working title.

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making theory in art education with opacity,
making art education with textual pedagogical gestures

a doctoral thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Art Education

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resumo

Esta tese argumenta que uma especificidade na linguagem de teoria de educação artística fá-la concomitantemente pedagógica e teórica. O meu interesse prevalente é o de abordar tal especificidade para demonstrá-la e praticá-la: actuando-a para fazer sentido dos seus limites. Daí, escrevo predominantemente com textos usando esta linguagem. Argumento que tais teorias são parte da prática da educação artística. O sobrepor de teoria e prática é o meio para investigação, salientado como gestos textuais pedagógicos: escrever enquanto pedagogia.

Os textos principalmente abordados são por Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Édouard Glissant, Gert Biesta, jan jagodzinski, Dennis Atkinson. Faço dois argumentos chave. Primeiro, as escritas de Rousseau, Biesta, jagodzinski, Atkinson, estão entrelaçadas pela atribuição de uma tarefa reveladora ao trabalho pedagógico quando perante opacidade, visando desvelar clareza e afastando a perda de inteligibilidade. Afirmo que isto depende de uma alternância entre opacidade e clareza. Segundo, contendo que tal alternância molda o encontro com arte: uma expectativa reveladora é depositada sobre a opacidade da arte. Encontros opacos com arte são considerados frutíferos pelo que podem revelar. Argumento que isto estreita a imaginação do trabalho teórico, focando-se nesse fim.

Para colocar tal alternância em questão, uso a escrita de Glissant, nomeadamente sobre opacidade — irredutível —, que contrasto com obscuridade — momentânea. Assim, postulo teoria de educação artística como leitura de opacidade enquanto obscuridade. Alego que isto torna aceitável depositar expectativa em arte, relacionando-o com uma preocupação Continental de obtenção de significado. Teoricamente, uso o contributo de Glissant para questionar este legado: recusando teorizar como o reduzir do seu referencial opaco. Isto é para propor um fazer de teoria que enfatize o seu singular fazer em detrimento de sentido: teoria tem de ser feita e portanto abordada nos seus fazeres. Fundamentalmente, isto é para propor considerar textos teóricos enquanto obras de arte: práticas criativas singulares cujas linguagens são feitas estranhas.

palavras-chave:

escrever pedagogia; fazer teoria; gestos textuais pedagógicos; opacidade; teoria em educação artística.

abstract

This thesis argues a specificity to a language of art education theory makes it concurrently pedagogical and theoretical. My overarching concern is to address such specificity to demonstrate it and to practice it: enacting it so as to make sense of its limits. Thereon, I predominantly write with texts using such language. I argue such theories are part of art education practice. Overlapping theory and practice is the means for inquiry, foregrounded as textual pedagogical gestures: writing as pedagogy.

The texts mainly addressed are by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Édouard Glissant, Gert Biesta, jan jagodzinski, Dennis Atkinson. I make two core arguments. Firstly, Rousseau's, Biesta's, jagodzinski's, Atkinson's, writings are entwined by the assigning a revelatory task to pedagogical work before opacity, aiming to disclose clarity and dealing away with loss of intelligibility. I assert this relies on an alternating between opacity and clarity. Secondly, I contend such alternating shapes an encounter with art: a revelatory expectation is placed onto the opacity of art. Opaque encounters with art are deemed fruitful because of what they can reveal. I argue this narrows theoretical labour's imagination, as it focusses on such end.

To inquire on such alternating, I use Glissant's writings, namely on opacity — irreducible —, which I contrast to obscurity — momentary. I thus posit art education theory as reading opacity as obscurity. I claim this makes acceptable placing an expectation onto art, relating it to a Continental concern for obtaining meaning. Theoretically, I use Glissant's contribute to inquire on such legacy: refusing to theorise as reducing its opaque referential. This is to propose a making of theory that emphasises its singular making before sense: theory has to be made and therefore addressed by its makings. Ultimately, this is to propose to consider theoretical texts as artworks: singular creative practices whose languages are made strange.

keywords:

art education theory; making theory; opacity; textual pedagogical gestures; writing pedagogy.

This study is made for my parents, Mamã e Papá, Justa e Luís,
who, with my obscurity, with my confusion, with my opacity,
are always impatiently patient to make clarity.
They always stay with me.
Your makings are caring, generous, giving, loving; I must keep on trying to write it.
I must keep on trying to write with them.
Thank you for making me write with the eternity you give.
I do not know the future; but you make me believe it can be made. You make me.
Thank you — *for everything and more*.

thank you, for making belief

Juuso Tervo;

whatever I may write, whatever I may make, it is lost in
the ocean of attentiveness, joy, generosity and wonderfulness you *make*.
I keep on with. Thank you.
For the air; for staying with the waves; for making waves; for staying with loss.
Thank you; repeating can mean: never enough.

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My friends and neighbours, in Helsinki and Finland: for overwhelming me with kindness. Namely,
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for making me better, for making me want to be better,
for making *home*.

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hello, and welcome

A magisterial tone fits censure; but another kind of tone—one less agreeable to philosophical haughtiness—must be adopted in order to make proposals. (Rousseau, 1762/1979, p. 33)

Thus [science] invites us, within its developments, to risk our research beyond the legislations that are emanated by its philosophies. For long we have divined in the world an order and a disorder, which we have casted as measure and immeasurable. But all poetics have let us believe this which is certainly not false : there is as well an immeasurable order, a measure of disorder. The only detectable stabilities in Relation concern the union of cycles which play within themselves, the corresponding of their movements' lines. Analytical thought is invited to build ensembles, from which the united variations reconstitute the totality of the playing. These ensembles are not models, but revealing echoes-world. Thinking makes music. (Glissant, 1990, pp. 106–107, translated here).

This thesis argues there is a specificity to a language of art education theory that makes it *at the same time* pedagogical and theoretical. This study's[1] overall concern is to address such specificity not merely to *show* it — to prove it —, but also, and most importantly, to *make* with it — to use it. In this regard, the study takes on the endeavour of enacting the very language it addresses, thus not being limited to analysing it. This is also to say I *write* this thesis as a theoretical *and* pedagogical piece. The relation between theory and pedagogy is thereby not articulated in ordained interplay; rather, it is expressed as one of confusion. *Writing* is the realm of and for this inquiry, as such *practice*, of writing, is the mode to express the specificity this study is concerned with.

Language[2] is in this study understood as the resource *of* and *for* making theory. In this regard, rather than being solely concerned with the *what-ness* of language when making theory in art education — as in an essentialist fashion —, this study also focusses on the *how-ness* of language when committing to such labour. Language, here, is therefore contemplated as a question[3] to be engaged with. This means I am less concerned with overcoming issues of language, than I am with *staying concerned with issues of language*. This is to understand what such *staying with issues* may mean when *making* theory in art education.

---

[1] I am writing with Juuso Tervo's (2018) text: «[t]he event of study is an event where education *acts in the present* without a recourse to the past or future. This certainly does not mean that past and future are completely shut off from this event. On the contrary, they are exposed to their contingency *in* the present» (p. 38). This is to call on the stories that can be made in art education — *work to be made* — rather than what can be read from History, a crystallised piece. Studying is regarded in contrast to *learning from* (Tervo, 2018; see also Tervo, 2023b). I side with this passage, as I intend this thesis to be a story, in the making, to be learnt with.

[2] I am writing with Daniel Tröhler's (2011) text: «[*h*]*ow* we [those occupied with educational issues] think focuses more on distinguishable modes or modalities of thinking, talking, or writing about education. These modes or modalities are called *languages of education*» (p. 1). «"[T]he background linguistic system... of each language is not merely a reproducing instrument for voicing ideas but rather *is itself the shaper of ideas*"» (Whorf, as cited in Tröhler, 2011, p. 8, emphasis added). *Language* is thus non-abstract and non-essential; it is a fundamentally political domain. As the *shaper of ideas*, this means language effects: it cannot be reduced to a result; to address a language is both to address the entanglement of what it conveys and how it conveys.

[3] I am writing with texts by authors like Maurice Blanchot (1969/2003) — «[t]o question is to seek, and to seek is to search radically, to go to the bottom, to sound, to work at the bottom, and, finally, to uproot» (p. 11); «[a] question is movement, the question of everything is a totality of movement and movement of everything» (p. 12) — and Hugh J. Silverman (1994) — «[q]uestions, [...] render it possible for there to be lies as well as truths. By questioning, language opens up a space for both scientific language and poetic language, nonfiction and fiction to happen» (p. 37). I am thus favouring *question* before *problem*, which some authors prefer to use, like jan jagodzinski (2017) as he takes on a problematic. jagodzinski refers to Deleuze and Guattari, who write: «[a]s the creation of thought, a problem has nothing to do with the question, which is only a suspended proposition, the bloodless double of an affirmative proposition that is supposed to serve as an answer» (Deleuze & Guattari, as cited in jagodzinski, 2017, p. 1). Resisting jagodzinski's preference is to say I resist the attribution of a binary telos to a question. To pose a question is, in this study, to question — and not to necessarily expect an answer.

The verb *to make* is an important anchor when riding this study, given the expression *making theory* is favoured before *theorising*. This is to stress I am not merely concerned with *what* theory can convey — that is, analysing theory from its ends. Most importantly, I am invested in what *makes* such conveying, *and* how such *making* defines the conveying — in this regard, I am emphatically addressing theory by its means. Recollecting the past paragraphs: *how* can a language of art education theory be *written* to convey pedagogy and theory at the same time? And what does that *make* for art education theory?

Thereon, this study is predominantly written along with texts that can be understood to make use of such language. And beautifully so. With such pages, something both theoretical *and* pedagogical occurs: a language is held and yet, it bleeds through — the writing seems to be speaking. The writers' texts are not merely conveying theory, they are not merely conveying pedagogy; they convey both, and they make it so *at the very same time*. The theory these authors *make* can thus be argued as part of the practice of art education — a practice, thereby, not limited to classrooms, schools, and the kind. The Classical divide between theory and practice is blurred by such overlapping. That is, theory as generalisation — a *clear* theoretical discourse that takes the place of its *opaque* practical reference[4] — is put in question. Cherishing such dual language is a postulation I offer: to consider such *clear confusion* of theory and pedagogy as this study's *means of and for inquiry*; and joyfully so.

Recollecting: how can a language of art education theory be *written* to convey pedagogy and theory at the same time? This thesis argues a specificity to a language of art education theory makes such conveying possible: on the authors' writings, *textual pedagogical gestures* can be read. This makes the texts' language tangible. Theory is not merely a *mode* for communicating; at the same time, theory teaches by making the reader *believe* he is being taught. Imagination is therefrom invited. And what does that mean for art education theory?

---

4 I am writing with Michel de Certeau's (1980/1988) text: «[o]ver three centuries, in spite of the historical avatars of consciousness or the successive definitions of knowledge, the combination of two distinct terms persists unchanged, the first being a referential and unrefined knowledge, and the second *an explanatory discourse that brings forth into the light an inverted representation of its opaque source*. This discourse is what we call "theory." It retains the word's ancient and classical meaning of "looking at/ showing" ("*voir/ faire voir*") [see/make see] or of "contemplating" (*theōrein*). It is "enlightened."» (p. 72, square brackets added, emphasis added).

Textual pedagogical gestures are the specific tool I am concerned with in this study. This is the very motif that, on the one hand, informs the choosing of the authors I address in more detail — a tool that can be *read* in such texts. On the other hand, such motif is taken as the very tool so as to make such addressing — a tool for *reading* and *writing* with the texts. Thereunder, *textual pedagogical gestures* not only shape this thesis' referential, but the very practice this thesis makes use of. To express clearly; textual pedagogical gestures: the practice of writing as pedagogical practice. This is the specificity to a language of art education theory this thesis makes use of: the thesis is also *expressed* by means of textual pedagogical gestures.

So, as a theoretical and pedagogical piece, the question is what and how does this thesis teach. The brief answer is *theory*, rather than being a clear discourse *about* the opacity it addresses — a replacement —, *is* the clear and opaque expression of the addressing. It *teaches* by sharing a singular *traverse*, *journey*, *errantry*[5], of learning. So, it teaches by *sharing* what it learns and what it does not. It shows itself unceasingly by unceasingly sharing itself; teaching the singular relation it makes with its references, rather than a generalising gaze about them.

Recollecting: and what does that mean for art education theory? This is what this thesis asks in its whole; in its whole, it answers — art education theory expresses itself on the span of writing. So, the overall endeavour of this thesis is *not* to write *about* art education, but to *write art education*; in a theoretical key. Theory's systems are thus not dealt away with, but rather than dictating[6] a certain path for theory, they offer small anchors along uncertain paths. *Making with* theory, rather than *from* theory.

Recollecting the passages inaugurating this study: could a tone *make* proposals expressing the music of thinking? This thesis aspires to sing it.

Is this the tone of an artwork?

---

[5] I am writing with texts by, respectively, Maurice Blanchot (1984/2016), Michel de Certeau (2013/2015), and Édouard Glissant (1990). These writers' works echo and murmur across this study — either obviously, or less so. I foreground them as such writings, notwithstanding the authors' ties to French literature, can be read to not settle for the comfort and security of the authors' mastery over their own natural language. It is not mastery *over* language, but mastery *with* it — an account of this relation with language is more detailed in this study's part III, namely to what concerns the writing of Édouard Glissant. Bringing these three authors here — Blanchot, Certeau, Glissant — is also a nod to Juuso Tervo, who brings them to my attention during the first moments of our *collaboration* — working *with*: I cannot see this study otherwise. Still these writings cause a great impression on me. Along the uncertain paths of this study, more than guiding me, they stay with me. I try to keep up with. This is also pedagogy.

[6] In this study, whenever I refer to *dictating* or *dictation*, I mean it with *dictatorial* overtones.

The authors tracing this study's inaugural passages — Édouard Glissant and Jean-Jacques Rousseau — are two of the five authors whose texts this study delves into more detailedly. The other three authors are Gert Biesta[7], jan jagodzinski[8], Dennis Atkinson[9] —, theorists *and* teachers, writing on art and education.

[7] Gert Biesta (1957) is not an art educator, but there is an interest in his latest work towards the intersection of art and education, (e.g. Biesta, 2018), and aesthetics as well (e.g., Biesta, 2022). He dedicates his career to theoretical and empirical research, particularly in education's public role, and the articulations of democracy and education. With over twenty books — as author, co-author and editor —, Gert Biesta has an impressive output of over one hundred articles published, and this since 2010 alone. In 2017, he publishes the book *Letting Art Teach. Art education 'after' Joseph Beuys* (Biesta, 2017a), following his professorship in the ArtEZ Institute of the Arts, the Netherlands. ArtEZ Institute of the Arts is not the only art focussed educational institution Biesta has ties with, visiting, more recently, Uniarts, the University of the Arts Helsinki. Among the honours Biesta holds, it can be foregrounded as examples three honorary doctorates — Universities of Uppsala, Örebro and Oulu —, or the Grand Medal of the University of Ghent. Further, in 2025, Biesta performs a talk in a pre-conference for the *Nordic Conference for Educational Research* — NERA Conference 2025 —, namely in network 2 — *Arts, Culture and Education*, at Aalto University. Again, not being an art educator per se, the fact that he is currently concerned with such discussions — on art and education — aligned with his wide and noticeable presence in the educational field, attests to his contribution in the very expanse and interest on art education.

[8] jan jagodzinski (1948) is Professor Emeritus of Visual Arts and Media Education at the University of Alberta in Edmonton, Canada. jagodzinski is also prolific, with, for example, an output of over fifteen books — as author, co-author and editor —, over ninety book chapters and over one hundred refereed articles. His contribute also encompasses being member of editorial boards of several journals, such as *Studies in Art Education*, *Journal of Social Theory in Art Education*, *Journal of Cultural Research in Art Education*, or *Journal of Art for Life*. The recognition of his work is also institutionally visible, receiving honours such as the United States Society for Education Through Art — USSEA — International Ziegfeld Award or the Manuel Barkan Memorial Award, respectively in 2022 and 2011. Visiting activity includes stints in the Universities of Klagenfurt and the NSW University.

[9] Dennis Atkinson (1947) is Professor Emeritus at Goldsmiths University of London, Department of Educational Studies and the Centre for the Arts and Learning. After teaching in secondary schools in England during the 1970s and 1980s, he becomes lecturer in art and design education at the same University, afterwards gaining the position of professor of Art in Education, in 2005. As author, co-author and editor, Dennis Atkinson's contribute spans across books, several articles in notable peer-reviewed journals — noticeably, in *International Journal of Art & Design Education*, but also, for example, in *Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education*. Alike jagodzinski, he is also a recipient of the International The Ziegfeld Award by The United States Society for Education Through Art for outstanding international contributions to art in education, in 2015. As visiting scholar, he has ties with the Universities of Porto, Helsinki and Barcelona. Amongst other endeavours, his contribute can also be regarded between 2002 and 2009 as the Principal Editor of *The International Journal of Art & Design Education*.

Choosing these three authors concerns three motives. Firstly, because their texts share the specificity to a language of art education theory this study addresses, that is, textual pedagogical gestures. This study shows how evident this is and, as mentioned, makes use of it. In this respect, the first motive, and most pressing one for the purposes of this study, concerns *specifically* their practice of writing. Secondly, because of the influence they exert in the educational field, not merely institutionally[10]so, but also by means of their output, referenced by several scholars[11]. This second motive thus refers to the impact of their work, in general, which also effects art education. Thirdly, because of their influence as well, but at another level. That is, their presence in my very doctoral studies and in the doctoral programme housing this study[12]. This third motive likewise refers to the impact of their work, but at an institutional level. It is therefore also part of the contextualisation and significance of this study.

The thesis is written along with two core arguments, expressing a relation *with* and *of* the five authors' texts. These arguments are not layered in developmental manner; rather, amassed by overlapping the addressed texts.

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[10] Please refer to the previous three footnotes.

[11] For uses of Gert Biesta's work, see, for example: Baldacchino (2019), Lewis (2012), MacGill (2023). For uses of jan jagodzinski's work, see for example: Kallio-Tavin (2013), Tavin (2007), Ylirisku (2021). For uses of Dennis Atkinson's work, see, for example: Hernández-Hérnandez (2020), Penketh (2020), Skregelid (2021).

[12] They are present, nevertheless, through different registers. Gert Biesta's *Letting Art Teach. Art education 'after' Joseph Beuys* (2017a) is regarded as a pedagogical object of the doctoral programme, not necessarily as an example to follow but as gateway piece to work with matters of art education. Gert Biesta's work is also addressed occasionally, in matters engaging with pedagogy and education in general. jan jagodzinski is the least directly approached of the three. However, his work is object of discussion by influence of other scholars, either by conversations or texts by scholars such as John Baldacchino, or by approaching journals such as *International Journal of Art & Design Education* or *Revista Portuguesa de Pedagogia*. Dennis Atkinson bears the most evident presence. Apart from his writings being used as pedagogical objects — for example, in my second year of studies, a collection of articles is discussed and analysed —, Dennis Atkinson is a visiting professor at the University of Porto, part of the editorial board for the first four issues of *Derivas*, the doctoral programme's journal, while also contributing with a few articles for the journal. Moreover, he is involved in other activities concerning the doctoral programme, such as commenting on students' works, or performing lectures, to give a couple of examples.

layer one

The writings by Jean-Jacques Rousseau are more entwined than they are detached from those of Gert Biesta, jan jagodzinski, Dennis Atkinson. The core argument is they *assign a revelatory task to pedagogical work when in presence of opacity*. Such task aims the *disclosing* of clarity thereby dealing away with the *loss of intelligibility*. This is evinced by the *textual pedagogical gestures* that can be read on their texts: the gesturing made in the writings of Biesta, jagodzinski, Atkinson, echoes Rousseau's.

This is not to say these four authors make theory for the same ends. This is neither to say they should be making theory differently. Nor this is to make this study's aim the establishing of a different and detached making of theory in art education. Rather, this is to make clear — to *express* — *how* these four writers partake of a complex and layered legacy. That is, they share the same tools for making proposals: shaping thoughts and expressing thoughts. Again, to be clear: they are *not saying the same*; but they share the *same* tools to *say*. In this respect, it is argued the *how-ness* of language is not detachable from the *what-ness* of language: textual pedagogical gestures effect what theory says.

To make this core argument, I make use of Jean-Jacques Rousseau's writings, namely *Emile, or On Education*[13] (1762/1979), and *Essay on the Origin of Languages*[14] (1781/1998b). The latter is addressed to show Rousseau revolves in language for purposes of control, foregrounding how such drive is also a pedagogical issue. For Rousseau, language serves, or, more precisely, *should only serve*, to thoroughly communicate reality: it is favoured as vector, as dictation. Pedagogically, this means teaching *for* learning, the latter limited to the acquiring of a predetermined knowledge — always controlled by the teacher. This is what interests Rousseau (e.g., 1781/1998b): language as means for showing reality — his *own* — to others, making others *comprehend* it as absolute. In other words, he is invested in language to *control* reality: this is precisely how and why Rousseau (1762/1979) *writes the very language which constitutes Emile*.

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[13] From here, I refer to Rousseau's (1762/1979) piece as *Emile*. I address this text across the study, but emphatically so in part II.

[14] From here, I refer to Rousseau's (1781/1998b) piece as *Essay*. I address this text more detailedly in part I, mainly in chapter one.

Choosing Rousseau's (1762/1979) educational book is not limited to it being a pivotal constituent of educational History[15]; Continental[16], modern, enlightened (Tröhler, 2011). *Emile* (Rousseau, 1762/1979) remarkably enacts the very pedagogy addressed by its writing: a pedagogy relying on *an ambiguous interplay of opacity and clarity*, an interplay that, ultimately, serves to *show by revelation*. In other words, a contrasting operativeness serves to reveal reality — Rousseau's, the instructor's, the text's, *own* — to Emile — *and to the reader* —, comprehended as absolute. And Rousseau — the writer, the teacher, the narrator — thoroughly *controls* his language of control: he makes use of textual pedagogical gestures, ever so precisely. They are means for controlling Emile and his education: the *comprehension* of reality the instructor shows as absolute truth. This reality shown by the instructor is indeed his own: it is a reality *made* for Emile to see in due time — when the instructor decides so. And that is how Rousseau writes the book as well, made clear «when one has read [*Emile*'s] writing» (1762/1979, p. 41). A predetermined reality is thus *concealed* so as to be *revealed*: and *only when* Rousseau, the teacher, deems it appropriate; *only when* Rousseau, the writer, deems it appropriate for it to be *comprehended*.

And this is the story Rousseau makes the reader imagine, the teaching he makes the reader *believe*: his proposal bleeds through by his tone. Rousseau, the instructor, the text; they speak — «an *assertive tone* [is used] not for the sake of making an impression on the reader but for the sake of *speaking to* [the reader] *as* [Rousseau] *think*[s]» (Rousseau, 1762/1979, p. 34, emphasis added). It is claimed so; *yet*, an impression is made by a practice of writing, his pedagogical practice as well.

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[15] I am writing with Juuso Tervo's (2023b) text. The terms *History* and *Historical* are rendered with a capital H, to foreground a «generalized historical imagination» (Tervo, 2023b, p. 281) as possibly encompassing all which has happened; therefore, it is implied an understanding of it would allow for the comprehension of that which is not here.

[16] Alike what is foregrounded in the previous footnote, the term *Continental* is rendered with a capital C: it is also to foreground such word also entails a generalised imagination (Tervo, 2023b) of a geography. This is a similar case to that of rendering words with quotes — such as 'Western' (e.g. Tervo, 2022) or 'White' (e.g., Martins, 2023a). I am, nevertheless, making use of the term *Continental* in relation to a legacy of philosophical reasoning in what is now commonly accepted as the European territory, a reasoning which was *exported* (Glissant, 1990). Following Édouard Glissant, «continental thoughts [are] «mostly systematic [*de système*]. By way of continental thought, the mind [*l'esprit*] runs with audacity, but we then reckon [*estimons*] we see the world from a block, from a majority, or from a jet, as some sort of imposing synthesis, precisely as we can see the general views of the configurations of landscapes and reliefs parading from aerial captures» (Glissant, 2009, p. 45, translated here). This also sums up how *theory* operates: establishing a privileged point of view that speaks on behalf of its opaque reference (Certeau, 1980/1988). Using this term is intentional: it is also an immediate articulation with the writings of Édouard Glissant, as he posits «[*t*]*he archipelagic thought*, thought of the essay, of intuitive temptation, which could be affixed to continental thoughts» (Glissant, 2009, p. 45, translated here). *Continental*, especially when juxtaposed with archipelagic, alludes to a way of thought that works within its own fixed and enclosed domain; that of a continent. Continental thought is inquired on across the study, but *directly* addressed, even if briefly, in this study's part V.

In Jean-Jacques Rousseau's *Emile* (1762/1979), what is revealed to Emile is what is *hitherto unknown*, which Rousseau knows beforehand. An unknown to Emile, an unknown to the reader, an unknown Rousseau controls. Contrastingly, the unknown in Gert Biesta, jan jagodzinski, Dennis Atkinson, is not their *property*. *Yet*, it reveals: what is unknown, in the latter authors, is addressed with formulations such as «*yet*-to-come» (Atkinson, 2018, p. 2, emphasis added), «*yet* to be imagined and produced» (jagodzinski, 2024, p. 482, emphasis added), or «not *yet* arrived» (Biesta, 2021c, p. 656). Thereby, expectation is placed *onto* the unknown[17]. In other words, opacity is desired as momentary and there is an interplay with clarity that comes from revelation. This is to argue pedagogical work, in this light, is made with strategies for *showing from revelation*, and, in light of what this study posits, theoretical work as well. Clarity is a matter of time, as it were. Whereas the time of opacity, for Rousseau, is interrupted by himself — the author, the master —, the time of opacity, for Biesta, jagodzinski and Atkinson, is interrupted by an event — an event where the unknown makes itself known: truthfully.

Anticipated in such manner, the unknown is thus never unknowable and insurmountability does not concern it. This is not to hint the unknown is here, in this study, desired or idealised as absolutely unknown. The point is that of inquiring on why such possibility is foreclosed from the outset, by an operativeness which defines it. It is this alternation and interplay of opacity and clarity — a contrasting operativeness where clarity takes the place of opacity — this study inquires on.

[17] Tellingly, for example, Gert Biesta's (2021c) language in the following passage acknowledges such expectation: «[i]t seems safe to conclude, therefore, that tomorrow's "world of education" as envisaged by Faure and his co-authors in the early 1970s has not arrived — or, *in a more optimistic reading*, has not *yet* arrived» (p. 656, emphasis added).

layer two

To what concerns art education theory, this study contends such alternation and interplay shapes how an encounter with art is considered. The core argument is a *revelatory expectation is placed onto the opacity of art*. That is, engaging with opaque encounters with art — where a loss of intelligibility is noted — is regarded fruitful for education: because of what such encounters can show, that is, reveal. Art, be it the piece or the practice, discloses truth — loss of intelligibility is momentary and the opacity of art is dealt away with.

What I mean by *showing from revelation* is the clarity art eventually and assumedly provides, *in* these authors' writings, occurs *in* a given event. An event that irrupts (e.g., Atkinson, 2022), breaks through (e.g., jagodzinski, 2022), or interrupts (e.g., Biesta, 2021b). Art education is thus rendered as art and its education[18], which suggests education is a potential property of art which art actualises by revealing it. Art is therefore made a teaching entity, and a particular one too: one controlling — *comprehending*, seizing[19] — the knowable within its opacity, to reveal it. It shows *in the end* — when opacity is dealt away with. In this respect, an otherwise way of *reading*[20] is the matter at hand. A gaze with which it is possible to bear witness to an irruptive revelation, which breaks through and interrupts — *therein revealing what is hitherto unknown*. It is possible to extract something and bring it to light; thereon intelligibility is regained. And this is expected; *and* this is what is expected from theory.

In pedagogical terms — here, not aside theoretical ones — this entails a divide between what teaches and what learns, a divide which secures one and the other's positions. This is to say this contrast is hardly at stake in what these three authors refer to. In this regard, the relation between teaching and learning is more of an exchange, and interchange, than it is a shared relation. I mean: a singular partaking of the same *at the same time*.

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[18] A formulation used by jan jagodzinski (e.g., 2018, 2022), similar to, for example, *art's education* (e.g., Baldacchino, 2024). John Baldacchino (2024) does offer a clarification between «art's education (the pedagogical inherence of art) and art education (art's location within the structures of schooled education)» (p. 466).

[19] I am writing with Édouard Glissant's (1990) text: «[t]here is within this verb «to comprehend» the movement of hands which take contexture [*l'entour*] and pull it back to themselves [*ramènent à soi*]» (p. 206, translated here). Glissant (1993) refers to *prendre* — seize.

[20] There is a legacy in conflating knowing and seeing in Continental thought (Mehtonen, 2003). I do not address this in this study, but it is important to note it. On the pervasiveness of vision in art education, see, for example, Penketh, 2024, pp. 23–38.

The textual pedagogical gestures written by Biesta, jagodzinski, Atkinson, aim *showing* what art reveals, they aim the teachings art is expected to provide. Art is expected to teach *new* modes[21], that is, *new means for meaningfully addressing the world*, and it must not be prevented from it.

Noticeably, scholars do manifest a need for educational languages (e.g., Bergdahl, 2010; Biesta, 2005; Kuokkanen, 2017). Some educators, so as to address the world differently, turn to art or artistic practices, entailing the available educational language does not suffice[22]. «[D]ifferent 'modalities' of art — the visible, the tactile, the audible» are foregrounded as «fundamentally different ways of being in dialogue with the world» (Biesta, 2017a, p. 39). For example, Sharon Todd (2022) writes on how practices by feminist art collective Sisters Hope «might open up spaces» (p. 347). Spaces «for another kind understanding of how knowledge is generated, beyond a narrow definition of skill-based competence or the passing on of information as inheritance» (Todd, 2022, p. 347). Todd (2020) also puts aesthetics to work so as to «creat[e] *encounters* of the world that educate about the climate emergency while also giving time for climate sorrow» (p. 1110). Emily Hood and Tyson E. Lewis (2021), for instance, foreground the «*moment* of *encountering* certain materials [...] often accompanied by certain human articulated sounds such as 'oohing' and 'ahhing'» (p. 224). «[S]pecial sounds», they write, «uttered in moments when materiality captures the human» (Hood & Lewis, 2021, p. 224), evincing a «*point of interface*» (p. 231, emphasis added). Art, object or practice, is thereby considered an entity that *can teach*, namely, how to address the world so as to learn from it.

By expressing this, these educators point, perhaps, to a different *tone* to make proposals, one not exclusive to philosophical frameworks. A singular tone that expresses the very singularity of a hitherto unknown language.

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[21] For example, Atkinson (2018) writes «the force of art can take us beyond the human as is constituted into *new modes* of becoming» (p. 1). jagodzinski (2022) writes «[w]e can project that the entanglement of art (right hemisphere) with science (left hemisphere) produces the 'new' depending on which modality is forwarded: artscience or scienceart» (p. 14). Biesta (2017a) writes «art is the exploration and *transformation* of our desires so that they can *become* a positive force for the ways in which we seek to exist in the world in grown-up ways» (p. 72, emphasis added).

[22] This briefly addressed call for language is furthered in chapter one, with more detail on work by the mentioned scholars.

However, such tone is expected to *come*: the common trope is the desire for an *eventfully interruptive encounter*, from engaging with art or artistic practices. The opacity of the world, at a point, is matched by the opacity of art. This means pedagogical strategies revolve around such kind of encounter, be it by searching for it, arranging it, or simply forwarding it. The teacher *shows* the heir apparent teaching entity to the learner — art which conceals a lesson to be disclosed. So, *showing from revelation defines* the imagination of pedagogical work, which is to say the aesthetic encounter, argued as expansive, entails a narrowing imagination. Teacher remains teacher — the artwork, or something else —; learner remains learner. This is captured by theoretical writings.

A new language is thus to be learnt *from* art to *match* the hitherto absent language to understand the world — opacity gives way to clarity: intelligibility is regained. This is to say the time of opacity is interrupted by clarity, in turn replacing it. So the interruption, the breaking through, the irruption, is required for such *change*. The contrasting operativeness where clarity continuously takes the place of opacity controls what theory can say — what theory can teach *about* opacity. Such contrast remains unquestioned; thus theory controls — *comprehends* — its references' opacity: delimited by momentariness. This echoes the operativeness of theory: a discourse where the relationship between its reference and itself is expressed by control.

So, a contrasting operativeness where clarity takes the place of opacity shapes *how* an encounter with art is considered: illegibly. Theory *reads* art so as to teach: it has to make art legible so that it can *show* what it hides. In this regard, textual pedagogical gestures are premised on *showing from revelation*. It is thus less about letting art teach, than it is about *making art teach* — making it show, making it reveal.

What does it mean for art education theory to *inquire* on this alternation and interplay of opacity and clarity — a contrasting operativeness where clarity takes the place of opacity? What does this making of theory, a making that alternatively settles on opposing ends, cannot make?

working layers

To inquire on this multilayered interdependence of ends — teaching, learning; reading, writing; opacity, clarity —, I make use of Édouard Glissant's[23] writing. Mainly, but not merely, what concerns *opacity*[24] in *Poetics of Relation*[25] (1990), both *what* Glissant writes *about* it and, most importantly, *how* Glissant *writes it*.

«The opaque is not the obscure, but it can be it and it can be accepted as such», Glissant writes[26] (1990, p. 205, translated here). «It is the non-reducible» (Glissant, 1990, p. 205, translated here). I thus postulate: if opacity cannot be reduced, if it is unsurmountable, then theory as generalisation is nothing but an attempt — the language of theory cannot *comprehend* its opaque reference's language. Opacity is thus not *comprehensible*: theory can only control it by speaking on its behalf; by taking its voice; by taking its place; by writing onto it. Thus such making of theory narrows the space of language: it *obliterates* languages it does not comprehend.

A relation of the two core arguments can therefore be expressed. The *precision*, that is, the clarification of obscurity and opacity Glissant writes, makes the following questions plausible: *Is art education theory the reading of opacity as obscurity?* Is theorising, in art education, accepting the opaque as the obscure? *Is the assigning of a revelatory task to pedagogical work when in presence of opacity* an endeavour that *deals away with opacity by accepting it as obscurity?* Is this what makes acceptable *the placing* — the writing over — *of an expectation onto the opacity of art?*

Conceptualising opacity — making it an abstract idea to be extracted and, then, applied — makes these questions *plausible*, insofar as I imply *the* answer. An immediate comprehension of opacity allows for me to quickly clothe statements as questions.

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[23] Édouard Glissant (1928–2011) is a writer whose work evades titling. This claim is furthered in this study's part III. This study, however, postulates his work as a teacher. That is, taking up the concern that in this study encompasses Rousseau, Biesta, jagodzinski and Atkinson, this study addresses *how his texts may teach by means of textual pedagogical gestures*.

[24] Addressing opacity with Édouard Glissant's writing is the main endeavour for this study's part III.

[25] Originally, *Poétique de la Relation* (1990). Throughout this study, even though I make use of my own translations of Glissant's writings, I refer to it by its title in Betsy Wing's translation (Glissant, 1990/1997a). These matters — why is this thesis written in English and why I choose to translate Glissant — are addressed in this study's methodological clarification.

[26] A glimpse at the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary may read the opaque and the obscure connected by difficulty in understanding. This conflating is also troubled by positing *opacity* as «obscurity of meaning» (Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 2007). However, more attentively, it can be read they are not precisely the same, as Glissant claims. The Latin *opacus* is rendered as *shaded dark*, whilst *obscurus*, Latin, is rendered as *dark*. So, it is plausible to posit *opacus* is dark *made*, and *obscuritas makes* dark: it conceals. This is not a claim to hint at some unquestionable truth; simply, a technical aid.

But reading with opacity as merely a *concept* is a reduction. Glissant does not reduce opacity to *a* comprehension; rather, he constantly stays with it by making it *expressed* on the fabric of his text. That is, opacity is written *about* by *writing opacity* itself unceasingly: Glissant's writings do not deal away with opacity by *answering* what and how it is. Rather, they stay with it and move along with it — at the same time declaiming it. This is to say he *writes* opacity by the clear expression of his text. «The literary text is by function, and contradictorily, producer of opacity» (Glissant 1990, p. 129, translated here). The time of opacity can thus be imagined beyond momentary referencing: its time is the very span of a text, of writing. Risking a reduction: Glissant expresses opacity *by expressing opacity itself by means of the opacity* he *makes with his texts*, unceasingly resisting to reduce it to a *comprehension* of *what* it is.

Putting it plainly, this is to say Glissant addresses opacity in an opaque language. He does not *replace* the language of opacity by that of his texts, as they do not *provide* opacity. It is not about offering a *reading* of opacity. In other words, *opacity*, is unceasingly put at stake by unceasingly being expressed. Putting it opaquely: Glissant unceasingly tries to *imitate* opacity, an imitation he *shares* by means of his writing: writings inviting to imagine opaquely, *with* text's opacity. Opacity is *made*: and only by writing can such expression, such making, be made clear.

The contrasting operativeness between opacity and clarity is thus put in question literarily. And literally: it is more about *asking continuously* than it is about asking *for an answer*, with inquiry staying sustained by writing unceasingly. Merely *conceptualising* opacity may fall short to *address questions* as it asks more for an answering — what is, what is not —, than it invites to *stay with inquiry*. A philosophical tone, the conventional one of «established philosophy» (Silverman, 1994, p. 208), may limit the *addressing* of questions; it may limit encounters with art by dealing away with questions it *does not reveal*.

Recollecting: art education theory is the *reading of opacity as obscurity*.

Reading the contrasting operativeness of art education theory with regard to the alternation and interplay of clarity and obscurity, rather than opacity, invites to consider a legacy to this conversation. One traversing the writings of Rousseau, Biesta, jagodzinski, Atkinson, Glissant — and my own: a tradition of concern with obscurity in language, where obscurity is addressed by contrast (Mehtonen, 2003).

This addressing by contrast is not just «an exclusive opposition, rather [an] *inevitable interdependency*» fed by Classical rhetorics' way of «*describing and proving things by way of their opposites*» (Mehtonen, 2003, pp. 17–18, emphasis added). In this regard, contrast is «a methodological accessory» (Mehtonen, 2003, p. 17) so as to *obtain meaning*. And this obtaining of meaning is an aspect particularly evident in the «*hope of the enlightenment*» (p. 135, emphasis added), and it is traceable to Augustinian dialectic (Mehtonen, 2003) — a Continental endeavour. There is «*faith* in the *temporary* nature of obscurity» (p. 135, emphasis added). That is, ambiguity is admitted but only *until* a certain point, when contexts are met. In other words, *clarity* and *obscurity* conflate when properly enlightened: clarity is not understood as the replacing of its reference, but as an equaliser. To what concerns writing, engaging with a text under *obscurity* ultimately brings about a *revelation*. Intelligibility is therefrom regained. In such way, art education theory is more entwined to a modern and enlightened legacy than it is detached from it.

Theoretically considered, Glissant's contribute shines through as a way to inquire on such legacy: refusing to accept the practicing of theory as transmuting its opaque reference into something readable. Not dependent on such mission, theory can be made as the unceasing addressing of its references' opacity by making opacity with writing. Art education theorists are thus compelled to *work with* imagination: not a patient waiting for it to come, but unceasingly imagining opaquely. Theoretical text entwines, or weaves (Glissant, 1990), itself with its reference: opacities are moved along with each other, but they *never match*. The control of discourse over its reference is thus sustained *in* question. The relation between theory and language is thereby no longer one of control, but one of *collaboration*: theorising is putting language in practice which makes theorising a practicing of language. Theory is the *making* of sense; and *making* is what is emphasised. Pedagogically considered, theory ceases to dictate *about* the opacity of its reference. Rather, it shares the making of its own opacity: it invites to learn with itself. Glissant's *conceptualising* — gerund — of opacity is thus a modality: a way to address, rather than an address. And, at the same time, it cannot be reduced to a modality: opacity is also expression.

Keeping with this study's tools: Édouard Glissant's precision[27] is unceasingly translated here as a textual gesture. This to write my imagination of Glissant's writing as an *opaque textual pedagogical gesture* — which is to say, to make my imagination tangible by conveying it in language. In this regard, I continuously try to converse with the textual pedagogical gestures of Rousseau, Biesta, jagodzinski, Atkinson, along with the very opacity of their texts, by *imitating* Glissant's. I thus do not *control* the time of such textual pedagogical gesture to a moment — it is not about merely *showing* with a *revelation*. *And* I write with textual pedagogical gestures across this study: *sharing* their very expression, the very relation made with the texts addressed. Holding with open hands as I traverse[28], rather than seizing it.

Thus this textual pedagogical gesture is written improperly: it constantly errs across the text with *other* texts, without settling[29]. An improper tool — one requiring its constant and simultaneous practicing and honing. I thus postulate a textual pedagogical gesture in this study as a tool asking for *precision* in its *approach*, rather than in its design. It asks to be attentive to means — *how* is theory *made* —, rather than to ends, that is, it inquires more on the interplay itself, an interplay itself makes as well, than it does about alternative solutions.

More precisely, what I am postulating in this study is the unceasing translating of Glissant's textual gesture by imitation. By *imitating*, I am not referring to a mere and sterile mechanical reproduction of the writings addressed. Rather, as a way of listening that is expressed: reading while writing at the same time. In this respect, not only do I imitate Glissant's textual gesture to address the textual pedagogical gestures of Rousseau, Biesta, jagodzinski, Atkinson, I also imitate the very textual gestures of

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[27] I am writing with Juuso Tervo's (2018) text: «poetic *precision*, a precision that potentializes the very event that history creates and makes sure that we are never finished with the present» (p. 43). Again, a precision with means, rather than with ends.

[28] In my earlier writings along the doctoral studies (e.g., Paupério, 2017, 2019), I focus mainly on *translation*, proposing its relevance along educational concerns as a continuous practice, rather than as a result. This is not to reject results, but to emphasise the *process* that may lead to results. So, if considering *translation* as the carrying of a relic to another place, rather than controlling such relic by enclosing it within hands, I do not claim property of it: I simply try to carry it while sharing the carrying. This is a nod to those early writings and, at the same time, expressing this thesis is not detached from them; it carries them.

[29] I am writing with Juuso Tervo's (2023c) text: «'theorizing' education from an *improper place*; that is, a place where the language of education *wanders* between different registers [...] without completely settling into any of them» (p. 1). I am, nevertheless, favouring *erring* before *wandering*. This nuance is inspired by Glissant's writing and use of the word *errance* (Glissant, 1990). Betsy Wing, in her introduction for *Poetics of Relation* (Glissant, 1990/1997a) notes that, with such word, «Glissant stresses overtones of sacred mission rather than aimless wandering; *errance*, its ending linked for the contemporary reader with deconstruction's validation of *différance*», deflects the negative associations between *errer* (to wander) and *erreur* (error). Directed by Relation, errantry follows neither an arrowlike trajectory nor one that is circular and repetitive, nor is it mere wandering—idle roaming. Wandering, one might become lost, but in errantry one knows at every moment where one is—at every moment in relation to the other» (Wing, in Glissant 1990/1997a, p. xvi). In this regard, I make use of the verb *err*: a textual pedagogical gesture is the practice of writing as a pedagogical practice put in relation to the other: the learner, the reader. It does not settle, it goes *with*.

these writers as well. Using this double and overlapped *imitating* is also part of the very *making* of inquiry — learning *as I use*, and, at the same time, *sharing* such *movement*. Thereby, reading and writing overlap in practice; theory teaches what is learnt with. It shows by sharing: this is the textual pedagogical gesture I aspire to make.

This conversation amidst texts *makes* inquiry: putting the practice of theory in question by making expressed the relation of *what* theory *means* and *how* it is *made*. In this light, *clarity* in art education theory can be postulated aside a dependence on obscurity. This is to say the momentariness of art education theory is challenged: the clarity a theoretical endeavour is expected to offer — *making see* — neither necessarily follows nor contributes to the *ceasing* of its opaque reference. It works *with* it, that is, it is about staying with the loss of intelligibility to a point where the pair legible and illegible no longer matter. Theory thus teaches by the clear unceasingly sharing of the opaque relation it unceasingly makes with its references: not only passing on what is understood[30]. This is the textual pedagogical gesture I wish to bring fore by writing with these authors' writings: *the invitation to write otherwise with opacity* rather than the invitation to read opacity differently, that is, to read *obscurity*. This is what a making of theory that alternatively settles on opposing ends cannot make: to resist *accepting* — comprehending — opacity, to resist the *obtaining* of *sense*.

This study is thus not invested in foregrounding a making of theory to deal away with a loss of intelligibility before opaque encounters. Rather, to foreground art education theory as the very *clear expressing of an entwinement* of what is not understandable and what is understandable, thus not solely writing *about* their dichotomy. This is to say that, in this study, I am not concerned in proposing an opposing position — that is, contra a momentary opacity, a perpetual one. This is, rather, to *extend* inquiry across the whole writing of this thesis: to *clearly* share the *opacity* of *practicing theory*.

This is what I mean by writing this thesis aspires to *sing*: trying to write the sound I listen to with the texts addressed. To imitate the sound I hear by listening to it and expressing it clearly: recollecting the sound of thinking by sharing the making of a song. «Thinking makes music», Glissant (1990, p. 107, translated here) writes. So, to

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[30] I am writing with Brian McGrath's (2013) text: «[c]ognition is always possibly contingent, the result of a chance entanglement; and reading describes not only a process of understanding but also, and perhaps more importantly, a way of passing along what one does not (yet) understand» (p. 92) —, used by Juuso Tervo (2023b) as well. I would, however, write it without *yet*: passing along what one understands and does not understand, and unceasingly so.

express such sound, one must write. «Plainchant or howling (in duration or in the instant) are the preferential places of the poetics of Relation, because it is averse to the insolences every presumption of pre-eminence dresses itself with. But in truth the preference does not stand» (Glissant, 1990, p. 216, translated here). That is, no *song* for relation is pre-established: it is singular and never given beforehand. It is a song to be composed by recollecting an ephemeral encounter with sound — clearly imitating sound.

In this respect, *meaning* is not to be *obtained* — rather, *made*. Art education theory is thereby not only a pedagogical practice, not only a theoretical practice, but a creative — *never from nothing* — practice: it *is* the very singular encounter, it *is* the very artwork.

It has to be *made*.

a tale in the tail

By addressing these authors' texts, I am also making a case for their pedagogical success. This is not to say *I make* such texts teachers as if it were up to this study to be the last bastion of titles. I am, rather, manifesting the very desire to *learn with* their texts, rather than *from them*. This thesis thereby *expresses* the very *desire* and the very *making* of such desire. I *say* the absence of their pedagogical texts — the learner, the student, my very position. And this occurs because an invitation is expressed by means of their texts; which I read.

If I can *share how* a teaching is by sharing what and how I learn, being a learner or a teacher is put in question. That is, the divide is less of a groove, than it is an undulation.

So, rather than focussing on the exclusive separation of such ends — teaching and learning, writing and reading —, I am invested in how can their very relation be, that is, *be made*. This improper relation amidst ends is the singular position I wish to write. And I write it so by means of a textual pedagogical gesture: to address this undulation, to address this layered and wavy ground. A textual pedagogical gesture that errs with the waves of such ground — *waving hello*, at this point.

Hence a desire: an endeavour concerned with sharing places amidst the same space at the same time, which cannot be made so alone. With text *with*, something both *educational and theoretical* may happen — it is an event *made* when *writing with writing*. It is an event that desires not to depend on the legislations of contrasts, it is an event that is clearly shared along with its opacity.

So I postulate this theoretical text as a teacher: a make-belief teacher; and I, a make-believe teacher, as my make-belief theoretical text teaches. *Making* is what is emphasised. If I can teach what I *cannot* learn *from* these authors' texts, does it mean I am a teacher or a learner? Does not this mean the divide is less of a groove, than it is an undulation?

In this regard, this study is nothing more than a *fable*: a confusion of writing orality and fiction (Certeau, 1982/1992) within a field of operations; a making of space where practice and theory mingle. It does not claim ownership of what it contains, that is, neither it is representative of any *truth* nor does it speak on behalf of its references.

To say I am invested in this study speaking for itself, is not, however, to posit it as an exercise of privileged isolation. What I mean is the very inquiry I make in relation to the references I address is the very inquiry I make towards the study itself. This is to say I aim to make expressed the textual pedagogical gestures I practice *and* address, *at the same time,* thereby sharing their very making contingently to the matters at hand. Delineating this study as a fable has no other intention than to bleed through such limits, inventing space[31] — whatever path possible: a not necessarily pendular *traverse*, *journey*, *errantry*. In this respect, what *theory* teaches is no longer a clear and pristine gaze that progresses over otherness, but, rather, a clearly opaque expression of an addressing of otherness.

This is my invitation to believe: to believe we hear what we cannot say by expressing it unceasingly, but, at the same time, being aware it is not more than a belief. A *translating*, rather than a translation. This is my invitation to stay with loss of intelligibility: to keep making sense of opacity *with* opacity — *making* is what is emphasised. Making loss with loss — resisting an intelligible expectation: *making art education theory with art education theory*, where reading cannot be made without writing. *Making* theory in art education as more of an unceasing sharing of the amassing of a question, and less as an interplaying of question and answer. Making theory in art education without being merely a philosopher, without being merely a poet. Without being merely a teacher, without being merely a learner. Without being merely. Perhaps, as someone who does not know its language. Perhaps, as someone who does not know its practice. Perhaps, as someone who does not know its title, nevertheless working impatiently by sharing the making of it. Someone who impatiently tries not to reduce the opacity of the world with their patient making.

Is this an art education theorist?

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[31] I am writing with Michel de Certeau's (2013/2015) text: «[T]he poetic is the invention of space in a prison. It animates, it moves a closed, decadent order from within. It is therefore "mystic" in that it creates movements in the secrecy of a blocked situation» (p. 77). This blocked situation is the very fixing of the written.

This study's main audience are art education theorists and art educators performing academic research. More particularly, those occupied with issues entwined with reading and writing (e.g., Cocker, 2020; Leavy, 2018; Séraphin, 2017), philosophy (e.g., Baldacchino, 2019; Lewis, 2012), critical theory (e.g., Kallio-Tavin, 2013; Penketh, 2023), historicisation — as in *how* History is a product (e.g., Garnet, 2020 cf. Martins, 2011) —, and art education itself (e.g., Almeida, 2015; Hafeli, 2009; Meyer, 2017). These very areas also compose the very milieu with which I wish to continue academic work.

Moreover, educational theorists working amidst the mentioned issues may also find interest in this study, especially those engaging with pedagogy. I am speaking about scholars such as Carl-Anders Säfström, Naoko Saito, Lovisa Bergdahl, Jorge Ramos do Ó, or Kimmo Kontio. Bringing these specific scholars here also has to do with them being reflective before legacies that may inform their own work. For example, as a philosopher of education, Säfström (e.g., 2023) inquires on the influence of philosophy in limiting educational thought, such as Plato's separation between world and thought, proposing «education is precisely the critique of the [traditional] distinctions [of theory and practice]» (Säfström, 2021, p. 13). Saito (2009) suggests «a different approach to writing about oneself» (p. 253), one that avoids fixing language to «the narrow and fixed framework of the narrator, [imposing it] on the listener» (p. 254). Saito (2009) puts forward the process of translation, as a «reengagement with [one's] language» (p. 263). «Finding one's language means taking what is given and adding something new to it» (p. 263). Translation also concerns Lovisa Bergdahl (2010), pedagogically, arguing for a «'double vision' where [she] both acknowledge[s] [...] the other person's secrecy [...] and the desire for recognition» (p. 156). While this shows «the necessity of translation», it also evinces «the impossibility of reaching full understanding» (Bergdahl, 2010, p. 156). Jorge Ramos do Ó (2019) is also at hands with ambiguity: addressing the very seminar of scientific writing he himself conducts, Ó puts forward what *would* be the seminar's *ultimate* proposition, that of «an academic writing apart from all systematic spirit» (p. 30, translated here). Ó's overarching endeavour is that of fostering inventive writing in the context of the university; *making one's hand*, to allude to the title of Ó's (2019) book. As for Kimmo Kontio's (2015) case, I am referring to his inquiry on Rousseau's writings, arguing «[h]istory [...] has an essential pedagogical function in the totality of Rousseau's thought: to *show* [...] there are no other alternatives than barbarity *or* freedom» (p. 134, translated here, emphasis added). This study owes to these scholars' contributes and, in a broad stroke, can be read to express the desire of working *with* them, not merely *from* or *against* them: *it writes to them*. This is to say this study writes *on* the divide of theory and practice. It writes itself translating its references unceasingly, sharing what it understands and what it does not. It writes *with* systems but without letting them define a path; and it writes how a *story* has an essential pedagogical function to Rousseau.

It would be a pleasure, of course, to read this study with the main authors I am addressing — Gert Biesta, jan jagozinski, Dennis Atkinson.

I do not claim any kind of *originality* whatsoever in this study, and there are scholars invested in the same issues addressed. For example, as Säfström (2021), Cat Martins (e.g., 2022) in their pedagogical work invite doctoral students to inquire on the divide of theory and practice when writing. This study is also a response to such call, as I am, as well, a student in the same doctoral programme[32]. Further, the matter of writing, in itself, is also a fundamental part of this study's *what-ness* and *how-ness*. Such matter occupies scholars such as Patricia Leavy (e.g., 2018, 2024), or Lena Séraphin (e.g. 2017) working detailedly on it, a matter which is not aside reading, which these and other scholars (e.g., Cocker, 2020) also consider thoroughly.

For example, Leavy's (2018) arguments constitute the aesthetic dimension of a text as an important point of articulation between the text itself and the reader. In this light, Leavy (2018) calls for researchers to be attentive to the «craft of writing and readers' aesthetic pleasure» (p. 200). Leavy uses fiction as a contrasting example to «traditional academic writing» (p. 190), seeing the former «lessens the power differential between text and reader» (p. 190). «The practice of writing fiction» is a different way for «engag[ing] with the data or content at the heart of [one's] efforts», pens Leavy (p. 190). This also serves to postulate the relevance of imagination, by which, Leavy argues, «fiction grants [...] entry into what is otherwise inaccessible» (p. 190). Imagination and fiction, in a less technical key than in Leavy's (2018) approach, is also core to the work of scholars such as Lena Séraphin (e.g., 2017) or Emma Cocker (e.g., 2020). The former, for example, writes her thesis' aim is the «mak[ing of] a knowledge-creating environment embracing the imaginary in this way extending and augmenting the sensible or rational with the capacity of imagination» (Séraphin, 2017 p. 107, translated here). The latter, Emma Cocker (2020), understands «[o]ne person's imagination provides a germinal ground for another's, for another's, for another's» (para. 10). With a particular focus on reading, Cocker sees «[r]eading is a site of rehearsal, where reader and text negotiate one another's force» (2020, para. 7). The importance of reading is considered in its relation to writing, as the latter «can store the circumstances of both its own production and the context in which it is

[32] The bond to the mentioned doctoral programme, especially in what concerns writing is addressed in this study's part I, mainly in chapter four.

read» (para. 10). This study is in line with such scholars, namely in what concerns the attentiveness to the relation that can be made with a text, and how scholars should indeed consider the manner of addressing text. I side with the understanding that «[r]eading augments the reader's capacity for further reading» (Cocker, 2020, para. 10) as in fostering the will to «act» (para. 10). For example, I am here concerned with *reading* attentively Édouard Glissant's work *and* other readings of his work[33]; I thus partake of the aspiration Emma Cocker (2020) is referring to.

My contribute in this study is less one of establishing a difference with such research work, than it is to complement it. This is to say that while I do *not* deal away with the attentiveness of reading, I am committed to emphatically make a case for *writing*; and this is *not* because I want to feed a contrast between reading and writing. Rather, because of the very specificity of this study. Positing the *making* of theory in art education as the *making* of an artwork expressing an opaque relation with other artworks — theoretical endeavours by means of textual pedagogical gestures —, cannot be *made* without the very means for its expressing. That is, the practice of theory I am committed to — writing as pedagogy, by means of textual pedagogical gestures — implies the very *writing* of a discursive space: otherwise, this study would stay *apart* from its very reference. I am not *merely* addressing reading, I am not *merely* addressing writing; I am *making theory*, but *only* with writing I can *express* the aspiration Cocker (2020) is referring to. Recollecting: trying to write the sound I listen to in and with the texts addressed; an imitation, not as a mechanical reproduction, but a way of listening. Reading and writing at the same time, and *expressing it with writing*.

But the thorough theoretical trait of this study is also a limitation, and perhaps its most meaningful one. As this study is fundamentally concerned in *making* sense of art education theory as a pedagogical practice, I am well aware not all art educators, and educators as well, may find utility in it. Making this endeavour an exclusively theoretical affair leaves out an immense material of research being made in the field of art education. Both by academic researchers and classroom practitioners in art education alike, but even by art education theorists more akin to empirical research. A major slice of art education is thus beyond this study. This does not mean I cannot have hope — even if a very, very, very, modest one — for this study to be a small

[33] This is addressed in this study's part III.

reminder on *how* one teaches not being detachable from *what* one teaches. This is not to say this thesis *tells* a procedure for teachers; I am not *teaching teachers*; this is about inquiring on *how* texts teach. I am, rather, stressing the possibility of imagination as germinal, to use Cocker's (2020) word. This modest hope is entailed to the dual language of art education theory I bring fore, as I see it questions the modern divide of theory and practice, *maybe* inviting conversations amidst art educators more focussed on empirical research or theory-to-practice approaches, *and* art education theorists. So, I am referring to this study's very social dimension.

This dual language is, I believe, one of the significant postulations of this study's contribution. Addressing art education theory as a tangible endeavour that is *at the same time* pedagogically concerned is a useful and improper manner to evince the entwinement of *what* art education theory can propose and *how* it may do so. It thus asks more about what means *may* mean, and less than what ends may be *assumed* to mean. At the same time, by writing textual pedagogical gestures, what such means may mean is also made expressed. This is also not to *tell* how art education theorists should work, but to invite one to, as possible as it may be, be attentive to what *informs* one's theorising, particularly in its educational entwinements. In this regard, this study is merely an example of what can be made with such approach, and *how* it is made so.

This study's very scope is a limitation as well: I cannot posit the references I look into as an all-encompassing and all-depicting slice of such subfield. This study is an *album*: a collection and a mingling of writings which constitute the very educational traverse of my doctoral studies. Again, I am not looking into *giving*, with this study, a proper manner to make theory in art education. In this respect, such position merely can claim the singularity of the very study itself — a singularity I try to make expressed across the whole piece. Thereby, an intimate position — as an art education theorist and teacher: of course, a make-believe position; but a learner, a student nonetheless — is emphasised upon theorising. Placing this study's attention onto *how* is the language one makes use of when making theory, is also a way to address such limitation: *addressing* it continuously. In this respect, such singularity stands opposed to theoretical discourse as a generalisation, as I take issue with the very *reducing* such discourse makes of its reference. Yet, this study cannot not be a reduction itself: I try, by this study's very practice and endeavour, to resist taking the place of the references I address — and yet, I cannot but theorise. Both the latter aspect and the personal

trait of this study represent a motivation to be thoroughly self-critical, as possible as I may be. Thereby, I must address a concern: writing this study opaquely is very much entwined with the issues brought fore in the last sentences.

While I forward such manner of writing as part of this study's core, as I see it allows me to actually *make* this inquiry by articulating references via their very opacity, it is not necessarily effective. The aim of writing clearly with confusion is not reduced to one of *informing* — that is, of transmitting meaning vectorially —; but this endeavour *is* a doctoral thesis, so, I do not intend to deal away with *communication*. Whilst neither reading and writing are exempt activities, and it is not, by any means, my intention to *alienate* readers, I do assume responsibility for the manner in which this study is written, and thus the shortcomings it entails. That is, it is not for me to say this text is an enticing read, even for those who constitute this study's main audience. In this respect, if aesthetics is considered, it does not prioritise pleasure, as, for example, Leavy (2018) proposes; rather, an «aesthetics of turbulence» (Glissant, 1990, p. 169, translated here). What I mean by this, is that *in this very text*, I take on the endeavour of mingling everything together — times, spaces, authors, languages; and form, and content, and rhythm. So, this study tries to unceasingly recollect «[t]he Other of thought [which] is always set in movement by the ensemble of confluences, where each is changed by the other and changes the other» (Glissant, 1990, p. 169, translated here). But thisit is not to ignore the thought of the Other (Glissant, 1990), that is, the attentiveness towards the reader Leavy (2018) puts forward. Rather, to also mingle together *thought of the Other* and the *Other of thought*. This is not a superficial option: it influences this writing unceasingly, in that it favours the very contingency along the addressing of references with the *making* of their relation. This differs from a *constant mindset* when writing and articulating thought — this writing is thus not about keeping *on track*. In this regard, this study is not detached from efforts of *poeticisation*, that is, of a balance amidst different registers, namely of science, philosophy and art. I am referring to, for example, Novalis' unbound articulation of poetry and science[34], or Baumgarten's «ultimate objective of poetic representation [being] clarity, but not [one] prescribed as the criterion of truth» (Mehtonen, 2003, p. 175). Nevertheless, Baumgarten sees «[p]oetic representation is at its most perfect and most beautiful

[34] For example, Novalis writes «[t]he sciences are separated only due to a lack of genius and acumen — the relationships between them are too intricate and remote from each other for the understanding and dullness» (1797/2024, p. 36).

clarus and *confusus*» (Mehtonen, 2003, p. 175), a *perfect end* with which I am not concerned.

In relation to the mentioned endeavours, this study acknowledges a Continental legacy of concern with obscurity in language, where obscurity is addressed by contrast (Mehtonen, 2003). I am invested in engaging with this legacy, particularly with the consequences a mode of reasoning by means of contrast entails for art education theory, and how it is part of its very language. Specifically, how it may be a core constituent in regarding encounters with art with revelatory expectation, as the contrast between obscurity and clarity is not aside a methodological approach to achieve meaning (Mehtonen, 2003). In this light, contrast is made a tool — and a *proper* one — «in the development of the human sciences» (Mehtonen, 2003, p. 18). Therefrom, this study makes use this methodological interdependence of obscurity *and* clarity (Mehtonen, 2003), also methodologically. That is, arguing such contrasting operativeness is limiting the language of art education theory, I see how the references addressed in this study are part of such legacy, delving into *how* the *how-ness* of this trait conditions *what* theorisation proposes. However, the contrast between obscurity and clarity is overlapped with the contrast between obscurity and opacity I make use of with Édouard Glissant's writings[35]. *Opacity* is thus made an improper tool to engage with the contrast between obscurity and clarity, inquiring on the very temporality and interdependence between the pair. In other words, the approach by means of contrast is not a fixed and proper method to compose this study: itself is inquired into, that is, *made* improper.

As a final note, this very History I engage with — even if by inquiring on it — binds this study to a geopolitical location, as the focus on Continental production of research leaves other contexts aside. I am rather hesitant to even consider a possibility to *fully* evade such limitation — as Continentalism is also, in my case, intimate —, but this does not mean I should neglect what it circles. This is to say that I am not invested in offering a pristine formula for art education theory, but to stay critical with it as I write the study. Thereunder, even *within* the limits of such scope, I also engage with sources that work on the questioning of such roots. In this regard, this study's attempt to perform an attentive reading towards contributions of otherwise

[35] Addressing opacity with Édouard Glissant is the main endeavour for this study's part III.

geographies *of thought*[36] is an attempt to minimise the damage of such limitations. I see Édouard Glissant's work already represents a remarkable questioning of a Continental legacy by means of such legacy's very foundations, but I try to make sense of Glissant's writing, namely, opacity, with a heterogeneous collection of scholars[37]. This is an attempt to *read* Glissant opaquely, so as to express the opacity of his writing, of his practice — which I do by writing, by *practicing*.

As Rauna Kuokkanen (2007) meaningfully asks, «[w]hat are the *responsibilities of the participants of the established discourse* individually — and of the academy as a collective — when it comes to listening to, responding to, and (most significantly) recognizing [other][38] epistemes?» (p. 8, emphasis added). This is to ask how can those in the academy relate to what is alien to them or it, without reducing them to their own comprehension. *Staying with* this question is of utmost importance to prevent educational work — art education theory included — from being narrowed through the avoiding, the rejecting or the ignoring, of contributions that *do not fit a generalised imagination*. Hence, in future academic work, the above mentioned aims of this study *must* be addressed *with* its limitations at hand, not forgetting Kuokkanen's (2007) question.

