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Assessing Startup Solutions in a Corporate Setting: Evidence from Open Innovation at Sogrape

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ASSESSING STARTUP SOLUTIONS IN A CORPORATE
SETTING: EVIDENCE FROM OPEN INNOVATION AT
SOGRAPE

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Abstract: This report examines how corporate-startup collaboration can be structured and adapted to the context of a wine-producing company, Sogrape. Based on an internship in the Innovation Department of this company, the report addresses a practical challenge faced by the company: how to identify, select, test and internally adopt startup solutions in a way that creates value beyond isolated pilot projects. In general, Sogrape is well-aligned with the literature explored, however, three solutions were identified to solve the main issues mentioned above (especially to improve the post-pilot adoption): bilateral annual meetings with the business units, a co-funded model for the pilots and a partnership with a corporate accelerator or even the creation of one inside doors at a later stage.

Key words: Open Innovation, Startup, Collaboration, Wine Sector

Resumo: Este relatório analisa como a colaboração entre empresas e startups pode ser estruturada e adaptada ao contexto de uma empresa produtora de vinho, a Sogrape. Com base num estágio no Departamento de Inovação desta empresa, o relatório aborda um desafio prático com que a empresa se depara: como identificar, selecionar, testar e adotar internamente soluções de startups de forma a criar valor para além de projetos-piloto isolados. De um modo geral, a Sogrape está bem alinhada com a literatura analisada, no entanto, foram identificadas três soluções para resolver as principais questões acima mencionadas (especialmente para melhorar a adoção após a fase de piloto): reuniões anuais bilaterais com as unidades de negócio, um modelo de cofinanciamento para os projetos-piloto e uma parceria com um acelerador empresarial ou até mesmo a criação de um dentro da própria empresa numa fase mais tardia.

Palavras-chave: Inovação aberta, Startup, Colaboração, Setor Vitivinícola

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1. Introduction

Innovation has become increasingly important for companies operating in traditional sectors, including the wine industry. Wine firms continue to rely on heritage, origin, quality and long-established practices, but they are also being pressured to respond to new environmental, technological and market challenges (European Commission, 2024). These are creating a context in which traditional ways of innovating may no longer be sufficient.

As a result, open innovation has become a relevant mechanism to answer to the challenges mentioned above, especially through collaboration with startups. They can offer specialised solutions and more agile approaches to problem-solving, representing an opportunity to test new ideas and accelerate transformation (Flores et al., 2025). However, incumbent-startup collaborations are not automatically successful: a startup may have an interesting solution, but this does not guarantee that the solution fits the company's strategic priorities or operational reality (Kurpjuweit et al., 2021).

This report was developed in the context of an internship in the Innovation Department of Sogrape, the leading wine company in Portugal (Sogrape, n.d.a). The department plays an important role in identifying innovation opportunities and connecting the company with startups. However, one of the main challenges observed in most cases is that the collaboration process has a very difficult stage that begins after the pilot, when the company must decide whether the solution should be adopted, scaled or stopped (an issue closely related to accountability and misaligned incentives) (Kurpjuweit & Wagner, 2020; Markham et al., 2005; Seran & Bez, 2021).

The purpose of this report is therefore to analyse how Sogrape can structure its collaboration with startups more effectively, from the first interaction with the startup to the post-pilot decision. To do so, the report is organised as follows. First, it presents the sector context, highlighting the specific challenges that make innovation relevant in the wine industry. Second, it reviews the literature on corporate-startup collaboration and identifies the key elements that influence the success of these partnerships. Third, it analyses the company's current approach to innovation and startup engagement and compares it to the main key points raised by the literature. Finally, it proposes guidelines to support a more structured collaboration process, with particular attention to pilot design, internal ownership and post-pilot implementation.

2. The Wine Sector

2.1. Main Challenges and Innovation Pressures

The vitivinicultural sector appears to be undergoing more than a temporary slowdown. It is facing a structural adjustment in which several of its traditional conditions are changing. For many decades, the sector relied on stable consumption patterns, predictable harvests, strong export demand and well-established product categories. However, these conditions have become less stable. Lower demand, climate variability, pressure on prices, changes in consumer preferences and stricter sustainability expectations are increasingly affecting the way the sector operates (European Commission, 2024).

In Europe, the importance of wine can not be assessed only through production volumes. The sector remains a major agri-food activity and is closely linked to exports, rural economies and regional identity. Between 2020 and 2025, the European Union produced an average of 157 million hectolitres of wine per year, confirming its position as the world's leading wine-producing region. Its global relevance is also clear because in 2023, the EU accounted for 44% of the world's vineyard area, more than 60% of global wine production and 48% of wine consumption. In addition, wine represented 7.3% of EU agri-food export value in 2024. These figures indicate that wine is an agricultural product, as well as an important sector for employment, rural development and cultural heritage (European Commission, n.d.).

Recent international data also show that the sector is facing a difficult adjustment period. According to the OIV (2026), the world's total vineyard area declined to 7.0 million hectares in 2025, corresponding to a decrease of 0.8%, and continuing the downward trend observed in previous years. Wine production remained low as well. Although global output increased slightly compared with 2024, reaching 227 million hectolitres, it was still 9.4% below the five-year average. This means that the partial recovery in production was not enough to reverse the broader decline affecting the sector.

Demand-side indicators point in the same direction. Global wine consumption fell to 208 million hectolitres in 2025, representing a 2.7% decline compared with the previous year. This decrease may partly reflect short-term economic pressure on consumers. Nevertheless, it also seems to be related to longer-term changes in consumption patterns, especially in mature wine markets. International trade followed a similar pattern, since export volumes

decreased to 94.8 million hectolitres, 4.7% below 2024, while export value fell to €33.8 billion, a decline of 6.7% (OIV, 2026).

All in all, these indicators suggest that the sector is being affected by several pressures at the same time, including less stable production conditions, climate-related risks, weaker consumption and a more uncertain trade environment. In this context, the current period may be understood as a structural transition in which the future performance of the sector will depend on its capacity to adjust to changing economic, environmental and social conditions (OIV, 2026).

2.1.1. Declining demand and changing consumption patterns

One of the main pressure points for the wine sector concerns the weakening of its traditional demand base. In the European Union, domestic wine consumption has fallen to its lowest level in three decades. Similar to what is observed at the global level, this suggests that the current decline cannot be interpreted only as a short-term cyclical slowdown. Instead, it appears to reflect a more structural change in consumer behaviour, particularly in mature markets where wine has historically held a stable position in consumption patterns (Šajn, 2025).

2.1.2. Structural oversupply and pressure on value creation

Another important sign of stagnation is the growing imbalance between the sector's production capacity and the level of demand currently observed in the market. In several regions, declining consumption, weaker export performance and uncertainty in international trade have created situations of excess supply, not necessarily because production is expanding (we have seen that it is not), but because demand is falling faster than the sector's productive capacity. This concern is reflected in Šajn's reference to a "structural surplus supply of wine" (Šajn, 2025, p.2), as well as in the EU Wine Market Observatory's observation that many producers perceive an imbalance between supply and demand in specific regions (European Commission, 2024). This imbalance places downward pressure on prices and makes it more difficult for producers to protect margins, especially when production costs remain high. The issue is therefore not only one of volume, but also of value: producing and selling wine may no longer be sufficient if companies are unable to

differentiate their offer and secure adequate returns in a more constrained market environment.

2.1.3. Climate instability and production uncertainty

The sector is also becoming increasingly exposed to climatic disruption. Recent harvests show that wine production is more vulnerable to extreme weather events, irregular rainfall, drought, heatwaves and disease pressure. The low level of global wine production in recent years illustrates how climate variability is making output less predictable. This uncertainty affects growers directly, as well as companies that depend on stable supply, consistent product quality and long-term planning (OIV, 2026).

2.1.4. Slow adaptation to new market expectations

The wine sector has traditionally created much of its value from heritage, origin, quality and established consumption habits. These elements remain important sources of differentiation, however, they may also slow adaptation when demand patterns begin to change. Current consumer preferences point more and more towards moderation, convenience, sustainability, authenticity and experiential forms of consumption, rather than relying only on traditional bottle-based formats (European Commission, 2024).

2.1.5. Sustainability pressure and underused by-products

As just mentioned, sustainability has become an important strategic issue for the vitivinicultural sector. Wine production is closely dependent on natural resources and agricultural ecosystems, which makes environmental performance increasingly relevant for the sector's long-term viability. At the same time, wine production generates several by-products and waste streams, including grape pomace, stems, lees, vinasses and wastewater, that have often been treated mainly as residues or low-value outputs. However, this approach represents both an environmental challenge and a lost opportunity, particularly as the sector is being encouraged to improve the management, valorization of waste and residues (OIV, 2025; Gabur et al., 2024).

2.1.6. Regulatory complexity, traceability and transparency

The sector is also operating in a more demanding regulatory environment. Labelling requirements, certification processes, export rules, sustainability credentials and traceability

expectations increase the need to manage information accurately across markets, products and supply chains. They also raise expectations regarding the availability of reliable and transparent information to all stakeholders (OIV, 2025).

2.2. Linking Wine Sector Challenges to Open Innovation

The challenges facing the wine sector do not point to a single problem, but to a broader need for faster adaptation, that requires wine companies to develop capabilities that may not exist fully inside their traditional structures. In this context, open innovation becomes relevant as a way to access external knowledge, experiment with new approaches and test whether emerging solutions can be adapted to the specific needs of wine companies. Through collaboration with startups or research institutions, firms can explore responses to sector challenges without having to develop everything internally (Weiblen & Chesbrough, 2015).

Open innovation can make this contribution in four main areas. First, it can strengthen the commercial side of the business. In a context of structural oversupply, weaker demand and changing consumption patterns, wineries need to differentiate their products and communicate wine's traditional strengths in ways that remain attractive to new consumers. Startup collaboration can support this through solutions involving wine tourism, brand storytelling, consumer data tools, digital wine education, and augmented labels (Flores et al., 2025; Spadoni et al., 2019; OIV, 2021). These tools can help producers increase perceived value to reconnect with consumers and translate heritage and authenticity into more accessible and interactive formats.

Still regarding the commercial side, startups can also support product and portfolio adaptation. As consumer preferences shift towards fresher styles, sparkling wines and low- and no-alcohol alternatives, collaboration with startups and external partners may help wineries test new product concepts, formats and value propositions more quickly (del Rey & Mueller Loose, 2025).

A second contribution relates to production resilience. Climate instability makes viticulture less predictable and increases the value of technologies that help wineries anticipate changing conditions. Startups and technology providers can contribute with precision viticulture, climate and vineyard monitoring, disease prediction systems, sensor-based irrigation, and AI-supported decision-making (Ferro & Catania, 2023; Flores et al., 2025; Galati et al., 2025).

Through pilot projects, wineries can test these solutions before wider adoption, assessing both their technical feasibility and economic viability (Flores et al., 2025; Galati et al., 2025).

A third area is sustainability and circular value creation. As mentioned above, wine production generates by-products and waste streams that may have higher-value applications. Circular solutions, however, frequently require capabilities that go beyond conventional wine production. Fortunately, startups can help transform by-products into ingredients, biomaterials, cosmetics, compost, bioenergy or packaging (Gabur et al., 2024; Matias et al., 2025). Through experimentation and economic assessment, wineries can evaluate whether these applications are technically viable, commercially attractive and consistent with their sustainability positioning (Flores et al., 2025; Matias et al., 2025).

Finally, open innovation can support the growing need for transparency and regulatory compliance. As labelling, certification, sustainability claims and traceability requirements become more demanding, wine companies need to manage information more accurately across products and markets. Digital solutions developed by startups often combine IoT, blockchain, e-labels, and e-certificates (OIV, 2021; Spadoni et al., 2019), that allow to test traceability platforms, smart labels, blockchain-based information systems, digital certification tools and consumer-facing transparency solutions (Flores et al., 2025; OIV, 2021). These technologies can improve internal information management while giving consumers, regulators and business partners clearer access to information about origin, production conditions, product characteristics, sustainability credentials and certification (OIV, 2021; Spadoni et al., 2019).

Overall, open innovation makes adaptation more concrete and testable. Across these different challenges, the same logic applies: external actors provide specialized capabilities, while wine companies use pilots, experimentation and internal validation to assess whether those capabilities can create value in their own context, complementing their own capacities.

3. Literature Review

3.1. Open Innovation as the Broader Framework

Open innovation provides the broader framework for understanding corporate-startup collaboration. In contrast with a closed innovation model, where firms depend mainly on internal R&D, open innovation argues that firms can use both internal and external ideas, as well as different paths to market, to accelerate innovation (Chesbrough, 2003). Later work refined this definition by describing open innovation as the management of “purposive knowledge inflows and outflows” (Chesbrough et al. 2006, p.1) across firm boundaries, allowing firms to use external knowledge internally and to create value from internal knowledge externally (Chesbrough and Bogers, 2014).

