to two speakers in favour and two speakers against. If the motion for division is carried, those parts of the proposal or of the amendment which are approved shall then be put to the vote as a whole. If all operative parts of the proposal or of the amendment have been rejected, the proposal or the amendment shall be considered to have been rejected as a whole" (UN, n.d.).

[143] Original text: "a questão de Angola era não apenas um problema de Portugal mas também um problema da NATO."

[144] Original text: "conheciam todas as técnicas de voto e procurariam na medida do possível tirar partido daquela por nós preconizada."

compromising their belief in the principle of self-determination; the United Kingdom, however, sided more closely with Portugal, arguing that the proposal would place Portugal in "an intolerable dilemma at the United Nations[145]" (Fragoso, 1962a, p.15); France merely stated that it had recommended Belgium's proposal to its own government; Italy indicated that it would have been willing to accept Belgium's proposal; whilst the Netherlands pointed out that the plan could not proceed without Portugal's full consent.

During the meeting, there was not complete unanimity within NATO regarding the Portuguese issue. Portugal's allies were generally willing to support Portugal and avoid the adoption of resolutions that were overly harsh towards the country during the vote at the United Nations meetings. However, the Portuguese side was unwilling to accept the allies' proposal to endorse the principle of self-determination at the UN meetings. Rather than such political interference in Portugal's affairs, Portugal preferred to secure room for manoeuvre at the UN through procedural and institutional means, namely through the system of international rapporteurs and split voting, rather than making the slightest compromise on principle.

On the one hand, Portugal was rallying its allies at the NATO summit to vote in its favour during the upcoming round of UN meetings concerning the country; on the other hand, Portugal and the US were still in talks regarding the renewal of the Azores agreement. In the eyes of the US, the Azores had become a symbol of transatlantic tensions, while Salazar skilfully transformed the discussions between Portugal and the US on decolonisation into "a referendum on NATO's commitment to European values" (Parrott, 2016, p. 112). In the view of the US government, maintaining relations with Portugal and ensuring Portugal's stability within NATO was currently more in the US's interests than promoting self-determination in Africa. This shift in the US stance towards Portugal at the United Nations in 1962 was regarded as having been driven by the critical importance of the Lajes base in the Azores to US strategic and security

[145] Original text: "num 'dilema intolerável' nas Nações Unidas."

interests, which in turn exerted a decisive influence on US policy regarding Portuguese colonialism (Rudrigues, 2014).

In late 1962, There were two agendas in the question of Angola that Portugal needed to face in UN: *The situation in Angola: reports of the Sub-Committee established under General Assembly resolution 1603(XV) and of the Government,* and *Non-compliance of the Government of Portugal with Chapter XI of the Charter of the United Nations and with General Assembly resolution 1542 (XV): Report of the Special Committee on Territories under Portuguese Administration*. These two agenda items were discussed simultaneously at the 17th plenary session of the United Nations General Assembly and the Fourth Committee of the 17th session of the United Nations General Assembly, respectively.

Meanwhile, at the Fourth Committee of the seventeenth session of the United Nations General Assembly, prior to the statement by Fragoso, the representative of Portugal, the Chair informed the Committee at the 1350th meeting that a request for a hearing concerning the territories under Portuguese administration had been received. This request was subsequently circulated as document A/C.4/566.

At the subsequent 1381st meeting on 13 November 1962, the same request for a hearing was adopted without objection. However, at the following 1382nd meeting at the same day, the Portuguese representative, Soares Barata, stated: “His delegation objected categorically to hearings of that type; such hearings, when they concerned Portugal, were not based on any provision of *the Charter* and were contrary to its letter and spirit” (General Assembly, 1962e, p.356). However, this did not prevent the Chair, at the 1383rd meeting on 14 November, from proposing, and the Committee from agreeing that “the normal procedure of circulating the request for the hearing should be dispensed with and that the Committee should take a decision immediately” (General Assembly, 1962f, p.357). Consequently, at the subsequent meeting, political groups and individuals representing all the colonies of Portugal spoke in turn and responded to questions from representatives of Member States.

In November 1962, the Fourth Committee of the 17th Session of the United Nations General Assembly considered, under agenda item 54, *Non-compliance of the Government of Portugal with Chapter XI of the Charter of the United Nations and with General Assembly resolution 1542 (XV): report of the Special Committee on Territories under Portuguese Administration*. As the result, the scope of the discussions on this agenda item was not limited to Angola, but also covered other Portuguese Non-Self-Governing Territories. During this two-month session, political groups from Angola, FNLA (Front Nacional de Libertação de Angola), MDIA (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola), NTO-BAKO (Associação dos Povos de Origem Bakongo) and, later in the proceedings, the MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola), which took part in the petitionary hearings held at the United Nations. Although these political groups all originated from Angola, their positions within the General Assembly differed.

At the 1398th meeting on 27 November, Holden Roberto and Kounzika, representatives of the FNLA, took the floor in turn. They described in detail a series of atrocities committed by Portuguese forces within the Angolan territory, including bombings, massacres and threats, in order to set the record straight regarding the events in Angola: “Contrary to what was claimed in the Portuguese press” (General Assembly, 1962g, p. 452), thereby refuting the Portuguese representative’s earlier account of the events.

The FNLA representative stated that on 15 March 1961, after all peaceful channels of communication with the Portuguese Government had broken down, the FNLA chose to take up arms against the repressive measures of the Salazar regime. In their speeches at the meeting and in their subsequent responses to questions from other delegates, the two representatives linked Portugal’s ongoing colonial war to external aid, stating that the Portuguese government’s ability to continue waging colonial war in Angola was largely due to “what it was receiving from foreign countries” (General Assembly, 1962g, p. 452). In their view, the reforms touted by Portugal did not signify genuine

political openness or a transfer of power, but were instead intended to strengthen political integration between Angola and Portugal. The FNLA representatives pointed out that these reforms "aimed at strengthening Angola's political integration with Portugal" (General Assembly, 1962g, p. 452) , with the purpose of facilitating Portuguese immigration to Angola and maintaining Portugal's military, political and economic control over the territory. At the same time, these reforms had "not established freely elected and representative political institutions with a view to transferring power to the Angolan people" (General Assembly, 1962g, p. 452).

Consequently, during the meeting, FNLA representatives Holden Roberto and Kounzika appealed to NATO member states, all UN member states and non-member states, "especially Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, France and the US" (General Assembly, 1962g, p. 452), to draw their attention to the situation in Angola, and "asked them to cease supplying the Portuguese with any assistance whatsoever, whether in the form of armaments or of financial loans" (General Assembly, 1962g, p. 452). As for the Portuguese government's role in the Angolan conflict, the FNLA representatives once again recommended that "Portugal cease, forthwith, all armed action against the inhabitants of Angola and enter into negotiations with the fighting Angolan people" (General Assembly, 1962g, p. 453). Finally, they expressed the hope that a specialised agency would be established to provide assistance to Angolan refugees currently residing in the Congo (Leopoldville).

Jean-Pierre Bala and Kaziluki, representatives of the MDIA, spoke at the 1400th meeting. Unlike the FNLA representatives, who focused on highlighting the violent acts committed by the Portuguese Government in Angola, the discrepancy between its public rhetoric and actual actions, and the FNLA's armed resistance against the Salazar regime (General Assembly, 1962g, pp. 451- 453), the MDIA representatives also stated in their address that "the Portuguese Government had pursued its vacillating and destructive policy and had not kept any of its promises", and that "the Angolan people were at their wits' end and would lay the entire blame on Portugal if it were to abandon all prospects of agreement and cooperation" (General Assembly, 1962h, p.472), they placed greater

emphasis on engaging with the Portuguese Government through negotiation rather than war.

Bala stated that MDIA "had consistently pursued a policy of friendship" (General Assembly, 1962h, p.471), and that "when faced with the choice between war or negotiation with Portugal, his party had preferred to attempt to enter into contact with the Portuguese Government" (General Assembly, 1962h, p.471). The MDIA rejected the resolution adopted at the most recent meeting of the Overseas Affairs Committee held in Lisbon in October 1962 regarding the revision of the basic legislation governing all territories under Portuguese rule[146], and called upon the Portuguese Government to grant Angola full independence and to participate in a round-table conference in January 1963, attended by representatives of the Angolan people and the Portuguese Government, to draw up a timetable for the transfer of power. Finally, the MDIA representatives devoted considerable space to describing their vision for the structure of a future independent Angolan state.

The statement made by the representative of NTO-BAKO Angola at the 1408th meeting, however, was closer to the position put forward by the Portuguese representative during the session. Angelino, the representative of NTO-BAKO Angola, stated at the meeting that he was "an indigenous Angolan"(General Assembly, 1962i, p.541), and that he "wished to give an objective account of the situation in his country and to rectify exaggerations which had been made for propaganda purposes"(General Assembly, 1962i, p.541).

---

[146] After the beginning of the war in Angola in 1961, Salazar realised that, in order to maintain Portugal's domination in Angola, military suppression alone would not suffice, certain adjustments to colonial policy were also necessary. Consequently, in 1961, the newly appointed Minister for Overseas Affairs, Adriano Moreira, travelled to Angola in an attempt to maintain control by, amongst other measures, strengthening the powers of the colonial governor. However, this reform was soon curtailed by the Portuguese government. The policies implemented in Angola by the Governor-General, Venâncio Deslandes, particularly regarding higher education and fiscal matters, brought him into conflict with the central government, and he was ultimately dismissed in September 1962. Subsequently, revised by Moreira in 1962, and published in 1963, the *Lei Orgânica do Ultramar* (1963) further fuelled discontent among the Angolan white elite, as the draft reforms had not been fully discussed in Angola beforehand and the Angolan representatives of the white settlers involved had no voting rights. (Pimenta, 2014)

Having opened the meeting with these remarks, Angelino went on to cast doubt on the stance of Angola's nationalist movements, implying that the country's nationalist movements were being instigated by external forces. In his speech, Angelino pointed out that neither Emmanuel Kounzika, leader of the Democratic Party of Angola, nor the União das Populações de Angola (UPA) were Angolans, and further claimed that the leaders of other political parties "had received their political training in the Communist Party in France or in the Soviet Union" (General Assembly, 1962i, p.541).

Angelino then began to explain the "true facts"(General Assembly, 1962, p.541) about Angola in his speech, attempting to shed light on the history of Portuguese rule in the country. In his defence, he cited examples to show that slavery in Angola was not introduced by the Portuguese, but had long existed and been widely practised by the Arabs. However, he stated that this was not intended to exonerate the Portuguese for having practised slavery, but rather that it "should be judged within the context of the times", and that "it should also be remembered that Portugal was one of the first countries to abolish slavery" (General Assembly, 1962i, p.541).

Angelino went on to argue that, although the Portuguese government's record in the areas of "wages", "medical care", "education" and "political freedom" , "left room for improvement in certain respects"(General Assembly, 1962i, p.541), the Portuguese government had been involved in Angola's infrastructure development, and that Angola was by no means "a police state", "and that racial discrimination was not permitted in any public institution". He had found the various sections of the population living together in complete harmony." In Angelino's statement, it was the UPA that was truly responsible for the acts of terrorism and genocide, whilst the other groups, the UPA and the MPLA, were the real causes of the refugee crisis in Angola.

Finally, in his speech, Angelino, speaking on behalf of his party, NTO-BAKO Angola, expressed his party's aspirations: a desire for Angolan independence, "but as the result of a natural evolution brought about through the economic, social, political and cultural progress of the people; it was opposed to a precipitate independence which

would make Angola dependent on the assistance either of the former colonial power or of other nations. ”(General Assembly, 1962i, p. 542). Furthermore, he elaborated on the concept of independence as understood by NTO-BAKO Angola: “independence alongside Portugal, within a multiracial society similar to that of Brazil” (General Assembly, 1962i, p. 542).

Angelino’s remarks stood in stark contrast to the positions expressed by the representatives of the FNLA and the MDIA during the meeting. This led to his statement being met with strong scepticism and condemnation from other delegates. In their subsequent remarks, the Soviet allies and other Asian and African nations maintained that “the petitioner was obviously a tool of Portuguese colonialism”(General Assembly, 1962i, p. 543), and raised further questions regarding the concept of Angolan self-determination to which he had referred in his speech. When Achkar, the representative of Guinea (Conakry), asked in his speech “how and when the petitioner’s party thought that independence would come to Angola”, Angelino stated that “he could not indicate any definite dates. His party had not yet had any talks with the Portuguese Government.” (General Assembly, 1962i, p. 543), having previously stated that “NTO-BAKO had no relations with the Portuguese Government” (General Assembly, 1962i, p. 542). The representative from Bolivia, Salamanca, who was also the Chair of the Sub-Committee on Angola (to be verified), focused more on verifying Angelino’s testimony, pointing out contradictions between the content of his statement and United Nations documents.

Apart from responding to the remarks made by Angelino, the representative of NTO-BAKO, the criticisms levelled at the Portuguese representative by delegates from other countries opposed to Portugal during the Fourth Committee meeting focused primarily on rejecting Portugal’s position and denouncing its practice of colonialism.

At the 1393rd meeting on 21 November, Achkar, the representative from Guinea (Conakry), refuted the Portuguese Government’s narrative regarding its colonies, stating “the falsity and inadmissibility of the Portuguese Government’s claims that those

colonies were an integral part of Portugal itself" (General Assembly, 1962j, p. 423). Furthermore, Achkar pointed out that the "true purpose" of Portugal's expansion in Africa, and the "civilising mission" and "policy of assimilation" it pursued, were founded on "de facto racial discrimination, engendered by shameless economic exploitation." (General Assembly, 1962j, p. 424), constituting a negation of and "affront" to African values, and "was a flagrant violation of the Organisation's (UN) purposes and principles." (General Assembly, 1962j, p. 424). At the 1399th meeting, Karseno, the representative of Indonesia, pointed out that Portugal's reforms in its overseas territories had not brought about any substantive changes, that Portugal's overseas economic policy "denied the primacy of the interests of the inhabitants of the territories under its administration" (General Assembly, 1962k, p. 459), while the indigenous population was deprived of all freedom of political expression. Following the Portuguese government's political reforms, electoral eligibility criteria had become "even stricter", and instances of discrimination and forced labour "continued to exist", with illiteracy rates "being among the highest in the world"(General Assembly, 1962k, p. 459). At the 1401st session, the Mongolian representative, Purevjal, stated explicitly in his address that the reason the Portuguese government was able to disregard United Nations resolutions and continue waging colonial war in Angola stemmed from "the support they received from their allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), who were supplying Portugal with arms and material for suppressing the national liberation movement of the peoples of the Portuguese colonies" (General Assembly, 1962l, p. 480) . He further advocated that the United Nations ensure the implementation of Resolution 1514 (XV) in Portuguese territories. The first measure should be to demand that NATO member states cease supplying arms and military equipment to Portugal; second, to demand that the Portuguese government immediately recognise the right of peoples to self-determination and independence, cease military operations and repression, withdraw its troops, release political prisoners, and allow political parties to operate freely; and finally, should Portugal refuse to comply with the United Nations' decisions, to be prepared to take decisive action, including sanctions (General Assembly, 1962l).

At the 17th plenary meeting of the United Nations General Assembly, the Portuguese representative, Mr Garin, took the floor once again. At the outset of his address, Mr Garin reiterated that Portugal's arguments and position were founded not only on *the Charter*, but also on "traditional overseas policy", "laws and practices, both old and new", "constant and considerable efforts to promote the well-being of our overseas populations", "irrespective of race, religion or place of origin" and "on the dedication of these populations to Portugal" (General Assembly, 1962m, p.965). He further contended that Portugal need not repeatedly reiterate the views previously expressed at the Assembly, for: "Those arguments stand, because they have not been refuted" (General Assembly, 1962m, p. 965).

Although Garin stated at the outset that there was no need to repeat the arguments concerning the Angolan issue that had been put forward at previous United Nations meetings, he nevertheless went on to deliver a lengthy speech at the meeting, reiterating Portugal's position on the Angolan question.

Firstly, Garin retraced the course of the Angolan conflict, interpreting the unrest in northern Angola as "an international conspiracy against Portugal" (General Assembly, 1962n, p.966), and attributing the uprisings in Angola primarily to the UPA (Union of the Populations of Angola), which was proclaimed in Leopoldville in 1960, as well as to other external forces. In Garin's account, the unrest in northern Angola was driven by "third parties behind that organisation who had no connection with Angola." (General Assembly, 1962n, p. 965), and he denied that the uprising constituted a national liberation movement. Consequently, Garin emphasised at the meeting that Portugal could not accept the characterisation of those "aggressors" as "liberators" or "nationalists", while the Portuguese "defenders" of order were described as "oppressors" (General Assembly, 1962n, p. 965).

Furthermore, Garin consistently maintained that Angola did not pose a threat to international peace and security. In his statement, he emphasised that the unrest in

northern Angola was merely "a relatively small part of Angola" (General Assembly, 1962n, p.967), and that the other provinces had not been affected. In his view, the United Nations' characterisation of the events in northern Angola as "a threat to international peace and security" was unfounded, and "the concern of the United Nations, several situations which pose a real threat to peace do not seem to worry this Organisation" (General Assembly, 1962n, p.967).

Finally, in response to a series of questions regarding Portugal raised by Mr Salamanca, Chair of the Sub-Committee on the Situation in Angola, during the previous meeting A/PV.1180, Garin not only addressed the issue of refugee outflows that was mentioned by Salamanca, but also devoted considerable time to highlighting the progress made by Portugal in political and administrative matters, citing reports from visits to Angola by the International Labour Organisation and the World Health Organisation in recent months to demonstrate the progress achieved in these areas. At the conclusion of his statement, Garin declared: "We have nothing to conceal, and we are always ready to demonstrate our good faith when others demonstrate their fairness of purpose." (General Assembly, 1962n, p. 969), and finally stated that the presentation of these reforms undertaken by Portugal in Angola was intended to demonstrate "the efforts made by Portugal so that Angola may not suffer any lag in its normal progress in any field of activity. As these efforts have not been given their due place in the official documents of the United Nations", and added that "It gives my delegation much pleasure to state in this Assembly that, during the period under review, several measures of far-reaching scope and application—I use these terms advisedly—have been adopted in Angola." (General Assembly, 1962n, p. 965)

At the plenary session of the 17th session of the United Nations General Assembly, the statements made by representatives of countries opposing Portugal focused primarily on criticising Portugal's colonial policies, highlighting the threat to international peace and security posed by the atrocities committed by Portugal in Angola, and emphasising Portugal's longstanding refusal to cooperate with the United Nations and to implement resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security

Council. At the 1185th meeting, the Soviet representative stated that the situation in Angola remained "one of the most burning colonial questions" and strongly contended that the Portuguese government's "most cruel regime of fascist terror and violence bordering on" (General Assembly, 1962o, p. 1009) not only seriously endangered "peace and security in this area of Africa" but also revealed Portugal's true nature as "international criminals" (General Assembly, 1962o, p. 1009). Concluding his statement, the Soviet representative pointed out that Portugal's disregard for UN resolutions and contempt for *the Charter* stemmed from "financial and military aid and the diplomatic support of its NATO allies" (General Assembly, 1962o, p. 1009). The view that the situation in Angola would have a significant impact on and pose a threat to the situation in Africa and even internationally, along with the accusation that Portugal's allies were providing economic and military aid for Portugal's atrocities in Angola, was raised repeatedly by representatives of various countries like Ukriane, Poland, Togo and India during this session of the General Assembly (General Assembly, 1962o; General Assembly; General Assembly, 1962p; General Assembly, 1962q; General Assembly, 1962r), and they demanded a response from Portugal and its allies. Furthermore, at separate meetings of the Fourth Committee and the UN General Assembly, Asian and African countries drafted new resolutions. At the 17th plenary session of the United Nations General Assembly, Asian and African countries tabled draft resolution A/L.415 and Add.1, whilst at the Fourth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, they tabled A/C.4/L.759 (and Add.1, Rev. 1), A/C.4/L.760 and A/C.4/L.761.