> Consider as well that from the West itself have flowed out [*sont issues*] the variables that have every time contradicted its impressive itinerary [of an indifferent universality]. It is there where it is not a monolith, and this is why it must depart towards entanglement. The whole question is to know if it will do so in participatory manner or under ancient taxings [*anciennes impositions*]. And even if one had no illusion about the realities, to simply ask this question is already to begin changing its givens. (Glissant, 1990, p. 205, translated here)

So as to sustain the inquiry of this study and *invite*, I make use of a question: *what does it mean to make theory in art education?* To do it in participatory manner, I stay asking it: *addressing* a question without foreclosing its path, without imposing an enclosing answer. *Staying with* inquiry, by sharing the making of a question.

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[36] I am writing with Benjamin Davis' and Kris Sealey's (2024) text, as they propose «that shifting the geography of reason, to borrow the tagline and long-standing commitment of the Caribbean Philosophical Association, will result in major contributions to thinking the present» (p. xii).

[37] This endeavour is undertaken in part III, namely in chapter nine.

[38] Kuokkanen (2007) is referring specifically to *indigenous* epistemes. I alter such quote, as I see such question is relevant in its possible transversality as well, which should not be mistaken by a generalising of Kuokkanen's contribute.

What does it mean to make theory in art education?

I ask this question not only to answer to it, but to also stay with it as I go along this study. In this regard, this study's main question is also a guiding — or erring — one. The very formulation of the question, and resisting the very *definitive* answering of it, mirrors this intention. That is, I write *what does it mean* to express I do not wish to foreclose what the question may entail. Thereby, I am not invested in *telling definitively* what and how art education theory *should be* — neither for me, nor for anyone. It is, rather, a question with which I *study*, that is, one I repeat across these pages, so as to keep the relation with this study's references contingent to the very study. It is more of a tool I patiently maintain to impatiently write with it. Rather than to ask it so as to give an answer to be read, I am sustaining the inquiry across the study thus establishing a common ground with what is addressed. I thus *continuously express the relation* of this study with what it addresses, making use of this erring question as an anchor. Paradoxically, however, a somewhat clayish anchor: I do mould it slightly, specifically regarding Édouard Glissant's and Jean-Jacques Rousseau's writing. I pose the question as *what does it mean to make theory in education*, so as to articulate their contributes in relation to the general motif of making theory, in broader educational scope — a living question, so to speak. In this respect, the question is made *improper* and not impervious to the very practice of writing.

Thereunder, I am intentionally *not* asking what does it mean to make theory in art education *with textual pedagogical gestures*. On the one hand, I wish to emphasise the specificity of this language of art education theory with regard to the writings of this study's main art education theorists. On the other hand, and more importantly for this matter, I am keeping a more general question to also address other art education theorists who do not write in such a way. This is *not* to say writings of other art education theorists (e.g., Geahigan, 1980; Lankford, 1992a; McRorie, 1996; Swift, 1999) do not address pedagogy, nor they cannot be learnt with: learning *with* these authors' texts is part of the very endeavour of this study[39]. Nevertheless, the contrast I trace[40] divides them on how they all relate to very divide of theory and practice: such divide is *affirmed* by the latter authors, so as to conduct their inquiries. That is, such binary is seen as convenient *in theory*, even if acknowledging «in reality, the two activities work together» (Steers & Swift, 1992, p. 7). Conversely, I argue the texts by the main authors addressed in this study — Biesta, Atkinson, jagodzinski — can be read to inquire on such divide by *blurring* such divide. But there is more to this blurring which is a fundamental motivational point for this endeavour.

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[39] In this study's parts I and V, I address texts by these and other authors in more detail. These authors are not random, they are named by art educator Peter Smith (1998) as examples «ask[ing] those important questions that will keep [art educators] thinking instead of swallowing whole the theories of the day» (p. 375). This is related to Smith's (1998) call for «a greater attention to philosophical grounding», meaning «a more thought-out *philosophy of art education*—distinct from philosophy of art or philosophy of education» (p. 371). That is, art education's very own philosophy. I am addressing Smith's suggestion because I see it as a productive one, though I hesitate to limit the practice of art education theory to philosophical groundings. As useful as philosophical reasoning can be made, a utility that also fuels this study, another tone for making contributions can, perhaps, be considered, as Rousseau's (1762/1979) passage suggests in this study's rubric. To be clear: this is not to deal away with philosophy, but to consider what may be at stake by emphasising philosophical frameworks in theoretical work.

[40] I am writing with Maurice Blanchot's (1969/2003) text: «[t]o write: to trace a circle in the interior of which would come to be inscribed the outside of every circle» (p. 79). Further, writing: «an irregularity that no trace can stabilize (or inform): a tracing without trace that is circumscribed only by the endless erasure of what determines it» (Blanchot, 1969/2003, p. 170). In this respect, when I use *trace* in this study, I am referring to anchors I continuously set so as to *continue* writing: I am thus not *tracing* in definitive manner, in that the traces made are part of the whole study, part of the whole text. As put by Silverman (1994), «[t]races are also inscriptions of the place between binary oppositions» (p. 68). Traces are thus here understood as «tools of the trade» which «are neither the one nor the other and yet they note the co-givenness, co-operation, and co-incidence of the two» (Silverman, 1994, p. 68). Still, Silverman's (1994) piece focusses on the very «"thinking the between" by developing "difference"» (p. 1), which is a *difference* from this study: I am committed to thinking the amidst, but confusing difference with similitude. This is not to conflate, but to *overlap*: trace is neither one or the other, and yet it is. The co-givenness, the co-operation, the co-incidence are not joints, but the very matter: traces express the singularity of the relation this study makes with that it addresses, by blurring itself with them. Blanchot (1969/2003) continues: «[t]o write: trait without trace, writing without transcription. Writing's characteristic trait will never be the simplicity of a trait capable of tracing itself and merging with this trace; it will be rather the divergence on the basis of which begins, without beginning, this pursuit-rupture. The world? A text?» (p. 170). This question, *as question*, is kept in this study, indeed, by a taking as endeavour a writing *tracing itself* and *merging with such trace*: writing is the very blurring of traces without conflating them — merging by coming together and *not* dissolving, and clearly expressing a relational singularity. «Insofar as our conscience of Relation is total, which is to say immediate and therefore immediately on the world's realisable totality, we no longer need, when we evoke a poetics of Relation, to add : relation between what and what?» (Glissant, 1990, pp. 39–40, translated here).

In this case, notwithstanding different aims and procedures in theorising, I evince with this study they all suggest a sonic relevance to pedagogical and theoretical work[41]. What I see as interesting for the purposes of this study, is that this sonic interest is connected to a possible mean to address what may evade vision, which is to say that it can be a manner to *listen* to the unknown. The *key*, and the specificity to Biesta, jagodzinski, and Atkinson, is that the sonic limit traced between writing and orality is another limit I see — or hear — these three authors blur with their texts, particularly by their textual pedagogical gestures. This is why I choose these three authors' works as this study's main references: the specificity of the language of art education theory they share with their writings may hint at a tone to make proposals, beyond an exclusively philosophical one. This is *not* to deal away with philosophy, but to *not* frame work exclusively within such framework. In this respect, I see it is worthy to address their hinting, which Rousseau recognises as well: with this study, make sense of the tone that can be sung, making it integral to the *proposal*, to the very contribution, to the very inquiry as well.

So, to *make* such tone, not only do I make use of this main *erring* question to anchor all of this study's references to it, but also to be clear on how they overlap: not solely how they differ. The question thus serves as a focal point *not* from which to depart towards a *finding*. It is a focal point that does not *direct* the writing of the study, but one where to amass the references, arguments, claims, and thoughts, which are part of this *erring*. Rambling, more than pursuing: working *with* the question by staying with it.

What does it mean to make theory in art education? I can only write this now by recollecting. The answer this study finally offers[42] — as an *invitation*, *not* a *dictating* — is the making of theory in art education as the letting go of what one knows. To *not comprehend* references addressed. To consider theoretical writings artworks: opacities with which one cannot be done with, and yet, stays with them. At the same time, to consider the very singular theorisation one makes, one's artwork, is never heard. To make it as precisely as possible: writing sound; writing art education itself.

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[41] I crystallise such claim in part V, while addressing it more detailedly in relation to texts by Biesta, jagodzinski and Atkinson, in part IV, namely, in chapter 14.

[42] The *final* response to this study's guiding question is addressed in this study's *farewell*.

There are, nevertheless, two more specific questions with which I write this study; more solid anchors, so to speak. Firstly: if Jean-Jacques Rousseau's (1762/1979) textual pedagogical gestures in *Emile, or On Education* can be read to overlap those of educators Gert Biesta, jan jagodzinski, and Dennis Atkinson, what does this entail to the *making* of art education theory? Secondly, how can Édouard Glissant's postulation of *opacity* be made a tool for overlapping such textual pedagogical gestures *and*, therewith, in *making* an otherwise gesture *with* them?

These questions thus contribute to the anchoring and focussing of this study, being articulated to the two core arguments brought fore. Recollecting: the texts of Rousseau, Biesta, jagodzinski, Atkinson, can be read to *assign a revelatory task to pedagogical work when in presence of opacity*. This is not detached from placing a *revelatory expectation onto the opacity of art*. This is to say such arguments rely on a contrasting operativeness where clarity takes the place of opacity, an operativeness which shapes *how* an encounter with art is considered: illegibly. Therefrom, endeavours are concerned in making sense of such encounters, *sense* is what is emphasised. Glissant's precise distinction between opacity and obscurity offers a nuance to inquire on the mentioned alternating, making plausible the following questions: *Is art education theory the reading of opacity as obscurity?* Is theorising, in art education, the accepting of the opaque as the obscure? Is *the assigning of a revelatory task to pedagogical work when in presence of opacity* an endeavour that deals away with opacity by accepting it as obscurity? Foregrounding the textual pedagogical gestures — of Rousseau, Biesta, jagodzinski, Atkinson — are premised on *showing* from revelation, I look into how they might be shaping their very proposals. I make use of an opaque pedagogical textual gesture, both to address their overlapping, *and* to make a textual pedagogical gesture: I foreground it as a *wave*.

The answers I pursue with the two more focussed questions — which I can now address by recollecting this study — are answers to *continue* the very inquiry, and not to enclose it. What I mean is that what this gesturing entails for art education theory is what this study wishes to make sense of — *making* is what is emphasised. The textual pedagogical gestures traced are thus *anchorings* to continue the very weaving of inquiry.

The main and guiding question is addressed throughout the whole writing of this study, whilst the latter two are directly addressed in this study's farewell. Indirectly, however, what the two latter questions ask comes to fruition along this study's part IV, from the structure defined in part II. In part IV, I deal in detail with the textual pedagogical gestures of Biesta, jagodzinski, and Atkinson, in relation to those of Rousseau, making use of what I learn with Glissant's writing. That is, what I read as a textual gesture in part III, and write, as a textual pedagogical gesture, with this study.

With these questions, a collection of four aims accompany this study. One; *making* theory in art education as the impatiently patient enduring of weaving sources by the plural complexity of their relations: resisting the onset of relations dictated by *either* affiliation *or* opposition. Two; inviting attentiveness to the textual pedagogical gestures one may make by writing, trying to be conscious of the History that informs such making *and* not foreclosing — perhaps, uncertain — paths of theory. Three; writing as a creative practice where limits are more blurred than they are affirmed, so as to forward an educational life premised on *sharing*. These limits can be, for example, the ones between learning and teaching, reading and writing, sonics and text: writing as the very place for inquiring on divide. Four: making theory in art education without being merely a scientist, without being merely a philosopher. Without being merely a teacher, without being merely a learner. Without being merely. Rather, as an art education theorist: clarity and confusion. That is, sharing clarity without dealing away with confusion, sharing confusion without dealing away with clarity — all at the same time.

These aims concern this study's guiding question, being taken into account across the whole endeavour, and, finally, recollected in this study's *farewell*. Regardless, these aims are not merely written to grid this study's contribution; they also compose a referential current for the academic endeavours I wish to continue.

What does it mean to make theory in art education? To unceasingly address this question, I stay *with* these aims and go along *with* the work these aims call for. Whatever it may mean, it may mean by staying and going, at the same time; patiently and impatiently.

This thesis is self-referential: this is not to say it looks at itself as an example to be reproduced, rather, *itself* is the very place where inquiry is made; or, more precisely, it is where *inquiring* is *continuously being made*. Thereby, the methodological undertaking of this study is that of *continuously addressing* the very procedures *making* its discoursing. This means this study delves into art education theory literature to address the language used — *how* is the mode of writing art education theory. At the same time, this study is also *making use of such language*. It is thus written so as to understand the limits of what it — both itself and the language it makes use of — can make. *Making* sense of limits aims sharing the imagining of what it cannot make. To ask it clearly: what can I *not* say with the language I *know*? How to say what I cannot say? To put the latter question differently in regard to the methodological undertaking: how can this study be the making of a contribute?

As this study's contribute is not representational, the methodology is not to be a system of methods to extract something and reveal it as a finding. In this respect, *speculative* would be a more adequate manner to consider this study's methodology, in contrast to a *descriptive* one. While I deal with *speculation* in part IV with regard to Dennis Atkinson's writing, I believe it is worth to briefly consider how he sees it. Atkinson writes «speculative inquiry, thinking and practice [...] are crucial [as] such inquiry *recognizes* the *immanence* of potential *that enables* a more *expansive* pursuit of invention and innovation» (Atkinson, 2022, p. 125, emphasis added). However, as this study takes on the endeavour to indeed *make* something with what it addresses, at the same time *expressing it*, I am hesitant to write a *speculative* methodology is absolutely favoured before *descriptive*. What I mean is that *speculating*, as put by Atkinson while drawing from Alfred North Whitehead, Isabelle Stengers and Martin Savransky (Atkinson, 2022), operates under a particular temporality. That is, *firstly*, a privileged point of view is to be attained so as to, *then*, proceed with *making*: recognition *enables*

invention. This temporality is also readable in other passages: «speculation as a [...] mode of *questioning on an unfinished present* whose potential is the invention of strategies, operations or ideas, [...] capable of provoking [someone] to *transition into a future*» (Atkinson, 2022, p. 89). Or, «our speculation [...] is not addressed [...] according to the world from which we departed but to a world-in-the-making so that on return, our understanding and the world will have been changed» (Atkinson, 2022, p. 141). While I side with the relevance of questioning the present and not foreclosing paths of inquiry, this operativeness of *speculating* entails *locating* the present inquiry — this very study — in a *determinant* position for a future endeavour. This is already counter to a study resisting «its own affirmation as a *determining moment* between past and future» (Tervo, 2018, p. 41). What I mean by this, is that this study — and therefore its methodological undertaking — has nothing to do with the making of a position *to stand out*, transposable to situations to work as a pivot between two different worlds. So, rather than a «pedagogical speculation» that does «not return to the same ground from which it 'took off'» (Atkinson, 2022, p. 141), what could more precisely *say* this study's methodological endeavour? Rather than merely questioning on an incomplete present (Atkinson, 2022) — that is, writing *about* it —, how to *express the very incompleteness* of this study while, at the same time, *making* its contribute? The immediate answer is to *make* a contribute that *expresses clearly the very incompleteness* it addresses. So, how to address this methodological undertaking?

Risking naming, I prefer to refer to this study's contribute as a postulation, and, thereby, to the methodological endeavour as *postulative*. The preference for such *premise* in contrast to a *speculative* one, aside the more obvious contrast to a *descriptive* one, has to do, mainly, with this study's endeavour of continuously making a textual pedagogical gesture, *with* other textual pedagogical gestures. This is to say that this study's contribute is not limited to, using Atkinson's terms, «recogniz[ing] the immanence of potential» (2022, p. 125) in textual pedagogical gestures, that is, *recognising* what such textual pedagogical gestures can make — here, to question the very theory and practice divide by blurring it. At the same time, this study *actualises* — to keep up with Atkinson's terms —, the very textual pedagogical gestures. So, the methodological endeavour is not about *recognising* so as to, *then*, expand by usage — this study does not claim a perspective for a future detached from a past; it is not about an articulation of potentiality and actuality. This study's temporality *is* the very

study's temporality: again, the time of *writing* resisting «its own affirmation as a *determining moment* between past and future» (Tervo, 2018, p. 41, emphasis added). It is making by using — *at the very same time*. It is what this study makes and expresses of itself: the relation between theory and textual pedagogical gestures — the methodological endeavour is, then, to express this relation, that is, this movement[43]. In this respect, this study does not aim to offer a speculation, but to postulate itself: offering itself as common ground for belief.

And this belief is not to be taken as *an absolute truth*: unlike how Rousseau (e.g., 1762/1979) postulates. I am referring to *postulational rhetorics* (Szkudlarek, 2017, 2019), that is, a language of education *postulating* what *should be done*, thereby making an idyll — a yet to come — a key operator in educational work. This is to say it feeds a generalisation of time (Tervo, 2023b) in how education is discussed, namely, a modern one, an enlightened one, a New Christian one: out with the old, in with the new. Now, very briefly: this study highlights Jean-Jacques Rousseau's *Emile* (1762/1979) due to its language — a dual language which theorises and teaches —, arguing it is part of its very success. And this study expresses a relation amidst Rousseau's language and the making of theory in art education: the placing of a revelatory expectation onto art. That is, such expectation of revelation — what *is to happen* — makes theory and pedagogy focus on what *should* be made. Postulating — offering a common ground for belief —, when made in such a way that *defines* an educational telos, makes educational endeavours the accomplishing of such a truth. In other words, the realising of the very potential it claims. Thus what is asked — what is postulated — entails a desired answer: it demands (Szkudlarek, 2019).

But, as this study places emphasis on the very writings it addresses by writing with them — *true* as in made tangible by language —, what if a postulation is *unceasingly* made? This means that it is *now*, *here*, on the very surface of writing this study stays with: by inquiring, it makes what is deemed true permanently in question. Again, as this study takes on the endeavour to indeed *make* something with what it addresses, *expressing it*, the very expressing cannot not be the very place of inquiry itself. Postulation as *postulating*; theorising by postulating. Switching the temporal undertones changes what it can say: it says not *what should be made*; it does *not claim* a

[43] I am writing with Édouard Glissant's (1990) text: «[n]ow, movement is where [Relation] realises itself absolutely. Relation is movement» (p. 186, translated here).

yet to come. Impatiently and patiently, it says what is made thus making *itself* the very place of inquiry; neither a representation, nor a privileged gaze —; it *is* what it *is*. This is *not* to make an essentialist claim. Rather, it is to affirm this study does not speak on behalf of otherness, as in the former — a representation —, nor does it intend to serve as a voice for otherness, as in the latter — a privileged gaze. It says itself: it is merely true insofar as the story it tells.

It is, nevertheless, pressing to understand *why* and *how* is this *postulative* methodology *useful*. Or, better put, *made* useful in light of this study's methodological undertaking of *continuously addressing* the very procedures *making* its discoursing. If this study *offers itself* as *common ground for belief*, rather than externalising a proposition, what it postulates can *never* be *proved* by itself alone — this is *not* to say it is *not shareable*. Sharing a clear idea — true as in made tangible by language —, but without claiming any ownership of truth: this is what a *postulative methodology* contributes to. This is to say the rhetorical devices — the methods — that can be used for this postulative methodology do not aim manipulating, but inviting: what is asked, *remains being* asked; what is postulated *remains being* postulated — always to be proven. The difference of this methodology can be summarised, with no intent of making a reduction, by contrast. Speculation: proposing a way for what could be made — opening a future, as it assumes there is something that can be made. Postulation, as in, for example, Rousseau: dictating a way for what should be made — closing a future, as it assumes there is *one* thing that *should* be made. Postulation, *here*: sharing continuously what is made and how it is being made — not dependent on future, it is unceasingly making. In this respect, the methods are chosen *not* to achieve an end, a finding, a proof; but, rather, to *sustain* the very inquiry — amassing it and sharing it clearly, at the same time.

Following the aim of making use of textual pedagogical gestures, the methods serve to emphasise the very postulating of such gestures, that is, affirming their tangibility in text, amassing them — *not* to impose them; rather, to *superimpose* them. This is to say *writing* systematically expresses a relation amidst, but not limited to, Rousseau, Glissant, Biesta, jagodzinski, Atkinson — a relation that concerns the study itself: it expresses the language it *knows*. This is not only to evince how such authors contrast, but, at the same time how they overlap: writing the amidst-on, rather than the in-between. This is to make these authors partake of the same space at the same

time, addressing them aside developmental reasoning. In this respect, I am interested in making use of, for example, repetition so as to, *at the same time*, stress and relate arguments, while continuously experimenting them and with them, *at the same time* sharing such experimenting. «The excess is a repetition that signifies» (Glissant, 1990, p. 222, translated here). This is not to *show* absolute truth, but to simultaneously hold and share the very movement of writing by amassing: it signifies *the* movement it makes. For example: anaphora, occurring most evidently in this study's part V — in what concerns *recollecting*. But the devices of repetition are not exclusively rhetorical. For example: refrain, occurring most evidently in this study's part IV — in what concerns the addressing of writings by Atkinson, jagodzinski, Biesta, and Rousseau[44]. In this respect, there is an intentional hypnotic manner[45] of writing, to confound vectorial linearity and make use of such confusion to share language in non determinative manner. This is also what the guiding question of this study makes: it is continuously asked so as to *make* an inquiry, continuously — opacifying the relation of the responses it asks, by also not being static: thickening the weave (Glissant, 1990).

This is why it is more precise to refer to this study's engaging with references as a *layering work*, than as a framework. Indeed, this study amasses on what the writing delineates: it constitutes an opaque mass. Nothing is neither intentionally hidden nor mysteriously concealed; rather, overlapped and shared so. It is this opaque mass that should bleed through this fable's delineating, its writing; again, this study is nothing more than a *fable*, but this claim, nevertheless, requires more precision. That is, *how* is this *fabling* integral to this very study, especially in regard to the relation it expresses with theory as generalisation.

By *fable*, I do not mean *myth*. «"[M]yth" [is] a fragmented discourse which is articulated on the heterogeneous practices of a society and which also articulates them symbolically» (Certeau, 1980/1988, pp. 133–134). Composing a myth is thus systematic in that it entails reproducing a prevailing mode of thought, by seizing external references *into* its own domain. Making a myth is constituting *the* exemplar.

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[44] I am intentionally writing both anaphora and repetition, as I address them.

[45] I am writing with Michel de Certeau's (2013/2015) text, regarding John of the Cross's writing: «[a]gainst a background of repetition, subtle shifts are introduced by a series of combinations between the modified elements. As in *tales and poems*, the transformation of a detail within a host of resemblances creates the instant that strikes: it is nothing, a little hitch in passing, just a slight difference of sound in the melody, but it changes the direction of the rest of the fragment, provoking a drift, and sequels, in that space of meaning, before the following fragment returns to the same refrain and sets off on a new variation» (p. 93, emphasis added).

Contemporarily, such composing is firmly entwined with writing, as such practice is that which reproduces it (Certeau, 1980/1988). «The origin is no longer what is narrated, but rather the multiform and murmuring activity of producing a text and producing society as a text. "Progress" is scriptural in type» (p. 134). So, the practice of writing myths, «the "scriptural" [...] separates itself from the magical world of voices and tradition»[46] (p. 134). It progresses *over* the Other, «absolutely refu[sing] the Other's existence as element of relation» (Glissant, 1990, p. 62, translated here). As with the case of a generalising theory, it *is*, *absolutely*, in itself (Glissant, 1990). Theory for ends.

Risking naming, I would rather address this study as a *fairytale*. What I mean by this, is that this study's endeavour of writing a singular position is not one of generalisation, even if it takes part and makes use of a structure. That is, formally, it obeys the structuring of a doctoral thesis as any other — it makes use of a table of contents, parts, chapters and the kind. It is part of a societal order as it abides by the institutional. But «*upholding* social order — the function of myths — and *reflecting* that social order» (Cardigos, 1996, p. 16) — the function of fairytales — is not the same. Fairytales are «the product of subordinate classes, ideologically conditioned by the dominant ones, but nevertheless still expressing the condition of the actual crafters of the fairytales» (Cardigos, 1996, p. 16). Composing a fairytale, despite working *with* a system, does not *necessarily* reproduce the *way of thought* it addresses[47]. So, in contrast to myth, which claims ownership of truth, a fairytale merely expresses its singular truth: it expresses the relation it establishes with what it addresses. This is not a *heroic* study; «[c]osmic achievements are the stuff of myths» (Cardigos, 1996, p. 22). This is to say that rather than composing a study to *affirm and reproduce* a structure of theorising, the goal is to inquire on this very structure, by making use of it — not an outstanding position, but moving along with its structuring. The textual pedagogical gestures I make use of in this study are thus *not* a premise to write *over* the references I am addressing. Rather, they are made the very improper tool to establish a conversation on the ground offered by the very references: the structure of a thesis is simply an

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[46] Noticeably, Certeau (1980/1988) foregrounds *Robinson Crusoe* (Defoe, 1719/2007) as an example of a «scriptural practice [...] that has the status of a myth» (Certeau, 1980/1988, p. 136), articulating its appeal with Jean-Jacques Rousseau's *Emile* (1762/1979) as well. Jean-Jacques Rousseau is rather aware of the effectiveness of myths. As noted by Allan Bloom, translator for the version of *Emile* (Rousseau, 1762/1979) this study makes use of, «[t]he language of human relations has lost its foundations» for Rousseau, who sees «a demythologized world» (Bloom, in Rousseau, 1762/1979, p. 21). In chapter one, I deal more attentively with Rousseau and language, whilst in chapter six, I address *Robinson Crusoe* (Defoe, 1719/2007), along my reading of Rousseau's *Emile* (1762/1979).

[47] Isabel Cardigos (1996) does note «[t]here is one register in which fairytales are the wishful thinking voice of the humble [merely] *swapping* roles with the mighty [thus working as a discourse that] actually supports the systems of power» (p. 16).

anchoring — gerund — to *tell* its story. Thus this study does not *progress over its references*; it expresses a singular account of their movements, moving *with* them, which is also to say it *stays with* them. In this respect, a divide can be traced between *myth* and *fairytale* when it comes to writing: a *myth* is to write *over* otherness, while a *fairytale* is to write *to* otherness. So, when I write I aspire to *sing*, to *write sound*, I mean that I wish to address otherness in a language I do not control, but that can be heard. It is thus *not* to sing *over* it.

But what I mean by *writing sound* needs clarifying: firstly, it stems from the mentioned attraction before a sonic aspect art education theorists evince in pedagogical and theoretical work. *Writing sound*, nevertheless, does echo the claim of writing being «a voice that resounds» (Nancy, 2002/2007, p. 36), but to reference this passage is not without addressing a difference: that of listening and hearing. «[P]erhaps we never listen to anything but the non-coded, what is not yet framed in a system of signifying references, and we never hear [*entend*] anything but the already coded, which we decode» (Nancy, 2002/2007, p. 36, brackets in original). So, briefly put, *hearing* is here linked to comprehension and understanding, in that sound is *read* as meaningful: it «is to understand sense» (p. 6). *Listening*, on the other hand, is posited as «always [being] in the edge of meaning» (p. 7), «strain[ing] toward a present sense beyond sound» (p. 6). I am foregrounding this divide not to ascertain, for this study, a correct *concept* that can be used throughout it. Rather, I am interested in extending the very inquiry towards such divide, overlapping hearing and listening by making them operative amidst each other. «If listening is distinguished from hearing both as its opening [...] and as its intensified extremity, that is, reopening beyond comprehension [...], that necessarily signifies that listening is listening to something other than sense in its signifying sense» (Nancy, 2002/2007, p. 32). If *hearing* is the presumption of meaning with sound whereas *listening* is the inquiry into meaning with sound, then, listening to what is heard can be a practice of inquiry into sound, not *beyond* comprehension but within comprehension. It is about listening to hearing, and to hear such practicing of listening: making sound improper so as to emphasise the *making* of sense with sound. This is why, across the study, I make use of *hearing* and *listening*, sometimes in the very same sentence. Recollecting: *writing sound* stems from the mentioned attraction before a sonic aspect art education theorists evince in pedagogical and theoretical work. So, *hearing* such call I respond by *listening* to it at the

same time: I understand that call, but I resist comprehending it by paying attention to it, expressing *listening*, gerund, with *writing*. So, not only writing resounds, it listens (Nancy, 2002/2007). What is foregrounded is thus neither listening nor hearing, but the expressing of sound in writing. «Listening is musical when it is music that listens to itself» (Nancy, 2002/2007, p. 67).

So, how to make such expression *heard* with writing? When I write I intend to share the making of a song, I am not saying there is a particular song, or genre, or tone, I must define so as to, *then*, write. As put, and again following Glissant (1990), even if plainchant or howling may be preferential, no song for relation is pre-established. So, a song is always to be made, to be composed by recollecting an ephemeral and singular encounter with sound — clearly *imitating* sound. *Why* I see it — or hear it — as relevant for this study, is that it is a way to, perhaps, hear the unknown sound the scholars addressed seem to hint at. So, the sonic, here, is neutral in that it is not necessarily loud or quiet; it is not qualifiable by default. I have in mind the «theoretical problem that preoccupied John of the Cross and haunted Surin: How can we speak of a "thing that has no name and that cannot be expressed? How can we find the right words for [an] "unknown language"[?]» (Certeau, 2013/2015, p. 112). The *song* is what is used to address what these questions put at stake, leading one «from the content to the form of mystic language», being «not just a word but a practice» (Certeau, 2013/2015, p. 112). In other words, *practice* is not to be *found*, but *made* as *shareable*. But *how* to make it, has to do with making memory operative and, rather relevantly for this study's aims, *how* is memory *made operative*.

«Poetry is memory; this is the classical assertion. [...] The singer sings from memory, and grants the power to remember. The song itself is *mé-moire,* the space where the justice of memory holds sway» (Blanchot, 1969/2003, p. 314). But the point is not to uphold such Classical assertion: the aim of writing sound, here, is not about *granting power to remember*, in that I cannot say I *grant power* with this study. Yet, this is not to deal away with the memorable. However, a difference can be traced in *upholding* a Classical assertion and *reflecting* it, so as to work *with* it. So, if «[p]oetry makes remembrance of what men, peoples, and gods do not yet have by way of their own memory» (Blanchot, 1969/2003, p. 314), it can partake in feeding the mythical, by neglecting, or *forgetting* otherness. Conversely, emphasising the *forgetting*, placing emphasis on the risk of obliteration — of erasing languages —, makes *forgetting* a

practice, that is, an *intentional letting go* of what is acknowledged. To forget is not forgotten, which is to say it is not without responsibility. «Forgetting is the very vigilance of memory» (Blanchot, 1969/2003, p. 314). Positing this in terms of language, then, the language one *knows* can be intentionally forgotten so as to make space for a language unknown: the *memorable*, rather than being what is mechanically repeated, can be a very practice for questioning what one, assumedly, knows. Thereby, if a singer sings the memorable, the song is not the same over again, but constantly composed, recollected unceasingly: humming, perhaps, while it hesitates with words. «To explain how he speaks in tongues, one glossolal says that instead of forming words, "[he] can concentrate on the *communication* itself, rather than on the *mode* of communication."» (Certeau, 2013/2015, p. 214). So, *writing sound* is also expression; it is opaque, yet clear.

In light of this continuously affirmed and forgetful *postulating*, this *fairytale* sung along with writing as it goes along with postulating, I almost always write using the present tense. This is in line with making this endeavour a *study*. Again, and recollecting a previous footnote: «an event where education *acts in the present* without a recourse to the past or future [which] does not mean [they] are completely shut off from this event [rather,] exposed to their contingency *in* the present» (Tervo, 2018, p. 38). I am not claiming, however, this is *how* to *execute* such proposal — again, no absolute truth is to be claimed. This is merely an experiment concerned with mingling this study's references in the *present* text.

This mingling, this insisting, this repeating, this amassing, this postulating, influences not only the references I make use of, but also *how* they are made use of, and *why* so. The matter I am addressing — the texts — is the very opaque mass that captures this thesis' journey, rather than an objective extraction of art education theories. While the relation of the five protagonists — Rousseau, Biesta, jagodzinski, Atkinson, and Glissant — is emphasised by the very extent of writing devoted to their writings, different authors from different times from different places are invited to this *symposium*[48]. An album of friends — *album amicorum* — who mingle; that is they are with each other but do not settle in the confusion the text expresses, while at the same time contributing to the expression of the confusion themselves. «The City of

[48] I am writing with Plato's (Plato, ca. 385 B.C.E./1997d) text, *Symposium*.

Plato is for Plato, the vision of Hegel is for Hegel, the village of the griot is for the griot», Glissant writes (1990, p. 208, translated here). «It is *not forbidden to see them in confluence, without merging them in magma or reducing them to one another*» (Glissant, 1990, p. 208, translated here, emphasis added). This is a mingling of friends (Mehtonen, 2003), a confused and clear mass — and mess, perhaps. Again, «[t]he excess is a repetition that signifies» (Glissant, 1990, p. 222, translated here): this mingling, this insisting, this repeating, this amassing, this postulating; it is the thick expression of the language I *know*. It is the overfilling of boxes, so as to clear them away and conceive infinitely[49]. And this excess expresses the very commitment to a way of theorising made in the span of the textual pedagogical gestures I make use of in this study. Again, textual pedagogical gestures are the tool I refer to, defining the span of the movement: I am *making*, as I go along with these friends. How wide can a gesture be, without forfeiting precision? How can I wave precisely in relation to all? How singular *without* being absolute can the wide be? These questions are the very concern of the textual pedagogical gesture I make with this study.

But this very *I* is a matter to be addressed as well: an ambiguity between *writer* and *written* I am uncertain what to make of. I am referring to «the question of the self and the human subject as textualized [meaning] the question of an authorial self [being] written in the text as a possible reading of its textual interests» (Silverman, 1994, pp. 1–2). While I am making a case in this study for the *very practice of writing* of the addressed authors and emphasising such practice before authorship, there is, nevertheless, an overlapping of both. This is particularly evident with Jean-Jacques Rousseau and, even more blatantly, with regard to *Emile* (1762/1979) in this study's part II: Rousseau, the narrator, the instructor, the writer; their overlapping conflates. In the case of Rousseau, however, it is plausible to argue there is an overarching political interest to his life and work, along with the writings of some scholars as well (e.g., Kontio, 2015; Silverman, 1994; Szkudlarek, 2019; Tröhler, 2011). But this *fabling*, effected by such writings, also effects the very writing of this study, thus also contributing to it: I also evince how different texts of Rousseau can be read to overlap. Thereunder, his writings are read as autobiographical. In this light, «if autobiography is

[49] I am writing with Édouard Glissant's (1990) text: «[w]e move ourselves on the surface, within the span, weaving our imagination, and not filling the voids of a knowledge: but on the contrary clearing the overfull boxes, as we go, to finally conceive volumes of the infinite» (p. 223, translated here).

a literary genre, it falls on the side of literature» (Silverman, 1994, p. 93). *If* so, the *tone* to make proposals is, *then*, «one less agreeable to philosophical haughtiness» (Rousseau, 1762/1979, p. 33). Perhaps, one of «sincere and honest report» (Silverman, 1994, p. 115); at least, «so [Rousseau's] claim goes» (p. 115). This *I* of Rousseau can therefore be argued as part of its very success: it bleeds through the writing.

To be clear, the point is not to address Rousseau *personally*, but to stress the figure Rousseau *writes*: it is key to the very fable — mythical, in that it is heroic — he constructs. «writing [his] own life, [offering] a verbal picture of who [he is] and what [he has] done» (Silverman, 1994, p. 173). I am uncertain how to *settle* this ambiguity: so, I try to make sense of it, being clear on the overlapping of writer and written, making use of it as well. In this respect, I learn about it by imitating, which I share with this study: I thus amass it with the very inquiry. This is to say the *I* of this study is part of the very fairytale I am constructing. I thus construct the position of a make-believe teacher with a make-belief text, that is, a theoretical contribute that as a doctoral dissertation is expected to convince the reader *I* know, or such *I* knows. Contrastingly to Rousseau, I do not want to convince there is *no alternative* to what *I* say: this *I* is simply a *making* to share belief as belief, and a mere method for interpretation, which I use for self-reflexiveness, not only the text's. That is its modest importance, never superseding the singular relation expressed by this study and the references addressed.

Again; mingling, insisting, repeating, amassing, postulating: this is the collection I continuously recollect along this study; this is the *album I am composing*: my relation with a world, in the duration of this practice. An «aesthetics of turbulence» (Glissant, 1990, p. 169, translated here), rather than one of pleasure[50] (e.g., Leavy, 2018). Making this album is not without its uncertainties, but that is the «chance of poetics»: the «accident» (Glissant, 1990, p. 153, translated here). It is about «jolt[ing] all genres so as to express what [one] want[s] to express» (Glissant, 2010, p. 30, translated here).

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[50] Nevertheless, I do not deal away with pleasure altogether. During the writing of this study, I experiment with typography and formatting: these attempts are thoroughly experimental in that they operate under an unceasing *try and see* register. I settle with what is shown, with no intent to *convey* any other thing than what this text writes — but I am more than happy to listen to those who may read it. There are a few premises and convictions, such as prioritising seriffed typefaces — e.g., *Garamond* — because of a perceived easiness in reading. This is not to dismiss the used typeface's — *Hoefler Text* — echoing of baroque ones — e.g., *Janson* —, which also thickens the relation with Édouard Glissant's (1990) interest in the baroque excess, an image of overlapping situations. However, this *overlapping* of font and text is accidental — that is also the «chance of poetics» (Glissant, 1990, p. 153, translated here). Paper-wise, I would favour cream with a very light texture. This preference cannot not make me recollect *Gallimard*'s *Collection Blanche*, a collection holding several titles by Glissant, such as the original publication of *Poetics of Relation* (1990). But this is, nonetheless, another accident. Experimenting with these pages ceases when reading the text, I feel there is no other chance; yet, feeling at ease. A different chance than that of poetics, perhaps.

And this very relational practice[51] overlaps that of the *natural* language this study makes use of — English. There is important critique regarding the issues of a dominant presence of the English language in educational settings and in the academia (e.g. Phillipson, 2008a, 2008b; Hult, 2017; Biesta et al., 2023). The problems are several, such as narrowing down the number of people who can engage in educational discussions, and narrowing down the discussions themselves, as some educational concepts exist within specific languages as well (e.g., Baldacchino & Saeverot, 2024, pp. 2–4; Biesta, 2024, pp. 13–14). The shortcomings also have to do with *how* English is used — read and written, and therewith understood. So, not only the presence of English is a problem, but *how* such presence is. In this study, for example, the limits of writing it in English are expressed rather clearly by *waving*: a waving hello, a wave in the sea, a wavy ground. This *waving* of *waves* is inherent to the very use of English: this is not an intentional articulation from the outset; it is written along the writing of the study. In this respect, it is possible *because* of the English language; so, a direct influence of such articulation with what this study postulates cannot be dismissed. At the very least, asking about it not only is quite plausible, but rather necessary.

However, English can be rather useful as well. For example, John Baldacchino and Herner Saeverot (2024) understand a «need for a comprehensive and more ready-made access to an anglophone audience» so as to «gain a direct access to such a[n educational] conceptual wealth»[52] (p. 4). Moreover, in the various discussions that are part of this study's journey, English is a useful resource for communication, particularly between myself and this study's supervisor, Juuso Tervo, whose mother tongue is Finnish. Further, not being an English native speaker and making myself write in English, I regard the friction inherent to the movement between my mother tongue, Portuguese, and this study's tongue, English, can be quite helpful. A mother tongue, if not used hesitantly, may become dominant as a resource, thus closer to a father tongue[53]. This is especially relevant in a case where my mother tongue, Portuguese, has a colonial legacy. In this respect, the utility of writing this study in English is not

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[51] I am writing with Édouard Glissant's (1990) text: «If we nevertheless refer to the literary text, which after all best depicts the image if not the function of a language, and if we analyse how it is considered across learning or translation (*these two fundamental mechanisms of relational practice*), we very naturally return to the critical approach of the notions of transparency and opacity» (p. 129, translated here, emphasis added).

[52] This is a motivation to assemble *The Bloomsbury Handbook of Continental Philosophy of Education* (2024).

[53] I am writing with Päivi Mehtonen's (2003) text, when referring to the institutionalisation of Latin; a «father tongue», a «language of power» (p. 14).

merely communicative: it is also the placing of natural language in question, as rejecting a *home* for a tongue is to make it strange; and this is intentional. Both English and Portuguese are made strange by one another: it is my conviction this results in a more careful writing of this study; I can only hope, however, such care bleeds through.

When references are not in English, I translate them, noting it; thus, all quotations are in English. Further, I respect English versions, whether they resort to, for example, what is usually named as *American English* or what is usually named as *British English*. When I add or alter emphases, I note it as well; if something is added or altered in the quote itself, it is shown by the use of square brackets. Although unusual in the English language, I favour the use of *guillemets* as quotation marks so as to more clearly evince when a reference bears, for example, quotation marks itself, or apostrophes. At times, translating, I find some words may not be adequate to write what I *read* in the reference; other times, I sense reading the original and the translation alongside is useful for precision. Thereon, I place the original word or expression between square brackets, occasionally placing a longer passage in a footnote. This is also done when I understand the word, or expression, with which I render the original involves a more authorial decision.

The motives for writing this study *entirely* in English can be summed up in two points. Firstly and very simply, I understand it allows for a more constant reading of the whole monograph — it *stays* with English as it *goes along with it*. Secondly, translating texts of different languages involves this study in a relational practice (Glissant, 1990) with this study's natural language and the texts', both in the quotes used, and in the very balancing of tongues: mother's and this study's. In this regard, it is also part of the very contribute of this dissertation: these translations are postulated in this study, thus stressing its singularity. To give a specific example: this study makes use of a few biblical passages; the Bible chosen for this study is intentional: the translation by scholar Frederico Lourenço (2018), directly from the Greek scriptures. Using it has not to do with considering it better than others, but with Frederico Lourenço's (2018) very remarks. Namely: his acknowledging of different bibles and not claiming a theological interest in his endeavour but, rather, critical and Historical, focussing on the very text. As written by Robert Carroll and Stephen Prickett (1997) prefacing *another* Bible, «Bibles are, by their very nature, partisan. As that plural suggests, there are many bibles, even in English, and each is the product of a particular

interest group» (p. v). Addressing the hardships encountered in the translation, and thus its limitations, one of the tasks Lourenço (2018) takes on is the attentiveness to trying to translate sound as well. That is, Lourenço does not polish the version when, for example, his reference bears several repeated words or several conjunctions — aspects intrinsic to ancient Greek itself as it is written without spacings (see Lourenço, 2018, p. 42). This is connected to the orality of the scriptures, *making believe what they write is here*; it makes itself heard, so to speak. This sonic attentiveness is also what I see as a highlight of Lourenço's work; therefore I make use of his translation, and I translate such take to this study with this in mind. This is also why I am specific in referencing both Lourenço's and Carroll and Prickett's *Bibles* in this study.

As Édouard Glissant's writings are core to this study, I thoroughly analyse the relation of the author's originals with available translations, more than I do with other references — which I only occasionally do, something not aside having to deal with time constraints. As a consequence, I translate Glissant's writings to this study. This is particularly evident with *Poetics of Relation*[54] (1990), given the weight of such work in this study. Notwithstanding, no translations made — from any reference —, especially those stemming from *Poetics of Relation* (Glissant, 1990), claim superiority or truthfulness before any other versions whatsoever. This *making* is, merely, the very thickening of the relation I wish to express with Édouard Glissant's writings. On the one hand, it is an effort to weave this study with and in Glissant's discourse. On the other, it is a very relational practice that affirms the very singular position of this study, that is, the relation it makes with what it addresses, as such practice effects the very way I can write with the writings of Édouard Glissant. To give an example: in *Poetics of Relation*, Glissant (1990) addresses *comprendre*: «[t]here is within this verb «to comprehend» the movement of hands which take contexture [*l'entour*] and pull it back to themselves [*ramènent à soi*]» (p. 206, translated here). Glissant is referring to *prendre* — seize (see Glissant, 1993).

Betsy Wing, who renders *Poetics of Relation* in English (Glissant, 1990/1997a), sees «[*c*]*omprehension* [sic] could, of course, be translated as "comprehension" to point out the root connection with the French word *comprendre*, which [she has] earlier rendered

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[54] As mentioned, I refer to the original version of *Poétique de la Relation* as *Poetics of Relation*. Given the weight of this book in this study, I exceptionally make this adaptation in line with the aim of writing this study in English. To note the difference in citation, one should refer to the date. The original *Poetics of Relation* is dated 1990, while Betsy Wing's translation is dated 1990/1997a. There is a 2025 edition of *Poetics of Relation* (1990/2025), but displaying the same translation by Wing.

as “to grasp” or, when the sense is mechanical, as “to comprehend” (and once, at Glissant’s behest, as “to integrate”)» (Wing, in Glissant, 1990/1997a, pp. 220–221). But Wing renders *comprendre* as *understand*, explaining that «[i]n American English, however, the controlling attitude implied in this particular instance, vis-à-vis other people or cultures, is more apparent in *understanding* than in *comprehension*» (Wing, in Glissant, 1990/1997a, pp. 220–221). I do not belittle what Wing states regarding here the appropriation of the *other*; however, and despite the ambiguity between written and writer, I do wish to emphasise *the written*.

The motive for me to render it as *comprehend* has also to do with, on the one hand, the very root connection Wing mentions, and, on the other, the closeness to *compress*, *compact*, or *complete*; *prendre*: also to consume. This is not only decided in light of *Poetics of Relation* (Glissant, 1990). For example, Glissant writes: «*Lisez un poème. Vous n’avez pas besoin de le comprendre pour l’aimer. Pis, un poème compris est un poème fini*» (Glissant, 1993, p. 122). Jeff Humphries (see Glissant, 1994/2005) renders the latter snippet as «[r]ead a poem. You don’t need to understand it to like it. Worse, a poem understood is a poem done with» (p. xxxiii). However, I would share it as: «Read a poem. You do not[55] need to comprehend it to like it. Worse, a comprehended poem is a finished poem» (Glissant, 1993, p. 122, translated here). *Compris* can also, sonically in French, allude to a an adjective — *including*. It also recalls the Portuguese *cumprido*, that is, the past participle of *cumprir*: carry out, accomplish, fulfil. Again, this is *not* to claim the translations I share as *superior*: rather to put this very relational practice in question and thickening the relations of this study with its references. And I do not intend to *comprehend* such practice, but, *with* such practice, I can try to *understand*: I can *make* sense, and I cannot say it enough: *making* is emphasised. And again, even if both English and Portuguese are here made strange by one another, if an underlying comfort in English begins to settle, unceasingly addressing Glissant’s French makes it strange. This is Glissant’s «intent [as well]—to provide sudden contact with an unforeseen relation in language, not unlike the collisions between cultures that he sees as productive of Relation» (Wing, in Glissant, 1990/1997a, p. xiii). As Glissant (1990) writes, «Relation endeavours and expresses itself in opacity» (p. 200, translated here).

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[55] Using *do not* instead of *don’t* has to do with the very context of this text: a thesis. I do not take issue with this aspect in Humphries’ translation (Glissant, 1994/2005), considering the reference (Glissant, 1993) is an interview.

This study, this postulation postulating itself, is the very expressing of the relation it makes with its references. This mingling, this insisting, this repeating, this amassing, this postulating: this is the collection I unceasingly recollect along with this study; this is the *album I am composing*. This is the artwork I share: an opacity made with textual pedagogical gestures — both the language I *know* and I do not *know*. If I cannot say the words to express it, I can try to write them as I hum.

Betsy Wing's rendering of *Poetics of Relation* (Glissant, 1990/1997a) includes a glossary so as to accompany the reader. There, Wing makes use of the passage Glissant (1975) writes in his book *Malemort* so as to introduce its very glossary:

> for the readers *of elsewhere*, who do not accommodate to uncommon words or who wish to all comprehend. But maybe for us, for us as well, establishing a list of the many words in us from which sense escapes, or to fix the syntax of this language we stammer. The readers *of here* are futures. (Glissant, 1975, p. 231, translated here)[56]

The original *Poetics of Relation* (Glissant, 1990) does not have a glossary per se; however, Glissant offers fragments in different moments of the book[57]. These snippets not only offer sense on their own, but, on their whole, they can be read to enact the very *thing* Glissant writes about. As Wing notes, «[t]he structure of *Poetics of Relation* is based more on associative principles than on any steady progress toward irrefutable proof; it is an enactment of its own poetics» (Wing, in Glissant, 1990/1997a, p. xii). «Across [*Poetics of Relation*] I revolve what for me, for so long, traces the compositional lines of such poetics», Glissant writes (1990, p. 47, translated here). And such «revolving sufficiently points such poetics does not end on a qualitative absolute» (Glissant, 1990, p. 47, translated here). As I read it, what makes Glissant write the glossary on *Malemort* (1975) — a tool to continuously read and re-read the text, a tool to continuously hone language — is what he expands across *Poetics of Relation* (1990), entirely. Unlike a *proper* glossary *establishing* the connection between word and meaning, Glissant's *glossing* does not seek such absolute, but, rather, unceasingly saying itself, that is, expressing its singularity *in relation* to what it addresses.

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[56] Wing (Glissant, 1990/1997a) renders: «for readers *from elsewhere,* who don't deal very well with unknown words or who want to understand everything. But, perhaps to establish for ourselves, ourselves as well, the long list of words within us whose sense escapes or, taking this farther, to fix the syntax of this language we are babbling. The readers *of here* are future» (p. xxi). I am sharing Wing's translation as juxtaposing it to my own affirms the very relational practice of translating *Poetics of Relation* (Glissant, 1990) in, and for, this study. For example, while the *readers from here are the future*, which I do not dispute, I prefer to keep Glissant's (1975) plural — *futurs* — not to stress individuality, but to address singularity.

[57] *Opacity* is one of the words Glissant (1990) continuously revisits. For example, there are two chapters addressing such word emphatically (see Glissant, 1990, pp. 125–134; pp. 203–209), but the presence of *opacity* is not limited to those chapters. This scattering of words, namely, with regard to *opacity*, is addressed in part III.

Glissant shares the making of language, literally[58]. So, there is no need for Glissant to write a glossary as the very work *is* the glossary: no reductions[59]. In contrast to a proper glossary to which the reader is pulled, glossing: it goes along with the reader. Glissant *writes* what he *says* — making music with thought, so I hear.

However, I do consider an aid for riding this study relevant, not necessarily to *fix* a syntax, but to continue an anchoring. In *Poetics of Relation* (1990), Glissant adds a note in regard to the «binaries that seem to have greatly occupied [him]» (p. 216, translated here) in the book. Binaries do not confine imaginaries, as they «are nothing but conveniences for addressing the weave» (Glissant, 1990, p. 216, translated here). The note Glissant (1990) adds is a list — a «litany» (p. 236, translated here) of the «binaries, surpassable or not», and their articulation, which Glissant writes by punctuation, markers, spacing. «[T]he comma (,) indicates a relation, the dash (–) an opposition, the colon (:), a consequence»[60] (p. 236, translated here). For example, «Thought of the Other : – Other of thought» (p. 236, translated here). By writing this *litany*, Glissant not only crystallises the *ends* he addresses, but *how* he is addressing them, *sharing* such *means* with readers, both of elsewhere and here. Making sense; emphasising *making*.

In this respect I am offering a modest list merely to accompany this study, where the relation of ends is one of unceasing overlapping. This is not to provide definitive meanings, but to offer an aid to *sustain* inquiry *towards this study* as well, keeping «associative principles» (Wing, in Glissant, 1990/1997a, p. xii).

Do rip, copy, cut it; write with it: nothing more than a bookmark to carry with, and to carry, this studying.

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[58] This claim is further detailed in three moments: chapter one; across part III; and chapter 17.

[59] I am at not at all hinting Wing's glossary (see Glissant, 1990/1997a pp. xxi–xxiii) is useless or inappropriate. Quite the contrary: not only it is a valuable companion to the reading of Glissant's work (1990/1997a), it is as well a generous contribution from her very work as a translator. As Wing writes, «translators—whose first work is to be attentive, even hopeful readers—then, with as many premonitions of disaster as prospects of opening possibilities within their own languages, they must confront the task of making these new openings available to new readers» (Wing, in Glissant, 1990/1997a, p. xi). And I believe she does so.

[60] It should be noted I am rendering these elements as they are in *Poetics of Relation* (Glissant, 1990); for example: the colon with a space between it and the first parenthesis. Recollecting the second of this study's two inaugural passages: «But all poetics have let us believe this which is certainly not false : there is as well an immeasurable order, a measure of disorder» (Glissant, 1990, p. 106, translated here). I do the same in this passage, that is, I replicate the spacing between the word *false* and the colon — I understand it to be part of Glissant's writing. I read a suggestion of this colon having the same function in the mentioned *litany*. Betsy Wing also notes «Glissant is very attentive to textual geography: punctuation, markers, spacing. In all of his writing, including *Poetics of Relation*, this graphic element is important—much as one expects it to be in poetry» (Wing, in Glissant, 1990/1997a, p. xix). It is uncertain, however, why Wing does not consider the spacing before the colon in her translation (see Glissant, 1990/1997a, pp. 223–224). Again, I am not hinting Wing is *wrong*, after all, Wing and Glissant do converse about the translations. But, for example, if one refers to the use of a semicolon (e.g., Glissant, 1990, pp. 30, 47), the textual geography, to use Wing's (Glissant, 1990/1997a) words, differs: a space immediately before it, like the ones with colons, is not readable. This is also key to my decision in rendering the space behind the colon.

opacity
practice
writing

practice of writing
language in practice

language
product
resource

tool
textual pedagogical gestures

textual pedagogical gestures
the practice of writing as pedagogical practice

the practice of writing textual pedagogical gestures
making art education theory

making art education theory
writing art education; more than writing about art education

writing art education
writing sound
making language
imitating
making belief

art education theoretical texts
artworks

artworks
practices
opacities

This study is made along with five parts. Paradoxically, while such parts are sequenced, the texts therein contained are not necessarily linear — that is, vectorial. Writing them is an overlapping process encompassing notes, fragments, longer pieces, self recordings, papers and talks presented, underlined and scribbled and stained xerographic copies, failed and precious conversations; a captured confusion. In this respect, the parts do not intend to *represent* a seamlessly progressing argument, but they are, literally, parts of the studying. This is not to say this study is a work of chance, but to say this study's commitment to forsake an all-commanding telos for art education theory — paradoxically, an end in itself — makes it cherish chance. The parts thus operate like anchors for the reading and writing of this study, in relation to the questions and aims set out while being traversed by the main and guiding question as common current and *anchoring* tool. More than a sequencing, these parts are an overlapping of each other. They are part of the collection amassed by this study, and they themselves make the collection as well, parting it, and amassing it. In regard to the affinity with rhetorics expressed in this study's methodology, the overarching purpose of this display is to express, and at the same capture, the very way I theorise — this is also the poeticising of a book's dividing.

In the first part — *ground, and grounding* —, I write the ground on which this study gestures, along five chapters. This part's aim is to express the very relation between this study and art education theory — thus anchoring the former's contribute by tracing a context. Put briefly, this part is made so as to sustain the postulation of a making of theory that addresses its reference *without* dealing away with opacity. While such aim entails addressing the very subfield of art education theory, chapter one begins with an overlapped reading and writing of Jean-Jacques Rousseau with Édouard Glissant with Platonic snippets. This is less of an excursus, than it is an inaugural clarification. That is, it serves to postulate: how this study sees language; what are the issues of language this study puts in question; how such issues are entwined to education and art educational theory. Moreover, this chapter evinces a difference

between Rousseau and Glissant in how they relate to History, that is, «the erudition and the heritage of commentary of bygone generations – in a word, what is *written*» (Mehtonen, 2003, p. 149). Articulating various times and places — 'Ancient Greece', the enlightenment, modernism and contemporaneity —, serves to trace, or amass, a trait in Continental language, especially in what concerns educational theory. The issues foregrounded are thus evinced as not *new*. I am referring to control: both in how theory as generalising discourse aims the control of its opaque reference, and how a language of education is controlled by a binary of learning and teaching. This is *not* what Édouard Glissant does: I argue Glissant's writings make plausible a discursiveness of theory that does not *control* its opaque source, and a language of education not exclusive to opposite ends. With such possibility in mind, I move on to address the field of art education theory, in wide manner, so as to amass a call for this study. Acknowledging the field of art education as vibrant and layered, the task of this chapter is to keep such opacity, by amassing a call amidst such heterogeneity: namely, how art education theory can be means for being critical of the field itself. There are three different layers for this study's contextualising, each with its own trope. Chapter two layers a contemporary contextualising for this study, with a trope of eventualising (Martins & Popkewitz, 2015). This chapter addresses contemporary examples of art education theory made from different areas of inquiry and frameworks, which is made to argue in favour of such heterogeneity. In chapter three I address *A Seminar in Art Education for Research and Curriculum Development*, held at the Pennsylvania State University in 1965. Foregrounding such example is not unconscious: as a Historical example of the scientification of art education, such seminar is part of the theoretical aspect of the field, of the *very possibility of doing it*. However, the point is not to uphold its Historical presence, but to, rather, inquire on such presence. Placing these endeavours aside — those addressed in chapter two and those addressed in chapter three —, serves to express their relation: both share a concern with opacity — the loss of legibility —, making theory so as to deal away with it. That is, I claim that, notwithstanding what sets them apart, they remain entwined by a scientific effort of control. Each in their way, all look at the field of art education as a mass that needs to be thoroughly fragmented so as to be addressed. Keeping with the terms of eventualising (Martins & Popkewitz, 2015), they look for the knife to cut the cake of art education. In other words, *theory* is invested in different ways for reading the

opacity it addresses. At the same time, both cases evince a social trait to art education. In light of this study's emphasising of writing, in chapter four I compose a reading of *Derivas*, the journal of the Doctoral Programme in Art Education, Universities of Porto and Lisbon. *Derivas* is taken as a meaningful sampling in that it provides a direct articulation between this study and its *home*. Engaging with *Derivas* serves to bridge this study to the mentioned doctoral programme's very work — and *work to be made* —, as I share what and how I learn about *writing*. At the same time, I invite this study to the ongoing conversation amidst such texts, that is, I *make* this study a contribute to such work as well. *Derivas* is also interesting as it can be read to depict a rather layered and heterogenous portrait of art education. In this respect, in line with the previous chapter's inquiry on History, I posit this fourth chapter as a fairytale, a continuing of fabling rather than a reproducing of a fable. In chapter five I argue in favour of *not* limiting imagination, by inquiring on arguments that delimit frameworks in art education theory. Addressing imagination also serves to continue part I to part II.

In the second part — s*tructure, and structuring* —, I compose a reading of Jean-Jacques Rousseau's (1762/1979) *Emile*. I foreground it as a book enacting the pedagogy it claims, one which relies on an ambiguous interplay of *opacity* and *clarity* so as to *show by revelation*. In subtle manner, or apocalyptically so, it is an ambiguity that ultimately aims control. By stressing *how* Rousseau's theoretical endeavour teaches, I show how its way of controlling is also firmly entwined with, and dependent on, a fixed pedagogical relation. A firm yet wavy divide — a thick veil — between teaching and learning, and teacher and learner, is written in such text. This separation controls each of the positions, never detaching them: they must be secured by *obscure* means. The argument is that Rousseau needs *obscurity* to teach, which, in his case, is to *manipulate* Emile: and this narration is *taught* to readers. In this regard, chapter six sustains the success of Rousseau's book not only results from *what* it says, but, also, *how* it says: Rousseau thoroughly *controls textual pedagogical gestures*. Foregrounded as an *obscure textual pedagogical gesture*, I make Rousseau's gesturing the reference with which I address art education theory so as to argue on its entwining to a modern and enlightened legacy. That is, how art education theory engages with opacity by accepting as obscure, and how that is not detachable from a revelatory expectation upon encounters with art. Therefrom, pedagogical and theoretical endeavours revolve around *showing by revelation*, and, I claim, art education theory is narrowed: it *reads* the

world, which is to say it translates the world to its own language. It believes what is other can be comprehended. This argument, in chapter seven, sets part III in movement: the need for a tool to inquire on this convenient interplay between obscurity and clarity, teaching and learning, writing and reading, drives part III.

In the third part — *threshold, and threshing* —, I make sense of Édouard Glissant's writings on *opacity* by means of a related, overlapped and heterogenous reading of references. In this regard, the overall purpose is the translating — gerund — of opacity in Glissant's terms, that is, *opaquely*, making a tool to continue this study. In other words, it is a *making* of sense of opacity by expressing the very relation I make with opacity, resisting to reduce it to an applicable concept. This part also serves to emphasise *writing* in relation to reading, by stressing a difference between beginning to *imagine opaquely* and waiting to *see opacity*. I thus begin by writing my own reading of Glissant's *œuvre* so as to share a wide understanding of opacity in light of his writings: this is chapter eight. I continue with opacity in chapter nine, writing my reading of other scholars reading Glissant, scholars writing from several frameworks and for different purposes. Inviting this collection of scholars to this conversation is not unconscious: it is to keep *translating* opacity without rendering it absolute. In this respect, the aim is to sustain a relation of opacity not by claiming control over it, but, rather, by expressing the very collaboration between it and this study. Pedagogically, it is to learn opacity with opacity, opaquely — and sharing such learning. Theoretically, it means I try to address opacity by imagining its language. This is not only made by setting apart opacity and obscurity, that is, *reducing* opacity to an abstract concept, but by *making with it* a tool improper to the operativeness of obscurity and clarity. This tool is an *opaque textual pedagogical gesture*. Notwithstanding its usage across the study, such tool is particularly evinced in part IV, so as to address the textual pedagogical gestures by Jean-Jacques Rousseau *with* Gert Biesta's *with* jan jagodzinski's *with* Dennis Atkinson's, *at the same time.* This part is thus the attempt of expressing complexity by the constitution of an opaque mass; again, nothing is neither intentionally hidden nor mysteriously concealed; rather, overlapped and shared so. This is what I share with part III, and make it as part IV's task, which I set in motion with chapter 10, keeping the movement of this study.

In the fourth part — *garden, and gardening* —, I compose an overlapped reading and writing of texts by Jean-Jacques Rousseau *with* Gert Biesta *with* jan jagodzinski

with Dennis Atkinson *with* Édouard Glissant. Such amassing is to share in clear manner what I can learn and what I cannot learn with their work. This is made by mingling these authors' texts, making use of the opaque textual pedagogical gesture inspired by part III. I argue how the three authors — Biesta, jagodzinski, Atkinson — rely on *textual pedagogical gestures premised on showing* that echo Rousseau's, and how their making of art education theory is guided by such language. I address each author mainly by, but not solely, a specific textual pedagogical gesture: respectively, *pointing*, *staging*, *caring* — a chapter to each one: respectively, 11, 12, 13. These *textual pedagogical gestures* are foregrounded as the very pedagogical strategies these teachers and theorists narrate and depict: this is how their texts teach, and this is the language with which they *make* theory. Such theorising and teaching, however, is made complicated as I contend their work is not detached from the assigning of a revelatory task to theoretical and pedagogical work. Such task relies on obscurity — a momentary and veiling loss of intelligibility —, making these authors' work indebted to an alternation and interplay of obscurity and clarity. This part sustains the three authors' making of art education theory deals away with *loss*, as an expectation is placed onto the opacity of art. Thus they read art as obscure — loss is what they cannot teach with their theories. Motivated by the loss of loss, I continue this study with chapter 14, opening up part V.