The Portuguese context is particularly relevant because the national literature suggests that open innovation has developed gradually and unevenly among Portuguese firms. Teixeira and Lopes (2012), studying innovative corporates in Portugal as a country in a mid-level phase of technological development, show that national firms stay close to a closed innovation model. Their findings indicate that open innovation is more visible in the incorporation of external knowledge and technology (inbound) than in the outward transfer or external exploitation of internally developed knowledge (outbound). Indeed, the authors show that only a minority of the firms analyzed had incorporated open innovation into their innovation strategy, and that outward-oriented practices were particularly limited. More specifically, Portuguese firms rarely made internally developed technologies available to other organizations, even when those technologies were not directly used in their own core business.

Fernandes, Cesário and Barata (2017) reinforce this interpretation by showing that Portuguese innovation remains more firm-based than cooperation-based, especially in product innovation (with cooperation-based innovation referring here to the formal collaborative dimension of open innovation). The authors also note that Portuguese companies remain less mature in open innovation than firms in other European contexts, with cooperation involving competitors being restricted to a limited number of sectors.

De Faria, Lima and Santos (2010) further deepen this picture by showing that cooperation in innovation activities is not only selective, but also dependent on firms' internal conditions.

In their analysis of portuguese data, cooperation partners are more valued by firms with stronger absorptive capacity, higher innovation investment, greater attention to incoming knowledge spillovers, and cooperation links with suppliers or firms from the same group.

3.2. Corporate-Startup Collaboration and Collaboration Models

The open-innovation framework can involve several types of external partners, including universities, suppliers, customers, research organisations and startups. Within the broader open innovation literature, corporate-startup collaboration is a more specific form of external engagement (Dizdarevic, van de Vrande and Jansen, 2024; Giglio et al., 2025). Its relevance comes from the fact that startups and large firms are different in ways that create both opportunities and tensions. On the opportunity side, startups and large firms can be complementary: startups typically to bring promising ideas, agility and the ability to take risks, while large firms provide resources, scale, market access and established routines (Rothaermel, 2001a, 2001b; Weiblen and Chesbrough, 2015; Ching and Caetano, 2021).

At the same time, these differences can make collaboration difficult: while Prashantham and Kumar (2019) emphasise differences in power, structure and organisational culture, Minshall et al. (2010) describe such relationships as asymmetric partnerships shaped by differences in size, commercial experience, decision-making routines and internal complexity. This can create practical misunderstandings. For example, one start-up CEO recalled that a large partner asked to speak with the firm's Latin America sales director and even requested the training of 20,000 consultants, although "our whole business was six programmers in one room" (Minshall et al., 2010, p.8).

This double character helps explain why corporate-startup collaboration cannot be treated as a generic act of "working with startups". Different models serve different purposes. Weiblen and Chesbrough (2015) show that firms can work with startups through corporate venture capital, corporate incubation, outside-in startup programs and platform startup programs. Corporate venture capital is closer to investment and the search for financial or strategic returns, while outside-in startup programs focus on bringing external startup solutions into the corporation's own activities. Kurpjuweit and Wagner (2020) develop this more operational perspective through the concept of startup supplier programs, a specific type of outside-in model. These programs differ from company accelerators, another type of outside-in model, because they are not mainly designed to mentor startups, but to select, test

and potentially integrate startups as suppliers for the corporation's core business. All these are further explained in Tables 1 and 2.

Type of collaboration	Definition
Corporate Venture Capital (CVC)	Equity-based model in which the corporation invests in external startups to gain financial returns, strategic insight, influence over emerging technologies, or possible acquisition opportunities (Weiblen and Chesbrough, 2015)
Corporate Incubation	Inside-out model in which internal ideas that do not fit the corporation's current core business are developed in a startup-like environment, either to be commercialized independently, spun off or later reintegrated into the corporation (Weiblen and Chesbrough, 2015)
Outside-in Startup Programs	Non-equity model in which corporations work with external startups to bring startup solutions into the corporation's own business (Weiblen and Chesbrough, 2015)
Corporate Accelerator	Subtype of outside-in startup program. These usually work with cohorts of early-stage startups and provide temporary access to mentoring, education, funding, corporate resources and networking. Their objectives are broad and may include exploring ideas, attracting talent, closing technological gaps or supporting startup development (Weiblen and Chesbrough, 2015; Kurpjuweit and Wagner, 2020)
Startup Supplier Programs	Subtype of outside-in startup programme. These programs are not mainly designed to mentor startups, but to select, test, customize and potentially integrate startup technologies through supplier relationships with the corporation's core business (Kurpjuweit and Wagner, 2020)
Platform Startup Programs	Inside-out model in which the corporation encourages startups to build products or services on top of its own technological platform. The aim is not primarily to absorb startup solutions internally, but to expand the corporation's platform ecosystem and increase the value of the platform (Weiblen and Chesbrough, 2015).

Table 1. Types of collaboration (own elaboration)

Type of collaboration	Examples mentioned in the literature	Example's Sectors	Bibliographic reference
Corporate Venture Capital (CVC)	Google Ventures/Nest, as investment followed by later acquisition.	Smart home technologies	Weiblen and Chesbrough (2015)
Corporate Incubation	Xerox PARC/3Com and Adobe, as spin-offs from corporate research.	Corporate research labs	
Outside-in Startup Programs	AT&T Foundry, as a non-equity model for testing and transferring startup technologies.	Telecommunications	
Corporate Accelerator	Nike+ Accelerator, as a cohort-based program for digital and sport-related startups.	Sport-related digital products	
Startup Supplier Programs	BMW Startup Garage, as a model for testing startups as potential suppliers.	Automotive OEM	Kurpjuweit and Wagner (2020)
Platform Startup Programs	SAP Startup Focus, as a platform model where startups build around SAP HANA.	Enterprise software	Weiblen and Chesbrough (2015)

Table 2. Examples for each Type of Collaboration (own elaboration)

3.3. From Startup Sourcing to Startup Selection

A recurring issue in this literature is the need for an internal bridge between the startup ecosystem and the corporation's business units. Weiblen and Chesbrough (2015), Gutmann et al. (2019), and Napp and Minshall (2011) say that innovation units or departments play an important role in connecting external startup opportunities with relevant internal stakeholders that can use them. This bridging role is also discussed through the idea of boundary spanners: dedicated people or interface units that help translate the startup's offer

into internal needs and reduce misunderstandings between the two sides (Weber and Weber, 2011; Ben Mahmoud-Jouini et al. 2018).

Kurpjuweit and Wagner's (2020) stage-gate model of startup supplier programs gives this bridging role a more structured form. The process starts with the identification of startups aligned with the firm's priorities. Gate 1, preselection, then screens whether the startup is sufficiently credible and ready to continue, focusing on their potential to become qualified suppliers, including aspects such as the founding team, legal situation, funding, strategic fit, business model readiness and product maturity.

After this first screening, the second stage is internal matchmaking, where the startup is connected with a business unit with a possible use case. Gate 2 assesses market fit, which means that, at this point, the question is no longer only whether the startup is interesting, but whether there is a concrete internal need and a viable business case.

The third stage is, finally, the pilot project, where the startup's technology is customised and tested under real operating conditions. This is followed by Gate 3, that evaluates the pilot and determines the next step, based on the performance of the solution, its applicability to the company's context and the startup's readiness to become a supplier. If the outcome is positive, the company can move toward sourcing or continue product development before adoption. If direct sourcing is not appropriate, the model also allows alternative routes, such as piloting the solution in another business unit or being analysed through the corporate venture capital lens. This process just described is illustrated in the image below (Figure 1).




Figure 1. Startup Supplier Stage-gate Process (Kurpjuweit and Wagner's, 2020)

Besides, startup supplier programmes are usually positioned “one step after an accelerator program”: the startups are still early-stage and may need to adapt their products, but they should normally have an advanced prototype or functioning product. (Kurpjuweit and Wagner’s, 2020, p. 69). The ideal startup is therefore not necessarily the largest or most established one. Instead, it should be mature enough to be tested under real conditions, while still flexible enough to adapt its solution and benefit from a corporate customer.

3.4. Evaluation Criteria for Selecting Startups

While the above-mentioned structure provides guidance on the startup selection process, it does not by itself determine which startups should move forward. For this reason, the process must be complemented by clear evaluation criteria that allow the company to assess whether each startup is strategically relevant and capable of contributing to the objectives of the collaboration. On this matter, De Groote and Backmann (2020) show that partner selection in incumbent-startup collaboration involves more than identifying a technologically interesting solution. They distinguish between project-related and partner-related criteria, as both the attractiveness of the solution and the suitability of the partner need to be evaluated. Project-related criteria include strategic fit, novelty, market readiness, timing and cost, while partner-related criteria concern the startup’s expertise, commitment, professionalism, resources and risk profile.

The broader literature provides more detailed insights about some of the specific criteria above mentioned. Strategic fit is important because collaboration works better when the startup’s solution is connected to what the corporation already does and needs. This can improve innovation outcomes and make knowledge transfer and learning easier (Keil et al., 2008). Moreover, fit may also depend on how closely the startup’s knowledge and industry relate to the corporation’s existing business and capability needs (Lee, Park and Kang, 2018).

At the same time, startup maturity can matter, but its relevance depends on the purpose of the collaboration. Business maturity, reflected in more professional management processes, may be useful when the firm needs a partner capable of working reliably with corporate procedures (Kanbach and Stubner, 2016; Simon et al., 2019). Technological maturity, where the solution is already known or validated, may also help when the objective is product innovation or a more efficient innovation process (Enkel and Sagmeister, 2020a; Minshall et al., 2010). However, earlier-stage startups may still be relevant when the corporation is

seeking exposure to cultural change rather than only a ready-to-integrate solution (Rigtering and Behrens, 2021).

This distinction helps explain why, in a startup supplier model, traditional supplier selection criteria are not always appropriate. Kurpjuweit et al. (2021) argue that startups often lack delivery records, financial stability, certifications or evidence of long-term operational reliability. These weaknesses may create concerns for firms, but the solution is to adjust the selection process to the preferred type of collaboration.

In the next table (Table 3), there is an overview of the main selection criteria, supported with some examples from the literature mentioned throughout this section.

Criteria	Examples mentioned in the literature
Strategic fit / relatedness	Quantitative evidence: analysis of a longitudinal firm-level database shows that external collaborations with more related partners are associated with higher innovative performance (Keil et al., 2008)
Startup maturity	Startup maturity matters especially when the objective is value-chain integration. In the Value Chain Investor model, illustrated by TechStars METRO and SPACELAB/Media-Saturn, startups are typically later-stage, with developed products/customers or at least prototypes that can be connected to the corporate value chain (Kanbach and Stubner, 2016)
Technological maturity	Large firms may require the startup technology to be de-risked before adoption. This can mean assessing whether a prototype or low-volume-tested solution has reached a sufficient readiness level, and what tasks and costs are needed to move it toward volume production (Minshall et al., 2010)
Risk / supplier reliability	A startup can be innovative but still risky as a supplier. One company reported concerns about lack of production-process experience, financial stability and certifications; another case failed because the startup ran out of funding (Kurpjuweit et al., 2021)
Market fit / internal use case	A startup solution needs an internal customer. One company stated that it would not collaborate without business-unit support; another noted that if no one internally wants the technology, the other criteria become irrelevant (Kurpjuweit et al., 2021)

Table 3. Main Selection Criteria (own elaboration)

Therefore, a good startup is not necessarily a good collaboration partner. As mentioned before, De Groote and Backmann's (2020) create the structure that distinguishes between project and partner specific criteria. Kurpjuweit et al. (2021) make a similar point through their four forms of fit: resource and capability, strategic, technological and market. The idea of market fit is especially relevant in a supplier-oriented collaboration model because the startup can only become a supplier if there is an internal customer willing to use the solution. The next matrix (Table 4) combines both these ideas, where a startup solution only becomes relevant if there is a clear internal use case and a business unit willing to adopt it.

	Low partner suitability	High partner suitability
Low project attractiveness	Low priority. The solution is not sufficiently relevant or strategically aligned. The startup also raises partner-related concerns. This case should normally be rejected or deprioritized.	Good startup, weak project fit. The startup may be competent, but the specific solution does not address a clear company need or fit current priorities. The relationship may be worth keeping, but a pilot should wait until there is a stronger use case.
High project attractiveness	Promising solution, weak partner. The solution may be strategically market-ready, but the startup may lack the commitment, resources or professionalism needed for collaboration. De Groote and Backmann's (2020) cases show this risk, as promising collaborations can suffer when partners do not keep promises or have misaligned expectations.	Strong collaboration candidate. Both dimensions are favorable: the solution is attractive, and the startup appears capable of collaborating reliably. This is the clearest case for moving forward to a pilot.