Faced with the views and accusations voiced by representatives of other nations at the meeting, Portugal did not remain as silent as it had at previous meetings, instead, it participated in the debates and refuted the criticisms levelled against it. During the subsequent plenary session of the General Assembly, the Portuguese representative, Garin, stated that the current debate consisted "almost entirely of unwarranted accusations against Portugal, without the least attention being paid to what Portugal has stated." (General Assembly, 1962r, p. 1070). In his address, he presented the Portuguese government's account of events in Angola, outlining Portugal's contributions there and

offering a serious and measured response to the accusations levelled by representatives of other nations. In the Fourth Committee, in addition to reiterating the situation regarding Portugal's construction and reform efforts in Angola to demonstrate that its endeavours in Africa "were fully in keeping with the exigencies of modern times" (General Assembly, 1962s, p. 531), the Portuguese representative, Fragoso, provided a response during the subsequent debate regarding the allegations that the Portuguese government had failed to comply with *the Charter* and General Assembly resolutions. The proactive participation of Portuguese representatives in debates at both meetings was regarded as more cooperative than in previous years, demonstrating greater self-assertion and, to some extent, influencing the level of support for Portugal from other nations that had previously held hostile attitudes (Santos, 2014, p. 198).

However, in response to the accusations levelled by representatives of countries opposed to Portugal, the statements made by Portugal's allies at the meeting did not constitute an active defence or clear endorsement of Portugal or its colonial policies. Rather, when confronted with accusations on related matters by representatives of other nations, they distanced themselves from Portugal, denying that they provided economic or military support for Portugal's activities in Angola. Nevertheless, in the subsequent vote on the relevant draft resolution, these allies of Portugal still cast votes that were relatively favourable to Portugal. At the 1393rd meeting of the Fourth Committee, the Spanish representative, Piniés, in response to the Soviet representative's enquiry at the 1392nd meeting as to "whether there were any Spanish troops in the mixed units serving in Cabinda" (General Assembly, 1962t, p. 418), the Spanish representative, Piniés, firmly replied that "there were no members of the Spanish armed forces serving in the Portuguese Army either in Cabinda or in any other territory the situation in which was being considered by the Committee" (General Assembly, 1962u, p. 423).

Similar denials were made in response to questions and criticisms directed at the United Kingdom and the US. At the 1402nd meeting, the US representative, Bingham, denied that the US or NATO had provided military or economic assistance to Portugal in its colonial war in Africa. Bingham stated that, at the request of the US Government,

the Portuguese Government had given assurances that “certain equipment (mostly transport vehicles) furnished to Portugal by the US under a military assistance agreement within the framework of NATO had not been diverted to Africa” (General Assembly, 1962v, p. 496), and indicated that no evidence of a breach by the Portuguese Government had been found. However, the US representative also noted that since the Second World War, a large quantity of US-manufactured arms “had been available on the international surplus market”, and that “it was obviously impossible to control all arms transactions taking place through private channels” (General Assembly, 1962v, p. 496).

At the 1405th meeting, the British representative, Wall, in addition to endorsing the statement made by the US representative, similarly stated that “the United Kingdom had not supplied military equipment to Portuguese African territories and was not aware of any evidence that equipment supplied to metropolitan Portugal had been used in those territories”(General Assembly, 1962w, p. 517). He concluded his remarks by asserting that the series of attacks levelled against the United Kingdom by the Soviet Union and other communist states were “solely in pursuit of the Cold War aims so dear to the countries which had signed the Warsaw Treaty” (General Assembly, 1962w, p. 517).

The majority of the early statements made during the General Assembly and Fourth Committee sessions focused primarily on condemning Portugal’s actions in Angola and its other overseas territories. Apart from responding to certain significant allegations, Portugal and its allies did not make many statements at this stage, their contributions to the proceedings were more evident in the later discussions concerning the draft resolutions.

At the General Assembly and the Fourth Committee, Member States, comprising mainly Asian and African nations, submitted draft resolutions A/L.415 and Add.1 (General Assembly), and A/C.4/L.759 (along with Add.1 and Rev.1), A/C.4/L.760 and A/C.4/L.761 (Fourth Committee). The UN Library does not provide open access to the original draft resolutions, nor are the full texts of all drafts included in the meeting

documents. As a result, the content of the draft resolutions is primarily derived from UN documents A/5349 and A/RES/1819 (XVII), the meeting records, and General Assembly (International Organization, 1962).

In draft resolution A/L.415 (and Add.1) submitted to the General Assembly, given that A/L.415 was adopted without amendment, the text of General Assembly Resolution 1819 (XVII), adopted following the draft resolution, is cited here. In addition to stating in draft resolution A/L.415 that "Solemnly reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of Angola to self-determination and independence, and supports their demand for immediate independence." (General Assembly, 1962x, p.75), and condemning the Portuguese Government whilst demanding that it immediately cease its armed operations and repressive measures against the Angolan people, also requested Member States to use their influence "to secure the compliance of Portugal with the present resolution" (General Assembly, 1962x, p.75). Furthermore, the text included paragraphs 7 to 9 of the draft resolution, which provoked a strong reaction from the Portuguese representative and became a focus of statements to intervene by Portugal's allies during the meeting:

" 7. Requests all Member States to deny Portugal any support or assistance which may be used by it for the suppression of the people of Angola, and in particular to terminate the supply of arms to Portugal;

8. Reminds the Government of Portugal that its continued non-implementation of the resolutions of the General Assembly and of the Security Council is inconsistent with its membership in the United Nations;

9. Requests the Security Council to take appropriate measures, including sanctions, to secure Portugal's compliance with the present resolution and with the previous resolutions of the General Assembly and of the Security Council." （General Assembly, 1962x, p. 75）

With regard to draft resolution A/L.415, Mr Garin, the representative of Portugal, stated that Portugal "rejects most emphatically the unwarranted allegations it contains", arguing that, just as in the General Assembly debate, "it has nothing to characterise it except its utter divorce from *the Charter*", "illegal, unrealistic and unreasonable" (General Assembly, 1962y, p. 1163), and expressed strong opposition to the draft's proposed sanctions against Portugal, describing them as "outrageous" (General Assembly, 1962y, p. 1163). The US representative, Bingham, likewise expressed opposition to the draft resolution, citing as his main grounds "the call for an arms embargo" and "the call for sanctions" (General Assembly, 1962y, p. 1164). Finally, the Italian representative requested a separate vote on paragraph 7 of the draft resolution.

Meanwhile, in the Fourth Committee, Asian and African countries tabled further draft resolutions, namely A/C.4/L.759 (together with Add.1 and Rev.1), A/C.4/L.760 and A/C.4/L.761. Draft resolution A/C.4/L.759 (and Add.1 and Rev.1), submitted at the 1415th meeting on 15 December, primarily expressed "condemnation of Portugal's attitude as being incompatible with *the Charter*" and "reaffirmation of the inalienable right of the people of the Territories under Portuguese administration to self-determination and independence" (S.H.O., 1962, p.2) and included paragraphs 7 and 8 of the operative part of the draft resolution, which were the focus of the discussion:

" 7. Earnestly request all Member States to refrain forthwith from offering the Portuguese Government any assistance which would enable it to continue its repression of the populations of the Territories under Portuguese administration and for this purpose to take all measures to prevent the sale and supply of arms and military equipment to the Portuguese Government;

8. Request the Security Council, in case the Portuguese Government should refuse to apply the present resolution and the former resolutions of the General Assembly, to take all appropriate measures to secure the compliance of Portugal with its obligations

as a Member State.”（S.H.O., 1962, p. 3）

Following draft resolution A/C.4/L.759 (and Add.1 and Rev.1) was A/C.4/L.760, introduced at the 1417th meeting on 11 Deccember, The subject matter of this draft resolution concerns “a special training programme (in the area of education, economy, etc.) for Territories under Portuguese Administration” (S.H.O., 1962, p. 7), whilst the subject matter of A/C.4/L.761, submitted at the 1419th meeting, concerns “the General Assembly would dissolve the Special Committee on Territories under Portuguese Administration” (S.H.O., 1962, p. 9).

With regard to draft resolution A/C.4/L.759, the representative of Italy introduced amendment A/C.4/L.762 at the 1418th meeting, proposing on the understanding that the delegation was in agreement “to achieve the widest possible agreement”, and “in a spirit of conciliation and compromise”, that the final part of the seventh operative paragraph of the draft resolution be amended to read: “and to take effective measures to ensure that any arms and military equipment sold or supplied to the Portuguese Government will not be used for this purpose”(General Assembly, 1962z, p. 605). This amendment by the Italian representative would have softened the comprehensive arms embargo on Portugal into a specific embargo concerning arms sold to the Portuguese Government, ensuring they would not be used for repressive purposes. The representative of South Africa, however, expressed strong opposition to the entire draft resolution and even to the draft on technical assistance (A/C.4/L.760), arguing that it “would place upon a Member State, against its will, obligations not sanctioned by Chapter XI or Article 2, paragraph 7, of *the Charter*” (General Assembly, 1962z, p. 605).

In contrast to the more moderate amendment proposed by the Italian representative, which narrowed the scope of the arms embargo by restricting the ban on the sale of arms and military equipment to the Portuguese government to those used for repressive purposes in Africa, the Soviet representative put forward a more comprehensive proposal that strengthened the original draft resolution. In his statement, the Soviet representative noted that over the past 45 years, three anti-Soviet blocs had emerged,

and that the third alliance, which was NATO, was encircling the Soviet Union under the pretext of defending Europe, whilst implementing its aggressive strategy in Africa, one aspect of which was supplying its allies with weapons to carry out repressive operations in their African colonies. Furthermore, the Soviet representative sought to highlight the relationship between NATO and Portugal at the meeting: "It was the support of the NATO countries which enabled Portugal to defend its policy by force" (General Assembly, 1962z, p. 608), and in a subsequent statement proposed amending the end of paragraph 7 of the draft resolution to read: ". . . and for this purpose to take all measures in order to establish a complete embargo on further sales and supplies of weapons and military equipment to the Government of Portugal; and further requests the countries concerned to see to it that such armaments already supplied are no longer used in Angola and other territories under Portuguese administration" (General Assembly, 1962z, p. 607).

This statement by the Soviet representative was opposed by the French and American representatives, who argued that Amendment A/C.4/L.762, proposed by the Italian representative, was "clearly" better worded (General Assembly, 1962z, p. 605), whilst certain delegations, here the French representative was referring to the Soviet delegation, amongst others, were using this draft resolution "to engage in a manoeuvre against NATO" (General Assembly, 1962z, p. 607). The US representative, also, expressed support for the amendment proposed by Italy and endorsed the statement made by the French representative.

However, the debate on the draft resolution was not limited to a clash between the Soviet delegation and Portugal's allies, such as France, Italy and the US. In contrast, representatives from Latin American countries such as Colombia and Peru expressed support in their statements for the draft resolution put forward by Asian and African nations, and for the principle of self-determination, but they were more inclined to use less strongly worded condemnation of the Portuguese government, in order to secure "at least very broad support in the Committee" (General Assembly, 1962z, p. 603). The Asian and African nations, however, remained steadfast in their commitment to the draft

resolution they had proposed. They rejected all amendments put forward by the Soviet Union and Portugal's allies, refusing to allow the draft resolution to become a battleground for Cold War negotiations. The Asian and African nations and Soviet considered that paragraph 7 of the operative part of the submitted draft resolution had already clearly articulated their demands. In their statements, they, like Soviet representative Brykin, indicated that the sole purpose of submitting this draft resolution was "to seek ways of ensuring the complete and peaceful decolonisation of the territories under Portuguese administration" (General Assembly, 1962z, p. 607), and the representative of Cameroon said they had no intention "to take part in the Cold War or to approve or condemn any particular military organisation" (General Assembly, 1962z, p. 604).

The discussions on the other two draft resolutions submitted, A/C.4/L.760 and A/C.4/L.761, were more moderate. At the 1417th meeting, A/C.4/L.760 was introduced, and the Chair reminded the Committee that A/C.4/L.760 was intended to address "technical assistance to peoples from territories under Portuguese administration" (General Assembly, 1962I, p. 594). Regarding this draft resolution, however, the Portuguese representative, Mr Fragoso, expressed clear opposition, stating that the draft resolution ignored the efforts made by the Portuguese Government in its overseas provinces in recent years, "was a gross travesty of the truth and clearly showed that the draft resolution was an attempt to force assistance for ulterior motives. (General Assembly, 1962II, p. 603). In his statement, he reiterated that this constituted interference in Portugal's internal affairs and, furthermore, that the issues raised by the draft resolution should not be discussed in the Fourth Committee. He concluded by stating that he would vote against A/C.4/L.760 and would not participate in the vote on the subsequent draft resolution A/C.4/L.761.

In the ensuing debate, the Soviet representative, Mr Brykin, introduced draft amendment A/C.4/L.763. The US, however, expressed its disagreement with the wording of the draft resolution and subsequently introduced amendment A/C.4/L.765, seeking to add a new operative paragraph to the draft that "requested the Government of

Portugal to co-operate in the implementation of the resolution" (General Assembly, 1962II, p. 613). The US representative considered that such an amendment "filled a gap that might have been due to an oversight" (General Assembly, 1962II, p. 613). Thus, US did not express opposition to the draft amendment proposed by the Soviet representative, but rather put forward its own amendment on the basis of support. France and the United Kingdom also did not oppose the draft resolution. However, the direction of their proposed amendments was to modify the draft resolution's provocative accusations against the Portuguese Government, arguing that "such criticism seemed out of place in a resolution which, if the US amendment (A/C.4/L.765) were adopted, would seek the cooperation of the Portuguese Government" (General Assembly, 1962II, p. 613). Latin American countries likewise supported the removal of rhetoric that might worsen relations with the Portuguese government, seeking cooperation with the Portuguese government. The representative of Guinea (Conakry), as one of the sponsors of the draft resolution, also stated at the meeting that he accepted "the French oral amendment to the French text of the final preambular paragraph, the Soviet Union amendment (A/C.4/L.763) as amended, and the US amendment (A/C.4/L. 765)" (General Assembly, 1962II, p. 615), and this meant a amendment less critical to Portugal was adopted.

At the 1419th meeting on 12 December, a discussion was also held on draft resolution A/C.4/L.761. In his statement, the representative of Mali explained that the purpose of submitting A/C.4/L.761 was to discontinue the operations of a committee with overlapping functions, namely to cease the work of the Special Committee on Territories under Portuguese Administration and to incorporate its work into the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. In a subsequent statement, the representative of Guinea (Conakry) indicated that this draft resolution would effectively prevent duplication of work by no longer establishing a separate body for territories under Portuguese administration, but rather that "all colonial problems should henceforth be considered in the context of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV)"

(General Assembly, 1962II, p. 614), thereby incorporating them into the broader discussion of decolonisation issues under General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). The representative of the Soviet Union again tabled amendment A/C.4/L.764, requesting that the report and minutes be made available to the relevant bodies as "it would be very useful to the various bodies mentioned in the amendment" (General Assembly, 1962II, p. 614).

During the final two months of 1962, at the 17th Session of the United Nations General Assembly and its Fourth Committee, a total of 49 meetings were held concerning matters relating to Portugal's overseas territories. During these sessions, five draft resolutions and four amendments to draft resolutions were considered, and numerous split votes were conducted as requested. At the peak, 97 Member States took part in the voting, demonstrating the high level of attention the United Nations paid to discussions on Portugal's overseas provinces amidst the wave of decolonisation. Meanwhile, outside the United Nations, negotiations between Portugal and the US regarding the Azores Agreement were still ongoing.

Subsequent US documents reveal that, during the second half of 1962, Portugal continued to exert strong pressure on the US in negotiations regarding the renewal of the Azores base agreement. The *Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy* (Rusk, 1962b) dated 12 June 1962 assessed the state of US-Portuguese negotiations and predicted the future course of negotiations with Portugal. In the memorandum, Rusk stated that efforts made during the negotiations to allay the Portuguese government's concerns regarding the US administration "have been singularly unsuccessful" (Rusk, 1962b, p. 932). At the same time, the US recognised that the Portuguese government would in future use US interests in the Azores as "the only lever by which the Portuguese can hope to obtain a modification of our African policy" and would "attempt to use this lever to maximum advantage" to maintain pressure on the US government, with a view to securing "political concessions" (Rusk, 1962b, p.932) regarding US policy towards Portuguese interests in Africa.

Although Rusk mentioned in his memorandum that the US was endeavouring to discuss the Azores negotiations, which concerned Western European defence and its African policy separately, he also noted that "Realistically, we recognise that we may not be able to separate the two issues of the Azores and our African policy because Portugal will not permit them to be separated" (Rusk, 1962b, p. 934). Despite the US government being prepared for the possibility of withdrawing its forces from the Azores, it nevertheless maintained great patience in engaging in these protracted negotiations. They considered it essential to dispel the Portuguese government's mistrust, namely, the perception that "while outwardly professing friendship, we are actually seeking to undermine Portugal's position in its African territories" (Rusk, 1962b, p. 934), and, whilst maintaining normal bilateral relations with Portugal across many sectors, to "advantageously seek to develop specific solutions to the issues that have strained our relations"(Rusk, 1962b, p. 934).

In a telegram sent by the US State Department to its Embassy in Portugal on 15 September 1962, Rusk stated that the prospects for renewal negotiations were not optimistic. However, the US still had no intention of abandoning its position on the right to self-determination for the peoples of Portuguese territories in exchange for progress in the negotiations. Nevertheless, Rusk indicated that he would, as far as possible, "intend to balance these with attempts to be positively helpful to them (the Portuguese)" (Rusk, 1962a, p. 945), and hoped to do everything possible to help Portugal extricate itself from its predicament due to its "outmoded colonial policy and the strongly-expressed anti-colonial policy of its Afro-Asian critics" (Rusk, 1962a, p. 945).

During the formal negotiations on 24 October 1962, US Ambassador Elbrick and Foreign Affairs Minister Nogueira discussed the draft resolution adopted the previous

month by the Committee of Seventeen[147]. The US Ambassador stated that this was an overly extreme resolution "that the US had not been able to go along with"(Department of State, 1962, p. 952). Nogueira agreed with this assessment, but he hoped that the US would continue to stand by Portugal, as "to be helpful, such an attitude must be a more permanent part of US policy"(Department of State, 1962, p. 952).

In light of Portugal's long-standing and consistent stance, on the evening of 8 December 1962, in the *Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations*, the US Department of State instructed the US Mission to the United Nations that it must "make strenuous efforts" (Rusk, 1962c, p. 964) to secure one-third of the votes in order to block the adoption of draft resolution A/L.415, which was due to be discussed. In the telegram, the US Department of State elaborated on the importance of blocking the adoption of this hardline draft resolution, as well as the efforts to be made outside the UN to prevent its passage, namely, to sway the voting intentions of other nations. Firstly, the US Department of State believed that the adoption of this draft resolution would enable the Portuguese government to handle its affairs more flexibly at the UN in the future; secondly, this draft resolution was "not only a matter for Portugal but also for NATO and the US" (Rusk, 1962c, p. 964). To this end, the cable noted that whilst the US State Department anticipated all NATO delegations would firmly oppose the resolution and were "prepared to go to any NATO capital at once should any division develop"(Rusk, 1962c, p. 965), it also issued a circular to all Latin American nations, stating that opposing the resolution was equally in their interests. Finally, in the telegram, the State Department also provided the delegation with guidance on the direction of their subsequent statements at the meeting. The main thrust was to highlight the Portuguese Government's changed attitude and the results of its reforms, both at the United Nations and in its overseas territories, whilst reaffirming the US' consistent

---

[147] Committee of Seventeen, which was Special Committee on Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. On 17 September 1962, at the 114th meeting, the Committee voted on the draft which were introduced by representative of Mali and other 11 countries. The draft was adopted by a roll-call vote of 13 to 3 (Australia, United Kingdom of Great Britain and North Ireland, United Stated of America), 1 abstention (Italy). (Special Committee on Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 1962, p. 178). The content of draft A/L. 415 was similar to this draft.

support for the Angolan people's right to self-determination. It was also necessary to emphasise the unreasonableness of the draft resolution at the meeting: "should make it clear that this resolution is totally out of keeping with the Salamanca Report, on which consideration of the Angolan question should logically be based"(Rusk, 1962c, p. 965) . Throughout the document's instructions, in addition to repeatedly emphasising the need to demonstrate the Portuguese Government's "new spirit of moderation" at the current General Assembly and to highlight the US' role in exerting "the heaviest diplomatic pressures on the GOP (Government of Portugal), with our efforts meeting with success", there was also a requirement to distort the stance of African and Asian nations as well as the Soviet bloc, stating that "the tragedy is that the entire effort will come to naught because of the penchant of some nations to heap more and more abuse upon Portugal" (Rusk, 1962c, p. 965).