In the fifth part — *album* —, I recollect. This is not to bring this study to completion, that is, to an absolute truth, but, rather, to continue it: to continue the making of a textual pedagogical gesture. While this part's recollecting is performed across the whole of this study's surface, its span has a particular scope: to see what opportunity can be made *with* the scientification of art education by poeticising it. Keeping with this study's language, this recollecting is more of an amassing than it is a retrograde sequence. This part is also to postulate art education theory as the inquiring into the very subfield of art education theory itself. In this respect, this part is self-referential: it refers to the study itself, and tries to address it opaquely, inquiring into it. I begin by focussing on how philosophical frameworks are called for by other art education theorists, so as to show how a momentary loss of intelligibility is *also* core to their arguments — this recollecting is chapter 15. I continue with chapter 16, recollecting the Platonic writings addressed in this study's part I, and furthering them with another Platonic text. Thereby affirming a legacy amidst the mentioned art

education philosophers and Classical philosophy, I show a limit to such philosophical language, namely, how it *rehearses* what it proposes. In other words, I make a case on how making use of certain philosophical frameworks entails *reading* otherness — *comprehending* opacity, that is, reading it as obscurity. Perhaps, a tone unfit for making proposals. In chapter 17, I continue recollecting the study, stressing the relation between the assigning of a revelatory task to theoretical and pedagogical work, and Continental nostalgia. That is, how *meaning* is always expected — and thus opacity is reduced to what is comprehensible: the argument is loss is bound to the loss of intelligibility, which makes it addressed as *what might be lost*. In this light I evince the relevance of a making of theory that resists controlling its opaque source. This makes way for chapter 18, where I clearly name and address the textual pedagogical gesture I make along with this study: *waving* — a gesture addressing loss of intelligibility by unceasingly trying to *imitate* its language, without *comprehending* it. Again, by imitating, I am referring to a way of listening which is also expressed; reading while writing *at the very same time*. Theoretically, I am proposing a textual pedagogical gesture to write art education theory in a manner that, rather than *representing* its *opaque* reference, expresses the very collaboration with it. It makes the imagining of such sharing tangible. So, while I acknowledge sharing *sense* is important in art education theory, I aim to inquire on the operativeness of the pair legible and intelligible — obscurity and clarity —, by unceasingly extending the very opacity of what I address, to a point where such pair is not the core of art education theory's concern. So, imitating a language without controlling it, I postulate, puts the gravity of sense in the very means, in the very *making* of sense. Pedagogically, it means teaching as *sharing learning* is favoured before imparting prior acquired information.

I wave farewell by recollecting the questions and aims traced, addressing what I understand as this study's main pitfalls, and, finally, answering what does it mean to make theory in art education — for my part, and solely for my part[61]. Waving goodbye to what I know and, at the same time, waving hello to what I do not: this study is the very capturing of this non rehearsable waving; this singular traverse, journey, errantry.

[61] I am writing with Édouard Glissant's (1990) text: «[f]or my part, and solely for my part, that is to say, without desiring to teach, I will resume [these teachings from the poetic perception of the chaos-world]» (p. 217, translated here).

This collection, this continuous recollecting, this symposium, this mingling — this album: the titling of its five parts, the five fingers I wave with, echoes Quintilian's organising of memory[62]. I am, however, unconcerned with being *certain* of *what are* these elements. Rather, *how* can they be traversed and *how* one carries oneself with imagination — *what does it mean to go along with opacity?* Going along with opacity entails staying *with* it. Not necessarily planted garden, not necessarily crossable threshold, not necessarily patterned structure, not necessarily walkable ground.

Do you want to write them in the album you carry, as you go along with me, as you stay along this text?

Welcome, make yourself a home.

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[62] See Quintilian (ca. 95/1968), *Institutio Oratoria*, book XI, chapter 2. «This idea was not original [but] Quintillian's description penetrated the educational field's coming to be [*devir*] in hegemonic manner» (Ó, 2019, p. 147, translated here).

I · ground, and grounding

The second consideration depends on relations given in certain situations — relations [*rapports*] accidental to the thing, which consequently are not necessary and admit of infinite variety. (Rousseau, 1762/1979, p. 35, brackets added)

The panorama determined and the equidistances defined, perhaps it is the place for coming back to a no less necessary "degeneralisation"? Not towards a renewed excess of specificities, but to a (dreamed) total freedom of their relationships [*rapports*], traced in their clashes' very chaos. (Glissant, 1990, p. 75, translated here)

This part's overarching purpose is to contextualise this study. I begin with an overlapped reading and writing of Jean-Jacques Rousseau with Édouard Glissant with Platonic snippets. More than an excursus, the first chapter is an inaugural clarification and first contextualisation, sampling this study's very relation with language, particularly with regard to current educational discussions. I am referring to calls for different educational languages (e.g., Bergdahl, 2010; Kuokkanen, 2007), which also make scholars engage with art and art practices (e.g., Todd, 2020). To be clear on *how* language is favoured for this study, and why, I evince how differently Rousseau and Glissant engage with History, that is, «what is *written*» (Mehtonen, 2003, p. 149). Thereunder, I also see how *gestures* are considered by the two writers. Put briefly, this is to show Rousseau's interest in language is premised on it being an instrument for controlling what it addresses. Glissant's writing is foregrounded as a tangible alternative, one not invested in absolute control[63]. With such possibility at hand, I take on the endeavour of addressing the subfield of art education theory.

This is to say I am not aiming to install an absolute context for this study, but, rather, to compose it tactically[64]. In this respect, this contextualisation is more of an unceasing *contextualising*: it is not a context to which I wish to bring a clear coherency. Rather, to regard it in its opacity and make something with it.

This is not to say systematicity is dismissed: each of the three subsequent chapters — two, three, four — establish a different layer of context to this study, respectively: contemporary, Historical, institutional. Each layer is addressed with a specific trope, which I use to inquire on each contextualisation. Tropes are not here merely understood as abstract concepts, but constantly integral to the very inquiry. This is to *make* sense of how can such tropes be part of the very possibility of making this study. Thus, what I mean by *possibility* is not so much the *enabling* such tropes provide, but, rather, what can be motivated with them: what to *make* with them, and what I can *not make* with them.

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[63] This is not to say Glissant does not control *writing*. *Control*, here, refers to what these writers address, aside their own writing.

[64] I am writing with Michel de Certeau's (1980/1988) text. A *tactic* may be regarded in contrast to a *strategy*; whereas the latter enables the extraction of «a subject of will and power [...] from an environment», the former «insinuates itself into the other's place» (p. xix). A strategic «assumes a place that can be circumscribed as *proper*», the tactical «cannot count on a "proper" (a spatial or institutional localization), nor thus on a borderline distinguishing the other as a visible totality» (Certeau, 1980/1988, p. xix).

Chapter two layers a contemporary context, making use of a trope of *eventualising* (Martins & Popkewitz, 2015). Very briefly, eventualising is «*to make visible the different practices that make it possible* to think about schooling, art, teachers, children and difference in people in the governing of the present» (Martins & Popkewitz, 2015, p. 8, emphasis added). It entails being critical towards the field itself, by inquiring it from various perspectives: eventualising is thus indebted to a deconstructive approach, in that it multiplies the approaches to art education. In this respect, this chapter evinces examples of art education theory made from different areas of inquiry and frameworks. This is not to reduce them to an absolute comprehension, but to argue how rich the field of art education can be due to such heterogeneity. Thereunder, I argue non prescriptive approaches to theory in art education are not only possible but desirable. I end by addressing the relevance of *eventualising* for this study, stressing the relational infinity that can be unceasingly imagined *with* the amassing of different perspectives to art education theory.

Chapter three layers a Historical context, making use of a trope of scientification. In this respect, I address the *A Seminar in Art Education for Research and Curriculum Development*, held at the Pennsylvania State University in 1965. This event is brought fore as it is part of the *very possibility of making art education theory*, argued as «sett[ing] new criteria for art education's labour that put the emphasis on knowledge production as the immaterial practice of art education» (Tervo, 2019c, para. 10). At the same time, however, addressing it is also to show how such possibility is a making — Historically produced: in this respect, I inquire on its mythical presence. I also see the event's legacy as entwined to *eventualising*, as I understand the efforts involved in it show *how* to eventualise. That is, the event is posited as a collective endeavour aiming to explain the phenomena it engages with. While this case is not exactly the same as that brought fore in chapter two, both layers are entwined by an effort to bring clarity onto an opaque situation, whilst also being clear examples of the social dimension of art education. I end by addressing the relevance of scientification for this study, stressing the relational infinity that can be unceasingly imagined *with* jolting different frameworks in art education theory. Seeing this chapter *with* chapter two is to argue for scientification as a *useful procedure*, but not for universal applicability. Rather, as *means*: means for poeticising, bringing different frameworks together so as to consider a theoretical endeavour as a singular making, rather than an absolute generalisation.

Chapter four layers an institutional context, making use of a trope of writing, a practice which I address with regard to the doctoral programme that houses this study. I compose a reading of *Derivas*, the mentioned doctoral programme's journal, to understand *how* is writing and what it may entail to art education theory, and because such journal can be read to depict a heterogeneous portrait of art education theory. In this respect, and in line with the contextualisations of chapters two and three, I am not intending to *control* the journal, rather, to work *with* it, that is, with the textual opacities in it contained. This chapter thus addresses the texts, the writings, by overlapping them: thereby, this is also a modest sample of how this study is written. In this regard, an in line with the preceding two chapters, I postulate steps so as to continue this study, that is, how to continue this fairytale, by *staying* with writing.

This part's fifth and last chapter makes a case for imagination and the *not foreclosing* of its uncertain paths. This is made by inquiring on examples of calls for «greater attention to philosophical grounding within the field» (Smith, 1998, p. 371), that is, for a more coherent foundation of art education theory. While I do not dismiss the relevance of systematicity, I affirm its importance as *means* rather than ends. This is because, I argue, such reasoning implies a foreclosing of space *from the outset*, thus limiting the paths of theory to certain ones. This is to say it narrows imagination: this *narrowing* serves to articulate this part with part II, thus continuing the studying.

In light of an «aesthetics of turbulence» (Glissant, 1990, p. 169, translated here), I mingle the layers together so as to continuously make sense of them, which is to say *making* sense of this study's contribution. Amassing them traces the ground for the study, which is one of permanence, not one of departure. This is to stress this study's commitment in staying *with* inquiry, therefore with what it inquires on.

Unlike what Rousseau (1762/1979) writes in the passage heading this part, relationships accidental to this study are necessary because of infinity: an infinity where relation can be «traced [with] their clashes' very chaos» (Glissant, 1990, p. 75, translated here). They are *made* necessary by the clear singularity of their chaos: by an opaque relation *expressed* clearly.

This chapter is an inaugural clarification and contextualisation to this study. There are three overlapping purposes to this: firstly, to share what is at stake in how Rousseau and Glissant regard the usage of language. Secondly, to make clear how such usages of language show different ways to relate to, in general, text, and, more particularly, to a tradition of language being used as vector, as dictating. Thirdly, I foreground how such tradition is entwined with discussions in education and art education, being grounds for theoretical endeavours. This provides a first approach, that is, a broader framework, to which this study wishes to contribute.

To what concerns Jean-Jacques Rousseau, specifically for this study's aims, I wish to stress how a trait of Rousseau's modern and enlightened pedagogy reverberates across contemporary educational discussions as a concern. Namely, how it is entwined to a language of learning in education (Biesta, 2005), that is, a way of discussing education that is fundamentally concerned with the most effective and efficient way to acquire knowledge, and thus to convey it vectorially. In this light, teaching is reduced to dictating. However, this is not to claim Rousseau's pedagogy is *new*, that is, a legacy is not merely traced *from* him. He finds in History, and in a particular mode of reading History, inspiration for how language *should be*.

To what concerns Édouard Glissant, specifically for this study's aims, I wish to stress how he also acknowledges a tradition of how language should be under History, but relating to it differently from Rousseau. How Glissant relates, and what he suggests with such relation, is taken up to tackle the mentioned educational concerns and further the study.

I begin by weaving Platonic snippets, which are brought fore for three motives. Firstly, and on a more general level for this study, to argue how the concerns addressed traverse a wide temporal scope. Secondly, so as to evince what is a source of inspiration to Rousseau's intentions regarding language and, therefrom, how he takes it up as an *ideal* resource. Thirdly, to show how Glissant acknowledges that which inspires Rousseau whilst not abiding by it.

This introductory chapter is therefore a first dip to, on the one hand, why I consider Glissant's work a relevant pairing to this study's other texts — namely those of Rousseau, Biesta, jagodzinski, Atkinson. On the other, to make clear why I am proposing to be attentive to, in general, how texts teach, and, more specifically, Rousseau's pedagogical language.

Put briefly, this is to share how Rousseau *dictates what he learns from* Plato's accounts — *from* History —, and, how Glissant *shares what he learns with Rousseau* — *with* History. These different manners of engaging with History — again, what is written (Mehtonen, 2003) — also serve to show how these two authors deem the importance of gestures in language, and thus how they make use of them. That is, for this study's purposes, this serves to share how they gesture with writing and what such gesturing, in light of their concerns, should *make*.

In this regard, this chapter also stresses *how texts teach*, and differently so, as well.

—If there are no teachers, neither are there pupils?
—As you say.
—And we agreed that a subject that has neither teachers nor pupils is not teachable?
—We have so agreed. (*Meno* 96c)

—What do we do when we name?
—I don't know what to answer.
—Don't we instruct each other, that is to say, divide things according to their natures?
—Certainly.
[...]
—Answer me this: If we hadn't a voice or a tongue, and wanted to express things to one another, wouldn't we try to make signs by moving our hands, head, and the rest of our body, just as dumb people do at present?
—What other choice would we have, Socrates?
—So, if we wanted to express something light in weight or above us, I think we'd raise our hand towards the sky in imitation of the very nature of the thing. And if we wanted to express something heavy or below us, we'd move our hand towards the earth. And if we wanted to express a horse (or any other animal) galloping, you know that we'd make our bodies and our gestures as much like theirs as possible.
—I think we'd have to.
—Because the only way to express anything by means of our body is to have our body imitate whatever we want to express. (*Cratylus* 388b, 422e–423b)

—To acquire an untied work of Daedalus is not worth much, like acquiring a runaway slave, for it does not remain, but it is worth much if tied down, for his works are very beautiful. What am I thinking of when I say this? True opinions. For true opinions, as long as they remain, are a fine thing and all they do is good, but they are not willing to remain long, and they escape from a man's mind, so that they are not worth much until one ties them down by (giving) an account of the reason why. And that, Meno, my friend, is recollection, as we previously agreed. After they are tied down, in the first place they become knowledge, and then they remain in place. That is why knowledge is prized higher than correct opinion, and knowledge differs from correct opinion in being tied down. (*Meno* 97e–98a)

The weaving I share is comprised by three pieces from the Platonic dialogues *Cratylus* (Plato, trans. 1997a) and *Meno* (Plato, trans. 1997b). I bring these pieces into this study because they can be read to express a particular pedagogy and the relationships it structures. That is, they depict an essential premiss of Socrates' teaching, as recounted by Plato, namely, how it relies on the guaranteeing of fixing of ends by means of contrast.

Firstly, the condition of the teacher is simultaneously dictated as that of the learner: one *is* because of the other, and the other *is* because of the one. In other words, to teach is made exclusive to teachers, while to learn is made exclusive to learners. That is, their positions are fixed by specific functions that do not overlap, whilst relying on a contrasting operativeness. They both depend on each other's fulfilling of roles. Secondly, it delineates knowledge. This is to say knowledge *is* because it is limited and fixed within one's domain, and it is deemed valuable by the possibility of being retrieved at one's will — a controlled and controllable archive. If it is not tied down — *comprehended* —, it is not knowledge: this is what is forwarded as naming; once it is possible to name, it is possible to dictate — thus teaching is reduced to a position of authorial power which reduces the learner to a position under, and aside, it. Thirdly, it fixes a hierarchy within language itself; gestures are deemed inferior by their incapability of vectorially conveying meaning, simply *imitating*. Gestures are practiced by the *dumb* — those who lack *the correct* language.

By mingling these pieces it is possible to read how pedagogical practice and educational theorisation depend on language. That is, defining the limitations of language by its desirability — naming and thus *instructing* — and undesirability — what does not concern naming, is therefore not teachable —, conditions, immediately, the modality of education. That is, the ways in which education is addressed, are ways that pursue a path of *and* towards absolute comprehension; any deviation from it is incorrect. Contemplating education, that is, theorising it, is not detached from pedagogy; in Plato's accounts, always valued through certain paths. All this articulated by means of text; all this by means of writing and reading.

Cratylus, specifically, is very briefly mentioned by Jean-Jacques Rousseau in *Essay* (1781/1998b), but rather meaningfully. In such essay[65] Jean-Jacques Rousseau imagines how would a first, original, language be. Immediately positing speech[66] as that which «distinguishes man from animals» (1781/1998b, p. 289), echoing Aristotle's *Politics*[67], Rousseau claims it as the inaugural institution and thus a result of nature.

In the *Essay*, Rousseau (1781/1998b) begins by praising a language devoid of words, claiming its easiness and independence from «conventions», as «more objects strike [the] eyes than [the] ears and shapes are more varied than sounds; they are also more expressive and say more in less time» (p. 290). However, he laments the forgetfulness of Europeans in «the art of pantomime», merely «gesticulat[ing] while speaking», «gestures [that] signify [only] natural uneasiness» (1781/1998b, p. 290). This is contrasted to «ancient history», Rousseau claims, «full of those ways of presenting arguments to the eyes», always generating «a more assured effect than all the discourses that could have been put in their place» (p. 290). «[T]he most energetic language is the one in which the sign has said everything before one speaks» (p. 290). However, Rousseau ties gestures to physical needs and sets them in contrast to passions — passions are *not* conveyable by gestures. As such, *language with words* is deemed superior before gestures, providing a «successive *impression* of discourse, striking with *repeated* blows» (p. 291). Rousseau is firmly interested, on the one hand, in the «assured effect» (p. 290) of the language of gestures of ancient History. On the other hand, in the «moving of the heart and enflaming of passions» (p. 291) that only the language of words, according to him, can provide. But why?

His understanding of the value of such wordless language is not detachable from the *meaning* of gestures, meaning being what is objectively conveyed by such gestures; that is *how* one acts upon the senses of the other. Such *correctness* is what ultimately

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[65] In *Of Grammatology* (1967/2016), Jacques Derrida provides a detailed analysis of Rousseau's essay (pp 179–279). Some aspects of Rousseau's piece forwarded in this study are also foregrounded by Derrida. In this regard, only specific ideas of Derrida from the context of his writing are indicated, whereas claims stemming from my own reading are not. The reading, however, is similar: Derrida analyses the way in which the text is written, besides its content. Derrida writes: «[t]he architecture [of the Essay's] must find its justification in the deep intention of the *Essay.* It is for that reason that it interests us. Yet we must not confound the sense of the architecture with the declared intention of the work» (p. 212). My approach to this piece of Rousseau is brief; however, in this study's part I, I discuss *Emile, or On Education* (1762/1979) more lengthly, and with more attention to the very entwinements of the book's 'intentions' and 'architecture' — not merging the two, but sharing their coherency.

[66] In the original text, *parole*.

[67] As Tervo (2014) notes, in *Politics*, Aristotle centres language in what distinguishes humans as *political* animals from other living beings. The «capability in communal life [is enabled by language] which allows humans to communicate and contemplate communal issues of the *polis*; issues such as justice and injustice, good life, and social order» (Tervo, 2014, p. 35). *Speech*, not voice, makes language a political domain, as «although animals do not speak, they can still express themselves» (Tervo, 2014, p. 36).

interests Rousseau (1781/1998b), a correctness for an unequivocal use of language to be imposed onto others — language is, for Rousseau (1781/1998b), a vector; it is dictation. Ambiguously, this is evident from the examples of gestures[68] from «ancient history» he provides. To give two: by sending the twelve pieces of his wife to the Tribes of Israel, Levite of Ephraïm drives them to the execution of the Tribe of Benjamin (see p. 291). By gifting Darius, a frog, a bird, a mouse, and five arrows, silently and immediately departing, the King of the Scythians made clear Darius should leave the country, or face death (see p. 291). Such «*harangue* was understood» (p. 291, emphasis added), Rousseau writes.

This is to highlight what is for this study a great concern in Rousseau's interest in language: a manipulative one. This is not, by any means, a judgement of Rousseau's character, but to foreground how such drive entails a pedagogical issue. Again, for Rousseau (1781/1998b), language serves, or, more precisely, *should only serve*, to immediately communicate reality — to show it absolutely. That is, language *serves* by its *absolute effect*. Imagining *the* first, original language, Rousseau (1781/1998b) believes it as «figurative» (p. 294), a direct portrayal of reality, both in element and condition, with «many synonyms to express the *same being* in *different relations*» (p. 296, emphasis added). «Instead of arguments», Rousseau continues, «it would have aphorisms; it would persuade without convincing, and depict without reasoning» (p. 296). What Rousseau laments, in the «degeneration of language» (Derrida, 1967/2017, p. 212), is that what he *sees*, or what he *believes to see*, requires a great deal of effort to be conveyed *onto* someone else. Such is, for him, the same motive for praising the essence of words and speech, that which allows for discourse's *repeated impression* on the other. This is why, for Rousseau (1781/1998b), «*Cratylus is not as ridiculous as it seems to be*» (p. 296, emphasis added). *Naming* dictates; the original language, even if wordlessly, if it enables the precise articulation of *what* something *is*, it certainly must dictate absolutely. Teaching as maximum instruction, teaching as absolute dictation: tying down is a must; writing allows for the captivation of language.

[68] As Derrida (1967/2017) argues, Rousseau separates gesture from gesticulation, even if not evidently: «the former, which outlines the shadow of presence, silently plies the first metaphor; the latter is an indiscreet and cumbersome adjunct of speech. It is a bad supplement» (Derrida, 1967/2017, p. 257).

learning from History

In *Cratylus*, Socrates mediates a dispute between Hermogenes and Cratylus. While the former understands the correctness of names is through communal convention, the latter

> adopts the *obscure* 'naturalist' position that each name names only whatever it does 'by nature' [which] means that under expert etymological examination each name can be *reduced* to a disguised description correctly *revealing* the nature of the thing named by it — *and that revelatory capacity is what makes it the correct name for that thing*. (Cooper, 1997, p. 101, emphasis added)

The dispute is ended by Socrates by claiming that knowing names is not relevant, as what such knowledge «can ever *reveal* [is the naming introduced by the first to name] the nature of reality, and that might well be wrong» (Cooper, 1997, p. 101, emphasis added). «To learn the truth [requires going] *behind word*s altogether» to tie down «the permanent, unchanging natures of things as they are in themselves» (Cooper, 1997, p. 101, emphasis added). Truth, or what is not truth, is likewise delivered by revelation. This is to say that such original language, figurative and wordless, is not necessarily revealing of the meaning of names — names as resulting from someone's decision — but of the very meaning of reality itself, even if by negation. Therein, a position where revelation indeed *must* occur is sustained. The interest in such encounter, however, is not merely concerned with the *name* but with the truth the name *comprehends*. That is the dictation of names: the revelation of otherness as absolute truth.

This is the gesture Rousseau (1781/1998b) is concerned with: showing reality to others — his own — and making others comprehend such reality as absolute. In this regard, despite differentiating speech as superior to gestures, he regards them in the same manner, which means his choice derives from the very scale he himself provides. That is, the wordless original language, its gestures, gesticulations, voice and speech, they are all regarded under the same gaze. That is, for Rousseau (1781/1998b), their value is considered under a common currency: the fixing of absolute truth and its dictating onto others. Language is *good* insofar as it serves such *end*, which is a vision that sees unity as above everything else — unity, *the absolute truth*, is to be encountered *through* language, always original, never plural. The surface of language, once dealt

with, reveals the unity of truth; Rousseau's concern is in how to achieve such unity in the most effective manner, even if taking his time through discourse's repeated blows.

Rousseau, however, already has an idea, or an imagining, of such unity, and how can it be made a viable alternative. This is evident in the following passage:

> This makes me think that if *we had never had anything but physical needs*, we might very well never have spoken and would have understood one another perfectly by the language of gesture alone. We might have established societies little different from what they are today, or ones which might even have proceeded to their end better. *We might have instituted laws, chosen leaders, invented arts, established commerce, and, in a word, done almost as many things as we do with the aid of speech*. [...] The Grand Vizier's mutes make themselves understood among one another and understand everything that is said to them by signs quite as well as could be done by discourse. Master Pereyre and those who like him *teach* mutes not only how to speak but to *know what* they are saying, are first compelled to *teach* them another language, no less complicated, with whose aid they help them understand spoken language. (Rousseau, 1781/1998b, p. 292, emphasis added)

By contrasting needs with passions, where the first is less important than the second, Rousseau (1781/1998b) posits needs via gestures reproduce «societies little different from what they are today» (p. 292). From here, it is possible to infer that a change in society, for Rousseau, is only achievable from passions, passions which can only be conveyed by speech. In this regard, Rousseau's dictating is not detachable from his politics (Tröhler, 2011), both bound by language: speech makes language a political domain. More specifically, the bind is tighter the more the language dictates *his* reality onto others; the more the language *convincingly claims to comprehend truth*. The more truthful the encounter, the better. Rousseau, the master, teaches how to speak and to know what one says — in his intended manner, *his own* correctness; a pedagogical relation of control. Moreover, teaching and learning remain separate — learning is the acquisition of knowledge, or the tying down of knowledge, like the tying down of a work by Daedalus — maker of the labyrinth. Knowing one's way around a maze, no deviation.

This gesture of Rousseau can be read; his need for the conveying of passions bleeds a gesture through his text. As Derrida (1967/2016) notes, needs and passions, despite Rousseau's hierarchisation of them, are entwined in the discourse of Rousseau, which is to say in his writing. As it is impossible to encounter the original figurative

language which would name everything absolutely, such encounter has to be *made*. This means, in pedagogical terms, that the work of the teacher for Rousseau is to *make* the encounter so as to show such encounter — that encounter reveals reality, and is to be *found* by the learner. It is the fabrication of an absolute encounter, meant to be encountered merely as it is. The learner learns to read it; the learner learns to read reality — Rousseau's reality, Rousseau's own truth.

So Rousseau writes; so as to, *exclusively*, teach. Like how Socrates does, as told by Plato, one simply has to tie down so as to pass on. In this regard, the imagination of Rousseau, when it comes to the interest in language, is narrowed to a comprehending of it that derives from a condition of meaningfulness — objective, unambiguous. Along this study's guiding question — *what does it mean to make theory in education?*[69] —, for Rousseau, making theory is to make the learner read the absolute reality of the world, that is, Rousseau's world which he reveals *when* and *where* he intends to. It means to *show* absolute clarity. Rousseau *makes* the end so as to, only then and solely in such manner, *reveal* it. He thus controls the time of revelation: what is to be learnt, is what is to be read from such revelation. Illocution serves Rousseau as the conveying of meaning so as to dictate: he passes on what he comprehends, and that which *he* comprehends must be comprehended. The tone to make proposals must be in perfect pitch, and perfectly pitched.

gesturing to make language

Derrida's following passage is reminiscent of Plato's and Rousseau's capturing of a unity, but he introduces an inversion to it, that is, he inverts converging *into* itself:

> With it or already without it, we must attempt to *recapture the unity* of gesture and speech, of body and language [...], of tool and thought, before the originality of the *one* and the *other* is articulated and without letting this *profound unity* give rise to confusionism. These original significations must not be confused in the orbit of the system where they are opposed. But we must, in order to think the history of the system, its sense and value, exceed it somewhere, in an *exorbitant* way. (Derrida, 1967/2017, p. 92, emphasis altered)

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[69] Recollecting: this study's guiding question refers to art education, specifically — *what does it mean to make theory in art education?* —, but at this point I ask it in light of a broader educational scope.

So, as Rousseau's (1781/1998b) and Plato's accounts, Derrida (1967/2017), partakes of this movement of recapturing unity so as to be encountered. Yet, he claims the relevance of thinking it «*exorbitant*[ly]» (Derrida, 1967/2017, p. 92), as he sees writing as «guiding the pure description of facts» a scientific postulation (p. 81). His claim on the unity of writing is for it to be comprised by units that move it from its very centre; that deviate it outside of itself — *exorbitant* is precisely chosen for this: it is a small image of Derrida's deconstructive approach[70]. This is to say Derrida fragments unity into units, and therefrom subsequently: a continuous labour of fragmentation which relies on the separating of units by their difference so as to avoid the establishing of binary contrast. Derrida's plurality is thus one comprised by the juxtaposition of various singularities.

In this light, I see Édouard Glissant's writings can be made an interesting pairing to Rousseau's unity, as despite following Derrida's proposal to not deal away with the unity of gestures and languages, Glissant does not suggest fragmentation.

> It was really an imperceptible sign, a sort of swaying of the barely raised hand, which became (for I adopted it in turn) our sign of complicity. It seemed to me we were perfecting this sign language [*mimique*], nuancing it as we went along all the adventitious signifiers. Thusly we shared, until my departure, the snippets of this language of gestures which Jean-Jacques Rousseau said it preceded all spoken language. (Glissant, 1990, p. 137, translated here).

Immediately evincing a gesture as constituent of language, Glissant dissuades any attempt of posing an hierarchy between gestures and gesticulations, foregrounding the existence of meaning insofar as it is shared. This sharing is *not* the passing of one's comprehension so as to dictate it onto the other; this sharing is the very practice of sharing, of making a language with: this is to say *speech* is not a property of one's language. The silent person who walks that waves to Glissant invites him to enrol in complicity, which Glissant accepts: they weave themselves with language, they *share* a gesture — they share the making of a language continuously, where the correctness of language is figured out as they go along, *imitating to hear*, and *to express* such *listening*. Clearly expressing reading and writing at the same time. This is to say they share the making of their relation, they share the making of sense — *making* is what is

[70] See also Spivak, in Derrida, 1967/2016, pp. cii–cxi.

emphasised. Unlike Glissant *and* the silent person who walks, Rousseau does not share the making of his language. And unlike Derrida, Glissant does not fragment, he does not *deconstruct* the meaning of a unity, as there is nothing to deconstruct — no speech to be read. Before this absence, this loss, only by *making* together a language can a relation be made. Gestures, for Glissant, are less of a supplement than they are an addition. Glissant makes a beach with sediments, whilst Derrida breaks them into dust. Glissant is less concerned with ends, Glissant is less concerned with ending; means are the question, not the answer.

This gesture of Glissant can be read in his writing[71]. In pedagogical terms, this means the work of the teacher for Glissant is to *continuously make* the encounter and at the same time *share* its very *making*, with — it is *not* to be *found* by the learner. Learner and teacher may thus share a relation where teaching and learning overlap them improperly. Educational life is thus defined by not only the passing along of what one understands, but also the passing along of what one does not understand (McGrath, 2013), *at the same time*. This is how Glissant writes: he teaches by sharing a journey of learning. In this regard, the imagination of Glissant, when it comes to interest in language, is made along uncertain paths. And along this study's guiding question — *what does it mean to make theory in education?*[72] —, for Glissant, to make theory in education is to *make with* the learner the world, that is, a shared world which is not revealed, but made. The world is neither posited as what pre-exists, nor as what it appears — it is not to be revealed, it is not *yet* to come: the world is work to be made. Glissant *makes with* means and such making of means with means is *shared*. The correctness of language, a shared clarity, is not dependent on a predetermined time. What is to be learnt is what is written *with* the absence of clarity, the loss of intelligibility. A pedagogical act of *showing* ends, then, is not of use to Glissant. Unlike Rousseau, illocution serves Glissant as *conveying* so as to share the making of language, so as to share the making of sense — and always at risk. Communication, more than merely a mode for communication.

Rousseau and Glissant write their language with gestures as well; gestures are tangible *and* indeed part of language, which is to say they *tool* resources for relation.

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[71] Glissant's practice is addressed in more detail in part III.

[72] Again, this study's guiding question refers specifically to art education, — *what does it mean to make theory in art education?* —, but I ask it, yet again, in light of a broader educational scope.

Gestures are thus postulated in this study less as supplements of language, that is, something that *completes* it, but more as one of its toolings, that is, something with which it is possible to make it. This means textual gestures effect the discursive space made with writing. In other words, writing is made with textual gestures and such textual gesturing also *says* the text: *what* it says and *how* it says.

a language for teaching

Rousseau's account in the *Essay* (1781/1998b) sums up his preference for language, that is, its purpose, which is how *Emile* (1762/1979) is told. Language as vector, language as dictating. While Rousseau's educational book (1762/1979) is more detailedly approached throughout this study, I wish to immediately stress how Rousseau's language, and very usage of it, echoes a pressing concern in educational discussions. Again, I am referring to the language of education being exclusively limited to learning (Biesta, 2005). A «language of learning», in light of teaching «becom[ing] redefined as supporting or facilitating learning, just as education is now often [being] described as the provision of learning opportunities or learning experiences» (Biesta, 2005, p. 55). More specifically, education is reduced to an instrument at service of a predetermined aim (Biesta & Säfström, 2011; Todd, 2022), that is, it is constituted as an answer to a question — both bound by design. The more *proper*, the better. Accordingly: *What is education? It is learning*. No more, no less. This language constitutes pedagogy as a service where knowledge is a product (Biesta, 2005) to be consumed, dimming the emergence of commonalities during an educational process (Bergdahl & Langmann, 2017). There is thus a *right* and a *wrong* education, thereby «find[ing] itself under attack for not delivering what it is supposed to deliver» (Biesta & Säfström, 2011, p. 540).

Like Rousseau's language, as in Plato's accounts, this *new language of learning* Biesta (2005) foregrounds — rather, not so new — fosters a situation where specific and predetermined ways of doing, performing, acting, are dictated onto *learners*, ways concerned with the attainment of a predetermined outcome in the most effective manner. *Learners* are *good* insofar as they absolutely master a process. This *learnification of education* (Biesta, 2009a) delimits the space on which discussions of and for education happen. In other words, this language entails the fixing of grounds for

educational discussions and for those who think, discuss and write about education — language and relations are thus crystallised, as their imagining is limited as well. In such framework, to address education is to address learning as an acquiring of a specific knowledge in ideal manner. Teaching follows the same *mission*, being reduced to the giving of a predetermined message.

More than a *new language of learning*, it is a language of ends — but it is not timeless, it *needs* a generalised time to function, that is, one detained by an «epistemic mastery over the past, present, and future» (Tervo, 2023b, p. 281). Therefore, positing it as *new* feeds it; positing its alternatives in relation to such categorising may as well feed it. Ends for ends. This is also why this study takes as its endeavour the making of theory *with means*; this is also why this study claims focussing on ends premises education is more *dictated* than it is, if ever, *shared with.*

art as a language other

Apart from Biesta's (2005) invitation to think of a «language to talk about education in a way that is different from the new language of learning» (p. 64), there are other claims for change of language in educational contexts, even if for different aims and with different approaches. For example, Kuokkanen (2007) calls for a language of «hope and new possibilities» (p. 157) for «participation and commitment» (p. 157), agreeing «[l]anguage mirrors but also constructs our reality and thus our values» (p. 157). Bergdahl (2010) contends «the language of religion holds resources for developing another language for education» (p. 18). Tavin (2007) suggests «deploy[ing] a postmodern language of representation» as a way to relate with «the world through a language ideally unfettered by the discourse of aesthetics» (p. 43). As pointed by Biesta, «[a] possible language of and for education» is to be claimed (Biesta, 2005, p. 54). Using Glissant's (1990) words, such languages of education demand the «*changing* [of] *mentality*» (p. 126, emphasis added). But if languages need languages, do they work together by occupying space, or by making it? What can these proposals make, other than suggesting replacements?

Thinking about other educational languages so as to engage with the world differently has inspired some educators to address art and art practices, entailing the

available language does not suffice to address the world. For example, Sharon Todd (e.g., 2020, 2022) is putting aesthetics to work so as to, for instance, «creat[e] *encounters* of the world that educate about the climate emergency while also giving time for climate sorrow» (2020, p. 1110). Or, through the «coming together of art and education [...] find a way of conceptualizing the practices of education as sensory, bodily ones that matter to how students engage with [...] forms of life» (Todd, 2022, p. 339). Drawing from projects by the feminist art collective Sisters Hope, Todd (2022) sees how their practices «might open up spaces [...] for another kind understanding of how knowledge is generated, beyond a narrow definition of skill-based competence or the passing on of information as inheritance» (p. 347). Even if not referring to art directly, Todd (2023) proposes to look into «pedagogical formations that resist the tendencies of machine learning», so as to «think of education and the *staging of encounters* that teachers engage in» (p. 27).

A similar case seems to be that of Tyson E. Lewis (2018) when, drawing from Steven Shaviro, he proposes «aesthetic encounters enable us to "act in the world and relate to other things in the world without reducing it and them to mere correlates of our own thought"» (p. 134). Notably, when building such argument, Lewis (2018) foregrounds «[Jane Bennet's] interest in cultivating a new perceptual style [open to the appearance of the thingness of objects]» as an «educational» problem «most properly» (p. 127). With Emily Jean Hood, Lewis (Hood & Lewis, 2021) partially reports a wider study that centred on the way artists relate to that which they work with, «and vice versa» (p. 224). What Hood and Lewis (2021) wish to foreground is the «moment of *encountering* certain materials [which] were often accompanied by certain human articulated sounds such as 'oohing' and 'ahhing'» (p. 224). Such «language», they contend, is «both within language and outside of it» (Hood & Lewis, 2021, p. 224). These «special sounds», they write, are «uttered in moments when materiality *captures* the human» (p. 224, emphasis added), evincing the «*point of interface*» (p. 231, emphasis added) between «organic and inorganic actors» (p. 231). The aesthetic encounter, accordingly, moves us towards the world, and Biesta (2017a) has made a clear case for this and how such movement is, to him, strikingly pedagogical. The «different 'modalities' of art — the visible, the tactile, the audible» are highlighted as «different ways of being in dialogue with the world» (Biesta, 2017a, p. 39). Put briefly, Biesta suggests radical openness so as to *let art teach* — that is the gift of art, where the

teacher's task, as put by Juha Varto, «is about guiding a child or youth, often an adult, too, into discovering skill and alertness» (2008, p. 10). These contributions thus place an expectation onto art, as an entity that *can teach*, namely, how to address the world so as to learn from it.

If art attracts these scholars as a possible way to address what is alien to them, how is such language they are contending? The common trope is the *encounter with art* as *eventfully interruptive*. In other words, calls for a different educational language look to an alternative, to *otherness* as *complete alterity* which one must open, or be open to. Engaging with the world is tied to its abrupt encountering[73]. In pedagogical terms, this means pedagogical strategies revolve around such kind of encounter, be it by searching for it, arranging it, or simply forwarding it. The teacher *shows* the heir apparent teaching entity to the learner — art which conceals a lesson to be disclosed. That is, teaching as *showing* what *might be there* defines the imagination of pedagogical work, which is to say the aesthetic encounter, argued as expansive, entails a narrowing imagination. Teacher remains teacher — the artwork, or something else —; learner remains learner. Ends for ends.

hearing a call

What I wish to more emphatically recollect is the remarkable call I read in the mentioned scholars' writings: «*that of changing mentality*» (Glissant, 1990, p. 126, emphasis added). *A language is to be made*: these scholars' writings articulate the used educational languages do not suffice. In this respect, these scholars are critical *towards the very field they work in*. Some of the mentioned examples define specific aims for such *other* language — issues to be responded to —, whilst others do not. Notwithstanding, these educational theorists point to a certain specificity to what is lost in their language, *and* how they intend to tackle such loss. A *new* language is to be learnt *from* art, to *match* the hitherto absent language to address the world, to

[73] The examples are not limited to merely theoretical endeavours. A more empirical example is that of João Pedro Fróis and Boyd White's (2013) research strategy on meaning-making, consisting in the elaboration «of visual maps by individuals in response to their interactions with artworks» (p. 109). Such interactions are considered as *encounters*. Their research into meaning-making follows a sequence: «(1) encounter with artwork, (2) note writing, (3) aesthetigram design, (4) comparison to Jones's model, (5) text writing» (p. 111). While this case is not one where there is a turn to art — the sequence follows an inverse vector —, it posits in art the same potentiality, or hope: that of an revelatory immanence to be disclosed after its encountering. That is, the encounters with art promoted in such research are premised on singular engagements, that is, it places emphasis on what can be said of an artwork, rather than what can be made with it. But it is meant to be categorised, and *only then* written about.

understand it — opacity gives way to clarity; that is, intelligibility is regained. Loss is to be dealt away with. So they theorise: they make their very singular position tangible. This is to say these theorists engage with art and make such engagement tangible by means of their texts, which they write in relation to singular, special, giving, encounters with art.

But, even if arguing for an *event* that may reveal teachings, they are already *making* an event: by their very texts. They are already making their language tangible. «[W]riter[s], entering into [their] amassed writings, [renounce] an absolute, [their] poetic intention, unquestionably and sublimely [*tout d'évidence et de sublimité*]» (Glissant, 1990, p. 129, translated here).

To address this call for a «changing mentality» (Glissant, 1990, p. 126), I respond by emphasising *means* rather than ends. Thereby, I believe it is important to consider the very ways that *make* this very study's *mentality* as well. In this respect, each one of the next three chapters addresses a layer for contextualising this study; contemporary, Historical, institutional. Each layer focusses on a key trope for *making* this study: eventualising (Martins & Popkewitz, 2015), scientification, writing.

The overall purpose of this brief chapter is to express this study's contribute along with a contemporary contextualisation of art education theory. The main trope for this chapter is that of *eventualising* (Martins & Popkewitz, 2015). By *trope*, I do not mean I make use of *eventualising* merely as a concept, but also as a methodological aid to make this contextualisation. In this respect, *eventualising* is also part of the inquiry itself, and not merely an inquiring instrument.

To *eventualise* (Martins & Popkewitz, 2015) is to «*to make visible the different practices that make it possible* to think about schooling, art, teachers, children and difference in people in the governing of the present» (p. 8, emphasis added). Martins and Popkewitz (2015) use an analogy to explain it: «arts education [sic] like a recipe and the outcome» (p.8). Like a cake, art education can be understood to be something «produced from a number of [varied] ingredients» (p. 8). When the cake is ready, the ingredients «*are no longer seen*» (p. 8, emphasis added). This is to argue art education «is historically produced through different events» (p. 8). So, then, eventualising art education is like deconstructing a cake.

In this respect, to *eventualise* art education entails being critical towards the field itself, by inquiring it from various perspectives, «ask[ing] about the historical conditions that make art education a school subject possible» (Martins & Popkewitz, 2015, p. 7). Art education is thus the place for inquiry, rather than being mobilised towards an object of study (Martins & Popkewitz, 2015).

The mass of art education, *the cake*, is to be fragmented into units to bring its concealed ingredients to light. This is to say that art education theory is not without efforts of clarity towards an obscuring cake.

areas for inquiry

To what concerns art education theory, I believe understanding *eventualising* is not without acknowledging the relevance of the heterogeneity that can be regarded in art educators' research work.

For example, philosophical frameworks are used for theoretical endeavours, especially to what concerns the very lexicon art education theorists use to articulate speech. Scholars eventualise intrinsic, and *foundational*, elements of art education work, such as studying (e.g., Lewis, 2014; Tervo 2018), learning — or unlearning — (e.g., Atkinson, 2017; Baldacchino, 2015), and teaching (e.g., Tavin, 2010). For example, Tavin (2007) makes use of philosophical tools to call on the relevance of regarding aesthetics[74] as a product of Historical entanglements, so that «it never speaks for itself» (Tavin, 2007, p. 44). Tavin's (2007) effort is similar to one made with psychoanalytical tools (Tavin, 2010), in that both examples make art education itself the object of inquiry. The latter case (Tavin, 2010) delves into how can art education be «more reflexive about its own anxieties and enjoyment» (p. 60), rather than reduced to a derivate of psychoanalytical inquiry. It thus looks into art education as *more than* what can already be said about it. However, when considering *eventualising*, I am also referring to areas of inquiry, from where theorists take on the *cake* of art education.

One of such areas is critical race studies, making visible implications and entanglements of race, racism and class in art education (e.g., Acuff, 2018, 2022; Acuff & Krahe, 2022; Crabbe & Kantawala, 2024). For example, Joni Acuff (2019) implicates those who do not see themselves as people of colour in such framework, foregrounding Whiteness must be regarded as racialised as well, otherwise «it is simply normal»[75] (p. 8; see also Pedersen, 2023). Critical race studies are also entwined to concerns with how language and knowledge are structurally entwined with patterns of race and class, as language is not aside how one contemplates the world (e.g., Scheuermann, 2024). Samuel Guimarães and Cat Martins (2024), for instance, look into the very doctoral programme of art education, at the Faculty of Fine Arts,

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[74] Tavin (2007) suggests to strikethrough the word *aesthetics* so as to call attention to its Historical contingency. This study does not reproduce Tavin's formatting.

[75] Lisa Lowe (2015) writes «*race* as a mark of colonial difference is an enduring remainder of the processes through which the human is universalized and freed by liberal forms, while the peoples who created the conditions of possibility for that freedom are assimilated or forgotten» (p. 7). «To investigate modern race», Lowe (2015) continues, «is to consider *how racial differences articulate complex intersections* of social difference within specific conditions» (p. 7, emphasis added).

University of Porto, so as to contemplate practices to decolonise it. This is to say there is a concern in Guimarães and Martins (2024) in regarding the doctoral programme as not *normal*; rather, and keeping with the trope of eventualising, as a cake that needs to be addressed. The latter case not only offers an example on how critical race studies are contributing to art education, it also evinces the relevance of intersectionality (Crenshaw, 1991) to the field. Another area of inquiry, and also key to intersectionality, is disability studies, as the *what-ness* of disability is recurrently ignored, in contrast to the distance to whatever is understood about it (Kallio-Tavin, 2020). Claire Penketh (2023), for example, responds to such issue, making visible how art educators, when calling for the field's universality, make use of a Historical imagination that neglects disability, before which, therefore, critical perspectives fall short (Penketh, 2023). Penketh suggests there might be «an answer in [John] Steers' allusions to a depoliticised and compliant profession, with orthodoxies of art practice, also reflective of conventional and outmoded beliefs about disability, where assumptions about non-normative bodyminds were reproduced rather than challenged» (2023, p. 113).

John Steers' work does show attentiveness before orthodoxies, and not only in art practice. For example, by recognising the pervasiveness of policies or reforms that move art education away from socially concerned matters (e.g., Steers, 2015), and also calling for the role art teachers may have in resisting them (e.g., Steers, 2014). Further, John Steers, referring to InSEA[76], brings attention to issues such as, for example, its domination by the «Western world and by the English language» (Steers, 2005, p. 133). Another example of an author inquiring on orthodoxies is John Swift, bringing attention to the gender imbalance in art education literature (e.g., Swift, 1997, 1999a; Adams & Swift, 2011), or to how art schools, looking into a specific case of women's education in Birmingham between 1880 and 1920, are not necessarily «radical» but «rather reactionary» (Swift, 1999c, p. 322).

I am briefly bringing these examples together, this rather odd collection, in this study to show how eventualising art education is not without a field of art education that is self-reflexive and rather messy. That is, despite efforts of clarity before the cake of art education they all taste, I see the complexity of the cake can be further fragmented the more different the knives one uses to do so. «[A]sk[ing] about the

[76] *International Society for Education through Art*. For a Historical overview of InSEA, see Steers, 2005.

historical conditions that make art education as a school subject possible» (Martins & Popkewitz, 2015, p. 7) can thus continuously be made. This is to say that theoretically inquiring into art education may continuously *teach* about art education: eventualising is also a pedagogical gesture.

I am not conflating *research* work with *theoretical* work: I am arguing the more layered, messy and turbulent the field of art education is, the richer the cake is. *And* the more specific the work of art education is, the less generalising it can be. And this turbulence is also expressed in the very research infrastructure that enables and promotes a webbing of these contributions. I am referring to the very collective endeavours playing a determinant role in disseminating art education's labours, such as associations, conferences, conventions, seminars, research groups, publications, and the kind[77]. This is to say art education neither *exists* solely in schools nor is such existence one of *properly* defined borders: it is a social mass. This means the field, and the subfield of art education theory as well, is not necessarily built beyond turbulence, but along with it. And not without paradox: eventualising art education cannot be an endeavour detached from the cake it addresses. Even if bits and slices are taken, the cake is not the same once it is tampered with.

I am not looking to control, to *comprehend* such field, rather to work *with* it in its opaque messiness. That is, with such opacity, what opportunity can be made? With these fragmented sediments, rather than breaking them more, what beach can be amassed? Or, with these ingredients, without recipe, is it plausible to make a cake?

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[77] At an international level, some examples are the *International Society for Education through Art* — InSEA —, officially connected to the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation — UNESCO —, it seeks to «promote and advance education through art, design and crafts in all countries, in addition to nurturing intercultural understanding» (https://www.insea.org/about-us/). The InSEA holds congresses and forums, webinars, and more. In terms of journals, aside other kinds of publications, it is responsible for two journals: the *International Journal of Education through Art* — IJETA —, and the *International VISUAL JOURNAL for Art Education* — IMAG. In the United States of America, for example, two examples can be foregrounded. The *National Art Education Association* — NAEA —, established in 1947, presents itself as «the professional home for visual arts, design, and media arts educators» (https://www.arteducators.org/). Some of the association's offshoots are its national convention, held almost uninterruptedly since 1948, and its publications, such as *Studies in Art Education*, focussed on theoretical outputs. Another association is the *Art Education Research Institute* — AERI —, annually holding a symposium since 2016. Looking into the United Kingdom, the *National Society for Education in Art and Design* — NSEAD — is the United Kingdom's «trade union, learned society and professional association for art, craft & design educators» (https://www.nsead.org/). It hosts conferences, such as *The National Art & Design Education Conference*, and publishes a magazine for its members. To what concerns theory, more specifically, it publishes the *International Journal of Art and Design Education* — iJADE — since 1982. But efforts are not limited to the English language: an example can be Finland's *Finnish Society for Research in Art Education* — STTS, *Suomen taidekasvatuksen tutkimusseura* —, established in 1983. Focussing on research-based teaching, the association hosts a seminar, at a rather constant yearly interval since 2009, as well as symposia. There are other examples across Europe and beyond — such as EDDA Norden or the Japanese Association of Art Education, JAAEd.

languages for inquiry

Alike the scholars addressed in the previous chapter, I hear a similar call in these efforts: again, «*that of changing mentality*» (Glissant, 1990, p. 126, emphasis added). That is, these scholars' writings point to a language of art education that, even if satisfactory, is to be questioned. They are indeed *critical* towards the very field they partake in. Therefrom, a language is to be *made*.

But, what I find remarkable and more relevant is the language can also be regarded as *not to be made*: eventualising — gerund — is already the *very ongoing making* of language. It can be the very expression of art education theory in an incomplete, imperfect language: a language which inquires on the language of art education, but as an endeavour that does not cease. Work to be made, unceasingly: *writing* — gerund — as one goes along with. If *eventualising* cannot be detached from what it addresses, then it becomes rather relevant for art education theory to address itself as it *theorises* — makes see — the cake's layers, ingredients, and the kind. Writing and listening, at the same time: putting art in education in question, and keeping such movement. In this respect, writing is not limited to see how a cake is «produced through different events» (Martins & Popkewitz, 2015, p. 8). Textual pedagogical gestures merely concerned with *showing from revelation* — making visible what is hitherto invisible — are not very precise. It is not only about fragmenting: it *cannot not make* yet another layer to an opaque mass; another layer of dough. Theorising is the *making* of theory: textual pedagogical gestures must be written clearly with regard to their very opacity.

So, writing on the History of art education is not aside writing art education History: this is to say *stories are made* when theoretically inquiring into art education. In this respect, *inquiry* is also the making of an event. It is more about being messy, than it is about merely showing beyond messiness. Art education theory can be such a field — heterogeneous — and it is relevant to keep it as such: to not foreclose the uncertain paths of theory, so it can be *made* — rather than replicated. Thereunder, non prescriptive approaches to theory in art education are not only possible but needed.

What does it mean to make theory in art education? —, making theory in art education means that listening to the noise heard is required. It means to be critical towards art education theory itself, at the same critical of such critiquing. It means to critique language by expressing language, rather than obliterating it.

chance with inquiry

Addressing the *eventualising* of art education theory also aids in depicting a field of art education theory that, notwithstanding its heterogeneity, makes me inquire on a conversation across difference. So, rather than *extracting* the correct piece of the cake, — *piece of cake* —, a more fortuitous endeavour can be made along by mingling all the bits and bobs, overlapping them, «jolt[ing them all] so as to express what [one] want[s] to express» (Glissant, 2010, p. 30, translated here). That is the «chance of poetics»: the «accident» (Glissant, 1990, p. 153, translated here). In this respect, what I take on as this study's endeavour is the very making of a cake.

What I mean is that rather than limiting my addressing to the very mass of art education by *making visible* what such cake *hides* (Martins & Popkewitz, 2015), I try to imitate the cake: try to imagine a recipe as I go along the writing of this thesis — expressing what I listen, that is, overlapping writing and reading, with writing. And I share such imagining: the very ingredients, the cake. Nothing is concealed, rather, overlapped and shared so; an opaque cake, clear and confusing. The effort of clarity is thus not one to deal away with the cake, but to extend the inquiry so as to *clearly* inquire into what is being *made*. In theoretical terms, this means *theory* is not a discourse replacing what it addresses, rather it is the very expression of its singular making in language — in this study, tooled by textual pedagogical gestures. This is to say that to eventualise art education theory is taken as the *very eventualising of art education theory*, an event that spans across the whole thesis: inquiry, sustained.

And again; «[e]very language must be defended» (Glissant, 1990, p. 126, translated here): notwithstanding the effort of fragmentation entailed in the works of the scholars addressed, there are other purposes for art education theory. Namely, that of bringing an overarching coherency to the field. In this respect, and keeping with the commitment of addressing art education theory without *comprehending* it, I understand it is important to acknowledge other contributes. This is also to continue addressing art education theory in opaque manner: to continue the jolting. The chance of poetics is not aside a chance of learning: one not rooted to seizing knowledge, but, rather, to studying unceasingly and sharing such bumpy and uncertain journey. *Making* sense.

The overall purpose of this brief chapter is to express this study's contribute along with a Historical contextualisation. To do so, I address the *A Seminar in Art Education for Research and Curriculum Development*, held at the Pennsylvania State University in 1965[78]. Bringing fore this example is not a random choice, and it is bound to the very Historical contextualising of this study. What I mean by this, is that I am not presenting a Historical example so as to simply establish an affiliation *for* this study. Rather, to inquire on such Historical example to also express the very relation with History this study makes; again, a *contextualising* made clear.

The intentions for addressing the *Seminar* are similar to those for addressing *Emile*[79] (Rousseau, 1762/1979). That is, both are regarded as educational watersheds; but my *attraction* to these *events* is due to their constitutive places in educational *History*; not to *uphold* them, but to *reflect* them so as to address them critically, thereby making an opportunity with such legacy. In line with the *fairytaleness* of this study, I am thus also inquiring on their *mythical* presence: not only on what they are deemed to represent, but also how they are written into History. In this respect, I am not bringing fore the *Seminar* merely for *what* it is regarded to make. Addressing such *event* is also to show *how* it exists: it is *made*, and there are different layers for this making.

But to bring specifically the *Seminar* has also to do with it being deemed as, and representative of, a key Historical example of the *scientification* of art education. That is, such event is part of the theoretical aspect of the field, of the *very possibility of making art education theory*. This is because it is read to establish «a conceptual foundation for further innovation in the field, including the aesthetic education and the discipline-based art education movements [foregrounding] the idea of creating a *comprehensive*, *coherent approach* to *teaching* art» (Deng et al., 2019, para. 24, emphasis added). In this respect, it can be argued it articulates an «emphasis on knowledge production as the immaterial practice of art education» (Tervo, 2019c, para. 10).

[78] From here, I refer to such event as *Seminar*.

[79] Again, *Emile* (Rousseau, 1762/1979) is detailedly addressed in part II.

making an event by responding to an event

The *Seminar* is a *concerted collective effort*, made within a specific context. Such made event cannot be detached from a program aiming to perform drastic alterations in educational endeavours in the United States of America, with increasing political and financial support, something also motivated by political competitiveness before the Soviet Union (Deng et al., 2019; Tervo, 2019c). So, the event does not appear suddenly: it is an intentional mobilising of education to address social concerns, that is, it is somewhat of an educational reflex[80] (Tröhler, 2011). However, along with the combination of social and economic factors[81], the *Seminar* is also an organised response to calls within the field of art education itself. The overarching concern is that of a lacking systematicity in art education (e.g., Barkan, 1955), which is to be *found* through art education's very scientification.

This event results from the gathering of various scholars aiming to change «the focus of art education from psychologically grounded, developmental approaches to teaching and researching to a more self-conscious stance as part of the humanities and *interdisciplinary* scholarship» (Knochel et al., 2019, para. 1, emphasis added). For all the heterogenous group involved in it[82], telling of such interdisciplinarity, it is possible to read a traversing approach to tackle such goal: *making art education more theoretical*, and doing so by also affirming a divide between theory and practice, where the two alternate. That is, constituting the field by means of a discourse — theory — that aims explaining the phenomena it engages with — pedagogical practice —, thereby generating a subfield. A theory-to-practice approach: the *Seminar* puts art education in question for establishing «best practices» for the field to be «passed down to schoolteachers» (Deng et al., 2019, para. 12).

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[80] The *educational reflex* is brought fore by Daniel Tröhler (2011) as «a Protestant concept promising to *overcome* [...] cultural tensions between commercialism and classical republicanism» (p. 21, emphasis added). This matter is furthered with Rousseau's *Emile* (1762/1979) in part II.

[81] For a more detailed account on what characterises and feeds the discursive scenario that leads to the *Seminar*, see Deng et al., 2019; Efland, 1984; Tervo, 2019c.

[82] To name a few: Francis T. Villemain: philosopher; David W. Ecker: art educator; Nathaniel L. Champlin: professor of history and philosophy of education; Elliot Eisner: art educator; Arthur W. Foshay: school principal and consultant; Manuel Barkan: art educator; Joshua C. Taylor: art historian; Allan Kaprow: artist. See, for example, Ecker, 1966, pp. 24–36, for an argument on the need for art educators as researchers to turn to other fields of inquiry so as to help «art teachers to clarify their professional problems and to structure and justify their art curriculum» (Ecker, 1966, p. 36).

Notwithstanding, psychological and developmental approaches to art education[83], such as those spearheaded by Herbert Read (e.g., 1943) and Erwin Ziegfeld (e.g., Smith & Ziegfeld, 1944) can also be regarded to overlap the *Seminar*. Interestingly, Edwin Ziegfeld (1962), absent from the *Seminar*, acknowledges potential — and power — in scientific reasoning. He writes «science comes closer to being an *international language* than art and it, more than any other factor, is shrinking the size of our world and bringing together the people in it. A scientific fact is the same everywhere» (Ziegeld, 1962, p. 22, emphasis added). This is a lament for Ziegfeld (1962) as he is concerned that research is affecting the understanding of what art is — in his understanding. But this *shrinking world* also makes him write «everyone is everyone else's neighbor and with problems in common [which] explains why an *international* society for art education has been established» (p. 21, emphasis added). Ziegfeld is referring to InSEA, which, not unlike the *Seminar*, is also articulated to a context. In this case, one premised on *unity* in line with the calls for *universal peace* in the aftermath of the 1939–1945 world war[84]. Bearing the title of Herbert Read's (1943) *Education through Art*, it is the same educationalist who gives a speech in the association's first general assembly. What I wish to foreground from the titled *The Future of Art Education* (Read, 1956) is how Read positions the very need for *unity* across the field. Read (1956) recognises the importance of annual congresses but, to him, it does not suffice to attend to «a number of *unco-ordinated* papers» (p. 10, emphasis added). More than «institutes of research», delivers Read, «experimental schools in different parts of the world where [art educators'] theories can be put to the test» are required (p. 10). But, prior to installing such schools, teachers «must [be found], and the first necessity is therefore a training college for teachers in this new method of education» (p. 10).

There is thus an endgame here for theoretical endeavours: to illuminate the paths of pedagogical work, that is, to lessen the uncertain paths of an assumedly obscure field of practice. Noticeably, theory and pedagogy are not detached, but linked in orderly manner: by means of theory, there is the goal to teach teachers. That is, even if alternating theory and practice, all of these scholars intend to *teach* practice by

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[83] The limits of which, especially with regard to Herbert Read's contributes, Manuel Barkan (1955) already questions in *A Foundation for Art Education* (see pp. v–vi).

[84] Again, for a Historical overview of InSEA, see Steers, 2005.

means of theoretical endeavours. Briefly put, Read's salvific education through art aims external effects — «education for peace» (Read, 1956, p. 6) —, which is to say, to shed light onto society. Theory is to be *put to the test* — validated, or not — in classrooms, in the *field*. Teaching is the pivot between a theory-to-practice approach and the figure of the teacher is the soldier[85] in such field. The drive for research is thus not aside the teaching of teachers, by providing guidelines for applying a *new* method of education. Theory is made *from* empirical data and it is made *towards* empirical results: theory teaches by staying concerned with ends.

making an event by writing on an event

The *Seminar*'s efforts can be seen to be critical of art education itself, but, conversely, rather than placing emphasis on unity, they show how to *eventualise* art education, that is, how and why to be self-reflexive in a scientific key. And this can be *shown* also because the event itself is recollected in a report (Mattil, 1966), bearing the same name as the *Seminar*[86]. So, addressing the *Seminar* is addressing the very *Report*: it is recollecting the made recollections of the event, written recollections that also write the *Seminar*'s place in History.

It can be read in the *Report* (Mattil, 1966) the concerted collective effort of the *Seminar* is planned throughout three interconnected and sequenced steps:

> the identification of the most critical broad areas of concern in art education, the selection of those persons in and outside the field of art education who could effectively come to grips with problems, on both theoretical and practical levels, and the designing of a functional structure which could meet the objectives of the seminar. (Mattil, 1966, p. 1)

So, *coming to grips with problems* — seizing, comprehending — in effective manner is a necessary trait for those involved in the *Seminar*, and «art education *must begin systematic* and sustained inquiry into the area of curriculum» (Mattil, 1966, p. 2, emphasis added). And the theoretical *and* practical levels need each other, as «[t]heoretical thinking in art education will *produce little without* the accompanying

[85] I am alluding to Read's military background (see, for example, Steers, 2005).

[86] From here, I refer to such report as *Report*.

rigorous investigation which it produces the data necessary to *validate* theories» (Mattil, 1966, p. 2, emphasis added).

Francis Villemain, philosopher, echoes this interplay of theory and practice in how he sees philosophy as a contribute for the *Seminar*'s goals and, ultimately, art education:

> The philosophic message here, a canon of intellectual adequacy, is *to frame a conception of art that identifies* subject matters to which, whatever their source, *measures of excellence are applicable*. Both a theory of value, a conception of what is what is not of worth and why, and a compatible theory of art are facets of *the conceptual equipment educators require to competently* confront research and curriculum development. (Villemain, 1966, p. 9, emphasis added)

And such *equipment* is that which enables a continuation of inquiry, as «one can *empirically identify the content* [of the experience of critically beholding a painting] and *having so done, one can proceed* to assessments» (Villemain, 1966, p. 22, emphasis added). Such equipment is the answer to the question «what then is the *relevance of the literature* of the philosophy of art *to* contemporary educators *grappling with* research and curriculum development?» (Villemain, 1966, p. 8, emphasis added). So, the interplay between theory and practice is also located by timeliness, that is, there is a sequence to each of them; theory-*to*-practice-*to*-theory, and so on. In this regard, Villemain's proposal is that art is regarded as educational by that which can be extracted from it and applied onto the educational field. That is, once identification is possible, acting is possible: clarity is therefore a goal of Villemain's philosophical inquiry. And the concern with clarity reverberates across the *Report*, a clarity of theory that *replaces* the opacity of classroom practice.

For example, David Ecker (1966) inquires on «what constitutes *an adequate conception of a problem* in art education» (p. 24, emphasis added), expecting his answer may help to «*illuminate* if not to *resolve* the other questions» (Ecker, 1966, p. 24, emphasis added). That is how Ecker sees one of the core concerns of the art educator as researcher, «that of *helping art teachers to clarify their professional problems*» (pp. 35–36, emphasis added). If not by means of, for example, philosophy (see Villemain, 1966) or History (see Taylor, 1966), areas of inquiry like criticism contribute to such enlightening task. Rosenberg (1966) asks:

> *What but criticism can tell us what we are doing* and if it is what we want to do? What but criticism *can indicate other ends*, *explain what makes those other ends* attractive and *indicate what must be done to serve them*? (Rosenberg, 1966, p. 61, emphasis added)

So, then, it is of utmost importance these fields of inquiry bring their perspectives to shed light onto a field that is asking for structuration. These different lights constitute the field by means of their specificities, controlling it so as to properly use such insights to compensate for the lack of consistency in the field of art education. This is summed up by Manuel Barkan (1966), who laments the lack of interdisciplinarity of the field, writing «[a]rt curriculum is faltering [...] because [art educators] have not learned to use the aesthetician and critic, nor do [art educators] *properly* use the art historian» (Barkan, 1966, p. 243, emphasis added). These concerns of *proper* use are relevant as «[t]he field of art education concerns itself with *educating people for greater control and understanding* of visual images and forms broadly conceived as art» (Hausman, 1966, p. 92, emphasis added).