Table 4. Startup Collaboration Assessment Matrix (own elaboration, based on De Groote and Backmann (2020); Kurpjuweit et al. (2021))

3.5. From Pilot to Implementation: Internal Adoption and Organisational Conditions

Once a startup has been selected, the pilot becomes a key moment, but it should not be mistaken for the final objective. As discussed above, Kurpjuweit and Wagner (2020) treat the pilot as a stage where the startup's solution is customised and tested under real conditions.

However, the pilot remains part of a broader pathway in which the firm must decide whether to adopt the startup as a supplier, continue developing the collaboration, redirect the relationship or stop the project.

This connects with Basu, Phelps and Kotha's (2016) argument that collaboration with external organisations depends not only on searching for external knowledge, but also on integrating that knowledge with organisational units. In that regard, the central matter is not just whether the pilot operates technically correctly, but also whether the solution can be absorbed by the organisation that is expected to use it. Homfeldt et al. (2019) make a similar point by showing that externally sourced startup ideas may be novel and attractive, but that implementation depends on economic progress, internal fit and proof of technical feasibility.

The distinction between adoption and implementation is useful for understanding this problem. Klein and Sorra (1996) define adoption as the decision to use an innovation, while implementation requires organisational members to use it consistently and with commitment. Their model highlights the importance of implementation climate (meaning that the use of the innovation is anticipated, encouraged and rewarded) and innovation-values fit (meaning that users see the innovation as compatible with their priorities and value). In the context of startup collaboration, this means that a positive pilot decision is not enough.

The pilot-to-implementation stage therefore raises governance and commitment questions. Firms need to clarify who has decision-making authority, who is accountable for the collaboration, how costs are assigned, and which metrics define success or failure (Markham et al., 2005). They also need to ensure sufficient internal support, since the resources allocated and the commitment of top leadership are frequently treated as critical conditions for successful collaboration (Stern et al., 2014; Blanka and Traunmüller, 2020; De Groote and Backmann, 2020).

Several papers therefore move the discussion from external sourcing to internal acceptance. One reason this transition can be difficult is that startups and large companies often operate with different organisational logics. Freeman and Engel (2007) contrast the entrepreneurial model, associated with creativity and speed, with the corporate model, associated with scale, execution and control. Corporate-startup collaboration therefore requires these different ways of working to be brought together inside concrete projects.

Internal acceptance may also be affected by how employees perceive external knowledge. Burcharth, Knudsen and Søndergaard (2014) analyze employee attitudes toward open innovation through the concept of the not-invented-here syndrome, which refers to negative attitudes toward sourcing knowledge from outside the corporation. Applied to startup collaboration, this suggests that startup solutions may be perceived as less familiar or more uncertain than internal alternatives. This paper also suggests that employee training can help reduce these negative attitudes.

Internal coordination can also determine whether a startup solution is adopted. Seran and Bez (2021) add that the challenge is not only to connect a startup with the corporation, but also to coordinate the different internal units that may be involved in the collaboration. A startup may enter through the innovation team, but its solution often needs support, data, budget or adoption from one or more business units. If these units have different priorities or incentives, the project may lose momentum before implementation.

Weissenberger-Eibl and Hampel (2021) also focus on what happens after external knowledge has been identified, since firms need to make that knowledge understandable, credible and usable internally. They identify barriers such as absence of internal commitment, communication problems with the external partner and unclear strategic orientation. They also discuss mechanisms that can reduce the gap between external knowledge and internal use, including early combination of both kinds of knowledge, direct contact with the external partner, clear cooperation planning and pilot phases that help build legitimacy.

Corporate-startup collaboration may also generate learning effects beyond the immediate project. Rigtering and Behrens (2021) argue that collaboration with startups does not automatically make established firms more entrepreneurial. Its effect depends on whether the employees involved develop reflexivity and intrinsic motivation. Reflexivity refers to the process through which employees compare startup ways of working with corporate routines and begin to question existing practices, while intrinsic motivation refers to their willingness to act on those insights.

This learning perspective adds an important final layer to the discussion. Startup collaboration may expose employees to practices such as experimentation, prototyping, agility and faster decision-making. However, these learning effects only matter if the organisation gives employees enough autonomy, support and motivation to apply what they

have learned. Rigtering and Behrens (2021) therefore connect corporate-startup collaboration with internal conditions such as management support, time availability, incentives, flexible organisational boundaries and knowledge-sharing mechanisms.

3.6. Summary of the authors' ideas

After reviewing the literature and consolidating the main contributions discussed above, the key insights were organised into a summary table (Table 5). This table provides a structured basis for the analysis that follows.

Literature topic	Main idea from the literature (supported by the main sources)
Collaboration modes	Firms can collaborate with external actors through different models: CVC, Corporate Incubation, Outside-in (Corporate Accelerator and Startup Supplier Program) and Platform Startup Programs. (Weiblen & Chesbrough, 2015; Kurpjuweit & Wagner, 2020)
Startup sourcing and selection	The model structures collaboration as a staged process that progressively filters startups from initial identification to internal validation, pilot testing and potential supplier integration. (Kurpjuweit & Wagner, 2020)
Startup criteria for selection	The company must assess both the attractiveness of the project and the suitability of the startup as a partner, considering aspects such as strategic relevance, technological fit, maturity, market readiness, commitment and risk profile. (De Groote & Backmann, 2020; Kurpjuweit et al., 2021).
Internal matchmaking and business-unit involvement	It is important to create a bridge between the startup ecosystem and the corporation's internal units. Innovation teams help translate startup solutions into internal needs and connect them with business units that have a concrete use cases and willingness to support the collaboration. (Weiblen & Chesbrough, 2015; Gutmann et al., 2019; Napp & Minshall, 2011; Kurpjuweit & Wagner, 2020; Seran & Bez, 2021).
Pilot implementation and organizational conditions	A pilot should not be treated as the final objective, but as a testing stage. Moving from pilot to implementation depends on clear success metrics, governance, accountability, budget, internal coordination, openness to external knowledge and commitment from the units that will use the solution. (Kurpjuweit & Wagner, 2020; Klein & Sorra, 1996; Markham et al., 2005; Burcharth et al., 2014; Weissenberger-Eibl & Hampel, 2021)

Table 5. Summary of the Literature Review (own elaboration)

4. From Sector Challenges to Sogrape's Reality

4.1. Company Overview

Sogrape, a Portuguese family wine company established in 1942 under the leadership Fernando van Zeller Guedes and a group of partners, was founded originally under the name Sociedade Comercial dos Grandes Vinhos de Mesa de Portugal. From the beginning, the company was strongly associated with Mateus Rosé, a brand that later became one of the most internationally recognised symbols of Portuguese wine (Sogrape, n.d.a; Instituto da Vinha e do Vinho, n.d.; Eurisy, 2016). Over time, Sogrape developed into an international wine group, while keeping a strong connection to Portuguese family ownership and wine heritage.

This evolution is important because Sogrape's internationalisation was not based only on exporting Portuguese wine. The company now has wine operations in Portugal, Spain, Chile, Argentina and New Zealand, and sells its wines in more than 120 markets (Sogrape, n.d.a; Larguesa, 2024). This shows that its international strategy involves more than selling abroad. It also involves managing different brands, production origins and consumer markets across several geographies. In 2025, Portugal represented 24% of Sogrape's sales, which means that most of the group's business was generated outside its domestic market, being the most important one the United Kingdom, with 37% (Sogrape, 2026).

In Portugal, Sogrape is commonly described as the country's leading wine company. Its activity covers several important wine regions, including Vinhos Verdes, Douro/Porto, Dão, Bairrada, Bucelas and Alentejo. The company's Portuguese operations combine its own vineyards with grapes sourced from many winegrowers, which gives it a broad production base while keeping it connected to regional diversity and local agricultural networks. In Portugal alone, Sogrape reports 980 hectares of vineyards, 61 grape varieties and more than 72% of production directed to export markets (Sogrape, n.d.b).

The scale of Sogrape's activity helps explain its relevance in the wine sector. The company reports more than 1,100 employees, 1,600 hectares of vineyards, 19 wineries, 25 estates, over 30 brands and operations across 12 wine regions (Sogrape, n.d.a). Its portfolio includes brands such as Mateus, Sandeman, Porto Ferreira, Offley, Casa Ferreirinha, Gazela, Quinta

dos Carvalhais, LAN and Framingham, while brands such as Herdade do Peso also play a relevant role in the group's commercial portfolio (French, 2019; Fernandes, 2023).

In recent years, sustainability has become more visible in Sogrape's strategy. Through its global programme Seed the Future, the company links sustainability to environmental responsibility, wine heritage, people and communities. In its 2024 Sustainability Report, Sogrape reported a 13.5% reduction in total greenhouse gas emissions compared with 2021 and stated that 97.89% of waste was redirected for reuse or recycling, indicating how the company is beginning to translate its sustainability commitments into concrete operational indicators (Sogrape, 2025).

The ability to adapt is also becoming increasingly relevant in Sogrape's response to the difficulties facing the wine industry. In the context of pressure that the sector is going through, Sogrape reported more than 30 active research and development projects in 2024, including initiatives related to regenerative soils, biodiversity monitoring and more sustainable vineyard management (Sogrape, 2025). This suggests that transformation within the company is not limited to new products or branding, it also reaches the vineyard, the production process and the way environmental risks are monitored over time. Eurisy's case study (2016) also shows how Sogrape has used satellite and climate information to support vineyard management and decision-making in wine production, supporting this idea even more.

Another relevant development is Sogrape's growing interest in open innovation. Through Sogrape Ventures, the company created a venture capital initiative focused on startups with ideas, technologies and business models connected to the wine and beverage value chain (Sogrape, n.d.c). This became more concrete with its first investment in *Candam Tech*, a Spanish startup developing hardware and software solutions for waste management, especially in beverage packaging such as glass and aluminium (Marcela, 2024).

All this makes Sogrape a company positioned between tradition and transformation. On one side, it is rooted in family ownership, Portuguese wine heritage and long-established brands. On the other, it is adapting to a changing wine industry through internationalisation, sustainability, research and development, and open innovation. This combination makes Sogrape a relevant case for analysing how established companies in traditional sectors can

protect their legacy while preparing for new environmental, technological and market conditions.

4.2. The Role of the Innovation Department

Sogrape's innovation journey did not start with a formal department, but rather with a mindset that has been present since its early days. Mateus Rosé represented a bold and disruptive approach to wine branding at the time of its launch, so innovation has long been embedded in the company's DNA. However, the innovation function only became structured and strategic much later, in 2019 (Sogrape Vinhos, 2026a).



Figure 2. Innovation Path Sogrape Vinhos, 2026a)

Since then, it has evolved through several key milestones, as shown in Figure 2. In 2021, the creation of the Take the Shot Studio provided a dedicated space for ideation and intrapreneurship. Later, in 2022, Sogrape adopted an Open Innovation Strategy, opening the organisation to external collaboration and new ecosystems and this effort strengthened in 2023 with the launch of Sogrape Ventures, reinforcing startup engagement and structured innovation investment. In 2024, the company received the National Innovation Award, validating its progress externally and, more recently, in 2025 and moving into 2026, the focus has been on executing pilot projects with startups and fostering a stronger experimentation culture across the organisation (Sogrape Vinhos, 2026a).

From an operational standpoint, the department remained relatively small and agile. During the period of this work, the team was composed of three members, and midway through the

semester it was reduced to two. This small team structure required a high degree of autonomy and prioritisation, reinforcing a hands-on approach to innovation management.

The department's impact is already visible. Since 2023, more than 240 employees have been directly involved in innovation initiatives, reflecting strong internal engagement. Sogrape has also increased its external presence, participating as a speaker in around 30 events and as a jury member in 17 occasions, strengthening its positioning within the innovation ecosystem. Additionally, over 260 startups have been analysed, showing a consistent effort to identify and evaluate new opportunities (Sogrape Vinhos, 2026a).

Strategically, innovation efforts are organised around “Must Win Battles” that span the entire value chain (from viticulture and oenology to production, marketing, distribution, and adjacent areas). These priorities are grouped into key themes such as WineTech, AI Excellence, Sustainable Futures, New Packaging & Materials, New Beverages, and Unforgettable Experiences, that, together, guide the development of initiatives (Sogrape Vinhos, 2026b).