Based on the *Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission* (Rusk, 1962c) of the previous paragraph, although the US sought to influence the voting intentions of other delegations at the General Assembly in order to block the adoption of a hard-line draft resolution, thereby creating a UN environment more favourable to Portugal and avoiding the risk that the draft resolution's content might provoke an overreaction from the Portuguese government, which could in turn jeopardise ongoing negotiations and NATO's interests. However, these efforts ultimately failed in the vote held on the day of the ballot. On 11 December 1962, at the 1418th meeting of the Fourth Committee, amendment A/C.4/L.762 to draft resolution A/C.4/L.759 (and Add.1), submitted by the representative of Italy, was put to a vote by show of hands at the request of the representative of Thailand. Ultimately, Italy's amendment A/C.4/L.762 was rejected by 30 votes in favour, 58 against and 9 abstentions[148]; Portugal was present but did not take

---

[148] Italy's amendment:
In favor: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Peru, Sweden, Turkey, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela.

Abstaining: Brazil, Chile, China(ROC), Cyprus, Israel, Mexico, Spain, Thailand, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

part in the vote. As Italy's amendment had been rejected, the Soviet delegation withdrew its own amendment, which was not put to a vote. Subsequently, with the support of the representative of Ireland, the representative of Sweden requested separate votes on preambular paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 and operative paragraph 7 of the draft resolution. The results were as follows: preambular paragraph 7 was adopted by 69 votes in favour, 8 against and 15 abstentions; preambular paragraph 8 by 68 votes in favour, 9 against and 17 abstentions; preambular paragraph 9 was adopted unanimously with 61 votes in favour, 10 against and 20 abstentions[149]. At the request of the representative of Guinea (Conakry), operative paragraph 7 of the draft resolution was again put to a separate vote, and a roll-call vote was taken at the request of the representative of Cameroon. The first part of operative paragraph 7 of draft resolution A/C.4/L.759 (and Add.1 and Rev.1) was adopted by 91 votes in favour, 2 against and 5 abstentions[150]; the second part was adopted by 65 votes in favour, 17 against and 16 abstentions[151]. Finally, at the request of the representative of Mali, a roll-call vote was taken on the draft resolution as amended in its entirety, and it was adopted by 78 votes in favour, 7 against and 12 abstentions[152].

The following day, at the 1419th meeting of the Fourth Committee, a vote was

---

[149] These three votes did not have records.

[150] The first part of operative paragraph 7:
Against: Portugal, South Africa.
Abstaining: Australia, France, Spain, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

[151] The second part of operative paragraph 7:
Against: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Turkey.

Abstaining: Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Austria, Brazil, China(ROC), Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Finland, Guatemala, Honduras, Ireland, Mexico, Peru, Sweden.

[152] Against: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Belgium, France, Portugal, South Africa, Spain.

Abstaining: Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Turkey.

taken on draft resolutions A/C.4/L.760 and A/C.4/L.761. First, the Committee voted on draft resolution A/C.4/L.761, amendment A/C.4/L.764 to the draft resolution, proposed by the representative of the Soviet Union, was adopted by 57 votes in favour, 0 against and 22 abstentions. Subsequently, the amended draft resolution A/C.4/L.761 was adopted by 84 votes in favour, 0 against and 3 abstentions[153].

Thereafter, a vote was taken in the Fourth Committee on draft resolution A/C.4/L.760, after the representative of Guinea (Conakry), on behalf of the sponsors, accepted the oral amendment proposed by France to the French text of the final preambular paragraph, the amended Soviet amendment A/C.4/L.763 and the US amendment A/C.4/L.765, a roll-call vote was taken at the request of the representative of Guinea (Conakry), and the draft resolution was adopted by 86 votes in favour, 2 against and 1 abstention[154].

Meanwhile, at the 1194th plenary meeting of the 17th session of the United Nations General Assembly, a final vote was held on the three draft resolutions A/C.4/L.759, A/C.4/L.760 and A/C.4/L.761, contained in report A/5349 of the Fourth Committee, as well as on draft resolution A/L.415. In the final vote on A/5349 on 14 December 1962, held by roll call, the draft was adopted by 82 votes in favour, 7 against and 13 abstentions[155], and ultimately became General Assembly Resolutions 1807 (XVII), 1808 (XVII) and 1809 (XVII) respectively.

The vote on draft resolution A/L.415 took place four days later, on 18 December. First, the meeting held a separate vote on paragraph 7 of the main text of the resolution,

---

[153] These 2 votes did not have records.

[154] Against: Portugal, South Africa.
Abstaining: Panama.

[155] Against: Portugal, South Africa. Spain, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Belgium, France.

Abstaining: Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Turkey, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Greece, Iceland. Italy.

as proposed by the representative of Italy. However, as there was opposition, the request was put to a roll-call vote and rejected by 47 votes against, 25 in favour and 16 abstentions[156]. The vote on the full text of draft resolution A/L.415 (and Add.1) was conducted by roll call and was adopted by 57 votes in favour, 14 against and 18 abstentions[157].

Judging by the voting results on the draft resolutions, with the exception of abstaining in the vote on draft resolution A/C.4/L.761, Portugal maintained its opposition to all other draft resolutions and cast votes against them. The US' voting behaviour, however, was more variable, and it did not align completely with Portugal's position in every vote. The US continued to support the principle of self-determination and did not defend Portugal's colonial policies; it merely opposed the draft resolutions' harsh condemnation of the Portuguese government, the comprehensive arms embargo and sanctions measures, and the potential adverse impact on NATO.

Acting on instructions from the US State Department, this explicit opposition to the draft resolution at the United Nations represented a clear shift in stance, which in turn influenced the voting behaviour of other Western nations and altered the political landscape within the United Nations (Pereira, 2022, p. 55).

The 1962 negotiations between Portugal and the US marked not only a turning point in relations between the two countries, but also a period when Portugal's control

---

[156] In favor: Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Republic of South Arica, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark. Dominican Republic, Finland, Prance, Greece, Honduras, Ireland, Italy.

Abstaining: Japan, Laos, Nepal, Panama, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Thailand, Uruguay, Venezuela, Bolivia, Ceylon, Chile, China(ROC), Cyprus, Iran,

[157] Against: South Africa, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United states of America, Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal.

Abstaining: Sweden, Thailand, Uruguay, Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Chile, China(ROC), Denmark, Dominican Republic, Finland, Greece, Honduras, Ireland, Japan, Mexico, Norway, Peru.

over Angola began to stabilise. Following the outbreak of the 1961 uprising, the Portuguese government began to continuously deploy additional troops and weapons to its overseas colonies (Cann, 2012), and by the end of 1962, tensions had arisen between the MPLA and the FNLA, leading to divisions and rivalry amongst the Angolan people (Guimarães, 2001). Portugal regained military control over most of the territory after 1961, and the situation in Angola shifted from large-scale uprisings and the Portuguese government's suppression to a protracted guerrilla war. In the eyes of the Portuguese: "Portuguese had managed to contain the war in Angola "(Venter, 2013, p. 36). Subsequently, the level of attention and engagement regarding the Portuguese issue within the United Nations began to wane, and votes on related resolutions no longer passed by an overwhelming majority (Santos, 2014). For a long time, "As long as they were not translated by the Security Council, the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, however strident they might be, remained ineffective[158]" (Pereira, 2022, p. 56). On 18 December 1962, the very day the resolution was adopted, Nogueira described this as: "Politically, it is a clear Portuguese victory[159]" (Nogueira, 1986, p. 50).

Following Portugal's admission to the United Nations, and up until the end of 1962, the first phase of discussions on the Portuguese colonial issue at UN meetings, with regard to the Angolan question, the strategy employed by Portugal in debates at the UN General Assembly and the Fourth Committee was not entirely fixed, but was forced to evolve as anti-colonial discussions within the UN expanded, Asian and African nations joined the organisation, and the international community's attention to the issue of Portugal's overseas colonies increased. Initially, the Portuguese government's strategy within the UN was one of non-cooperation and passive resistance. However, as discussions at meetings multiplied and international attention and pressure mounted, the government was eventually compelled to project an appearance of openness to dialogue

---

[158] Original text: "Enquanto não tivessem tradução no Conselho de Segurança, as resoluções adotadas na Assembleia Geral, por mais estridentes que fossem, mantinham-se inoperantes."

[159] Original text: "Politicamente, é uma clara vitória portuguesa."

within the UN. This is described as an "appearance" because such a posture did not imply that Portugal accepted UN oversight of its overseas territories, nor did it signify acceptance of a future in which those territories would move towards self-determination and independence. On the contrary, the Portuguese government's core objective and guiding principle remained, from the outset, to participate in UN affairs whilst retaining its unique and exceptional interpretation of "overseas provinces" within the UN framework, and to prevent, as far as possible, places such as Angola from being drawn into the rhythm of non-self-governing territories and self-determination advocated by African and Asian nations.

Consequently, during this phase of the meeting, Portugal's primary strategy remained to repeatedly invoke *the Charter* and interpret it in a manner favourable to itself. The Portuguese representative repeatedly emphasised that Portugal's overseas provinces, such as Angola and Mozambique, were not colonies but part of Portuguese territory; therefore, in accordance with Article 2(7) of *the Charter*, there should be no interference in Portugal's internal affairs. When confronted with differences of opinion with the Asian and African nations and the Soviet bloc, the Portuguese representative stated at the Fourth Committee of the 16th Session of the United Nations General Assembly that Portugal did not consider itself to be repeating outdated arguments that had already lost their validity; rather, he contended that the Asian and African nations and the Soviet bloc were employing a new, expansive interpretation to forcibly apply Chapter XI of *the Charter* to Portugal's overseas territories: "for the simple reason that those arguments would continue to be valid for as long as *the Charter* itself remained an instrument of general application whose provisions meant what they said and not what some would wish them to mean" (General Assembly, 1962i, p. 231).

According to the statement made by the representative of Portugal at the meetings, in addition to its interpretation of *the Charter*, Portugal also sought to shift the focus of the meeting's discussions on the Angolan issue. Faced with accusations from Asian and African nations and the Soviet bloc regarding colonial rule, forced labour, racial discrimination and military repression, Portugal did not acknowledge its own role in the

Angolan crisis, but instead attributed it largely to external agitation, terrorist activities and internal security issues. At the same time, Portugal repeatedly emphasised the reforms it had implemented in its overseas territories, such as changes in education, labour, administration and social development. However, these reforms were not intended to prepare the Angolan people for self-determination, but rather to demonstrate at the UN meeting that Portugal remained capable of administering these territories, thereby undermining the grounds for further UN intervention.

During the meeting, Portugal also shifted the focus of accusations made by Asian and African nations and the Soviet bloc regarding its actions in its overseas provinces onto the conflict between Western nations and the socialist bloc. In this way, Portugal sought to downplay the meeting's focus on colonial issues in its overseas provinces, whilst hoping to secure the support of its Western allies. By aligning its own interests with those of its Western allies in this manner, it attempted to procedurally resist the adoption of draft resolutions at the meeting that were unfavourable to Portugal.

However, as time went on and the anti-colonial tide continued to rise within the United Nations, Portugal's position within the organisation became increasingly precarious and isolated. Portugal's strategy was no longer confined to the debating chamber, but relied more heavily on diplomatic manoeuvring outside the meeting hall. Particularly in its relations with the US, Portugal exploited the strategic importance of the Lajes Air Base in the Azores to the US and NATO, thereby compelling the US to adopt a more cautious stance in negotiations regarding the issue of Portuguese Africa. Outside the meeting halls, Portugal leveraged the military base's indispensability to US strategic interests to extract certain political concessions from the US during negotiations. By 1962, the Cold War confrontation between East and West that Portugal had sought to shape was no longer the focus of the meeting; discussions then had increasingly shifted towards the more specific demands of Asian and African nations regarding self-determination, sanctions, an arms embargo against Portugal, and accusations levelled at Portugal's allies. The stance adopted by the US during the voting on resolutions also helped to shape the prevailing mood within the meeting. Following

the vote on the relevant resolution and the conclusion of negotiations between Portugal and the US, relations between the two nations stabilised. The US no longer pressed Portugal excessively to change its policy in Africa, but instead steered the relationship towards a path of gradual evolution. Although Portugal was unable to prevent the resolution's adoption through a majority vote at the meeting, the diplomatic manoeuvring outside the United Nations secured Portugal limited support from its allies —what Nogueira described as a political success.

5. A comparative study of France and Portugal at the United Nations

In the earlier subsections of Chapter 3, we organized respectively the Portuguese diplomatic statements and actions regarding the situation in Angola at meetings of the United Nations Security Council, the General Assembly and the Fourth Committee between 1960 and 1962, as well as French diplomatic statements and actions regarding the Question in Algeria at meetings of the United Nations Security Council and the First Committee between 1955 and 1957. Both of these time periods correspond to the early stages of the Angola and Algeria issues being placed on the agenda for discussion at United Nations meetings. In this subsection, we shall compare the defence strategies used by the two governments during the initial phase of these agenda discussions. As stated at the beginning of this subsection, the time periods during which Portugal and France participated in these meetings were different, as was the atmosphere in the UN. Therefore, in this comparison of strategies, the mere time span is not the primary focus, in this subsection we will compare the strategies used by the two countries during the meetings, distinguishing between those used during the meetings and those used outside it. Firstly, we will examine the rhetorical strategies used by the two countries in their statements to uphold their respective positions, and secondly, how they sought to secure the support of other Member States for their positions, or to ensure their neutrality outside the meetings, thereby maximising their advantage within the meetings. At the end of this subsection, we will explore the reasons behind the strategies used by both sides within the United Nations.

The research in this subsection is primarily conducted using qualitative analysis. In analysing the content of the debates between Portugal and France at United Nations meetings, we shall first draw upon Sadia Saeed's article *Decolonisation Struggles at the United Nations: The Question of Algeria, 1955–1961*, which examined the struggles surrounding the Algerian question. She divided the meeting discussions into three aspects:

1. Is the Algerian question an international concern? (The Question of Admissibility)

2. Is the Algerian anti-colonial movement a legitimate movement? (The Question of Naming)
3. Has the French presence been beneficial to the Algerians? (The Question of Development) (Saeed, 2021, p. 432).

In this study, to better suit its research objectives and content, the analytical dimensions have been divided as follows:

1. Is the situation in Angola/ the Algerian question a matter of international concern? (The Question of Admissibility).

2. Is the Angolan/ Algerian anti-colonial movement a legitimate movement? (The Question of Naming).

3. Has the Portuguese/ French presence been beneficial to Angolans/Algerians? (The Question of Development).

The analysis of debating strategies at the meetings will draw upon the four-part framework of Rhetorical adaptation developed by Jennifer M. Dixon in her article *Rhetorical Adaptation and Resistance to International Norms* (Dixon, 2017): Norm disregard, Norm avoidance, Norm interpretation, and Norm signalling. Building upon the framework of rhetorical adaptation developed by Dixon, this subsection will analyse how Portugal and France articulated their positions at United Nations meetings and responded to the criticisms and rebuttals raised by countries, which primarily from Asia and Africa, that held opposing views.

Typology of rhetorical adaptation

Type	Definition	Is the norm acknowledged?	What is being reinterpreted?
Norm disregard	Ignoring or not making reference to a norm that is relevant to a given action	No	Nothing
Norm avoidance	Arguing that motivations or actions, or the outcome of actions, fall outside one or more of the parameters of a given norm	Maybe	The state's actions
Norm interpretation	Arguing about the definition of prohibited or prescribed actions, or about the conditions under which a norm applies	Yes	The norm
Norm Signaling	Expressing support for values and practices that are part of a norm, while not changing relevant behaviors	Yes	Nothing

Figure 1: Types of rhetorical adaptation (Dixon, 2017, p. 86).

In the end, the arguments put forward by France and Portugal at the United Nations should not be viewed merely as statements of their respective policies, but must be analysed within the context of the debate itself. The focus of the debate on Algeria and Angola centred primarily on questions such as whether the United Nations had jurisdiction; whether nationalist organisations could represent the local population; whether colonial rule actually promoted or hindered local development; and what kind of solution would be legitimate. France and Portugal sought to counter or redefine the arguments put forward by opposing nations, which centred on self-determination, the nature of France and Portugal's colonialism in Algeria and Angola and United Nations oversight by redefining the nature of the issues, the status of the actors involved and the impact of colonial rule, thereby undermining the persuasiveness of Portuguese and French arguments. Consequently, the term "strategy", as used in this subsection

encompasses not only how France and Portugal in the face of demands for decolonization from the international community, employed a combination of rhetorical adaptation at the United Nations; but also the diplomatic measures and actions they undertook to maintain their rule over Angola and Algeria, to secure international support, and to prevent adverse outcomes for themselves at the United Nations.

Following an analysis of the records of the debates between Portugal and France at the United Nations on the the situation of Angola and Algeria, the study found that both countries used a combination of these rhetorical adaptation to counter accusations levelled at them during the meetings by other representatives holding differing positions.

The Question of Admissibility: Is the situation in Angola/ the Algerian question a matter of international concern?

Initially, "endangering the maintenance of international peace and security" (Saudi Arabia, 1955, p.1) was often cited as one of the primary reasons that Asian and African representatives requested United Nations' intervention in the matters concerning Angola and Algeria.

However, Portugal consistently adopted a negative stance, rejecting UN intervention from the outset and using a combination of norm avoidance and norm interpretation strategies to counter the concerns raised by the UN and other nations. In the statements made by the Portuguese representative, norm avoidance was used to argue that Angola was part of Portuguese territory as an overseas province, not a non-self-governing territory in the eyes of the United Nations: "By traditional right, constitutional law, administration and practice, Angola is a province of Portugal, an integral part of a unitary State" (General Assembly, 1961, p. 42). Furthermore, based on the Portuguese Government's characterisation of its overseas provinces, the Portuguese representative employed the strategy of norm interpretation, insisting that the Situation in Angola constituted a matter of Portugal's internal affairs. Consequently, it was not a matter of international security. As a result the Situation in Angola fell within the scope

of Article 2, paragraph 7 (domestic jurisdiction), of the Charter, rather than within the scope of Article 73(e) (declaration regarding Non- self- governing territories) of the Charter, thereby denying the legitimacy of discussing the situation in Angola at the United Nations meetings. This approach was maintained throughout, and as the meetings progressed, the Portugal delegation continued to deny the applicability of newly adopted resolutions such as 1514 (XV).

Throughout 1955, the question of Algeria repeatedly featured on the agenda of United Nations meetings. The French delegation, in addition to making extensive reference to provisions of the Charter, sought the support of other states, and at the 795th meeting of the 1st Committee of General Assembly held towards the end of that year, the Algerian question was ultimately excluded from the agenda. In the early stages, with regard to the Question of Admissibility, France initially employed a strategy of norm interpretation in its statements during the session. Specifically, it cited the French *Ordonnance royale du 22 juillet 1834,* alongside Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter, to argue that Algeria was part of France and therefore a matter of French internal affairs. Building on this, the French representative also cited Articles 34 and 35 of the Charter to assert that the Algerian question did not constitute an international issue as defined by the Asian and African states. However, as the meetings progressed and discussions deepened, the French statements on this issue, whilst continuing to deny the United Nations' jurisdiction on legal grounds, also incorporated new arguments based on sovereignty in response to the counter-arguments raised by representatives of other nations regarding Algeria from a historical perspective. These included the assertion that "In fact, there had never been an Algerian nation, and, prior to the French

presence, no State had imposed its law on Algerian [160]" (General Assembly, 1957, p.017), thereby denying Algeria's historical existence as both a nation and a state.