To *come to grips*, to *grapple*; to *control* art education. To slice its cake with the proper knife for the slice intended: to come to terms with what operates «in competent works by artists, critics and other engaged in art» (Barkan, 1966, p. 264). The collective endeavour of the *Seminar*'s participants is not far from the operativeness of *eventualising*. Again, it is possible to consider the authors' efforts in «set[ting] new criteria for art education's labour that put the emphasis on knowledge production as the immaterial practice of art education» (Tervo, 2019c, para. 10). Moreover, the *Seminar*'s *Report* (Mattil, 1966) stands as a proposal for the very enlightening of the field — where practice occurs. The path throughout the *field* must be made certain with the aid of theory. Theory-*to*-practice. Calling for interdisciplinarity, the *Report*'s (Mattil, 1966) writings convincingly *make* a case for the immaterial practice of knowledge production (Tervo, 2019c) to be a collective endeavour. A manner of operating similar to *eventualising*: in both situations the cake of art education is taken to be sliced. Along what is recollected in the *Report* (Mattil, 1966), though, properly so.

making events by recollecting an event

But the *recollecting* in the *Report* (Mattil, 1966) is not the exclusive way to address the *Seminar*. Such event is also *recollected* in other occasions that further *and* stress its importance, contributing to its placing *in* History. In other words, what is made on such occasions furthers and establishes the *Seminar*'s status as a key for the scientification of art education. In 1984, in a themed issue of *Studies in Art Education*, the *Seminar* is recollected[87] as a producer of «noticeable change» (Rush, as cited in Deng et al., 2019, para. 8). Until such publication, aside some exceptions, the event is rather absent in art educators' discussions (Deng et al., 2019). Then, in 2016, a conference is arranged so as to commemorate the seminar's 50th anniversary. The aim of such conference is to «critically reflect on the *continuing influence* of this historical event to the contemporary scholarship of art education» (Knochel et al., 2019, para. 1). Moreover, proceedings from such 50th anniversary commemoration are published in 2019, with several contributors (e.g., Deng et al., 2019; Tervo, 2019c).

The *continuing influence* of the *Seminar*, or, more precisely, the *Seminar*'s recollections, is, again, brought fore in this study due to what it *can* mean for art education theory, that is, how can such legacy be made an opportunity. The *Seminar*'s *Report* (Mattil, 1966) articulates a purpose for theorising in art education, namely, the making of an explanatory discourse so as to bring clarity onto an unrefined knowledge: this is the Classical purpose of theory (Certeau 1980/1988). The *field's* opacity is read as *obscured*, *containing* important teachings that have to be illuminated. To do so, to uncover such teachings, art education theory operates by identifying — *reading* — the very operations — *controls* (Barkan, 1966) — that constitute the field. That is, to «critical[ly] re-examin[e] and historiciz[e] [art educators'] current "ways of working"» (Tervo, 2019c, p. 28). This is proposed by making a case on theoretical endeavours to be collectively shared in relation to art education: art education's *immaterial labour* (Tervo, 2019c). That is, the «labor that produces the *informational* and *cultural content* of the commodity» (Lazzarato, as cited in Tervo, 2019c, para. 10). A paradoxical labour: even if immaterial (Tervo, 2019c), it is tangible: it effects how art education is thought, discussed and written. It is part of the language of art education.

[87] See, for example, Deng et al., 2019, and Efland, 1984.

What does it mean to make theory in art education? Noticeably, the scholars writing the report (Mattil, 1966) *teach* by means of their clear gaze: they are teaching *and* theorising — *at the same time*. Making theory in art education means to teach the categories that can be made into approaches to the field to teach teachers about it. To provide particular overviews — explanatory discourses — with which to explain the unrefined practice of pedagogy. To make teachers see, or, *read*. Theory is therefore not deprived from a prescriptive character that also contributes for art education to be an applied field: it applies theories. And theory *teaches*: to bring coherency to art education by means of other fields of inquiry. Art education theory is *made* to enlighten an unrefined knowledge, but it is also made so for an equivalence to science and math to be established (Deng et al., 2019). In this regard, the *sophistication*, that is, the complexifying of knowledge the contributions in the *Seminar*'s *Report* (Mattil, 1966) aim at, not only *makes* the field *more* academic, not only *makes* the field *more* theoretical, it *makes* it so by means of a scientific approach. The *Seminar*'s «significance» may be «compared to a teaching act with both a stated and hidden curriculum» (Deng et al., 2019, para. 24).

Just as the tongue is tied to language, it is tied to taste: so, art education theory is concerned with identifying the flavours of art education's cake. «[W]e still *cannot explain* what to do about our attractions to the past. *How can our taste* for Medieval art, Benin bronzes, Italian mannerism, or Art Nouveau, *be translated into* contemporary idioms?» (Kaprow, 1966, p. 79, emphasis added). Indeed, to *taste the cake*, one must slice it. The texts in the *Report* (Mattil, 1966) *add on* from their specificity to the making of the subfield of art education theory, and they are made to do so as well. Despite leaning onto a divide between theory and practice, where one end teaches the other, I believe it nevertheless shows the *relevance of the singularity of languages* and the very collaborative possibilities amidst such singularities, as opposed to a universal unity. Once again, «[e]very language must be defended» (Glissant, 1990, p. 126, translated here). So, the *ends* of theorisation are *made means* so as to extend inquiry.

The *Seminar*'s recollections do contribute for the scientification of art education; this can be an opportunity: a potential for inquiry. That is, even if affirming a Classical divide between theory and practice, the stressing of interdisciplinarity renders the foreclosing of *other* contributes rather undesirable. Further, it entails a social dimension to the field that is not without the multiplication of, again, «professional

networking and interdisciplinary conversations», in turn «stimulat[ing] more rigorous research and scholarship» (Deng et al., 2019, para. 24). In other words, to *eventualise* art education, art education theory, and the whole art education research infrastructure, are entwined to the legacy of the *Seminar*: as I am *fabling* it. A legacy of multiplication, a legacy of studying — an opaque mass to not be done with: and because I am *fabling* it in such a manner. So, this study is not about ignoring systematicity or science, but to work *with* them, rather than *from* them. So, it is not necessary to *uphold* a Historical example, but it can be rather useful to reflect it: to fable a fairytale rather than a myth, which is to say systems of *scientification* can be considered in non fixed manner. So, this is about making a case for not limiting frameworks for making theory in art education. I thus ask: *why frame work?*

The very amassing of frameworks to poeticise the scientific dimension of art education continues the jolting. It continues the joyous chance of mingling. *What does it mean to make theory in art education?* It means to commit to a *precise tangible labour of art education theory*. To *write* with a poetic precision, never being done with the present (Tervo, 2018), inquiring on means *at the same time* such means are used. This is to say language is put in practice and such practice in question — art education theory, rather than being an effort for universal applicability, is the very expression of its singular making in language. Uncertain paths are not to be foreclosed but unceasingly tooled — here with textual pedagogical gestures: teaching and theorising, at the same time. «Analytical thought is [thereby] invited to build ensembles» (Glissant, 1990, p. 107, translated here): to *make* sense.

In this light, this chapter *makes* sense of an event by recollecting its recollections, and this *fabling* is not without *writing*: this is the trope for chapter four, where I address such practice to further this study's contextualising; now, institutionally.

The overall purpose of this brief chapter is to express this study's contribute along with an institutional contextualisation. To do so, I address the practice of writing in art education with regard to the Doctoral Programme in Art Education from the Universities of Porto and Lisbon, Portugal, especially as practiced by the programme's students. In this respect, it is a self-referential contextualisation.

I make use of *Derivas*, the journal of the mentioned doctoral programme, composing a reading of it so as to address *how* is writing, and what it may entail to art education theory. As with the previous chapter — that is, in line with how *History*, what is written, is regarded in this study — this institutional contextualisation is not an effort to *validate* this study. But to inquire on such institutional case to, again, also express the very singular relation this study makes with it; again, a *contextualising* made clear. In this light, and alike the contextualisations of the previous two chapters, I am not intending to *control* what I am addressing, the journal, but to work *with* its textual opacity.

«Perhaps what could stay for the writing of [...] theses would be the idea of conversation and of shared reading» (Martins, 2024, p. 13, translated here). This idea of conversation and of shared reading is structural for this study's writing, which is to say this *fabling* is not without a concern for orality: thus, to inquire on tones for making proposals is made relevant. This is one of the motives for addressing *Derivas*: the very different tones that can be read in what the doctoral programme's students express. This is to say that, in terms of a fairytale, *the condition of the very crafters is expressed* (Cardigos, 1996), as *Derivas* provides a platform for the students of the doctoral programme to converse about, and share, their ongoing work.

This is particularly evident from issue seven onwards, with a change in the editorial team, themselves pinpointing a very interruption[88] between such issue and issue six, where «a transformation is inaugurated [...] and another horizon for the journal is presented» (Almeida et al., 2023, p. 5, translated here). Such editorial team (Almeida et al., 2023) define an ambition for the publication, being less interested in an «indexed publication and [in being] oriented by criteria defined by indexing platforms» (p. 6, translated here). Rather, the emphasis is placed on a «work made by various hands, in its various dimensions» (p. 6, translated here), especially in what concerns the very doctoral programme. Addressing this journal is thus to invite this study to this *making of tales*. This chapter could thus be the continuing of a fairytale; recollecting: knowledge is the tying down of Daedalus' sculptures. How to stay with the sculptures of the crafters, the makers, by moving *with* them, rather than captivating them?

[88] The very title of the journal's editorial says it: *And in Number Seven, Derivas Begins Anew* (Almeida et al., 2023, translated here).

beginning by writing about

The mentioned de-emphasis on *indexing* is neither to fence the journal nor the doctoral programme, as «establish[ing] relations with researchers and students from other Universities» (Almeida et al., 2023, p. 7, translated here) is an aim. By dimming the focus on the format and intensifying the look onto the work itself, a joint commitment in «creating publishing criteria» (Almeida et al., 2023, p. 8, translated here) is taken up. Texts are therefore «reviewed» and «discussed» together, «assuming the proximity to that which is the work produced in the scope of research in a doctoral programme» (p. 8, translated here).

The mentioned doctoral programme can be currently characterised by a focus on non discriminatory educational practices, remaining open to a myriad of references so as to share a non-hegemonic and non-discriminatory art education[89]. The work made is regarded as *work to be made*, where the questioning of foundations is taken as a continuous endeavour. In this regard, the literature of art education is considered critically, namely, before the *makings* of the literature at hand to understand its operativeness, which is extended to other projects[90]. This goes for writing as well, as questioning the lines that may separate theory from practice is a suggested endeavour. That is, regardless of more theoretical or more empirical approaches to the field of art education, attention is placed on *writing* being more than merely a record of research, or an informing of results. There is an interest towards a writing that, itself, *is* research. This refers not only to a practice that assumes a more performative character (e.g., Dias, 2017), also graphically so (e.g., Brásio, 2024; Casais, 2023; Santos, 2024), but also to the attentiveness towards what one makes, as it may carry with it grids of rationality that inform it (e.g., Martins, 2024). This is to ask how are the textual gestures one may use — even if inadvertently — shaping the discursive space being made.

Despite such focussing, the scope of the work made in such doctoral programme is rather wide, and it is such wideness *Derivas* can be read to encompass, with eight issues published at the time of this writing. The journal can be regarded as an unstable

[89] See, for example, Almeida et al., 2024, and Martins, 2022.

[90] See, for example, the CREAT_ED project (Martins, 2023b).

publication, in that there is no clear editorial line[91], notwithstanding the new beginning announced. In this regard, its title is appropriate[92]. As I am interested in seeing the journal's two moments by their entwinement rather than by their contrast, I believe an overview and overlapping of the journal's contributions is necessary. This is, on the one hand, to *make see* a sample of art education, messy and heterogenous. On the other, to contextualise and further this study, particularly to what concerns the practice of writing. In this respect, the effect of such practice I am interested in *studying* is how can it be an expression of the questions it asks and the legacy it carries, at the same time constituting a contribute that is also self-reflexive. This is to say I am addressing *sense* but placing emphasis on *means*; thus, writing is considered at the same time analytical and constitutive of what it studies. This becomes particularly interesting for this study's purposes, when what is written — the expressed stories — can be read as more than, for example, a report or a prescription.

This is not to say that writing so as to express more of an account, showing or demonstration, does not happen in *Derivas*, neither it is to say such manner of writing should be discarded. For example, issue number six derives from the seventh *International Encounter on Art Education*, which centres around the epistemologies and practices of art education in the Community of Portuguese Language Countries, specifically Cabo Verde and Mozambique (Rainho, 2022). In an issue where an «encounter of writings is organised as a contribute to the deepening of the approached matters resulting from the encounter» itself (Rainho, 2022, p. 7), the first two parts function as the dissemination of the research conducted in Cabo Verde and Mozambique. As such, the texts are more like reports (e.g., Fortes, 2022; Monteiro, 2022; Pinto, 2022; Vencezlau, 2022), also providing an important view of coloniality's impact on the educational endeavours of both countries (e.g., Bila, 2022; Bonifácio, 2022; Santos, 2022). The act of questioning, latent in the decolonial ambition before Historical legacy, is also assumed by looking into the very decolonial work made (e.g., Midori, 2022). There are other texts aside the ones in the mentioned sixth issue that practice writing similarly, be it regarding, for example, educational work in relation to cultural institutions (e.g., Terra, 2014, Valente, 2017), or discussing issues of ableism (Geraldes, 2024).

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[91] See, for example, Almeida et al., 2023; Martins & Silva, 2014; Paz, 2018.

[92] *Derivas* can be translated to English as *Drifts*. However, it is homonymous to a verbal form of *derivar*: to derive.

In such cases, writing is practiced so as to question an object of research, making see issues by writing *about* them, in reporting manner. Nevertheless, this does not mean that writing is detached from the object it addresses: it *makes it as well* by offering a particular depiction of it. In this respect, writing about writing is a manner to address such ambiguity, by putting means of inquiry in question.

continuing about beginning to write

Cat Martins and Ana Cachucho (2014) already in the journal's first issue are rather clear about the challenge posed to researchers: a writing invested in art education itself, «without it being transformed into an account of experiences» (p. 7, translated here). The questioning of lines that make a divide between theory and practice is an assumed endeavour, «promoting reflections that do not merely result from action, but that frame and inscribe the very possibility of acting» (Cachucho & Martins, 2014, p. 7, translated here).

Writing about writing is a topic that traverses the journal (e.g., Almeida, 2024; Barreira, 2014; Correia & Silva, 2014; Dias & Gomes, 2022; Martins, 2024; Martins & Silva, 2014; Muthewuye, 2024; Paz, 2018). One of the concerns brought fore before, and with, such practice, is how to actually begin to do it, to make it (e.g. Correia & Silva, 2014; Muthewuye, 2024; Martins, 2024). This is intimate to what is tackled in the very *Seminar of Scientific Writing*[93], a curricular unit where focus in placed on «the passing from a model of knowledge transmission to one other centred in the very processes of constructing scientific/artistic objects» (Martins, 2024, p. 12, translated here). Martins affirm that what is most pleasing for them in this seminar is its «*always initiatory side*» (2024, p. 11, translated here, emphasis added). This *initiatory side* refers to the very «opening [of] a possibility of making [the seminar's] space-time a space of sharing ideas and confrontation, duly argued, from various positionings» (Martins, 2024, p. 12, translated here). *How to begin to write?*, Martins (2024) ask in their text's title. How to commit to taking on the absence of a «clear idea» (Muthewuye, 2024, p. 26, translated here), to the doubt in «*how* to write about what we do not yet

[93] The original name is *Seminário de Escrita Científica*. The work made by students in such curricular unit sustains different issues of *Derivas*, namely numbers three (December, 2017), five (March, 2022), seven (October, 2024) and eight (December, 2024). It is noteworthy the two latter issues mirror the very shift proposed by the editorial team in issue seven (see Almeida et al., 2023).

know» (Alves et al., 2023, p. 13, translated here), «to write about the unknown» (Rosa, 2014, p. 88, translated here).

What I find interesting in this initiatory side (Martins, 2024) is, indeed, the very singularity that can be made with the sharing of ideas, that is, on what can be made by expressing a relation with *other* discourses. And to express a relation with *other* discourses is not simply to name it, but to actually *make* such relation tangible, expressed clearly by the entwinement of opacities. In this respect, when I refer to discourses, I am not exclusively referring to authors, but to texts as well. This makes me recollect Michel de Certeau's (2013/2015) reading of John of The Cross's writings, specifically in how poem and prose relate to each other in the latter's work. Michel de Certeau (2013/2015), in such reading, or «considering» (p. 71), focusses «on the relations between two discourses, one of which illustrates the opening of a space to beauty [...] the other of which relates to a suffering of history» (p. 71). Certeau claims the two ends, in relation, «maintain one another» (p. 72) but with one *transforming* the other. Therefrom he proposes such «literary operation» results in «the implementation of a historicity, a way that is peculiar to it of articulating time with what escapes it, and hence, ultimately, of thinking time» (p. 72). This implementation, this poetic beginning (Certeau, 2013/2015), «is not thinkable in itself. It occurs suddenly, abruptly [...], one known not whence, for no reason» (p. 74), Certeau argues. With regard to writing, this means that to think it in light of a poetic function is to *not determine* it, rather, it is to think the movement of writing itself, to think its engendering. This is to write it means to *make* stories, rather than to make History.

This poetic making (Certeau, 1980/1988) — poetics — is the very approach to the content this study encompasses, again, jolting (Glissant, 2010) the writings addressed. That is, to make these texts partake of the same space at the same time, thus approaching them aside developmental reasoning. This is to emphasise *not* a clear end when writing, but, most importantly, a clear relation in a confusion amidst ends. In other words, it is more about writing *with* poetic meanderings, rather than *from* poetic beginnings. Indeed, Certeau (2013/2015) does write «[the genesis of the poem] attempts to "hold" the first music, [...] to captivate a language by entering into it as would a dancer» (p. 74). In this respect, what I ask, with this study, is whether an *initiatory* thesis can also be the very *continuing* of a dance, indefinitely: joining a dance floor, perhaps in the dark. Not a dance in the «realm of the predicate [but]

embrac[ing] the ineffable [...] 'arrived' [but] gone nowhere» (Fang et al., 2021, p. 15, italics removed).

Indeed, «the writing desire associated with [research], should have as its centre the interrogation [...] capable to make research a field where one would understand something that one has not *yet* understood» (Martins, 2024, p. 13, translated here, emphasis added). My suggestion is to, perhaps, hold the *yet* and resist to understand what is not understood, *and* without comprehending — seizing — it. Recollecting the works of Daedalus: how to stay with the sculptures by moving with them, and not stopping them?

to continue by writing with

Recollecting: «[p]erhaps what could stay for the writing of [...] theses would be the idea of conversation and of shared reading» (Martins, 2024, p. 13, translated here). Manuel Brásio (2024), for example, engages with his musical practice so as to write a piece with a conversational *tone* to it. Brásio (2024) attempts to achieve it not only through the content of the writing, where the question «what is to begin?» (p. 104, translated here, formatting altered) is also expressed. Brásio's text, in his words, «aims to show [his] way of thinking — chaotic while seeking for organisation and methodology [...] it seeks to think while it writes and communicates an idea» (p. 109, translated here). An expressed desire for clear confusion.

Moving away from a writing aiming simply to be read and comprehended is expressed by Luana Andrade (2023) as well. Andrade (2023) shares a text reflecting on her own artistic work in relation to her condition as a migrant, by means of *introductory notes*[94] that mingle different frameworks. «[P]oetry, fiction, and art, may occupy themselves with their very reconsidering, exactly because they may occupy themselves with any subject», Andrade claims (p. 53, translated here). What I read in such openness by Andrade, is a written invitational trait to such areas, which she transposes to her writing and thus to the very reading of her writing. In this respect,

[94] The original title of the piece is *Cento e poucas notas introdutórias à artista-turista* (Andrade, 2023), which can be rendered as *One hundred and something introductory notes to the artist-tourist*. It should be noted this study does not reproduce Andrade's (2023) formatting.

both Andrade (2023) and Brásio (2024) can be read to emphasise *not* a clear end when writing. They thus write *with* poetic meanderings, despite their beginnings[95].

Bringing these examples, specifically, has to do with their very expressing of a desire, by enacting it. The desire of writing *as* desire of sharing — which is expressed with writing. Such opening of writing to artistic *practicing* entails, indeed, a making of theory that places emphasis on the means to do so. So, these contributes can be seen to look into the very conveying of theory and practice at the same time. Notwithstanding the solitary endeavour of writing these examples (Andrade, 2023; Brásio, 2024) narrate, they also depict a desire to bleed through their pages, addressing a reader.

«Researching», Alves et al. (2023) write[96], «begins a movement in relation to that which is not here yet. The question invites» (p. 13, translated here). Marcela Pedersen's (2023) piece, for example, asks how her «writing can be solidary with other people who also try to create fairer and less violent spaces/practices?» (p. 37, translated here). In light of a conversation, Ramos (2018) writes it is not about «acknowledging but producing a place. Many are the possibilities of continuity, many are the paths to follow» (p. 71, translated here). «Writing/to accumulate», André Alves writes (2023, p. 105, translated here), calling for a writing that is «itself a means of artistic experimentation and investigative thought» (Alves, 2023, p. 112, translated here). Indeed, «[w]riting *with*, it redirects the emphasis from thinking to approach, to the tension between the intentionality and the unexpectedness of experience, of observation, of thought» (p. 112, translated here).

«[T]exts are written *with* other texts» (Cabeleira, 2017, p. 6). Such invitation to engage in writing as a shared endeavour is indeed motivated by Cat Martins (2022) to the doctoral students enrolling in the *Seminar of Scientific Writing*. The students, and authors, are to begin «the writing of an article in shared manner» (Martins, 2022, p. 6, translated here), where bumps — «writing's various phases, moments, hesitations,

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[95] Contributions like the ones mentioned are also *made* shareable by relaxing editorial structuring (see Almeida et al., 2023), in line with the mentioned emphasis placed on a «work made by various hands, in its various dimensions» (Almeida et al., 2023, p. 6, translated here). This is, again, more evident from issue seven, where each and everyone's processes of writing and thinking are «accompanied and taken care of» (Alves et al., 2023, p. 10, translated here) by each other. This is a committing to a shared endeavour, «work[ing] from attentive reading and listening» (Alves et al., 2023, p. 9, translated here), «distinguished from the modality of reading by peers (peer review) which tends to occur in a text's later stage» (p. 10, translated here).

[96] Alves et al. (2023) share editorial responsibilities in such issue, a consequence of the expansion of such responsibilities to the students (see Almeida et al., 2023; 2024). Alike what is mentioned in the previous footnote, the way in which the *editorial* is made, *makes* as well.

leaps, recoils» (p. 6, translated here) — are «situations for sharing» (p. 6, translated here). Again, «[p]erhaps what could stay for the writing of [...] theses would be the idea of conversation and of shared reading» (Martins, 2024, p. 13, translated here)

This is the very idea I want to express *with* the *ensemble* (Glissant, 1990) of texts in *Derivas*: these pieces, these opacities, *express* ideas; they *stay* in the pages of their texts and yet, they stay with the reader who can express a relation *with* them by reading in them an invitation, by *making* with them an opportunity. So, in this respect, affirming this very idea is to inquire on the very separation «the "scriptural"» traces before «the magical world of voices and tradition» (Certeau, 1980/1988, p. 134). Rather than progressing *over*, it commits to staying with. To continue the very conversation, the very infinite conversation that forgets *the* origin, by putting it in question, unceasingly (Blanchot, 1969/2003). Again, more of a continuing, than an initiation. Continuing sharing and addressing the fables that inform writing, by recollecting them as fairytales: rather than tying down sculptures, to be carried away with them. Make stories, rather than History, by placing emphasis on the very means to express these stories; here, *writing*.

What does it mean to make theory in art education? It means to express meaning, by making *it* with writing. It means to share the story of one's own journey of learning — it is to *express* studying, that is, the very relation that is constantly to be made with the legacies that inform one's imagination. And, at the same time, to express a contribute: imagine otherwise and share such imagining.

The aim for part I is also to further the very significance of this study by tracing a contextualising for it. This is to say that I *make* a contextualisation by inquiring on the legacies that may inform the journey of my doctoral studies, so as to see what opportunity can be made with them. This is to say that, rather than being concerned with sharing a clear-cut account of affiliations and oppositions, I take on the endeavour of, again, expressing a singular relation amidst this study and the sources addressed. As mentioned, this *contextualising* is not an effort for bringing coherency to this study. Rather, it is made to express an inquiry on eventualising (Martins & Popkewitz, 2015), scientification and writing: the very amassing of these ends traces the very wavy ground for this study. Again, the very relationships amidst the references addressed are thus *made* necessary by the clear singularity of their chaos: by an opaque relation *expressed* clearly. In this light, rather than coherency, the purpose is one of *consistency*: an opaque singular mass, instead of a general one.

So I write this part by *imitating* the references addressed — *eventualising* with what *eventualises*, *scientifying* with what *scientifies*, writing with what writes —, to learn. Again, by imitating, I am not referring to a mechanical reproduction of what is addressed. Rather, I am listening to the sources and sharing what I hear: expressing a reading with writing, *resisting* to speak *over* them, «experiment[ing] with the [H]istories [I] read, write, and study; or, in a word, [the stories I] *make*» (Tervo, 2024, p. 70). This is what I imagine with this part, which I make tangible by language; that is, imagination is made tangible not only by writing *with*, but also by *writing to* this ground. That is, by *responding* to the calls I imagine, I fable. By imitating a cake of art education, I am thus able to contextualise this thesis by *making* a context, rather than finding one. A cake is made, but the ingredients and the recipe come along with it.

Nevertheless, I have no intention of dealing away with *coherency* or *systematicity*. Calls for it must also be taken into account; as, again, every language is to be defended (Glissant, 1990). However, I hesitate when coherency and systematicity entail the foreclosing of uncertain paths of theory, that is, when imagination is narrowed from the outset.

For example, art educator Peter Smith (1998), suggests «greater attention to philosophical grounding *within* the field» (p. 371, emphasis added), understanding art educators rely on an enormous amount of different and dense theorisations *external* to the field of art education. Further, according to Smith (1998), often such gigantic and multiple theory is used so as to explain minute details occurring within the very field of art education. What Smith regards as the result of such relation between art educators and different theorisations, is the latter are brought by the former into the field as external unquestionable authorities so as to validate arguments.

Smith (1998) makes a suggestion similar to Manuel Barkan's (1966), that of art educators looking in the literature of art education so as to «find in [such] literature pointers for future research» (p. 374). From such pointers, see if a «basis for a critique of authorities from outside the field [can aid in] select[ing] and reject[ing] rather than blindly accept[ing] authority (Smith, 1998, p. 374). In other words, for Smith, theory in art education incurs in the mistake of being made by the composing of theoretical sources that are deemed valid from the outset. Art education has to be made strong to resist such *contamination*, as «[c]oncerted and systematically structured research is a necessity for the future health and development of [the field]» (p. 371). *What does it mean to make theory in art education?* It means to make the field clear, but whatever that may mean, *first* it has to be made robust.

I neither take issue with Smith's (1998) suggestions of looking into the literature of art education nor do I refute the relevance of «[c]oncerted and systematically structured research» in art education (p. 371). But Smith (1998) loses me when his reasoning implies a foreclosing of space *from the outset*, that is, uncertain paths of theory are to be shied away from. In other words, Smith's making of theory implies limiting space to make space. I must be precise: this limiting is initiatory; it is not a matter of a continuous making, rather, an appeal to *selecting* the frameworks and areas of inquiry with which one may address the cake of art education. Only certain slices can be cut with certain knives.

Claims looking into *limiting controls* can be found in Karen Hamblen's (e.g., 1988, 1993) work as well, being interestingly mirrored in the language used. For example, Hamblen (1993) understands «it is important that *relevant* theory and research are *translated into substantive* art instruction» (p. 192, emphasis added). And such *relevant* theory shows «*there are linkages* between art learning and learning in other subjects areas and that art study can promote creative behaviors, critical thinking skills, and academic achievement» (Hamblen, 1993, p. 196, emphasis added). So, *linkages* already exist; it is thus a matter of *finding* them, *extract them so as to apply them*. So, then, this reasoning determines from the outset that whatever's desirable already exists and the makings of theory must bring them to light. This manner of making of theory is also what allows for Hamblen (1988) to discuss on the maturity of art education: maturity is a notion that already exists and in itself holds meaning. Keeping with the reasoning, it is thus a matter of finding the linkages between art education and maturity so as to prove or refute such inquiry, that is, it is a matter of *searching for patterns* (Hamblen, 1988) that point to it. And this is not to say that *relevant art theory* or *linkages* are to be dealt away with. However, Hamblen posits them as conditions which already exist and must therefore be identified: she cuts the cake with the correct knife for a particular kind of slice. So, why limit questions from the outset? As Hamblen writes (1993), «[q]uestions are not ipso facto, an educational plus. They are subject to the same distortions and misuse as other aspects of the curriculum» (Hamblen, 1993, p. 201). Indeed, they must be addressed; but when I ask — why limit questions from the outset? —, is where I go astray from Hamblen. I do not see the questions that can be posed about art education should be *first* formulated *then* posed, *from* an intended answer.

Again, this is *not* to dismiss calls for systematic research (e.g., Feldman, 1959; Geahigan, 1980, 1985; Apps & Mamchur, 2009), for attention towards what art educators are prescribing (e.g., Anderson & McRorie, 1997; Geahigan, 1998a; Silberberger, 2022), or for clear ideas (e.g., Lankford, 1992a; Fróis & White, 2003). Again, and this is not repeated enough, «[e]very language must be defended» (Glissant, 1990, p. 126, translated here). But what can be done with such systematicity? This is a question to be maintained and that is how, I believe, working with systematicity may be useful: when what is being made is not established from the outset; anchoring, rather than a perpetual anchor. For example, writing «philosophy of education, far

from being merely theoretical, approaches the essence of what education must be» (Pereira, 2024, p. 119, translated here), is to assume an essence exists, something which is to be approached with *keys*, and correct ones as well. In this case, such keys can only be provided by philosophical frameworks, so, systematicity *dictates* what may come. This to say the *key* also conceives the *lock* which it *opens*.

Art education theory can be made *with* systematicity; but art education theory does not have to necessarily made *from* or *towards* systematicity. That is, the space of art education theory does not have to be properly located and delineated from the outset. Delineating a *proper* place for *making* art education theory limits what can be imagined with it: whilst it may establish a *foundation* for art education theory, such foundation leaves aside what it does not fit it. *What does it mean to make theory in art education?* Why limit what it may mean? Why limit imagination?

And inquiring on the limiting of imagination is not detached from inquiring on the very contrasting operativeness between obscurity and clarity that sets the motion of art education's *eventualising* and *scientification*. So, then, the endeavour of art education theory does not have to be limited to a certain path of inquiry, between ends. Rather, amidst ends, there can be made space for movement. Fixed texts, statues, can be imagined to move, and desirably so.

Manuel Barkan (1966) asks «[d]o we have the stamina, to do the job? And finally, do we have the imagination to break out of our own orthodoxies?» (p. 255). What I propose is that we stay *with* orthodoxies: to sustain the inquiry on what informs the tools one makes use of, that is, what shapes what one *says*. What, then, can I not say? And how to say it? This is not to say it does not require stamina: work is always to be made.

In this light, along with this ground, I proceed this study by addressing Jean Jacques Rousseau's *Emile* (1762/1979). The task for part II is to see what such tradition means for Rousseau's pedagogy, focussing on his writings and how he relies on an interplay between obscurity and clarity to control Emile. That is, how Rousseau installs an orthodoxy so as to teach. This to stay with Rousseau's textual pedagogical gesturing so as to make sense of what it means for art education theory.

Not foreclosing imagination is the task for part II.

II · structure, and structuring

I undertook this translation with a selfish motive. I thought it the best way to familiarize myself with a book which was very alien to me but which seemed to contain hidden treasures. (Bloom, in Rousseau, 1762/1979, p. ix)

Clothe reason in a body if you want to make youth able to grasp it. (Rousseau, 1762/1979, p. 323)

These snippets are from Jean-Jacques Rousseau's *Emile*, in its rendering by Allan Bloom (1762/1979). Why I regard and immediately display such snippets as awfully apposite to the concerns of this study, is related to their articulating of a quite essential dimension to a pedagogical gesture, and the pedagogical relation such a gesture entails. Both snippets foreground methods to acquire knowledge, while establishing roles — places —; evinced, in both, is the existence of something which can, and might, be eventually known; which is to say *grasped*, *comprehended*. Such challenge — learning — is methodically answered. Learning occurs when what is unknown is comprehended as known, and teaching *is* as it *reveals* such comprehending. In the first snippet, the alien text teaches by revealing its concealed treasures, while the learner seeks for them; in the second snippet, the instructor obscures reason with a disguise so as to be comprehended by the learner.

Of concern to a pedagogical relation, the interplay between teaching and learning indicated by these snippets keeps such activities as separate and dichotomous entities. Hence, the relation between the teacher and the learner does not escape power, that is, neither evade their predefined potential — they rather stick to them. Both snippets entail the allocation of power to the teaching entity — the alien text, or reason. Therefrom, the pedagogical relation is immediately premised on that latent order: that which comprehends knowledge reveals it to that which, lacking it, pursuits it. They both depend on each other's fulfilling of roles to be sustained. By a contract establishing the teaching entity holds and reveals the hitherto unknown, the not comprehensible is always deemed as desirable due to its revelatory potential. In other words, educational life is defined by acquiring what, assumedly, lies beyond the opaque. Opacity is desirable as a threshold to be crossed — both as an educational goal, and the educational condition. That is, education operates on overcoming the loss of intelligibility. A state of confusion is thus dealt away with. Opacity is thus regarded as a problem to be tackled through its *solving*, thus binding the figures of teaching and learning to a pedagogical relation focussed on comprehending the unknown — this detaches unknown from unknowability, and also predetermines grounds for relation. Again, while the first snippet imagines an unknown to be uncovered, and therefore presupposes it and its seizing, the second covers the unknown so as to be seized later. I am thus suggesting the gestures depicted by each snippet are less dichotomous than they are entwined. The unknown as *is*, that is, an

unknowable unknown, remains unaddressed: it is always a momentary stage that precedes something known; opacity is explained away, or, rather, overcome. This is to say opacity is accepted, and also convenient, as obscurity.

I do not want to deal away with this conflating of obscurity and opacity. Rather, I wish to see how can their distinction aid in *making* sense of art education theory in relation to textual pedagogical gestures which are concerned with the assumedly concealed. In this regard, this part aims to argue there is a tool that structures reasoning, which is echoed in texts by Gert Biesta, jan jagodzinski, Dennis Atkinson. This is not to set this study *apart* from such references: this clarifying is to be used along this study, thereby also structuring this study.

This part conducts a reading of Jean-Jacques Rousseau's *Emile* (1762/1979), foregrounding it as a book impressively enacting the pedagogy it claims. That is, *what* the book instructs and *how* the book instructs are not regarded separately, rather, overlapping. I make clear Rousseau's text evinces a pedagogy relying on an ambiguous interplay of *opacity* and *clarity* to *show by revelation*; ultimately, being a form of control.

I conclude by weaving such interdependence with more Contemporary educational concerns, also by recollecting them. With this part, I wish to bring attentiveness to *how* texts teach and what it may entail, educationally. In this case, how Rousseau's textual pedagogical gesturing affirms a divide between teaching and learning, therein placing importance on such activities by separating them but *never detaching them*. This is to say a chaining is desirable. I title Rousseau's gesture of showing from revelation as an *obscure textual pedagogical gesture*. Briefly put, Rousseau makes use of obscurity and relies on it: not only *for* Emile, but *for* the reader.

> Far from putting himself between the events and his readers, he hides himself. *The reader no longer believes he reads; he believes he sees*. (Rousseau, 1762/1979, p. 239, emphasis added)

Rousseau's (1762/1979) book is a relevant constituent of educational History. Not only is *Emile* (Rousseau, 1762/1979) part of the grids of History, but plays a pivotal role in them, as «[t]he beginning of modern education — if we follow the dominant historiographies and philosophies of education — can be precisely dated [to] the year of publication of Rousseau's *Emile*» (Tröhler, 2011, p. 61). Daniel Tröhler's account in *Languages of Education. Protestant Legacies, National Identities, and Global Aspirations* (2011) is rather precise: as he puts it, «[t]here is an *old and a new*, and *the line of demarcation*» is *Emile* (Tröhler, 2011, p. 62, emphasis added). This is *not* to say *Emile* is that which demarcates by itself; rather, such line is traced, such demarcation is attributed, which underlies its traversing recognition. «Rousseau's exceptional position in the development of education was *constructed* in the *first* comprehensive history of education ever published» (Tröhler, 2011, p. 62). *Emile*'s presence is a *making*.

Tröhler (2011) foregrounds a profoundly important aspect to *how it is made* a pivot: its reduction. Such reduction — that is, such making of a comprehensible package — is performed not only by limiting Rousseau's output, but also by systematising it (Tröhler, 2011). The reduction is therefore not only the trimming of Rousseau's offerings[97], but their very streamlining: shaped neatly to serve an educational whole. *Emile* (Rousseau, 1762/1979) is therefore *made* comprehensible, «mirror[ing] the specific interests of the educational field in educational questions», telling «a lot about what these interests are and thus how the educational field is *pre-structured in a normative way*» (Tröhler, 2011, p. 66, emphasis added). That is, it can be said such interest in questions is bound to the accomplishing of answers.

The reduction of *Emile* (Rousseau, 1762/1979) is not simply invented from nothing; Rousseau's language is not inconsequential: it *speaks*. On the one hand, to the dissatisfaction arising from the pressures of an «emerging capitalist society» (Tröhler, 2011, p. 66). On the other, *Emile*'s (Rousseau, 1762/1979) «rhetoric operates within the Biblical myth» (Szkudlarek, 2017, p. 21), and such «religious connotation is by no means specific to Rousseau's pedagogy: it was fundamental for the emergence of the lay discourse of education in modern Europe» (Szkudlarek, 2017, p. 22). What I wish to immediately weight in these accounts[98] is twofold. Firstly, *Emile*'s doubled insertion into an educational History: on the one hand, because it is *made* apropos; on the other, because it *responds* appropriately. Therefore a tradition is installed and it installs; a structure is fixed and it fixes; question and answer meet. Secondly, how the book's (Rousseau, 1762/1979) success evinces the field's constitution as prescriptive (Tröhler, 2011). I am referring to how «the interest is *in the method* and not in the result that Rousseau had *promised* at the end of the book» (Tröhler, 2011, p. 66, emphasis added). This formulation could sum up *Emile* (Rousseau, 1762/1979): a text delivering a message by revelation. So, not only the to-be-known is momentarily obscured for Emile; it is so for the reader as well. *How to reveal in a certain time* — this is a question that presupposes the answer is already chosen. It is about how to lead to it effectively: *means* do not serve a question, but an answer — means for ends.

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[97] Strategies include cutting *Emile* (Rousseau, 1762/1979) to its first three books, «a contraction [that] holds true especially for the English editions» (Tröhler, 2011, p. 66), which may have also motivated Allan Bloom (Rousseau, 1762/1979) to turn to such 'alien' text, as, for him, «the only available translation is inadequate in all important respects» (Bloom, in Rousseau, 1762/1979, p. vii).

[98] See: Tröhler, D. (2011). Rousseau's Classical Republicanism. In *Languages of Education. Protestant Legacies, National Identities, and Global Aspirations*. (Chap. 4, pp. 61–79). Routledge; and Szkudlarek, T. (2017). Education, society, and the nation. "I have decided to be what you made me". Rousseau. In *On the Politics of Educational Theory*. (Chap. 2, pp. 19–41). Routledge.

So, an already known message is to be convincingly conveyed: the interest is thus in the *method*, the adequate tone to make proposals; education's purposes are already defined.

an obscure presence

As for the snippet heading this chapter, I choose it as it helps me to bring forward two aspects of Rousseau's education in *Emile* (1762/1979) I wish to address for this study. Such snippet collects the drive for the instructor's ambiguous interplay of opacity and clarity. Here, the precision provided by the distinction between opacity and obscurity (Glissant, 1990) aids in addressing this rather complex alternation, in its very complexity. What I mean by ambiguous, is that Rousseau's alternating of opacity and clarity defines what and how Emile perceives. In contrast, the alternating of obscurity and clarity is the very operativeness Rousseau makes use of. That is, whereas Emile *believes* what he sees, dismissing what Rousseau hides from him — it remains opaque, unless a revelation *takes place* —, Rousseau thoroughly controls such reality *and* the book — text. That is, Rousseau masters the articulation between obscurity and clarity, controlling opacity, that is, keeping it *out of the way*. In this respect, he makes *believe* and *accept* the opaque is obscure — he deals away with the opacity of the world by limiting the world to *meaning*. This *is* impressive: he lures the reader, he lures Emile, by writing obscurity with the absolute control of the very opacity of his text.

This is in line with Rousseau's interest in History, again, «the erudition and the heritage of commentary of bygone generations – in a word, what is *written*» (Mehtonen, 2003, p. 149). The snippet inaugurating this chapter is taken from *Emile*'s (1762/1979) Book IV, where Rousseau delves into History and its utility for Emile (Rousseau, 1762/1979; Tröhler, 2011) as it is by «means of [H]istory that, without the lessons of philosophy, [Emile] will *read* the hearts of men» (Rousseau, 1762/1979, p. 237). Through History, Emile finds the study for his relationships, which is the «study suitable for man [...]. This is the job of his whole life, beginning from the point we have now reached» (Rousseau, 1762/1979, p. 214). Specifically, in this snippet, Rousseau refers to Thucydides, «to [his] taste the true model of historians», as he «reports the facts without judging them, but he omits none of the circumstances proper to make us

judge them ourselves» (p. 239). Rousseau claims «[h]e puts all he recounts before the reader's eyes» (p. 239). Rousseau, the instructor, thus praises Thucydides and his work, clearly stating why such approach to History is ideal, and, I claim, more so in light of Rousseau's *obscure* textual pedagogical gesture. Rousseau mirrors this obscuring of himself throughout the entire book, despite the change in methods from the first three books to the latter two. Contrastingly to the methods, the methodological goal does not change: things are to be dominated secretly — the student and that which revolves around him —, so as to provide the deliverance of a message, already known to the instructor, through sudden revelation. To briefly provide a couple of examples: in Book II, the instructor clearly states his strategy and its aim, advising to «arrange things so carefully that the suggestion [whether Emile is lying or telling the truth] always comes from [Emile], never from [him];» (p. 102); the same attitude can be witnessed in Book IV, as «[b]y dint of *spying* [the movements of his soul] out, one gets to be able *to foresee them and finally to direct them*» (p. 226, emphasis added).

So, even though «the first three books of *Emile* [depict] a theater production with paid actors behaving exactly the way the governor wants them to, just to prevent himself from interfering with Emile's will» (Tröhler, 2011, p. 76), such *not*-stepping aside of the instructor continues throughout Books IV and V. Emile, the instructor's property[99], is deceived by the instructor's obscure presence so as to *believe* what is before him — provided what is before him is carefully staged by the instructor himself: the instructor's truth is Emile's world.

The obscurity I am discussing is also noted by Tervo (2020), as «Rousseau's skilful craft of evoking a will to learn by annihilating all external traits of education involved a *fair amount of work done in secrecy*» (p. 152, emphasis added). As highlighted, «the true task of education was to appear as something else than education; namely as life lived according to Nature» (Tervo, 2020, p. 152). Nature, as staged by the instructor, is the book Emile has to read, and the instructor is to obscure himself in such reading, pointing Emile's gaze towards what he *should* read, never interfering — that is, not showing interference. The instructor is to be an obscure intermediator, just like how Rousseau understands Thucydides' contribution. «No book other than the world, no instruction other than the facts» (Rousseau, 1762/1979, p. 168).

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[99] Something also stressed by referring to Emile as *his* on numerous occasions (Rousseau, 1762/1979) — «my Emile» (e.g., p. 241) or «my pupil» (e.g., p. 78).

mastering obscurity

I am neither conflating nor detaching the instructor's obscurity with his staged nature's clarity; rather, I am arguing their interplay is core to Rousseau's (1762/1979) pedagogy — which he writes. That is, the instructor also appears *clearly* at very particular moments, and the staged nature is clear insofar as it is contrasted by its opaque framing. More specifically: even though the instructor's own obscuring implies disappearance, what results from such disappearance is not a stepping aside Emile, that is, it is never an absent instruction. Rather, the guidance of Emile's very steps over a carefully designed path. An *overwhelmingly subtle* instruction that covers all which is to be hidden and, from that which is hidden, selects that which is to be uncovered. Rousseau (1762/1979) may believe the accounts of Thucydides by assuming the latter simply delivers facts as they are; but what matters is Rousseau considers it *can be made* so. And so he *makes* it — he reproduces the myth.

That is, while it is not evident by Rousseau's writings in *Emile* (1762/1979) he, in fact, *believes* Thucydides' very accounts, he stands by the effectiveness of the historian's delivering: he makes use of such making of belief to instruct Emile. A tone in perfect pitch, «less agreeable to philosophical haughtiness» (Rousseau, 1762/1979, p. 33), ideal for *making* proposals. Comprehension is to be delivered *as it is*, contoured by an opaque frame to the pupil, a frame crossed by the instructor when he wants to; a frame that changes accordingly to the instructor's control — the opaque is conflated with the obscure. That is the text Emile reads: the text Rousseau shows him, never letting go of such text, never letting go of Emile, who is unaware of the instructor's grip. The interplay between the opaque and the clear is used by Rousseau as a surface; such surface hides what is to be uncovered, and what is not to be uncovered. In this regard, the «figure of *the invisibility of the educating agent* as one of the premises on which the modern idea of education was built» (Szkudlarek, 2017, p, 22) cannot be detached from the manipulation, and mastering, of obscurity: «[l]et him not learn science but discover it» (Rousseau, 1762/1979, p. 168).

This strategic usage of obscurity is in line with the second snippet from this part's opening page[100], also by the same author and text. Again, not only Emile's instructor is familiarised with what is unknown to his pupil, but he is also in control of

[100] Recollecting: «[c]lothe reason in a body if you want to make youth able to grasp it» (Rousseau, 1762/1979, p. 323).

the circumstances that surround the path to its grasping. The instructor's gesture renders obscure — illegible — what is not to be *yet* revealed to — read by — the pupil, but provides small beams of clarity so as to lead him into it, that is, to the clear revelation of an hitherto unknown, already known to the instructor. That which is not deemed important by the instructor, that is, that which does not fit his vision for Emile, remains *meaningless*, therefore dismissible, for Emile.

> I shall choose the time, the place, [...] Then I shall speak to him, and he will listen to me. I shall be tender, and he will be moved. [...] Then, in revealing to him all I have done for him, I shall reveal that I have done it for myself, and he will see in my tender affection the reason for all my care. What surprise, what agitation I am going to cause in him by suddenly changing language! [...] It is in this way that you get a young man to listen to you and that you engrave the memory of what you say to him in the depths of his heart. (Rousseau, 1762/1979, p. 323)

The preceding passage shows the very effect Rousseau intends with his interruptive pedagogy by means of the interplay of obscurity and clarity: to *write* Emile's memory by an abrupt change in language. So, Emile is made suitable to learning: learning what the instructor intends, reading the world the instructor shows him. Thereby, the instructor is rendered successful in his mission and in securing his place, whilst exclusively guaranteeing Emile's place as a learner. That is, here, one who overcomes a stage of confusion onto another of predetermined intelligibility. The instructor thus secures: who teaches and who learns are identities fixed by a pedagogical gesture that points to an end through a passing opacity. There is an end and such end is one of clarity; Rousseau, again, both hides what is to be uncovered and what is not to be uncovered. Thus is promoted a pedagogical relation bound by a selected end to come by revelation, even if such end is momentarily obscured, by design. What follows is the fixing of learning to an overcoming of a stage of confusion; the instructor conceals and reveals *when* he decides to, as also stressed by the usage of *then* in the very snippet above. It is also worth noting that such grip of Emile's instructor is neither limited to the circumstances which are set *towards* learning, nor to that which is to be revealed. «Begin, then, by studying your pupils better. For most assuredly you do not know them at all» (Rousseau, 1762/1979, p. 34), the instructor recommends, as those unknown must likewise be *made* known, from the start. They *must* be comprehended.

obscuring deviation

In Rousseau's (1762/1979) *Emile*, the making of theory is sustained by a textual and pedagogical gesture that relies on obscurity — intentionally so —, an obscurity temporally overseen by the instructor. As far as a pedagogical relation is concerned, the snippets at hand imagine and, indeed, figure it *through* obscurity. Nevertheless, neither entail remaining in the dark absolutely, they use the unknown as a gateway for knowledge — both by revealing what should be revealed: opening the gate ever so slightly, and rendering opaque what should not be revealed: also keeping the gate closed, even dissimulated, for Emile. Again, in more detail: the snippets at hand imagine and figure the pedagogical relation through *a specific and delineated momentary obscurity* previously arranged by the instructor so as to be punctually overcome by Emile, always under the instructor's control. The pedagogical relation depicted shares this very goal. It is predicated on a functioning that depends on the existence of a teaching entity as deliverer of a message, and a learner as receiver of such message — the *same* message. In this regard, such gesture is premised on absolute unity. This is to say that, notwithstanding an obscure cloaking of knowledge, the inventiveness of the textual pedagogical gesture *imagines* clarity, and a specific one too. It aims the comprehension of that which it studies; it aims learning through the making of something comprehensible. Learners remain outside the message, the latter obscured by a teaching entity which will reveal it, in time. This is because, for Rousseau (1762/1979) in *Emile*, the teaching entity is a fusion between what Emile learns, who teaches Emile and what teaches Emile. The how-ness of education is therefore predicated on learning and teaching, neither of which overlap, and all remains within the instructor's domain — the writer intends to be read.

So, again, a methodology to acquire knowledge is foregrounded, while establishing roles, evincing something to be eventually known — *comprehended*, *grasped, seized*. The challenge — learning — is methodically answered. Methodologically speaking, this means there is no engaging with a methodological question; instead, there is an arrangement of a methodological answer, pointing, staging and caring for *certain* paths to learn from. Paths which are made clear by a contrast to an opaque framing. Theoretically, this means the making of theory establishes a hierarchy between a *what-ness* and a *how-ness*. That is, it chooses from the start *where* paths lead

to: what is to be worked on is the *absolute best* method to achieve it — even if extended in time. It moves in vectorial fashion, in line with a Continental «demanding of [...] transparency» (Glissant, 1990, p. 204, translated here), that pursues the deployment of intelligibility (Jullien, 2012/2015).

The language of Rousseau in *Emile* (1762/1979), exemplified in the snippets brought fore, displays this same kind of arrangement, that is, it structures relation accordingly. In other words, the ways in which education is discussed, thought and written — its language (Tröhler, 2011) —, are ways that *lead* towards, convergingly so, shirking uncertain paths[101] in the *crusade* for what lies beneath the loss of intelligibility. The unknown is read as the not-known-*yet*, thus never unknowable. Why such message is secondary in relation to the method to achieve it might as well be a consequence of an underlying belief in the not-yet-known message being *one* and thus, in time, *revealable*. No point, therefore, in alternative paths to it — rather, the most proper and effective, even if elongated in time[102].

a momentary obscurity

Rousseau's (1762/1979) pedagogy in *Emile* is secured by the circumstances which are controlled so as to abide by an, or *his*, educational whole[103]. In this regard, again, there is no engagement with a methodological question, but with *the* methodological answer: how to control so as to secure. In other words, Rousseau (1762/1979) *knows* the end he wants to serve, even if he may reflect on how to do so. The interest thus lies, indeed, in the method to be applied. «Begin, then, by studying your pupils better» (p. 34), writes the author: it is about studying something — here, someone — and to adjust *it*, and to adjust *the ways in which to adjust it*, to a whole, an end to be revealed. Rousseau's educational life brought forward in *Emile* is predicated on a gesture of design that is made clear «when one has read [*Emile*'s] writing» (1762/1979, p. 41). Just as the *Redeemer* eventually reveals, even if moving in mysterious ways, what is hitherto hidden; «[w]hat I do you do not yet understand it; you will understand it later. (John,

[101] I am writing with Édouard Glissant's (1990) text: «[t]heoretician thought, which concerns the fundamental and the foundational, showing them as truth, shirks [*se dérobe*] these uncertain paths» (Glissant, 1990, p. 44, translated here).

[102] Rousseau's (1762/1979) instructing of Emile goes from the pupil's *childhood*, up to his *manhood*, told across a rather long book.

[103] Which is not detached from his political whole (see Kontio, 2015; Tröhler, 2011).

13:7, translated here). Obscurity is momentary by design, and that defines how Rousseau makes theory, and it defines how he teaches, and how others learn.

As such, Rousseau's work is impressively coherent, despite its «paradoxes» (Bloom, in Rousseau, 1762/1979, p. 3). What I mean by coherent is its constitution as a *unified whole* throughout different approximations: form, content *and* message converge. It is enlightened not only because of what it *says* — or *what* it *teaches* —, but also, and more importantly for the present study, of *how* it says it — *how* it *teaches*. This means the text's performative dimension[104] is also relevant, which is quite an appealing detail as the instructor claims he «hate[s] books» (Rousseau, 1762/1979, p. 184). Here, there is a hinting of a separation between the writer and the figure, Rousseau and the instructor.

So, we have *Emile* (Rousseau, 1762/1979), a non-laconic educational book narrated by someone who hates books; «sad furnishings», as he sees it (Rousseau, 1762/1979, p. 159). This apparent contradiction is intriguing because even if hating books, he engages with books and literature ever so intensely. And here, by *he*, I mean both: Rousseau and the instructor overlap; thus the above separation is made ambiguous again. Rather than rejecting books altogether, Rousseau not only writes an educational book — *the world for Emile*, that is, that which the learner must comprehend —, the instructor defines a rather special place for a particular book in Emile's education, and within *Emile*, the *book*, as well: Daniel Defoe's *Robinson Crusoe*[105] (1719/2007).

a containing obscurity

> I hate books. They only teach one to talk about what one does not know. It is said that Hermes engraved the elements of the sciences on columns in order to shelter his discoveries from a flood. If he had left a good imprint of them in man's head, they would have been preserved by tradition. Well-prepared minds are the surest monuments on which to engrave human knowledge. (Rousseau, 1762/1979, p. 184)

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[104] I am writing with Tomasz Szkudlarek's (2019) text. The expression *performative dimension* comes from Szkudlarek's interest in the usage of the word *should* in *Emile* (1762/1979), pointing at the «ontological meaning of postulational rhetoric, and the effects it brings to education and society» (2019, p. 428). This is yet another evidence on the relevance of a text's *how-ness*, that is, how the way in which it is written cannot be detached by the ways in which it can be read.

[105] Original title: *The Life and Strange Surprizing Adventures of Robinson Crusoe, of York, Mariner: Who lived Eight and Twenty Years, all alone in an un-inhabited Island on the Coast of America, near the Mouth of the Great River of Oroonoque; Having been cast on Shore by Shipwreck, wherein all the Men perished but himself. With An Account how he was at last as strangely deliver'd by Pyrates. Written by Himself.*

Positioned between *Emile*'s (Rousseau, 1762/1979) two methods, that is, by the end of Book III and before Book IV, immediately preceding the advent of Emile's *manhood*, the introduction of *Robinson Crusoe* (Defoe, 1719/2007) into Emile's education, or instruction, comes *in time*, that is, in the time Rousseau elects. The instructor gifts such book to Emile when he deems Emile is ready to read it, that is, in a point where his imagination[106] is shaped so as to properly receive it[107]. Rousseau (1762/1979) makes *Robinson Crusoe* (Defoe, 1719/2007) the point of transition between the two methods of teaching: at the very moment Emile's mind is *well-prepared*, following the education provided in and by *Emile*'s (Rousseau, 1762/1979) first three books, and ready to have *knowledge engraved in it*, the knowledge to be received in and by *Emile*'s final two books. Rousseau «starts with the independent natural man and then turns somehow to the education of the citizen by teaching him history and political principles» (Tröhler, 2011, p. 74). The *independent natural man* is the man whose imagination has been contained from what is alien and unimportant — according to the instructor's scale —, an imagination now ready: shaped, moulded, *made for* the teachings of Robinson Crusoe's life. Allan Bloom, the translator for the rendering of *Emile* (Rousseau, 1762/1979) I am using in this study, articulates it quite clearly: not only a «harmless amusement for Emile», Defoe's work is meant to «provide [Emile] with a vision of the *whole* and a *standard* for the judgement of both things and men» (Bloom, in Rousseau, 1762/1979, p. 7, emphasis added). *Robinson Crusoe* is Emile's manual, a «kind of Bible of the new science of nature and *reveals* man's *true* condition» (Bloom, in Rousseau, 1762/1979, p. 7, emphasis added), a «fable of development that could *teach to perfection* the place of humanity in nature» (Keymer, in Defoe, 1719/2007, p. viii, emphasis added). In light of a «demythologized world» (Bloom, in Rousseau, 1762/1979, p. 21), Rousseau sees a call for myths. Myths can have a tone for proposals.

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[106] The research project CREAT_ED (Martins, 2023a, 2023b) takes Rousseau's *Émile* (1762/1979) as its starting point, especially to what concerns the narrowing and control of Emile's imagination. Such project «started from the work [developed] as a critique of how creativity is instrumentalized within the current Portuguese educational field, mirroring international directives» (Martins, 2023a, p. 11). CREAT_ED (Martins, 2023b) «aimed to understand, historically, how the idea of the child as a creative being became a problem in education and arts education» (Martins, 2023a, p. 11).

[107] See also *Emile*'s introduction (Bloom, in Rousseau, 1762/1979, pp. 7–8).

> Yet Rousseau also dismissed as redundant almost a quarter of the text (the episodes before and after the island story), and the novel has owed its success ever since to the power of its castaway myth. It was above all as a celebration of pioneer self-sufficiency that *Robinson Crusoe* ran into more than a hundred American editions between 1774 and 1830, and reprints gathered pace in Britain and Europe over the same period. (Keymer, in Defoe, 1719/2007, p. viii)

Indeed, just as Rousseau's (1762/1979) *Emile* is *made* a referential point in educational History, Rousseau himself also systematises *Robinson Crusoe* (Defoe, 1719/2007) contributing to its dissemination and also to the ways in which such dissemination is received. *Robinson Crusoe* (Defoe, 1719/2007), «*disencumbered of all its rigmarole* [is] both Emile's entertainment and instruction throughout the period» at hand (Rousseau, 1762/1979, pp. 184–185, emphasis added). This is *how* Rousseau *makes Robinson Crusoe*. Given the proper preparation provided by the instructor in *Emile*'s Books I, II and III (Rousseau, 1762/1979, pp. 37–208), fine-tuning Emile and his imagination, *Robinson Crusoe* «teaches [Emile] the utility of the sciences and makes him inwardly free in spite of society's constraints» (Bloom, in Rousseau, 1762/1979, p. 8). Emile, contrary to other «young people [who] read history», being «transformed, so to speak, into all the persons they see», never «prefers to be someone other than himself» (p. 243). *This* is the danger of books: they instigate madness, as «[h]e who begins to become alien to himself does not take long to forget himself entirely» (p. 243), and a mind, unlike Emile's *well-prepared* one, «which *makes up imaginary relations* that have neither reality nor appearance is mad» (p. 203, emphasis added). Whatever evades comprehension is to be scrapped, «[n]o descriptions, no eloquence, no figures, *no poetry.* [...] The time for adopting another kind of language will come only too soon» (p. 169, emphasis added), a time when Emile's mind is ready to read the lessons of History, a time when Emile can use Robinson Crusoe's life as mirror, a time when Emile's imagination is restricted and framed by the obscure instructor. A time of simply learning, that is, of acquiring the knowledge set up by the instructor, in the conditions set up by the instructor. Unlike «children [who] read» and from there «get knowledge» (p. 218), Emile does not risk having his imagination «catch[ing] fire» (p. 218). The Other of thought (Glissant, 1990) is eclipsed.

> As Ilse Vickers puts it, *Robinson Crusoe* expresses 'the characteristic Baconian belief in man's duty to study, alter and improve nature to his various uses'; its focus on Crusoe's discoveries and applications makes the novel 'an allegory of the *advancement of learning: a model* of initiative and invention'. (Keymer, in Defoe, 1719/2007, p. xx, emphasis added)

For Rousseau (1762/1979), the teachings of Robinson Crusoe's life do not pose a threat to Emile; they do not expand his imagination. They keep imagination within the instructor's dominance, that is — *his* —, «real world», perfectly limited, unlike the «imaginary world [which] is infinite» (Rousseau, 1762/1979, p. 81). This so-called *real* world, of «spare style and vivid specifications» (Keymer, in Defoe, 1719/2007, p. viii), is the world made by Rousseau: a world that *contains* Crusoe's island and *where* no other relations can be imagined, other than those which are already set up. An island within an island — a continent[108].

As the facts provided by Thucydides, unmediated, in Rousseau's reading, the life of Robinson Crusoe is exposed to Emile, who rather than believing he is reading, *believes he sees*. That is, the «natural life lived according to Nature (Tervo, 2020, p. 152)» which Emile is taught during the first three books, is reproduced in *Robinson Crusoe* (Defoe, 1719/2007). With such book, Rousseau wants Emile to «think he is Robinson himself, [...] to note Robinson's failings attentively; and to profit from them so as not to fall into them himself in such a situation» (Rousseau, 1762/1979, p. 185). *Robinson Crusoe* (Defoe, 1719/2007) is *made* an instruction manual, and Emile is to *learn from* Robinson Crusoe.

Rousseau (1762/1979), the instructor, neither deals away with imagination nor with books: he defines a specific place and orientation for them; he sets up an obscure cloaking around them, and stays in the very threshold between obscurity and clarity, controlling opacity. Initially restricted and directed, once properly carved, knowledge can be *engraved* so as to make Emile learn what he is supposed to: the lessons of History, where, again, he finds the study for his relationships, the «[t]he job of his whole life, beginning from the point [...] reached» (Rousseau, 1762/1979, p. 214).

What follows this shaping and delimitation of imagination — which is to say what is, for Emile, the world —, is Emile «[estimating] what is foreign to him *only in*

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[108] Recollecting: *Continental*, especially when juxtaposed with Glissant's archipelagic thought (Glissant, 2009), alludes to a way of thought that works within its own fixed and enclosed domain.

relation to himself», an «exact and sure» estimation (Rousseau, 1762/1979, p. 207, emphasis added). Showing «men by means of their differences» (Rousseau, 1762/1979, p. 235) to Emile is thus for him to reduce others to *his own* comprehension. *Readings* that may shake this disposition to perceive relationships in these terms, that is, relation defined by comparison to a predetermined setting — Emile himself, predetermined — are thus not desirable. There is no *making* with invention, only with deployment; in other words, relation is not *imagined* otherwise, rather, merely reproduced along an existing grid. In terms of a pedagogical relation, this means it is premised on, and fixed to, a latent order: what seizes knowledge reveals it to that which, lacking it, pursuits it. Theory is *made* so as to be deployed. So as to be imposed. So as to dictate. But, with Rousseau's *tone*, seductively so: a convincing fable that writes History — a myth.

making obscurity, making obscure

Rousseau, in this regard, is well aware of a relation between reading and writing; that is, despite the *truth* in and of the world, one has to be prepared for it so as to comprehend it; one learns to read, so as to *recognise* and *identify*. In other words, *how* a teaching entity teaches is a fundamental aspect for Rousseau's pedagogical concerns — reading is an activity aiming the clear receiving of a message, it is never something that aims imagining aside from such *end*. Reading is to be instructive, and *Emile* (1762/1979) not only is a report on Rousseau's pedagogy: it enacts it, it *makes* itself. It teaches. *Emile* (1762/1979) is convincing, believable, also because of the textual pedagogical gesturing it makes use of. By momentarily obscuring a message, whilst always controlling its content and revelation, Rousseau defers learning to whenever he deems it apposite; he grasps it and delivers it: in the end, if one is to stick to the path he chooses. Theory for Rousseau must be *proper*: it is concerned with its deployment in the correct way — the usage of it is limited to its predetermined function. *Emile* enacts the instructor's obscure textual pedagogical gesture.