Figure 3. Must Win Battles (Sogrape Vinhos, 2026b)

The current project portfolio reflects this strategic direction and is distributed across different levels of ambition within the innovation horizon framework. Based on the three horizons logic introduced by Baghai, Coley and White (1999), innovation initiatives can be understood as varying in their distance from the current business. Incremental innovation corresponds to improvements close to the existing business, usually aimed at optimising current products, processes or operations. In contrast, transformational innovation involves

more substantial changes, often extending existing capabilities into new solutions, markets or business models. Finally, disruptive innovation represents the most ambitious level, as it explores longer-term opportunities that may challenge existing assumptions and potentially create new sources of growth.

While the framework includes three categories, the current portfolio is concentrated in the latter two: around 60% fall within transformational innovation, while the remaining 40% correspond to the disruptive type. As shown in Figure 4, no active projects are positioned within the incremental innovation space, showing that the team is prioritising more ambitious initiatives over small-scale improvements (Sogrape Vinhos, 2026a). This does not mean that incremental innovation is absent from the organisation; rather, these initiatives appear to be happening across the organisation, within individual departments, without the direct involvement of this team.




Figure 4. Sogrape's Innovation Horizon (Sogrape Vinhos, 2026a)

4.3. Strategic Challenges for the Current Year

The Innovation Department at Sogrape is confronted with a set of interrelated challenges that aim to strengthen the company's long-term competitiveness. These 2026 challenges, present in Figure 5, reflect both external pressures (such as evolving consumer behavior, digital transformation, and environmental constraints) and internal ambitions to adopt exploratory, learning-oriented innovation practices through targeted pilot initiatives. (Sogrape Vinhos, 2026c).




Figure 5. Innovation Department Challenges for 2026 (Sogrape Vinhos, 2026c)

A primary challenge concerns the application of artificial intelligence (AI) to demand forecasting and commercial decision-making. Specifically, the department seeks to explore how AI-enabled models can support more accurate demand predictions and generate channel-specific recommendations regarding portfolio composition, pricing strategies, and promotional activities. Addressing this challenge is expected to contribute to improved sell-out performance and margin optimization, while also enhancing decision quality across commercial functions.

This first challenge was actually addressed in the first semester of 2026. Sogrape engaged with *Tilect*, an AI-driven platform focused on predictive modelling and scenario simulation for pricing and commercial strategy, designed to enable business users to perform advanced analytics without requiring technical expertise or coding skills (Tilect, n.d.). The pilot was a success and they are now working on scaling the implementation.

Closely related to this is the challenge of capturing timely and actionable consumer insights. The Sogrape's typical consumer is different from their client, since they operate in a B2B model. Therefore, the Innovation Department aims to combine several data sources (including point-of-sale data, social listening, field observations, and lightweight qualitative methods) to rapidly and safely generate insights that can inform portfolio and pricing decisions.

Another significant challenge lies in enhancing consumer engagement across channels. The department is tasked with exploring new ways to deepen relationships with consumers through personalized journeys, loyalty and community-building initiatives, and test-and-learn

activations. The strategic objective is to increase retention, purchase frequency, and brand advocacy, while simultaneously developing internal capabilities for experimentation and iterative learning in consumer-facing initiatives.

From a sustainability and circular economy perspective, the Innovation Department faces the challenge of waste valorization. This involves mapping by-products generated across the value chain and examining opportunities to convert them into value-adding outputs, such as ingredients, biomaterials, or energy solutions. Pilot projects and external partnerships are central to this effort, with a strong emphasis on assessing both economic viability and environmental impact.

Regarding the valorization of residues from the process of wine production, although there was no pilot occurring during my internship, I had the chance to contact three startups that solved this problem. Out of these, only one followed up on our contact, but in the end, it didn't go through due to a lack of a robust business model (Sogrape Vinhos, 2026i). However, the installation of a *Humiverso* vermicomposting unit at the company is planned. *Humiverso* develops systems that use vermicomposting to transform organic waste into vermicompost, a natural soil improver produced through the action of worms and other organisms (Humiverso, n.d.). In Sogrape's case, the unit is expected to valorise the organic waste generated daily in the company's canteen, turning it into compost instead of treating it only as waste.

Finally, the department is exploring the challenge of developing early-stage carbon capture capabilities. Through low-cost, low-risk experimental initiatives, the objective is to accelerate learning and validate whether, where, and how carbon capture technologies could create tangible value for the company. These exploratory efforts support broader decarbonization goals while ensuring that investments remain proportionate and knowledge-driven at this stage.

Collectively, these challenges define an innovation agenda centered on experimentation, cross-functional integration, and evidence-based learning. They position the Innovation Department as a strategic enabler of transformational change, balancing short-term business impact with long-term capability building and sustainability objectives.

5. Internship Context and Activities Developed

5.1. Internship Position and Departmental Integration

The internship at Sogrape, within the Innovation Department, is framed by the promotion of open innovation as a strategic approach to identifying opportunities, developing partnerships, and strengthening an organizational culture of innovation. In this sense, the internship was designed with the purpose of contributing to ongoing collaborative innovation initiatives, supporting the alignment between the company's internal needs and external solutions with potential application in the wine sector (FEP, 2025).

More specifically, the main objectives defined for the internship were to:

1. Contribute to the implementation of ongoing collaborative innovation initiatives; to support the team in organizing events and open innovation programs;
2. Promote the communication of innovation initiatives both internally and externally, in coordination with the communication team;
3. Develop proposals for the integration of emerging technologies into wine production processes, in line with market demands and sustainability principles;
4. Identify opportunities to optimize the company's production and management processes by exploring technological solutions aligned with circular economy practices;
5. Collaborate in the preparation and implementation of the Innovation Week and other actions aimed at fostering a culture of innovation.

5.2. Main Activities Performed

In practical terms, these objectives have been translated into a diverse set of activities directly related to innovation monitoring, trend analysis, startup scouting, pilot follow-up, and support for internal innovation initiatives.

A first relevant dimension of the internship has consisted of the continuous monitoring of the innovation ecosystem. This included the selection, analysis, and systematization of newsletters (The Drinks Business, The Spirits Business, FoodBev, Beverage Daily and *Grande Consumo*), with a focus on innovation in the wine sector, consumer trends, emerging technologies, sustainability, and other topics of potential strategic interest for Sogrape. This

radar activity made it possible to identify relevant market signals, follow the evolution of sector dynamics, and, finally, strengthen the organization's ability to anticipate opportunities and challenges. Figure 11 in the Annex section shows the platform where the news were saved.

In this context, as shown in Figures 12,13 and 14 of the Annexm, research was also carried out around the priority challenges defined for 2026, with the aim of better understanding the selected themes, their market relevance, and the possible technological or organizational responses associated with them (Sogrape Vinhos, 2026c). In parallel, research was conducted on product and consumption trends identified for the current year, in order to understand how these trends are being explored and what their potential impact may be for the sector. This included, for example, the analysis of emerging formats such as single-serve solutions (Figures 15, 16 and 17 in the Annex), which are associated with changing consumer preferences and the growing search for convenience, flexibility, and adaptation to new consumption occasions (Sogrape Vinhos, 2026d).

Another important activity, related to the latter, involved benchmarking initiatives developed by other brands in the sector in relation to the main trends identified for the year, coming from the Trends Report made by one of the team's members (Sogrape Vinhos, 2026e). This work, shown in part by Figures 18 and 19 from the Annex section, supported the understanding of how different players are responding to market changes, which types of solutions are gaining visibility, and how these movements may inspire or inform Sogrape's own innovation agenda.

The internship also included participation in external innovation and ecosystem events, such as TRENDS 26, promoted by Portugal Foods, and the SIM Conference (Figure 20 in the Annex). TRENDS 26 was particularly relevant for understanding the main innovation and consumption trends shaping the agrifood sector, as well as the growing importance of innovation, internationalization, and market adaptation in a context of changing consumer priorities and economic transformation (Portugal Foods, 2026). The SIM Conference, focused on startups and investment matching, was relevant for understanding the dynamics of the entrepreneurial ecosystem, identifying emerging solutions, and observing how startups, investors, corporates, and other ecosystem players connect around innovation opportunities (SIM Conference, n.d.). Following these events, internal presentations,

exemplified by Figures 21 and 22 from the Annex, were prepared to systematize the main takeaways and translate them into insights potentially relevant for Sogrape (Sogrape Vinhos, 2026f, 2026g).

Related to the previous task, the internship also involved the creation of a structured Excel file mapping relevant events for startup discovery and ecosystem monitoring, illustrated by Figure 23 from the Annex section (Sogrape Vinhos, 2026h). This tool aimed to support the identification of conferences, startup competitions, innovation forums, and other relevant moments where new solutions, partners, and market signals could be identified. As such, it contributed to a more systematic approach to ecosystem engagement and future scouting opportunities.

A significant part of the internship was also dedicated to startup scouting and analysis. This included the identification and assessment of startups related to the previously mentioned strategic topics, as well as other startups connected to ongoing projects that had already been signalled by the team. The analysis focused on understanding each startup's value proposition, business model, relevance to Sogrape's innovation priorities, and potential fit for partnership or experimentation. This work involved the detailed review of a large number of startups and the consequent completion of an internal radar file (Figure 24 from the Annex), where each opportunity was classified according to its level of relevance and priority, using categories such as go, no-go, or not priority (Sogrape Vinhos, 2026i). In the cases classified as go, contact was established by email (as shown in Figure 25) and one of these contacts led to a meeting with the startup to better understand its business model and potential applicability.

In addition, the internship included involvement in a concrete Scouting Mission developed in collaboration with *Plug and Play*, a company that connects startups and investors (Plug and Play, n.d.). This project made it possible to follow the startup scouting process more closely, from the definition of the search scope and relevant criteria to the analysis and discussion of potential solutions. This experience contributed to a more practical understanding of how structured open innovation processes can be used to identify external solutions aligned with corporate challenges, and the main goal was exactly to learn from *Plug and Play* to make it possible to make it without a third party in the following challenges.

Another relevant dimension concerned the support provided to pilots and experimentation processes. This included the preparation of detailed PowerPoint presentations with information on ongoing pilots, helping to organize and communicate their objectives, status, expected value, and next steps (Sograpeinhos, 2026j, 2026k, 2026l). Figures 26 and 27 from the Annex bring an example of one of these presentations. In parallel, support was provided in the definition of test cards and posterior analysis of the results for the *Corkified* pilot (smart NFC-enabled corks, developed in partnership with Corticeira Amorim) with the purpose of clarifying the hypotheses to be validated after its testing (Corkified, n.d.) (Sogrape, 2026k). This activity was particularly important to ensure that experimentation was not only based on the execution of a solution, but also on the structured validation of assumptions, learning objectives, and measurable outcomes (and it is supported by Figure 28 present in the Annex section).

Another important contribution (supported by Figures 29 and 30 from the Annex) was the support given to the preparation of Innovation Day. This initiative was understood not only as a way of giving internal visibility to the work developed by the Innovation Department, but also as a mechanism to stimulate employee engagement, disseminate knowledge, and introduce new perspectives and dynamics within the organization (Sogrape Vinhos, 2026m).

In addition to this, the internship also involved support in the design of an internal innovation workshop. This included the definition of the workshop's main themes and the development of a dedicated canvas to guide participants' reflection, designed to help structure ideas, clarify opportunities, and encourage a more practical and collaborative approach to innovation (Sogrape Vinhos, 2026n). The objective of this initiative was to stimulate internal participation, promote creative thinking, and support the development of ideas aligned with Sogrape's innovation priorities. Figures 31, 32 and 33 from the Annex illustrate my contribution.

Taken together, these activities contributed to active participation in Sogrape's open innovation dynamics, combining research, ecosystem monitoring, startup analysis, pilot support, and internal engagement initiatives. They also enabled a deeper understanding of how innovation can be structured within a corporate context, from the identification of trends and external solutions to the preparation of internal initiatives that promote experimentation, collaboration, and an innovation-oriented organizational culture.

6. Sogrape's Innovation Model

6.1. Sogrape's Innovation Ecosystem




Figure 6. Sogrape's Innovation Ecosystem (Sogrape Vinhos, 2026o)

Figure 6 illustrates the broader architecture of Sogrape's innovation activity, which is organised around two complementary pillars: Open Innovation and the Ventures arm. While these areas are connected and can reinforce each other, they serve different purposes within the company's innovation system.

The Open Innovation pillar is the most relevant for this report, as it includes startup pilots, university projects, ecosystem engagement and design thinking initiatives. It represents the space where external technologies and solutions are explored, tested and potentially implemented in collaboration with actors outside the company.