The Question of Naming: Is the Angolan/ Algerian anti-colonial movement a legitimate movement?

During the meetings, countries (comprising mainly Asian and African countries and the Soviet bloc) opposed the view that the Angolan/ Algerian anti- colonial movement was terrorism, described the armed actions of the Angolan and Algerian peoples as "widespread nationalist agitation (representative of Iran)" (General Assembly, 1961a, p.395) and a "passionate endeavour to achieve self-government" (General Assembly, 1961a, p. 397), whilst describing the actions of Portugal and France as "massacring (representative of Central African Republic)" (General Assembly, 1961a, p. 402) and "Portuguese colonialism (representative of Central African Republic)" (General Assembly, 1961a, p. 395), as well as "the consequence of that war and of the refusal of the French Government to recognise the right of the Algerians to self-determination (representative of Iran)" (Security Council, 1956, p. 3).

---

[160] This view was taken from a footnote in the NOTE DU SECRÉTARIAT DES CONFÉRENCES dated 22 January 1957: "En raison du caractère éminemment technique de cette « Note sur quelques aspects de l'incompétence de l'Assemblée générale dans l'affaire algérienne », rédigée par M. Chaumont, nous ne l'avons pas retenue. Pour l'auteur de la note, la question algérienne devait être considérée comme « essentiellement » nationale au sens de l'article 2 § 7 (of the Charter), en l'absence d'un État algérien, d'une nation algérienne. (Owing to the highly technical nature of this 'Note on certain aspects of the General Assembly's lack of jurisdiction in the Algerian affair', drafted by Mr Chaumont, we have not included it." In the author's view, the Algerian question should be regarded as "essentially" a national matter within the meaning of Article 2(7), in the absence of an Algerian state or an Algerian nation)" (Secrétariat des Conférences, 1957, p.128).

However, in the early stages in 1959, Portugal's statements and the results of votes on the relevant agenda items were unable to prevent the Angolan issue from being discussed at the United Nations General Assembly as France had done in 1955. And the ongoing discussions on Angola within the United Nations, gave rise to further debates on other issues concerning the country. With regard to the question of naming, faced with accusations from representatives of countries, which primarily from Asia and Africa that opposed Portugal's position, the Portuguese representatives primarily used a strategy of norm avoidance to explain the actions, seeking to legitimise Portugal's atrocities in Angola and thereby excluding its conduct from the category of violent colonial repression. Firstly, Portugal denied the national libration nature of the Angolan war, labelling it as "pure terrorism" (General Assembly, 1961b, p. 17). It also denied allegations of repression, extermination, colonialism and atrocities, asserting that its actions constituted the legitimate maintenance of public order in Angola. Furthermore, Portugal directed its criticism towards the communist bloc, asserting that external forces (the Soviet Union and what the government of Portugal called as communist organisations in Angola's neighbouring countries) were instigating subversive activities within Angola.

Between 1955 and 1956, France persistently sought, through voting, to procedurally exclude the Algerian question from the United Nations agenda. It was not until the end of 1956 that it abandoned this course of action. Consequently, discussions on the Algerian question were concentrated in 1957. At the 1957 session, in addition to continuing the strategy of the previous two years, which was resolutely denying that the United Nations had jurisdiction over Algeria, a combination of norm avoidance, norm interpretation and norm signalling strategies was used, with norm avoidance and norm signalling being used more frequently. And in the question of naming part, the French representative's remarks at the meetings primarily used a strategy of norm avoidance. The representative redefined the nature of the Algerian War from France's perspective, stating: "Because of the impossibility, so far, of obtaining a ceasefire with the rebels, France had had to take the military measures necessary for the maintenance of order and the protection of life and property" (General Assembly, 1957, p.105). This was not

merely a matter of suppressing a rebellion and maintaining public order in Algeria, but also of "creating the concrete conditions for a political settlement" (General Assembly, 1957, p.105). They further asserted that this rebellion stemmed not only from domestic political groups but also involved communist elements. Thereby, by explaining France's position, they sought to obscure the narratives put forward by countries opposed to France regarding the nature of the Algerian conflict, whether as a war of colonialism or a war of national liberation.

The Question of Development: Has the Portuguese/ French presence been beneficial to Angolans/Algerians?

On this issue, when discussing the situation in Angola, representatives of countries opposed the view that the Portuguese/ French presence been beneficial to Angolan/ Algerians primarily pointed out that: "In fact, in the Portuguese colonies at present, no sort of equality between Portuguese and Africans (representative of USSR)" (General Assembly, 1961a, p. 405), whilst on the question of Algeria, countries holding an opposing view stated: "To the deep concern of Africa and Asia, the people of Algeria continue to be deprived of equality and of the inalienable right to progress and develop in freedom (representative of Indonesia)" (General Assembly, 1955, p. 172).

In response to criticism from other delegations, the Portuguese representative's statement exhibited a combination of norm disregard and norm signalling strategies. Whilst expressing support for human rights and racial equality, the Portuguese representative failed to put these principles into effective practice, instead, they responded to calls for political rights for the local population by highlighting Angola's development achievements, thereby sidestepping the core issues of concern. In the Portuguese representative's statement, Portugal was portrayed as respecting human rights, supporting racial equality and multiracial coexistence, and having undertaken constructive and effective reforms in the political, educational, healthcare, economic and infrastructure sectors, whilst demonstrating an attitude of openness to the outside

world. This was used to refute the accusations of colonial oppression levelled by countries holding opposing views: " The whole world knew that the same political and social rights were enjoyed by all the Portuguese people, no matter what their race, colour, creed or origin might be (representative of Portugal)" (General Assembly, 1961c, p.186). However, in practice, the outside world was not granted free access to Angola to conduct investigations, and the Angolan people did not, as Portugal claimed, enjoy equal rights with white settlers. Furthermore, although the Portuguese representative's statement touched upon the rights and welfare of the Angolan people, when discussing Angola's future during the meetings, the representative essentially avoided addressing the most crucial issue of greatest concern to the international community: the Angolan people's demands for self-determination and political representation.

The French representative primarily employed a norm signalling strategy. In his address to the meetings, he repeatedly emphasised France's principles of liberty and equality, the benefits that an Algeria under French rule would bring to North Africa and to Algeria's own development, and the reforms and contributions made in various sectors across Algeria. He also advocated for a ceasefire, free elections and negotiations, whilst accepting the presence of external observers to monitor the process. Although France expressed a willingness to negotiate in its statement, it denied that the FLN was the sole representative of the Algerian people and refused to engage in negotiations based on the premise of independence. With regard to the issue of the right to self-determination, France primarily employed the norm interpretation strategy, while France kept asserting that the situation in Algeria did not fall within the scope of the Charter's provisions, thereby limiting the Charter's applicability and then emphasized on interpreting the subject and method of implementation of self-determination from France's perspective. In the earlier period of 1955, the French representative primarily used the norm interpretation strategy in his statement. Although the French representative acknowledged the existence of Article 1, paragraph 2, of the Charter, as invoked by other Member States, which was "To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of

peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace" (United Nations, 1945). France maintained that there "appeared to be no specific provision in the Charter granting the General Assembly competence in that respect" (General Assembly, 1955a, p.7), and therefore argued that the provisions of the Charter cited by other States did not apply to the situation in Algeria. Later, in 1957, the French representative continued to rely primarily on a normative interpretation strategy. In contrast to the FLN's demand that independence serve as the basis for negotiations, the French representative explained that the concept of the right to self-determination in France's position differed from "a collective right, independent of minority rights and independent of individual rights" (General Assembly, 1957a, p.324), on the contrary, it should be "an individual right to be exercised freely by each member of the collective group, taken not as an abstract entity, but as the sum of the individuals comprising it" (General Assembly, 1957a, p.324). Consequently, the French representative repeatedly emphasised during the proceedings that the will of the Algerian people should be expressed through free elections, whilst refusing to negotiate with the FLN.

In terms of timing, Portugal's strategy regarding its statements on the situation in Angola at United Nations meetings gradually shifted its focus from the interpretation of norms towards norm avoidance, norm disregard and norm signalling. In terms of content, Portugal's statements on the situation in Angola at United Nations meetings initially focused on interpreting norms that is, explaining that the norms themselves did not apply to Portuguese colonies (specifically, that provisions such as those in the Charter did not apply to Portugal), and that Portugal's actions in Angola did not breach norms relating to international security, arguing that its conduct in Angola constituted the maintenance of public order rather than a breach of the peace. In later statements, however, the frequency of interpretations regarding the norms and Portugal's own conduct decreased, whilst the Portuguese representative's statements increasingly contained references to the norms or the disregard of certain norms. This was reflected in the Portuguese representative's frequent references to the policies implemented by Portugal in Angola to maintain its rule there, whilst simultaneously disregarding the genuine demands of the Angolan people and Angolan political groups. In terms of the

proceedings, the Portuguese representative's statements at the United Nations General Assembly almost entirely sidestepped discussions regarding the Angolan people's right to self-determination, maintaining that self-determination did not apply to its overseas province of Angola. Furthermore, the statement expressed no willingness to engage in political dialogue with Angolan political groups, denied allegations of colonialism, and even saw the representative walk out of the meeting in full view of the assembly, demonstrating an attitude of defiance towards mainstream international norms (Reis, 2013).

In terms of timing, France's strategy regarding its statements on the question of Algeria at United Nations meetings gradually shifted its focus from norm interpretation to norm avoidance and norm signalling. In terms of content, in the early stages, France used procedural means to prevent the question of Algeria from being raised at United Nations meetings, citing the Charter extensively and asserting that the United Nations had no jurisdiction over France's handling of the question of Algeria. In later statements, however, the frequency of normative interpretation decreased, whilst the French representative increasingly focused on articulating positions regarding norms and explaining its own conduct. This was reflected in the extensive emphasis placed on France's various development initiatives in Algeria and in clarifications regarding its reform plans. During the meetings debates, France did not entirely sidestep the issue of self-determination, but rather redefined it in a manner favourable to itself, thereby expressing its rejection of the Algerian people's demands.

An analysis of the meeting records reveals that the content and strategies of the two countries' defences of colonialism are similar. Indeed, even during the 1188th meeting of the Plenary Session of the United Nations 11th General Assembly in 1962, whilst discussing the agenda item the situation in Angola, the Tunisian representative, Mestiri, stated in his address that the views expressed by the Portuguese representative were almost identical to those put forward by the French representative during the discussions on the question of Algeria that same year:

"Do we not find here, with hardly a change of wording, all those arguments we heard during the debate on the Algerian tragedy? … It is all there, from the 'final phase' to 'Angola, an integral part of Portugal', together with "pacification" and 'psychological action' …" (General Assembly, 1957, p.1057).

Both Portugal and France invoked the Charter and other legal instruments to deny that the the question of Angola and Algeria fell within the jurisdiction of the United Nations, both claimed legitimacy for the atrocities they committed on the ground, casting doubt on local nationalist activities and linking them to terrorism, foreign aid and external interference. Whilst at the same time, by framing their actions in terms of administrative reform, economic development, education and social development, they sought to demonstrate their rule's capacity to improve local society, thereby downplaying or sidestepping the local population's demands for self-determination.

However, these similar arguments do not imply that the two countries adopted entirely identical strategies. In its statements at the meetings, Portugal gradually shifted from boycotting the meetings and declaring, on legal grounds, the inapplicability of international norms, to participating in the discussions to a limited extent, whilst confining its remarks to the framework of Angola as a Portuguese overseas province. Portugal consistently refused to accept the principles of self-determination, the transfer of sovereignty or political negotiations with nationalist organisations. France, meanwhile, gradually shifted during this period from procedurally blocking the question of Algeria from being brought before the United Nations and making numerous legal assertions regarding the inapplicability of international norms, to participating in and controlling the topics of discussion whilst continuing to deny the United Nations' jurisdiction. Under the pretext of a ceasefire, free elections and negotiations, France did not genuinely seek to negotiate on an equal footing with Algerian political groups, but rather attempted to dominate Algeria's political evolution. It is evident that, compared with Portugal, France took a more proactive and frequent approach to alleviating

pressure from the United Nations through more flexible wording, by employing a greater number of norm avoidance strategies.

This does not imply that Portugal's debating strategy lacked flexibility comparing to France, rather, the decisions and rhetorical strategies adopted by Portugal were linked to its policy during this period. In João Tavares's *"Por uma política externa de independência nacional" – Uma perspetiva realista sobre a política externa portuguesa durante a era Salazar (1933–1968)* (Tavares, 2024), he pointed out that Portugal's foreign policy during the Salazar era, and under Nogueira's leadership, remained steadfastly committed to safeguarding Portugal's national interests on the world stage, regardless of changes in the external landscape (Tavares, 2024; Tavares, 2025). Furthermore, in addition to Salazar's advocacy of sovereignty during the Estado Novo period, Portuguese foreign policy-makers and elites are also considered to have collectively established a "strong and distinctive authoritarian identity [161]" (Mendes, 2020, p. 25). In his article, Mendes argues that Portugal established a "triângulo identitário (Identity Triangle)" in its diplomacy during this period, comprising essentialism, particularism and Westernism. Essentialism led to "elites of the Estado Novo regarding the empire as the essence, mission and historical purpose of Portugal in the world[162]" (Mendes, 2024, p. 22). Particularism, based on Lusotropicalismo, elucidated the unique nature of Portuguese colonialism. It constructed a multi-continental and multi-ethnic concept, promoting the idea that the innate adaptability of the Portuguese people stemmed from their mixed ethnic origins, their transcontinental territories, and their history of contact with Muslims and Jews on the Iberian Peninsula during the nation's earliest centuries. This served as a basis for legitimising the continued sovereignty over its overseas territories (Castelo, 2017).

---

[161] Original text: "uma forte e especial identidade autoritária".

[162] Original text: "elites do Estado Novo assumiam o império como a essência, missão e finalidade histórica de Portugal no mundo".

In the colonial policies of Portugal's New State era, *Lusotropicalismo* served the interests of the Portuguese authoritarian and colonialist regime and was accorded undue credibility. In reality, however, under Portuguese colonial policy, the "assimilados" did not enjoy equal status or treatment with white settlers (*colonos brancos*), let alone the indigenous inhabitants (Cardão, 2007). However, this theory obscured the severe and systematic racial discrimination practised by Portugal in its colonies, whilst promoting the image of Portugal as a multiracial, integrated society where all were equal. This cloaked Portugal's colonial actions in Angola in the guise of anti-racism, thereby instilling a sense of pride and cohesion in Portuguese nationalism (Castelo, 2017). Subsequently, decreto-lei 2048/51, enacted in 1951, redefined the status of the colonies as "overseas provinces" at both the legal and discursive levels, thereby reinforcing territorial continuity. By detaching itself from the realities of inequality and discrimination, Portugal constructed, through ideology and official narratives, an imagined empire grounded in both territory and culture (Baptista, 2013). Meanwhile, Westernism enabled Portugal to embody both "the adoption of a Western and Christian cultural and civilisational identity" and "an anti-communist political and geopolitical identity[163]" (Mendes, 2024, p. 22). These elements helped construct an image of Portugal as a great power, or even an empire, and any colonial self-determination would have shattered this endeavour. Consequently, under this highly self-consistent identity framework, Portugal, in its statements to the United Nations, placed its sovereignty and territorial integrity above international norms (Tavares, 2025) and when met with counterarguments during discussions, rather than adopting a more flexible strategy, it interpreted voices of opposition within the UN as a lack of understanding and prejudice towards Portuguese values (Reis, 2014).

Against this backdrop, coupled with France's status as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, the country paid close attention to developments

[163] Original text: "a assunção de uma identidade cultural e civilizacional ocidental e cristã", "uma identidade política e geopolítica anticomunista".

within the UN in order to project its image as a major power on the international stage in a manner that served its interests.

This also explains why, when confronted with international norms, Portugal shared France's stance on the Algeria issue in denying Angola's sovereignty, but France adopted a more flexible and adaptable explanation for its own actions compared to Portugal's relatively stubborn approach in its meetings statements.

In line with the view expressed by Pineau in his summary at the end of 1957, who thought that the statements made by the French delegation during United Nations meetings could not alter the outcome of the vote (Service des Nations Unies au Département, 1957, p. 918), Nogueira argued that statements made during United Nations meetings "were fundamentally political and the majority of the Assembly was not to be swayed by law or logic, but only by emotions and self-interest" (Nogueira, 1963, p. 90). Consequently, the majority of statements made at the United Nations General Assembly were insufficient in themselves to alter the positions that most Member States had already determined prior to the vote. The purpose lay in publicly articulating the positions of Portugal and France on the events, upholding the legitimacy of their actions in their overseas territories, and resisting international norms. If, then, the statements made by the two countries at the Assembly did not directly influence the outcome of the vote, what other factors were at play?

At the United Nations meetings, the outcome of a vote is most directly determined by the collective voting results of Member States. However, voting outcomes within the United Nations are influenced by a number of factors, they are based on the political positions of Member States and are shaped by a combination of factors, including the leanings of interest groups, the specific circumstances of Member States, diplomatic relations between nations, and the specific content of draft resolutions. In this regard, before the issues concerning Angola and Algeria were brought before the United Nations for discussion, many countries had already adopted relatively firm positions on the matter. Consequently, the debates during the formal

sessions largely revolved around these pre-established stances. As a result, the statements made by Portugal and France during the sessions were unable to entirely alter the attitudes of other nations such as certain African and Asian countries like Iran and Saudi Arabia. The countries that truly offered significant room for manoeuvre were primarily those whose positions were still undecided, and it was precisely these nations that Portugal and France sought to win over. For this very reason, the official records indicate that, in addition to their statements during the UN debates, the actions of Portugal and France also included diplomatic activities conducted outside the formal proceedings.

France sought to secure support in the vote primarily through extensive and wide-ranging diplomatic efforts and by enlisting the backing of neutral nations. In the early stages of the question of Algeria, France acted behind the scenes, using friendly delegations to influence the agenda and attempting, through procedural means, to exclude the question of Algeria from the United Nations' proceedings. Whilst this approach proved effective initially, as more Asian and African nations joined the organisation, France abandoned this tactic and shifted to a more proactive role in participating in debates at United Nations meetings, whilst simultaneously conducting extensive diplomatic activities to mobilise other member states to cast votes in France's favour. Throughout this process, friendly delegations from the United States, Europe and Latin America became France's primary targets for courting. With regard to the United States, in addition to Washington's own stance, France also relied on the ripple effect or influence that the US's public statements would have on other nations (Department of State, 1957). In its efforts to secure favourable votes, France primarily framed the question of Algeria within the context of Euro-African relations and the Cold War, emphasising that stability in Algeria would benefit France and ultimately serve the interests of its Western allies. Furthermore, with regard to the United States, France, by repeatedly pledging reforms that were not strictly implemented in practice, led the US to believe that "the Algerian situation would not be improved by an acrimonious debate or by a highly controversial solution" (Department of State, 1957a, p. 288), thereby inclining the US to support the adoption of a resolution at the United Nations that was

lenient towards France. Furthermore, within Europe, the countries voting in favour of France's position were mainly concentrated in Western and Northern Europe (ex. Nato memebrs), many of which were themselves colonial powers, such as Portugal, the United Kingdom, Italy and Belgium. In addition to long-standing friendly relations or shared colonialist stances, France also made every effort, through reports within NATO, to emphasise to its Western allies the importance of the question of Algeria for maintaining stability in North Africa. Consequently, on 6 December 1957, during the final vote on the draft resolution in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, the amended draft resolution A/C.1/L.194 failed to pass, with 37 votes in favour and 37 against, and after the final negotiations, a resolution was agreed upon that was relatively lenient towards France (as discussed in C. 4.1.3).