The text *teaches*: to be read, to be learnt from. That is Rousseau's own call for writing — never an invitation to write *with*, but an instruction to read, or write *from*. It theorises accordingly: the *making* of theory relies on the mastering of obscurity, a mastering Rousseau shares by *Emile*'s (1762/1979) «collection of reflections and

observations [to which] public attention» (Rousseau, 1762/1979, p. 33) *must* be turned. «[He does] not see as do other men» (Rousseau, 1762/1979, p. 34).

What Emile thus learns is to learn *from*. He «has a mind that is universal not by its learning but by its faculty to *acquire learning*; a mind that is open, intelligent, ready for everything» — that is, a limited *everything* —; «if not instructed, at least able to be instructed» (Rousseau, 1762/1979, p. 207, emphasis added). Emile *learns to learn from* Rousseau, and the so-called masters[109] who read *Emile* learn to teach from Rousseau: all methodically so, all along from Rousseau's instructions. These are the teachings of Rousseau: to be a *specific* teacher and to be a *specific* learner, and to secure each one's positions by one another. Rousseau's educational language is never a language at stake: it is a prescriptive language concerned with the reading and the writing of a message seized and chosen by the teacher. It is absolute and it is not interested in making otherwise.

> I understood him in many Things, and let him know, I was very well pleas'd with him; in a little Time I began to speak to him, and teach him to speak to me; and first, I made him know his Name should be *Friday*, which was the Day I sav'd his Life; I call'd him so for the Memory of the Time; I likewise taught him to say *Master*, and then let him know, that was to be my Name; I likewise taught him to say, YES, and NO, and to know the Meaning of them; (Defoe, 1719/2007, p. 174)

In terms of this study's guiding question — *what does it mean to make theory in education?*[110] —, with Rousseau's writings, it means to make Emile read the absolute reality of the world, the instructor's own world. A world which reveals *when* and *where* he intends to. The end is *made* so as to, then, *show* it. The time of clarity is controlled; yet, at the same time, the *opacity* of his text is clear throughout. What is to be learnt, is what is read from such revelation, which remains latent *with* opacity, which is replaced when deemed opportune. Illocution serves Rousseau as the conveying of meaning so as to instruct. He passes on, or pushes on, what he comprehends, and what he comprehends must be comprehended. For Rousseau, sharing clarity when making theory is crucial to *execute* his intentions. It is a necessary requirement to control, govern, instruct. The instructor crystallises the pedagogical relation by making use of

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[109] See Tröhler, 2011, pp. 61–79.

[110] As noted, this study's guiding question refers to art education, specifically — *what does it mean to make theory in art education?* —, but at this point I ask it in light of a broader educational scope.

obscurity — obscurity is a veneer between him and his *Emiles*, and it is what he uses to contour Emile's imagination, while dictating when and where can Emile see clearly. The *endgame* of such textual pedagogical gesture is that of delivering what is intended, and that of receiving what is intended. Absolute clarity is superior: it comes from above; it reveals meaning as it names.

language of ends; recollected

Recollecting: this reduction of learning to an efficient process of engraving knowledge into a well-prepared surface that Rousseau champions, simultaneously reduces teaching to that which instructs in such a manner. This echoes the concern on a language of education being limited to that of learning (Biesta, 2005).

For Rousseau, showing clarity is part of his educational language, a language that is informed by and informs the pedagogical relation where teaching and learning are rooted in specific figures. To put such language at stake, which he refuses to do by securing its predetermination by use of an obscure textual pedagogical gesture, is to put the pedagogical relation at stake as well. In this regard, the way in which education is articulated, how its language is, conditions what can be said and what cannot be said (Custers & Magalhães, 2023), making education a political domain rather than an essential one. This entails Rousseau's reduction of education to an interplay between fixed positions of teaching and learning, binds a political ground to an essential one and is reliant on such functioning. As the *shaper of ideas* (Tröhler, 2011), this means language is operative: it cannot be reduced to a result nor to a process. To address language is to address the entanglement of what it conveys and how it conveys. In this regard, the educational teachings of Rousseau, the instructor, and his position in educational History suggest the *the natural language* used is also to be considered — not as detachable but in relation to the content and form of his writings.

While an analysis of Rousseau's (1762/1979) French in *Emile* and its translations is beyond this study, such particularity[111] is yet another reason for stressing language's very contingency, and thus of working *with* language by *staying with issues of language*, that is, not shirking from addressing it opaquely.

For Rousseau, «[e]ducation is *always* directed to a political *whole*» (Tröhler, 2011, p. 74, emphasis added), and «this is *[his] point*» (p. 73, emphasis added). Rousseau does not conceive of an education where relation exists in other ways than through the «original dispositions» (Rousseau, 1762/1979, p. 39) of nature, and thus these original premises must be respected. That is, the educational *end* is *properly defined* and the methods to achieve it accordingly so. Rousseau narrows education to the making of

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[111] There are arguments sustaining an intimacy between a trait crucial to Rousseau's (1762/1979) teachings in *Emile* and the operativeness of traditions that inform its natural language. More specifically, I am alluding to a movement some authors (e.g., Glissant, 1990; Jullien, 2012/2015) deem as intrinsic to the languages of 'Europe' and those which, through their expansion — imperialistically so or not —, were built upon the same axes, «"being," "principle," "causality," "truth," and so on» (Jullien, 2012/2015, p. 10). For example, sinologist François Jullien writes these axes «favored certain possibilities [of thinking] but *left others in the shadows*» (Jullien, 2012/2015, p. 10, emphasis added). Jullien writes: «European thought [is the] *questioning of science and truth*», which has «proven its effectiveness *through the mastery it ensures*» (2012/2015, p. 12, p. 12, emphasis added). It «does not divest itself», as «[u]pon encountering ways of thought from elsewhere [it] *retains its perspective*» (2012/2015, p. 12, emphasis added). Such capture of otherness into one's gaze echoes a way of thought which does not think aside a relation predicated on pre-assumed positions: it compares to itself. Put briefly, what I mean is that the cultural constructions that have erected the educational languages brought fore by Tröhler (2011) cannot be considered apart from their own linguistic «axes» (Jullien, 2012/2015, p. 10). By focussing, however, on Tröhler's (2011) and Jullien's (2012/2015) studies, I also want to bring fore how they articulate a binary way of reasoning as inherent to 'European' language. In other words, how it tends to rely on the interplay of two elements which are seen through their connection rather than their relational imaginaries. This also echoes Classical rhetorics' way of «*describing and proving things by way of their opposites*» (Mehtonen, 2003, pp. 17–18, emphasis added), to methodologically *obtain meaning* (Mehtonen, 2003).

the citizen within a particular context, a republic (Tröhler, 2011). Rousseau, by use of an educational language premised on the separation and fixing of teaching and learning, restricts politics to an essential domain.

Recollecting: in light of Rousseau's (1762/1979) *Emile* inaugurating modern education (Tröhler, 2011), it is important to stress the *educational reflex* (Tröhler, 2011), that is, the depositing of a salvific attribute to education before social concerns[112]. Put briefly, rather than working through the very tension between two elements, a third one is constituted as a fix for such problem (Tröhler, 2011). Education is thus mobilised as a *promise* to *overcome* what seems to be an irresolvable situation. That is, the solution to the tensions between classic republicanism and commerce entailed the training of the «Protestant soul» into being accustomed to the then «modern life» (Tröhler, 2011, p. 61). Moreover, Tröhler notes the phenomenons which cause it are new, but they occur at a specific time, in a specific location (see Tröhler, 2011, p. 21). So, not only the phenomena themselves but the conditions of their encounter are to be considered; reality as depicted by the modality of commerce becomes unfathomable to a classic republican view of society.

The language of the latter, however, *articulates* a problem with and towards the former. Put briefly, it renders a problem *real* and thus the *need* for it to be *solved*. (Tröhler, 2011). The *solution* is thus: one must *make* people in such way the issues of the present are taken care of in the future as conceived of in the present. Supported by a chronological conception of time, this reduces the educational process to an interstitial existence between the perceived dangers that are diagnosed from the past and the present and their future resolutions, from where its function is defined. Indeed: a solution defines the present; a solution *makes* the present by fabling the future.

It is on these terms Tröhler (2011) offers the contextualisation of *Emile*'s (Rousseau, 1762/1979) effectiveness in its pre-eminent role in educational history. In this regard, *Emile* (Rousseau, 1762/1979) operates as a prescription for the ills of a «degenerated» society (Tröhler, 2011, p. 65), constituting «natural education» as useful for its «moral regeneration» (p. 65). But this is what comprises *Emile*'s first three books.

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[112] Recollecting: the *educational reflex* is an epiphenomenon «aris[ing] out of a tension between the rise of a commercial society in the long eighteenth century and the renaissance of the language of classical republicanism as a reaction to the capitalization of society. It is in this tension that the 'educational reflex' was 'born,' a Protestant concept promising to *overcome* these massive cultural tensions between commercialism and classical republicanism» (Tröhler, 2011, p. 21, emphasis added).

Once Emile's moral basis is settled and ready to be taught about others — via History and politics —, that is, to learn from others in relation to himself only, the novel is *made* into a «drama» (Tröhler, 2011, p. 79):

> in Rousseau's *solution* the educational novel as a whole proves to be a drama, as the fate of Emile [...] *shows* [...]. There is no real alternative to Rousseau's radical republicanism and its educational concept of getting acquainted with the virtuous customs; that is, there is only a disastrous one. (Tröhler, 2011, p. 79, emphasis added)

Thus Rousseau builds a world where *to be free* is only possible through social *change* — *defined* by Rousseau, *told* by the instructor — and Emile, alone, can do nothing but to be inwardly free. Furthermore, he ties social change to a specific educational idea. Indeed, inspired by Thucydides' making of History, Rousseau tells a story by staging a scenario to *make see* there is «no real alternative to [his] radical republicanism and its educational concept of getting acquainted with the virtuous customs; [...] only a disastrous one» (Tröhler, 2011, p. 79; see also Kontio, 2015). The world Rousseau builds is never shown as a *making*: it is revealed as truth. So, it renders a problem *real*, as perceived by Emile and the masters who read from *Emile* (1762/1979), and thus the *need* for it to be *solved*. A problem is made into an educational issue by reducing education to instruction, that is, the instruction of a method to achieve a result: the answer required for the question at hand[113]. Emile and *Emile* (1762/1979) tell the same story, they *make the same History*. Like how Rousseau instructs Emile by obscuring what, in his view, is not to be uncovered and what is to be uncovered in due time, he writes in the same way, *revealing in the end his political message*. His obscure textual pedagogical gesture thus reveals the *correct answer*: revealing it within a made context, made believable.

He *isolates*, like Crusoe's island, teaching the reader and Emile what he deems should be learnt — *how* and *what for*. In other words, Rousseau's pedagogy never moves aside its axes of causality and — his — truth. In terms of a pedagogical relation, this means teacher and learner are fixed positions which serve a predetermined end, and depend on each other's interdependence and unchangeable operativeness to exist.

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[113] This interplay between question and answer as closed within the domain they install, is noted by François Jullien (2012/2015) as inherent to how philosophical thought, and thus 'European' culture, have «experienced the perilous fate of turning back on [themselves] and becoming self-reflective» (p. 9).

From the first two snippets heading this part, I recollect the one penned by *Emile*'s translator Allan Bloom: «I undertook this translation with a selfish motive. I thought it the best way to familiarize myself with a book which was very alien to me but which seemed to contain hidden treasures» (Bloom, in Rousseau, 1762/1979, p. ix).

Bloom, in the book's foreword, provides a brief account of his intentions, motivations and methods on the translation, and such practice in general[114]. Bloom, despite the book's alien-like perception to him, is adamant in attesting to *Emile*'s (Rousseau, 1762/1979) gems, consenting to them, notwithstanding their, even if *momentary*, obscurity. As Bloom writes, «[t]he translator of a great work should revere his text and recognize that there is much in it he cannot understand. His translation should try to *make others able to understand* what he cannot understand» (Bloom, in Rousseau, 1762/1979, p. vii, emphasis added).

[114] See Rousseau 1762/1979, pp. vii–ix.

For Bloom (Rousseau, 1762/1979), the path to know the text and, so he assumes, uncover what it obscures is made through the performing of a translation. This path, while not deprived of unforeseen circumstances — often unsurmountable ones[115] — makes a message understandable in the end. In other words, Bloom (Rousseau, 1762/1979) takes up the challenge to relate to such text by learning from it, which means overcoming a state where intelligibility is lost by bringing the text's «hidden treasures» (p. ix) to comprehensive light. The text *teaches*; the reader — who understands — *learns*. I am not claiming, however, Bloom *fails* or he is wrong in addressing *Emile* in such manner. That is, his attempt to familiarise himself with what he does not know is yet another way to tackle a moment of confusion. Rather, my focus is on the *expectations* Bloom writes with regard to the work of translation he agrees to pursue: making that which is alien understandable by others. Again, and to be clear: it is not within this study's scope to consider such expectations in their rightfulness or wrongness, but in what they suggest about *how* Bloom's writing teaches. More specifically, the translation of *Emile* results in, as he puts it, «a new sense of what it means to be a teacher and of the peculiar beauty of the relationship between teacher and student» (Bloom, in Rousseau, 1762/1979, p. ix):

> And *learning from* Rousseau has given me the occasion to *learn from* my students while teaching them. Over the past eight years I have given several classes on Emile, and the interest it provoked gave evidence of its usefulness. By students' questions and suggestions *I have been led toward the heart of the text*. It provided a ground for community among us in the *quest for understanding of ourselves*. (Bloom, in Rousseau, 1762/1979, p. ix, emphasis added)

The alien text's superficial nothingness, its obscurity, reveals, upon *farther* inquiry, what it hides; an understandable and whole core: its *heart*. In this regard, the textual pedagogical gesture is tied to an occurred learning, that is, a moment where intelligibility is regained after a — momentary — place of confusion. In other words, opacity is explained away; replaced by uncovering obscurity.

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[115] See Bloom, in Rousseau, 1762/1979, pp. viii–ix — e.g., «This is what I have tried to do, but I have often failed» (p. ix).

Contrarily, literally, to Emile's instructor, who not only is familiarised with what is unknown to his pupil, but is also in control of the circumstances that lead to knowledge, Bloom risks a path to uncover something he does not know *yet*, with his students. However, both aim for an end through a passing loss of intelligibility. There is an end and such end is one of clarity; though Bloom uncovers what is hidden, Rousseau hides what is to be uncovered and not uncovered. So, despite a reversal, both deal with, and promote, a similar kind of pedagogical relation: a relation bound by end to come by revelation, even if such end is momentarily obscured — by belief or by design, in community or individually. What follows, again, is the fixing of learning to the overcoming of a stage of confusion.

Notwithstanding its differences to Rousseau's gesture, Bloom's also entails a relation with the unknown as the not-known-*yet;* never unknowable. They *make* so as to show; to reveal; to achieve revelation. And this revelation is *expectable*.

This vignette serves to lay out a manner to conceive what is alien as something that is expected to be understood in an eventful moment where what is alien reveals its hidden treasures, thereby dealing away with the loss of intelligibility. This trait traverses texts by Gert Biesta, jan jagodzinski, Dennis Atkinson. In theoretical terms, notwithstanding differences, this means the operativeness of theory relies on the same premise: opacity, read as obscurity, is a momentary state that, once overcome, reveals something clear. I articulate the makings of the mentioned scholars in part III of this study, by overlapping their and Rousseau's writings. This is done so as to evince how they are rather close to Rousseau's textual pedagogical gestures, and *yet*, not the same.

To make clear, however, *how* and *why* to address these four authors — Rousseau, Biesta, jagodzinski, Atkinson — by their overlapping, I firstly foreground Édouard Glissant's writing. Focussing particularly on *opacity*, I conduct a reading, by composing a writing, of such postulation from Glissant's own writings, and from others' writings as well. *Opacity* is thus made a threshold *amidst* Rousseau, and Biesta, jagodzinski, Atkinson; not *between* them. It is a threshold that is not limited to the establishing of a separation between ends; it is neither an entry, nor an exit. To imagine how it can be is what part III makes tangible.

III · threshold, and threshing

One must preserve opacities, create an appetite for the propitious obscurities of transfers [*transferts*], ceaselessly belie the fake comforts of vehicular jargons [*sabirs véhiculaires*]. The fabric is not one of transparency; and it does suffice to claim for the right to linguistic difference or, conversely, to interlexicality, so as to certainly realise them. (Glissant, 1990, p. 134, translated here)

This part aims to make clear how and why are Édouard Glissant's writings on *opacity* used in and for this study. While I pay more attention to *opacity* as brought fore in *Poetics of Relation* (1990), I believe it is worthwhile to address it in a more generous context. This is to say that not only Glissant's writings aside *Poetics of Relation* (1990) are to be considered but also the works of other authors and scholars that have either worked on the *writer's* work, more broadly, and, or, on the *writer's* postulating of opacity. This is made so as to share a complexity by the constitution of an opaque mass; and again, nothing is neither intentionally hidden nor mysteriously concealed; rather, overlapped and shared so. In other words, I am trying to conceptualise *opacity* for this study, but resisting to make it a mere extraction to be thereafter applied. This is to say that I try to *invite* an understanding of opacity *to* this study by writing *with* it, more than to merely write *about* it. This also sums up *how* opacity is made operative for this study: it is a *tool* not limited to momentary usage. In this regard, this part makes clear opacity by trying to translate it without reducing it; it is thus a committed attempt.

Following the addressing of *opacity* with Glissant's *œuvre*, I see how Glissant's writings on opacity are brought fore in scholarly literature, from different frameworks and for different purposes. The intention of this *shared reading* is thus: reading *opacity* along with scholars that act in and from different areas and frames, regarding it differently, aims to address opacity as fundamentally contingent. This to say I give a political orientation to this reading. Moreover, I invite myself to write along with the very opacity of their texts. I thus compose an entwined and overlapping reading of such literature, expressing the very singular relation amidst them and this study, which is to say one not reducible to either opposition or affiliation. Again, the aim is not to provide a definition of opacity as if it were an essence I unveil before the reader — and myself —, but, rather, to show how can *opacity* be part of this study, and why am I foregrounding a particular way of reading of it, that is, why am I writing it as such.

The all-encompassing purpose is to make with opacity a way to address the textual pedagogical gestures of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Gert Biesta, jan jagodzinski, Dennis Atkinson: expressing clearly the opacity of their relation. At the same time, expressing clearly the opaque imagining of what can be *made* with such relation.

Opacity is neither firstly nor lastly approached in *Poetics of Relation* (1990). It can be read across Glissant's *œuvre*; in earlier pieces, such as *Soleil de la Conscience* (1997b) or *L'Intention Poétique* (1969), and later ones, like *Philosophie de la Relation* (2009). But also in other works considered to be of genres different to the ones mentioned, such as *Mahagony* (1987/2020a), or *A Field of Islands* (see Glissant, 1994/2005), regarded, respectively, as a novel and as a prose poem.

In *Soleil de la Conscience* (1997b), originally published in 1956, Glissant declares a «crown [*caboche*] of clay [*argile*], a red and opaque clay, with its contouring of sky» is all that suffices him (p. 35, translated here). A subtle example but I wish to *make* it a significant one. At this point in Glissant's *œuvre*, there is little evident distinction between *opacity* and *obscurity*; the latter family is, however, more present throughout the book at hand. Both seem akin to a certain loss of legibility preceding a revealing encounter. «[D]ay is made, by some sort of obscure secretion, the conscience of rhythm that comes to signify rhythm itself» (Glissant, 1997b, p. 15, translated here). «I fear hastening this night. Already exhausting this night where the obscurity creeps up like a lost lover» (p. 19, translated here). «Duration of knowledge, 'tis patience, obscure upsetting, the small clayish gift: the Chant» (p. 51, translated here).

> All the force, these revelations, these visions, this ultimate fire, what is it? The rebirth of common will, its marching in each and every one. And the Form (for if this force is matter, it goes towards the other, the word), we immediately see it is not the first point, it is not the resulting electricity of two matters that repel each other, the art of Man forces to combine. All the diffuse force cannot do anything without the Expression, which is second. What is Revelation, without the device and the ornament of the correct word? A shadow without guardian, a body without clarity.
> But it is here the wait and the silence accomplish their job. I descend in such water, merely memory and yet so real, the sea. Sign of the pure, and it would be necessary for me to one day return to this purity, whatever the cost, to make its praise. For light is the purity of water! But I say it again: a crown of clay, a red and opaque clay, with its contouring of sky is all that suffices me. (Glissant, 1997b, pp. 34–35, translated here)

I am translating — carrying — here these passages from such early work, because a preference for opacity can be read, even if the obscure can be praised, notwithstanding both being timidly contrasted. While the obscure carries within it something, momentarily concealed but later revealed — and thus a potential for revelation imminently actualised —, the opaque does not bear such immanence. In this regard, the revelation the obscure promises, even if momentarily unclear — clayish, a secretion, like a lost lover —, is *there*. Obscurity holds something *in* itself.

But despite the mentioned preference, there is not, in *Soleil de la Conscience* (1997b), an altogether rejection of obscurity. Following these pieces, obscurity holds a revelatory promise, one that, unlike a *named* revelation, is rather dim. The Biblical undertones are sound:

> After baptised, Jesus at once emerged from the water. And then the heavens opened and he saw the spirit of God descending as a dove and coming above him. And then a voice from the heavens which says: "This is my loved son, in whom I have pleased myself". (Matthew, 3:16–17, translated here)

Again, Glissant does not reject revelation. Rather, he sees it is possible for it to appear otherwise. A revelation from the dark, rather than from light: unlike the baptism of Jesus, whose existence begins from such event of naming, the point is the word is not to be *first*. In this regard, a revelation from obscurity may result in an obscure encounter, that is naked from adornment or device: from the correct word, from *predetermined meaning*. Orphan, unlike Jesus. A shadow without guardian. And, yet

again, revelation is not rejected, that is, the revelation from light, but deferred to some other time. For the moment, Glissant stays *in* the sea. Recollecting the claimed preference for opacity: if the obscure may reveal a different offering than light, why does Glissant declaim the opaque clay suffices him? What sets it apart from obscurity?

In both revelations, nameable with ease or not easily so, there is an encounter. In this *light*, obscurity holds the promise of a revelatory encounter. It *reveals*, even if such encounter is not necessarily *meaningful*, that is, unnameable: a *body without clarity*. The opaque clay, however, seems to not reveal a thing; yet, it makes something, even if modestly stated. How does it *make*, when revelatory making seems *not* to be the matter?

reading an invitation in writing

In *Poetics of Relation*[116] (1990), Édouard Glissant fragmentarily provides insights on *how* to understand *opacity*. Notwithstanding the sections where opacity is more directly approached[117], there are bits concerning such postulation scattered throughout the book (Glissant, 1990).

The opaque is «thick», (Glissant, 1990, p. 27, translated here). Opacity is a «force» against «reductive transparency» (Glissant, 1990, p. 74, translated here), a force of «join[ing] one another (without conjoining, that is to say without dissolving one another)» (p. 74, translated here). Opacity is «that which protects the Diverse» (p. 75, translated here). It is the expressed «violence» of «thought rising itself from the prisms of misery» (p. 170, translated here). Opacity does not have to do with «self-sufficien[cy]» (p. 199, translated here). To put it more adequately, then; more than only providing insights on how opacity *is*, Glissant (1990) also evinces how *not* to understand it. This is to say opacity is written as something to be read in non-definitive manner; *opacity* cannot be pinpointed to an absolute understanding, which

[116] *Poetics of Relation* (Glissant, 1990) tends to be singled out in Glissant's *oeuvre* as one of his most significant philosophical writings (e.g., Drabinski, 2019; Hallward, 1998). As I write this text, Penguin Books prepares a paperback edition of *Poetics of Relation*, to be released in April 2025 through its *Penguin Modern Classics* series. It is announced as Glissant's *most celebrated philosophical work*, bearing Betsy Wing's 1997 translation (Glissant, 1990/1997a cf. Glissant, 1990/2025). This footnote is written along the course of writing this thesis. Recollecting this writing, I decide to leave it: this is not to mysteriously conceal a message, but to trace an overlapping of chronology.

[117] See *Transparence et opacité* (Glissant, 1990, pp. 125–134), and *Pour l'opacité* (Glissant, 1990, pp. 203–209). For Betsy Wing's rendering, see *Transparency and Opacity* (Glissant, 1990/1997a, pp. 111–120) and *For Opacity* (Glissant, 1990/1997a, pp. 189–194).

complicates its rendering as an extractable concept. In other words, it is posited as an abstraction that requires an always contingent specificity. And this is also expressed by the very scattering of this postulation across *Poetics of Relation* (1990). To have a word that eludes meaning placed throughout a book in different places, thus entails a challenge to *a reading from* a *concept*: to read opacity in *Poetics of Relation* is to *read with* such *word*. This gesture of writing — and inviting a reading — as tracing a movement apart from a vectorial one is key to Glissant's *œuvre*, in general, and in *Poetics of Relation* more specifically. This leads me to one of the reasons for highlighting *Poetics of Relation* in this study: Glissant's writings on writing, and thereof ties to opacity.

language improper

For Glissant (1990), «the literary text [...] best depicts the image if not the function of a language» (p. 129, translated here), a text not immune to «learning or translation (these two fundamental mechanisms of relational practice)» (p. 129, translated here). Glissant (1990) writes one «very naturally return[s] to the critical approach of notions of *transparency* and *opacity*» (p. 129, translated here, emphasis added) when regarding the workings of such mechanisms. In other words, *what* a text bears, is not detachable by *how* it bears, nor by *how* readers bear witness to it: in this respect, an idea of an absolute text is held in question. This entails that *a* language, despite its possible idiosyncrasies, even a vectorial one, is not necessarily essential. If so, then it is «doomed to real impoverishment», as it does not «venture into the confusion of cultures' contact» (p. 126, translated here).

Glissant (1990) foregrounds French, his «language of creation» (p. 126, translated here), as an example of how it is affected by a critical approach. In light of a transparent one, Glissant (1990) rehearses how French is with «the function of humanisation, the famous universality that carries humanism [or] the harmonious predestination to clarity, to pleasurable rationality» (p. 128, translated here). And he can imagine it so only under *certain circumstances*. In the case of humanisation, French, «language of the Rights of man», would protect identity «against the hastes of an abusive collectivisation» (p. 127, translated here). This case would be dependent on an *innate* particularity of French which would see the individual as an «irreducible entity»

in the language's «inseparab[ility] from a quest for the dignity of man» (p. 127, translated here). In such situation, French, by itself, establishes such protection, functioning *for* it. In the second case, Glissant rehearses French as holder of a «literary vocation to clarity, from which a reputation of pleasing rationality, which in fact is to say the guaranteeing of a legitimate pleasure in the manipulating of an ensemble of consecutive, non contradictory, concisions» (p. 127, translated here). By possessing such inherent clarity, French can be the *provider* of an unbiased source of indisputable expression, «giv[en] [...] in advance» (p. 128, translated here). This clarity relies on «a «good» manner to practice the language» (p. 128, translated here), and thus on *language users to correctly use it*. This is to say that for it to be so, for French to bear such *innate* and *definitive* capabilities, imagination has to be narrowed down to a *certain* path, shielded from what would deviate it: *man* is *clear*. A predetermined future writes the present. But neither case «withstand scrutiny» (p. 128, translated here), Glissant states; «[t]here is no *vocation* of languages» (p. 128, translated here, emphasis added).

Following Glissant (1990), transparency is thus an approach that defines rules from the outset, that is, it pulls to itself the understanding of a text — it comprehends it, under the very standard it conceives. More accurately: it *makes* the text an emitter of one, absolute, possible comprehension. It *works* by an entanglement of pointing at its end, staging a scenario, and merely caring for successfully achieving such end by a certain path. Using such language, and using language in such a manner, is to constrict the expanse of imagination.

Glissant thus rejects the usage of the French language, or of any language, to make perfect tools to be deployed upon certain strains to fix them. Rather than such properness, which applies a designed function and predetermined usage to the «opacity of a world» (Glissant, 1990, p. 128, translated here), French — and any language not condemned to pauperism, a condemnation that does not result from nature (Glissant, 1990) — is to be *made* improper. A resource to be unceasingly assembled, disassembled, tampered with, sharpened or blunted, along with the opacity of the world. The purpose is thus the ongoing making of an improper tool along with an improper resource, that is, a tool which does not dictate the shape of what it tunes, of what it addresses. It is never adequate, so using it always entails an unrehearsable, even if rehearsed, precision.

> As there is a «good» manner to practice language, *there would be a «correct» manner to teach it*. This would ring out not only over the conception one makes of language but over *the idea that will be crafted from its relationship with other languages*. And consequently, over the *theoretical device* put into place by the disciplines concerned in the usage of languages, either to analyse them, either to translate them amongst themselves, either to allow for its learning. (Glissant, 1990, pp. 128–129, translated here, emphasis added)

reading a revelation in writing

But, Glissant (1990) writes, «[t]he literary text is by function, and contradictorily, *producer* of opacity» (p. 129, translated here, emphasis added). At this point, what directly concerns *writing* gains a more evinced momentum. A *relational practice*: «entering into [one's own] amassed writings, [the writer] renounces an absolute» (Glissant 1990, p. 129, translated here, emphasis added). «Writing is relative to this absolute, this is to say it effectively opacifies it, accomplishing it in language. The text goes from the dreamed transparency to the opacity *produced* in words» (p. 129, translated here, emphasis added). Glissant continues:

> The written text stands in the way of everything a reader could lead himself to formulate differently than the author's intention, at the same time the contours of which he can only guess. The reader goes, or rather tries to go back, from the opacity produced to the transparency he has read there. (Glissant, 1990, p. 129, translated here)

There are two things I wish to highlight in this more elongated visit to Glissant's passages. Firstly, writing *is* a practice and so is reading: both are productive activities. Hitherto, *opacity* serves to establish an argument before an idea of transparency that sees the relation between reading and writing unproblematic, that is, a scenario where one *writes what* one *reads* — here, reading is passive and writing effortless. Secondly, Glissant does flip the understanding of transparency by a precision in words: rather than a transparent lens for *a* truth, the transparent is merely something which can be dreamed, imagined. This means that, as far as one can tell, it thus does not exist in the present. This is not to say there is a *deferring* it to the future, rather, a mode to face the future: it does not foreclose imagining it aside known paths. A revelation unceasingly revealing — gerund —, rather than revealing — adjective.

In this light, *reading* can either be a transparent revelation that dictates a comprehension of what is shown, or, it can be a revelation from obscurity that imagines an understanding of what is shown. Transparency and revelation and obscurity are thus bound — even if messily.

Pedagogically, this entails a learner does not have to be necessarily instructed by what is shown by a teaching entity. However, the attempt of going back to transparency, may entail an expectation: the reader may not necessarily renounce an absolute.

making encounters opaque, not obscure

In *Poetics of Relation* (1990), contrastingly to *Soleil de la Conscience* (1997b), Glissant writes very clearly obscurity should not be mistaken for opacity, as «[t]he opaque is not the obscure, but it can be it and it can be accepted as such. It is the non-reducible» (Glissant, 1990, pp. 205–206, translated here). This remark is a useful anchor: in abstract terms, this seeming paradox immediately entails a distancing from a vulgar understanding of opacity as something which conceals something else. If approached conceptually, it means Glissant avoids conflating obscurity and opacity by a contrast in how each of them relate to reduction — a reduction to an indisputable meaning. As argued by Jeff Humphries, Glissant «is quick to distinguish between opacity and obscurantism» (Humphries, in Glissant, 1994/2005, p. xxxiii). Humphries quotes the writer[118]: «[r]ead a poem. You do not need to comprehend it to like it. Worse, a comprehended poem is a finished poem» (Glissant, 1993, p. 122, translated here). Humphries thus sees a need for «a different order of readerly experience than mere comprehension, [calling] for a different order of understanding, one that does not seek transparency» (Humphries, in Glissant, 1994/2005, p. xxxiii). That is, one that resists, again, *comprehension*, one that resists to *seize*.

Thus far, rather simply, it can be argued the opaque is not the obscure: the latter conceals something that can be revealed, in time. But the point is not the *what-ness* of

[118] Recollecting: in this study's hello, I make use of this passage as an example to why I decide to translate Glissant from his own writings. Humphries renders it as such: «[r]ead a poem. You don't need to understand it to like it. Worse, a poem understood is a poem done with» (Glissant, 1994/2005, p. xxxiii). Recollecting the original passage: «*Lisez un poème. Vous n'avez pas besoin de le comprendre pour l'aimer. Pis, un poème compris est un poème fini*» (Glissant, 1993, p. 122).

these words, but their *how-ness*. That is, by which means does obscurity work, and by which means does opacity work? And why the preference for opacity?

Humphries is precise when using *obscurantism*, as such word entails a deliberate hiding or rejection of things[119]; the *readerly experience* must thus not be concerned with a pre-existing dictating of revelation. However, a «different order of readerly experience» (Humphries, in Glissant, 1994/2005, p. xxxiii), in light of Glissant's revelatory ambiguity, is still an experience predicated on the *encounter*. And it is this precise point I wish to foreground. It is *how* such encounter is that which sets apart the obscure from the opaque. An *obscure* encounter still *reveals* something, and it is *expected* to do so, even if patiently. Opacity does not promise it. In other words, dealing with obscurity entails the encounter to happen, *eventually*, it entails waiting, whereas opacity does not necessarily expect it. If an encounter is desired, it has to be *made*.

This is to bring fore, again, Glissant's (1990) writing on writing: «[w]riting is relative to this absolute, this is to say it effectively opacifies it, accomplishing it in language. The text goes from the dreamed transparency to the opacity *produced* in words» (p. 129, translated here, emphasis added). In other words, the switch to an opaque understanding of, that is, an opaque approach to a text entails more than reading. It entails, it calls, it *asks* writing. It is not concerned with *encountering by finding*, rather, it is concerned with *continuously making the encounter*. This is an evidence of Glissant's relational poetics[120] made tangible by his writing, that is, by what I wish to postulate as an *opaque textual pedagogical gesture*. In this regard, opacity is not only something Glissant *shows* in the *what* of his writing; it is also *shown* by the *how*, the manner of his writing: it enacts what it postulates. He makes opacity, and he reads and writes with it. This means the relation between what is theoretical and empirical is made complicated. He shows opacity by sharing it unceasingly.

This why I believe the subtle, perhaps sketched, detail in *Soleil de la Conscience* (Glissant, 1997b) when apposed to the more robust, yet precise, writings in *Poetics of Relation* (1990) can be weaved to *make* understand why the red clay suffices Glissant. In

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[119] As a technical aid, the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (2007) posits obscurantism as an «opposition to reform and enlightenment», and an *obscurant* as «a person who obscures something».

[120] Tervo (2023b) uses Glissant, and Gloria Anzaldúa, to «imagine historical temporalities aside from the generalizing logic of modernity/coloniality» (p. 288). In such *study* (see p. 281), the author also notes and makes use of the method which rehearses such poetics, suggested by «an imbrication of beginnings and ends» (p. 280) that «entails a radical critique of the epistemic mastery over the past, the present, and the future that historians so often rehearse» (p. 281). In other words, the challenge Glissant poses to a vectorial motion can be made operative, towards an otherwise mode of making sense, one focussing more on *making* than on *sense*.

other words, theory can be *made* in a *certain* way — in a way that not only claims, but, at the very same time, declaims what it claims. And by *certain*, I do not mean it shirks from uncertainty: I mean it takes on the endeavour of certainly expressing uncertainties as well. It is a *making* that gives itself — it is more about making theory *and* sharing such *making* of theory and *made* theory, and less than theory — as written to be read — simply being shown. What is made possible is the passing on of both what is understood and what is not understood; more of an invitation, less of an instruction. Yet both. It *is* illocution.

writing as endlessly repeating impatience

Recollecting: the red clay suffices Glissant, the red and opaque clay. How does it *make*, when to make by revelation seems not to be the matter?

Glissant (1990) addresses the Creole storyteller's making, consisting in «unceasingly mov[ing] the most heterogenous elements of the real closer together» (p. 216, translated here). This is also the operation of poetry as described by Pierre Reverdy (Glissant, 1990); «[t]here is *no dissimulated reference* there but an uninterrupted process of revelation : *of putting in relation*»[121] (p. 216, translated here, emphasis added). But Glissant immediately laments revelation, as, for him, «[t]here ought to be another word, to define this moving closer together, when it amazes us and makes us deflect convention» (p. 216). The interest in Reverdy's contribution is akin to the one Glissant (1992) shows with regard to the work of Michel Leiris, and Glissant does express a relation with both:

> Just as Reverdy tried to give us the ability to touch the roughness of things, even through a poem, Leiris wanted to unfold speech that would be a live fabric, patient and revealing, of those very things that are true to the one who lives them, feels them, and refuses to name them in an ideal conclusion. Reverdy seeks ineffable contact, and Leiris *the Relation that states itself*. (Glissant, 1992, p. 27, emphasis added)

[121] Again, I am imitating the colon as it is in Glissant's (1990) text, that is, after a space. If following the mentioned *litany* (see Glissant, 1990, p. 236), then «the comma (,) indicates a relation, the dash (–) an opposition, the colon (:), a consequence» (p. 236, translated here).

This passage, in line with Leiris's writing being a *producing* of opacity, highlights the focus of Glissant in *making*, and, even more importantly for this study, in *making with*. And, again, he does not deal away with revelation, even if lamenting such word. He chooses not to be concerned with it as an *end*; that is, the revelatory word does not come first — neither as a predetermined beginning, nor as a predetermined end. Rather, it *may*, perhaps, come then — but for it to come, and such coming is never promised, something must be made, something must be unceasingly made, renouncing an absolute. So, rather than a Godlike entity that comes over and *names*, thus inaugurating knowledge by rapture — an encounter predicated on an irruptive revelation —, what comes over is «the *amassing* and the *infinitely recommenced indefinite impatience*» (Glissant, 1990, p. 223, translated here, emphasis added)

This is why the opaque clay is enough and this is how it makes: it *makes with*, *when* a relation is *made with* it. It makes by making with it. And the maker is not, again, a Godlike entity which makes by dictating; rather, the maker merely *makes* — which is not to say it is necessarily a making of simplicity.

In this light, with this clear confusion, unlike the obscure, the opaque is not subject to reduction, which means it cannot be contained, which means it cannot be comprehended, which means it cannot be compacted into an absolute event. And its time cannot be made momentary. It *makes me believe* there can be nothing to unearth. It also *makes me believe* it can be possible to *share* a practice, of weaving, a practice that is made with — a making made clear by the singular relation it expresses.

> The opaque is not the obscure, but it can be it and it can be accepted as such. It is the non-reducible, which is the most perennial guarantee of participation and confluence. We are far from the opacities of the Myth or of the Tragic, from where the obscure would carry exclusion, and from where transparency strived to «comprehend». (Glissant, 1990, pp. 205–206, translated here)

opacity means

Recollecting: *opacity* is a way to address. This is more of a mean than it is an end. What I find interesting in Glissant's *mean* is not only the conclusions he draws — or the traces he leaves —, but the *very mean* — the traces of leaving. Considering Glissant's writing and practice of French, his texts resist an opaque writing as simply

non legible, evincing a *making use* of the French language. In other words, as a master[122] of language, Glissant does not use such mastery to impose a mission onto who may read. Rather, he *makes use* of mastery as a very way to *deal away* with the need for servants. He is a master committed to learning, unceasingly, inviting readers to write with him; inviting learners to learn *with* him, rather than from him, and showing he also learns with: he also writes with, by sharing the very opacity of the relation he establishes. Which is also to say he shares the singular relation he makes by means of his texts' opacity: not by immanence, but through the very thickening of weaves amidst *all he moves closer together*. He makes with, and shares it. He passes on; he makes believe the reader is invited. He makes the reader *believe* there is an invitation. A tone expressing listening.

Pedagogically, this means a relation of teacher and learner can evade the constitution of a learner as outside the realm of knowledge. Moreover, it puts the very dichotomy of *inside* and *outside* knowledge in question. It is more about abolishing pearly gates, than it is about opening up such gates. This is to say the *realm* is not one of domain. The teacher's and the learner's opacities «can coexist, converge [*confluer*], weaving fabrics» (Glissant, 1990, p. 204, translated here). They thus express the singularity of their relation, by a very singular relation. The absence of a learner is thus considered: *presence* is not impeded to be *made*.

writing an invitation with writing

When I write I wish to make the subtle detail in *Soleil de la Conscience* (1997b) a significant one, it is the affirming of *staying with* it, rather than dealing away with it. I enact what I wish to foreground with this study: making a language *with opacity*, as I

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[122] I am writing with Maurice Blanchot's (1969/1993) text: «we should not be content with attributing to the master the role of example, or with defining his bond with the student as an existential one. The master represents a region of space and time that is absolutely other. This means that, by his presence, there is a dissymmetry in the relations of communication; this dissymmetry means that where he is the field of relations ceases to be uniform and instead manifests a distortion that excludes any direct relation, and even the reversibility of relations. [...] The master is destined, then, not to smooth out the field of relations but to upset it, not to facilitate the paths of knowledge, but above all to render them not only more difficult, but truly impracticable [...] Knowing by the measure of the "unknown," approaching the familiarity of things while preserving their strangeness, relating to everything by way of an experience of the very interruption of relations is nothing other than *hearing speech and learning to speak*. The relation of master to disciple is the very relation of speech when the incommensurable becomes measure therein, and irrelation, relation» (p. 5–6, emphasis added). Nevertheless, it should be noted *relation* is, in the original (Blanchot, 1969), *rapport*. Glissant (1990) writes «the French word «*Relation*», which somewhat functions as an intransitive verb, would not know to answer for example to the English term «relationship»» (p. 40). Glissant (1990) both uses *rapport* and *Relation*, not indiscriminately, and Betsy Wing (Glissant, 1990/1997a) renders them, respectively, as *relationship* and *Relation*. Perhaps, with Glissant's (1990) writing, it can be written Blanchot writes one of a master's endeavours is to confound relationships so a singular relation can be expressed.

go along with it. This means opacity is not treated as a mere abstract concept, that is, extracted to be applied to — which is, as well, why *opacity* is difficultly treated as a concept. This is the very textual pedagogical gesture I would like to make with Glissant's writings: one that *tries unceasingly to move closer together* that which it addresses, never reducing even if unceasingly risking it. This is the textual gesture I am enacting, which is the textual gesture I read in — *and* write with — Glissant's writing: an opaque textual pedagogical gesture.

This is not to say, however, *opacity* cannot be conceptualised. It *can*, indeed, but if used as a given concept, a concept that is simply culled and transferred, I contend it is not an opaque conceptualisation in light of Glissant's writings. I would then *read* onto his opacity some kind of comfortable assurance, pushing transparence onto it. But the endeavour is, rather, to write: writing so as to put language in practice, unceasingly. «If language is given in advance, if it aspires to vocation, it misses the adventure» (Glissant, 1990, p. 134, translated here). As put by John Drabinski (2019), adamant in considering the work of Glissant philosophical, opacity can be seen as a concept «*insofar* as it sustains the rhizomatic and nomadic character of subjectivity, intersubjectivity, and so the constant reinvention of not just meaning, but the meaning of meaning» (p. 13, emphasis added). For Drabinski, and in line with the baroque force Glissant forwards[123], what opacity appeals is

> to think outside the binary of the legible and illegible — to think, perhaps, of meaning as *simultaneously* declarative and precarious, just like the name written over and over in chalk. Accumulation rather than iteration, to put it simply. Erasure, trace, struggle, proliferation, accumulation, knowing, and the unknowable — all at once. *Opacity*. [...] Opacity underpins this resistance to the legible. Opacity is *life* that *does not make itself* legible, refusing a legibility which, *prima facie*, would infect opacity with transparency. (Drabinski, 2019, p. 20, emphasis altered)

[123] «[T]he baroque force» (Glissant, 1990, p. 47, translated here) is scattered, as a theme and as an approach in *Poetics of Relation* (1990). A full reading of the book would be most adequate, but *On a worldly baroque* can be a starting a point (Glissant, 1990, pp. 91–94, original title: *D'un baroque mondialisé*). This baroque force is what Glissant sees as a very image of overlapping situations — times, styles, geographies —, an overlapping that does not foreclose the relation of the situations, but, rather, expands it. The baroque thus becomes an image for that which shares itself showing what is made of. Moreover, and paradoxically so, it is a capture of movement that does not captivate it. This is close to what some scholars find in post-modernist writing (e.g., Cabeleira & Ó, 2015; Tavin, 2007) in that it poses a contrast before a tradition of classicism and its inherent givenness — modernism, enlightenment. For this study, nevertheless, Glissant's take is favoured, as it is more about *making* relation, than it is about establishing relationships of difference.

making teaching with writing

Interestingly, the *philosopher* John Drabinski (2019) sees Glissant's writings as *philosophical*. As I, for this study's purposes, wish to forward Glissant's writings as pedagogical. So as to further the questions posed, I continue to read and write *with* opacity. The purpose is to compose, to write, an opaque reading of opacity: this is not to say that I wish to be unreadable. Rather, this is to resist considering opacity as a resource to be extracted, what scholar Benjamin Davis (2023) would consider a Western gesture; a gesture that can also be read as akin to philosophical work[124]. Reading with opacity is thus to *make* an overlapping of authors, ideas — a joining of opacities, where they do not conjoin. *Joining* — gerund. *Writing* with opacity is thus to *make with* the overlapping of authors, ideas — a weaving of opacities. It is to confound reading with writing. The task is to pass on clarity with confusion. The task is to share opacity opaquely.

I claim the relevance of opacity is tied to such making, a making that tries not to reduce. But how can I be certain — or less uncertain — this reading of opacity is an opaque reading? That is, before such device shared by Glissant, can I avoid «*retain*[ing] [my] perspective», the «tool» Continental language *detains*, rather than «*forg*[*ing*] concepts [and] *expand*[*ing*] categories» (Jullien, 2012/2015, p. 12, emphasis added)?

Keeping up with the task of reading Glissant opaquely, and to both *make* sense of this sentence and to bring fore — that is, *make* — the relevance of such idea to this study, I expand my reading of Glissant. That is, to other texts working with Glissant, with preference to *opacity*, and thus furthering the reading of Glissant alike — writing *with them all*. In other words, this is not merely to show a concept being used differently and how I may relate differently to such usages. It is, also *and* perhaps more importantly, to share the complexity of a concept by translating it, in its living complexity, to this study. It about expressing the singular relation amidst this text and all the references, clearly in its very opacity.

Again, if philosopher Drabinski posits Glissant's writings as philosophical, and if I, a make-believe teacher, intend to postulate Glissant's writing as a make-belief practice, in this make-belief theoretical contribute, there is a crucial, pressing,

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[124] I am writing with Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari's (1991/1994) text: «philosophy extracts concepts» (p. 24). «The task of philosophy when it creates concepts, entities, is always to extract an event from things and beings, to set up the new event from things and beings, always to give them a new event: space, time, matter, thought, the possible as events» (p. 33).

question that *must* be addressed. As scholar Patrick Crowley (2006) acutely asks, «[w]hat kinds of 'intelligence' and 'connaissance' are at stake in [...] readings of *opacité*?» (p. 111). That is, if examples such as «[Celia] Britton and [Peter] Hallward provide exegetical versions of intelligent readings based on context and argument» (Crowley, 2006, p. 111), could they be «envelop[ing] *opacité* within a structure (postcolonial, philosophical) that *determines its shape according to the approach*[?]» (p. 111, emphasis added). In other words, Glissant's writings may as well be eventualised by scholars, an endeavour I am partaking in.

Following Crowley's (2006) suggestion of a «movement 'across' [...] a transversal poetics» (p. 111), I continue the weaving of opacities, opaquely so — thickening the weave by amassing and overlapping texts. This also follows the gesture of part I: I continue the *jolting*, the accident; the joyous chance of inquiry. Not only by moving these scholars's writings, and Glissant's, closer together, but moving *with* them as well. So, *what* belief is being *made* is also a matter in question. The point, in sharing a shared movement, is thus to express this *what-ness* by emphasising the very *how-ness* of the crafters', the makers' very positions, expressed by text, rather than writing over them: fabling a fairytale rather than a myth. It is to *make* movement and account for such movement. In this regard, chapter nine expresses that very movement, this very singular relation.

Noting, as Crowley (2006), *opacity* «invites scholarly interpretation, [supporting] forms of communication between groups and individuals» (p. 111), I look into how opacity is regarded and made operative by different scholars. It should be noted I am focussing on texts written in English. This sets a common ground: addressing an author's work in a language which is neither its natural language (Tröhler, 2011) nor the author's mother tongue, stresses the self-reflexive aspect of this study. That is, when Crowley (2006), again, asks «[w]hat kinds of 'intelligence' and 'connaissance' are at stake in [...] readings of *opacité*?» (p. 111), what is at stake with regard to natural language can also be made part of the inquiry[125]. Yet, this defined limit when collecting the sources is, as well, a limitation for this study.

I write this chapter by weaving the opacities of texts by scholars working in rather different fields and frameworks. This is to perform a reading resisting immediate intelligibility — and forcing myself to write, recollecting. It is closer to what Mimi Sheller (2004), in relation to the reading of Creole texts, calls «an ethics of postcolonial reading, [...] [contra] believing in [an] endless capacity for intercultural communication across creole continuums, [pausing] on that which [I] cannot understand» (Sheller, 2004, p. 106). However, as this reading is *made with* writing, this pausing is impatient: it continues to make hesitantly, rather than simply stopping, waiting. The pausing on what I do not understand is continuously shared — I try not to *control* the references. Paradoxical paradox[126]. I thus *make* sense of opacity by amassing and repeating impatience.

There is a methodological purpose to this — opaquely reading opacity — and simultaneously an analytical one: show how scholars are differently concerned with opacity and evince why it matters in a certain manner for this study's purposes. Both their contributes, *and* why jolt them. I am thus concerned with difference as means for weaving rather than for detaching — blurring divides, *making means* rather than *ending*.

[125] I am referring to, for example, Betsy Wing's translating of Glissant (e.g, 1990/1997a), in this study's methodological considerings, and how philosopher Peter Hallward (1998) translates Glissant, which I point in this chapter.

[126] I am writing with John Drabinski's (2019) text: «[p]aradoxical paradox. The imperative is to *think both at once*, to think how a site can be so saturated with sadness that it drowns expression *at the same time* that one thinks the beauty of inheritance, survival, and creation» (p. 26, emphasis complemented). In this study, more specifically, the imperative is to *make both at once*: express both at the very same time.

This manner of reading and writing has been used by some scholars, naming it a creolisation[127] of sources. Édouard Glissant (1990) provides an important clarification to his understanding of creolisation in comparison to mixedness. The latter as «an encounter and a synthesis of two different ones [*différents*]», the former as «mixedness [*métissage*] without limits» (Glissant, 1990, p. 34, translated here). «Creolisation diffracts, whilst certain modes of mixedness may once again concentrate» (p. 34, translated here). In other words, to *creolise* is to *make* theory expansively where emphasis is placed on *making the expansive*. It is to approach reading opaquely, the «perpetual movement of cultural and linguistic impenetrability that makes one not arrive to a *definition* of being» (Glissant, 2010, p. 31, translated here, emphasis added). This is not merely a collection; rather, it is a mingling — an unfinished album. As Glissant (1990) writes, «movement is where [Relation] realises itself absolutely. Relation is movement» (p. 186, translated here). And this movement of reading is expressed by writing.

reading opacity with: old and new opacities

> There, the chronology — the linearity — of the community (which in the West will become History) has no suitability whatsoever. (Glissant, 1990, p. 60, translated here)

> Christical individuation did not have as consequence a refluxing of history, a cyclical recommencing, on the contrary (by the universalisation of linear time, ***before and after Jesus Christ***) it will generalise the species' chronology and it will inaugurate a History of Humanity. (Glissant, 1990, p. 61, translated here)

> The Christ-inspired generalisation was at such moment relayed by the one Darwin proposed, at first one and the other opposing each other. On the two cases the matter was about transcending the ancient mythical filiation, connected to the becoming of a community, so as to overcome it in a generalising conception, yet assuring the force of the principle of linearity which had «comprehended» and motivated History. (Glissant, 1990, p. 61, translated here).

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[127] For example, *Creolizing Critical Theory. New Voices in Caribbean Philosophy* (Davis & Sealey, 2024) and *Creolizing Rousseau* (Gordon & Roberts, 2014), are books in the series *Creolizing the Canon*, «revisit[ing] canonical theorists in the humanities and social sciences through the lens of creolization. It offers fresh readings of familiar figures and presents the case for the study of formerly excluded ones» (Gordon & Roberts, 2014, p. ii).

If a universalisation of time — *before* and *after* a *made* pivot — is at hand when approaching Glissant's *œuvre*, it is possible to follow Peter Hallward (1998) when he sees there are «"early" and "late" positions» in «Glissant's theoretical writings» (p. 442).

Notwithstanding some hesitation before Hallward's (1998) reading of Glissant (e.g. Headley, 2014; Loichot, 2020), there are motives to spend time with his take, here. Besides the gesture of keeping up with the goal of addressing opacity opaquely, I see Hallward's (1998) text as a crystal clear — or crystallised — example of the limits one traces with writing. That is, *how* the way Glissant's writing is addressed *makes* the discourse on it as well. Further, even if I side, in general, with a cautious attitude before references, this does not mean I am to uphold previous cautiousness. That is, I am to be cautious before cautiousness before Hallward. In this respect, I am uncertain to regard Hallward's take as «misleading» (Headley, 2014, p. 64), or to title it as «unorthodox» (Murdoch, 2014, p. 14).

The trope from which Hallward (1998) builds such *earlier* and *later* positions for Glissant is that of the *nation*, which Hallward then links to totality, ultimately what, in his reading, makes Édouard Glissant inseparable from Gilles Deleuze (see Hallward, 1998, p. 443) — Hallward, it should be noted, is rather invested in Deleuze's work[128]. Also, it should be noted how is the trope used to erect his text: a chain of events *linked* by their sameness. Hallward (1998) is referring to what he sees as a «*major shift* in [...] priorities» (p. 442, emphasis added), arguing «Glissant [...] replaces a concept of the specific (or relative and co-constituent) with a concept of the singular (or absolute and self-constituent)» (p. 442). To Hallward, Glissant, that is, the *later* one, is firmly Deleuzian, more so than the *earlier* Glissant. Such shift and Deleuzian affinity, Hallward contends, is made in and by *Poetics of Relation*, a text he cannot imagine as more «dependent» (p. 455) on Deleuze than another. The bridge — perhaps absent given the coincidental entity Hallward sees in Glissant and Deleuze — is built from the interest in the *singular* both develop in their work, as Hallward comprehends it. For Hallward, «Deleuze's philosophy presents a radically *singular* picture of the cosmos — the cosmos as one, self-dividing, self-creating substance, very close to Spinoza's inspiration» (p. 442). Unlike the *later* and *singular* Glissant, Hallward reads the *earlier*

[128] This is *not* to claim he is exclusively working with *Deleuzian* frameworks, so to speak. The influence of Deleuze, however, is not merely connoted in his work; see, for example, *Out of This World: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Creation* (Hallward, 2006), or articles (e.g., Hallward, 2000, 2003) bearing *Deleuze* on the title, not to mention others which make use of his work, such as the one (Hallward, 1998) I am addressing in more detail in this study.

one is more akin to the specific by means of «a kind of affirmative "territorialization" with the sophisticated recognition of other places» (p. 441). Such *territorialisation* is the «pursuit of a *national* specificity» (p. 442), which Hallward sees as abandoned, later, «in favour of a kind of self-asserting, self-constituting singular immediacy» (p. 442).

For Hallward (1998), while the earlier Glissant «composes himself into existence —*through* Martinique» (p. 449), the later Glissant, and in *Poetics of Relation* specifically, almost never uses the word *Martinique* (Hallward, 1998). Hallward quotes, translating, Glissant: «"the circulation and action of poetry are no longer the conjecture of a given people, but the becoming of planet earth"» (Glissant, as cited in Hallward, 1998, p. 454). Unlike the *nation*, Hallward affirms «[w]hat is rigorously consistent in Glissant's work, end and late, is the *end affirmed*, the Totality» (p. 443, emphasis added). This is *how* he regards «what kind of specificity is actually at issue in Glissant's theoretical writings», *and* «if it always the same specificity (p. 442). There is thus a unity at stake in Hallward's reading of Glissant: a totality, where Glissant and Deleuze meet by conflating, by conjoining.

What Hallward (1998) argues is entwined to *how* he argues: *how* he passes on the above passage from Glissant says it. In the original (Glissant, 1990): «*La circulation et l'action de la poésie ne conjecturent plus un peuple donné, mais le devenir de la planète Terre*» (p. 44). Betsy Wing (Glissant, 1990/1997a) renders such passage as: «Poetry's circulation and its action no longer conjecture a given people but the evolution of the planet Earth» (p. 32). Although Hallward (1998) mentions «[a]ll translations are [his] own», staying «close as possible to the original French» so as to «evoke [what he understands as] Glissant's often peculiar syntax» (p. 459), it remains to be said why, for Hallward, *becoming* is favoured in detriment of *conjecturing*, in regard to what poetry's circulation and action *makes*. This translation is telling of how Hallward reads Glissant: rather than reading Glissant establishes a difference between different consequences in regard to what the circulation and action of poetry *makes*, Hallward reads Glissant is establishing a difference between different consequences in regard to what the

circulation and action of poetry *is*[129]. In other words, Hallward conceptualises poetry, rather than addressing it as a contingent practice.

So, focussing on such territorialisation as the nation, and by placing a unitary interest in totality, Hallward (1998) can construct the two phases of Glissant's *œuvre* by the second lacking what the first includes, and by both the first and second including a common aspect — totality. Hallward (1998) contends the «*substantial contrast* between [what is sustained by *Poetics of Relation*] and the earlier theory is profound and obvious, and implies a sweeping reevaluation of categories only thinly masked by the persistence of familiar terms and figures» (p. 454, emphasis added). Such distinction, of an earlier and a later Glissant, is handy to perform a reading that reduces Glissant's work to two moments and, whatever may be the «terms» or «figures» (p. 454) used in both moments, they follow such boxing. Such is the case for his view on *opacity*. That is, he reads opacity from a *difference* that separates. «In Glissant's early work, "to consent to opacity" was to recognise "the irreducible density of the other"» (p. 454). In *later* work, as Hallward sees it, «the emphasis is on the fact that "opacities can coexist, flow together, weaving materials which can be understood only from the texture of the weave and not from the nature of the composing elements"» (p. 454).

Despite Hallward's (1998) own warning on his reading of Glissant being «at odds with the prevailing reception of Glissant [as not divided by stages]» (p. 444), Chi-She Li (2019) also argues on such divide, specifically delving on *opacity*, in a homonymous piece (Li, 2019). Aiming to «*explicate*» (Li, 2019, p. 859, emphasis added) Glissant's «aesthetics of opacity in terms of its formation and significance» (p. 859), Li contends «[t]here are *two stages* in how Glissant comprehends [it]» (p. 861, emphasis added). Like Hallward, he sees a «dividing moment occurs right after *Caribbean Discourse*» (p. 861), pointing to *Poetics of Relation* as the moment where opacity «receives an overhaul» (p. 861), following the «collection of thoughts» (p. 861) amassed during the 1980s. Asserting «opacity becomes a postcolonial strategy proper» (p. 862) with *Caribbean Discourse* (1981/1996), he relates it with *L'Intention Poétique* (1969), arguing Glissant, in such earlier works, «has been engaged in a long process of attempting to articulate

[129] My reading is closer to that of Wing's (Glissant, 1990/1997a), but keeping with the endeavour of *making* sense of Glissant's work *with* this study, I render: «[t]he circulating and acting of poetry do not conjecture a given people, but the becoming [*devenir*] of planet Earth» (Glissant, 1990, p. 44, translated here). Aside the more evident option of rendering *devenir* as *becoming*, English allows for writing the *circulating* and the *acting* of poetry, stressing the gerund so as to convey an ongoing process, *forever conjectural* (Glissant, 1990).

specific historical experiences in a language that could do justice to their *specificity*» (p. 862, emphasis added).

Both Hallward (1998) and Li (2019), see earlier and later stages in Glissant, identifying a changing *specificity*, albeit using different tropes. Moreover, they posit *Poetics of Relation* (1990) as crucial in this two-headed approach to Glissant's career. That is, their writings *locate Poetics of Relation in* the, and *as* the, *joint* in Glissant's *œuvre*. Earlier and later *Glissants*: old and new opacities.

Indeed, some scholarly literature does seem to mirror such understanding of opacity's two moments. This is not necessarily because a bicipital aspect is enunciated, but because some scholars (e.g., Britton, 1999; Clark, 2016; Crowley, 2006; Murdoch, 2012) do place a clear emphasis on an opacity that can be traced to what Hallward and Li both see as an early moment of Glissant's work. Namely foregrounding *Caribbean Discourse* (1981/1996), *opacity* is posited as a firmly postcolonial tactic of and for resisting the transparent gaze of the external colonial agent. From Glissant's writings, *opacity* is foregrounded by scholars as an important concept against a Continental desire of transparency. That is, a drive for understanding that ultimately reduces otherness into something containable by the *comprehension* of who performs the understanding. In other words, there is a traversing consensus that *opacity* represents a valuable gambit as means for resisting an oppressive and colonial stance. But how is resistance performed and towards what?

reading opacity with: resistance

Acknowledging Glissant's writings are «later subject to "revaluation" in light of the "Tout-monde"» (Clark, 2016, p. 54), Colin Clark intentionally brings *Caribbean Discourse* (1981/1996) as his point of engagement with Glissant's writings on opacity. Clark (2016) understands «*opacité* [as] a strategic, poetic response to particular traumatic or oppressive experiences in the Caribbean» (p. 50), that can be translated to other settings, namely, in his regard, Algeria. The specificity Glissant offers, to Clark, is that of a «sociopolitical basis to aesthetic form» (p. 53). That is, there is a *content* in Glissant's writing that is foregrounded in a particular *manner*. This combination makes the political relevance of a literary opacity, for Clark, greater: rather than merely

evoking oppression or violence, such kind of literature *depicts* oppression, which, in Clark's view, calls the reader to «act» (p. 66) on it. The text calls by its *tone*, perhaps.

Other authors, not only necessarily referring to *Caribbean Discourse* (1981/1996), (e.g., Aching, 2012; Connolly, 2016; Hayes, 2012; Johnson, 2014; Mandenga, 2021; Rotas, 2012; Scanlan 2018; Sundén, 2024) also recognise such tactical advantage in *opacity*, regarded in light of its mobilising (e.g., Allouche, 2024; Calixte, 2005; Connolly, 2016; Sinha, 2016; Wiedlack, 2023). Babli Sinha (2016), sees Glissant's writings on opacity as capable of performing a gesture of *combined* opposition and resistance. Sinha (2016) foregrounds how opacity has been a «professional asset» (p. 221) for actress Merle Oberon, early on using «a performance of upper-class Englishness offscreen and onscreen to render herself opaque in the face of lifelong scrutiny regarding her ethnicity» (p. 221). By defying «the legislative insistence on transparency through [such performances'] opacity» (p. 221), Sinha foregrounds how can opacity suggest a deviation «from *linear narratives* of artists' lives toward *performativity*, away from naturalism toward an examination of *how* performances [are] used» (p. 225, emphasis added). In other words, Sinha foregrounds a questioning of History, as linear narratives are deflected.

This deflecting of linear narratives is similar to what Shana L. Calixte (2005) forwards on «global gay discourse» (Calixte, 2005, p. 134). That is, how it «initiates a historical reworking of (normative) gay history, where gay identity is seen as all consuming, heroic and celebratory» (p. 134), which obscures its «marginalizing and invalidating» consequences (p. 134). Not quoting Glissant's work directly, Calixte (2005) refers to his writings as used by David Murray, seeing opacity as an important concept «for a discussion on sexuality and alternative scripts to western imperialist codifications» (p. 129). By codifications, Calixte is referring to «a direct colonial "naming"» (p. 129), before which an «"opaque" identity *construction*, therefore, becomes, effectively a tool of resistance» (p. 129, emphasis added). This is not to come up with an alternative nomenclature, but to resist naming itself: «a way of un(naming), a known yet unknown space, a desire and identity that can be *imagined*, but *not necessarily spoken*» (p. 131, emphasis added).