On the other side, the Ventures arm has a more investment-oriented and venture-building role, covering internal ventures, external ventures and the VC fund. Through these activities, the company scouts startups, manages its portfolio and analyses potential investment opportunities. This was the case of *Candam Tech* mentioned in the company overview section (Marcela, 2024). The connection between both pillars shows that, in Sogrape, startup scouting, pilots and ecosystem engagement can generate knowledge useful for venture activity, while Ventures can also identify technologies or startups that may later support open innovation projects (the analysis of the possible pilots or investments is not done separately).

The figure also includes two transversal layers: Innovation Capabilities, which helps build internal awareness and readiness for innovation, and Measure & Learn, which supports the monitoring of innovation activities and their impact over time.

6.2. Startup Sourcing Mechanisms

Within Sogrape's Open Innovation activity, different mechanisms are employed depending on the level of internal know-how of the challenge. This means that startups are identified and engaged depending on whether the company already has a clearly defined challenge, whether it has only identified a broader opportunity area, or whether the opportunity itself still needs to be shaped through interaction with external actors. Figure 7 summarises this logic by presenting three sourcing mechanisms (Sogrape Vinhos, 2026a).




Figure 7. Startup Sourcing Mechanisms (Sogrape Vinhos, 2026a)

6.2.1. Scouting Missions: Targeted Sourcing under High Knowledge Conditions

Scouting missions are most appropriate when the company has a relatively high level of internal knowledge about the problem and a clearer understanding of the type of solution it is looking for. This is more likely to happen in domains that are close to Sogrape's core business, such as viticulture, winemaking, production or distribution, where internal teams already have strong technical and operational expertise. Therefore, these mechanism follows a more problem-driven logic, where the company starts from a defined internal need and searches externally for solutions that may address it.

Until this day, only one Scouting Mission occurred with the help of a third party, *Plug and Play*, that structured all the process and presented the solutions to Sogrape (Plug and Play, n.d.).

6.2.2. Open Calls: Broad Sourcing under Intermediate Knowledge Conditions

Open calls are more useful when the company can identify a relevant opportunity area, but does not yet know which technological approach, business model or type of partner is best suited to address it. In these situations, Sogrape may know the domain in which it wants to innovate, but still benefit from exposure to a wider range of external solutions.

An open call consists of a structured invitation for startups to submit proposals within a defined thematic scope. This allows the company to generate a broader and more diverse pool of alternatives. Compared with scouting missions, open calls are less targeted, but they can reveal approaches that the company may not have previously considered.

Although no open call has been launched yet, the purpose of the Scouting Mission with *Plug and Play* was precisely to learn from the experience, extract the main takeaways, and apply them internally to better prepare and support future open calls.

6.2.3. Co-Creation: Exploratory Sourcing under Low Knowledge Conditions

Co-creation becomes more relevant when the company is operating in domains that are further away from its existing expertise or when the problem itself is not yet clearly defined. In these situations, traditional sourcing may be less effective, because the company may not yet know what type of solution to search for or even how to frame the opportunity. This is actually the main form of sourcing startups nowadays in Sogrape, under which most of the pilots were designed.

In this case, interaction with startups and other external actors becomes part of the learning process. Co-creation may emerge from inbound contacts, spontaneous startup proposals, exploratory conversations, ecosystem engagement or discussions with universities, partners and clients. Instead of selecting a startup to solve a predefined problem, the company works with external actors to progressively define both the problem and the possible solution.

6.3. Value Chain Scope and Project Governance




Figure 8. Value Chain Scope and Project Governance (Sogrape Vinhos, 2026o)

Figure 8 presents the governance model through which the Innovation Department structures innovation work (Sogrape Vinhos, 2026o). The upper part of the figure first defines the scope of innovation across the wine value chain. Innovation is organised around several verticals, including viticulture, winemaking, production, marketing, sales and distribution, and adjacencies. This shows that innovation is not confined to one single area of the company, but can emerge across both technical and commercial parts of the business.

This structure also helps clarify the relationship between the Innovation Department and the R&D Department in Sogrape. In broad terms, R&D tends to be more involved in the first three verticals, which are closer to viticulture, winemaking and production processes. The Innovation Department, by contrast, is generally more active in the later verticals, where the focus is closer to the market, the consumer and the way the product reaches the client. However, these boundaries are not rigid. Innovation can also operate in more technical areas when the project requires it, as shown by the existence of *Fibersight*, an ongoing pilot where fiber optic sensors were applied in one vineyard to measure mainly the temperature and humidity (Sogrape Vinhos, 2026p).

The lower part of the figure then explains how innovation projects are governed. This is where the reinforced RASCI logic becomes relevant. It is a responsibility assignment matrix used to clarify who does what in a project or process, distinguishing between those responsible for execution, those who approve or are accountable for decisions, those who support implementation, those who should be consulted, and those who should be informed (Cabanillas et al., 2011, 2012). In the company's model, as shown in Figure 9, this logic is

applied at project level involving people from the business unit in question and from the Innovation Department (they add the Innovation PMO to this model, to show who is the responsible for supporting coordination and project management).



Figure 9. RASCI applied in Sogrape

6.4. Innovation Flow and the Role of Pilots



Figure 10. Innovation Flow (Sogrape Vinhos, 2026o)

Figure 10 presents the company's innovation flow, showing how innovation projects move through three main phases: Innovation Strategy, Innovation Management and Innovation Experimentation. Together, these phases describe the path through which an idea moves from initial opportunity identification to testing and decision-making (Sogrape Vinhos, 2026o).

The first phase, Innovation Strategy, is focused on opportunity identification. At this stage, the objective is to identify and assess potential areas where innovation may create value for the company. This is therefore the moment when broad opportunities are screened and selected before more concrete solution development begins and, in the case of Sogrape,

registered in the radar excel file of startups mentioned on the internship activities section (Sogrape Vinhos, 2026i).

The second phase, Innovation Management, is where those opportunities start to be translated into more specific solutions. The figure divides this phase into two steps. The first is Problem-Solution fit, where the company assesses whether a given idea or solution actually addresses a relevant problem. The second is Product-Market fit, where the company evaluates whether the proposed solution has a clear value proposition and whether it is suitable for the market. Importantly, the figure indicates that both stages may involve either in-house innovation or open innovation, showing that the company does not rely exclusively only on one of them.

The third phase, Innovation Experimentation, is labelled Reality Builder. This is the stage where the company moves from conceptual validation to more practical testing and decision-making. Here, decisions are made about if a project should be launched, scaled, abandoned or sold. This phase is especially important because it is where pilots become central. Pilot projects allow the company to test solutions under real or near-real conditions before committing to broader implementation. They make it possible to assess not only whether a solution works technically, but also whether it is operationally feasible, valuable for the business and worth scaling. For this reason, the experimentation phase is particularly relevant for this report, since the analysis will focus mainly on how pilots are used, managed and evaluated within the company's innovation process.

7. Comparison Between Sogrape's Reality and the Literature

7.1. Open Innovation as the Broader Framework

The case of Sogrape does not contradict the open innovation logic described by Chesbrough (2003), Chesbrough et al. (2006), and Chesbrough and Bogers (2014). The company looks beyond its internal resources and treats startups as potential sources of technology, knowledge, market insight and business solutions. Its experience also shows that access to startups only becomes useful when the organisation is able to identify relevant opportunities, connect them with internal needs and turn them into projects that can actually be used.

This point is especially important in the Portuguese context. As discussed in the literature review, Teixeira and Lopes (2012), Fernandes et al. (2017), and de Faria, Lima and Santos (2010) suggest that open innovation in Portugal has developed gradually and has not always been the dominant form of innovation. Sogrape reflects this transition: it is already open to external startup opportunities (in fact, it is the main focus of the department), but some of the routines needed to source, assess and integrate those opportunities are still being consolidated.

7.2. Corporate-Startup Collaboration and Collaboration Models

A first important feature of Sogrape is that it does not interact with startups through a single route. As highlighted before, it has a corporate venture capital dimension, where startups are analysed from an investment perspective, and it also explores supplier-oriented collaboration, where startups may provide solutions for internal business needs (Sogrape, n.d.c; Sogrape Vinhos, 2026b). This distinction is useful because it prevents corporate-startup collaboration from being treated as one homogeneous activity. As Weiblen and Chesbrough (2015) argue, collaborations with startups can take several forms according to the goal of the corporation. In Sogrape, some startup opportunities are interesting because they may generate long-term strategic value, while others are relevant because they can solve a specific operational or commercial problem.

The internship focused mainly on this second route. In that sense, part of the company's activity is close to the startup supplier logic discussed by Kurpjuweit and Wagner (2020). The objective is not simply to discover innovative startups, but to understand if a startup solution can respond to a concrete business need and eventually be adopted by the organisation. In

practice, the investment and supplier logics may overlap, since a startup can be both a potential investment and a potential provider. In Sogrape this has not happened yet, however some pilot partners are being analysed through the investment lens. Nevertheless, different routes bring external knowledge into the company in different ways, and each route requires its own evaluation criteria and internal commitments.

7.3. From Startup Sourcing to Startup Selection

Sogrape's sourcing approach follows the same broad logic. Conceptually, it distinguishes between open calls, scouting missions and co-creation, depending on how clearly the opportunity or challenge is defined internally. This is consistent with the bridging role discussed by Weiblen and Chesbrough (2015), Gutmann et al. (2019), Napp and Minshall (2011) and Ben et al. (2018). The Innovation Department does not simply search for startups in isolation. Its role is to connect the external startup ecosystem with the internal business units that may eventually use the solutions. This intermediary position is important because many startup opportunities are not immediately understandable or usable from the perspective of a large organisation.

Another important comparison is between Sogrape's Innovation Flow model and Kurpjuweit and Wagner's (2020) startup supplier stage-gate model (Figures 10 and 1, respectively). Both models avoid moving directly from startup discovery to implementation. Sogrape's Innovation Strategy phase broadly corresponds to startup identification, Innovation Management to internal matchmaking and fit assessment, and Innovation Experimentation to pilot testing and evaluation. However, Kurpjuweit and Wagner's model is more specific and operational, because it focuses on startups as potential suppliers and defines possible post-pilot routes, such as sourcing, further development, CVC, licensing or acquisition. Sogrape's flow is broader, since it covers both in-house and open innovation and does not focus only on supplier integration.

7.4. Evaluation Criteria for Selecting Startups

The criteria used by Sogrape also show an attempt to make startup assessment selective rather than opportunistic. These criteria include strategic scope, wine sector applicability, team and founder quality, brand investment, follow-on guidelines and geographical sourcing,

as presented before. However, some are broadly relevant to startup assessment, while others are more specific to investment decisions (Sogrape Vinhos, 2026b).

Strategic scope and wine sector applicability are the two criteria most directly related to fit. Strategic scope assesses whether the opportunity is aligned with the company's broader priorities and with relevant areas of the wine value chain, such as viticulture, winemaking, production, supply chain, sales or marketing. This reflects the literature on strategic and contextual fit, particularly De Groote and Backmann (2020), Keil et al. (2008), Weber and Weber (2011), and Lee, Park and Kang (2018). Wine sector applicability is slightly different. It does not require the startup to be originally designed for the wine industry. Rather, it asks whether the solution can generate practical value in a wine-related context. A sector-agnostic startup can therefore still be relevant if the company can identify a credible use case. This is close to Kurpjuweit et al.'s (2021) emphasis on different forms of fit, especially market fit. The *Tilect* optimisation project illustrates this logic: although the solution is not wine-specific, it may still be suitable for a pilot (not for investment) because it addresses a concrete need within the company.

A robust business plan is also a relevant criteria for evaluating startups, as it shows whether the startup has a clear value proposition and path for growth. It helps the company assess whether the solution is commercially viable and sustainable over time. In this sense, the business plan is closely linked to startup maturity (Kanbach and Stubner, 2016; Simon et al., 2019), as it indicates the extent to which the startup is prepared to move beyond experimentation and support a structured collaboration.

The emphasis on team and founder quality adds another layer to the assessment. De Groote and Backmann (2020) distinguish between the attractiveness of the project and the suitability of the startup as a partner. A solution may be technically promising, but the collaboration can still fail if the startup team is not reliable, flexible or capable of working with a large organisation. This distinction is particularly useful in the company case, as a pilot that happened before my internship did not go through just because the characteristics of their team were not compatible with Sogrape's teams.

Geographical sourcing plays a more practical role. By prioritising ecosystems and geographies that are strategically relevant, the company can focus its attention on startup environments that are easier to monitor and more connected to its business priorities. This

does not mean excluding opportunities from other locations. Instead, it makes the search more disciplined and manageable. For a company exposed to many potential startup opportunities, some degree of focus is necessary; otherwise, openness can easily become scattered and reactive.