Portugal's diplomatic manoeuvres, however, were more targeted, or, one might say, the options available to Portugal were few and far between. On the issue of Angola, Portugal initially attempted, like France, to rally its allies in a bid to prevent the matter from being placed on the agenda of the United Nations General Assembly through procedural means. In response to the Portuguese Government's request, the French side, drawing on previous experience, advised Portugal not to fight against the issue being placed on the agenda, as this "would be doomed to failure[164]" (Marcos, 2007, p. 76). Although France still chose to support Portugal, this failed to prevent the Angolan issue from being placed on the General Assembly's agenda as the French had anticipated. Thereafter, Portugal's diplomatic efforts focused more prominently on maintaining the support of a few key allies, particularly to prevent Western powers such as the United States from shifting their support towards draft resolutions that were harsher on Portugal. During the session, based on the available sources, Portugal's diplomatic efforts centred on three main areas: the United States, the Western bloc (primarily within NATO), and other nations facing accusations on similar issues within the United Nations (such as South Africa and Spain). As for the United States and NATO, the factors that led them to make decisions more favourable to Portugal stemmed largely

[164] Original text: "pois estaria destinado a ir de encontro ao fracasso".

from Portugal itself, which was the strategic value of the Azores military base and Portugal's alignment in the tense Cold War landscape. This forced especially the United States (and the US had a certain influence on other countries) constantly weigh the principle of decolonisation against the maintenance of their strategic relationship with Portugal, which ultimately lead, although Portugal was unable to prevent the draft resolution from securing majority support by the end of 1962, it was able to ensure that key nations did not back harsher sanctions or coercive measures. Consequently, despite facing overwhelming opposition at the United Nations General Assembly, Portugal, as Nogueira said in the end of 1962, had a political success.

However, the statements and reactions of Portugal and France at the United Nations General Assembly cannot be explained solely by their respective political systems, the policies they implemented in their colonies, or their standing and diplomatic actions within the international community, the circumstances in which the two countries found themselves at the United Nations also differed significantly.

Discussions on the Question of Algeria began in 1955 and took place in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, whilst the Situation in Angola and the Non-compliance of the Government of Portugal with Chapter XI of the Charter of the United Nations and with General Assembly Resolution 1542 (XV): report of the Special Committee on Territories under Portuguese Administration were discussed in the Fourth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. Firstly, when discussions on the Question of Algeria began, there were 76 Member States, a figure which rose to 82 by 1957, the new Member States including 11 Third World countries. By the time the Situation in Angola was discussed at the United Nations, in 1960, the United Nations already had 99 Member States, a figure which rose to 110 by 1962, between 1955 and 1962, a total of 27 new Third World countries joined the United Nations. Furthermore, the First Committee dealt primarily with international security matters such as disarmament and international challenges threatening peace, whilst the Fourth Committee dealt with decolonisation issues. This meant that, compared with France, whose discussions at the meetings were in fact more focused on regional

security issues, Portugal, following *the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples* (Resolution 1514 (XV)), was facing greater pressure for decolonisation. Furthermore, whilst Portugal was dealing with issues relating to its overseas territories at the United Nations, the situation in Angola was no longer an isolated issue but had become part of the broader agenda concerning Portugal's non-self-governing territories.The intensity and level of attention paid to the agenda were also clearly reflected in the number of meetings held. Between 1955 and 1957, approximately 30 meetings were held on the question of Algeria, whilst over 60 meetings were convened on the situation in Angola from 1960 to 1962, illustrating the high-pressure situation Portugal faced within the United Nations. Taking into account the circumstances of the two countries as summarised above, consequently, although both countries were forced to use the United Nations as a forum in which to articulate and defend their positions, France, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, placed greater importance on its image within the organisation, whereas Portugal had no such considerations. Therefore, France was better placed to shift its focus from excluding items from the agenda to influencing the debate and the text of resolutions, whilst Portugal was more likely to concentrate on securing the support or abstention of a few key countries.

A comparison reveals that France and Portugal shared very similar defence strategies of their colonial policies at the United Nations. Both countries denied the jurisdiction of the United Nations, emphasised territorial integrity, and characterised nationalist organisations as insurgent or terrorist forces. At the same time, they denied and concealed the atrocities committed by their own governments as measures to maintain order, and downplayed the true nature of colonialism and the atrocities of war by invoking the causes of reform, equality and development. From the perspective of Dixon's framework of rhetorical adaptation, the two countries typically did not employ a single strategy in their statements, but rather a mixture of strategies: when addressing the nature of overseas territories, norm avoidance and norm interpretation were used in combination, primarily to argue over the applicability of norms. This was usually manifested by first explaining that their own situation did not fall under the norms

demanded by external parties, and then, on that basis, declaring that their actions fall under another norm that was favourable to them. However, when statements concerned their own conduct, norm signalling and norm interpretation were combined, primarily to argue that the norms did not apply to their actions. In the case of the Portuguese representative's statements, the strategy of norm disregard was also occasionally employed, demonstrating a direct disregard for the norms. This indicates that, when faced with issues concerning the nature of territories over which there is in fact little dispute and which have already been clearly defined by norms (non-self-governing territories, trust territories), both countries tended to rely primarily on interpretation. When confronted with actions involving two or even multiple parties, such as the nature of war, both countries tended to seek legitimacy for their actions primarily by interpreting their own conduct, which means, by demonstrating that their behaviour complied with the norms and claiming that the other party's behaviour does not. Additionally in situations where an explanation proves impossible, there may even be instances of disregard for the norms.

The most significant difference between the two countries lay in the limits of their rhetorical adjustments. Portugal did indeed shift from a refusal to engage in discussions to limited participation, and also incorporated references to reform, development and equality. Consequently, Portugal's statements at the meeting did undergo certain adjustments in response to pressure from both within the debates and from outside. However, these adjustments remained consistently influenced by the colonialist authoritarian regime and an ideology of strong identification with the overseas territories, shaped by *Lusotropicalismo*. As a result, when confronted with the norms, Portugal adopted a more hardline stance and an even more evasive attitude. On the other hand, France, although, like Portugal, it did not recognise the possibility of Algerian independence, amidst internal political turmoil, more proactive in reinterpreting self-determination, free elections, a ceasefire, reform and negotiation as a political process led by France, although in fact the Algerians have never granted the same extensive voting rights as the French people (Pickles, 1963). However, rather than

accepting the demands made by few Asian and African nations, as well as other states, regarding independence and the representativeness of the FLN, France, when confronted with these norms, preferred to vie for the interpretative authority over potential solutions.

Ultimately, the study revealed that the strategies used by the two countries at United Nations meetings were primarily influenced by two factors: the country's position within the organisation; and its geopolitical context. These two factors affect a country's ability to mobilise and secure support during the course of such meetings. As demonstrated by the two case studies on France and Portugal, the closer a state is to the core of the organisation, in this case is the United Nations, the more its statements are typically constrained by its reputation within the organisation and its international image. As a result, even when upholding its own position, like France, it is more likely to do so through limited adaptation or normative language. Conversely, states like Portugal on the periphery of the organisation face lower costs in openly resisting norms and are therefore more likely to disregard them.

However, as factors influencing the outcome of votes, a country's geopolitical considerations carry greater weight than the mere content of its statements at meetings. In the case studies examined in this research, we could find that Portugal with limited overall power but control over specific strategic resources, seek to leverage their geographical location, military bases or value to an alliance as bargaining chips in diplomatic negotiations, in order to influence the voting choices of major powers or allies; by contrast, France, which possess strong comprehensive national power and extensive diplomatic networks, tend to link their own interests to alliance security, bloc cohesion or the international order, framing their national demands as the common interests of their allies, and seeking the support of other states through diplomatic and political pressure. In other words, whilst France and Portugal share similar strategies for defending their colonial interests, differences in the context in which their states operate within international organisations, and their geopolitical positions have led to varying

degrees of rhetorical adaptation and different choices of diplomatic strategy when confronted with new norms arising from anti-colonial movements.

Furthermore, during the course of the research, the study also fund that, the stability of a regime (or the continuity of its policy), and the national Identity, might also influence the strategies of two countries at the United Nation, which could be considered a direction for the future research.

Referências Bibliográficas

Afghanistan et al. (1957) Other Documents and Publications. *The Question of Algeria. Agenda item 59 (XII). Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon, Egypt, Ghana, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen: joint draft resolution*, *United Nations*. Date: 5 December 1957. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3861629?ln=en&v=pdf (Accessed: 28 June 2026).

Afghanistan et al. (1961) letters and Notes Verbales. Sent to president of the Security Council, *Letter dated 26 May 1961 addressed to the president of the Security Council by the representatives of Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Cameroun, Central African Republic, ceylon, Chad, Congo (brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), cyprus, Dahomey, Ethiopia, federation of malaya, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea (Conakry), India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, United Arab Republic, Upper Volta, Yemen and Yugoslavia*, *United Nations*. Date : Available at: 28 May 1961. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/631243?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 29 February 2026).

Afghanistan et. al (1961) *Letter dated 10 March 1961 addressed to the president of the Security Council by the representatives of Afghanistan, Burma, Cameroun, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Dahomey, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, Upper Volta and Yemen*, *United Nations*. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/630922?ln=en&v=pdf (Accessed: 03 February 2026).

Aghanistan et al (1956) Letters and Notes Verbales, *Letter dated 13 June 1956 from the representatives of Afghanistan, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Thailand and Yemen, addressed to the president of the Security Council, received on 18 June 1956*, *United Nations*. Date: 18 June 1956. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/566619?ln=en (Accessed: 20 June 2026).

Alexander, M.S., Evans, M. and Keiger, J.F.V. (2002) ‘1 The “War without a Name”, the French Army and the Algerians: Recovering Experiences, Images and Testimonies ’, in *he Algerian War and the French Army, 1954–62 Experiences, Images, Testimonies*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 1–42.

Alexandre, V. (2017) *Contra o vento: Portugal, O império e a maré anticolonial (1945-1960)*. Lisboa: Temas e Debates : Círculo de Leitores.

Alphand, H (1955) Telegram , from Alphand to Pinay,1 October 1955 ,

Examen critique des différentes solutions possibles après le vote sur l'Algérie , *Documents diplomatiques français, 1955, Tome II (1juillet–31 décembre)*. Paris: Imprimerie nationale, no. 260, pp. 586–590.Available at: https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bd6t53270594/f3.item.texteImage (Accessed: 2 June 2026).

Alphand, H (1955a) Personal letter, from Alphand to Massigli, 19 November 1955, L’affaire algérienne devant les Nations Unies : plan en vue de faire rayer la question de l’ordre du jour de l’Assemblée, *Documents diplomatiques français, 1955, Tome II (1juillet–31 décembre)*. Paris: Imprimerie nationale, no. 376, pp. 831–833. Available at: https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bd6t53270594/f3.item.texteImage (Accessed: 2 June 2026).

Alphand, H (1955b) Telegram, from Alphand to Pinay, 22 December 1955, Suggestions du chef de la mission française en vue d’organiser des réunions groupant les représentants des États occidentaux à l’O.N.U. pour faire face aux blocs soviétique et africano-asiatique, *Documents diplomatiques français, 1955, Tome II (1er juillet–31 déc*embre). Paris: Imprimerie nationale, no. 440, pp. 979–981. Available at: https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bd6t53270594/f3.item.texteImage (Accessed: 2 July 2026).

Alphand, H. (1955) Telegram, from Alphand to Pinay, 22 December 1955, Suggestions du chef de la mission française en vue d’organiser des réunions groupant les représentants des États occidentaux à l’O.N.U. pour faire face aux blocs soviétique et africano-asiatique, *Documents diplomatiques français, 1955, Tome II (1er juillet–31 décembre)*. Paris: Imprimerie nationale, no. 440, pp. 979–981. Available at: https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bd6t53270594/f3.item.texteImage (Accessed: 2 July 2026).

Alphand, H. (1956) Telegram, from Alphand to Pineau, 10 April 1956, Le représentant américain espère que la France aura rétabli l'ordre en Algérie suffisamment à temps pour éviter l'inscription de l'affaire en novembre à l'ordre du jour, *Documents diplomatiques français, 1956, Tome I (1er janvier–30 juin)*. Paris: Imprimerie nationale, no. 231, pp. 565–566. Available at: https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bd6t5327013g/f3 (Accessed: 15 June 2026).

Alphand, H. (1956a) Telegram, from Alphand to Pineau, 3 May 1956, Modération du délégué de l'Inde au sein du groupe afro-asiatique au sujet de la question algérienne, *Documents diplomatiques français, 1956, Tome I (1er janvier–30 juin)*. Paris: Imprimerie nationale, no. 292, pp. 702–703. Available at: https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bd6t5327013g/f3 (Accessed: 15 June 2026).

Alphand, H. (1956b) Telegram, from Alphand to Pineau, 26 May 1956, Revirement des délégations arabes du groupe afro-asiatique. Celles-ci demandent de saisir le Conseil de sécurité de l'affaire algérienne. Réticences des Asiatiques, *Documents diplomatiques français, 1956, Tome I (1er janvier–30 juin)*. Paris: Imprimerie nationale, no. 347, pp. 856–857. Available at: https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bd6t5327013g/f3 (Accessed: 15 June 2026).

Alphand, H. (1956c) Telegram, from Alphand to Pineau, 28 June 1956, Succès français à la séance du Conseil de sécurité consacrée à l'inscription à l'ordre du jour de l'Assemblée de la question algérienne, *Documents diplomatiques français, 1956, Tome I (1er janvier–30 juin)*. Paris: Imprimerie nationale, no. 438, pp. 1071–1072. Available at: https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bd6t5327013g/f3 (Accessed: 15 June 2026).

Alphand, H. (1956d) Telegram, from Alphand to Pineau, 31 December 1956, L'ambassadeur de France a exposé de nouveau à M. Murphy les intentions de son gouvernement au sujet de l'affaire algérienne et a souligné l'intérêt porté à l'attitude de la délégation américaine au cours des débats aux Nations Unies, *Documents diplomatiques français, 1956, Tome III (24 octobre–31 décembre)*. Paris: Imprimerie nationale, no. 334, pp. 618–619. Available at: https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bd6t53270683/f3.item.texteImage (Accessed: 15 June 2026).

Alphand, H. (1957) Telegram, from Alphand to Pineau, 17 January 1957, Heureux effets des contacts franco-américains à propos de l'Algérie (mission du général Gouraud en particulier), *Documents diplomatiques français, 1957, Tome I (1er janvier–30 juin)*. Paris: Imprimerie nationale, no. 50, pp. 101–102. Available at:

https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bd6t5327061f?rk=214593;2 (Accessed: 20 July 2026).

American Committee on Africa (1958) *The status of Portugal's African territories*, *African Activist Archive*. Available at: https://africanactivist.msu.edu/record/210-849-30087/ (Accessed: 10 November 2025).

Antunes, M.J. (2020) 'A crack in everything: Violence in soldiers' narratives about the Portuguese Colonial War in Angola', *History and Anthropology*, 33(5), pp. 611–630. doi:10.1080/02757206.2020.1786381.

Argentina et al. (1957) Draft Resolutions and Decisions. *Question of Algeria: Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Italy and Peru : joint draft resolution*, *United Nations*. Date: 12 Febuary 1957. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3857581?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 28 June 2026).

Argentina et al. (1957a) Draft Resolutions and decisions. *The Question of Algeria. Agenda item 59 (XII). Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Italy, Peru, Spain: joint draft resolution*, *United Nations*. Date: 5 December 1957. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3860379?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 28 June 2026).

Azevedo, F.A. de (1936) *Mística Imperial*. Lisboa: Editorial Cosmos.

Ball, J. (2017) 'The history of Angola', *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of African History* [Preprint]. doi:10.1093/acrefore/9780190277734.013.180.

Barnett, M. and Finnemore, M. (2004) *Rules for the world: International organizations in global politics*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Barros, L.H.A. de (2017) *Uma análise do Percurso da Ideologia Colonial Portuguesa em relação à áfrica (1928-1961)*, *Cadernos de História UFPE*. Available at: https://periodicos.ufpe.br/revistas/cadernosdehistoriaufpe/article/view/110098 (Accessed: 29 October 2025).

Barros, L.H.A. de (no date) *Uma análise do Percurso da Ideologia Colonial Portuguesa em relação à áfrica (1928-1961)*, *Cadernos de História UFPE*. Available at:

https://periodicos.ufpe.br/revistas/cadernosdehistoriaufpe/article/view/110098 (Accessed: 25 March 2025).

Bastos, C. (2019) 'Chapter 10. Luso-tropicalism Debunked, Again: Race, Racism, and Racialism in Three Portuguese-Speaking Societies Cristiana Bastos', in *Luso-tropicalism and Its Discontents The Making and Unmaking of Racial Exceptionalism*. New York, America: Berghahn Books, pp. 243–264.

Belmessous, S. (2013) *Assimilation and empire: Uniformity in French and British colonies, 1541-1954*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bender, G.J. (1980) *Angola under the Portuguese the myth and the reality Gerald J. Bender*. Berkeley, Calif. u.a: Univ. of California Pr.

Betts, R.F. (1961) *Assimilation and association in French colonial theory, 1890-1914*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

Birmingham, D. (2015) *A short history of modern Angola*. Johannesburg & Cape Town: Jonathan Ball Publishers.

Bruno Cardoso Reis (2013) 'Portugal and the UN: A rogue state resisting the norm of decolonization (1956–1974)', *Portuguese Studies*, 29(2), p. 251. doi:10.5699/portstudies.29.2.0251.

Burke (1962) Letter. *339. Letter From the Ambassador to Portugal (Elbrick) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Tyler)0*, *U.S. Department of State*. Date: 14 May 19662. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v13/d339 (Accessed: 20 February 2026).

Canada, Ireland and Norway (1957) Other Documents and Publications. *The Question of Algeria. Agenda item 59 (XII). Canada, Ireland, Norway: amendments to the joint draft resolution A/C.1/L.194*, *United Nations*. Date: 6 December 1957. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3861637?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 29 June 2026).

Cann, J.P.(2012) *Counterinsurgency in Africa: The Portuguese Way of War, 1961-1974*. Solihull, West Midlands: Helion & Company Ltd.

Cardão, M. (2007) ‘Patrícia Ferraz de Matos, as cores do Império. Representações Raciais no império colonial’, *Ler História*, (53), pp. 260–266. doi:10.4000/lerhistoria.2999.

Carty, A. (2011) ‘International law and the spirit of anti-colonialism: Europe Fights Back’, *The Modern Law Review*, 74(1), pp. 135–149. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2230.2010.00840.x.

Castelo, C. (2011) “Uma incursão no lusotropicalismo de Gilberto Freyre,” Blogue de História lusófona.

Castelo, C. (2017) ‘The luso-tropicalist message of the late Portuguese empire’, *Palgrave Studies in the History of the Media*, pp. 217–234. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-61792-3_12.

Conferences Secretariat (1956) Note, 28 May 1956, Évocation de la question algérienne aux Nations Unies, *Documents diplomatiques français, 1956, Tome I (1er janvier–30 juin)*. Paris: Imprimerie nationale, no. 351, pp. 864–866. Available at: https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bd6t5327013g/f3 (Accessed: 15 June 2026).

Conklin, A.L. (1997) *A mission to civilize: The Republican idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895-1930*. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press.

Connelly, M. (2002) *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria’s fight for independence and the origins of the post-Cold War era*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Constitution de 1848, IIE république (n. d.) *Conseil constitutionnel*. Available at: https://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/les-constitutions-dans-l-histoire/constitution-de-1848-iie-republique (Accessed: 25 April 2025).

Cornut-Gentille, B. (1956) Telegram, from Cornut-Gentille to Pineau, 27 October 1956, État des affaires devant les Nations Unies: la position française est pénible, sur la défensive, et rencontre un climat psychologique de plus en plus défavorable, *Documents diplomatiques français, 1956, Tome III (24 octobre–31 décembre)*. Paris: Imprimerie nationale, no. 35, pp. 53–55. Available at: https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bd6t53270683/f3. (Accessed: 15 June 2026).