Calixte's (2005) concerns are close to those of Katharina Wiedlack (2023), who draws from not only a queer perspective to Glissant's writings on opacity to critique a Western visibility politics. Similarly to the issues posed by Calixte (2005) on global gay

discourse, Wiedlack (2023) writes «[c]ontemporary western-oriented global queer political culture favours individualized visual representation to fight for social acceptance» (p. 923). The issue Wiedlack (2023) raises, however, is not merely about a particular resistance to being made visible by naming (cf. Calixte, 2005). It also brings fore the case of visibility not being a possibility, as «[i]n many post-soviet and western contexts [...] LGBTIQ+ visibility is increasingly threatened» (Wiedlack, 2023, p. 922). While Wiedlack acknowledges some value in critique performed by scholars[130], she does not see significant «develop[ment of] alternative concepts of queer visual politics» (p. 923). And *making proposals* is relevant, particularly in a context where the matter entails a grave life risk for specific minorities, which cannot afford to remain isolated. Wiedlack thus sees, as well, Glissant's work as «a poetic strategy to resist the violence of Western knowledge production and societal inclusion [simultaneously creating relationality]» (p. 927). This relationality is further detailed by Wiedlack using a particular work as a source of inspiration to tackle it: *Opacity - Minority - Improvisation: An Exploration of the Closet Through Queer Slangs and Postcolonial Theory*[131], by Anna T. (2020). Wiedlack (2023) writes «Glissant finds opacity in the poetic usage of creole languages in the Caribbean» while «T. refers [Glissant's] concept to queer slang in the context of Greece, and other non-northwestern and non-European contexts» (p. 927). T., Wiedlack continues, «highlights the potential and function of queer slang to navigate verbally between the hegemonic normative society and its demand for transparency and visibility» (p. 927).

The conceptualisation worked by Anna T. (2020) to which Wiedlack (2023) relates is that of the closet, which T. (2020) reimagines as a «space of resistance, self-care, community-forming, as a heterotopic and heterochronic space of creativity, as a potentiality» (p. 18). T. wishes to «offer a reparative reading of, or listening to, the closet» (p. 19), aside from such concept being depicted as a space only regarded as desirable by means of exiting it or staying within it, that is, by the *revealing* of who hides. *Who*, is either forced inside it, or liberated from it (T., 2020; Wiedlack, 2023). T.'s (2020) *closet*, put briefly, is neither one of oppression nor it functions binarily. It *can be* a moment of resistance, and it *can be* permeable: one may choose how, when, and what to reveal — if such is their desire (T., 2020). Wiedlack (2023) is particularly

[130] See Wiedlack, 2023, p. 923.

[131] From here, I refer to T.'s (2020) piece as *Opacity - Minority - Improvisation*.

interested in what such concept may instigate «for a thinking of queer opacity through visual means» (p. 927), neither «transparent to the western gaze» nor to «that of the heteronormative post-soviet hegemon» (p. 933). Alike Merle Oberon (Sinha, 2016), Wiedlack (2023) recognises opacity's potential in its control of obscurity: it reveals *not* what the oppressor wishes.

These scholars' works show how a method of opacity as a defensive gambit that can be made active at will can only be sustained by the very engaging with it. In other words, opacity is never treated as a given, to be *first* recognised, *then* used. This is to say the *identity* of opacity is not fixed and it can only be addressed by practicing it — until then, it does not exist. It is not merely about *contacting* opacity, but about *making* opacity. They *see* opacity by means of *imagining* its *how-ness*. More than that: with the opacity produced by their texts, their *writing*, they *share how* they imagine opacity. Opacity is not to be merely paradoxically read, it is a making — the *how-ness* is also a concern. This is to say a relation of *making* and *opacity* can be expressed with these texts; making *with* opacity.

reading opacity with: expecting its encounter

Sabiha Allouche (2024) proposes a «"pedagogy of opacity" to showcase the violent workings of the "Western gaze" intense preoccupation with the "Muslim woman"» (p. 28). For Allouche (2024), opacity «is an act of refusal [and] a wilfully erected shield that resists assimilationist projects, [...] the right to make oneself knowable according to [their own] terms [...], irrespective of and despite Eurocentric conventions» (p. 29). Also resisting and opposing, Allouche's (2024) pedagogy consists in mobilising such understanding of opacity in «relegat[ing] the "right to [it]" [...] to the "Muslim woman" by acknowledging [Allouche's and her students'] very own opaqueness when encountering her Otherness» (p. 28).

Works, such as that of Allouche (2024), which account for the very irreducibility of the other as preceding condition, are invaluable. That is, the work evinces an addressing of otherness with tact and carefulness, which is also a pedagogical gesture. While this study is more concerned with the relation between making and opacity, scholars who perform the mobilising of opacity as something to be encountered must

nevertheless be acknowledged, particularly when such encountering overlaps their *practice*. Martin Strand (2024), for example, wishes to stress «the importance of acknowledging *opacity* in the encounter with the Other [...] in clinical contexts» (p. 3). Strand (2024) contends «a strictly *descriptive* view in which opacity is considered as a given» (p. 4) is at stake in Glissant's works, which he sees as vital for an approach in a «clinician-patient encounter» (p. 1). And this approach is not, Strand asserts, «an abstract philosophical task [...] but a hands-on, practical necessity in the face of the patient-as-Other that [Strand is], in an everyday clinical as well as in a Levinasian sense, ultimately responsible for» (p. 7)[132]. Abigail Hackett (2022) expresses such carefulness with children, making a case for «[y]oung children and educators [needing] time and space to embrace divergent language practices» (p. 250), so as to operate against «hierarchies of talk» (p. 250). Using Glissant's writings on opacity as an assertion that «underpins a view of difference as uncontainable and irresolvable» (Hackett, 2022, p. 249), Hackett sees the concept offsets «the desire for clear fixed meanings to be conveyed through familiar and recognisable routes» (p. 249)[133].

Hence, Glissant's writings on opacity are *made* creative by addressing them: by writing with them, about them, from them, and more. Now, while the line between making opacity and the drive for encountering opacity as basis for practicing is not self-evident, I want to stay with this detail so as to further this study's purpose. That is, for *making* a case on the *making* of opacity, it is important for this study to emphasise that how to *begin to imagine* opaquely does not entail the same than *thinking how to wait* to see opaquely. And to begin to imagine opaquely is already *making* opaquely. Again, as this reading and study are *made with* writing, this endeavour is impatient: it is to unceasingly make hesitantly, rather than simply waiting. To *make* sense of opacity is to amass and repeat impatience, patiently.

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[132] In educational terms, the scholars in this sub-chapter can be read to tackle a crucial question elegantly formulated by Lovisa Bergdahl (2009): «if difference cannot be reduced to common knowledge or intelligibility, the question that needs further exploration is how education can add to, and not undermine, a respect for the unknowability, or indeed the untranslatability, of the Other» (p. 39). This matter is furthered in Bergdahl's dissertation (see Bergdahl, 2010), particularly in the tensions that concern the intersections of education, religion and democracy. Alike Strand (2024), Bergdahl (2010) sees the work of Levinas particularly relevant, as the philosopher's «notion of responsibility rests entirely on the asymmetrical command to let the other live no matter what» (Bergdahl, 2010, p. 127).

[133] Hackett makes use of opacity again and in the same manner in a more empirically-driven piece, working with David Ben Shannon (Hackett & Shannon, 2023), albeit with greater focus on the relational potentiality of opacity (see pp. 125–128).

reading opacity with: imagining its making

Benjamin Davis (2019, 2023) offers a conceptual, and fundamentally political, perspective that further thickens the weaving of opacity for this study, particularly in its purpose of engaging with an educational tradition. Davis (2023) asks «Continental ethics and human rights discourse to take seriously Caribbean philosophy and Indigenous philosophy, [...] Black Studies and Indigenous Studies» (p. xiv), towards the «gain [of] ethical modes attuned to the rhythms of this century» (p. xv). Rather than trying to come up with some kind of contribution to be *given* to unprivileged groups of people, Davis's (2023) work is more concerned with «address[ing] the task of creatively becoming more responsible to elites, those [...] who 'occupy positions aligned with power and privilege» (p. 4)[134]. In other words, this entails Davis is adamant in stressing something is to be *made by*, rather than *made for so as to be encountered by*. And keeping with his resoluteness in rejecting a *solution*, Davis (2023) contends, with Stuart Hall, the matter at hand is «to shift the meaning of [...] inherited language in order to make political gains» (p. 17), rejecting «*a transcendental ethics of interruption*» in favour of «a method that deepens the oppositional elements of existing cultural forms» (p. 14, emphasis added). This is to say that those who *hold* language — the resource —, the elites, must look into their own power and use it in favour of the «rights claims made by the dispossessed» (p. 18), not so as to interrupt their own lives, but to live differently. In this case, living differently entails an imagination unfettered by nostalgia, as it is not about recollecting some past example within one's own language. Moreover, it entails imagining *with*. In this regard, Davis contends «Levinas's framing of an 'encounter' with a single Other» — as made by Strand (2024) — is less contributive for «decolonial pursuits», as he sees the Other's «difference is understood in terms of 'alterity', [being] ultimately served through reverence»[135] (p. 32).

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[134] Davis (2023) is writing with «Michael Rothberg [who sees elites as] 'implicated subjects', meaning people who 'occupy positions aligned with power and privilege without being themselves direct agents of harm; they contribute to, inhabit, inherit, or benefit from regimes of domination but do not originate or control such regimes'» (p. 4).

[135] A similar observation is made by Naoko Saito (2009), in relation to Lovisa Bergdahl (2009), claiming «the way that Bergdahl draws out the educational implications of Derrida's philosophy, however, with its emphasis on a 'respecting' of difference, risks turning the unknowable into something substantial, which would be a kind of mystification» (Saito, 2009, p. 264). Bergdahl (2010) seems to consider such observation, later on: «[i]f there is that for which I can give no account, there is a limit to what I can know about you just as there is a limit to what I can know about myself. In addition, we are never fully the producers or authors of our lives. This is a task we share with our neighbour and in this sense we are fundamentally dependent upon other people's stories to make sense of our lives» (Bergdahl, 2010, p. 171). This is to say that Bergdahl (2010) not only points to the *thought of the Other*, but can be read to suggest *the Other of thought* (Glissant, 1990) as well.

The point I wish to foreground is Davis (2023) understands the language used by Levinas is bound to a tradition of knowledge that does not serve an imagination aside it. That is, it imagines *for the other*, but it does not imagine *with the other*. This means, to what concerns this study, *making* is never shared. So, from such unsuitability of Levinas's writings, Davis (2023) understands Glissant's «relative ethics of opacity is more capable of speaking to today's ethical problems and possibilities» (p. xiv). For Davis, Glissant «*invites* [...] an *expansion* of ethical responsibilities *outward* in pluralities, toward concretely different others in a process of *making*» (p. 40, emphasis added). Another important nuance Davis foregrounds that gives weight to his arguments in favour of *making*, and positions his suggestion on the elites' hands, is that of reading Glissant's claims as «ultimately an *achievement*, more that it is a given» (p. 48). Indeed, Glissant (1990) contends: «[p]oetic thought, before or after the accident of the poem, or across it, attempts to constitute itself in an axiomatic system: meshing the unmeshable» (p. 99, translated here). In other words, Davis helps to see opacity as more than merely a gesture of opposition and resistance; it is also *an invitation to relation* (see Davis, 2023, p. 50). That is, relation is to be *made*, continuously made whilst unceasingly imagining it.

Recollecting Hallward's (1998) writings on old and new opacities: I do not see Davis's (2023) reading is exclusive to a *later* Glissant that *breaks* from a specific territorialisation (Hallward, 1998). However, to further this claim, I wish to continue writing *with* opacity, rather than *about* it. What I mean is the same as Sylvia Wynter, writing a piece in 1989 that is rather clear about *not* using Glissant's writings as demarcated, but as a body of work. This is not to argue, however, one is wrong and the other is right. Rather, to argue there is no *need* to establish a pivot, as Hallward (1998) does, with *Poetics of Relation* (Glissant, 1990).

reading opacity with: neither old nor new opacities

Though prior to the original publication of *Poetics of Relation* (Glissant, 1990), Sylvia Wynter (1989) expresses a weaving amidst Glissant's writings, and the context of Martinique: that is, they *make* each other — Martinique and Glissant, which is also made by Wynter, as she writes. This weaving Wynter (1989) discusses *and* writes, is also

mirrored in how Wynter suggests to address Glissant's work: «look[ing] at all the major themes of Glissant's works as themes which *cross-link* and *cross-resonate* with each other from one work, one genre to another» (p. 639).

So, expressing the relation between the situation of Martinique and Glissant's work, Wynter (1989) makes use of such weaving to argue the work of Glissant can be regarded as a construction of an identity that has to be recurrently imagined before a reality that is simultaneously adverse and absent, and that shows no possibility for upheaval. The observation concerning the specificity of Martinique, which Wynter (1989) articulates to Glissant's discourse, is that of a colonised Jamaican population that despite «British propaganda» does not move from a «core truth» that promotes «allegiances» (p. 637). Martiniquans, in contrast, deal with a Colonising France «accept[ing] German domination», becoming «both an ally and a neocolony» of the Third Reich. Wynter sees such particular condition prevents revolts in Martinique such as those occurring in Jamaica, thereby positing the «metaphor [...] of *blocking*» (p. 638) as a central existential ground for Glissant's work (see Wynter, 1989, pp. 637–638).

This argument makes me weave Wynter's (1989) contribute as an interesting pair to Davis's (2023). Following the former, to address a blocking, for Glissant, is not merely possible through opposition, such as in colonised Jamaica. Rather, at the same time, in oppositional *and* relational manner (Wynter, 1989). So, in a situation where a revolt does not seem to be adequate, before a reality that is evinced in its complex opacity, Glissant, not only in oppositional manner, not merely in relational manner, writes. Writes his language, letter for letter. He «build[s] [his] language with rocks» (Glissant, 1969, p. 50, translated here), a passage used by Betsy Wing (Glissant, 1990/1997a) to head her introduction in *Poetics of Relation*. «The stumbling blocks of a translation frequently exist at its most productive points» (Wing, in Glissant, 1990/1997a, p. xi). This is to say that Glissant *stays* with language, with the blockings of language, *with* the rocks: he does not deal away with the bumps, the stumbling blocks of reality, of the reality he must deal with. «[I]t is to the letter [his] language that which *institutes* [*him*]» (Glissant, 1969, p. 50, translated here). Glissant is implicated in the reality of Martinique: and he implicates himself as well with Martinique. The «implicated subjects», as Davis (2023) writes with Michal Rothberg, must acknowledge their implication and implicate themselves. Again, Glissant «*invites* [...] an *expansion* of ethical responsibilities *outward* in pluralities, toward concretely different others in a

process of *making*» (Davis, 2023, p. 40, emphasis added). And this invitation of weaving, of *moving closer together* is the movement Wynter (1989) writes.

In this respect, it is *not necessary* to address Glissant's writing by establishing a pivot to demarcate the work. It is possible, surely, but this is an issue in Hallward's (1998) case because rather than aiding to further his own work, it constricts it — as it does with Glissant's writings. That is, Hallward (1998) *critiques*, but, perhaps, a different tone for *making* proposals is needed.

reading opacity with: not only what, not only how

Like with Wynter's text (1989), it should be noted Hallward's piece is published in 1998, thus not written from a situation to read Édouard Glissant's work in wider scope. However, Hallward (1998) does not hesitate to attribute the title of the «most thoroughly Deleuzian writer in the francophone world» (pp. 441–442) to Glissant, seeing «*Tout-monde* (1993) and *Poétique de la Relation* (1990)» offer «in fiction, and in theory, an extraordinarily tribute to Deleuze's nomadological philosophy» (p. 442). This is a different take from John Drabinski's (2019), who also writes Glissant's work as «profoundly philosophical» (p. ix), basing his readings on Glissant's poetics mainly «from the insight into *tout-monde*, something largely elaborated *in and after Poetics of Relation*» (p. ix, emphasis added). However, unlike Hallward (1998), Drabinski (2019) sees Glissant's homage to Deleuze, and Guattari as well, is a «creolization» (p. x). That is, Glissant reads Deleuze and Guattari but he performs a *relational reading* (Gordon & Roberts, 2014) of them — Glissant writes *with* them, not *from* them.

Crowley (2006, p. 112) recognises such intimacy between what is read and *how* it is read when addressing Hallward (1998). «Glissant's work [...] according to [Glissant's] *own reading*, is part of a network, a Relation, that includes the work of Deleuze and Guattari but transforms it within an archipelago of other contexts» (Crowley, 2006, p. 112, emphasis altered), contexts which differ from Deleuze and Guattari's. This may as well mean, using Glissant's words, Hallward (1998) «contracts [Glissant's] thickness to [an] ideal scale that furnishes [him] with grounds for comparisons and perhaps judgements» (Glissant, 1990, p. 206, translated here).

In other words, the *shift* from a specificity to a singularity in Glissant exists because Hallward's reading (1998) *makes* it. By this, I mean Hallward's (1998) reading of Glissant is more indebted to his own philosophical approach to reading, than it is to a possible limitation due to not contemplating Glissant's work in wider manner. As Crowley (2006) acutely writes, Hallward shelves «Glissant's work within a genealogy of thinkers and writers [...] who [advocate] a realm beyond relation» (p. 111). Indeed: the sources Hallward draws from cannot be detached from how he reads Glissant. «Hallward sets Glissant's work within one context» and «explain[s]» it in such framing (Crowley, 2006, p. 111), which can also be said of Li's (2019) reading.

Hallward (1998) argues «it is hard to see how [the displacement he reads in *Poetics of Relation*] can work in the interests of the displaced themselves» (p. 459), claiming the «promotion of Glissant as today's "exemplary" theorist of a postcolonial singularity, is another step toward the effective disarmament of the specifically "dispossessed"» (p. 459). Hallward (1998) does not see what I see as an invitation for the elites — and Glissant in 1990 is firmly part of an elite[136] — to look into their own power and use it in favour of the «rights claims made by the dispossessed» (Davis, 2023, p. 18), again not so as to interrupt their own lives, but to live, or, *make*, differently. It is thus *not* about *providing weapons*, but about *abolishing the very need for weapons — making* as a welcoming invitation.

Poetics of Relation (1990), then, gains a particular relevance in Glissant's body of work. The work asserts the addressing of elites so as to invite them, which is to say, *show very clearly they are part of what is shared*, to partake of a world that *can be*, while simultaneously rendering the elites' responsibility visible. And it is not necessarily a break, I contend; it is the very *continuation* of the weaving Glissant *makes* with his writings, and others *make with* his writings as well, which I see Glissant acknowledges as well[137].

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[136] I speculate: Édouard Glissant is aware of his implicated condition in 1990, two years away from being shortlisted for the Nobel Prize. Further, in 1995, Michael Dash (1995) contends «Edouard [sic] Glissant's eminence not only in French Caribbean literature but in Caribbean literature as a whole is undisputed» (p.1). What I mean is that Glissant is entwined to a practice that can be of a regime of domination: language, that which is the resource for writing, what constitutes History (Mehtonen, 2003).

[137] I speculate: why does Trinidadian and Tobagonian J. Michael Dash translate the title *Le Discours antillais* to *Caribbean Discourse* (1989/1996)? Is it an evidence of the life of Glissant's writings and intentions, where «each theoretical construct is undone or extended by a deconstructing poetic energy» (Dash, 1995, p. 182)? Such move, indeed, ceases to exclude other islands, such as Trinidad and Tobago — it relates them by a sea. Considering Glissant is pleased to have Dash render a different version of 1958's *La Lézarde* (see Dixe, 2023), which Dash renders as *The Ripening* (1958/1985), is this a conscious gesture by Glissant to further relation by means of a fluid geography? Also, some of Betsy Wing's decisions in *Poetics of Relation* were made *with* Glissant, such as, again, *comprendre*, even rendered «once, at Glissant's behest, as "to integrate"» (Wing, in Glissant, 1990/1997a, p. 221). As Wing (2021) recalls Glissant's most memorable words to her: «"I wrote it once. Now you write it."» (Wing, 2021, para. 1).

After all, *Poetics of Relation* (1990) *is as well* the expression of a recollection. Glissant (1990) is suggested that what he «say[s] there is already in or almost in *Soleil de la conscience*, this little book published over thirty years ago» (p. 223, translated here). Glissant (1990) «accepts it» (p. 223, translated here). «Across [*Poetics of Relation*] I revolve what for me, *for so long*, traces the compositional lines of such poetics» (p. 47, translated here, emphasis added). But not a pivot: he revolves again on such compositional lines; to give an example, in *Philosophie de la Relation* (Glissant, 2009). Again, like Wynter (1989) suggests, why not «look at all the major themes of Glissant's works as themes which *cross-link* and *cross-resonate* with each other from one work, one genre to another» (p. 639)? Why not *more*?

> And there were at least four or five meetings where this very text was repeated, translated, diverted, shortened, put into symbols, prolonged, without me having to present excuses. You repeat yourself, [...] Like literatures, the philosophy of Relation is repetition and displacement, *all at once*. (Glissant, 2009, p. 94, translated here, emphasis added)

And again, this not to argue Hallward's (1998) text is *wrong*. But to show that his text *expresses* the relation of *what* is written, and *how* it is written: thus it shares, as well, grounds for inquiry. And I would not call it «misleading» (Headley, 2014, p. 64) because it leads precisely to itself, and I would not call it «unorthodox» (Murdoch, 2014, p. 14), as it is rather orthodox. «The movement from difference to transparency», Drabinski (2019) writes, «colonial and imperial through and through, represents a failure of what Glissant calls the imaginary» (p. 15).

reading opacity with: call on writing

And this serves to recollect Anna T.'s (2020) text. Not necessarily for her understanding of *opacity*, which she posits as a postcolonial concept. This is very much articulated along Celia Britton's own reading of opacity (Britton, 1999; T., 2020), which entails a possibility for controlling the act of concealing, «yet not constantly, not exactly, and doing so while allowing for a porous shielding» (T., 2020, p. 75, parentheses removed). And, as Glissant (2009) makes clear, or clearer as he recollects, one «has the right to be obscure, first and foremost to oneself» (p. 70, translated here).

Rather, because of how Anna T.'s (2020) work can be read as rather thick, by moving closer together of not only authors, concepts, ideas, thoughts, emotions, theories. At the same time, maintaining a particular balance that evinces the weaving itself as a contribute — thereby inviting me to the very weaving. Unorthodoxly so. It shares clearly with confusion[138], it shares obscurity with opacity. Anna T.'s (2020) writing makes me believe I listen. And it is made so with the opaque expression of her text, which is *made* a force for relational engagement.

Davis's (2019, 2023) texts look to opacity to question Continental frameworks, while T.'s (2020) writing shows her questioning in opaque manner — both reject reduction. The former asks to consider irreducibility, the latter asks to consider irreducibly. When closer together, together so they overlap, I may write *with* them an invitation to *making* creative methodology and politics; an opportunity for responsibility, that is not imposed. It does not dictate a duty and it does not bind: it *invites* by the very evidence it shows, not that it hides or hints.

These scholars make use of opacity. This is neither to extract and comprehend them or their texts nor to extract and comprehend *opacity*. But to share how and what I learn with these writings, by amassing them — and rehearsing a contribute which expresses the desire to unceasingly bleed through my writing.

To call on writing by means of writing, by means of *making*.

reading opacity with: with writing

I do side with the takes that show *opacity* as a not stable nor fixed *concept* throughout Glissant's *œuvre*. I am hesitant to adhere, however, to a gaze that establishes *Poetics of Relation* (Glissant, 1990) as a break (Hallward, 1998) or division (Li, 2019) in Glissant's writing. That is, I believe it is possible to contend for the significance of Glissant's work and, *at the same time*, *not* positing it in interruptive, eventful terms. Rather than a needle that Glissant uses to puncture or rip the fabric he weaves with his writing in different patches, *Poetics of Relation* (1990) is in this study argued as yet another mesh that Glissant uses to thicken the weave of his writings.

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[138] See, for example, T., 2020, p. 30.

What I wish to stress here is that choosing *Poetics of Relation* (1990) is not because of its irruptive eventfulness, but because of the unceasing *weaving* — *making* — it invites to imagine, it invites to make. And it very clearly expresses — at least, I read it so; this is the reading I share. Further, this mingling of different readings by scholars, serves as well to foreground how reading Glissant from a trope of irruptive eventfulness *makes* his work constricted before his own writing. Glissant engages with Deleuze's texts not *to* erode them, but, *with* Deleuze's very own *writing*, he imagines it differently[139], and shares that very imagination — by means of his writing. Not an alternative, that is, an oppositional stance aiming to be apart from it, but a *stance* that makes itself a very part of it. Not only desiring to imagine what is not here, but sharing the imagination of what is not there: expressing a very singular relation by the opacity of his writing, which is weaved with the opacity of Deleuze's. Making loss present; paradoxical paradox.

I must address the previous sections, in recollection. The point being: engaging opaquely with the literature — reading opaquely — makes me write certain things, that is, it demonstrates opacity can be used to imagine other articulations, touches; all unforeseen. I *make with* opacity, I *make with* imagination — and I make opacity with opacity, and I make imagination with imagination. To take these insights and place them *here* is not so much to claim opacity is *in itself* a path to perform; but to show it can be a contribute. I am pointing, staging, and caring for this, but I am trying to wave at them to invite you to them, rather than showing from the outset. This is not to say I am building a trap; rather, I am showing the journey along a labyrinth. On the one hand, this reading aims to *show* opacity can be a concept that gives itself to different usage, and, on the other, how such *giving* is only expressed when *made*, when *written*. It is about showing by unceasingly sharing. To read these scholars in a shared manner can only be shared by writing *with* them.

I believe this is the coherency or, more precisely put, *consistence*, in Glissant's work: a continuous relation across difference, never conflating such differences, but maintaining them opaquely. Not because they are effaced and re-written to be re-read; rather, they can be read in a shared manner, as Glissant's writing, I contend, is an invitation to learn with, rather than to learn from. It terms of pedagogical gestures, it

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[139] See Hallward, 1998, cf. Drabinski, 2019.

is a gesture that captures totality (Glissant, 1990) and yet, it does not seize it; it passes it on. A poetics of relation, uncontainable *by* an absolute imagination.

writing opacity: only, with

In this regard, the writer Édouard Glissant is not only a poet (e.g., Aching, 2012; Connolly, 2016; Fulton, 2024; Rappe & Stöger, 2024; Wiedlack, 2023); is not only a philosopher (e.g., Drabinski, 2019; Hallward, 1998; Wiedlack, 2023); is not only a theorist (e.g., Bermann, 2014; Diawara, 2016; Hoving, 2011; Johnson, 2014). The list could be longer[140]. And I do not hesitate to call him a writer: he *is* a writer because he *writes*, but the way in which he writes cannot be pinpointed. This is to say that, in practice, it is possible to address him, even if his writing eludes titling. The line is blurred, even if certain works appear to be more obvious.

As Glissant (2010) himself believes, in a conversation with Lise Gauvin, it is possible «to write poems which are essays, essays which are novels, novels which are poems» (pp. 29–30, translated here). This «undo[ing] of genres, this partition that has been so profitable, so fruitful in the case of Western literatures» (Glissant, 2010, p. 29, translated here) is performed because the «roles [...] granted to these genres [are] no longer suitable for [an] investigation which is not merely an investigation of the real, but also an investigation of the imaginary, of the depths, of the non-said, of the bans (p. 30, translated here). One

> must "jolt" in the sense of a jolt on a road, but also in a chaos, of what is chaotic [...] jolt[ing] all genres so as to express what we want to express. [...] Poetry can be jolty; prose can be dreamy and lapse into some kind of torment, debate, intoxication, without ceasing to be significant. (Glissant, 2010, p. 30, translated here)

This is what Glissant answers to the question of whether he sees a difference between prose and poetry. Again, by engaging with how they can otherwise be, he answers by imagining questions *and* by sharing the very formulating.

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[140] Other examples for titles used include critic (e.g., Murdoch, 2012) or novelist (e.g., Bermann, 2014). It should be noted that most of all sources read use more than one title to refer to Édouard Glissant.

J. Michael Dash (1995) understands Glissant is «neither exclusively poet, novelist, dramatist nor essayist», «often simultaneously» combining such «categories» (p. 1), or titles. Celia Britton, another noteworthy translator of Glissant's work, backs it: Glissant is «not only a thinker but also a novelist and poet» (Britton, in Glissant, 2020b, p. 1). Perhaps it is more precise to address his texts as more than a combination: it is an impatiently patient labour. What they *make*, rather than what they *are*: a precise tangible labouring. Glissant is an opaque writer, which is to say classifications do not concern him. It is an active eluding of an absolute. And such eluding is not a rejection, a moving away, but an affirmation before it, an amassing of it, a moving *with* it. *Staying* with *issues*.

It is possible to believe he is more than: the focus on his work is on its *how-ness*. The workings of his work. This study wishes to *make* his work, however, a teacher. So, what does an opaque text teach?

In this part, I share a shared reading of Édouard Glissant's writings on *opacity* so as to try to make an opaque conceptualisation of it. In this regard, the aim is to invite such postulation to this study as a traversing thought to *think with*, rather than an abstract concept to be deployed on.

While risking and in this way assuming the reduction of *opacity*, I believe it is important to foreground an understanding of it so as to continue this study. I ask to imagine an opacity that is unsurmountable; an opacity that is never momentary. It is the very overlapping of the world's singled out singularities that cannot be comprehended in totalitarian manner, that is, it cannot be reduced to an extractable idea to puncture the fabric of existence. It thus suggests the ongoing elusion of a vectorial relationship in favour of an unceasingly layering relation.

This is a fragile, very fragile proposal: I need you to believe this is the case. But, as Glissant's writing *is* writing, it can be made something more. If this gesture is not shared, there is nothing. Opacity is thus difficult because it is — even if insurmountably — fragile. It depends on compromise, responsibility; on sharing. I *choose* to believe it is possible to imagine so. I invite you to believe it is possible to imagine so. Therefrom, it is possible to *make with*.

This is why I refer to *opacity* as a *postulation*. His gesture depends following the belief one is already in the world, which is to say the world is not to be encountered, as *found*. Rather, it is to state the possibility the world can be made otherwise — and this otherwise is *with*. This opaque otherwise-with is an otherwise that is made by a gesture that does not supersede existing traditions, but learns with them, with legacy.

In terms of this study's guiding question — *what does it mean to make theory in education?*[141] —, with Glissant's writings, making theory means to invite the writing of the world. A shared world. A world which is not revealed, but impatiently made: unceasingly written *with*. Glissant *makes* the means and shares them, *at the same time*. The time of clarity is not controlled, rather, unceasingly imagined along with the very singular opacity made along his writing: clear and confusing. What is to be learnt, can only be learnt with the making of such clarity, with. It is passed on what is understood, and what it is not. With Glissant's writings, being clear when making theory is crucial to *not impose* intentions. It is a necessary requirement to relation, it is the clear establishing of an invitation. Better put, a requirement to the *continuous making* of relation. Obscurity is of no use — nothing is hidden, nothing is mysteriously concealed. The *game* of such textual pedagogical textual gesture is that of making what is imagined with. Clarity is the thick and opaque gravity of relation. This is the kind of a teacher an opaque text is. Or, more precisely put, this is a kind of teacher an opaque text can be imagined to be: a thick, dense, yet inviting text, composed by the amassing of references, times, places. A text that does not *dictate* what it argues, but *shares* the very argument as it goes.

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[141] As noted, this study's guiding question refers to art education, specifically — *what does it mean to make theory in art education?* —, but at this point I ask it in light of a broader educational regard.

To address the writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Gert Biesta, jan jagodzinski, Dennis Atkinson, I imitate Glissant's. That is, I render an opaque textual pedagogical gesture to compose an overlapping reading, and writing, of the mentioned authors. This is to see how the contrasting operativeness between obscurity and clarity, in their works, binds them. And what such relation *means*: the purpose for part IV is to address these texts so as to trace a limit for their language, from which mine is not detached.

IV · garden, and gardening

Across echoes-world, *a balance and an enduring* are rekindled. The individuals and the communities together exceed [*dépassent*] haughtiness or suffering, force or impatience — even if it is imperceptibly made so. The whole question is that of such process's optimising. Resultants are unpredictable, but the enduring traces itself : it is what settles into the place of ancient classicisms. No longer it is accomplished by the deepening of a tradition, but by the disposition of all traditions entering in relation. The baroques relay classicisms. The techniques of relation little by little replace techniques of the absolute, which often had been techniques of self-absolution. Arts of the expanse relate (dilate) the arts of depth. (Glissant, 1990, p. 109, translated here, emphasis added)

In this part, I compose an overlapped reading of, by writing with, texts by Gert Biesta, jan jagodzinski, Dennis Atkinson, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. I make use of the opaque textual pedagogical gesture I rehearse with Édouard Glissant's writings to share a clear idea with the mingling, the confusion, the jolting, of these four authors. By such *making*, I express how the making of art education theory in the three authors' writings — Biesta's, jagodzinski's, Atkinson's — rely on textual pedagogical gestures of showing that echo Rousseau's. In this respect, revelation is imminent to the intention of such gesturing. I address each author's texts — Biesta's, jagodzinski's, Atkinson's — mainly by, but *not solely*, a specific textual pedagogical gesture: respectively, *pointing*, *staging*, *caring*. These *textual pedagogical gestures* are foregrounded as the very pedagogical strategies these teachers and theorists narrate and depict: this is how their texts teach, and this is how they *make* theory.

Such practice of writing as pedagogical practice, however, is made complicated: on the one hand, I contend their texts are not detached from a revelatory task. Such task relies on momentary opacity — momentary loss —, thereby accepting opacity as obscurity. This makes these authors' *claims* indebted to a contrast between obscurity and clarity. I claim such *making* of theory they make use of, that is, the way in which their texts teach, is not quite fit for a sharing endeavour. On the other hand, however, their very texts can be read to express otherwise: there is an enduring that seems not to be concerned with revelation. This very tension motivates the writing of this part; that is, this part's all-encompassing purpose is to balance *stories* — what is written, and told, and listened — in the very confusion of their mingling, renouncing an absolute comprehension of them.

On a garden traversed, I invite to consider *how* can a making of theory in art education emphasising sharing — as *making with* — be: to move along with, to part V.

> Make your pupil attentive to the phenomena of nature. Soon you will make him curious. But to feed his curiosity, never hurry to satisfy it. Put the questions within his reach and leave them to him to resolve. Let him know something not because you told it to him but because he has understood it himself. (Rousseau, 1762/1979, p. 168)

> In the first place, you should be well aware that it is rarely up to you to suggest to him what *he ought to learn. It is up to him to desire it, to seek it, to find it. It is up to you to put it within his reach, skillfully to give birth to this desire and to furnish him with the means of satisfying it*. It follows, therefore, that your questions should be infrequent but well chosen; since he will put many more questions to you than you to him, you will always be less exposed and more often in the position to say to him, "*In what way is what you ask me useful to know?*"
> Moreover, it is of little importance whether he learns this or that, provided that he get a good conception of what he learns and the use of what he learns; *therefore, if you do not have any clarification of what you say which is valid for him, do not give him one at all.* (Rousseau, 1762/1979, p. 179, emphasis added)

These snippets from *Emile* (Rousseau, 1762/1979) evince the obscure gesture of the instructor, that focusses on the learning of the learner by a seemingly absent teacher — learning, here, the apprehension of an already contained, or tied down, knowledge. To do so means to place already answered questions, hiding the answers so as to be discovered by Emile, who is pointed to them by a desire. The instructor thus points: he hides the finger from Emile, building desire. Indirectly, surely, but a pointing nonetheless; in line with Rousseau's (1762/1979) paradoxes to be revealed in the end, with and by his text.

Moreover, it also foregrounds an interesting nuance to Rousseau's pedagogy: if Emile «learns this or that» (Rousseau, 1762/1979, p. 179), it is «of little importance» (p. 179) when compared to how such learning serves him, which is to say *his* interests, which are delineated by the instructor. On the one hand, it does not limit pedagogy to *what* is being learnt, demonstrating a concern to the *mode* of learning, that is, *how* Emile learns what is taught to him. On the other hand, it limits the aims of pedagogy to merely what is previously intended by the instructor. More specifically, therefore, it is about *how well* Emile learns the lessons.

This nuance both shows how complex Rousseau's pedagogy is, and yet, what drives it. In other words, Rousseau's straightforwardness is made through sinuous paths, *but* always certain ones. This is to say that what really matters is that Emile places his attention to the aim the instructor makes for him. If an instructor, however, is not sure whether what he says is *valid* for the pupil, nothing should be given. The instructor should thus only pass, even if conspicuously, what he himself deems convenient to be comprehended and comprehensible. That is also how *Emile* (Rousseau, 1762/1979) is written: with such book, the narrator points to his «collection of reflections and observations», «[as he] judg[es] that it is important to turn public attention in this direction» (Rousseau, 1762/1979, p. 33). Indeed, his pedagogical gesture and his textual gesture overlap.

This textual pedagogical gesture of *pointing* is the main trope I am using to address Gert Biesta's writings. I am engaging, mainly, with his book *Letting Art Teach. Art education 'after' Joseph Beuys*[142] (2017a), a work where Biesta articulates very clearly why and how art and education represent for him a relevant pairing.

The intention is to see how Biesta's writings rely on such textual pedagogical gesture differently from Rousseau's, yet echoing it. In other words, I am concerned in addressing the two writings' *pointings* by evincing their entwining — which is to say, *making* their weavings —, rather than their detaching.

[142] From here, I refer to Biesta's (2017a) piece as *Letting Art Teach*.

a two-faced concern

Gert Biesta's (2017a) *Letting Art Teach* presents a response to what Biesta finds worrying in art education: «the potential disappearance of both art and education from the theory and practice of art education» (p. 37). Thus foregrounding a separation between art and education from the outset, Biesta (2017a) argues the disappearance of art is «particularly visible in the ongoing instrumentalisation of the role of the arts in education» (p. 37). Specifically, how art is regarded as an efficient way to acquire knowledge, skills and competences, «something 'else', something that apparently really counts» (p. 37). Or, to frame it along with other of Biesta's contributions, how art is deemed an important resource to sustain a *language of learning* (Biesta, 2005). In other words, conversations about art in educational contexts usually happen for discussing how can art provide a contribute to specific and predetermined *ends*, ends which are not necessarily detached from aims which are regarded as educational — learning, teaching, training, instructing. It is a questioning of art through a movement that seeks an artistic way to tackle an intended educational answer. As for education's disappearance «from contemporary art education» (Biesta, 2017a, p. 37), Biesta contends there has been a progressive underlining of the role of the arts in education as mere providers of «opportunities for [children and young people to express] their own unique voice and identity» (p. 37). Biesta writes such «creative acts of expression are what matter educationally» (p. 37), regardless of whether or not what is expressed is «good», be it «for the one 'doing' the expressing», or «the world» where «such expressions *arrive*» (p. 37, emphasis added).

Following Biesta's (2017a) arguments, I wish to stress that in either situation both art and education disappear from art education by a pre-determinedly specified, and overwhelming, presence — one eats up the other by imposing one's ends onto the other. Just as the disappearance of art from art education results from circling its function in relation to a set image of the field, the disappearance of education from art education happens for the same reason. This is to say that, in either case, the language of one, takes hold of the other, and thus the situation: one is absolute before the other. So, the imposed limitations to the understandings of these concepts, art and education, result in what Biesta (2017a) calls a «double crisis in contemporary art education» (p. 37). This interplay between one and the other *makes* either more

comprehensible, that is, one *is* what the other *is not*, and vice-versa. In other words, such articulation secures the positions of one and the other, and their domains, which results in their unquestioned comprehension. This is to say *one* language assumes dominance over *others*: not reading such language, which is to say not following it, is to remain outside of the very domain it installs[143].

As Biesta (2017a) sees it, drawing from Hannah Arendt, «real educational work» consists in a continuous endeavour in favour of a balanced relationship with the world, where the latter *is* «in its own integrity and in dialogue» (p. 37) with those who engage in such educational task[144]. As for art, Biesta (2017a) brings fore he sees it as «an ongoing attempt at figuring out [...] what it means to be in dialogue with the world» (pp. 37–38). This «*reveal*[*s*]», as Biesta assumes, the educational question is the same as that of art: «how to *come* and remain in dialogue with the world» (p. 38, emphasis added). *World*, for Biesta, «refers both to the natural and to the social world, both to the world of things and to the world of beings» (p. 8). Biesta, working along Arendt and approaching such claim on other occasions, that of the relevance of a state of dialogue (e.g., 2013b, 2017b, 2021b), sees art and education as two elements that «cross each other's path» (2021b, para. 6). There, in such crossing, they partake of the same challenge: an *existential* one (Biesta, 2017a, 2021b).

For contextualising Biesta's concerns, I understand it is relevant to see this in light of Biesta's very research interests, namely, his contribution to the relations of education and democracy, and the former's public function (e.g., 2002, 2004a, 2004b, 2006a, 2006b, 2007, 2009b, 2010b, 2021c).

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[143] Approaching the «discursive construction of a 'Western' past for Finland and the United States in art education literature», Tervo (2022) highlights the title, or in Tervo's (2022) terms, *label*, of the 'West' is interestingly received at «face-value» (p. 245) and such non-problematisation is a motive for it to be addressed. Drawing from Michel de Certeau, Tervo writes the West's «intelligibility is established through a relation with the other» (p. 245), hence arguing «that while the 'West' has created a sense of belonging and historical continuity for some, it has also been mobilized to produce places of Otherness [...] that mark the contours of its realm» (pp. 245, 246). This is also to say I draw from Certeau's terms, as evinced by Tervo's contribution. It can thus be argued Biesta's concern results from the same discomfort before the smooth legibility of *art* and *education*, where one field eats up the other field. Tervo's contribution (2022), along with Certeau, aids in articulating what is at the end of this paragraph.

[144] Biesta writes *us* and *ourselves*, which I assume to represent those concerned and who engage with such dialogical desire. He is a bit more specific on such task, particularly on the teacher's side (see Biesta, 2017b, p. 8). Nevertheless, and this is telling by the work of art Biesta chooses (2017a), the student remains absent. In Biesta's view (see pp. 47–48), this is ultimately an evidence of the teacher being considerate of the learner's freedom. In other words, what is at stake here is an extreme positioning of the learner: to be out, is to be free. Paradoxically, however, this also entails an issue: the exclusiveness of a text by a teacher. The text is *intentionally written as thoroughly pedagogical*.

the figure of democracy

Biesta (2006a) sees the History of education and democracy as deeply entwined matters, as «since [education's] inception [...], political and educational thinkers alike have asked what kind of education would best prepare the people (*demos*) for their participation in the ruling (*kratos*) of their society» (p. 118). He does not, however, see such relationship and task as a given, arguing they are dependent on an understanding of how is the «democratic person» (Biesta, 2006a, p. 119). Following Arendt[145], Biesta writes «subjectivity is not defined by the attributes of an individual but is understood as a quality of human interaction» (p. 137). This moves away education's concerns from the *production* of *future people*, and towards a constant revisiting on how people *are* with others, a view Biesta can extend to «society at large», becoming a «lifelong process» (p. 141). This «political conception» of a democratic person, drawing from Arendt, is put against an «individualistic conception» — drawn from Kant —, and a «social conception» — drawn from Dewey. Biesta sees these conceptions *through* an understanding of education *through* democracy — contra *for* democracy (see pp. 123–125). Biesta contends the former conception aims at the «development of the individual's knowledge, skills, and dispositions» (p. 136), things which are, according to Kant, already within the person (Biesta, 2006a). As for the latter conception, notwithstanding a participatory role in democratic life, Biesta argues it stays tied to «an instrumentalistic and individualistic view» (p. 136), as Dewey sees the democratic subject as «created» only along such participation, made from one's own inherent characteristics (Biesta, 2006a). So, albeit Dewey educes something so as to provide a contribute to others, it is still something understood to be *brought fore* from *within*, just as in Kant's case. What sets apart Arendt's contribution, and thereby Biesta's, is that of an education which is not considered from an essentialist premise. Therefore, in light of Biesta's arguments, what is to be educed, is to be so from the crossing of paths themselves.

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[145] In *Beyond Learning*, Biesta (2006a) analyses the democratic person in light of Kant, Dewey and Arendt (respectively, «individualistic», «social», «political», see pp. 127–135). Such influence of Arendt in Biesta's views on democracy and education is also telling in *The Beautiful Risk of Education* (2013b), where a chapter titled *Democracy* is devoted to a comprehensive analysis of Hannah Arendt's political thinking and how Biesta draws from such political thinking in his educational work (see Biesta, 2013b, pp. 101–118). There are two ideas I would like to highlight: i) political existence is not something which merely happens; rather, it is constituted by one's actions in the public space in relation; ii) political existence needs to be continuously reconsidered due to its fragility, as democracy is ongoing, a change within changing (Paupério, 2022).

This brief excursus, and clarification, into Biesta's educational grounds aids in contextualising both his concerns on art education and thus how he sees the field. For Biesta, neither impulses that are pushing the disappearances of art and education, and sustaining them as monoliths, are in line with the political conception of the democratic subject. Rather, each echo the subjects brought fore by Kant's and Dewey's educational views, as Biesta (2006a) conceptualises them. The use of art education, exclusively, as a way for learners individually expressing themselves — unleashing an inner voice — is tied to Kant's individualistic conception. As for the instrumental use of art education, for a more efficient acquisition of useful skills, it operates alike Dewey's social conception, where competences are valued in relation to a predetermined end, or something that counts — *for who takes such decision*. Further, I would like to stress that by seeing the challenge of education and art as an existential one, without conflating them, Biesta addresses the «*relationship*» (2017a, p. 117, emphasis added) between the two fields by their intersection, which is to say he articulates art and education from such intention — a point is from where something may be educed.

point made

In this regard, it is possible to claim a traversing trope to which Kant, Dewey, and Arendt and Biesta converge: convergence itself. That is, Kant brings fore what is within the individual: the point of the one for the one; Dewey brings fore what is within the individual of use to others: the point of the one for the others; Arendt and Biesta bring fore what is within an intersection: the point amidst one and the others. This is were they *point* to: a moment, an event from where something irrupts. The arts' «educational significance» (Biesta, 2017a, p. 117) is thus explored with such concerns in mind, as Biesta understands the «arts provide unique existential possibilities for *encountering* the resistance of the world» and «working *through*» (p. 118, emphasis added) such resistance. Again, there, in such encounter, they partake of the same challenge: an existential one (Biesta, 2017a, 2021b). This is to say the desire to see art as contributive to an educational view is not aside a political whole. It is, nevertheless, a different political whole than the one Rousseau (1762/1979) depicts in *Emile*.

a political whole and a question

Rousseau's political whole is presented as *the* solution, to which there is no alternative other than becoming a slave (Tröhler, 2011), no alternative to freedom other than barbarity (Kontio, 2015). Rousseau shows such solution negatively so, that is, by affirming its presence in contrast to an absence of alternatives, enclosing the domain of discourse to a span *between* one and the other. Such technique is in line with the educational principle of negative education, a paradoxical condition he uses to favour what he sees as necessary — the virtuous republic[146]. Again, Rousseau (1762/1979) does not conceive of an education where relation exists in other ways than through the «original dispositions» (p. 39) of nature, premises which must be respected. Biesta (e.g., 2002; 2003) clearly moves away from Rousseau, seeing the political whole as the very possibility for alternatives that emerge from worldly encounters. Biesta thus flips Rousseau's politics: the question «what is this [the world] asking of me?» is favoured before «what does this [the world] mean?» (Biesta, 2017a, p. 39). The first question is that which demands the response from the very encounter with the world, a response that should be devoid of predetermination, calling upon the subject to act before it. The second question, in contrast, demands the subject to be compliant with a predetermination. In Rousseau's (1762/1979) writing, questions posed — owned by the instructor — already have answers — owned by the instructor. The instructor decides when to give them to Emile.

Recollecting this study's guiding question — *what does it mean to make theory in art education?* —, along with Rousseau's educational standing: making theory is to make Emile read the absolute reality of the world. Rousseau's world. A world which he reveals *when* and *where* he intends to. Rousseau *makes* the end so as to, then, *share* it by revealing it. What is to be learnt, is what is read from such revelation. The *resultant* of such textual pedagogical textual gesture is that of delivering what is intended, and that of receiving what is intended — the correct answer for the chosen question. Biesta does not hesitate when responding to what it means to be a teacher; the search «for the *progressive* meaning of teaching remains that: a search that is still ongoing» (2017b, p. x). Just like his view on democracy, education is always to be constructed. Rousseau's question to Emile, however, should be recollected.

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[146] See Tröhler, 2011, pp. 61–79.

«"*In what way is what you ask me useful to know?*"» (Rousseau, 1762/1979, p. 179, emphasis added) is the question the instructor should ask in response to Emile's questions. As the teaching entity is, for Emile, the world — Rousseau's world, a fusion of who teaches, what teaches, and what Emile is to learn —, the question Emile learns to pose, and to seek answers to, is similar: what is the world asking of him? Of course, the difference lies in an open-endedness Biesta argues for, as there should be no predetermination to the answer. Yet, both worlds ask.

showing by pointing

Unlike Rousseau (1762/1979), who obscurely uses opacity to disappear — momentarily —, only to make the educational process more visible — as in *believable* — for Emile — and the reader —, Biesta sees a teacher should be present, not mysteriously so. He is, indeed, rather cautious before the «educational paradox» of «cultivat[ing] freedom through coercion» (2017a, p. 86), what Rousseau indeed tackles by making use of such ambiguously obscure presence before Emile (see also Tervo, 2020). Before such «predicament», Biesta's (2017a) gesture brought fore in *Letting Art Teach* enacts his «response» to it: «arousing *desire* in another human being»[147] (p. 86, emphasis added), «the desire for wanting to exist in the world as subject» (p. 58). By *showing*: an «archetypical *form* of teaching» (p. 44), «an act of someone showing *something* to *someone*», implying «there is something to see and more specifically that there is something [...] worth seeing» (p. 44). Biesta contends such gesture[148] also entails «one person actually *believes* that there is something to see that is worth seeing by another person» (p. 44). To do so, he points to the work *How to explain pictures to a dead hare* by Joseph Beuys.

According to Biesta (2017a), Beuys conveys «at the very same time teaching-as-showing and a showing of this showing» (2017a, p. 48), while also «above all, [showing] that what ultimately matters in teaching is the freedom of the student» (p. 118). Posing

[147] It is noteworthy such calling of desire is also contextualised by Biesta in light of his democratic education. He formulates the «educational *ambition* — which [he has] characterised as an imperative upon the educator — as that of arousing in another human being the desire for wanting to exist in the world in a grown-up way» (2017a, p. 85). Biesta is also careful about what a «grown-up way of existing» consists in: «acknowledging the alterity and integrity of what and who is other» (2017b, p. 8). Perhaps, *attentive* could replace such word. Nevertheless, *desire* should also be considered with Biesta's account in how it also plays a part in the expanding of «global capitalism», which is yet another motive to address it (see Biesta, 2017a, pp. 71–72).

[148] Biesta (2017a) is not constant when addressing *showing*, using, for example, *act*, *form* or *gesture*, all in the same page (p. 44).

Beuys's piece as a «figure *for* the teacher» (p. 48), Biesta sees that whatever Beuys — a teacher — murmurs to the hare — a learner —, only matters absolutely if the ambition is to control the *other end*. As such, this piece, for Biesta, serves as a «reminder to the teacher that education should never end up in control» (p. 48). This is Biesta's reading, explicitly not detached from his educational views, and aiming, declaredly, at the contrary of what Rousseau aims at.

> 'Look, there is something there that I believe might be good, important, worthwhile for you to pay attention to.' At this point we may wish to emphasise the word you — YOU — in order to highlight that it is for YOU to decide whether YOU should pay attention or not, that it is for YOU to decide to step forward as subject or to remain object. (Biesta, 2017a, p. 58)

But «[w]hat remains mysterious» in this, for Biesta (2017a), is «how [to] actually manage to catch and focus another human being's attention [given] the difficulty of shifting a [learner's] attention from the finger that is pointing to what the finger is pointing at» (p. 44). The gesture Biesta (2017a) uses so as to address the act of teaching as showing is therefore that of *pointing*, suggesting «to another person, the student[149], that there is something 'out there' — in the world — that might be good, important or worthwhile for the student to pay attention to» (p. 38). Notwithstanding the emphatic *you*, in the passage at hand, Biesta does not want to «force another human being to exist as subject [and] that is why the educational gesture must remain hesitant and gentle» (pp. 58–59). The gesture to perform the «educational imperative» (p. 58), is, then, to gently and hesitantly point so as to arouse desire — an interruption is constituent of it. And Biesta contends that «it is important [for] educators [to] acknowledge the *interruptive* quality of [their] actions [...] *not hid*[*ing*] it away by taking recourse to suggestions such as that children are by their very nature curious and eager to learn» (p. 86, emphasis added).

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[149] Drawing from Rancière, Biesta favours on another occasion the word *speaker* (Biesta, 2010a), although «not [as] a conclusion» to the matter of «how [to] refer to those who are subject to education» (2010a, p. 540). I am tempted to consider the word *learner*, despite this study not being particularly devoted to the task of honing which word to use. Biesta sees *learner* as problematic, very much tied to the issues of the *language of learning*, as in someone who is lacking, a «*product* of the 'explicative order'» (2010a, p. 542). Looking, however, at Biesta's idea of the world — as alterity, indeed — and the educational impetus of establishing a dialogue that is never final, I see that *learner* could also be used. In other words, I suggest, *lacking* does not have to be considered in light of a hole to be filled, but along a latent condition in relation to attentiveness, or, following Biesta, «grown-up-ness» (2017b, p. 8). However, this still binds *learning* to *lacking*, that is, it implies that something is missing. This means *learning* is an eternal path towards completion. I side with Biesta on the problematics of such binding: *learning* should not, altogether, be considered in light of lacking. I do not, however, wish to deal away with such word: an aspiration to be complete is also a relational desire (Glissant, 1990). So, the question is how such desired is expressed: as a desire that *stays* latent and made productive, or as a desire to exhaust itself consuming the other, therefore made absolute.

What is not interrupted, however, is the interruption between teacher and learner.

showing not only by pointing

However, and I wish to stress this, what strikes me as most appealing in Biesta's (2017a) piece is how he explains the work of the educator in light of his existential approach to art education. And by *explaining*, I refer to Biesta's usage of such word, which he does not limit to a «transmission of knowledge from a teacher to a student [but expands it to the] event of bringing someone [...] into a domain of sense-making or [...] into a world» (p. 45). In other words, following Biesta, *explanation* is basis for dialogue, which, in his regard, is what art education can provide of most value (2017a).

In the book's fifth chapter (see Biesta, 2017a, pp. 85–91), the work of the educator is explored under «three headings: interruption, suspension and sustenance» (p. 85), an explanation performed along art's potential educational contributes. In more abstract terms, I sum it up as such: there is an event that interrupts the child's state so as to instigate doubt; such interruption of state is to be suspended so as to provide time for the child to engage with it; such engaging is to be sustained with the aid of the teacher. This is how Biesta (2017a) sees the work of the teacher: assisting the child in encountering the world, an encounter that «manifests itself in the experience of *resistance*» (p. 64), resistance that is to be worked through. But such resistance can be instigated, that is, it is possible to put «something '*in the way*' of the student's trajectory» (p. 87, emphasis added). Such introduction of resistance is regarded by Biesta as a rather fruitful tool in educational work, «in which the *turning* towards the world and the encounter with a reality that is 'outside' of the student and not constructed by them can take place» (p. 87, emphasis added). The introduced resistance is where «the arts have particular things to offer» (p. 88). Following Biesta, what art can do, «things that cannot be easily offered in any other ways» (p. 89), represents an «important contribution to make to *the pedagogy of interruption*» (p. 89, emphasis added). While Biesta makes a case of art's contributions in other moments of educational work — such as playing «an important role in providing support for sustenance» (p. 91) —, *how* he *explains* such work is telling.

Amidst «interruption, suspension and sustenance« (Biesta, 2017a, p. 85), Biesta slides in another heading: *Introducing resistance* (p. 87). Biesta, literally, introduces a moment of interruption *in* the journey of educational work. This, again, is what strikes[150] me. Granted, it is in line with what Biesta (2017a) announces in the first written pages of the book: *how Letting Art Teach* is. That is, how the book not only consists «of text, but also contains images, figures and forms, and also has a particular form, namely that of a book[151]» (p. 39).

> There is therefore a dialogue going on between the text and what is containing the text, a dialogue that seeks to show that this book is not just a text with illustrations that (literally) try to illuminate the meaning of the text, but that the book, itself, in its entirety, has something to offer beyond the meaning contained in the text and the imagery. Such an offering, as may become clear in what is to follow, might itself be encountered and received as (a) teaching. (Biesta, 2017a, p. 39)

But it is, nonetheless, a meaningful textual gesture which suggests me the very enactment of a pedagogical gesture of pointing; a textual pedagogical gesture it is. Even if ambiguously so — it strikes me, yet it is inconspicuous; it is not necessarily gentle, and definitely not hesitant. A fingerless pointing, nonetheless. And it enacts how I see Biesta (2017a) regards art's most important contribution to education: that of providing an interruption that *points* learners «towards something and away from something else» (p. 118). In such manner, I see Biesta (2017a) simulates his vision of the world with this book — and attempts to point the reader to it. In my case, it is evident such invitation happens, and it is joyfully accepted.

Biesta, to *point* to what he believes one should *care* about makes use of the *staging* of this book. And pointing *shows* me, but I am hesitant to say it *turns* me. But, am I not *turning* — gerund — as I *write along with* Biesta's writing? Hesitation is intentional.

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[150] During the writing of this study, in a conversation with Juuso Tervo, I am asked whether this word is meant to evoke a physical punishment by a teacher to a learner. This is not the original intention, but it is interesting to foreground this reading of it so as to, on the one hand, *point* to how I may have felt like a learner from Biesta's writing, and, on the other, as an evidence of the fragility of writing, *when in light of Rousseau's interest in it*: conveying otherwise. In other words, while an *instructing* consequence with my language in this study may be unavoidable, this is more of a thought to be mindful of, rather than an ultimate goal. With it in mind, the goal, rather, is to invite the reader to write with this study. I therefore stay with this word.

[151] It is not perceptible if Biesta is referring to a book — in abstract manner —, or if he has in mind its idiosyncrasies, such as, but not limited to, its sheets' and pages' textures, weights, colours. Or even the possible smell a book has or may have. Notwithstanding, the point I wish to foreground is vision is not the exclusive domain of the arts, and such characteristics may also feed the way in which something interrupts — to use Biesta's words — the state of things. Unlike the original pressing, which boasts, for example, a linen wrapped hardcover, the Swedish translation (Biesta, 2017/2021a) is a paperback.

«Such an offering, as *may* become clear in what is to follow, *might* itself be encountered and received as (a) teaching», Biesta (2017a, p. 39, emphasis added) writes in the introduction. Again, Rousseau's (1762/1979) educational life brought forward in *Emile* is predicated on a gesture of design that will be made clear «when one has read [his] writing» (p. 41). With Biesta, it *might*; with Rousseau, it *will*.

Both texts, *Emile* (Rousseau, 1762/1979) and *Letting Art Teach* (Biesta, 2017a) teach; not merely differently so.

making opaque encounters obscure

Like Rousseau's *Emile* (1762/1979), Biesta's *Letting Art Teach* (2017a) is a coherent work. Again, what I mean by coherent is its constitution as a unified whole throughout different approximations: form and content come together. *How* it *teaches*, matters. So, we have *Letting Art Teach* (Biesta, 2017a), a laconic educational book by someone who, if I may, enjoys books[152]. The work of both writers — theorists *and* teachers — thus attest to the importance they attribute to teaching: their theories are offered in such a way. Not simply because teaching matters, in itself, but «*how* teaching matters and what teaching matters *for*» (Biesta, 2017b, p. 1) — they differ, clearly, but they are more entwined than they are dichotomous, which this chapter makes clear. They teach and theorise at the same time, teaching is how they make theory and making theory relies on more than contemplating teaching: it practices pedagogy. There is an imbrication, an overlapping which bleeds through their texts. Indeed, Biesta (2017a) writes, educators like Rousseau seek «to circumvent representation by suggesting that all education needs is for the child to encounter and handle things» (p. 105). Encounters, however, never «with things 'as such' but always encounters with educational 'stagings', and behind such stagings lie quite explicit educational intentions and didactic programmes» (p. 105).

In terms of this study's guiding question — *what does it mean to make theory in art education?* —, with Biesta's writings, making theory in art education means to *reveal* the world abruptly. An end is *pointed* at, to hint it, so it can be shared. The time of clarity is

[152] I speculate. This stems, mainly, from the closing lines of the acknowledgements in *The Rediscovery of Teaching* (Biesta, 2017b): «although I do not envisage adding a fifth title to the trilogy, one can of course never be sure about what the future will bring. In my view, however, a quartet is also not a bad achievement» (p. x).

not necessarily controlled, but there is an attempt to do so. What is to be learnt, is what is read from such eventual revelation. Illocution serves Biesta as the conveying of meaning so as to point to a dialogue with the world — his book, by means of his gesture. He passes on what he understands and what he believes could be understood. For Biesta, sharing clarity when making theory is crucial to *hone* his intentions. It is a useful requirement to overcome. He crystallises the pedagogical relation by taking advantage of opacity — a veneer between him and the learner, and the teaching entity — *the world* —, the result of such gesture being that of delivering what is intended: accepting it as obscure. Not in terms of a content previously hidden by Biesta, as Rousseau would do, but as pointing to moments for attunement, where the opacity of art, when encountered and worked *through*, provides an educational contribute. As with Bloom and Rousseau (1762/1979), educational imagination is imagined *beyond* opaque encounters. While with Rousseau, a revelation from clarity is the result — an illumination of what is previously intentionally hidden —, with Biesta, perhaps, a revelation from darkness — an obscure reading.

Biesta's writings, not only depict an image of his educational concerns, but also *show* a specificity to a language of art education theory: such specificity expresses theory and pedagogy at the same time. With Biesta's writings, *textual pedagogical gestures* can be *heard*. He makes his language tangible, teaching by making me *believe* I am being taught: which I express by this very chapter.

With Biesta's text, art education is what may be culled from the crossing of art and education — where art may be a provider of tools for educational purposes. Therefore, what is to be educed, is to be so from contact itself — a moment that can be titled, within a world that can be narrated. The theorisation approached is concerned with how may art contribute to an expanded understanding of the world — and one's place in the world — by working through the very resistance of worldly *encounters*. In other words, art's opacity is summoned to *match* moments of loss of intelligibility — which is to say it appears opportunely, and such opportunity is severely entwined with interruption. *What does it mean to make theory in art education?* In the foregrounded manner of making theory in art education, it means to make use of art's opacity to render the unknown knowable. It means to *change* what is unknown into something *known*. With Glissant's lexicon (e.g., 1990), it is to accept the opaque as obscure.

However, *what* is written in Biesta's (2017a) text, such coherent piece, is written with caring ever so intensely about writing, about practice, about making. I want to hesitate to understand why should such an opacity be interrupted.

At this *point*, I *believe* the *stage* is set to address jan jagodzinski's textual pedagogical gesture.

> I will arrange things so carefully that the suggestion always comes from him, never from me; (Rousseau, 1762/1979, p. 102)

> I return, therefore, to my method, and I say: when the *critical age* approaches, furnish young people with sights which restrain them and not with sights which arouse them. Put their nascent imaginations off the track with objects which, far from inflaming, repress the activity of their senses. (Rousseau, 1762/1979, pp. 230–231, emphasis added)

These snippets from *Emile* (Rousseau, 1762/1979) again evince the obscure gesture of the instructor, that focusses on the learning of the learner by a seemingly absent teacher. To do so means to *arrange* a setting that limits Emile's imagination to a domain of an already predefined envisioning. Whatever deviant path Emile may imagine is annulled by specific objects. For Emile to seize knowledge, that is, the *true knowledge* which is property of the instructor, he must do it on his own. Better put, he must believe it is his own making. He learns to believe what he desires is what he desires, rather than what the instructor desires for him. The instructor thus stages: he circumvents Emile's sight to that which is intended to be shown, and instructed, whilst remaining in the audience. In other words, Emile's imagination is carefully contoured, on a narrowing trajectory in and towards the instructor's, Rousseau's, world. The stage is set and the show, or such showing, must go on — *as intended*, until the predefined end.