By contrast, brand investment and follow-on guidelines are more clearly connected to the venture capital side. The brand investment criterion concerns the type of startup the company is willing to invest in, especially by avoiding pure brand-driven startups that may require significant and recurring capital without offering a clear technological or strategic innovation component. The follow-on guideline is also investment-oriented, since it relates to the need to reserve capital for future funding rounds and avoid excessive dilution after the initial investment.

7.5. From Pilot to Implementation: Internal Adoption and Organisational Conditions

The pilot process shows that Sogrape is already concerned with internal alignment, in the way that several mechanisms reduce the risk of launching pilots without a clear organisational basis. From the beginning, the people involved in a pilot are organised through a RASCI model (Cabanillas et al., 2011, 2012). This helps identify not only who participates during the pilot, but also who would need to remain involved if the solution moved forward. In addition, nowadays, pilots do not usually begin if the relevant internal teams do not see value in the solution and Sogrape tries to understand the potential post-pilot budget before the pilot starts, and success metrics are normally defined in advance.

These practices are close to the stage-gate logic discussed by Kurpjuweit and Wagner (2020), where the pilot is not treated as an isolated experiment but as part of a path that may lead to sourcing, further development, another type of collaboration or termination. They also relate to Basu et al. (2016) and Homfeldt et al. (2019), because the central issue is not only whether the startup idea is attractive, but whether it can be integrated into the organisation that is expected to use it.

For this reason, the main difficulty does not seem to be a lack of pre-pilot preparation. The more precise challenge appears after the pilot evidence is produced, since some pilots considered successful did not become implemented solutions afterwards. The reasons were

not purely technical. In some cases, as mentioned above, the startup team did not fully meet expectations, in others, the business unit did not show enough interest to continue. Budget was also a recurring barrier. This is where Klein and Sorra's (1996) distinction between adoption and implementation becomes especially useful. Deciding that a solution is promising is not the same as creating the organisational conditions for people to use it consistently.

The same point is reinforced by Markham et al. (2005), Blanka and Traunmüller (2020), and De Groote and Backmann (2020). These authors are useful here because they draw attention to accountability, resources, decision authority and internal commitment. In Sogrape, the RASCI model and the use of success metrics already address part of this problem. However, the difficulty of moving from a successful pilot to implementation suggests that the post-pilot decision still depends heavily on whether the business unit has enough commitment, budget and operational capacity to continue.

Sogrape's recent experience illustrates this tension well. Since the beginning of the pilot programme, only one project moved from pilot to adoption (during the internship period), even though it was initially at risk, mainly because of budget constraints. It only became viable after Sogrape negotiated better conditions. At the same time, there was some hesitation because another startup was more mature, already had larger clients and already offered some of the desired features. Nevertheless, its price was above what Sogrape was expecting, which led the company to continue with the first startup. The adoption decision was therefore not based only on whether the pilot had worked. It involved a practical comparison between maturity, price, feature readiness, adaptability and strategic fit.

This example also helps nuance the literature on startup maturity. Kanbach and Stubner (2016), Simon et al. (2019), Enkel and Sagmeister (2020a), and Minshall et al. (2010) help explain why maturity can be attractive when the corporation needs a reliable partner or a more ready-to-use solution. A more mature startup may reduce uncertainty, offer more developed features and provide greater confidence to internal users. However, Sogrape's choice shows that maturity is not decisive on its own. Price, fit and adaptability still matter. A less mature startup may be preferable if it is more flexible, more affordable and more willing to adapt to the company's needs. This is consistent with De Groote and Backmann's (2020) broader argument that startup evaluation involves both the project and the partner.

Sogrape also appears to be learning from previous experience. In the past, the innovation team pushed more strongly for pilots, sometimes before business-unit commitment was fully secured. This helped create experimentation, but it also increased the risk that pilots would move forward without a clear internal customer ready to adopt the solution afterwards. More recently, business units have started to gain more ownership and become more involved in the process. This evolution is important because the main challenge is not only the relationship between the company and the startup, but also the relationship between the Innovation Department and the internal units that must support, fund or use the solution.

This is where Seran and Bez (2021) are particularly relevant. Their work highlights the importance of internal coordination in corporate-startup collaboration. In Sogrape, the Innovation Department acts as a bridge, but the success of a startup project relies on whether the relevant business unit sees the solution as its own and is willing to allocate attention and resources. Without that internal ownership, the pilot may remain an Innovation Department project rather than becoming a business solution.

Weissenberger-Eibl and Hampel (2021) also help explain this issue because they focus on what happens after external knowledge has been identified. Sogrape's experience shows that a startup solution must become understandable, credible and usable internally. A positive pilot is not enough if the route to implementation remains unclear. The business unit must trust the startup, understand the value of the solution, have the resources to implement it and be willing to change its existing routines or suppliers. Otherwise, the project can lose momentum even after promising results.

7.6. Summary of the comparison

Overall, Sogrape is aligned with several important ideas from the literature. It uses startups as external sources of knowledge, recognises different collaboration routes, applies criteria that protect strategic fit and sector relevance, and is gradually building more structured sourcing and pilot routines. It confirms that open innovation does not create value simply because a firm gains access to external ideas, but that its value depends on the firm's ability to select relevant partners, connect them with internal needs, create accountability around pilots and build the organisational conditions needed to turn tested solutions into implemented innovation. In Table 6, a comparison with the context from the previously constructed Table 5, as a result of the analysis of Sogrape's case.

Literature topic	Main idea from the literature	Sogrape's case
Collaboration modes	Firms can collaborate with external actors through different models: CVC, Corporate Incubation, Outside-in (Corporate Accelerator and Startup Supplier Program) and Platform Startup Programs (Weiblen & Chesbrough, 2015; Kurpjuweit & Wagner, 2020)	CVC + Startup Supplier Program
Startup sourcing and selection	The model structures collaboration as a staged process that progressively filters startups from initial identification to internal validation, pilot testing and potential supplier integration (Kurpjuweit & Wagner, 2020)	Innovation Flow structures the innovation process in a broad way, covering different types of innovation and providing less operational detail on each phase.
Startup criteria for selection	The company must assess both the attractiveness of the project and the suitability of the startup as a partner, considering aspects such as strategic relevance, technological fit, maturity, market readiness, commitment and risk profile (De Groote & Backmann, 2020; Kurpjuweit et al., 2021).	Criteria for pilots: strategic scope, team and founder quality, robust business plan (maturity) and geographical sourcing.
Internal matchmaking and business-unit involvement	It is important to create a bridge between the startup ecosystem and the corporation's internal units. Innovation teams help translate startup solutions into internal needs and connect them with business units that have a concrete use cases and willingness to support the collaboration (Weiblen & Chesbrough, 2015; Gutmann et al., 2019; Napp & Minshall, 2011; Kurpjuweit & Wagner, 2020; Seran & Bez, 2021).	Pilots do not begin if the business unit does not find a clear use case and the Innovation Team is responsible for the startup-business unit connection.
Pilot implementation and organizational conditions	A pilot should not be treated as the final objective, but as a testing stage. Moving from pilot to implementation depends on clear success metrics, governance, accountability, budget, internal coordination, openness to external knowledge and commitment from the units that will use the solution (Kurpjuweit & Wagner, 2020; Klein & Sorra, 1996; Markham et al., 2005; Burcharth et al., 2014; Weissenberger-Eibl & Hampel, 2021)	Pilots use RASCI, predefined success metrics and early budget discussion. However, post-pilot implementation still depends on business-unit ownership, available budget and operational capacity. So far, only one pilot has moved to adoption, showing that successful testing does not automatically lead to implementation.

Table 6. Summary of the Comparison (own elaboration)

8. Recommendations for Improving Startup Collaboration and Pilot Conversion

The comparison with Sogrape indicates that the primary issue is no longer simply how to become more open to startups: the more important question is how to make this openness more selective, more internally owned and more likely to result in implemented innovation.

At present, many startup opportunities reach the company through events, startup databases or direct contact from startups. This keeps the Innovation Department exposed to unexpected technologies, but it can also make the process reactive. In some cases, an interesting startup may be identified before the internal problem, expected value and adoption conditions have been fully clarified. Although business units are already involved before pilots are launched, validating a pilot is not the same as being ready to adopt the solution later. A business unit may accept a pilot because the idea appears promising and the initial burden is low, while still being unwilling to allocate budget, adjust routines or integrate the solution after the test.

This difficulty was visible in a pilot project from last year. In that case, “the project was identified as an example of a pilot initiative driven primarily by the innovation team, without there being a sufficiently high-priority need for the business unit, which hampered its scalability” (Sogrape Vinhos, 2026q, p.5). The case illustrates a broader risk in the current model: when the Innovation Department carries most of the initial cost, business units may agree to test solutions that they are not prepared to own because it is free, even without being fully convinced. As a result, even a technically successful pilot may fail to become an implemented solution.

For this reason, the first adjustment should concern pilot funding. The company could introduce a co-funded model in which the Innovation Department continues to support experimentation, but the relevant business unit contributes with part of the pilot cost. For example, Innovation could cover 70 or 80 per cent, while the business unit covers the remaining 20 or 30 per cent. The contribution should remain moderate, because the objective is not to discourage experimentation. Rather, the aim is to create enough “skin in the game” for business units to support only pilots they consider genuinely relevant. Kurpjuweit and Wagner’s (2020) RailCo case supports this logic, as business units were more willing to

collaborate with startups when startup relationship managers brought part of the budget for the collaboration stage.

This change would help filter pilots that are unlikely to convert, however, co-funding also creates a risk. In a context where the absolute number of conversions is already low, asking business units to contribute financially could lead to even fewer pilots. This would improve selectivity, but it could also reinforce business-unit hesitation toward startup collaboration if no complementary mechanism is introduced.

This is where challenge briefs become important. Their role should not be only to define problems, but also to create more informed business-unit demand before the co-funding decision is made. The company could introduce annual briefs jointly defined by the Innovation Department and selected business units. These briefs should be bilateral: business units would identify relevant problems, operational constraints and adoption conditions, while the Innovation Department would help them understand where startup collaboration could be useful by bringing examples, technologies and sector-specific opportunities that may not yet be visible internally.

Each brief should focus on a limited number of priority problems linked to the sector challenges discussed in Section 2. It should define the problem, the internal owner, the budget available, the type of solution being searched for, the minimum conditions for adoption and the resources that the business unit would be willing to commit if the pilot succeeds. This is consistent with Kurpjuweit and Wagner's (2020) startup supplier logic, where startup search is most valuable when it is connected to real business-unit needs and potential internal customers. In this model, the Innovation Department would not simply search for interesting startups and ask the teams later, but it would help business units translate relevant problems into startup collaboration opportunities.

Many industry examples such as Packamama's flat wine bottles, adopted by producers such as Taylors and Accolade, show how startup collaboration can be very successful (Carr, 2022). The Innovation Department would then have the special responsibility of transmitting this message to the business units that would consequently develop spontaneous and genuine interest in engaging with startups.

The co-funding model and the challenge briefs should therefore reinforce each other. Co-funding would test whether business-unit interest is serious enough to justify a pilot, while challenge briefs would help build that interest in the first place. Together, they would reduce pilots with weak adoption prospects without simply closing the door to experimentation.

Only once this model is more mature should the company consider a more structured corporate accelerator-type solution. A realistic and potentially interesting first step would be to partner with an external accelerator or incubator specialised in agrifood, sustainability or wine-related technologies. Through this partnership, the company could develop startup challenges linked to the sector issues discussed earlier, while relying on the external partner for scouting, startup selection and early solution development.

The case of E. & J. Gallo Winery supports this gradual approach. Gallo, one of the most established wine companies in the United States, partnered with SVG Ventures-THRIVE to access and speed up disruptive technologies within the wine sector (SVG Ventures, 2019). The partnership was linked to concrete business needs, as Gallo stated that it was looking for new ways to improve efficiency, respond to growing demand and adapt to changing consumer preferences. THRIVE's model also reinforces this logic, as it focuses on addressing industry challenges, testing solutions in the field and along the supply chain, building ecosystem partnerships and reducing the time needed to bring innovation to market. The case is therefore relevant because it shows how a wine company can use an external innovation platform to access specialised startup capabilities without necessarily developing all scouting and acceleration capabilities internally.