Couve de Murville (1955) Telegram, from Couve de Murville to Pinay,

3 October 1955, L'ambassadeur de France informe le secrétaire d'État des suites du vote sur l'Algérie, *Documents diplomatiques français, 1955, Tome II (1juillet–31 décembre)*. Paris: Imprimerie nationale, no. 266, pp. 603–604. Available at: https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bd6t53270594/f3.item.texteImage (Accessed: 2 June 2026).

de Guiringaud (1955) Telegram, from de Guiringaud to the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs, 8 October 1955, Analyse des votes sur l'Algérie aux Nations Unies, *Documents diplomatiques français, 1955, Tome II (1juillet–31 décembre)*. Paris: Imprimerie nationale, no. 283, pp. 631–633. Available at: https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bd6t53270594/f3.item.texteImage (Accessed: 2 June 2026).

de Gusmao, M.J. (no date) *Aspects of portuguese colonial policy*, *Sabinet African Journals*. Available at: https://journals.co.za/doi/pdf/10.10520/AJA0304615X_574 (Accessed: 25 March 2025).

De La Tournelle, G.L.(1956) Telegram, from M. de La Tournelle to Pineau, 12 July 1956, Entretien franco-espagnol sur l'Algérie, une candidature éventuelle de l'Espagne au Conseil de sécurité, les frontières sud-marocaines et Tanger, *Documents diplomatiques français, 1956, Tome II (1er juillet–23 octobre)*. Paris: Imprimerie nationale, no. 34, pp. 80–82. Available at: https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bd6t53270602/f3 (Accessed: 15 June 2026).

Dejean, M. (1956) Telegram, from Dejean to Pinay, 14 January 1956, Remise des lettres de créance de Maurice Dejean au maréchal Vorochilov, président du Soviet suprême: cordialité de l'entretien, *Documents diplomatiques français, 1956, Tome I (1er janvier–30 juin)*. Paris: Imprimerie nationale, no. 23, p. 42. Available at: https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bd6t5327013g/f3 (Accessed: 15 June 2026).

Demker, M. (2026) 'France and Algeria: Ideas of the nation in the French Political Elite discourse 1954–1956', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, pp. 1–19. doi:10.1080/13569317.2026.2630285.

Department of State (1957) Memoradum. *81. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, January 11, 1957, 3–4 p.m.*, *Office of the Historian*. Date: 11 January 1957. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v18/sources (Accessed: 25 June 2026).

Department of State (1957) Memorandum. *97. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, December 2, 19571*, *U.S. Department of State*. Date: 2 December 1957. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v18/d97 (Accessed: 5 August 2026).

Department of State (1957a) Memorandum. *84. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, June 14, 1957*. Date: 14 June 1957. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v18/d84 (Accessed: 28 June 2026).

Department of State (1957a) Memorandum. *94. Memorandum of a Conversation, Washington, November 19, 19571*, *U.S. Department of State*. Date: 19 November 1957. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v18/d94 (Accessed: 5 August 2026).

Department of State (1962) Memoradum. *348. Memorandum of Conversation*, *U.S. Department of State*. Date: 24 October 1962. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v13/d348 (Accessed: 10 April 2026).

DGLAB/Livro (no date) *Alves de Azevedo* , *DGLAB/Livro*. Available at: http://livro.dglab.gov.pt/sites/DGLB/Portugues/autores/Paginas/PesquisaAutores1.aspx?AutorId=9942 (Accessed: 30 September 2026).

Dixon, J.M. (2017) 'Rhetorical adaptation and resistance to international norms', *Perspectives on Politics*, 15(1), pp. 83–99. doi:10.1017/s153759271600414x.

Dulles (1955) Telegram 62. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France. Date: 5 October 1955. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v18/d62 (Accessed: 07 June 2026).

Département (1955) Note, 4 November 1955, Réunion anglo-américano-Française sur la discussion de la question algérienne à l'assemblée générale des Nations Unies, *Documents diplomatiques français, 1955, Tome II (1juillet–31 décembre)*. Paris: Imprimerie nationale, no. 347, pp. 770–772. Available at: https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bd6t53270594/f3.item.texteImage (Accessed: 2 June 2026).

Economic and Social Council (1946) *Draft resolution concerning the report of the Commission on Human Rights / submitted by the Drafting Committee on the Social Commission*, *United Nations*. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/634398?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 30 September 2026).

Economic and Social Council (1946) Resolutions and Decisions. *Commission on Human Rights.*, *United Nations*. Date: 21 June 1946. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/210615?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 30 September 2026).

Elbrick (1962) Telegram. *336. Telegram From the Embassy in Portugal to the Department of State*, *U.S. Department of State*.Date:12 January 1962. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v13/d336 (Accessed: 12 March 2026).

Elbrick (1962b) Telegram. *337. Telegram From the Embassy in Portugal to the Department of State*, *U.S. Department of State*. Date: 13 February 1962. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v13/d337 (Accessed: 04 March 2026).

Emerson, R. (1965) 'Colonialism, political development, and the UN', *International Organization*, 19(3), pp. 484–503. doi:10.1017/s0020818300012418.

Emerson, R. (1971) 'The United Nations and colonialism', *International Relations*, 3(10), pp. 766–781. doi:10.1177/004711787100301003.

Esquer, G. (1957) *Histoire de l'Algérie: 1830-1957*. Paris: Presses universitaires de France.

Evans, M. (2013) *Algeria: France's undeclared war*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Fourth Committee (1959) Reports. *Information from non-self-governing territories : report of the 4th Committee*, *United Nations*. Date: 9 December 1959. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/828918?v=pdf#files (Accessed: 11 November 2025).

Fraga, L.A. de (2014) *A Guerra Colonial: 1961-1974*, *DSpace Repository*. Available at: https://repositorio.grupoautonoma.pt/entities/publication/b6129f7d-6fcd-4969-9199-a131e2bd85ce (Accessed: 21 February 2026).

Fragoso, J.M. (1961) Compound document. *Reunião do Conselho de Segurança da ONU - Organização das Nações Unidas sobre a questão de Angola*.Date: 22 June 1961. Available at: https://digitarq.arquivos.pt/documentDetails/69f639f429434f9dad8cf00b27bf1e14 (Accessed: 01 March 2026).

Fragoso, J.M. (1962) Compound document. *Realização de reunião do Conselho da NATO*. Date: 26 September 1962. Available at: https://digitarq.arquivos.pt/ (Accessed: 21 March 2026).

Fragoso, J.M. (1962a) Compound document. *Realização da 2a reunião do Conselho da NATO sobre o problema de Angola*, *Digitarq*. Date: 12 October 1962. Available at: https://digitarq.arquivos.pt/documentDetails/af23cfc012d14a59992d1577e6a474f6 (Accessed: 23 March 2026).

Freixo, A.D. (2018) 'A crise do último império: A guerra fria E as Décadas Finais do Colonialismo Português (1945-1975)', *Diálogos*, 22(1), p. 126. doi:10.4025/dialogos.v22i1.43636.

Freyre, G. (2003) *Casa - Grande & Senzala*. Lisboa: Livros do Brasil.

Gaddis, J.L. (2007) *The Cold War: A new history*. New York: Penguin Books.

Garin (1961) Letter and NotesVerbales. *Letter dated 18 December 1961 from the Permanent Representative of Portugal addressed to the President of the Security Council*, *United Nations*. Date: 18 December 1961. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/632035?ln=en&v=pdf (Accessed: 18 September 2026).

General Assembly (1949) Resolutions and Decisions. *Establishment of a Special Committee on Information transmitted under Article 73e of the Charter.*, *United Nations*. Date: 2 December 1949. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/210413?ln=zh_CN (Accessed: 30 September 2026).

General Assembly (1954) Other Documents and Publications. *Adoption of the agenda and allocation of items to committees : memorandum by the Secretary-General*, *United Nations*. Date: 14 September 1954. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3858847?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 30 September 2026).

General Assembly (1955) Meeting Records. *General Assembly, 10th session : 530th plenary meeting, Friday, 30 September 1955, New York*, *United Nations*. Date: 30 September 1955. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/ (Accessed: 01 June 2026).

General Assembly (1955) Meeting Records. *General Assembly, 10th session : 529th plenary meeting, Friday, 30 September 1955, New York*, *United Nations*. Date: 30 September 1955. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/738770?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 3 August 2026).

General Assembly (1955) Reports. *Adoption of the agenda of the 10th regular session and allocation of items to committees and Organization of the Session : General Assembly :*, *United Nations*. Date: 22 September 1955. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/835986?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 26 November 2025).

General Assembly (1955a) *General Assembly, 10th session, official records, 1st Committee, 795th meeting, Friday, 25 November, 1955, New York*, *United Nations*. Date: 25 November 1955. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/ (Accessed: 10 June 2026).

General Assembly (1955a) Meeting Records. *General Assembly, 10th session : 530th plenary meeting, Friday, 30 September 1955, New York*, *United Nations*. Date: 30 September. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/738772?ln=en&v=pdf (Accessed: 28 October 2025).

General Assembly (1955a) Meeting Records. *General Committee, 103rd meeting, Thursday, 22 September 1955, New York : General Assembly, 10th session*, *United Nations*. Date: 22 September 1955. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/839068?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 3 August 2026).

General Assembly (1956) Meeting Records. *General Assembly, 11th session : 578th plenary meeting, Thursday, 15 November 1956, New York*, *United Nations*. Date:15 November 1956 Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/61131/files/?ln=zh_CN (Accessed: 05 June 2026).

General Assembly (1957) Meeting Records, *Summary record of the 830th meeting : 1st Committee, held at Headquarters, New York, on Monday, 4 February 1957, General Assembly, 11th session*, *United Nations*. Date: 4 Febuary 1957. Available

at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/861686?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 25 June 2026).

General Assembly (1957) Meeting Records. *Summary record of the 831st meeting : 1st Committee, held at Headquarters, New York, on Monday, 4 Febuary 1957, General Assembly, 11th session*, *United Nations*. Date: 4 Febuary 1957Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/861615?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 01 August 2026).

General Assembly (1957a) Meeting Records. *Summary record of the 831st meeting : 1st Committee, held at Headquarters, New York, on Monday, 4 Febuary 1957, General Assembly, 11th session*. Date: 4 Febuary. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/861615?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 25 June 2026).

General Assembly (1957a) Meeting Records. *Summary record of the 923rd meeting : 1st Committee, held at Headquarters, New York, on Thursday, 5 December 1957, General Assembly, 12th session*, *United Nations*. Date: 5 December 1957. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/860290?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 3August 2026).

General Assembly (1957b) Meeting Records. *Summary record of the 835th meeting : 1st Committee, held at Headquarters, New York, on Wednesday, 6 Febuary 1957, General Assembly, 11th session*. Date: 6 Febuary. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/861666?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 26 June 2026).

General Assembly (1957c) Meeting Records. *United Nations Digital Library System*, *Summary record of the 843rd meeting : 1st Committee, held at Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, 12 Febuary 1957, General Assembly, 11th session*. Date: 12 Febuary. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/861669?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 26 June 2026).

General Assembly (1957d) Meeting Records. *Summary record of the 838th meeting : 1st Committee, held at Headquarters, New York, on Friday, 8 Febuary 1957, General Assembly, 11th session*, *United Nations*. Date: 8 Febuary 1957. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/861645?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 27 June 2026).

General Assembly (1957e) Meeting Records. *Summary record of the 832nd meeting : 1st Committee, held at Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, 5 Febuary 1957, General Assembly, 9th session*. Date: 5 Febuary. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/861635?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 27 June 2026).

General Assembly (1957f) Meeting Records. *Summary record of the 840th meeting : 1st Committee, held at Headquarters, New York, on Saturday, 9 Febuary 1957, General Assembly, 11th session*. Date: 9 Febuary 1957. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/861655?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 28 June 2026).

General Assembly (1957g) Meeting Records. *Summary record of the 846th meeting : 1st Committee, held at Headquarters, New York, on Wednesday, 13 Febuary 1957, General Assembly, 11th session*, *United Nations*. Date: 28 June 2026. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/861684?ln=zh_CN (Accessed: 28 June 2026).

General Assembly (1957h) Meeting Records. *Summary record of the 913th meeting : 1st Committee, held at Headquarters, New York, on Wednesday, 27 November 1957, General Assembly, 12th session*, *United Nations*. Date: 27 November 1957. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/860306?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 28 June 2026).

General Assembly (1957i) Meeting Records. *Summary record of the 915th meeting : 1st Committee, held at Headquarters, New York, on Saturday, 30 November 1957, General Assembly, 12th session*, *United Nations*. Date:30 November 1957. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/860313?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 28 June 2026).

General Assembly (1957j) Meeting Records. *Summary record of the 916th meeting : 1st Committee, held at Headquarters, New York, on Monday, 2 December 1957, General Assembly, 12th session*, *United Nations*. Date: 2 December 1957. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/860262?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 21 June 2026).

General Assembly (1957k) Meeting Records. *Summary record of the 919th meeting : 1st Committee, held at Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, 3 December 1957, General Assembly, 12th session*. Date: 3 December 1957. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/860308?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 28 June 2026).

General Assembly (1957l) Meeting Records. *Summary record of the 914th meeting : 1st Committee, held at Headquarters, New York, on Friday, 29 November 1957, General Assembly, 12th session*, *United Nations*. Date: 29 November 1957. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/860268?ln=zh_CN (Accessed: 28 June 2026).

General Assembly (1957m) Meeting Records. *Summary record of the 917th meeting : 1st Committee, held at Headquarters, New York, on Monday, 2 December 1957, General Assembly, 12th session*, *United Nations*. Date: 2 December. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/860344?ln=zh_CN (Accessed: 27 June 2026).

General Assembly (1957n) Meeting Records. *Summary record of the 922nd meeting : 1st Committee, held at Headquarters, New York, on Wednesday, 4 December 1957, General Assembly, 12th session*, *United Nations*. Date: 4 december 1957. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/860339?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 21 July 2026).

General Assembly (1957o) Meeting Records. *Summary record of the 925th meeting : 1st Committee, held at Headquarters, New York, on Friday, 6 December 1957, General Assembly, 12th session*, *United Nations*. Date: 6 December 1957. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/860325?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 28 June 2026).

General Assembly (1957r) Meeting Records. *Summary record of the 926th meeting : 1st Committee, held at Headquarters, New York, on Friday, 6 December 1957, General Assembly, 12th session*, *United Nations*. Date: 6 December 1957. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/860314?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 28 June 2026).

General Assembly (1959) Meeting Records. *General Assembly, 14th session : 855th plenary meeting, Saturday, 12 December 1959, New York*, *United Nations*. Date: 12 December. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/738709?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 12 November 2025).

General Assembly (1959) Reports. *Information from non-self-governing territories : report of the 4th Committee*, *United Nations*. Date: 9 December 1959. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/828918?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 30 September 2026).

General Assembly (1961) Meeting Records. *General Assembly, 15th session : 966th plenary meeting, Thursday, 23 March 1961, New York*, *United Nations*. Date: 23 March 1961. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/748024?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 01 August 2026).

General Assembly (1961) Meeting Records. *General Assembly, 16th session, 4th Committee : 1196th meeting, Friday, 3 November 1961, New York*, *United Nations*.

Date: 3 November 1961. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/810191?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 03 March 2026).

General Assembly (1961) Other Documents and Publications. *Request for the inclusion of an additional item in the agenda of the 15th regular session : Situation in Angola /*, *United Nations*. Date: 20 Mar 1961. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/841261?ln=en&v=pdf (Accessed: 10 February 2026).

General Assembly (1961) Resolutions and Decisions. *Transmission of information under Article 73E of the Charter.*, *United Nations*. Date: 15 December 1960. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/205905?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 14 November 2025).

General Assembly (1961a) Meeting Records. *General Assembly, 15th session : 991st plenary meeting, Thursday, 20 April 1961, New York*, *United Nations*. Date: 20 April 1961. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/748082?ln=en (Accessed: 3 August 2026).

General Assembly (1961a) Meeting Records. *General Assembly, 16th session, 4th Committee : 1200th meeting, Tuesday, 7 November 1961, New York*, *United Nations*. Date: 7 November 1961. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/810722?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 02 March 2026).

General Assembly (1961a) Reports. *Adoption of the agenda of the 15th regular session, allocation of items and organization of the session : General Assembly : 4th report of the General Committee*, *United Nations*. Date: 22 March 1961. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/841089?ln=en&v=pdf (Accessed: 10 February 2026).

General Assembly (1961b) Meeting Records. *General Assembly, 15th session : 966th plenary meeting, Thursday, 23 March 1961, New York*, *United Nations*. Date: 23 March 1961. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/748024?ln=en&v=pdf (Accessed: 10 March 2026).

General Assembly (1961b) Meeting Records. *General Assembly, 15th session : 965th plenary meeting, Tuesday, 21 March 1961, New York*, *United Nations*. Date: 21 March 1961Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/748019?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 3 August 2026).

General Assembly (1961b) Other Documents and Publicantions. *Non-compliance of the Government of Portugal with chap. XI of the Charter of the United Nations, and Resolution 1542 (XV) of the General Assembly. agenda item 79 (xvi). report of the 4th committee*, *United Nations*. Date: 1 December 1961. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/841264?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 03 March 2026).

General Assembly (1961c) Meeting Records. *General Assembly, 16th session, 4th Committee : 1202nd meeting, Wednesday, 8 November 1961, New York*, *United Nations*. Date: 8 November 1961. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/810715?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 3 August 2026).

General Assembly (1961c) Resolutions and Decisions.*Non-compliance of the government of Portugal with Chapter XI of the charter of the United Nations and with General Assembly resolution 1542 (XV).*, *United Nations*. Date: 19 Dec 1961. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/204797?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 05 March 2026).

General Assembly (1962) Meeting Records. *General Assembly, 16th session : 1088th plenary meeting, Monday, 15 January 1962, New York*, *United Nations*.Date:15 January 1962. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/744640?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 05 March 2026).

General Assembly (1962) Meeting Records. *General Assembly, 17th session : 1188th plenary meeting, Friday, 7 December 1962, New York*, *United Nations*. Date: 7 December 1962. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/733350?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 3 August 2026).

General Assembly (1962a) Meeting Records.*General Assembly, 16th session : 1088th plenary meeting, Monday, 15 January 1962, New York*, *United Nations*. Date: 15 January. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/744640?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 05 March 2026).

General Assembly (1962b) Meeting Records. *General Assembly, 16th session : 1094th plenary meeting, Tuesday, 23 January 1962, New York*, *United Nations*.Date:23 January 1962. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/744647?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 10 March 2026).

General Assembly (1962c) Meeting Records. *General Assembly, 16th session : 1102nd plenary meeting, Tuesday, 30 January 1962, New York*, *United Nations*.Date:30

January 1962. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/744658?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 11 March 2026).

General Assembly (1962d) Resolutions and Decisions. *The situation in Angola.*, *United Nations*. 30 January 1962. Date: Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/205655?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 07 May 2026).

General Assembly (1962e) Meeting Records. *General Assembly, 17th session, 4th Committee : 1382nd meeting, Tuesday, 13 November 1962, New York*, *United Natios*. Date:13 November 1962. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/810580?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 22 March 2026).

General Assembly (1962f) Meeting Records. *General Assembly, 17th session, 4th Committee : 1383rd Meeting, Wednesday, 14 November 1962, New York*, *United Nations*. Date:14 November 1962. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/810320?ln=zh_CN (Accessed: 22 March 2026).

General Assembly (1962g) Meeting Records. *General Assembly, 17th session, 4th Committee : 1398th meeting, Tuesday, 27 November 1962, New York*, *United Nations*. Date:27 November 1962. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/810678?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 26 March 2026).

General Assembly (1962h) Meeting Records. *General Assembly, 17th session, 4th Committee : 1400th meeting, Wednesday, 28 November 1962, New York*, *United Nations*. Date: 28 November 1962. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/810255?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 14 March 2026).

General Assembly (1962i) Meeting Records. *General Assembly, 17th session, 4th Committee : 1408th meeting, Tuesday, 4 December 1962, New York*, *United Nations*.Date: 4 December 1962. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/810461?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 31 May 2026).

General Assembly (1962I) Meeting Records. *General Assembly, 17th session, 4th Committee : 1417th Meeting, Tuesday, 11 December 1962, New York*, *United Nations*. Date: 11 December 1962. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/810625?ln=zh_CN (Accessed: 07 April 2026).

General Assembly (1962II) Meeting Records. *General Assembly, 17th session, 4th Committee : 1419th Meeting, Wednesday, 12 December 1962, New York*, *United*

Nations. Date: 12 December 1962. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/810953?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 07 April 2026).