Rousseau's (1762/1979) method, or methodology[153], has here one of its fundamental traits declared: every detail is carefully arranged, every detail must serve the same end; the senses must only be active towards it. Moreover, by stressing the «return [to his] method» (Rousseau, 1762/1979, p. 230) in Book IV, Rousseau affirms the over-encompassing aspect of his pedagogy. On the one hand, it does not limit his pedagogy to *the* age of Emile, that is, it is a pedagogy that can be retrieved for *a* «critical age» (p. 230). On the other hand, it is the very limitation of pedagogical work by an interplay with the very limiting of the world. This both shows how effective Rousseau's pedagogy has to be, *and* how meticulous it needs to be. This is to say that what really matters is that Emile places his attention in the aim the instructor makes for him, a making that must be thoroughly calculated in advance. That is also how *Emile* is written: carefully arranged, as much as Rousseau can in his «vain efforts to do better» (p. 33), so that his «collection of reflections and observations, disordered and almost incoherent» (p. 33) can be presented. Despite mentioning the difficulty of assembling such collection, it has to be presented by such non-laconic book, as he «judg[es] that it is important to turn public attention in this direction» (p. 33). Indeed, a pedagogical gesture and a textual gesture overlap.

This textual pedagogical gesture of *staging* is the main trope I am using to address jan jagodzinski's writings. I am engaging, mainly, with the first chapter to *What is Art Education? After Deleuze and Guattari*[154], where jagodzinski (2017), editor of such book, writes *A Critical Introduction to What Is Art Education?*[155]. In such piece, jagodzinski (2017) articulates very clearly how he sees the work of an artist can be tied to teaching — by lighting Deleuze and Guattari's (1980/2005) *cosmic artisan* in other stages. This also serves him to make theory for how he sees art education. I am not limiting, however, this study's engagement to such text, as the mentioned motif — *the comic artisan* — is recurrent and continuously honed and rethought by jagodzinski (e.g. 2022; 2024), a motif which, I claim, relies on a pedagogical gesture of *staging*.

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[153] As argued in this study's part II, regardless of the different methods between *Emile*'s (Rousseau, 1762/1979) first three books and last two books, Rousseau's methodological goal does not change: things are to be dominated secretly so as to provide the deliverance of a message.

[154] From here, I refer to this book as *What is Art Education?*

[155] From here, I refer to jagodzinski's piece as *Introduction*.

The intention is to see how jagodzinski's writings rely on such textual pedagogical gesture differently from Rousseau's (1762/1979), yet echoing it. Again, I am thus concerned in addressing the two teachers', the two writers' *stagings* by evincing their entwining — which is to say, *making* their weavings —, rather than their detaching.

a concern: sieving chaos and proposing a matching world

jan jagodzinski's (2017) *Introduction* presents a suggestion «for art education in this age of the Anthropocene», an «'exit' strategy» (p. 31) to the argument he brings from Suhail Malik[156], that poses a «strong charge against contemporary art» (p. 30). Put briefly, Malik's argument according to jagodzinski (2017) «speaks of the malaise of the contemporary in general where art is subsumed under the global network of galleries tied to corporate interests» (p. 31). Malik's claim, summed up by jagodzinski as that of «[c]ontemporary art [...] not [being] adequate to the present» (p. 31), is grounded on the understanding that contemporary art is not an art of or for the present. Rather, it is an art of and for a *generalised* idea of what and how is the present. In short, «[c]ontemporary art mistakes itself for contemporary art» (p. 31). In abstract terms, this means contemporary art is regarded paradoxically as what it proposes can only be proposed within its own realm. In this respect, what contemporary art foregrounds can only be foregrounded within a particular domain which is in itself already articulated. So, under such movement sustained by «the art industry», that is, «critics, historians, curators and so on» (p. 31), there is no way for contemporary art to «contest an injustice» (p. 31), as it ultimately «negates» it (p. 31). It *places* injustices within its own cyclical indeterminate present, *making* them indeterminate, cyclically (jagodzinski, 2017). In other words, it reduces the present to a narrative sustained by an endless and unsolvable paradox, bringing what it may address to such very understanding. This is to say its language eats up others.

The reason for jagodzinski (2017) to bring Malik's argument to his own writing, his own stage, is that he sees an affinity between it and the very history of art education. For jagodzinski, «art education [...] follows the trends that appear on art's

[156] See jagodzinski, 2017, pp. 30–31

horizon [being] then worked into classroom use» (p. 31), workings which operate under the setting of standards. In other words, as with contemporary art's functioning (jagodzinski, 2017), art education provides an educational contribute to an already established educational idea. Both cases thus entail that a particular understanding of art is what is desirable. This means both art and education are not regarded as problems[157]; rather, as solutions for the same end, an end which is predefined and tied by jagodzinski to economic logic. As noted in 2024, jan jagodzinski sees art «remains a 'secondary subject'» taking «a backseat as to what 'counts' for the economy»[158] (jagodzinski, 2024, p. 479). jagodzinski's reasoning also separates art from education, or, better put, it establishes art education as what can be the contribution of art to education, also visible by the formulation *art and its education* (e.g. jagodzinski, 2017, 2022, 2024)[159].

In light of such institutional pressing, jagodzinski (2017) suggests «embrac[ing the] notion of the Cosmic Artisan, which does away with 'art' as it has become institutionalized, but stays true to art as developed in DW, an art that is committed to A Life» (p. 31). The use of the abbreviation *DW* in the previous citation might be a typographical mistake, as there is no reference to any work, in the *Introduction*'s (jagodzinski, 2017) notes bearing such abbreviation. I believe it should be a reference to *What is Philosophy*, hence *WP*. jagodzinski (2017) introduces *What is Art Education?* as a book that owes to the «problematic raised by Deleuze and Guattari in [...] *What is Philosophy?*» (jagodzinski, 2017, p. 1). The first pages of jagodzinski's *Introduction* (see

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[157] I am using this word in accordance to jagodzinski's (2017) preference. Recollecting a previous footnote: jagodzinski quotes Deleuze and Guattari: «[a]s the creation of thought, a problem has nothing to do with the question, which is only a suspended proposition, the bloodless double of an affirmative proposition that is supposed to serve as an answer» (Deleuze & Guattari, as cited in jagodzinski, 2017, p. 1).

[158] I believe such nomenclature — 'economic' or 'economical' — is worth questioning to better understand what may be at stake when discussing *economic* pervasiveness. While I keep the title of *economical* or *economic*, in accordance to the sources referenced across the study, I would use *financial*. Here, I have in mind Pierre François and Claire Lemercier's *Sociologie historique du capitalisme* (2021). Particularly, I wish to highlight they have divided the times of capitalism in three ages, calling its current stage the age of finance (François & Lemercier, 2021), specifically the period from the 1980s up to our present days. I do not, by any means, intend to *correct* jagodzinski, there is no hierarchy in mind. Rather, to be more specific — eventualising economy, so to speak. Finance is more akin to monetary resources and its management; to make an end (from the French, *fin*). «Finance is not a novelty: it is consubstantial with capitalism, to which its synonym, capital, also gives its name. If we speak of the age of finance, it is therefore to depict not its appearance, but its dominance [...]» (para. 39, translated here). In this respect, this *fin*, this *end* can be read in clearer way when discussing the effects of economic policies with regards to the *learnification of education* (Biesta, 2009a) and the *new language of learning* (Biesta, 2005), which, as suggested in this study's part I, can be referred to as a language of *ends*.

[159] Moreover, jagodzinski's reasoning entails a sequential and hierarchical condition to the relation between art and education. In other words, the arguments posed suggest school art lags behind contemporary art, and this distance must be shortened. For a discussion on the issues of such reasoning, which entails a temporality tied to a developmental educational narrative, see Tervo, 2020. For a contrasting position to jagodzinski's, see Efland, 1979, where, from suspecting «the school art style tells [...] more about schools and less about students» (p. 43), it is suggested that the focus should be on changing the very school, rather than «school art» itself (Efland, 1979).

jagodzinski, 2017, pp. 1–4) make the case of using *A Life* for his text in relation to art, under such work (Deleuze & Guattari, 1991/1994), namely chapter seven. While a thorough approach to the concept of *A Life* is beyond this study's aims[160], it should be noted very briefly how and why jagodzinski (2017) poses it, as it gives weight to his mentioned suggestion. Moreover, for this study's purposes, it aids in expressing *how* jagodzinski's suggestion and *exit strategy* are also made by it, that is, *committed* to it.

a suggestion: sieving chaos and proposing a new world

«A Life is a *transcendental* field, a *pure plane* of *immanence*. It is a plane of existence, of genesis, the clamour of becoming», jagodzinski writes (2017, p. 3, emphasis added). Such plane is where philosophy, science and art come together, each with «its own distinct method», respectively, the «ability to create 'pure concepts'», the «discover[ing of] knowledge via functions and domains of reference, or regions as specific states of affairs», and the «creat[ion of] new worlds of perception via blocs of affects and percepts» (jagodzinski, 2017, pp. 1–2). These planes, as foregrounded by jagodzinski (see p. 2) come together by intersecting, and in such intersecting they «*stave off chaos*» (p. 2). The brain, «not [to] be thought as a bodily 'organ,' but [as a] plane of immanence [...] acts as a screen or a sieve from the full intensity of chaos» (p. 2). In other words, the working of *A Life* is to establish a plane from chaos, or, more accurately, *find* one, as it *sieves* the already existing chaos. Written in this way, *A Life* is inherently paradoxical, as it bears the potential of *creating new* worlds, despite its action being the *sieving* of an *already existing one*. Indeed, genesis from the already existent, a «sequence of thought: the movement from blocs of sensations to concepts (virtual Ideas[sic]), which are then *actualized* into represented generalized objects and subjects» (p. 2, emphasis added). However, neither of the three spheres are essential, being «subject to change as they respond to a changing world that presents new problems» (p.2). This plane of immanence is expressed via art itself (see p. 3). That is, art is both the expression of the sieving of chaos, and the proposition of a new world.

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[160] For a comprehensive conceptualisation and engaging with *a life* in relation to an educational framework, see Varpanen, 2025. As a brief remark, interestingly, Varpanen's text seems to enact its very own interest. The thorough and attentive concern with *life* can already be read in the dissertation's very acknowledgements, written «in the depth of winter, but with a feeling of an invincible summer» (see Varpanen, 2025, pp. iv–vii). That is, Varpanen (2025) understands that without those acknowledged he would not be engaging with the same life, which would not make him «be here now» (p. vii).

This is how art should concern the artist, who

> for Deleuze, is someone who *delves into* the intensive chaotic presence of the flesh, *into the 'wound'* that defines his or her existence, experimenting with the force of the pure *event*, participating in it, thereby turning the physical event into a pure intensive becoming through a counteractualization. This takes a certain willingness, not in the sense of desiring per se, but a willingness to *find something* '*in*' the senselessness of the wounds that are inflicted on us all. [...] The most difficult task of the artist is to *extract* A Life or being of sensation from the lived as blocs of sensations that stand up. (jagodzinski, 2017, pp. 4–5, emphasis added)

Art, for jagodzinski (2017), is here less regarded in terms of its «utilitarian aspects» (p. 4), than it is for its irruptive force. In other words, it is a proposition *of* a new world, and not *for* a new world — the *new* world does not exist a priori. The language is telling: the artist is to *find something* in the wounds, and bring it to evidence. That is, to find a proposition in chaos and bring it to light; this is the conducting of an irruption. *A Life* «exists everywhere but it is *covered* over and *hidden* to *ordinary conditioned perception*» (jagodzinski, 2017, p. 3, emphasis added). The *making* of an artist can thus be articulated as the revelation of what is hidden: an encounter with the hitherto obscured the artist brings to clarity, the constituent of a new world: a *sign*. When such irruption is accomplished, the work of art stands on its own, «preserv[ing] blocs of sensations that can continually be encountered», until it «break[s] down» (p. 5). Notwithstanding, that very moment where the sign is revealed is when «[n]o separation exists between sign and meaning, and hence there is no separation between the world and the meaning attributed to the world» (p. 6). The *making* of art, or «[a]rting[,] as event *becomes* a *site* and a *moment* when change *happens*, a modulation takes place from one way of being to another» (p. 6). «*A true encounter with a sign is an event*» (p. 7), jagodzinski stresses. In a particular moment, then, sign, event, art, *A Life*, all come together; the irruption is propelled by their intersecting, which is to say, the point of conjoining.

Art is thus the manifestation of *A Life*. That is, the inherent immanence of *A Life* is released by the artist in the form of art. The plane found in chaos points to a new world, in the existing world, rather than to a representation of an image of already presupposed worlds, the issue of contemporary art and art education jagodzinski (2017) articulates with Malik.

exit, stage right: the cosmic artisan

Approaching this understanding of art and the artist's task is important to see how jagodzinski (2017) uses it to address the problematic brought forward by Malik. jagodzinski (2017) writes Deleuze and Guattari's concern is «the possible worlds art can *fabricate*, that is, art's engagement with the world as A Life» (p. 30), and he posits such possibility aside mere imagination. This detail means art's possibility is thus an imagining of possibility itself that becomes evident, that is, perceptible, which jagodzinski refers to as «fabulation» (p. 30). In other words, art becomes *in the world* and *A Life* is thereby manifested — immanence is *released* from intimate thoughts which become evidences. It is this understanding of art, that is, its inclination to fabling (jagodzinski, 2017), jagodzinski stages so as to frame the «'exit' strategy» (p. 31) for art education, following Malik's predicament about contemporary art. In this way, in the very moment of irruption, contemporary art *is and becomes* contemporary art; it needs not to mistake itself for it. But the stage, however, requires an actor.

The mentioned «'exit' strategy» suggested by jagodzinski (2017, p. 31) for art education, interestingly, is made through a figure, that of the cosmic artisan, which jagodzinski sets apart from an artist. Drawing from *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (Deleuze & Guattari, 1980/2005), jagodzinski (2017) sees such shift establishes a difference from an activity concerned with «represent[ing] the world, [...] or a nation», or self-expression (jagodzinski, 2017, p. 35). The focus is, rather, placed on a commitment to *A Life*, that is, to the emission of a sign that calls for a new world that calls new people who call for such new world. This is also an engaging with language that aims the possibility of detaching itself from a discourse, that is, it is also a way for jagodzinski (2017) to avoid a complicity between an artist and a discourse defined by «global institutions of art» (p. 35), that define the artist as well. Tellingly, it works as the very argument: contemporary art must be detached. Or, to use a word more frequently used by jagodzinski throughout the text, *released* from the narrative that makes it mistake itself for an already existent image of contemporary art.

If *not* an artist contributing with contemporary art, then, the *significance* of the cosmic artisan's contribution must be different.

an inconclusive new thought

Just as a teacher who exists in the educational world, the cosmic artisan can be «found in the art world per se», existing «as singularit[y]» (jagodzinski, 2017, p. 35). jagodzinski (2017), in the *Introduction*, predicates the era in which art education happens is the Anthropocene, «the [present] dystopia» (p. 37), and this is the very context «where cosmological imagination gives art and its education its mandate»[161] (p. 28). Again, a commitment to *A Life*: the event of its irruption which points to a new world. It is up to the cosmic artisan to «creat[e] new arrangements of the virtual, a much more difficult task» (p. 36), jagodzinski writes. And it is a *new* world, yet to come, for people *yet to come*, not a pointing to *others* who already exist, whose «perspective» is made understandable by the «usual ability of art [...] via novels and the like» (p. 36). In this regard, from the intersection of philosophy, science and art of Deleuze and Guattari's cosmic artisan (jagodzinski, 2017), jagodzinski suggests technology should be embraced by this cosmic artisan for a less modern conception than that of Deleuze and Guattari (jagodzinski, 2017). This is jagodzinski's solution to bring the 'exit' strategy to actualisation, even if virtually:

> Art, science and technology must come together to offer a postrepresentational or a postconceptual or non-representational logic to open up a gap within our habituated anthropocentric world to change human intensity so that a *belief* in the world can still emerge. (jagodzinski, 2017, p. 37, emphasis added)

jagodzinski's cosmic artisan is thus not an artist that represents the world, or an image of the world; such figure takes a step further and can show a world hitherto unknown by carefully staging, that is, by an *assemblage*[162] of technology, science and art. Art is the very manifesting of such opening of gap, that is, it is the very *stage* where the

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[161] In a more recent piece, jagodzinski approaches the *post-Anthropocene* (jagodzinski, 2024), but maintaining the relevance of a cosmological imagination. Whilst acknowledging a «rebirth of 'materiality' and crafts in the name of environmentalism and ecological consciousness» (jagodzinski, 2024, p. 480), jagodzinski nonetheless laments «a way of grasping the force of art in relation to science, technology, and philosophy never entered the classroom or higher education» (p. 481). This *way*, for art education, is the way as performed by the *cosmoecoartisan* (jagodzinski, 2024), who «generat[es] an apparatus-assemblage that has ethico-political import, with the proviso that such an assemblage can only exist as a potential in terms of its transformative affects. It is subject to failure and renewal when it 'breaksdown'» (p. 487). Art education «along cosmoecoartisan lines» (p. 487) thus follows lines comparable to the *cosmic artisan* brought fore in the *Introduction* (2017), that is, an exit strategy to an existing structure that condemns the present, *and*, thereby, the future.

[162] I am using the word *assemblage* in accordance to jagodzinski's (2017) text. For an account on how such word may be imprecise in relation to Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari's texts, see Phillips, 2006. *Assemblage* «is normally understood to be derived from the French word *agencement*, as used in the works of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (who, furthermore, do not use the French word *assemblage* in this way)» (Phillips, 2006, p. 108). I am not mentioning this issue to perform some sort of *correction*, rather, because it is telling of how concepts, and words, are *made*, which is not aside their usage. This is not to lament, but to joyfully converse.

immanence of *A Life* is *revealed*. The cosmic artisan «*must 'harness'* the forces of materiality to disturb the seemingly 'normativity' that all is 'business' as usual, so that the ontological foundations of what is happening needs to be made visible» (jagodzinski, 2022, p. 12, emphasis added). «All teaching *must* perform such a gesture», jagodzinski (2024, p. 484, emphasis added) writes, «forward[ing] paradox to generate an experience that evokes thought» (pp. 483–484). Or, returning to the *Introduction* (jagodzinski, 2017), emitting signs, as they «produce desire» (p. 6). For jagodzinski (2017), that is what makes «a great teacher[:] an emitter of signs» (p. 39), «a *catalyst*» (jagodzinski, 2022, p. 10). This also means jagodzinski's suggestion for change in art education is, ultimately, aimed at pedagogy. In other words, art education is not regarded apart from its pedagogy.

The cosmic-artisan-persona[163], from jagodzinski's writings, can be summarised — rather, staged — as thus: an attentive subject who gathers elements from the world and arranges them, *staging* an interruption that evokes an inconclusive thought: a sign that points to a new world. A pointing which can only be made by setting up a stage. A contrast to Rousseau (1762/1979), who is not at all interested in evoking inconclusive thoughts. Rather, the staging of the interruption is calculated so as to give a thorough and neat lesson to Emile. To understand how is this stage arranged, and what does it entail, it is important to see how is technology exemplified, as it is the very element that allows for the *exit strategy*. jagodzinski (2017) is clear by way of the work of Olafur Eliasson.

showing by staging

Rousseau (1762/1979), when a *critical age* is imminent, makes use of opacity to frame Emile's imagination to *the* stages he carefully sets up. This is how Rousseau makes Emile believe what he wants to; he defines *the* belief, he enlightens what is not to be obscured, and he obscures what is not to be enlightened — to *his comprehension*, dealing away with opacity, that is, reducing the world. Unlike Rousseau (1762/1979), jagodzinski (2017), in the critical age of the Anthropocene, sees *a* staging can make *a*

[163] Such figure is moulded in different moments along other concepts — e.g., ecology (jagodzinski, 2024), post-humanism (jagodzinski, 2017), but its operativeness remains the same.

belief in the world emerge. The indefinite article is here important in light of jagodzinski's writing, and it is also telling of yet another tension between what he writes, and what Rousseau writes.

> Deleuze|Guattari's philosophy is not based on biology; it is not biology that is used to explain other strata such as art, language and history. Biology becomes simply one way in which the power of life is manifested; the virtual power of Life is always *propelled outside* any representational designations, which is why the indeterminate article in *A* Life served Deleuze so well (*'a smile, a gesture, a funny face'*) for these singularities detached themselves from any possession. (jagodzinski, 2017, p. 30, emphasis added)

jagodzinski remits to *Pure Immanence*, quoting it in the *Introduction*'s (2017) notes:

> The indefinite is the mark not of an empirical indetermination but of a determination by *immanence* or a transcendental determinability. The indefinite article is the indetermination of the person only because it is determination of the singular (Deleuze, as cited in jagodzinski, 2017, p. 48)

Rousseau (1762/1979), however, sees pedagogy as instruction — an informative drive onto the other. As such, whatever sign can be emitted, must only serve his predefined end and when he decides the time is proper; it must *never* arise Emile's imagination beforehand. That is, the *immanence* of «[a] *smile, a wink, a careless gesture*» (Rousseau, 1762/1979, p. 217, emphasis added), may reveal what an instructor «seeks to hide from [pupils]. To learn it, [pupils] need only see that [the instructor] wanted to hide it from them» (p. 217). This entwinement furthers how the stagings of both, Rousseau and jagodzinski, operate: the immanence of interest to Rousseau (1762/1979) is bound to *the* staging that reveals it; the immanence of interest to jagodzinski (e.g., 2017) is bound to *a* staging that reveals it. The former, however, is desired in relation to a carefully arranged, hidden and previously known certainty, whilst the latter is desired in relation to a carefully arranged, hidden, never before known evidence.

jagodzinski (2017) writes about Olafur Eliasson's installation *The Weather Project* as an example for a coming together of art, science and technology, that irrupts the present state of times, altering it and its subjects (see pp. 37–39). I want to focus here on the piece's particularity jagodzinski (2017) evinces, *the* particularity that signals the

moment that makes Eliasson an «exemplary Cosmic 'posthuman' artisan in his creative endeavour, who like a great teacher, [for jagodzinski,] is an emitter of signs» (p. 40). Put briefly, in such installation, Eliasson «constructs an abstract *machine* that, in the first moment, is phenomenologically pleasant and soothing» (p. 38). However, Eliasson's staging does not *obscure* the «technical setup» (p. 38) of the piece. This technological evidence justifies the relevance of technology in the makings of the cosmic artisan, being fundamental for jagodzinski, as «it reveals what sustains that [pleasant and soothing] experience» (p. 38). This shift makes impossible a return to the first contact's mere *experience*, or affect. Eliasson's machine, jagodzinski argues, «positions the viewer in this vibrating gap to stir up an event; notice that this event 'happens,' [...] enabling the phenomenon of 'seeing yourself seeing'» (p. 38). jagodzinski contends that from such moment, a «new subject is produced» (p. 38), *aside* object and subject. «[I]t is *technology* that inserts itself between object (unknown Nature) and subject (the visitor) *staging* an encounter, an event» (p. 39, emphasis added). That is, the staging carried away by Eliasson gives way to an irruptive event. Showing by staging, for jagodzinski, is relevant for showing the stage itself which is, in itself, a catalyst for a *new* way of thought, that is, a *new* way of *seeing*.

Not unlike Gert Biesta's (2017a) showing by pointing, a textual pedagogical gesture that entails someone «*believes* that there is something to see that is worth seeing by another person» (p. 44), jagodzinski's (2017) showing by staging stages that very proposal. As with Beuys' *How to explain pictures to a dead hare*, Olafur Eliasson's *The Weather Project* also conveys a mode of teaching-as-showing and a showing of such showing. *The Weather Project* is made a teacher by jagodzinski (2017). *There*, is the exit. A figure of a teacher for art education, in a staging of what *should* happen in the classroom: a *new* subject from object and subject.

The stage, however, shows the very teaching entity; the learners, that is, the student and the master apprentice (jagodzinski, 2017), or teacher, remain in the audience. In other words, while the teacher and the learner may find themselves in the same position, that of learners, there is never an overlapping of the teaching entity — what teaches — and the learning entity — who learns. While Rousseau (1762/1979) hides himself from the stage and hides the staging itself, the cosmic artisan is apart from the stage and yet it provides the staging, «'a kind of superior viewpoint'» (Deleuze & Guattari, 1996, as cited in jagodzinski, 2017, p. 29). Like a

«Messiah who rises beyond[,] this celestial *deus ex machina* re-turns authority to art education by releasing students and teachers from the continued strain of their human-centred present» (Tervo, 2020, p. 162). The *machine* of Eliasson, jagodzinski's cosmic artisan, births a glorious future into the present — *if* the emerged belief is believed in.

> Jesus said to him: "See! Your faith has saved you". And suddenly, the blind retrieved his sight and followed him, glorifying God. And all the people, seeing it, gave glorification to God. (Luke, 18:42–43, translated here)

In this process, however, while there is a certain commitment to opacity as it is a quality of perceptions and of affects (see jagodzinski, 2017, pp. 19–20), the issue is that opacity itself is *fabled*[164] from obscurity. In other words, there is always a telos to it, even if unknown — the teleologic operativeness is sustained. A cosmic achievement by a *mythical* figure (Cardigos, 1996), a *release* from harnessed forces that irrupts into the very present — if not, it fails. So, there is a narrative: a sequence of connected events that, as contemporary art which functions in its own image itself fabricates, generate an understanding that is limited to such telos. Pointing at an unknown stage, but a stage, nevertheless. To both Rousseau (1762/1979) and jagodzinski (2017) gestures serve to arrange a stage for a mode of teaching, not only differently so. Rousseau's stage must appear pristine to work; jagodzinski's stage must appear tainted to work.

s*howing not only by staging*

When jagodzinski (2017) chooses *diagram* to refer to Eliasson's *The Weather Project*, it is equivalent of him saying what *it* is, in his understanding: «[t]he abstract machine is like the diagram of an assemblage» (Deleuze & Guattari, 1980/2005, p. 100). The assemblage (Deleuze & Guattari, 1980/2005), the disposition of elements that compose a stage, is interesting for jagodzinski *if* diagrammatic, that is, if what

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[164] I am writing with jan jagodzinski's (2017) text: «[i]magination certainly creates a possible 'future,' but a future of repetition that needs to be immediately overcome via the second synthesis of time (that of the past, memory and the necessity of reflection). It is the third synthesis of time of the eternal return that presents the future proper and closer to fabulation than that of imagination, which remains psychologically subjective» (p. 48). However, the same reasoning jagodzinski makes by a sequential and hierarchical condition to the relation between art and education, happens here. In other words, the argument posed entails a temporality tied to a developmental educational narrative (see Tervo, 2020). This is jagodzinski's time of education, and time used in the making of theory — predicated on the overcoming of moments. It is more about myths, than it is about fairytales.

composes the stage also reveals its very workings. Staging of staging, showing of showing. Signs; as a great teacher emits.

In a more recent piece, jagodzinski (2024) appears to enact this very cosmic pedagogy: by way of writing, he shows how four exhibitions by Latour and Weibel, which he deems as examples of cosmic-artisanship, can «offer active philosophies of the earth, cosmologies necessary for new educational imaginaries» (p. 483). jagodzinski's description is made «*to cull transferable ideas into art education*» (jagodzinski, 2024, p. 483, emphasis added). That is, jagodzinski points to such artworks' particularities so as to extract *A Life* that may inflict change. Such cosmic artisanship is how jagodzinski (2022) sees a contribute to education: *showing* an apparatus that a «cosmic» pedagogue must be apt to recognise so as to address «an Anthropocene 'problematic'» (p. 4). This is what jagodzinski (2017) does when addressing Eliasson's diagram: *pointing* at the stage's elements and at their very workings. The extracting of a sign that *makes* a new encounter, an event that calls for new people, for a new world, released from the world as is. As put by Deleuze and Guattari (1980/2005), «[a] book is an assemblage [and] [t]here is no difference between what a book talks about and how it is made» (p. 4).

> We will never ask what a book means, [...] We will ask what it functions with, in connection with what other things it does or does not transmit intensities,
> (Deleuze & Guattari 1980/2005, p. 4)

The *Introduction* enacts how I see jagodzinski (2017) regards art's most important contribution to education: that of arranging an event that *stages* a *new* world for learners. In such manner, I see jagodzinski shares with such text how, to him, can an envisioning of a new world be, and attempts to stage the reader in it. In my case, it is evident such invitation happens. jagodzinski (2017), to *point* to what he believes one should *care* about, makes use of the *staging* of the *introduction* — also setting the stage for the very texts it introduces. And staging *shows* me, but I am hesitant to say it *transforms* me. But, am I not *transforming* — gerund — as I *write along with* jagodzinski's writing? That is, am I not *transforming* jagodzinski's dictation into a practice of making?[165] Hesitation is intentional.

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[165] I am writing with Édouard Glissant's (1990) text: «[d]ictation, if it happens, [must] transform itself into a practice of creation, neither with obligation nor with sanction» (pp. 115–116, translated here).

making opaque encounters obscure

Like Rousseau's *Emile* (1762/1979) and Gert Biesta's *Letting Art Teach* (2017a), jan jagodzinski's *Introduction* (2017) is a coherent work. Again, what I mean by coherent is its constitution as a unified whole throughout different approximations: form and content come together. *How* it *teaches*, matters. We have this *Introduction* (2017), carefully staging the stage for signs to be emitted — signs that point to the work of art educators should do. The work of the writers — theorists *and* teachers — thus attest to the importance they attribute to teaching by means of theory. Not simply because teaching matters, in itself, but how it matters, and what it matters for. They differ, clearly, but they are more entwined than they are dichotomous, which this chapter makes clear. They teach and theorise at the same time, teaching is how they make theory and making theory relies on contemplating teaching. There is an imbrication, an overlapping which bleeds through their texts.

In terms of this study's guiding question — *what does it mean to make theory in art education?* —, with jagodzinski's writings, making theory in art education aims *staging* the world so as to induce abruptness. The end is *staged* to be revealed, so it can be shared. The time of clarity is not necessarily controlled, but there is an attempt to do so. What is to be learnt, is what is read from such eventual revelation. Illocution serves jagodzinski as the conveying of meaning so as to stage an encounter with the world. He passes on what he understands should be understood. For jagodzinski, sharing clarity when making theory is crucial to *reveal* his intentions. It is a useful requirement to overcome. He crystallises the pedagogical relation by taking advantage of opacity — a veneer between him and the learner, and the teaching entity — *a shocking event* —, the result of such gesture being that of delivering what is intended: thus accepting it as obscure. Not in terms of a content previously hidden by jagodzinski, as Rousseau would do, but as one staged, where the opacity of art, when the emitted sign is encountered, provides an educational contribute. As with Bloom and Rousseau (1762/1979), educational imagination is imagined *beyond* opaque encounters. While with Rousseau a revelation from clarity is the result — an illumination of what is previously and intentionally hidden in a stage —, jagodzinski aspires a revelation from darkness — an illumination of what is obscured, whilst the stage is still being arranged: interruptive.

«The Outside, after all is 'dark,' dark cosmic holes exist; light is both refracted and reflected — *Lux and Lumen* — transparency and opacity» (jagodzinski, 2017, p. 36). In jagodzinski's (2017) understanding, opacity *reflects* light, that is, it emits a sign. For Glissant (1990), opacity is «a whole silt[,] fertile silt but [...] uncertain» (p. 125, translated here). It bears an «insistent presence we cannot not sense» (Glissant, 1990, p. 125, translated here). It may be that, in jagodzinski's terms, Glissant is considered, perhaps, a dark Deleuzian (see jagodzinski, 2017, p. 32), which could be, perhaps, a reading of Peter Hallward (1998)[166] as well. Both jagodzinski and Glissant, however, side on their postulations being worldly. On the one hand, Glissant (1990), in *Poetics of Relation*, discusses *the world*[167] (e.g., p. 139) and *our world*[168] (e.g. p. 220). jagodzinski (2017), on the other, focusses on worlds, be it, for example, *for-us*, *new*, *without-us*, even though, quoting Deleuze, jagodzinski sees «this world is already ours» (Deleuze, as cited in jagodzinski, 2017, p. 24). This to say that, unlike Glissant, jagodzinski sees «we are not *in* the world, we become *with* the world» (Deleuze & Guattari, as cited in jagodzinski, 2017). In other words, such argument entails a temporality tied to a developmental educational narrative that can be noticed in jagodzinski's work (see Tervo, 2020). This is jagodzinski's time of education, and time used in his making of theory — predicated on the overcoming of moments[169]. Opacity, as argued in this study's part III, does not necessarily concern such *overcoming*; a different educational time, unconcerned with momentary eventfulness can be imagined. It is not that opacity enrols in the fabulation of the dark, or the light — it is the clarity along with the confusion of both. It is a different time of education, then, a time unconcerned with eventful disruptiveness, but with the very unceasing affirmation of the presence of absence.

jagodzinski's text not only depicts an image of educational concerns, but also enacts a language of theorisation in art education. Art education is what may be culled from the revealing darkened stage established by the coming together of art, science and technology — where art is the expression of new possible educational purposes. Therefore, what is to be educed, is to be so from the point of contact itself — a

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[166] Recollecting, here, this study's ninth chapter.

[167] In the original (1990), using the definite article *le*, or the contraction of the proposition *de* with the definite article *le*, *du*.

[168] In the original (1990), *notre monde*.

[169] Recollecting, here, a previous footnote.

moment that can be titled, within a world that can be narrated: an intersection, the emitting of a sign. The theorisation approached is concerned with how may art contribute to an expanded understanding of *a* world — and one's place in *a* world — by the very fabling of hitherto unknown worldly *encounters*. In other words, art's opacity is summoned to *produce* moments of loss of intelligibility that are perceptible — which is to say it appears opportunely, and such opportunity is severely entwined with interruption. *What does it mean to make theory in art education?* In the foregrounded manner of making theory in art education, it means to make use of art's opacity to render the known unknowable, yet *readable*. It means to believe something lies beyond what is comprehensible, yet, comprehensible as well. It means to inflict *change* to what is known, and therefrom *making* something *hitherto* unknown. In other words, with Glissant's (e.g., 1990) lexicon, it is to believe the opaque is obscure.

However, *what* is written in jagodzinski's (2017) text, such coherent piece, is written with caring ever so intensely about writing, about practice, about making. I want to hesitate to understand why should such an opacity be interrupted.

At this *stage*, I *believe* some *care* is in hand to address Dennis Atkinson's textual pedagogical gesture.

> I partake of his pain, of his indignation. (Rousseau, 1762/1979, p. 99)

> It is man's weakness which makes him sociable; [...] Every attachment is a sign of insufficiency. [...]
> [W]e are attached to our fellows less by the sentiment of their pleasures than by the sentiment of their pains, for we see far better in the latter the identity of our natures with theirs and the guarantees of their attachment to us. If our common needs unite us by interest, our common miseries unite us by affection. (Rousseau, 1762/1979, p. 221)

These snippets from *Emile* (Rousseau, 1762/1979) yet again evince the obscure gesture of the instructor, that focusses on the learning of the learner, but by a momentarily, and opportunely, present teacher. Unlike *pointing* and *staging* which function under the condition of the instructor being apparently absent, this gesture operates more intricately. On the one hand, the instructor *is* Emile's guardian; on the other, he does care about Emile's education, providing «assiduous care [exclusively aimed at] the preservation of a sound judgment and a healthy heart» (Rousseau, 1762/1979, p. 241). Of course, caring for Emile is never apart from specific interests, that is, the instructor cares for Emile insofar as the educational journey he carefully stages and points to does not deviate from the predetermined end.

However, it is the instructor's understanding that social relations are bound by lacking; lacking the other. This *weakness*, as the instructor considers it, is, nevertheless, a key element for his pedagogy as it is core to his manipulating of Emile. He gains Emile's trust from it, simulating his affinity with Emile's despair so as to obtain information. The instructor shows a self, a figure before Emile — to Emile, however, the instructor reveals himself absolutely. To the reader, a figure narrates Emile's journey and yet, to the reader, Rousseau speaks his political whole. This confusion Rousseau writes is presented in clear tone, firmly and not weakly.

And it is *weakness*, such risky and delicate state, that gives grounds to the teachings of History: *true History* which accounts for lessons that make Emile their neutral reader, their «judge» rather than «their accomplice or as their accuser» (Rousseau, 1762/1979, p. 237). This *weakness* is explored by Rousseau (1762/1979), the instructor, throughout the whole of *Emile*; it is not limited to moments in Emile's life. The instructor shows care, shows by caring, and cares about caring as well — ultimately, caring about what Emile fathoms being precisely the instructor's vision of, and for, the world. Caring is yet another layer of the opacity he builds around and for Emile. In this regard, caring matters for Rousseau insofar as it is a mean for conducting his obscure pedagogy. He transpires care, deceitfully: listening to Emile solely aims to seize accounts which provide information for Rousseau to further hone his pedagogy, to secure a *certain* future. At the same time, there is enormous care in getting a message across, to convincingly state an education «which *sacrifices* the present to an uncertain future» is «barbarous» (Rousseau, 1762/1979, p. 79)[170].

Caring is thus, and also, a gesture of great calculation for Rousseau's (1762/1979) pedagogy, and it is where I see his mastering in the interplay between opacity and clarity gains most relevance and is most impressive. It is not merely about disappearing from Emile's sight, while still being its *author*; it also requires appearing before Emile's sight, evidently so, yet, at the same time, concealing — and firmly controlling such operativeness between what is and what is not revealed. Caring allows for the instructor to step into the stage and point, *visibly* for Emile. It is the instructor's mask. Moreover, as approached in this study's part II, the very

[170] This is telling of Rousseau's intransigence of whatever may deviate from his own predetermined ends, that is, of stories that may tell a different tale than his own. See Tervo, 2019b, for a discussion in the context of art education and its «future-orientated imaginaries» (p. 42) that brings attentiveness to the relevance of other «(hi)stories, ceaselessly in the making» (p. 43), while also approaching the claims that justify *sacrifice* for the sake of something better.

commitment of Rousseau to writing *Emile* (1762/1979), a non-laconic book by someone who hates books, also evinces his meticulous care in getting *his* political message across, a traverse that makes use of a tone: a convincing one. That is also how *Emile* is *written*: Rousseau's «collection of reflections and observations, disordered and almost incoherent» (p. 33) are presented «as it is, [in such non-laconic book, as he] judg[es] that it is important to turn public attention in this direction» (p. 33). And «although [his] ideas may be bad, if [he] cause[s] others to give birth to good ones, [he] shall not entirely have wasted [his] time» (p. 33). Carelessly, perhaps, *Emile* might not have been published at all. Indeed, his pedagogical gesture and his textual gesture overlap.

This textual pedagogical gesture of *caring* is the main trope I am using to address Dennis Atkinson's writings. I am engaging, mainly, with the book *Pedagogies of Taking Care. Art, Pedagogy and the Gift of Otherness*[171] (2022), where Atkinson addresses pedagogy in art education by supporting pedagogies of taking care in light of moments where teachers must respond to different pathways of learning (Atkinson, 2022). Indeed, pedagogy and art education are not considered separately.

The intention is to see how Atkinson's writings rely on such textual pedagogical gesture differently from Rousseau's, yet echoing it. Yet again, I am concerned in approaching the two teachers' *carings* by evincing their entwining — which is to say, *making* their weavings —, rather than their detaching.

other concern

Dennis Atkinson's (2022) *Pedagogies of Taking Care* continues his previous writings on pedagogical practice particularly in art education, but more assertively forwarding pedagogical practices along the act of taking care. It is Atkinson's (2022) response to an overarching «obscur[ing]» of «'other' modes of practice» in education, «in both teaching and learning» (p. 2), that results from a wide spreading of prescribed and prescriptive actions that predefine and limit what education is and how it is. «In contrast», Atkinson proposes, «pedagogy might adopt the notion of the gift of otherness as both a generative opportunity to examine established values and modes of practice and in doing so expand how practice is conceived» (pp. 2–3). Such

[171] From here, I refer to Atkinson's book as *Pedagogies of Taking Care*.

limitations by prescriptiveness, Atkinson contends, result in the marginalisation of certain subjects, like arts. Value is rather placed on «disciplines on which [economic] ambition depends», thus «prioriti[sing] the production of subjectivities that are required to realize such ambitions» (p. 4). Contrastingly, «a pedagogy of taking care begins with a *concern* for each child or student's learning pathway, [...] working with and expanding [it] across a range of subject domains» (p. 4). In other words, the issue that concerns Atkinson can be summed up as the dominant presence of an overarching language that defines the ways in which education addressed, and what for, and thereby the involved pedagogical relation. This to say the educational field, and inherent practices *and* practitioners, are narrowed down to a predefined end, just like Rousseau's pedagogy. It is before this tapering Atkinson makes his proposal: a pedagogical approach that does not limit each and every one's *adventure* to come, to use a term akin to Atkinson (2018), and therefore education.

This is a very brief account of Atkinson's (2022) case and a full-blown detailing is not within the present study's concern. I wish to point, particularly, to how Dennis Atkinson sees the image of the teacher in a pedagogy of taking care, and its implications both to art education theory, and to how Dennis Atkinson *makes* theory. As Atkinson (2022) *makes* clear, his proposal for pedagogical work cannot be merely focussed on teachers, or teaching, and it should commence from caring about the very learner. In this regard, I begin engaging with Atkinson's pedagogical proposal — encompassing his theorising *and* teaching —, by a figure Atkinson believes one should care about, one who may already be part of this very study.

not just an idiot

It could be Socrates' *dumb* (Plato, trans. 1997a), it could be Glissant's (1990) silent person who walks. Dennis Atkinson (2022) brings attention to the idiot, «the one who does not speak the Greek language or share established customs»; the «'one who slows the others down' by resisting or interrupting established orders and customs, not because these are wrong but because *there is something* [*unknown*] more important» (p. 92, emphasis added). The idiot, or for Atkinson's (2022) «pedagogical purposes, an idiotic *event*, produces a *gap*, an *interstice*» (p. 93, emphasis added), «a provocation for

thought and practice, a questioning presence» (p. 93). This kind of interruptive event tells not «how to proceed but confers on a situation the power, the challenge, to make [those engaged with it] think» (p. 93). For Atkinson, pedagogical work, and education, are not immune to situations of such kind, situations which are inherently antagonistic to predefined and prescriptive pedagogical situations. That is, situations that are only concerned with *answering* presences. Atkinson suggests such event might be named «an event of otherness» (p. 137). Therein, it is this very event that carries the immanent potential needed to revisit the state of things and in such revisiting expand how is practice devised. The *gift of otherness* stems from becoming aware of such event, which «effects a 'dis-appearance' of 'reality' to invoke an 'other' reality, one whose *insistence* demands that we try to recompose our modes of practice in the here and now» (p. 137).

For Atkinson (2022), this is an ethical question as well, one which is concerned with «confer[ing] upon the specificity of a situation or a presence of the power to make [one] think, [rather than] impos[ing] the force of established frameworks of thought to explain a situation» (p. 138). Quite differently from Rousseau (1762/1979), not invested in sustaining questions at all, that is, questions devoid of answers he does not know. Rousseau (1762/1979) does recognise the force of imposing established frameworks, as «[i]n everything habit kills imagination» (p. 135). However, in contrast to Atkinson's case (2022), these forces are desirable as they establish control. Rousseau (1762/1979) asserts «[w]hatever explanation one prefers [his] method is [...], always effective; and [so he claims] this is perfectly confirmed by experience» (p. 135).

How, then, to act when one believes there might be something obscured which should not be prevented from revealing itself?

caring for, and with, speculation

One of the key arguments for Atkinson (2022) to sustain his pedagogy is the idea of speculation[172] which he posits as starkly opposed to a predeterminate and determinative approach to education and pedagogy. In his regard, «speculative inquiry, thinking and practice [...] are crucial [as] such inquiry *recognizes* the *immanence* of

[172] Recollecting: this is the matter briefly addressed in this study's methodological considerings.

potential that enables a more *expansive* pursuit of invention and innovation» (p. 125, emphasis added). Atkinson (2022) is careful, and caring, in presenting his argument: he acknowledges the importance of presenting learners to tradition and recognised forms of knowledge, notwithstanding his focus on the former educational task which engages with «a world to come [...] which cannot [...] be controlled or predicted» (p. 125). «Speculation», Atkinson writes with Vikki Bell[173], «involves an opening toward other presences heretofore ignored, un-consulted or otherwise rendered irrelevant to the scene at hand» (p. 128). But Atkinson *cares*: the question is not limited to letting in what is supposedly obscured, it is also expanded to the actions when its revealing occurs:

> My experiences of responding to children's drawing practices involved some encounters when I struggled to grasp what was produced because I seemed to have no working framework of reference. I was puzzled. The *affect of mystery was assuaged or passed over* by *reading* the drawings through cliched responses without engaging in a critical examination of the epistemological or ontological foundations, the constraints, of my practice and understanding. A crucial question therefore is, how is it possible for others such as teachers to 'see' or acknowledge the sense and relevance of these drawings for those who produce them and *thereby support and encourage their potential?* (Atkinson, 2022, p. 128, emphasis added)

Asking the question is already a split from Rousseau's (1762/1979) pedagogy — that is, asking the question and actually be invested in the very question. The instructor (Rousseau, 1762/1979) cares for Emile's answers, but only insofar as they provide *further* details so he may hone his already designed educational journey *further*. That is, questions *serve for* Rousseau to secure his educational *answer*. The potentials to be supported and encouraged in *Emile* are those which can amount to Rousseau's own educational idea; no deviations. So, unlike Rousseau, establishing a future and defining the present accordingly — time as vector —, Atkinson (2022) is interested in pedagogical work which may tackle «futures which are not simply extensions or continuations of the present» (p. 128). And caring for such possibility of a time which is not captivated gives way to a very important aspect of Atkinson's (2022) pedagogy: its convivial ambition.

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[173] *Vikki* is occasionally spelled as *Vicky* (see Atkinson, 2022, pp. 127, 128, 247).

In light of a non captivated future, and also not being interested in pursuing such end, Atkinson (2022) sees «pedagogical work is [...] constituted as a *learning-with*, rather than a *learning-from*» (p. 130). The aim is thus placed in «engag[ing] with the immanence of a learner's experiencing mutations emerging through a learning encounter» (Atkinson, 2022, p. 130). In other words, pedagogical proposals are to be made *with* the very encounter, the very encounter *with* an otherness concealing a gift. So, tackling the question above — how, then, to act when one believes there might be something obscured which should not be prevented from revealing itself — is indissociable from making a relation with otherness *not* aiming its controlling. But to make this relation, pedagogically, does not mean to simply be open to otherness, but to actually foreground a *proposition* — «a lure for feeling» (p. 8). «From a teaching perspective it is not a case of inventing propositions to reveal a prior reality for a learner to access but of propositions that help in *composing a reality* for a learner» (p. 132, emphasis added). Yet another contrast to Rousseau's (1762/1979) pedagogy, erected around propositions so as to reveal *his* prior, that is, already existing reality to Emile. *Luring*, for Atkinson (2022), is about inviting; for Rousseau (1762/1979), trapping.

Atkinson's (2022) convivial ambition is thus an enduring making, rather than a given. This makes me retrieve the idiotic event, or the idiot: the moment when language is interrupted. These moments put resources that can be used for making a relation in question, as there is not a speech, nothing within the domain of intelligibility for the convivial. In a pedagogy of taking care, this *gap*, to use Atkinson's (2022) word, this interruption of language, asks for «pedagogical tools [in speculative key] that [...] increase and expand the learner's experience in relation to the immanence of its evolving importance» (p. 143). But these tools, in speculative key, cannot be prescriptive, that is, they do not serve a predetermined aim. They are, rather, contingent. It can be said they are relevant insofar as they are *improper*: their usage is not restricted by a predetermined function.

art making

Dennis Atkinson (2022) presents a thorough and careful approach to art in *Pedagogies of Taking Care*. What I wish to foreground in his interest, is the very *making*

and *makings* of art. This is tied to the speculative key Atkinson (2022) sets, involving openness to presences hitherto ignored or unknown. But it also has to do with the work of pedagogy, as speculative process, which for Atkinson — and I side with him —, must not limit itself to mere openness before otherness. That is, it must foster such gift of otherness, and *take care* of it by forwarding propositions that account for a possible future for the learner's learning. So, it is not only about *caring*; it is about *taking care* (Atkinson, 2022), indeed.

There are two key moments I wish to foreground. First, an approach to Erin Manning's notion of artfulness, which «refers to the *manner* of practice» (Atkinson, 2022, p. 140; see also pp. 140–141), which immediately puts Atkinson's (2022) interest apart from the «art object» (p. 140). Artfulness is foregrounded as a «speculative process» (p. 140) which, «[i]n pedagogic work this includes the practice of *artfully inventing manners* that allow teachers *and* learners to cultivate experiencing that may lead to new or modified ecologies of practice» (p. 141, emphasis added). This might be regarded as the very rehearsing of pedagogical gestures, «minor gesture[s] [activating] the *collectivity* at the heart of thought [thus] effect[ing] *change*» (Manning, 2016, p. x, emphasis added).

Secondly, an approach to Michel Foucault's notion of the scandal of art, positing art «[a]s the 'site of the *irruption* of what is *underneath*', as that which 'has no right or possibility of expression', [thus] a site of otherness and as a gift of otherness» (Atkinson, 2022, p. 147, emphasis added). To foreground this in such *manner* serves to bring attention to a recurring concern in Atkinson's work: the event (e.g., Atkinson, 2011, 2018). Or, in more detail, his concern for the irruption of moments hitherto hidden that may teach — as in foregrounding a proposition towards unforeseen futures. In jagodzinski's (2017) terms, emitting a sign — and forcing a reconsidering of the frameworks at hand. That is, the idiotic event *emerges*.

In order to reconsider the very frameworks at hand, Atkinson (2022) turns to Laruelle's non-philosophy (see pp. 156–162). Put briefly, non-philosophy is a way of philosophising that addresses philosophy itself by negating its authority as a hegemonic way of thought — a philological[174] approach to philosophy, I would call it.

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[174] I am writing with Werner Hamacher's (2015) text, namely, the sixth thesis in *Minima Philologica*: «[t]he idea of philology, like the idea of language, forbids us from regarding them as something had [*eine Habe*]. Since the Aristotelian definition of man as a living being having language uses the (linguistic) category of having [*Habe*] for language itself, and thus tautologically, language is without a finite object and is itself a non-finite category, an *apeiron*» (p. 8, brackets in original).

Atkinson places emphasis on the *non*, seeing it «can also be applied to other autonomous domains of practice, as in non-pedagogy, or non-aesthetics, [...], in order to question their '*sufficiency*' and thereby open each to a more expansive field of practice» (Atkinson, 2022, p. 159, emphasis added).

Atkinson (2022) and Rousseau (1762/1979) seem to agree: «[e]very attachment is a sign of insufficiency» (Rousseau, 1762/1979, p. 221). Atkinson (2022) would, *perhaps*, posit it as: insufficiency is grounds for possible attachments. For Rousseau, these attachments are more like chains that instil weakness, whereas for Atkinson they evoke immanent convivialities. Atkinson (2022), from Laruelle, builds an important argument, or, better put, proposition[175]:

> It is important therefore to conceive thought as a practice that has numerous forms of life. *Beyond philosophy* the task would be to consider other practices, such as art, music, technology, science and other practices, in order to expose their colonizing authority in contrast to those practices that lie 'outside' and which may be marginalized or excluded. (Atkinson, 2022, p. 161, emphasis added)

«How», Atkinson (2022) asks, «does writing about art [...] capture or define art practice and its productions?» (p. 162). Indeed, what kind of intelligence is at stake when reading? I am not being careless by following *writing* with *reading*. Rather, I am postulating that writing without thinking the writing is reading oneself onto the other. It is not a *making* as creative practice; rather, it is executing. By asking this question, Dennis Atkinson (2022) shows he cares about taking care, that is, he assumes to be open to otherness *and* to be available to reconsider his own practice before an *idiot* that *points* to him something more important, unknown, could be *there*. Thereafter, Atkinson may advance a proposition so as to contribute to the ongoing pathways of learning. Moreover, this thickens the importance of art *making* set against the art *object*, a making less concerned with captivating, than it is with *releasing*. Rather than «obscur[ing] 'what is there' [...] *let* this otherness *show* [...] practice could be otherwise» (p. 173). *Letting art teach* is regarded as important.

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[175] I am writing with Atkinson's (2022) preference. See the fifth chapter in Atkinson's book (2022, pp. 125–144), making use of such concept, *proposition*, from Alfred North Whitehead, as a «'lure for feeling', as that which causes thought to think, a situation, for example, such as a learning encounter, that forces thought and practice» (p. 8).

showing by caring

Rousseau (1762/1979), the instructor, «partake[s] of [Emile's] pain [and] indignation» (p. 99) to thicken the binds between him and the pupil. The instructor's (Rousseau, 1762/1979) care, deceitful, is visible to Emile but at the same time, care is also concealed. *Caring* shows his mastering of an imbrication of opacity and clarity, which he uses to make Emile believe him, by an interplay that is carefully staged to point Emile towards the very obscured understanding Rousseau predefines. That is, the instructor holds an imbrication, but he does not share it as an imbrication; he shares it as an interplay, an interplay that only shows Emile what is intended. Absolute sequential understandings, never overlapping ones. It can be argued the instructor also *takes care*, albeit differently from Atkinson (2022): the proposition is always already there, an effective method already in motion that is to be repeatedly deployed whenever a slight deviation from Emile is noticed. Emile's belief must not be questioned by otherness, Emile's imagination must not even peek *outside*.

> When the *proposition* is stated, it is *necessary to imagine its demonstration* — that is to say, to *find* of which proposition *already known* this one must be a consequence and, out of all the consequences that can be drawn from that same proposition, to choose precisely the one required. [...] I do not intend to teach geometry to Emile; it is he who will teach it to me; I will seek the relations, and he will find them, for I will seek them in such a way as to make him find them. (Rousseau, 1762/1979, p. 145, emphasis added)

Atkinson (2022), on the other hand, cares enough to venture *outside*, and takes care to show how. In a brief passage, Atkinson (2022) poses what I see is his most relevant speculation in the book for this study's concerns. On the one hand, it evinces and unfolds, to me, what may be considered a valuable guiding light[176] for an otherwise pedagogical imagination, and, in this study's context, and otherwise making of theory in art education. On the other, because it can be written to suggest space between him, and the other three teachers. «We might argue, looking awry, that perhaps the true purpose of pedagogy is the *continuous education* of teachers or educators» (p. 184). But to make it so, that is, for a teacher or an educator to enrol in their very continuous

[176] I am writing with Dennis Atkinson's (2022) text: «a valuable guiding light to such a speculative pedagogy might be to adopt as a pedagogical imperative the advice given by Alfred North Whitehead[:] *Have a care, here is something that matters!*» (p. 89). For further reading on Whitehead by Atkinson, see also Atkinson, 2017, pp. 65–89.

education, *otherness* must be cared for; not solely opening oneself to it, but to move towards it, to let it show practice could be otherwise, one predicated on conviviality and forfeiting a privileged gaze. So, writing this question with Atkinson's (2022) terms and propositions: as an *immanence of potential* is *recognisable* in the above speculation, what does this *expansive pursuit of invention and innovation* show, as a possible world?

He lets otherness give its gift, which he cherishes:

> When we work with others as in a teaching-learning context, and we receive their gift [...] and we offer ours — when we function according to a pedagogy of taking care, an important medium of relation is empathy. It is not the imposition of established form, concepts or practice but an *empathic collaboration* that may give rise to new sensibilities and new possibilities. (Atkinson, 2022, p. 196)

A few pages onwards:

> Being sensitive to the practice of others and their evolving assemblages of practice, feeling that something may grow here without imposing an aim or your views, sensing that the student is making connections no matter how tentative, giving confidence to explore and experiment, allowing the student to feel the engagement in practice, all of these are important to a pedagogy of taking care. *It is a pedagogy in which both teacher and student are equals and where evaluation involves a mutual collaboration*, a pragmatic negotiation, *which is part of the ongoing practice and not something external to the practice*. (Atkinson, 2022, p. 196, emphasis added)

In other words, for Atkinson (2022), caring entails *forfeiting one's own language* and be available to engage with the language of otherness — it is to reimagine the ways in which one addresses. «A language that does not allow established abstractions to occlude the immediacies and divergence of practice» (Atkinson, 2022, p. 224), «an evolving collective language» (p. 224).

Unlike in the writings of Rousseau, Biesta and jagodzinski, in Atkinson's (2022) text the line between learner and teaching entity declaredly begins to blur. «Labels», or titles, even if handy, «can limit both teaching and learning» (Atkinson, 2022, p. 226), they can seize their practices and relations — a grip of language that puts a grip on language. Rousseau (1762/1979), on the other hand, does not forfeit his *his* Emile[177]. And to be precise: I am not arguing Atkinson (2022) *switches* positions with the leaner:

[177] Recollecting: as noted in this study's part II, not seldom the instructor (Rousseau, 1762/1979) refers to Emile as *his*.

he *blurs the line*. «Teachers shouldn't fear becoming Students again», writes Rousseau (1743/1998a, p. 30). With Rousseau (1743/1998a), however, no lines are blurred: his «method is so simple that it need *only be read*, and not studied» (p. 30). And I do mean Rousseau: these last passages are not written in *Emile* (Rousseau, 1762/1979).

showing not only by caring

Atkinson cares, and it is not merely evident by his accounts. For an example of an account: Atkinson (2022) recollects a moment in a classroom where a learner continuously says Atkinson's three raised fingers represent three lots of three. Atkinson, rather than immediately correcting or dismissing the learner, thereby sustaining the very pedagogical encounter in light of *his own hesitation*[178], asks the child to show him how could that be. «She counted the three sections of each finger giving [him] three lots of three (see Atkinson, 2022, p. 230). I do recollect hearing this account in person — Dennis does care.

But, again, this is not merely evinced by accounts; rather, by the accounting as well. Atkinson (2022) begins the book's eighth chapter writing he is «accused of 'not having a political position' or that [his] work is 'politically neutral'» (p. 193). He is confused by such take, in that he has «always thought (*perhaps* wrongly) that [his] concern with how we might respond effectively to the problematics of 'otherness' in the domains of pedagogic practice is a deeply political and ethical challenge» (Atkinson, 2022, p. 193, emphasis added). And Atkinson (2018) is not referring to «politics in terms of party politics» (p. 101). A chapter from another book (Atkinson, 2018) devoted to, and titled, *Ethics and Politics in Pedagogic Work*, is written to make such case. As a brief example, and I am referring to the response to otherness Atkinson (2022) mentions, in such chapter (Atkinson, 2018) recollects being «asked after giving a presentation [...] 'how do we recognise an event?'» (Atkinson, 2018, p. 104). I am mentioning this passage because the question posed to Atkinson (2018) makes him write about it and further his work, not in a way where he imposes his way

[178] Recollecting: in *Letting Art Teach* (Biesta, 2017a), in the fifth chapter, the work of the educator is explored under «three headings: interruption, suspension and sustenance» (p. 85). In abstract terms: there is an event that interrupts the child's state so as to instigate doubt; such interruption of state is to be suspended so as to provide time for the child to engage with it; such engaging is to be sustained with the aid of the teacher. This is how Biesta (2017a) sees the work of the teacher: assisting the child in encountering the world, an encounter that «manifests itself in the experience of *resistance*» (p. 64). Here, doubt is not instigated on the learner; rather, the teacher, Atkinson (2022), hesitates before it.

of thought, but, rather, in a way where he shows and shares his learning journey from that question. He «did not see the implicit transcendence in the use of the term 'recognition', which would deny the novelty of an event, its rupturing of any framework of recognition» (Atkinson, 2018, p. 104). So, when he is «accused» of political neutrality or disregard, he does not understand, as, for him, «the idea of the political is an ever-present ontological, ecological and relational challenge and an always *incomplete* practice» (Atkinson, 2022, p. 193, emphasis added).

Atkinson (2022) then proceeds with a clarification of his political approach for twenty pages. This is not to claim Atkinson (2022) *owes* something; rather, I see it is an evidence of his caring, and also his taking care — proposing. Not because, again, he wishes to impose onto others his vision, which is Rousseau's (1762/1979) concern, but because he embraces the very speculative aspect he foregrounds: he enacts it. He thinks; *perhaps* wrongly: this *perhaps* is constitutive of Atkinson's (2022) pedagogies of taking care. «[E]ducational sites are composed of a diversity of worlds and their manners of practice [where] the pedagogical adventure of taking care is [...] concerned [...] with a constant opening towards the 'and', the 'or', the 'perhaps' and with the creating of habits that allow human and non-human flourishing» (p. 232). He thus opens himself to the *perhaps*, accepting the speculative invitation and advancing a proposition to tackle such *puzzling*, such idiotic event. «Trusting the 'perhaps' [the idiot] is thus a pedagogical challenge and adventure that accommodates the insistence of 'perhaps' that may be only a vague or uncertain presence» (p. 235). «What would a metaphysic of 'perhaps' look like?» (p. 236), Atkinson *asks*.

> It *seems* to involve a recursivity between ontology and epistemology in which *neither realm is complete* [...] The *relation* between the ontology of practice and stories *from* practice, and not *about* practice, constitutes an open-ended recursive relation involving trust and uncertainty as well as already assimilated practices. (Atkinson, 2022, p. 236, emphasis added)

Perhaps, one should care about Atkinson's proposition. And caring does *show* me, but I am hesitant to say it *opens* me. But, am I not *opening* — gerund — as I *write along with* Atkinson's writing? Hesitation is intentional.

making opaque encounters obscure

Like Rousseau's *Emile* (1762/1979), Gert Biesta's *Letting Art Teach* (2017a) and jan jagodzinski's *Introduction* (2017), Dennis Atkinson's *Pedagogies of Taking Care* (2022) is a coherent work. Yet again, what I mean by coherent is its constitution as a unified whole throughout different approximations: form and content come together. *How* it *teaches*, matters. We have this book, *very meticulously written*, demonstrating care in the concerns it presents, whilst also demonstrating the author's care for what might be lost in these concerns. It thus enacts Atkinson's (2022) very pedagogies of taking care, as it accounts, or as it *endures* to try to account, for the possible deviances of a reader's pathways of reading, which is, put simply, Atkinson's very proposal for pedagogy in art education. The work of the writers — theorists *and* teachers — thus attest to the importance they attribute to teaching by means of theory. Not simply because teaching matters, in itself, but how it matters, and what it matters for. They differ, clearly, and yet, they are more entwined than they are dichotomous, which this chapter makes clear. They teach and theorise at the same time, teaching is how they make theory and making theory relies on contemplating teaching. There is an imbrication, an overlapping which bleeds through their texts.

In terms of this study's guiding question — *what does it mean to make theory in art education?* —, with Atkinson's writings, making theory in art education means being open to the abruptness of the world. The time of clarity is not controlled, but there is an attempt to understand it. What is to be learnt, is what is read from such revelation, from such worldquake[179]. Illocution serves Atkinson as the conveying of meaning so as to care about the world. He passes on what he understands and what he believes could be understood. For Atkinson, sharing clarity when making theory is crucial to *not neglect* his intentions. It is a useful requirement to overcome. However, he is willing to overlap with the learner, as he cares for the learner's pedagogy so as to reconsider his own practice from what is revealed from an obscure encounter. What is revealed from such encounter is to be cherished by Atkinson as a sign of a desire that points to new ways of thinking or making, towards an uncertain future, both in teaching and in learning. Conversely, whatever sign of desire Emile reveals to his instructor, has to be repressed and restored to the certainty of *a* future — insofar as it is *the* future designed

[179] I am writing with Dennis Atkinson's (2022) text, when he makes use of such word, drawn from Martin Savransky.

by Rousseau (1762/1979). As with Bloom and Rousseau (1762/1979), educational imagination is imagined *beyond* opaque encounters. In Rousseau, a revelation from clarity is what is intended — a revelation that serves the instructor as an advantage to control Emile. Atkinson is committed to opacity as well, as it may reveal something of advantage to the learner, but also to the teacher, who is ultimately interested, not deceivingly so, in the learner's very interests. So, «[h]ow might we develop a productive or convivial relation to this 'other night' that appears *beyond* the fading of the day when everything has disappeared into the night — an otherness, a gift, that *is already present*?»[180] (Atkinson, 2022, p. 136, emphasis added).