Another interesting case is the LVMH case as it illustrates what a more internalised model can look like at a later stage. LVMH is a large luxury group with several Wines & Spirits Maisons, and La Maison des Startups is its corporate accelerator. LVMH describes the programme as a mechanism for bringing startups, experts and Maisons together around pilots and real-world applications, with workshops, hands-on sessions and cross-Maison collaboration used to accelerate adoption and develop longer-term partnerships. Its relevance is therefore not simply that LVMH has an accelerator, but that the accelerator is connected to internal users, business needs and scaling opportunities (LVMH, n.d.a., n.d.b).

Taken together, these elements support a progressive path. The first step would be to make pilots more selective through moderate business-unit co-funding. The second would be to

use bilateral challenge briefs to generate better-defined problems and stronger internal demand for startup collaboration. Once this process is working, an external accelerator partnership could help the company develop more specialised startup challenges and manage a broader pipeline. Only if that experience generated useful pilots, active business-unit engagement and evidence of implementation potential should the company consider building its own corporate accelerator or internal startup lab.

9. Conclusion

This report analysed how corporate-startup collaboration can support innovation in the wine sector and how this process can be better structured within Sogrape. The analysis showed that, in a sector increasingly affected by climate instability, sustainability pressures, changing consumer preferences and growing regulatory demands, open innovation can help wine companies access external knowledge, technologies and business solutions that may be difficult to develop internally.

However, the report also highlighted that collaboration with startups does not create value automatically. Identifying promising startups or launching pilot projects is only one part of the process. For these collaborations to generate meaningful impact, they need to be connected to the company's strategic priorities, operational needs and internal decision-making structures.

A central conclusion is that the post-pilot stage is particularly important. Without clear responsibility, business unit involvement and predefined evaluation criteria, promising pilots may lose momentum before they are adopted or scaled. Therefore, the innovation team should not only act as a bridge between Sogrape and external startups, but also as a facilitator of internal alignment, ensuring that the right departments are involved from an early stage.

In that context, the proposed guidelines aim to make the startup collaboration process more structured and transparent. The first is introducing a moderate co-funding model for pilot projects, ensuring business units share part of the cost and demonstrate commitment. The second is creating bilateral challenge briefs with business units to make startup scouting more focused and problem driven. The third is adopting a gradual approach to accelerator initiatives, starting with external partnerships before considering an internal accelerator.

On a personal level, the internship was also a highly enriching experience. It allowed me gain knowledge through a real organizational context, understand more clearly how innovation processes work in practice and observe the challenges involved in turning ideas into implemented solutions. It contributed significantly to my professional development and my understanding of how innovation can be managed inside an established company.

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
Annex

Figure 11. Innovation Radar (Source: Intranet)

Centro de recursos Innovation Radar ☆ ⓘ					
Headline	Full Article / S...	Article	Theme (Keywords)	Publish Date ↓	Country/Region
Casal Garcia lança Fruitzy 0% e entra na categoria de bebidas sem álcool	Grande Consumo	- Casal Garcia is entering the non-alcoholic drinks market with the launch of Casal Garcia Fruitzy 0%; - Available in Strawberry and Passion Fruit flavours, the new range is a light and refreshing option, alcohol-free and containing just 17 kcal per 100 ml.	Novelty Low / No-Alcohol	25/06/2026	Portugal
Um em cada 10 consome bebidas alcoólicas pré-preparadas	Grande Consumo	- 10.3% of Portuguese adults consumed pre-mixed alcoholic drinks in 2024. - This represents around 736,000 consumers. - Consumption reached its highest level in ten years. - Penetration is highest among people aged 25–34, at 19.7%. - Women show 65% greater affinity for these drinks than men. - The trend highlights growing demand for convenient, ready-to-drink formats.	Ready to Drink (...) Trends	17/06/2026	Portugal
Consumo mundial de álcool deverá recuar na próxima década	Grande Consumo	- Global alcohol consumption is expected to decline until 2031, before gradually recovering. - By 2035, global volumes should remain 1% below 2025 levels. - Wine will face the sharpest decline, with volumes forecast to fall by 14%. - RTDs will outperform traditional categories, growing by an estimated 17%. - Consumption will shift from mature markets towards emerging economies, particularly India. - Health concerns, moderation and demand for convenience and lower-alcohol options are reshaping the market.	Trends	15/06/2026	Worldwide
Vetropack unveils 'Europe's lightest' Rhinewine bottle alongside new reusable variant	Food Bev	- Vetropack launched what it claims is Europe's lightest 750ml Rhine wine bottle. - It weighs only 350g while retaining the standard bottle dimensions. - Around 80% of the bottle is made from recycled glass. - Its lower weight reduces emissions, material use and transport costs. - Vetropack also introduced a returnable bottle for Austria's new reuse system. - Local production and shorter transport routes further reduce its environmental footprint.	Packaging Sustainability	15/06/2026	Austria
Absolut named vodka partner of Madonna's new	The Spirits	- Absolut is the official vodka partner of Madonna's new album.	Celebrity	12/06/2026	United States of...

Figures 12. Research about the 2026 Challenges (Example of Challenge 2 – Part 1) (Sogrape Vinhos, 2026c)

Waste valorization



Figures 13. Research about the 2026 Challenges (Example of Challenge 2 – Part 2) (Sogrape Vinhos, 2026c)

Waste valorization

How might we **map by-products and convert them into value** (ingredients, biomaterials, energy) through quick-win pilots and partners - measuring viability and impact?

To move quickly and safely: use **strategic partners + pilot projects** to test conversion routes with limited investment.

REDWine

- REDWine is an EU circular-economy project that turns winery "waste streams" into value, focusing on fermentation CO₂ and winery effluents as inputs
- It captures biogenic CO₂ from wine fermentation and uses it (together with treated liquid effluents) to cultivate microalgae (Chlorella)
- The output is microalgae biomass and extracts that can be valorised in food/ingredients, cosmetics, and agriculture
- The solution is tested in a real-world "living lab" pilot in Palmela (Adega Cooperativa de Palmela), aiming to prove technical + economic + environmental viability and reduce the sector's footprint

Figures 14. Research about the 2026 Challenges (Example of Challenge 2 – Part 3) (Sogrape Vinhos, 2026c)



Description:

Biomaterials startup that transforms grape marc from winemaking into high-value plant-based materials for fashion, design and lifestyle applications.

<https://www.planetofthegrapes.fr/>

Highlights

France 

Brands:

Agaperos
Ceci n'était pas un animal
Cassis Mehari Club

Sogrape's interest:

- Valuing Sogrape's own waste: transforming a by-product into an input for a premium material
- Brand differentiation and experience
- Sustainability Team

Waste valorization 




Figure 15. Research about the Single-serve solution (Part 1) (Sogrape Vinhos, 2026d)

Single-serve wine formats




Figure 16. Research about the Single-serve solution (Part 2) (Sogrape Vinhos, 2026d)

flakon.

PARIS

Description:

Flakon is a French wine and spirits company positioned around premium tasting experiences, offering curated discovery boxes built around small-format flacons designed for sampling rather than standard full-size bottles. The brand emphasizes access to rare and high-end wines and spirits, guided tasting through video content, and a gift-oriented experience, with its format explicitly presented as a sharing and discovery tool, since one flakon corresponds to two tasting glasses.

<https://flakon.fr/>

Wine kits:

- The Great Reds of France
- French Rare Wines
- The Great Wines of the World
- Wine Advent Calendar

Spirits kits:

- Rare Whiskies
- Rare Rums
- 24 Whiskies from around the World (Avent Calendar)

Some brands:

- | | | |
|--------------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------|
| • Chateau Maison Blanche | • Domaine des Ouled Thaleb | • Domaine Camille Braun |
| • Domaine du Coulet | • Weingut Wittmann | • Egiategia |
| • Roche de Bellene | • Villa Maria | • Domaine Grand |
| • Mas del Pèrie | • Casarena | • Domaine des Bernardins |

Pricing:

- One kit from 60€ to 110€
- Advent Calendar for 170€

Country of origin:

- France 




Figure 17. Research about the Single-serve solution (Part 3) (Sogrape Vinhos, 2026d)



Description:

One Glass Wine is a French packaging technology company rather than a traditional wine brand: it develops, manufactures, and sells filling lines and patented ready-to-drink single-serve wine glasses for wine and spirits producers. Its core offer is a packaging system designed to preserve the wine's original taste and aroma without additives or preservatives, while helping clients create convenient, portable, single-glass formats for retail, hospitality, and on-the-go consumption.

<https://oneglasswine.com/>

Features:

- PET material
- Solutions for 187 ml drinks
- Can retain the organoleptic qualities of the wine for up to 12 months
- Are 100% recyclable and unbreakable warranty

Important Insights:

- Both WIAG and Copa di Vino are examples of brands that used their services present on OGW's website

Country of origin:

- France



Figure 18. Trends Report – Benchmark (Part 1) (Sogrape Vinhos, 2026e)

1. The Wellness Revolution

1. Mindful Drinking Movement



HEINEKEN supports mindful drinking by positioning HEINEKEN 0.0 as a normal, confident choice rather than something that needs an excuse. Through its ["0.0 Reasons Needed"](#) campaign, the brand challenges the idea that people only choose alcohol-free beer when they are driving, dieting, or working, helping make moderation feel more socially accepted, modern, and lifestyle-driven.



Asahi promotes this by expanding its non- and low-alcohol portfolio and framing moderation as a positive lifestyle choice rather than a compromise. Through its [Smart Drinking](#) approach, the company offers consumers more options for different occasions, helps reduce alcohol intake, and creates more inclusive drinking experiences, such as its Sumadori bar in Japan, where people can choose drinks with different alcohol levels.



Diageo supports mindful drinking through a combination of education and brand-led moderation campaigns. Through its [DRINKIQ platform](#), the company provides consumers with information to make more informed drinking choices, while initiatives such as [The Magic of Moderate Drinking](#) and [Fancy That!](#) help make moderation feel more aspirational, socially accepted, and easier to understand in practice.



Figure 19. Trends Report – Benchmark (Part 2) (Sogrape Vinhos, 2026e)

4. New Rituals



1. Daytime Social Sips

CHANDON

CHANDON supports the “daytime social sips” trend by designing sparkling wine around brunch, garden gatherings and sunlit social occasions rather than formal evening rituals. In 2026, it introduced a new CHANDON Spritz, hosted a Club Brunch Social, and built a calendar of garden parties centered on sparkling wine, food and easy daytime conviviality.



CLUB BRUNCH SOCIAL

LA MARCA PROSECCO

La Marca Prosecco supports the “daytime social sips” trend by consistently positioning sparkling wine around brunch-led, casual social occasions rather than formal evening celebration. Through recent brand content such as “How to Host Brunch” and its mimosa-focused storytelling, La Marca frames Prosecco as an easy, stylish choice for relaxed daytime entertaining and lighter social rituals.



Brunch Brilliantly

Cupcake Vineyards

Cupcake Vineyards supports the “daytime social sips” trend by explicitly linking its sparkling range to brunch-led, casual daytime entertaining. Its current “Brunch Starts with Bubbles” platform presents the brand’s sparkling wines as “perfect for brunching,” framing them as approachable, sociable choices for relaxed daytime moments rather than formal evening-only occasions.



Brunch Starts with Bubbles

Figure 20. Presence at SIM Conference



Figure 21. Events' Presentations (Part 1) (Sogrape Vinhos, 2026g)




Figure 22. Events' Presentations (Part 2) (Sogrape Vinhos, 2026f)

Trends 2026 Portugal Foods

Trends 2026

Trends 2026 is a conference dedicated to strategic reflection on the future of the agri-food sector.

Organized by Portugal Foods, it is aimed at professionals, companies, and entities that closely follow the evolution of the sector and seek to align innovation, knowledge, and strategy with real growth opportunities.

It took place on February 10, at the Dr. António Cupertino de Miranda Foundation.