General Assembly (1962III) Meeting Records. *General Assembly, 16th session : 1089th plenary meeting, Tuesday, 16 January 1962, New York*, *United Nations*. Date: 16 January 1962. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/ (Accessed: 18 September 2026).

General Assembly (1962j) Meeting Records. *General Assembly, 17th session, 4th Committee : 1393rd meeting, Wednesday, 21 November 1962, New York*, *United Nations*. Date: 21 November 1962. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/810917?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 01 April 2026).

General Assembly (1962k) Meeting Records. *General Assembly, 17th session, 4th Committee : 1399th meeting, Tuesday, 27 November 1962, New York*, *United Nations*. Date: 27 November 1962. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/811003?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 02 April 2026).

General Assembly (1962l) Meeting Records. *United Nations Digital Library System*, *General Assembly, 17th session, 4th Committee : 1401st meeting, Wednesday, 28 November 1962, New York*. Date: 28 Novembro 1962. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/810251?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 03 April 2026).

General Assembly (1962m) *General Assembly, 17th session : 1170th plenary meeting, Tuesday, 20 November 1962, New York*, *United Nations*. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/733049?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 02 April 2026).

General Assembly (1962n) Meeting Records. *General Assembly, 17th session : 1183rd plenary meeting, Wednesday, 5 December 1962, New York*, *United Nations*. Date: 5 December 1962. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/733342?ln=zh_CN (Accessed: 04 April 2026).

General Assembly (1962o) Meeting Records. *General Assembly, 17th session : 1185th plenary meeting, Thursday, 6 December 1962, New York*, *United Nations*. Date: 6 December 1962. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/733345?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 04 April 2026).

General Assembly (1962p) Meeting Records. *General Assembly, 17th session : 1186th plenary meeting, Friday, 7 December 1962, New York*, *United Nations*. Date: 7

December 1962. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/733345?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 04 April 2026).

General Assembly (1962q) Meeting Records. *General Assembly, 17th session : 1187th plenary meeting, Thursday, 7 December 1962, New York*, *United Nations*. Date: 7 Friday 1962. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/733347?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 04 April 2026).

General Assembly (1962r) Meeting Records. *General Assembly, 17th session : 1188th plenary meeting, Friday, 7 December 1962, New York*, *United Nations*. Date: 7 December 1962. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/733350?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 04 April 2026).

General Assembly (1962s) Meeting Records. *General Assembly, 17th session, 4th Committee : 1408th meeting, Tuesday, 4 December 1962, New York*, *United Nations*. Date:4 December 1962. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/810461?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 05 April 2026).

General Assembly (1962t) Meeting Records. *General Assembly, 17th session, 4th Committee : 1392nd meeting, Tuesday, 20 November 1962, New York*, *United Nations*. Date: 20 November 1962. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/810562?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 05 April 2026).

General Assembly (1962u) Meeting Records. *General Assembly, 17th session, 4th Committee : 1393rd meeting, Tuesday, 21 November 1962, New York*, *United Nations*. Date: 22 November 1962. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/810917?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 05 April 2026).

General Assembly (1962v) Meeting Records. *General Assembly, 17th session, 4th Committee : 1402nd meeting, Tuesday, 29 November 1962, New York*, *United Nations*. Date: 29 November 1962. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/810632?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 05 April 2026).

General Assembly (1962w) Meeting Records. *General Assembly, 17th session, 4th Committee : 1405th meeting, Tuesday, 30 November 1962, New York*, *United Nations*. Date: 30 November 1962. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/810963?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 05 April 2026).

General Assembly (1962x) Resolutions and Decisions. *The situation in Angola.*, *United Nations*. Date: 18 December 1962. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/204510?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 07 April 2026).

General Assembly (1962y) Meeting Records. *General Assembly, 17th session : 1196th plenary meeting, Tuesday, 18 December 1962, New York*, *United Nations*. Date: 18 December 1962. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/733363?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 07 April 2026).

General Assembly (1962z) Meeting Records. *General Assembly, 17th session, 4th Committee : 1418th Meeting, Tuesday, 11 December 1962, New York*, *United Nations*. Date: 11 December 1962. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/810788?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 07 April 2026).

General Commitee (1955) Reports. *Adoption of the agenda of the 10th regular session and allocation of items to committees and Organization of the Session : General Assembly :*, *United Nations*. Date: 22 September 1955. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/835986?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 26 November 2025).

Georges-Picot, G. (1957) Telegram, from Georges-Picot to Pineau, 3 January 1957, Fixation de l'ordre du jour de la première Commission: sans l'accord des Russes et des Américains sur la priorité à donner au désarmement, il eût été très difficile d'éviter que cette priorité ne fût accordée à l'Algérie, *Documents diplomatiques français, 1957, Tome I (1er janvier–30 juin)*. Paris: Imprimerie nationale, no. 14, pp. 27–28. Available at: https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bd6t5327061f?rk=214593;2 (Accessed: 20 July 2026).

Gillissen, C. (2008) 'Ireland, France and the question of Algeria at the United Nations, 1955-62', *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, 19(1), pp. 151–167. doi:10.1353/isia.2008.0018.

Gillissen, C. (2008) 'Ireland, France and the question of Algeria at the United Nations, 1955-62', *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, 19(1), pp. 151–167. doi:10.1353/isia.2008.0018.

Girardet, R. (1972) *L'idée Coloniale en france de 1871 à 1962*. Paris: La Table Ronde.

Government of France (1834) *Ordonnance royale du 22 juillet 1834*, *Gallica*. Available at: https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bd6t5396708m/f152.item (Accessed: 30 September 2026).

Government of France (1848) *Constitution de 1848, IIE République*, *Conseil constitutionnel*. Available at: https://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/les-constitutions-dans-l-histoire/constitution-de-1848-iie-republique (Accessed: 30 September 2026).

Government of France (1881a) Loi du 16 juin 1881 Etablissant La Gratuite Absolue de L'ENSEIGNEMENT primaire dans les ecoles publiques. Loi dite 'Jules Ferry' et 'Bert Paul' - Légifrance, Légifrance. Available at: https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jorf/id/JORFTEXT000000877118/ (Accessed: 30 September 2026).

Government of France (1881b) *Loi Du 28 Mars 1882 sur l'enseignement primaire obligatoire*, *Légifrance*. Available at: https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jorf/id/JORFTEXT000000309710 (Accessed: 30 September 2026).

Government of France (1889) *Loi Du 26 juin 1889 sur la nationalité* , *Légifrance*. Available at: https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jorf/id/JORFTEXT000000314389 (Accessed: 30 September 2026).

Government of Portugal (1933) *Acto Colonial*, *Assembleia da República*. Available at: https://www.parlamento.pt/parlamento/documents/acto_colonial.pdf (Accessed: 25 March 2025).

Government of Portugal (1951) *Lei n.o 2048, de 11 de junho*, *Diariodarepublica.pt*. Available at: https://diariodarepublica.pt/dr/detalhe/lei/2048-1951-153753 (Accessed: 30 September 2026).

Government of Portugal (1951) *decreto-lei 2048/51*, *Assembleia da República*. Available at: https://www.parlamento.pt/Parlamento/Documents/Lei2048.pdf (Accessed: 25 March 2025).

Grain (1961) Letters and Notes Verbales. *Letter dated 7 March 1961 from the Permanent Representative of Portugal to the president of the Security Council*, *United Nations*. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/630918?ln=en (Accessed: 03 February 2026).

Guimarães, F.A. (2001) *The origins of the Angolan Civil War: Foreign Intervention and domestic political conflict*. Basingstoke, Hampshire: PALGRAVE.

Haas, E.B. (1953) 'The attempt to terminate colonialism: Acceptance of the United Nations Trusteeship System', *International Organization*, 7(1), pp. 1–21. doi:10.1017/s0020818300021536.

Hammarskjöld, D. (1957) Report. *Annual report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization, 16 June 1956 - 15 June 1957*, *United Nations*. Date: 25 June 1957. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/712434?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 28 June 2026).

Hauck, H. (1957) Dispatch, from Hauck to Albert Gazier, 19 July 1957, Entretiens entre le conseiller du travail auprès de l'ambassadeur de France et des leaders syndicalistes à la veille du Congrès des Trade Unions. Le diplomate français a trouvé ses interlocuteurs favorables aux préoccupations françaises à propos des futurs débats aux Nations Unies sur l'Algérie, *Documents diplomatiques français, 1957, Tome II (1er juillet–31 décembre)*. Paris: Imprimerie nationale, no. 54, pp. 102–104. Available at: https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bd6t5327062t/f3 (Accessed: 20 July 2026).

Hoover, H.Jr (1956) Telegram. *78. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France*, *Office of the Historian*. Date: 27 November 1956. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v18 (Accessed: 20 June 2026).

International Organization, (1963) 'General Assembly', *International Organization*, 17(1), pp. 97–225. doi:10.1017/s002081830002508x.

Jacobson, H.K. (1962) 'The United Nations and colonialism: A tentative appraisal', *International Organization*, 16(1), pp. 37–56. doi:10.1017/s0020818300010808.

Jensen, S.L.B. (2016) *The making of international human rights: The 1960s, decolonization, and the reconstruction of global values*. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

JHA,C.S.(1961) Other Documents and Publications. *Supplementary list of agenda items for the 16th Regular Session of the General Assembly: Item proposed by India. non-compliance of the Government of Portugal with chap. XI of the Charter, and Resolution 1542 (XV) of the General Assembly. letter dated 9 Aug 1961 from the*

Permanent Representative of India to the UN, addressed to the Secretary-General, *United Nations*. Date: 11 August 1961. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/841227?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 02 March 2026).

La Tournelle, G.L. (1957) Telegram, from de La Tournelle to Pineau, 24 July 1957, Regroupement des forces espagnoles dans le Maroc septentrional. Une certaine coordination des initiatives françaises et espagnoles serait souhaitable, *Documents diplomatiques français, 1957, Tome II (1er juillet–31 décembre)*. Paris: Imprimerie nationale, no. 61, pp. 131–132. Available at: https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bd6t5327062t/f3 (Accessed: 20 July 2026).

Lacoste, R. (1957) Telegram, from Robert Lacoste to Bourgès-Maunoury, 24 July 1957, Le ministre de l'Algérie reste convaincu que la rébellion n'espère plus que de l'O.N.U. un résultat positif, ayant perdu l'espoir d'une solution militaire et prenant conscience de la résolution du gouvernement français de ne rien abandonner, *Documents diplomatiques français, 1957, Tome II (1er juillet–31 décembre)*. Paris: Imprimerie nationale, no. 60, pp. 130–131. Available at: https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bd6t5327062t/f3 (Accessed: 21 July 2026).

Ladjal, T. and Bensaid, B. (2012) 'The French colonial occupation and the Algerian national identity: Alienation or assimilation?', *International Journal of Arab Culture, Management and Sustainable Development*, 2(2/3), p. 142. doi:10.1504/ijacmsd.2012.049124.

Le Ministère des Affaires étrangères (1957) Telegram, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Georges-Picot, 9 August 1957, Action de la France auprès des pays de l'Amérique latine et d'autres régions en vue des prochains débats aux Nations Unies, *Documents diplomatiques français, 1957, Tome II (1er juillet–31 décembre)*. Paris: Imprimerie nationale, no. 98, pp. 196–197. Available at: https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bd6t5327062t/f3 (Accessed: 20 July 2026).

Le Sueur, J.D. (2001) 'Chapter 10: Torture and the decolonization of French Algeria: nationalism, "race" and violence during colonial incarceration', in *Colonial and Postcolonial Incarceration*. New York, America: Continuum, pp. 161–175.

Lewis, M.D. (1962) 'One hundred million Frenchmen: The "assimilation" theory in French colonial policy', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 4(2), pp. 129–153. doi:10.1017/s0010417500001304.

Liberia, Ceylon and United Arab Republic (1961) Draft Resolutions and Decisions. *Joint draft resolution / Ceylon, Liberia and United Arab Republic*, *United Nations*.

Date: 14 March 1961. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/541526?ln=en&v=pdf (Accessed: 04 February 2026).

Liberia (1961) Letters and Notes Verbales. *Letter dated 20 February 1961 from the representative of Liberia addressed to the president of the Security Council*, *United Nations*. Date: 20 February 1961. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/630761?ln=en&v=pdf (Accessed: 03 February 2026).

Lodge, H.C. (1955)Letter. *63. Letter From the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Ambassador in France (Dillon)*.Date: 6 October 1955. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v18/d63 (Accessed: 07 June 2026).

Lodge, H.C. (1956) Telegram *64. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State*, *Office of the Historian*. Date： 1 November 1956. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v18/sources (Accessed: 20 June 2026).

Lopes, R.M.P.V. (2011) *Between Cold War and Colonial Wars: The making of West German policy towards the Portuguese dictatorship, 1968-1974*, *Between Cold War and colonial wars: the making of West German policy towards the Portuguese dictatorship, 1968-1974*. dissertation. London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London).

Lorcin, P.M.E. (1999) *Imperialism, colonial identity, and race in Algeria, 1830-1870: The role of the French Medical Corps*.

Lustick, I.S. (2002) 'Chapter 10: Self-Determination and State Contraction: Britain and Ireland, France and Algeria, Israel and the West Bank/Gaza', in *The self-determination of peoples : community, nation, and state in an interdependent world*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 201–226.

Luís Nuno Rodrigues (2013) 'The United States and Portuguese decolonization', *Portuguese Studies*, 29(2), p. 164. doi:10.5699/portstudies.29.2.0164.

Ma, S. L. (2016) 法国的民族国家和民族观念论析. Available at: https://www.pishu.com.cn/skwx_ps/initDatabaseDetail?contentId=8300537&siteId=14&contentType=literature (Accessed: 5 August 2026).

Macedo, H.V. de *et al.* (1962) Meeting Records. *260. DIÁRIO DAS SESSÕES N.o 10*, *Debates Parlamentares* . Date: 04 January 1962. Available at: https://debates.parlamento.pt/catalogo/r2/dan/01/08/01/010/1962-01-04/260 (Accessed: 15 September 2026).

MacQueen, N. (1997) *The decolonization of Portuguese africa: Metropolitan revolution and the dissolution of empire*. London, United Kingdom: Longman.

Marcos, D. (2014) 'Between the Atlantic and the empire: NATO as a framework for Portuguese–American relations in early Cold War (1949–1957)', *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, 12(3), pp. 324–341. doi:10.1080/14794012.2014.928068.

Marcos, D. (2014) 'Between the Atlantic and the empire: NATO as a framework for Portuguese–American relations in early Cold War (1949–1957)', *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, 12(3), pp. 324–341. doi:10.1080/14794012.2014.928068.

Marcos, D. da S.C. (2007) *Salazar e de Gaulle: A França e a questão colonial portuguesa, 1958-1968*. Lisbon: Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros.

Massigli, R. (1955) Note by the Secretary-General of the Ministry, 31 May 1955, Réponse américaine au sujet de ces mesures, *Documents diplomatiques français, 1955, Tome I (1er janvier–30 juin)*. Paris: Imprimerie nationale, no. 307, pp. 702–703. Available at: https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bd6t53270123/f3.item.texteImage (Accessed: 15 June 2026).

McDougall, J. (2017) *A history of Algeria*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Mendes, P.E. (2020) 'Percepções e imagens na Política Externa do Estado Novo português: A importância do triângulo identitário', *Dados*, 63(3). doi:10.1590/dados.2020.63.3.214.

Mendes, P.E. (2020) 'Percepções e imagens na Política Externa do Estado Novo português: A importância do triângulo identitário', *Dados*, 63(3). doi:10.1590/dados.2020.63.3.214.

Mendonça, A.G. (2021) ‘A Ideologia Imperial Portuguesa: Dominação e mentalidade para a áfrica (1910-1945)’, *Revista Mosaico - Revista de História*, 14(1), p. 174. doi:10.18224/mos.v14i1.8086.

Mendès-France (1955) Dispatch, from Mendès France to Mitterrand, signed by

Ministério do Ultramar (1954) *Decreto-Lei n.o 39666, de 20 de maio*, *Diariodarepublica.pt*. Available at: https://diariodarepublica.pt/dr/detalhe/decreto-lei/39666-1954-635399 (Accessed: 15 April 2026).

Ministério do Ultramar (1961) *Decreto-Lei n.o 43893, de 06 de setembro*, *Diariodarepublica.pt*. Available at: https://diariodarepublica.pt/dr/detalhe/decreto-lei/43893-1961-180992 (Accessed: 15 April 2026).

Motohara, T. and Kondoh, E. (2024) *“Reciprocal molecular dialogues between ovarian cancer stem cells and t heir microenvironmental niches”* . Academia Oncology. Academia.edu Journals, 1(2). doi: 1 0.20935/AcadOnco7406.

Naylor, P.C. (2002) ‘A reconsideration of the Fourth Republic’s legacy and Algerian decolonization’, *French Colonial History*, 2(1), pp. 159–180. doi:10.1353/fch.2011.0019.

Nogueira, F. (1962) Compound document.*Conversa do Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros, Alberto M. Franco Nogueira, com Dean Rusk, Secretário de Estado dos EUA*.Date: 14 May 1962. Available at: https://digitarq.arquivos.pt/documentDetails/0cdb940d5b8441f986e8378c6c92d57b (Accessed: 30 May 2026).

Nogueira, F. (1963) *The United Nations and Portugal: A study of anti-colonialism*. London, United kingdom: Sidgwick and Jackson Ltd.

Nogueira, F. [1987] *Um político confessa-se*. Porto: Livraria Editora Civilização.

Oliveira, P.A. (2013) ‘Live and let live: Britain and Portugal’s Imperial Endgame (1945–75)’, *Portuguese Studies*, 29(2), pp.186- 208. doi:10.5699/portstudies.29.2.0186.

P. I. D. E. (1960) sent to Salazar and Ministério do Interior e Negócios Estrangeiros. *Avaliação dos resultados da Assembleia Geral da ONU*, *Digitarq*. Date: 9 December 1960. Available at: https://digitarq.arquivos.pt/documentDetails/c3a16696b091465dad104812564b9146 (Accessed: 24 January 2026).

P. I. D. E (1962) Compound document. *Opiniões do Embaixador americano em Lisboa acerca da política dos EUA na ONU - Organização das Nações Unidas em relação a Portugal*. Date: 14 december 1961. Available at: https://digitarq.arquivos.pt/fileViewer/21a72bdafbe64c5a91edda94f53d4177?isRepresentation=false&selectedFile=12020749&fileType=IMAGE (Accessed: 08 March 2026).

Parodi, A. (1955) Telegram, from Parodi to Pinay, 6 July 1955, Conséquences militaires des mouvements de forces françaises vers l'Afrique du Nord, *Documents diplomatiques français, 1955, Tome II (1er juillet–31 décembre)*. Paris: Imprimerie nationale, no. 14, pp. 23–24. Available at: https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bd6t53270594/f3.item.texteImage (Accessed: 2 July 2026).

Parrott, R.J. (2016) *Struggle for solidarity: The new left, Portuguese African decolonization, and the end of the Cold War Consensus*, *Struggle for solidarity: the New Left, Portuguese African decolonization, and the end of the Cold War consensus*. dissertation on Doctor of Philosophy. University of Texas.

Pereira, B.F. (2022) *Orgulhosamente sós: A diplomacia em guerra (1962-1974)*. Alfragide, Portugal: D. Quixote.

Pereira, Pinto and Fragoso (1962) Compound document. *Estudo sobre política externa portuguesa*.Date:12 January 1962. Available at: https://digitarq.arquivos.pt/documentDetails/0b60131a17a54fcfa7451724afc25eb9 (Accessed: 04 March 2026).

Pickles, D. (1963) *Algeria and France: From colonialism to cooperation*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger.

PIMENTA, F.T. (2014) 'O Estado Novo Português e a reforma do Estado Colonial em angola: O Comportamento Político das elites Brancas (1961-1962)', *História (São Paulo)*, 33(2), pp. 250–272. doi:10.1590/1980-436920140002000012.