2

Highlights from Trends' panels

Internationalization Strategy of the Agrifood Sector 2030

Key Learnings:

Exports almost doubled in 9 years

- Spain leads the list of the main destinations for Portuguese exports
- Brazil and the US are the only non-European markets in the top 10
- The top 10 destinations do not include two of the world's 10 largest importers: China (22nd destination for Portuguese exports in this sector) and Japan (15th destination for these exports)
- All top 10 markets increased exports in 2024 when compared to 2019
- Spain with increasing relevance

Wines from fresh grapes in the top 2 of exports in the agrifood sector

Market Segmentation for Food and Beverage

- Strategic: Germany, US, France, UK, Japan
- Consolidation: Spain, Brazil, The Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, Poland
- Reinforcement: Italy, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Austria, Canada
- Selective betting: China, Emirates, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Singapore
- To evaluate opening: Africa, South America (highlight: Mercosur), Southeast Asia, India

Germany and Japan: Highlights

- Growing imports in these countries, but Portugal is staying behind

Importance of collective actions to gain scale



Figure 23. Event's mapping (Sogrape Vinhos, 2026h)

	A	B	C	D	E	F
1	EVENTS					
2	Regional Scope	Event	Website	Date	Location	Focus
3	Outside Europe	16th International Conference of the Academy of Wine Business Research (AWBR)	https://adelaide.edu.au/about/events/2026/awbr2026/	03-06/02/2026	National Wine Centre, Adelaide, South Australia	A major academic conference focusing on wine business research.
4		ProWine Tokyo	https://prowine-tokyo.com/en/	15-17/04/2026	Tokyo, Japan	A leading trade fair for wine and spirits in the Japanese and broader Asian market.
5		FHA Food & Beverage	https://www.foodhotelasia.com/	21-24/04/2026	Singapore EXPO	Reunites Food & Beverage, HoReCa, and ProWine into one comprehensive event. Includes specialized zones, expert panels, and the Young Chefs Grand Prix. Focus Areas: Emerging brands, global suppliers, food manufacturing technologies, and innovative, sustainable products.
6		RAW WINE Tokyo	https://www.rawwine.com/fairs/tokyo-2026	10-11/05/2026	Tokyo, Japan	Focuses on low-intervention, natural, organic, and biodynamic wines.
7		Vinexpo Asia 2026	https://vinexpoasia.com/newfront	26-28/05/2026	Hong Kong Convention and Exhibition Centre (HKCEC)	The premier B2B trade show for wine and spirits professionals in Asia-Pacific, featuring the "Vinexpo Academy" with over 40 sessions, Be Spirits, and Be No (no-alcohol) showcases.
8		Australian Wine Roadshow China 2026	https://www.wineaustralia.com/whats-happening/events/china-roadshow-2026	01-05/06/2026	Beijing, Nanjing, and Changsha	Specifically targeted at expanding Australian wine presence in China following Vinexpo Asia.
9		James Suckling Great Wines World (Asia Tour)	https://www.james-suckling.com/wine-tasting-reports/james-suckling-announces-schedule-for-2026-global-wine-events	10/28/2026	Bangkok	High-end, curated tastings for industry professionals and consumers.
10				10/30/2026	Hong Kong	
11				11/2/2026	Seoul	
12				11/4/2026	Tokyo	
13		ProWine Shanghai 2026	https://www.prowine-shanghai.com/en/	10-12/11/2026	Shanghai, China	A major, established trade fair for the Chinese wine market.
14		ProWine Mumbai 2026	https://www.prowine.in/	18-19/11/2026	Mumbai, India	Key trade event for the emerging Indian market.

Figure 24. Startup Radar (Sogrape Vinhos, 2026i)

	A	E	F	G	H	I	J
1	Startup Name	Description	Country	Vertical	Startup Life Cycle	Funding raised (equity), in euros	Actively looking for equity funding?
96	Planet of the grapes	Biomaterials startup that transforms grape marc from winemaking into high-value plant-based materials for fashion, design and lifestyle applications.	France	Adjacencies	Seed (€100K - €1M)	No information available	Yes
97	Brame	Provides a no-code gamification marketing platform that helps brands build interactive campaigns to boost customer engagement, conversions, and loyalty.	Switzerland	Marketing	Series B (€10M - €25M)	0	No
98	Yalt	Mobile app that simplifies and rewards grocery shopping by letting users scan products to earn rewards, discover offers, and manage loyalty benefits all in one place.	Portugal	Marketing	Seed (€100K - €1M)	0	Not confirmed
99	Circea	Circea is focused on upcycling biogenic CO ₂ side-streams, especially from alcoholic fermentation. Its proposition combines CO ₂ recovery, purification, and compression technology with a local circular-economy model that links CO ₂ producers, such as wineries, with downstream industrial and food-and-beverage uses.	Switzerland	Adjacencies	Seed (€100K - €1M)	6.6M	No
100	Beaver Nexus	Its solution is designed to process cellulose-rich residues directly at the source and produce biochar and related outputs through pyrolysis, with the company positioning this as a way to combine waste valorization, soil systems.	The Netherlands	Adjacencies	Series A (€1M - €10M)	27.2M	No
101	Optagon Labs	Focused on R&D and scale-up infrastructure for manufacturers, with an explicit first focus on food and beverage. Public company descriptions say it is building an "AI scientist" that takes technical product requirements such as flavor, texture, or shelf life and returns feasible formulations within manufacturing and supply-chain constraints.	Germany	Production	Seed (€100K - €1M)		Not confirmed
▲	M	N			O	P	
1	Date	Feedback			Stepwise Decision	Next Steps	
96	3/16/2026	Strongly aligned with the waste valorization challenge, by converting vineyard by-products into premium materials, with potential to reinforce brand differentiation and storytelling. Worth contacting, with potential for a pilot and/or investment.			ARCHIVED	Contact was made via the Sogrape Ventures email. An initial meeting was held. The founder did not yet have a clearly defined business case.	
97	3/16/2026	This is a more mature solution, with use cases involving well-known brands (Heineken, KFC, Lindt, Nespresso, McDonald's, among others). From an investment perspective, the company may already be too developed, but it does show potential for a pilot. The value proposition is similar to Tavora's. Contact to assess the possibility of a pilot, bearing in mind that the fit for investment may be limited.			CONTACT ESTABLISHED	Contacted via Sogrape Ventures email. Without answer.	
98	3/16/2026	Although more oriented towards small businesses, the value proposition partially fits the consumer engagement challenge and could be interesting for a simple proof of concept.			NOT PRIORITY	May be worth requesting the deck to understand the solution's flexibility.	
99	4/27/2026	Even though there's a high alignment with Sogrape's criteria and goals, it's a no go since a similar solution was already analyzed and disconsidered due to a high CAPEX. Similar to Enoengineering, but keep on radar.			NO GO		
100	4/27/2026	No-go. It's a really important topic. We were recently in touch with Agrophenols, which also produces biochar, but R&D is currently working on a European consortium for Embedded (a project on the same topic), so there's no point in pursuing this startup.			NO GO		
101	4/27/2026	No-go, as this does not appear to be a strategic priority for the business at this stage. Keep on radar.			NOT PRIORITY	Keep on radar	

Figure 25. Established contact with startups (Source: Outbox ventures@sogrape.pt)

Le 06/04/2026 11:27 CEST, Ventures SOGRAPE <ventures@sogrape.pt> a écrit :

Dear Planet Of The Grapes Team,

We are reaching out on behalf of [Sogrape Ventures](#), a €5M early-stage CVC fund based in Portugal. We invest in disruptive startups across the wine value chain, as well as innovative solutions within the broader drinks industry. The fund is backed by [Sogrape](#), a family-owned global wine company with extensive operations in viticulture, winemaking, and international distribution, and is managed by [Beta Capital](#), an independent VC company, with vast experience and a global network.

We recently came across with Planet Of The Grapes, and we're looking forward to understanding your solution/project and how it might align with our focus areas.

As part of our initial screening process, we typically review a short pitch deck to better understand the strategic fit, value proposition, traction, and team before determining next steps.

If possible, could you please share your most recent deck or any relevant materials?

Thank you in advance and we look forward to learning more about what you're building.

Best regards,
Beatriz Sá

Sogrape Ventures



Sogrape

Rua 5 de outubro, 4527, 4430-809, Avintes, Portugal

Figure 26. Example of a pilot's detailed PowerPoint Presentations (Part 1) (Sogrape Vinhos, 2026k)

Context

CORKIFIED

[Corkified](#) is an online platform facilitator that enables its users to receive selected, curated content on the wines and wine related, maintain an automated digital wine catalogue, and verify the authenticity of a particular wine and receive wine information updated via its own mobile app



AMORIM CORK


[See slides 21 – 24 to see more details](#)

[Amorim Cork](#) is the world's largest producer, supplier and distributor of cork stoppers. Starting from a unique, 100% natural and sustainable material, they use state-of-the-art technology, ground-breaking quality control and solid expertise to create the finest cork stoppers in the world

They have joined forces in a partnership to make Amorim's corks smart, by installing an RFID chip on the corks (without impacting the cork characteristics)

How is Sogrape involved with
Corkified & Amorim?

Corkified and Corticeira Amorim wanted to validate the solution through a wine producer perspective. Sogrape was considered a relevant partner to assess its suitability, performance, and potential application in practice.

Figure 27. Example of a pilot's detailed PowerPoint Presentations (Part 2) (Sogrape Vinhos, 2026k)

Pilot Implementation

The bottles were distributed in the Avintes' Lounge, where the pilot was designed to reflect different levels of consumer guidance. Some of the employees received no instructions on how the cork application worked, while the others were given guidance beforehand. This distinction was intended to provide a clearer understanding of how the solution might perform in a more realistic market setting, particularly in situations where end consumers, such as supermarket customers, may or may not receive prior explanation on how to use the product.




Figure 28. Example of test cards and analysis (Sogrape Vinhos, 2026k)

Test	Hypothesis	Criteria	Results	
NFC process	We believe that the NFC authentication is simple, intuitive and easy for consumers that received help	We are right if the average number of attempts is ≤ 3	81,1% tried ≤ 3 times	Validated
		We are right if $\leq 15\%$ report being unable to read the tag	3,8%	Validated
		We are right if the average ease-of-use rating is ≥ 4	3,75	Invalidated
	We believe that the NFC authentication is simple, intuitive and easy for consumers that did not received help	We are right if the average number of attempts is ≤ 3	100% tried ≤ 3 times	Validated
		We are right if $\leq 25\%$ report being unable to read the tag	0%	Validated
		We are right if the average ease-of-use rating is ≥ 4	4,41	Validated
App's usability	We believe that user that received help during find the app easy to navigate, visually appealing and performant	We are right if the average ease-of-navigation score is ≥ 4	4,41	Validated
		We are right if $\geq 80\%$ of users rate navigation performance as 4 or 5	84,6%	Validated
		We are right if the average visual appeal score is ≥ 4	3,94	Invalidated
		We are right if the average performance speed score is ≥ 4	4,06	Validated
	We believe that user that did not received help during find the app easy to navigate, visually appealing and performant	We are right if the average ease-of-navigation score is ≥ 4	4,27	Validated
		We are right if $\geq 70\%$ of users rate navigation performance as 4 or 5	86,4%	Validated
		We are right if the average visual appeal score is ≥ 4	4,14	Validated
		We are right if the average performance speed score is ≥ 4	4,14	Validated

Validated Invalidated Partially validated

Figure 29. Innovation Day (Part 1) (Sogrape Vinhos, 2026m)

Exploring Sogrape's first pilots

What is it?

Throughout 2024, the Innovation Team has designed a pilot's program to accelerate the knowledge transfer from startups to within Sogrape. In 2025, the first pilots are starting to take place, and the Innovation Week is a perfect occasion to present them to Sogrape's community. Each startup will present their solution and how the pilot is being implemented at Sogrape (if possible, with the first insights).

When is it?

4th June 2025

Where is it?

Avintes' Lounge

People involved:

- AssetFlow
- Entrii.AI

Attendees:

Open to all employees, enrolment required

Direct invitation to Innovation Committee, GLT and Head Of's

Figure 30. Innovation Day (Part 2)



Figure 31. Preparation of the workshop (Part 1) (Sogrape Vinhos, 2026n)

Tópicos
Novos formatos de produto
SOGRAPE

O que é que a Sogrape deve explorar?



"(...) as bebidas RTD continuarão a registar um forte crescimento, prevendo-se que a categoria registre um **aumento de 17% em volume na próxima década.**"

The Drinks Business, 2026

"Os **formatos pequenos estão a permitir a experimentação em grande escala. Mais de 30% dos compradores** afirmam que utilizam formatos pequenos para experimentar novos produtos antes de se comprometerem a comprar uma garrafa inteira."

NIQ, 2025

"Mercado europeu de bebidas passa por uma "reestruturação", com **71% dos consumidores a beberem menos álcool.**"

Beverage Daily, 2025

Figure 32. Preparation of the workshop (Part 2) (Sogrape Vinhos, 2026n)

Tópicos
Novos formatos de produto
SOGRAPE

Garrafas 500ml

Ideal para duas pessoas partilharem



Vinho a copo/ single serve

Conveniência a partir de qualquer lugar



Bag-in-box premium

Vinho premium num formato mais prático e sustentável



Packs de degustação

Uma seleção pensada para descobrir novos sabores



Vinho em cápsulas / mini formato

Conveniência e controlo em cada prova



Figure 33. Preparation of the workshop (Part 3) (Sogrape Vinhos, 2026n)