Pinay (1955) Telegram, from Pinay to de Guiringaud, 4 October 1955, Confirmation, à la suite de la décision prise par le Conseil des ministres, des nouvelles instructions données à la représentation permanente de la France aux Nations Unies, *Documents diplomatiques français, 1955, Tome II (1juillet–31 décembre)*. Paris: Imprimerie nationale, no. 270, pp. 608–609. Available at: https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bd6t53270594/f3.item.texteImage (Accessed: 2 June 2026).

Pinay (1955a) Telegram, from Pinay to Couve de Murville, 6 October 1955, Communication à l'ambassadeur de France aux États-Unis du message personnel adressé par le secrétaire d'État au ministre français des Affaires étrangères, à la suite de l'attitude américaine sur l'Algérie au cours des débats des Nations Unies, *Documents diplomatiques français, 1955, Tome II (1juillet–31 décembre)*. Paris: Imprimerie nationale, no. 277, pp. 621–623. Available at: https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bd6t53270594/f3.item.texteImage (Accessed: 2 June 2026).

Pinay (1955b) Telegram, from Pinay to the diplomatic representatives of France in New York, London, Washington and Buenos Aires, 8 October 1955, Suggestions de certains gouvernements pour permettre à l'Assemblée de revenir sur la décision prise dans l'affaire algérienne, *Documents diplomatiques français, 1955, Tome II (1juillet–31 décembre)*. Paris: Imprimerie nationale, no. 286, pp. 638–639. Available at: https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bd6t53270594/f3.item.texteImage (Accessed: 2 June 2026).

Pinay, A. (1955) Telegram, from Pinay to Couve de Murville, 26 May 1955, Notification à l'ambassadeur des États-Unis des mesures militaires prises pour faire face à la situation en Algérie, *Documents diplomatiques français, 1955, Tome I (1er janvier–30 juin)*. Paris: Imprimerie nationale, no. 300, pp. 690–691. Available at: https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bd6t53270123/f3.item.texteImage (Accessed: 15 June 2026).

Pineau, C. (1956) Circular telegram, from Pineau to the diplomatic representatives of France abroad, 29 December 1956, Les représentants diplomatiques de la France à l'étranger sont invités à reprendre auprès du gouvernement du pays de leur résidence l'exposé de la thèse française sur le problème algérien, en vue de la prochaine assemblée générale des Nations Unies, *Documents diplomatiques français, 1956, Tome III (24 octobre–31 décembre)*. Paris: Imprimerie nationale, no. 329, pp. 608–610. Available at: https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bd6t53270683/f3 (Accessed: 20 July 2026).

Pineau, C. (1956) Telegram, from Pineau to Alphand, 13 June 1956, L'affaire algérienne n'est pas un différend entre États, mais une situation existant à l'intérieur de l'État

français. Les conditions d'un recours au Conseil de sécurité ne sont pas réunies, *Documents diplomatiques français, 1956, Tome I (1er janvier–30 juin)*. Paris: Imprimerie nationale, no. 399, pp. 981–983. Available at: https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bd6t5327013g/f3 (Accessed: 15 June 2026).

Pineau, C. (1956a) Circular telegram, from Pineau to the diplomatic representatives of France in Latin America, 13 November 1956, Le gouvernement français ne s'opposera pas à l'inscription de la question algérienne à l'ordre du jour de l'assemblée générale des Nations Unies. Il compte cependant sur l'appui des états d'Amérique latine pour que l'examen du point algérien soit retardé le plus possible, *Documents diplomatiques français, 1956, Tome III (24 octobre–31 décembre)*. Paris: Imprimerie nationale, no. 168, pp. 292–293. Available at: https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bd6t53270683/f3 (Accessed: 15 June 2026).

Pineau, C. (1957) Circular telegram, from Pineau to the diplomatic representatives of France abroad, 19 August 1957, Arguments que le gouvernement français compte faire valoir à l'appui de la thèse qu'il s'apprête à défendre devant les Nations Unies, *Documents diplomatiques français, 1957, Tome II (1er juillet–31 décembre)*. Paris: Imprimerie nationale, no. 120, pp. 239–251. Available at: https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bd6t5327062t/f3 (Accessed: 20 July 2026).

Pineau, C. (1957a) Circular telegram, from Pineau to the diplomatic representatives of France abroad, 20 July 1957, Demande d'inscription de la question algérienne à l'ordre du jour de la douzième session de l'assemblée générale des Nations Unies déposée par le groupe arabo-asiatique. Instructions du gouvernement français à ses représentants dans divers postes à l'étranger, *Documents diplomatiques français, 1957, Tome II (1er juillet–31 décembre)*. Paris: Imprimerie nationale, no. 55, pp. 104–105. Available at: https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bd6t5327062t/f3 (Accessed: 20 July 2026)

Pinto, A.C. and Barreto, A. (2005) *Portugal Contemporâneo*. Lisboa, Portugal: Publicações Dom Quixote.

Porch, D. (1986) '14. Bugeaud, Gallieni, Lyautey: The development of French colonial warfare', *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, pp. 376–407. doi:10.1515/9781400835461-016.

Portugal (1956) Other Documents and Publications. *Information from Non-Self Governing Territories transmitted under Article 73e of the Charter*, *United*

Nations. Date: 20 Nove 1956. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/858230?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 30 September 2026).

Portugal (1961) Letters and Notes Verbales. Sent to the president of the Security Council, *Letter dated 3 June 1961 from the Permanent Representative of Portugal addressed to the president of the Security Council*, *United Nations*. Date: 3 June 1961. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/631253?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 29 February 2026).

Prochaska, D. (1990) 'Making Algeria French and unmaking French Algeria', *Twenty Years of the Journal of Historical Sociology*, pp. 297–320. doi:10.1002/9781444309720.ch13.

Quermonne, J.-L. (1957) 'Les Perspectives Institutionnelles de la décolonisation en Algérie', *Revue française de science politique*, 7(3), pp. 531–572. doi:10.3406/rfsp.1957.392428.

Reis,B.C. (2013) 'Portugal and the UN: A rogue state resisting the norm of Decolonization (1956–1974)', *Portuguese Studies*, 29(2), p. 251. doi:10.5699/portstudies.29.2.0251.

Renzo, M. (2019) 'Why colonialism is wrong', *Current Legal Problems* [Preprint]. doi:10.1093/clp/cuz011.

Rieker, P. (2018) *French foreign policy in a Changing World: Practising Grandeur*. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

Rocha, J. (2017) 'Race and society in Portugal: two notes and a remark', *Journal of Anthropological Sciences*, 95(2017), pp. 339–343. doi:doi 10.4436/JASS.95014.

Rowe, E.T. (1964) 'The emerging anti-colonial consensus in the United Nations', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 8(3), pp. 209–230. doi:10.1177/002200276400800301.

Rudrigues, L.N. (2014) 'OS ESTADOS UNIDOS E A DESCOLONIZAÇÃO PORTUGUESA', in *Portugal e o fim do colonialismo: dimensõesinternacionais*. Lisboa, Portugal: Edições 70, pp. 84–126.

Rusk, D (1962c) Telegram. *362. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations*, *U.S. Department of State*. Date:8 December 1962. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v21/d362 (Accessed: 11 April 2026).

Rusk, D. (1962) Memorandum. *340. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy*, *U.S. Department of State*. Date:23 May 1962. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v13/d340 (Accessed: 21 March 2026).

Rusk, D. (1962a) Memorandum. *347. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal*, *U.S. Department of State*. Date: 15 September 1962. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v13/d347 (Accessed: 16 March 2026).

Rusk, D. (1962b) Memoradum. 342.*Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy*, *U.S. Department of State*. Date: 12 June 1962. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v13/d342 (Accessed: 09 April 2026).

S.H.O., I. (1962) Other Documents and Publicantions. *United Nations Digital Library System*, *Non-compliance of the Government of Portugal with Chap. XI of the Charter of the UN and with General Assembly resolution 1542 (XV): report of the Special Committee on Territories under Portuguese Administration. Report of the 4th Committee.* Date: 13 December 1962. Available at: digitallibrary.un.org/record/846582?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 08 April 2026).

Saeed, S. (2021) 'Decolonization struggles at the United Nations: The question of Algeria, 1955-1961', *European Journal of Sociology*, 62(3), pp. 421–455. doi:10.1017/s000397562100028x.

Salamanca,C.(1962) Report.Sent to the President of the General Assembly. *Report of the sub-committee on the situation in Angola*, *United Nations*. Date:20 November 1961. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/716632?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 01 March 2026).

Salazar, O. [2015] *Discursos e Notas Politicas* . Coimbra: Coimbra Editora.

Santos, A. (2011) The Decolonization Committee of the United Nations Organization and the Struggle against the Portuguese Colonialism in Africa: 1961-1974. in C Quist-Adade & F Chiang (eds), From *Colonization to Globalization: the intellectual and political legacies of Kwame Nkrumah and Africa's future.* Daysprings Publishing, Canadá, pp. 199-209.

Santos, A.A.V. e Almada (2014) PhD Thesis. *A Organização das Nações Unidas e a Questão Colonial Portuguesa: 1961-1970*. Lisboa: Faculdade de Ciências Sociais e Humanas, Universidade Nova de Lisboa.

Saudi Arabaia (1955) Letters and Notes Verbales, *Letter dated 5 January 1955 from the representative of Saudi Arabia addressed to the president of the Security Council*, *United Nations*. Date: 5 January 1955. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/570419?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 01 August 2026).

Secrétariat des Conférence (1955) Note, 1 October 1955, Le Secrétariat

des Conférences du Quai d'Orsay estime souhaitable, à la suite du vote à l'O.N.U. sur l'Algérie : 1° le rappel immédiat de la délégation française à l'Assemblée; 2° le maintien de la délégation permanente au Conseil de sécurité; 3° le maintien de M. Jules Moch au sous-Comité du désarmement, *Documents diplomatiques français, 1955, Tome II (1juillet–31 décembre)*. Paris: Imprimerie nationale, no. 261, pp. 590–593. Available at: https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bd6t53270594/f3.item.texteImage (Accessed: 2 June 2026).

Secrétariat des Conférences (1957) Note, 22 January 1957, La question algérienne, *Documents diplomatiques français, 1957, Tome I (1er janvier–30 juin)*. Paris: Imprimerie nationale, no. 69, pp. 140–141. Available at: https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bd6t5327061f?rk=214593;2 (Accessed: 20 July 2026).

Secrétariat des Conférences (1957) Note, 22 January 1957, La question algérienne, *Documents diplomatiques français, 1957, Tome I (1er janvier– 30 juin)*. Paris: Imprimerie nationale, no. 69, pp. 140–141. Available at: https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bd6t5327061f?rk=214593;2 (Accessed: 20 July 2026).

Security Council (1946) *Provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council / adopted by the Security Council at its 1st meeting and amended at its 48th meeting, 24 June 1946*, *United Nations*. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/469249?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 11 February 2026).

Security Council (1955) Letters and Notes Verbales. *Letter dated 5 January 1955 from the representative of Saudi Arabia addressed to the president of the Security Council*, *United Nations*. Date: 5 January 1955. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/570419?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 26 October 2025).

Security Council (1956) Meeting records, *Security Council official records, 11th year : 729th meeting, 26 June 1956, New York*, *United Nations*. Date: 26 June 1956. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/633199?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 20 June 2026).

Security Council (1956) Meeting Records. *Security Council official records, 11th year : 730th meeting, 26 June 1956, New York*, *United Nations*. Date: 26 June 1956. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/633200?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 01 August 2026).

Security Council (1956a) Meeting records, *Security Council official records, 11th year : 730th meeting, 26 June 1956, New York*, *United Nations*. Date: 26 June 1956. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/61131/files/?ln=zh_CN (Accessed: 20 June 2026).

Security Council (1961) *Security Council official records, 16th year : 934th meeting, 15 February 1961, New York*, *United Nations*. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/631183?ln=en&v=pdf (Accessed: 03 February 2026).

Security Council (1961a) Meeting Record. *Security Council official records, 16th year : 954th meeting, 8 June 1961, New York*, *United Nations*. Date: 8 June 1961. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/631287?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 29 February 2026).

Security Council (1961b) Meeting Record. *Security Council official records, 16th year : 955th meeting, 9 June 1961, New York*, *United Nations*. Date: 9 June 1961. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/631289 (Accessed: 29 February 2026).

Security Council (1961c) Resolutions and Decisions. *Resolution adopted by the Security Council at its 956th meeting on 9 June 1961 [on the mandate of the Subcommittee on the situation in Angola]*, *United Nations*. Date: 9 June 1961.

Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/631321?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 30 February 2026).

Security Council (1961d) Meeting Records. *Security Council official records, 16th year : 988th meeting, 18 December 1961, New York*, *United Nations*. Date: 18 December 1961. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/631422?ln=es (Accessed: 18 September 2026).

Security Council (1961d) *Security Council official records, 16th year : 943rd meeting, 10 March 1961, New York*, *United Nations*. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/631275?ln=en&v=pdf (Accessed: 04 February 2026).

Security Council (1961e) *Security Council official records, 16th year : 943rd meeting, 10 March 1961, New York*, *United Nations*. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/631275?ln=en&v=pdf (Accessed: 04 February 2026).

Security Council (1961f) *Security Council official records, 16th year : 945th meeting, 14 March 1961, New York*, *United Nations*. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/631278?ln=en&v=pdf (Accessed: 05 February 2026).

Security Council (1961g) *Security Council official records, 16th year : 946th meeting, 15 March 1961, New York*, *United Nations*. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/631278?ln=en&v=pdf (Accessed: 05 February 2026).

Security Council (n.d.) *Voting System | Security Council*, *United Nations*. Available at: https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/content/voting-system (Accessed: 18 September 2026).

Service des Nations Unies au Département (1957) Note, 15 December 1957, Question algérienne à la douzième session de l'assemblée générale des Nations Unies, *Documents diplomatiques français, 1957, Tome II (1er juillet–31 décembre)*. Paris: Imprimerie nationale, no. 449, pp. 914–924. Available at: https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bd6t5327062t/f3 (Accessed: 21 July 2026).

Service des Nations Unies au Département (1957) Note, 15 December 1957, Question algérienne à la douzième session de l'assemblée générale des Nations Unies, Documents diplomatiques français, 1957, Tome II (1er juillet–31 décembre). Paris: Imprimerie nationale, no. 449, pp. 914–924. Available at: https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bd6t5327062t/f3 (Accessed: 21 July 2026).

Sessions, J.E. (2017) *By sword and Plow. France and the conquest of Algeria*. United States: Cornell University Press.

Silva, A.E.Duarte. (1995) O litígio entre Portugal e a ONU (1960-1974) . *Análise Social,* 30(130), pp. 5- 50. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/41011078 (Accessed: 25 January 2026).

Silveira, M.A.F. da (2019) *A Mão Estendida da América e a Rejeição de Salazar*, FSCH R&D Units. Document of Conference. Available at: https://run.unl.pt/handle/10362/93500 (Accessed: 01 March 2026).

Smith, T. (1974) 'The French colonial consensus and People's War, 1946-58', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 9(4), pp. 217–247. doi:10.1177/002200947400900410.

Smouts, M.C. (1955) 'France and the United Nations system', in *The United Nations system: The policies of member states*. Tokyo: United Nations University Press, pp. 186–230.

Stora, B. (2004) *Algeria, 1830-2000: A short history*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Tavares, J. (2024) '"Por Uma Política Externa de Independência Nacional" - uma perspetiva realista sobre a política externa Portuguesa Durante a era salazar (1933-1968)', *European Public & Social Innovation Review*, 9, pp. 1–15. doi:10.31637/epsir-2024-789.

Tavares, J. (2025) 'O que é o interesse nacional?: a visão realista de Franco Nogueira sobre o interesse nacional na política externa portuguesa', *Política Internacional e Segurança*, (31), pp. 44–61. doi:https://doi.org/10.34628/5ASK-K210.

Teixeira, N.S. (1955) 'Between the Atlantic and the empire: NATO as a framework for Portuguese–American relations in early Cold War (1949–1957)', *Análise Social*, 15(133), pp. 803–818.

Telepneva, N. (2014) *Our sacred duty: The Soviet Union, the liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies, and the Cold War, 1961-1975*. Dissertation on Doctor of Philosophy. London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London).

Thailand (1956) Letters and Notes Verbales, *Addendum to the letter dated 12 April 1956 from the Representatives of Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/3589)*, *United Nations*. Date: 16 April 1956. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/ (Accessed: 20 June 2026).

Thant,U. (1962) Report. *Annual report of the secretary-general on the work of the organization, 16 June 1961--15 June 1962*, *United Nations*. Date: 24 July 1962. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/716022?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 30 February 2026).

Thomas, M. (1995) 'The dilemmas of an ally of France: Britain's policy towards the Algerian Rebellion, 1954–62', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 23(1), pp. 129–154. doi:10.1080/03086539508582947.

Thomas, M. (2000) *The French North African Crisis: Colonial breakdown and Anglo-French relations, 1945-62*. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.

Thomas, M. (2001) 'France accused: French North Africa before the United Nations, 1952–1962', *Contemporary European History*, 10(1), pp. 91–121. doi:10.1017/s0960777301001059.

Thoral, M.-C. (no date) *French colonial counter-insurgency: General Bugeaud and the conquest of Algeria, 1840-47*, *British Journal for Military History*. Available at: https://journals.gold.ac.uk/index.php/bjmh//article/view/608 (Accessed: 25 February 2025).

United Nations (1945) U*nited Nations Charter (full text)*. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/810715?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 3 August 2026).

United Nations (1945) *United Nations charter (full text) | united nations*, *United Nations*. Available at: https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text (Accessed: 02 June 2026).

United Nations (1945) *United Nations charter (full text)*, *United Nations*. Available at: https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text (Accessed: 04 March 2026).

United Nations (1945) *United Nations charter (full text)*, *United Nations*. Available at: https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text (Accessed: 26 October 2025).

United Nations (1955) Other Documents and Publications. *Adoption of the agenda and allocation of items to committees : Memorandum by the secretary-general*, *United Nations*. Date: 14 September 1954. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3858847?+ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 26 October 2025).

United Nations (n. d.) *Decolonization*, *United Nations*. Available at: https://www.un.org/en/global-issues/decolonization (Accessed: 30 September 2026).

United Nations (n.d.) *The San Francisco Conference*, *United Nations*. Available at: https://www.un.org/en/about-us/history-of-the-un/san-francisco-conference (Accessed: 27 August 2026).

United Nations (n.d.) *UN charter*, *United Nations*. Available at: https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter (Accessed: 27 August 2026).

USSR (1961) Letters and Notes Verbales. Sent to president of the Security Council, *Letter dated 27 May 1961 from the Permanent Representative of the USSR to the president of the Security Council*, *United Nations*. Date: 27 May 1961. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/631239?ln=zh_CN&v=pdf (Accessed: 27 February 2026).

Vala, J., Lopes, D. and Lima, M. (2008) 'Black immigrants in Portugal: Luso–Tropicalism and prejudice', *Journal of Social Issues*, 64(2), pp. 287–302. doi:10.1111/j.1540-4560.2008.00562.x.

Vauthier (1957) Telegram, from Vauthier to Pineau, 3 September 1957, Le Dr Sid Cara expose les raisons que les populations d'Algérie ont de continuer à lier leur destin à celui de la France, *Documents diplomatiques français, 1957, Tome II (1er juillet–31 décembre)*. Paris: Imprimerie nationale, no. 149, pp. 318–319. Available at: https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bd6t5327062t/f3 (Accessed: 20 July 2026).

Venter, A.J. (2013) *Portugal's guerrilla wars in Africa: Lisbon's three wars in Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea (Conakry), 1961-74*. Solihull, England: Helion & Company.

Wheeler, D.L. and Pélissier, R. (2016) *História de angola Douglas Wheeler, René Pélissier*. Lisboa: Tinta-da-China.

Zack, L. (2002) ‘Who fought the Algerian War? political identity and conflict in French-ruled Algeria’, *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society*, 16(1), pp. 55–97. doi:10.1023/a:1016582411687.

Zhao, H. (2006) *Algéria*. Beijing, China: Social Sciences Academic Press.