Atkinson's account not only depicts an image of his educational concerns, but also enacts a language of art education theory. Art education is what may be culled from the crossing of art and education — where art may be a provider of tools for educational purposes. Therefore, what is to be educed, is to be so from contact itself — a moment that can be titled, within a world that can be narrated. The theorisation approached is concerned with how may art contribute to an expanded understanding of the world — and one's place in the world — by the very revelations that arise of hitherto unknown worldly *encounters*. In other words, art's opacity is summoned to support moments of loss of intelligibility — which is to say it appears opportunely, and such opportunity is severely entwined with irruption. *What does it mean to make theory in art education?* In the foregrounded manner of theorising art education, it means to make use of art's opacity to render the unknowable known. It means to believe something lies beyond what is not understandable, and something may lie beyond what is understandable. It means to be open to a *change* from what is *unknown*, expecting the revealing of something hitherto *unknown*. In other words, with Glissant's (e.g., 1990) lexicon, it is to believe the opaque is obscure.

However, *what* is written in Atkinson's (2022) text, such coherent piece, is written with caring ever so intensely about writing, about practice, about making. I want to hesitate to understand why should such an opacity be interrupted.

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[180] This *night* is a reference to Maurice Blanchot (see Atkinson, 2022, p. 136). For further reading on Maurice Blanchot *with* art education, specifically on how such nocturnal aesthetics may be used productively, see Tervo, 2020. I am foregrounding such contribution because such piece, by Tervo (2020), places a particular emphasis on writing, that is, not the written object, but the very making of it — writing as writing. «Blanchot's work encourages, even demands, to align oneself with the otherness that already is, present also in the workings of the Law that an anti-authoritarian education must always confront» (Tervo, 2020, p. 165). Again, it is this study's concern to consider writing as a gesture that mingles friends. A convivial gesture, to use Atkinson's words. The question to be engaged with, then, has to do with the *how-ness* of writing.

At this *point*, in this *stage*, the question to be taken *care* of is: the *pointing* and the *staging* and the *caring*; at what, or at who, do they wave?

In this part, I address writings of Gert Biesta, jan jagodzinski, Dennis Atkinson, with those of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1762/1979) in *Emile*. Again, the work of these writers — theorists *and* teachers — attest to the importance they attribute to teaching by means of theory. And again: not simply because teaching matters, in itself, but how it matters, and what it matters for; they differ, clearly, but they are more entwined than they are dichotomous. They teach and theorise at the same time, teaching is how they make theory and making theory relies on contemplating teaching. There is an imbrication, an overlapping which bleeds through their texts.

With this part, my aim is to express clearly a relation amidst them by writing with their texts: thereby, I also express, as well, the very relation of this study with their texts. This is to say the endeavour consists in addressing the very opacity of their texts: not to extract meaning, not to control them, not to uphold them. Rather, to *make* with them: I aim at sharing their mingling, their confusion, with clarity. Recollecting: in this study, nothing is neither intentionally hidden nor mysteriously concealed. I write this fairytale where I unceasingly attempt to express the very condition of these writers, of these crafters, of these makers, by sharing their very practicing. I thus imitate them: by writing my reading of them, I express my imagination of listening to them in their very language. I thereunder attempt to teach and theorise, *at the same time*. But what is this theorising, and what does it teach? How is this textual pedagogical gesture, and what does it entail to the making of theory in art education? Further, how is it contributive to the making of theory in art education?

The overlapped reading, and writing, of this part allows to claim these three writers — Biesta, jagodzinski, Atkinson — partake of the same specificity of language Rousseau (1762/1979) uses in *Emile*; even though the textual pedagogical gestures are used for ends which are not precisely the same as Rousseau's. The tools they all make use of, the tools with which they teach and with which they theorise, are premised on a contrasting operativeness between obscurity and clarity: the former, being the acceptance of opacity as such. So, *what does this making of theory, a making that alternatively settles on opposing ends, cannot make?* There are three aspects I invite to consider on these authors' very texts; one that entails a limitation and another that waves at what may address such limitation. Then, a question: to stay with it for part V.

Firstly, their textual pedagogical gestures are made so as to *reveal* upon an encounter with opacity. That is, pedagogical work is assigned with a revelatory task when in presence of opacity — this is to say the opacity of encounters with art is desired as momentary, and what is unknown is not considered as unknowable. As the unknown is regarded as the yet-to-come, opacity is made momentary and there is an interplay with clarity that comes from revelation. Being expected, opacity is accepted as the obscure. Pedagogical work echoes this concern, as the textual pedagogical gestures approached are strategies for *showing clarity from revelation*. Their theoretical cases echo it. Clarity is a matter of time, as it were, and to achieve it is to *deal away* with art's accepted obscurity when making theory.

Whereas the time of opacity for Rousseau is interrupted by himself, the time of opacity, for Biesta, jagodzinski, Atkinson, is interrupted by an event: art's interruption, shock, emergence. Art is therefore deemed interesting by its ability to provoke a break with what is *hitherto* understood; art itself *then* reveals what is hitherto unknown. It is accepted that art bears an immanence that uncovers what is hidden — art disclosing truth is what is perceived and accepted. So, letting art teach is crucial. This is to say the life of art education is composed by its eventful disruptiveness — a momentary, syncopated, revelatory, eventfulness. Single events, from obscurity to clarity, thus compose educational time as a sequence of moments. It is a making concerned in giving clear readings *in contrast* to opaque encounters with art. This sequencing means the loss of intelligibility, by momentariness, gives way to presence as a coming, a yet to come. In other words, their making of theory is premised on *what might be lost*, rather than loss. *Loss* is regarded as a presence that is not *yet*, never an unsurmountable absence: the unknown language of art just has to be translated to a known one, or itself must translate an unknown language.

In this regard, what is passed on in writing, what they pass on with their texts, is what is understood. The unknown is always regarded in retrospect, in recollection, after it is, assumedly, tied down. The unknown is shared as if it were possible to know. Learning with art is offered as what is to be learnt from art. Art uncovers; pedagogically, this means art remains the teacher, and the relation between teacher and learner is not one of overlapping, but of interplay. Briefly put, this is what a making of theory that alternatively settles on opposing ends cannot make: it does not stray away from established ends. It does not confound teaching with learning.

Secondly: yet, they all — Rousseau, Biesta, jagodzinski, Atkinson — seem to hint at a sonic lacking. Biesta (2017a) points at Meyer-Drawe's question, «exploring hearing and sound» on what could mean «to take the auditory as the starting point for [...] educational theories and practices, and not the visible» (p. 112). Biesta (2017a) foregrounds «that in such an approach [a] self-aware subject at the centre of the world [would not be found], but rather [a] subject radically exposed to a world that may or may not announce itself to the subject» (p. 112). jagodzinski (2017) is not as direct: he continues showing a stage with Deleuze and Guattari, foregrounding «[a]rt undoes the triple organization of perceptions, affections, and opinions in order to substitute a monument composed of percepts, affects, and blocs of sensation that take the place of

language» (Deleuze & Guattari, as cited in jagodzinski, 2017, p. 10). And this movement is, according to the stage set by jagodzinski, the «task of all art» (Deleuze & Guattari, as cited in jagodzinski, 2017, p. 10). «It is about listening», claims jagodzinski (2017, p. 10). Atkinson (2022) shows care for the collective moments when «future modes of practice» (p. 227) may be felt and speculated. «Such feeling and speculation», Atkinson (2022) continues, «do not have to emerge from major events or epiphanies but may occur gently from little incidents or surprises within contexts of mutual sharing and listening» (p. 227). There might be something lost in what is not yet heard. Listening is, perhaps, a way to compensate for what vision does not see.

And Rousseau (1762/1979) is also very much aware of listening. But, unlike the three authors that hint at its expanding towards hitherto unknown languages, that is, at the possible emergence of the unknown via a sonic mean, Rousseau (1762/1979) wishes to close such mean from other voices, that is, voices not understood. And voices that are *not to be understood*. «The child who wants to speak should hear [*écouter*] only words he can understand and say only those he can articulate» (p. 73, brackets added). Emile must only *listen* to himself — which is to say he must only comprehend the words his instructor deems to be comprehended. Rousseau narrows the space of language, while Biesta, jagodzinski, and Atkinson hint at its expanding; they literally call for it. This aspect is a space *made* by weaving relation amidst them and Rousseau.

For Rousseau, if there is any interest in what might be lost, it is because what might be lost is of use to his educational vision. For Biesta, jagodzinski, Atkinson, what might be lost is of use to otherwise educational visions. In this regard, it is no surprise that the latter three authors' engagement with art not only involves opaque encounters, but the very seeking of such encounter so as to interrupt, shock, emerge — a revelation, an aphetic release (Tervo, 2020). That is, reading opacity as obscurity is inherent to such drive. This means their making of theory in art education is not seldom dependent on what they see as irruptive artworks. In other words, art is invested with an apocalyptic character that, ultimately, defines its interest. In this obscurity, these three scholars and Rousseau overlap; but the aspiration to listening to what is other is where there might be an otherwise space. Weaving comes together here, but it is here such weaving more firmly resists tightening.

Listening to the murmurs, to the ramblings, of an unknown language and to translate them to a known language — this is why art is summoned to education in

Biesta, jagodzinski, and Atkinson: to provide a language to address the unknown. To compensate what language lacks. Art is therefore made a teacher, and a particular one too: a teacher that detains the knowable in its unknown, a teacher who shows by revelation; it shows *in the end*. Art shows by revelation, and pedagogical work focusses on strategies for such revelation to occur. This is to say the *pointing* and the *staging* and the *caring*, wave at who is not here — *yet*; assumedly, this *who* already exists and *will come*. They wave at presence, ignoring absence. There is expectation for *who*; *who* has to be made clear, from the obscurity that is covering, that is hiding, that is concealing. But what about the *who* who is silent? The *who* who remains absent? The *who* who does not want to speak? The *who* who cannot speak? The silent *who* who is lost in translation. This is the unsurmountable opaque loss I wish to address in this study, rather than the momentary obscure loss: the other as other, whose presence is evinced by absence itself, rather than by its coming presence. The absence of a name, of a revelation, of a title — the absence of a presence — that has to be unceasingly made, rather than a hidden and deferred, and expected, momentarily absent presence. To not expect to listen to such absence once it comes, once it is present, once it speaks. To speak absence, rather than speaking on behalf of an expected presence. To imagine opaquely. Rather than listening in hindsight, make sound with writing. Call; sing.

I am not dealing away with these textual pedagogical gestures. I am not waving goodbye to them; rather, I want to ask: how can they wave otherwise with? How can they wave hello to the silent? How am I sharing what I am learning *with* these gestures, rather than what I am learning *from* these gestures? That is, what can I *make with* these gestures? What am I learning with these teachers? Again, how is this textual pedagogical gesture, and what does it entail to the making of theory in art education? Further, how is it contributive to the making of theory in art education? What is this theorising, and what does it teach?

Thirdly, a question to continue inquiry: if *what* is written in the texts of Biesta (2017a), of jagodzinski (2017), of Atkinson (2022), such coherent pieces, is written with caring ever so intensely about writing, about practice, about making, why should such opacity be interrupted?

I want to hesitate to understand.

These writers' waving at presence wave goodbye to part IV.

V · album

An album,

originating from Latin: blank tablet; used as noun of neuter of *albus*, white; in English from the German use of the Latin phrase *album amicorum* 'album of friends'. A blank book for the insertion of collected items — autographs, memorial verses, etc. (Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 2007, altered here).

This part is a recollection[181]. Its overall purpose is to wave in wide manner at this study, so as to address how does it learn, what does it learn; how does it teach, what does it teach. This part is not a recollection which gives way to absolute truth — Rousseau's desire, Socrates' knowledge —, that is, a recollection which contracts to itself, taking the place of the other. Rather, a recollection so as to make a singular understanding, merely to be shared and aiming to make space. A *recollecting* — gerund.

[181] Recollecting: I am writing with Plato's (trans. 1997b) text: «[t]rue opinions. For true opinions, as long as they remain, are a fine thing and all they do is good, but they are not willing to remain long, and they escape from a man's mind, so that they are not worth much until one ties them down by (giving) an account of the reason why. And that, Meno, my friend, is *recollection*, as we previously agreed. After they are tied down, in the first place they become knowledge, and then they remain in place. That is why knowledge is prized higher than correct opinion, and knowledge differs from correct opinion in being tied down» (*Meno* 97e–98a, emphasis added).

Recollecting: part IV expresses this study's relation with writings by Gert Biesta, jan jagodzinski, Dennis Atkinson, *and* Jean-Jacques Rousseau's *Émile* (1762/1979). I make clear such relation by the opacity of such relation, which I make with textual pedagogical gestures: I evince such gestures by writing about them and, at the same time, enacting them, that is, writing them. I do not, however, enact them on their own: I make use of an opaque textual gesture I learn with Édouard Glissant's writings, which is to say I make an opaque textual pedagogical gesture. These textual pedagogical gestures are what I make use of so as to make this study: these are the textual pedagogical gestures which inform this study's discursive space. The writings by Rousseau, Biesta, jagodzinski, Atkinson, brought fore in this study imbricate theory and practice, that is, they teach and theorise *at the same time*. This shows it is possible to inquire on the theory and practice divide by blurring the very divide. With regard to a comprehension of theory as a discourse which explains what it does not *know* — *comprehending* —, it is possible to argue the writings of all five protagonists complicate such ordained structuring. Specifically, the writings of Gert Biesta, jan jagodzinski, Dennis Atkinson, by their textual pedagogical gestures, *teach* — as in *showing*, with no recourse to revelation — a way for making theory in art education: by inquiring on the divide between theory and practice. These authors' writings thus complicate a structure, that of theory as a privileged point of view which deals away with the addressed opaque reference. This is not to say they deal away with systematicity, on the contrary: following my claims, they are rather systematic to what concerns their means for making theory, as they enact the very gestures they write about. That is, they write their very pedagogical gestures, they make textual pedagogical gestures. Their practice of writing is also their pedagogical practice.

Recollecting: these writers' textual pedagogical gestures are made so as to *reveal* upon an encounter with opacity — which is thereby conflated with obscurity. There is a remarkable motivation in the confusion encounters with art offer them — as with science, the unknown is a driving force.

Recollecting: as is the case with the educators and art educators addressed in this study's part I, the unknown is, indeed, a driving force. This is a commonplace for science, and a commonplace for art education theory. The scientification of art education is part of the field's theoretical dimension, it is part of the very possibility of making it. Art education as a theoretical endeavour *is* a subfield, and art educators are

occupied with it. And, the subfield of art education theory is varied, layered, vibrant, unstable, confusing and messy. Again, I am less invested in bringing clarity *onto* such wavy context, than I am to *clearly* show such waviness and *why* I wish to propose it as relevant to consider it as such. That is, this is less about showing the messiness of art education theory than it is about making something with such messiness. That is, acknowledging it, serves not to control it, but to make such messiness operative and share its effect. I am not saying there is *an absolute* art education theory; rather, proposing to acknowledge many theories — *ways of and for making* —, and why moving them closer together, unceasingly jolting and overlapping them, matters. In terms of fabling, what I mean is that I do not aim at upholding the very *scriptural* dimension of art education theory — writing so as to say *what* it is, what it *should be*; writing to *show* truth. Writing, here, is to express relation: made by writing with the writings it addresses. It accounts for such singular movement: it traces a practice. Again, not a myth, but a fairytale: a story to continue conversation.

Keeping on with this study's gesture of overlapping writings so as to express their entwinement, more than a dichotomy, what can be learnt with this messiness? What can be learnt with this confusion of friends, this mingling, this symposium? So, notwithstanding this study's evident closeness to the writers addressed in part IV, why not learn with other writers *at the same time*? Why not learn at the same time with writers who make theory in art education differently, that is, for different purposes than Gert Biesta, jan jagodzinski, Dennis Atkinson? Namely, art educators invested in theory so as to bring coherency to practice? Why not continue a fairytale?

To continue this inquiry, I thus do not deal away with the scientification of art education, but I do wish to emphasise its makings, by poeticising it. To continue the jolting, the overlapping, the clear amassing. To see what opportunity can be *made with* the poeticising of scientification of art education. *What does it mean to make theory in art education?* —, making theory in art education means to inquire into the subfield of art education theory itself, *with* art education theories: fabling with fables.

This recollecting is made along with four chapters. In chapter 15 I recollect Peter Smith's (1998) suggestion to «greater attention to *philosophical* grounding *within* the field» (p. 371, emphasis added) of art education. To Smith's (1998) understanding, art educators rely on an enormous amount of different and dense theorisations *external* to the field of art education. Further, according to Smith (1998), such gigantic and

multiple theory is often used so as to explain minute details occurring within the very field of art education. Interestingly, Smith addresses jan jagodzinski's work as an example of such dense use of theoretical sources, whilst very briefly naming a few art educators who do not incur in such «grandiose borrowed theories» (p. 372). I follow the jolting of part IV, thereby composing an overlapped reading and writing of Peter Smith's text with texts by the art educators he mentions. On the one hand, this to address what, according to Smith, *makes* this philosophy of art education. On the other, this is to see how the writings of the authors mentioned by Smith overlap the works addressed more detailedly in this study's part IV, despite their contrast. This is made to show how their makings of theory also rely on a contrasting operativeness between opacity and clarity. To put it briefly, these authors also see the loss of intelligibility as momentary and place in it an expectation as well: they read opacity as obscurity. The loss of intelligibility is a motivation, as a question to be answered.

In light of art educator Peter Smith's (1998) call on a *philosophy* of art education, chapter 16 recollects the writings of Plato brought fore in this study's part I. An excursus to Socrates, via Plato's writings, is made so as to postulate why philosophical frameworks may be a constraint to the making of theory in art education. The question that motivates this recollecting is: what does Socrates make when faced with loss? To *make* such excursus, I make use of the textual pedagogical gestures brought fore in this study: *showing*, by *pointing*, *staging*, *caring*; *opaquely*. I thereby *share* a limit to a philosophical language, namely, how it *rehearses* what it considers. Ultimately, I *make* a case on how making use of philosophical frameworks may entail *reading* otherness, that is, comprehending the unknown, and why *otherwise* may be relevant; this is *not* a revelation, but a making.

Chapter 17, briefly put, recollects the whole study to articulate its very contribution. I gesture at the very study, that is, I imitate it: not by reproducing it mechanically, but to express listening: writing and reading, at the same time. It is the composing of a song, writing the memorable (Blanchot, 1969/2003) of this study.

In light of such clarity, chapter 18, finally, recollects — and answers to — the aims and questions set out in this study's initial pages. *Why* is this study made is what is weaved along with part V, to wave goodbye.

An album. By definition, blank. What definition could this be, other than something empty to be filled up? Could not the blank be opaque? A mass of unordained memories we compose so as to recollect? A recollecting that is not about showing truth — nostalgic —, but, rather, about merely making itself — making its own singular truth. In this mingling of friends, in this confusion, in this opaque mass; why not imagine clarity at the same time?

Recollecting: Peter Smith (1998) uses «weakness» (p. 371) to classify what he considers a matter of concern in art education literature. To Smith (1998), such *weakness* is art educators' reliance on an enormous amount of different and dense theorisations *external* to the field of art education. Again, Smith sees such gigantic and multiple theory is used so as to explain minute details occurring within the very field of art education[182]. What, and how, Smith regards as the result of such relation between art educators and different theorisations, is the latter are brought by the former *into* the field as external unquestionable authorities so as to validate arguments. In other words, according to Smith, theory in art education incurs in the mistake of being made by the composing of theoretical sources that are deemed valid from the outset. In his understanding, art education has to be made strong to resist such *contamination*, as «[c]oncerted and systematically structured research is a necessity for the future health and development of [the field]» (p. 371).

The reasoning of this concern is similar to an argument made earlier by Smith (1996), where he claims art educators are also responsible for «the precariousness of their profession» (Tervo, 2018, p. 32). This *tragedy*[183] is rooted in «a refusal to examine fully the world in which art education must exist» (Smith, as cited in Tervo, 2018, p. 32). That is, Peter Smith's (1996, 1998) reasoning of art education is not without a latent desire of autonomy for the field, predicated on the existence of a border that delineates it. This is to say such reasoning is bound to a language where articulating the existence of such border is possible. The existence of such delineating border not only makes possible, as in legible, a separation — between what is *outside* the field of art education and what is *inside* it —, but it is also made useful by its *sieving* properties. The delineation thus serves a specific interest: in Smith's (1998) text, particularly, such border sieves «authorities from outside the field that will help [those involved in art education] to select and reject rather than blindly accept authority» (p. 374). But how can this border be made?

[182] Smith provides a couple of examples; again, one of them is a piece by jan jagodzinski (see Smith, 1998, p. 372).

[183] See Tervo, 2018.

In order to «*overcome* or at least [lessen]» (Smith, 2018, p.371, emphasis added) such weakness, Smith suggests «a greater attention to philosophical grounding», meaning «a more thought-out *philosophy of art education*—distinct from philosophy of art or philosophy of education» (p. 371). That is, art education's very *own* philosophy. In addition, Smith (1998) is careful to note this does not mean making art education as some kind of absolute, unquestionable authority. Rather, he intends to «encourag[e] art educators to construct *philosophical frameworks*» (p. 374, emphasis added). Smith foregrounds three motives for emphasising such frameworks:

> for (a) thinking about what we already have done in order to see what we already know from the mass of literature at hand; (b) for seeing if we can find in the art education literature pointers for future research; and (c) if we have the basis for a critique of authorities from outside the field that will help us to select and reject rather than blindly accept authority. (Smith, 1998, p. 374)

Such systematic apparatus delineates the ground of art education theory. For Smith (1998), making theory in art education should be more attentive to its own and robust philosophical workings. It is worth paying attention to the *makings* of such workings, as brought by Smith (1998). Firstly, such makings make art education research, on the one hand, *capable* of not being contaminated by external sources. On the other hand, *capable* of selecting external sources. So, if contamination is to occur, it is a controlled one; it is assimilation. Secondly, such workings make art education research *capable* of *extracting* what is useful from what is made, and *capable* of using what is then *extracted* for further making. Philosophical workings.

The makings of the ground Smith (1998) calls for is not without walls, and this structuring is not devoid of a chronological operativeness. Furthermore, the making of theory operates *within* a specific philosophical domain, which is to say it operates within a domain of thought. Philosophical workings. But who can be *capable* of making such task? Who can «ask *those* important questions that will keep [art educators] thinking instead of swallowing whole the theories of the day?» (Smith, 1998, p. 375, emphasis added). Peter Smith leaves the door open to a few scholars who may be *capable* of such *exclusive* viewpoint. That is, «philosophical art educators to look at the field, past and present» (p. 375). However, in his brief commentary, Smith does not go beyond naming them — George Geahigan, Louis Lankford, Sally McRorie and John

Swift. But, in light of Smith's laid out systematic apparatus — a specific philosophical framework —, it can be assumed such art educators' work is one to be characterised by «reason[ing] from [the very authors'] art education experience rather more than from the theories of currently fashionable "authorities"» (p. 373). So, what more can there be to the affiliation between Peter Smith and the scholars mentioned?

sophistication, for finding

George Geahigan (1980) makes a similar claim to Peter Smith (1998). Geahigan (1980) sees that there is a «pervasiveness» (p. 54) of a topic in art education literature, namely, criticism. As Smith (1998) proposes a more robust philosophical grounding to the field, Geahigan (1980) sees «inquiry into art criticism, or *metacritical inquiry* as [he titles it] seem[s] to be an important part of the ongoing research of the field» (p. 55), and it thus requires a more systematic approach. Geahigan's argument is that «conceptual problems arise because educational metacritics simultaneously engage in two radically dissimilar sorts of tasks» (p. 54), some «characteristically philosophical [and others regarding] educational problems and matters of schooling» (p. 54). Respectively, the «formulat[ion] and present[ation of] various definitions»; the «formulat[ion] and prescri[ption of] various roles for criticism in educational settings» (p. 55). As Geahigan (1980) sees it, they represent different «forms of inquiry», being «*confounded*» (p. 54, emphasis added). In this regard, he proposes «mak[ing] explicit the various tasks of those who engage in such inquiry» as a «*first step* toward *clarification* of the metacritical literature» (p. 54, emphasis added).

And a first step it is, particularly considering Geahigan's (1980) understanding is that «metacritical literature is still in a *formative* rather than a *final stage of development*» (p. 64, emphasis added). Geahigan (1980) sees «[e]ducational writing *characteristically* moves from an initial use of rhetorical language, *vagueness*, and *ambiguity* to *precision* and *technicality* as it *develops*» (pp. 64–65, emphasis added). It is, fundamentally, to this certain path *towards* clarity Geahigan wishes to contribute, where art education may properly assimilate the stimuli in engaging with metacritical writing, keeping «a more thorough and technically sophisticated literature» (p. 65). And this call for scientific rigour and precision happens because it is deemed important

that «an educational idea [sustains] its viability» (p. 65). He maintains that, for it to happen, such idea «must generally become accepted as part of the ongoing policy of the schools. [...] Initial discourse upon a given educational topic, then, must appeal to a wide range of constituents» (p. 65). That is, it has to be *made* accepted. But to appeal to such constituents, Geahigan writes there is a resorting to «rhetorical and emotive language, by putting forth *vague* or *ambiguous* claims which resist easy refutation, and by presenting an idea with brevity and a minimum of complexity» (p. 54, emphasis added).

In other words, an educational idea can be stimulating because of its ambiguity, but such ambiguity lacks rigour thus hampering the very implementation of the educational idea, the «doctrine» (Geahigan, 1980, p. 65). This is to say passing on an idea *into* a classroom setting must overcome ambiguity. Geahigan (1980) therefore devises a framework «through which this sophistication can be achieved» (p. 65). Tellingly, Geahigan binds ambiguity to *feeble* complexity. So as to make others believe an educational idea, one must thus overcome the *weakness* of ambiguity. Not «everything desired can be brought about», Geahigan (1985, p. 180) writes[184].

Geahigan's interest in the attentiveness to the rigour art educators prescribe can be read elsewhere (e.g. 1998a; 1998b; 1999). As with his earlier piece (Geahigan, 1980), there is a concern with the clarity of instruction, which is to say that Geahigan does not make theory without regarding the pedagogical dimension of the field. He makes it *for* it. Critical inquiry is to be distinguished from critical discourse (Geahigan, 1998a; 1998b), respectively «mean[ing] to investigate, to search for knowledge, information and the like, while talk or writing refers to a linguistic activity, to the use of language» (1998a, p. 106). What Geahigan aims with such distinction, is to assert they represent different ways of engaging with works of art, and thus their educational consequences are also different — and, *by means of such distinction, rigorously appraisable*. Geahigan (1998b) claims art educators often regard art criticism as «certain procedures

[184] Geahigan (1985) is writing about Robert Bresson in relation to Ralph Smith and Jack Hobbs. Interestingly, Geahigan sees the latter two are respectively concerned with the prescription of «aesthetic goal objects» and «aesthetic method objects» (1985, p. 180), but «both subscribe to the same curriculum goal (appreciation of carefully chosen works of fine art), and since they would both allow a variety of different aesthetic method objects to be used in bringing about this goal, [Geahigan] conclude[s] that, despite their seeming disagreement, there are no discernible policy differences between them» (p. 11). In a way, Smith and Hobbs reason in a way apposite to what I title, in relation to this study's concerns, a language of ends: they premise their educational endeavours on a predetermined condition; here, the how-ness of art. While Bresson is seen in contrast to Smith and Hobbs, Geahigan's main issue with Bresson's «desirable goals» of «generosity and tolerance in programs of art education» (p. 180) is that they are too «broad and encompassing [and it is thus] not even remotely conceivable that they could be achieved in the public schools (p. 180).

for talking or writing» (p. 11). Put very briefly, Geahigan (1998b) sees critical discourse often relies on external aid so as to make its formulations, in an articulation where the latter serve as the presentation for the former. So, «*findings*» (Geahigan, 1998b, p. 12) are brought *into* criticism, whereas, in critical inquiry, the concern is put in the very «*searching and finding*» (p. 12). Critical inquiry, as Geahigan sees it,

> occurs when the meaning and value of a work of art have yet to be determined. Critics undertake inquiry because they do not *yet* understand works of art and have not *yet* reached a conclusion about the merit or value of a work of art. To interpret and evaluate through speech or writing, on the other hand, is to convey one's understanding and assessments to others. (Geahigan, 1998a, p. 12, emphasis added)

What Geahigan (1998b) is suggesting is that the process of inquiry is that which needs *sophistication*, because the «problematic situation» (p. 12) one may find oneself in when encountering works of art is something that is beyond one's control, it «happens» (p. 12). Geahigan (1998a) understands critics are in a better position to overcome such problematic situations, where, before them, they *can* «formulate a hypothesis» (p. 12), which is to say discourse is to be generated *from* such encounters with works of art. Further, «[r]ecognizing a problem and being able to formulate a hypothesis are *not activities* either but, rather, what philosophers call attainments» (p. 12, emphasis added). So, critics, in contrast to «naive viewers» (Geahigan, 1998b, p. 12), «are able to recognize such problems more easily because they approach a work of art with a more sophisticated background» (p. 12). Critics, then, possess an archive, a set of readily accessible tools, that allows for them to engage with the confusion aroused by encounters with art, but only momentarily so, as they are *able* to, by means of inquiry, *find* by themselves the «meaning and value of a work of art» (p. 12). It is this *sophistication* of critical inquiry Geahigan wishes to transpose to instruction: the focussing on the making of a method, rather than the passing on of an already established one. In this regard, «educators need *to turn their attention to* identifying conditions that will promote thinking and reflection about works of art» (p. 14). Coherent to his proposal, Geahigan is clear: «[t]here is no *single* kind of instructional activity that will allow teachers to do these things successfully» (p. 14, emphasis added). But he does propose three[185]. In presence of «problems of meaning and value»,

[185] See Geahigan, 1998b, pp. 14–15.

«questions» and lack of adequate concepts, teachers should be able to offer learners the «conditions necessary for *genuine* inquiry» by making use of «thoughtful viewing, dialogue, and sustained reflection» (p. 16, emphasis added). This allows for *attainments*.

Notwithstanding this focussing on the making of a method that, writes Geahigan (1998b), is «recursive, as opposed to [...] linear» (p. 12), Geahigan's proposal still relies in linearity. That is, there is *meaning*, there is *value* that is *yet to be found* in art. Even if attaining it is not the result of a predetermined and calculated procedure, the workings of the proposal Geahigan calls for is not without walls, walls that must be overcome to reveal art's meaning; and this structure is not devoid of a chronological operativeness. Without proper sophistication, it cannot be attained. This means Geahigan can *thereby claim art is intrinsically pedagogical*: it already encompasses teachings, even if hitherto hidden — one must attain them, find them.

Alike Peter Smith (1998), confusion and clarity work with each other, but they do not overlap. Confusion is useful, as momentary, and the ultimate goal is attaining clarity from such encounter. It is not a predefined procedure, but it does need proceeding. In other words, Geahigan's making of theory resonates with an approach to the field of art education that requires *prior* systematising. But it is a systematising that *does not stay with inquiry*, that is, systematising defines the path of inquiry. Inquiry is made throughout certain paths, once a system is defined. The field needs to be illuminated. This is a *sophisticated* approach in which an improper language has to be overcome (see also Geahigan, 1999). So, the walls that are to be overcome, are to be replaced by proper ones. Theory is made for sophistication — of what is not controllable. At the same time, *making* theory *makes* sophistication.

application, for unveiling

Louis Lankford (1992) is interested in the same approach. Speaking *for* art educators, Lankford writes they

> have their own elusive grail: The Perfect Art Education, being a *harmonious amalgam* of research, theory, and practice that *meets the needs and expectations* of every constituent. The quest for this prize is replete with difficulties (as quests of myth and legend should be). (Lankford, 1992, p. 195, emphasis added)

Alike Smith (1998), Lankford (1992) sees the field of art education, «a field struggling to focus its professional vision» (Lankford, p. 1992, p. 195), can benefit from «a greater attention to [a] philosophical grounding»[186] (Smith, 1998, p. 371). «[P]hilosophy», Lankford (1992) writes, «has been and continue [sic] to be an important element of art education research, theory, and practice» (p. 195).

> Philosophy of art education may be *operationally defined* as concentrated reflection and reasoning aimed at the formation of *fundamental* beliefs that are *applicable* to decision-making concerning teaching and learning art. [...] I have collapsed the distinction that might be made between philosophy *of* art education — or the principles that guide our actions — and philosophy *in* art education — or the application of philosophical methods to problems of art education. *This alliance of inquiry and conclusions* reflects the dynamic possibilities of *means-ends relationships* and allows for ongoing revision. (Lankford, 1992, p. 196, emphasis added).

Like Geahigan (1998b) who points to the very *crafting* of a procedure, Lankford (1992) sees more value — as in depth — in the engaging with a «learning experience» than in «its categorization» (p. 195). What I immediately wish to foreground from such essential passage is that Lankford's (1992) *philosophy of art education* operates in relation to the field of art education along an imbrication of inquiry and conclusions, a confusion that is interrupted so as to extract a proposal to be applied to the field. And such application is not necessarily definitive. In other words, Lankford sustains a continuous endeavour with confusion that serves the *attainment* of a clear idea — as Geahigan (1998). Indeed, one of the aims of philosophy is the «clarifying of ideas» (Lankford, 1992, p. 197). And, as Geahigan (1998b), notwithstanding this focussing on the crafting of a proposal from not a linear but a recursive method, Lankford's (1992) proposal still relies in linearity, which his writing mirrors. «As "Davy" Crockett simply advised, "Be always sure you are right, *then* go ahead"», Lankford states (1992, p. 196, emphasis added). This way of reasoning is made on another occasion as well, with David Pankratz (Lankford & Pankratz, 1992), writing that «[r]esponsibly teaching about art today involves helping students to understand *the nature* of art *in its totality* and preparing them to confront issues in art beyond the schoolyard and in the future» (p. 24, emphasis added). This means that, notwithstanding the concern and interest towards the possible recursiveness of theory,

[186] Lankford's piece is titled *Philosophy of Art Education: Focusing Our Vision* (1992).

Lankford (Lankford & Pankratz, 1992) reasons it apart from pedagogical practice. That is, recursiveness does not concern practice; it is to remain *within* theory. The following passage is rather clear of Lankford's interests in theory, and how theory serves practice. He writes on a work by J. M. Thompson: such «book would best be *employed* in the context of a graduate seminar, [...] accompanied by a knowledgeable instructor's interpretations and explanations [and] [t]o be *made useful* for art teachers, add to this a *pronounced element of theory-to-practice application*» (Lankford, 1995, p. 253, emphasis added).

Alike Peter Smith (1998), alike George Geahigan (1998b), confusion and clarity work together, but they do not overlap. Confusion is useful, as momentary, and the ultimate goal is attaining clarity from such encounter. It is not a predefined procedure, but it does need proceeding. In other words, Lankford's making of theory resonates with an approach to the field of art education that requires prior systematising. That is, an approach in which an improper language has to be overcome (see also Lankford, 2002b). «[L]ike many things sacred, the concept of aesthetic experience remains largely enshrouded by a mysterious veil of ambiguity» (Lankford, 2002a, p. 140). So, walls are to be overcome so as to reveal — yet, walls are needed for revelation; and revelation is also needed. Theory is *made* for application — onto what is not controllable. At the same time, *making* theory *makes* application.

cohesion, for clearing away

Sally McRorie (1996), introducing an issue of *Studies in Art Education*, points the «[t]he research reported [...] attempts to clear away some areas of fog» (p. 132). This *fog* McRorie (1996) is writing about refers to that which obscures the paths of the future; it is the *fogginess* of the present. McRorie draws the point with writer Milan Kundera; «when people look back in history, and perhaps across cultures, examine the lives and works of others, they see only the seemingly clear path that these others should have taken» (p. 131), writes McRorie. «When one looks back from what was others' far away future, one sees fog; the mistaken paths are clearly seen but the obscuring fog is not» (p. 131). In other words, McRorie's concern is to bring attention to how the field of art education incurs in assuming certain ideas are good, but cannot predict their

outcomes. Paths that can be regarded clearly now at distance, when close they are rather foggy (McRorie, 1996). However, only *some areas* of fog are to be cleared away; an important detail: McRorie nevertheless sees opportunity in fog:

> One of the main components of contemporary fog seems to be "memes," [...]. A meme can be anything from a brick to the Magna Carta to MTV. It is an idea that can lodge in a person's mind, and be transmitted, in print or image or by word of mouth, to other minds. Once it has been *communicated*, becomes a "replicator," [...] making it possible for still more complex ideas to evolve (McRorie, 1996, p. 131, emphasis added)

In a piece with Tom Anderson (Anderson & McRorie, 1997)[187], such valuing of fogginess seems to occur as well. Anderson and McRorie (1997) write about aesthetics and how can it «be used to *generate core* concepts that result in *systematically coherent* art programs» (p. 7, emphasis added). To what concerns art educators, specifically, aesthetics matters because of the «questions aestheticians ask about the definition, meaning, value, and functions of art, and how to talk about it. *Systematically* trying to answer these questions results in aesthetic theory» (p. 7, emphasis added). In other words, aestheticians can convey memes art educators may replicate — philosophy of art education is regarded from its theory-to-practice potential. Making theory in art education, therefore, aims future applicability. It is more about making theory *for* art education.

Alike Peter Smith (1998), alike George Geahigan (1998b), alike Louis Lankford (1992a), confusion and clarity work with each other, but they do not overlap. Confusion is useful, as momentary, and the ultimate goal is attaining clarity from such encounter. It is not a predefined procedure, but it does need proceeding. In other words, McRorie's making of theory resonates with an approach to the field of art education that requires prior systematising. That is, an approach in which an improper language has to be overcome, so as to convey a proper one. So, walls are to be overcome, albeit partially. Theory is made for cohesion — of what is not controllable. At the same time, *making* theory *makes* cohesion.

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[187] A thorough addressing of this piece is beyond this study's purposes, but I wish to bring attention to an important concern brought fore in it. Namely, questioning claims on how art is defined by the artworld collectively: «[t]his argument explains some of the struggles for position we see today. If art is defined by people who are *recognized* as the artworld, then who exactly gets to decide? Women, African Americans, and other representatives of cultural minorities have been underrepresented in the artworld. They have felt left out of the so-called universal (formalist) agenda and have been the strongest advocates of the instrumental reconstructionist strain of contextualism» (Anderson & McRorie, 1996, p. 10, emphasis added). So, *how* the artworld is made deserves inquiry.

splitting, for enabling

John Swift, writing with John Steers (Steers & Swift, 1999), look at «ways of improving Art in Education» (p. 7). While analysing Swift and Steers' (1999) proposals in such piece, a manifesto, are beyond this study, I wish to write I see no motive in arguing *against* proposing «a climate that emphasises and expects enquiry, experiment and creative opportunity» (p. 7), quite the contrary[188]. For this study's concerns, I want to briefly address *how* such manifesto is *conducted* and how such conducting is telling of a certain operativeness. Namely, writing a separation between theory and practice so as to *properly* manifest their argument, even though the closeness of the two is what is regarded as desirable. The following passage captures such *systematic* approach:

> Rationales are commonly understood as either intrinsic, i.e. for values only obtained through the study of art, or extrinsic, i.e., for values obtained across many subjects and in which art plays a contributory role. In reality the two may be more *intertwined* than is generally acknowledged. For *clarity of understanding*, practice and theory are listed separately and then together — *in reality*, the two activities work together and are seen as *symbiotic*. (Steers & Swift, 1999, p. 7, emphasis added)

John Swift and John Steers (1999) proceed by clarifying what concerns each end, practice and theory, and such *rationales* allow for them to articulate their manifesto. That is, these premises they define for practice *and* for theory (see Steers & Swift, 1999, pp. 6–7) serve to justify their combination and therein to sustain a different presence of art in schools. Indeed, the combination of theory and practice is coherently regarded as *symbiotic*: they do not overlap, rather, they interplay. So, even if together, the motion of their relation remains static: dichotomised; there is no mingling. Such manner of approaching *determines* a path. Each path to its own: even if in parallel, theory and practice stay in each one's lane — how theory is made defines how art is thought, written and discussed.

Notwithstanding the alternating of *ends* with theory and practice, John Swift and John Steers' (1999) arguments point to the *very means* in which teachers, and thereby learners, can engage with educational work. Theory is thus regarded as important in that «*enables* the use of ideas, images and text as *means* of interrogating received opinion in order to form knowledge and understanding» before art (Steers & Swift,

[188] See also Penketh, 2023, p. 114.

1999, p. 8). Theory *enables* means: John Swift (1999b) makes an important point on it in an another text, questioning «the means by which [bodies of knowledge or practices are] offer[ed]» (p. 102). Swift's point (1999b) is that means often function in a way that focus is placed on learning as acquisition of knowledge and skill, which render the learners «disempower[ed] until they learn to 'play the rules', and by so doing the *real game is lost*» (p. 102, emphasis added). So, theory for John Swift (1999b) represents an important place of inquiry before the inherited body of education. In this regard, theory must not render the place of the learner static, as a receptacle of knowledge. Theory has to be made robust enough to *act on practice*, which is to say Swift affirms the closeness of theory and practice, by their separation. The «artificial split between practice and theory» highlights «the hierarchical relationship between teacher and taught» (p. 101). But if their combination by their interplaying, however, can be passed on, and desirably so, in order to inquire on such hierarchy, then Swift's reasoning dismisses conveying a *confusion* of theory and practice as means for inquiry.

Alike Peter Smith (1998), alike George Geahigan (1998b), alike Louis Lankford (1992a), alike Sally McRorie (McRorie, 1996), confusion and clarity work with each other, but they do not overlap. It is not a predefined procedure, but it does need proceeding. In other words, Swift's makings of theory resonates with an approach to the field of art education that requires prior systematising. That is, an approach in which an improper language has to be overcome, so as to convey a proper one. So, walls are not overcome, but kept: the walls between theory and practice do exist, even if paper-thin. Theory is split from practice — either is to be controlled; they are meant to be apart from each other. At the same time, *making* theory *makes* splitting.

mingling, for overlapping

Recollecting the authors approached — Smith, Geahigan, Lankford, McRorie, Swift —, I wish to call on the remarkable motivation confusion offers them. When Peter Smith (1998), assuming an inherent philosophical side to art education, claims for a «more thought-out *philosophy of art education*» (p. 371), interestingly, he asks whether his «ego has fogged [his] reason» for such «proclamation» (p. 371). So this fogginess of reason is to be dissipated, it is to be explained away. Geahigan (1980) does

acknowledge «vague or ambiguous claims» (p. 54) speak effectively to a wide audience. Lankford (2002b) sees «[o]n a typical day» one may allow for «philosophers and historians to reflect on the significance of things» (p. 47). Yet, there are times when «events halt» one, becoming «staggered by a clamorous rush of thoughts and emotions», times one «tend[s] to become [philosopher] and [historian] of [one's] own [life] (Lankford, 2002b, p. 47). And the fog McRorie (1996) faces. And the lack of clarity sustaining John Swift's and John Steers' (1999) methodical separation of theory and practice so as to shed light. So, what question do these scholars ask? What question «keep[s one] thinking instead of swallowing whole the theories of the day?» (Smith, 1998, p. 375). This *fogginess*, vibrancy, unstableness, confusion and mess: questions are made *with* them. So, why must an answer deal away with them? Why must an answer deal away with what one does not comprehend?

It should be noted these scholars are invested in making theory in art education so as to look into classroom practice. That is, they look to deal away with the opacity of such practice. Their makings of theory are indeed invested in answers — asking the *correct* questions. Clarity is superior for these scholars, and this study *does not* take issue with such language of art education theory. Clearly, «[e]very language must be defended» (Glissant, 1990, p. 126, translated here). I do not wish to deal away with this making of theory — this study is *not* about dealing away —, I wish to learn with it.

The writers addressed in this chapter theorise to teach, and teach to theorise. They make it by alternation, which is to say they inquire on the theory and practice divide by affirming the divide, by affirming walls. This aspect sets these writers apart from the writers addressed in this study's part IV. However, they are more entwined than they are dichotomous. As with Biesta, jagodzinski, Atkinson, confusion, which is to say opacity, and clarity work together, but they do not overlap. Confusion is useful — as momentary — and the ultimate goal is attaining clarity from such encounter. In other words, opacity is conveniently addressed as obscurity: readings are to be *attained*. The opacity of practice, of *practicing theory*, is not only a question, but also an obstacle to be overcome by controlling it, that is by dealing away with fog: asking the «important questions to keep [one] thinking» (Smith, 1998, p. 375), thinking clearly. So, clarity interplays with obscurity, continuously. This very trait — this contrasting operativeness — concerns this study: this very trait of Continental thought (Mehtonen, 2003) which is part of its structuring.

To further these claims, I make an excursus to Plato. This is to address philosophical reasoning directly so as to, on the on hand, express how such trait can be traced along different times and places and authors, and, on the other, what can be *made* about and with such trait. In this respect, chapter 16 continues the jolting.

> *After* they are tied down, in the first place they become knowledge, and *then they remain in place*. That is why knowledge is prized higher than correct opinion, and knowledge differs from correct opinion in being tied down. (*Meno* 98a, emphasis added)

Recollecting: in this study's first chapter, I share a weaving of Plato's *Meno* and *Cratylus* so as to show how such texts can be read to express a particular pedagogy and the relationships such pedagogy and texts structure. Namely, an essential premiss of Socrates' teaching: how it relies on the guaranteeing of fixing ends by means of contrast. Recollecting: the condition of the teacher is simultaneously dictated as that of the learner. One *is* because of the other, and the other *is* because of the one. They both depend on each other's fulfilling of roles to be sustained. Further, knowledge is circled, fixed within one's domain, which means it is a resource deemed valuable by the possibility of being retrieved at one's will — a controlled archive. If it is not possible to seize an understanding — to *comprehend* — it is not knowledge: this is what is forwarded as naming. Once it is possible to name, it is possible to instruct. And, a hierarchy is written: in language, gestures are deemed inferior by their incapability of conveying meaning, simply imitating. Gestures are resources of the *dumb* — those who lack *the correct* language. Learning is the acquisition of knowledge, language is the acquisition of correctness; they are the tying down of life, like the tying down of the vivid sculptures of Daedalus — maker of the labyrinth. Again, knowing one's way around a maze, no deviation: this is knowledge for Socrates, as Plato offers it. It is the tying down of language.

As in *Meno*, as in *Cratylus*, the intention of seizing[189], of tying down, is yet again desired in *Phaedo* (Plato, trans. 1997c). The fixing of ends by means of contrast is yet again repeated. *Phaedo* recounts Socrates' last moments in prison, where, *according to what Plato has heard*[190], he has a discussion on what happens after life, that is, death. *Phaedo* is a piece famed by its capturing of Socrates' vowing to a philosophical life before death (Cooper, 1997) — that is, a life that anticipates death but, somehow, sees it. For what concerns this study, I see that *Phaedo* captivates very neatly the workings and the makings of a *proper* philosophy, especially when it deals with what it does not know. More specifically, what I wish to bring fore with this text is how Socrates deals with death, that is, its coming presence — or, at the moment of such dialogue, its absence. Better put: how Socrates *does not* deal with the loss death carries. Remarkably, Socrates resorts to an otherwise mode of reasoning, aside philosophy, to address death — and to address death, for Socrates, is to see what it means, what it is. *Imagining* death *aims comprehending* death.

According to what can be read from the testimony of those present, Socrates' permanence in prison is the first occasion the philosopher writes poetry, composing the hymn to Apollo. Such poem, such hymn, is composed by «putting the fables of Aesop[191] into verse» (*Phaedo* 60d). This resorting to poetry is a deal of great surprise and curiosity, and the condemned philosopher is inquired about what moves him towards such endeavour. Socrates mentions several dreams call him to it, dreams that pose a traversing instruction: «practice and cultivate the arts» (*Phaedo* 60e). To put it more rigorously, in accordance to the philosopher's language: Socrates, rather than merely presenting such instruction as a traversing aspect across different dreams, does say the dream is *one*, coming in different shapes. Such practice and cultivation of the arts is assumed by Socrates to be that of «the art of philosophy, [to his concern] the highest kind of art, and [he] was doing that» (*Phaedo* 61a). But as «the [popular] festival of [Apollo] was preventing [his] execution, [he] thought that, in case [his] dream was bidding [him] to practice this popular art, [he] should not disobey it but compose poetry» (*Phaedo* 61a).

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[189] Recollecting: I am writing with Édouard Glissant's (1990) text: «[t]here is within this verb «to comprehend» the movement of hands which take contexture and pull it back to themselves» (p. 206, translated here). Glissant (1993) refers to *prendre* — seize.

[190] See Cooper, 1997, p. 49.

[191] Aesop is a fabulist and storyteller. For an assembled collection of Aesop's fables, as well as a Historical background, see, for example, Aesop, trans. 2002.

> I thought it safer not to leave here until I had satisfied my conscience by writing poems in obedience to the dream. So I first wrote in honor of the god of the present festival. After that I realized that a poet, if he is to be a poet, must compose fables, not arguments. Being no teller of fables myself, I took the stories I knew and had at hand, the fables of Aesop, and I versified the first ones I came across. (*Phaedo* 61b)

This passage shows Socrates acknowledges the language of poetry is built with different means than those of philosophy. That is, the language of poetry is written by *means* of fables rather than those of arguments: a different tone for poetry is required, perhaps. However, this does not mean Socrates sees they *result* in different things: both are different shapes of the same dream — what matters, then, is to decode it, to translate it, to bring its instruction. In other words, the unknown in the dream is to be addressed by an unknown language so as to knowingly pass it — recollecting: a translation just like the one Allan Bloom (Rousseau, 1762/1979) makes. This is to say Socrates writes with Aesop's writings so as to show what he learns from the dream. Socrates learns from Aesop, the fabler, and teaches what he learns from him. Again, teacher and learner do not overlap; rather, they interplay. But what does Socrates pass on, and why?

showing with pointing

As Socrates concludes to explain what moves him to write poetry, he tells such explanation should be passed on to those who inquire him on his reasons. But such explanation is not deemed sufficient — following someone who is walking towards death might require more convincing. That is, what Socrates is asking is that *true* philosophers willing to follow the path to death, as philosophy is a «death-rehearsal» (Clift, as cited in Tervo, 2016, p. 7). However, what is being asked from Socrates is more belief to such claim, as it remains opaque for others why to do so:

> do you intend to keep this *belief* to yourself as you leave us, or would you *share* it with us? I certainly think it would be a blessing for us too, and at the same time it would be your defense if you convince us of what you say. (*Phaedo* 63c–d)

The explanation put «in the language of the mysteries» that one is «in a kind of prison, and that one must not free oneself or run away» is, as Socrates himself notes, «an impressive doctrine and one not easy to understand fully» (*Phaedo* 62b). Socrates is referring to himself and others being property of gods, that is, one is to remain in prison — life —, but gladly so: the gods are guardians. However, there is an exception to it: if one has no other choice but to die, which means death is a choice, freedom may be admitted as a god gave a sign to it. That is, Socrates believes Apollo prevented his execution, instead offering him an opportunity to take is own life. This is to say Socrates' term is on his own terms. So Socrates is committed to death, death which «is not a passageway that turns subjects into objects: rather, it can *elevate* [subjects] *beyond* subjects and objects, to the world beyond this world where everything *just is*» (Tervo, 2016, p. 7). Death, the unknown, the dream: they all conceal the same truth, the *truth of the world*, albeit coming in different shapes. The dream, the unknown, death: this is the presence that eludes Socrates, a presence that is, for him, *momentarily* absent. Truth is *yet*-to-come.

However, for Socrates to make others believe what Apollo points to the philosopher himself, it is not enough to point. The question is «how [to] actually manage to catch and focus another human being's attention [given] the difficulty of shifting a [learner's] attention from the finger that is pointing to what the finger is pointing at» (Biesta, 2017a, p. 44). Indeed, it is important for Socrates to move «public attention in this direction» (Rousseau, 1762/1979, p. 33).

showing with staging

To tackle the lack of belief his listeners utter, Socrates sets a stage, continuing to do what he deems «perhaps most appropriate for one who is about to depart yonder», that is «to tell and examine tales about what [one] believe[s] that journey to be like» (*Phaedo* 61d–e). After all, he asks, «[w]hat else could one do in the time [one has] until sunset?» (*Phaedo* 61e). The thesis that concerns Socrates is thus:

> I am afraid that other people do not realize that the one aim of those who practice philosophy in the *proper manner* is to practice for dying and death. Now if this is true, it would be strange indeed if they were eager for this all their lives and then resent it when what they have wanted and practiced for a long time comes upon them. (*Phaedo* 64a, emphasis added)

In other words, if the presence of death brings the understanding of truth, then there is no motive for a *proper* philosopher to not follow the path that leads to it. And to meet death, thus truth, is to *detach* the body from the soul as only the soul, released from the vicious veneer of the body, can aspire to understand such truth. That is, the detaching of the soul from the body is also what coincides with the detaching from the confusion of living, a confusion which prevents a truthful reading: the pure encounter with truth. To convince his listeners, Socrates proceeds in dialogical fashion, arguing on the purity of thought — «thought alone [released] from the whole body» (*Phaedo* 66a) —, which allows for one to «reach reality» (*Phaedo* 66a). To Socrates' understanding,

> All these things will necessarily make the true philosophers *believe* and say to each other something like this: "*There is likely to be something such as a path to guide us out of our confusion*, because as long as we have a body and our soul is fused with such an evil we shall never *adequately* attain what we *desire*, which we affirm to be the *truth*. (*Phaedo* 66b, emphasis added)

However, the way in which Socrates shares his belief is still not enough. Despite the «excellent» things said, the listeners say that it is «very hard [for the folk] to believe what [Socrates says] about the soul» (*Phaedo* 70a). In other words, not only Socrates passes on what he comprehends, and what is comprehensible, *he is also asked to do so by those who inquire him*. Thereby, in such dialogue, the positions of teacher and learner are thus fixed by both ends which commit to it. And Socrates agrees; it is important to share such belief convincingly, as «[t]hose who care for their own soul, [...] believing that nothing should be done contrary to philosophy and their deliverance and purification, [...] follow wherever philosophy leads» (*Phaedo* 82d). The followers are the «lovers of learning» (*Phaedo* 82d); philosophy teaches, but *belief* is a condition to follow such teaching. Again, it is the *way*, the *tone* in which Socrates shares his belief that does not suffice, as Socrates is certain no one could claim he is «babbling» (*Phaedo* 70c).

But even if Socrates would detain the whole knowledge of the world, his «remaining time would not be long enough» (*Phaedo* 108e) to convey it. That is, not only the description of it would be part of the reality to be reached — and passed on —, but what sustains it as true, in absolute terms. However, Socrates has time to *show* his conviction, to *make others believe* in his vision. The way to do so is to fable: making a believable stage. Socrates shows a vision of what expects the soul after death, after it is detached from the body. That is, Socrates philosophises by means of poetry: that is what he learns from Aesop. In proper philosophical fashion, he *extracts* a tool, seemingly improper, but makes it proper. Socrates learns from Aesop, the fabler, and teaches with what he learns from him. Socrates can thus pass on a conviction, but also showing he does so without imposing truth over it. It is diagrammatic. Respecting the prolonging of Socrates' tale, I prolong a quote:

> No sensible man would insist that these things are as I have described them, but I think it is fitting for a man to risk the *belief* — for the risk is a noble one — that this, or something like this, is true about our souls and their dwelling places, since the soul is evidently immortal, and *a man should repeat this to himself as if it were an incantation*, which is why I have been *prolonging my tale*. That is the reason why a man should be of good cheer about his own soul, if during life he has ignored the pleasures of the body and its ornamentation as of no concern to him and doing him more harm than good, but has seriously concerned himself with the pleasures of learning, and adorned his soul *not with alien* but with its own ornaments, namely, moderation, righteousness, courage, freedom and truth, and in that state awaits his journey to the underworld. (*Phaedo* 114d–115a, emphasis added)

Paradoxically, what is suggested as a truth to be believed in, as *the* truth is yet to come, makes Socrates' tale believable, and thus effective on his listeners, as «it reveals what sustains that [pleasant and soothing] experience» (jagodzinski, 2017, p. 38) of revelation after death. Indeed, it is important for Socrates to move «public attention in this direction» (Rousseau, 1762/1979, p. 33).

However, if these gestures do not suffice to make others believe, what more can be done?

showing with caring

Phaedo, as mentioned, captivates Socrates' vowing to a philosophical life before death, a life of learning; a life of learning that continues beyond. In such dialogue, it can be read Socrates' commitment to philosophy and his very commitment to teach it, and not only by making use of the makings of philosophy. Socrates cares enough to concede to the insufficiency of proper philosophical tools to properly address the unknown, to properly address his various dreams — or the single dream he sees in different shapes —; to properly address death. He speculates whether the dream asks him to cultivate arts other than philosophy. He tries to write a hymn, a poem. He recognises he must learn how to make poetry. He understands poetry does not aim at arguments, but at fables. He resorts to the writings of a fabler so as to versify. He explains to his listeners: by arguing, by fabling, until his last hour — perhaps, a derivative philosopher. Not unlike «Rousseau, a philosopher-poet like Plato, [who] tried to recapture the poetry in the world» (Bloom, in Rousseau, 1762/1979, p. 21): the tone to make proposals might be a sound detail.

What Socrates does not know indeed moves him to it: philosophical life is this enduring love of learning (Tervo, 2016; 2019a). He shows all this care to his listeners. That is the firmness in Socrates' teachings of philosophy: his commitment — his *belief* in philosophy. And he is committed to such *belief*, a *belief* which he deems so valuable that it has to be perfectly translated to others. He dies for it. He suicides, and calmly so: that is convincing enough. «Fear not those who kill the body, for the soul they cannot kill[192]» (Matthew, 10:28, translated here).

«[P]erhaps the true purpose of pedagogy is the *continuous education* of teachers or educators» (Atkinson, 2022, p. 184, emphasis added). But to do so, that is, for a teacher or an educator to enrol in their very continuous education, is to care for *otherness*; for *death*; not solely opening oneself to it, but to move towards it. Indeed, it is important for Socrates to move «public attention in this direction» (Rousseau, 1762/1979, p. 1).

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[192] For an example of the affinity between the teachings of Socrates and those of Jesus, to what concerns the deaths of soul and body, see Tervo, 2016. This biblical passage is also used in the mentioned argument.

showing naming

But can it be said Socrates accepts death as death itself? Perhaps, it is more precise to say Socrates accepts *his* death: *his* term on *his* terms. He ties *his* sculptures down, finally. His listeners are moved towards death, and should not stray from it — that is Socrates' philosophical endgame.

Like Biesta, like jagodzinski, like Atkinson; art is deemed as the language to address what is not known yet — it is the language that speaks to a coming presence, the presence of death. That is how philosophy, in Socrates, rehearses death: it takes hold of death, seizing it, even if making use of otherwise modes of practice. It may adopt a rhizomatic behaviour, by experimenting with poetry, with fables; but it extracts *from* them: the centre, the end, is fixed. In other words, death is *replaced* by art: but art is used for naming. Art is used to name absence, which is to say that art is mobilised so as to speak on behalf of absence. It deals away with the loss of intelligibility. But, in Socrates, neither art *speaks* nor does absence: they are tied down so as to conjure the correct word for Socrates to say. Socrates speaks on behalf of absence, on behalf of death. Socrates comes to terms with his term and death's terms. In life, he remains a teacher. In death, it is not clear — but he may be tied down by others. Mythical, and made mythical, not a mere fairytale.

This is how Socrates makes theory; and this is his teaching. Philosophy does wave at death — and it makes use of pointing, of staging, of caring. But it does not share the making of its language *with* death; it makes its language *from* the *eventual* presence of death, a death that never is a timeless absence. It waves to absence; but it waves goodbye to it. It waves goodbye to what it does not know. What it concludes is intimate to what it establishes: «[t]he owl of Minerva takes its flight only when the shades of night are gathering» (Hegel, 1820/2001, p. 20). Only when it knows it can show a proper traversing of the skies, does such owl spread its wings, and only then it is welcomed back by Minerva. Philosophy, in Socrates, is a language of ends. And this is why Rousseau *controls* the time of clarity: he wants to teach the world and he understands he can only do so by defining its time — its proper time: no alternatives. As Hegel (1820/2011) acknowledges, «for such a purpose [of teaching the world] philosophy at least always comes too late» (p.20).

Recollecting: it is possible to see art education theory does not have to learn from practice so as to teach practice. It can be the making of space, rather than «the filling [of] voids of a knowledge» (Glissant, 1990, p. 223, translated here). This can be regarded as what sets apart the three authors addressed in part IV and the authors addressed in chapter 15. It is possible to inquire on the divide of theory and practice without dividing theory and practice, which is to say it does not have to settle on alternate ends. Secondly, it is possible to argue, to write, art education theorists, by making theory in relation to pedagogical work do not necessarily detach themselves from pedagogical practice — perhaps, a writing I make as a learner. This aspect is common to all these writers; differently so, but not merely: a nuance says the tangent. The writers in part IV teach theorising, and theorise teaching. The writers in chapter 15 theorise *to* teach, and teach *to* theorise. The former make at the same time; the latter make by alternation. The former inquire on the theory and practice divide by blurring the divide; the latter inquire on the theory and practice divide by affirming the divide.

And art education theory can be made with systematicity, but it does not have to be made *from* systematicity. I *believe* «an educational idea [sustaining] its viability» (Geahigan, 1980, p. 65) can be important. I *believe* an «alliance of inquiry and conclusions reflect[ing] the dynamic possibilities of means-ends relationships and allow[ing] for ongoing revision» (Lankford, 1992a, p. 196) can be important. I *believe* «striving to facilitate student success» (McRorie, 2021, p. 1), can be important. When «feel[ing] bewildered at times [...] reflection based on research [...], can help [art educators] chart [their] paths and *keep to them*, more effectively» (McRorie, 1995, p. 4, emphasis added). And I *believe* addressing the «artificial split between practice and theory» highlighting «the hierarchical relationship between teacher and taught» (Steers & Swift, 1999, p. 101) can be important. Certainly. But must these inquiries be made with «greater attention to philosophical grounding *within* the field» (Smith, 1998, p. 371, emphasis added)? And must systematicity dictate the *making of a path*?

I believe there is an argument to be made before art education as a theoretical endeavour being *titled* as *philosophy of art education*, as Smith (1998) posits it. Calling for a certain autonomy in the field of art education by making walls entails systematising, which is what ultimately Smith (1998) calls for. And that is what keeps Geahigan (e.g., 1980), Lankford (e.g., 1992), McRorie (e.g., 1996), Swift (e.g., 1999b), occupied: making a *proper* view of the field, that is, the making of a theory that does what it is supposed to do: a superior viewpoint organising the field. Thereon, a *philosophy of art education* is a title that locates, and locks, the making of theory in art education to philosophy — and philosophy constitutes the *walls* of art education's *inside* and *outside*. Therefrom, those who *own* philosophy *own* the making of theory in art education. *Titling* art education theory *makes* art education theory in a particular way. It *properly makes* it. In this light, I believe Tervo's (2023a) words are fundamental to this issue, thus worth spending time with. Addressing education's autonomy, he writes:

> Without a proper name, "the educational" takes up an antinomic rather than simply autonomous character. This does not mean that it would become like Carl Schmitt's antinomic sovereign, *who occupies the threshold between* law and lawlessness [...]. Instead, a step not beyond education's autonomy interferes with the circular imagination that begins and ends with nomos, and by doing so, loosens the taken-for-granted connection between presence and power. This, I believe, encourages us to reimagine "the conditions that make it possible for us to identify something as 'educational'" [...] without residing to fashionable jargon [...] (Tervo, 2023a, p. 295, emphasis added)

And *jargon* does not have to be *fashionable* — such as «entrepreneurialism, economic growth, creation of human capital» (Tervo, 2023a, p. 295). Jargon can also be philosophical: jargon closes down the field within itself; it walls the field. I must be clear: this is *not* to deal away with philosophical tools, but to deal away with the very walls tools *properly* establish. I believe this argument (Tervo, 2023a) can be properly transposed to art education without rendering it proper as it seriously invites the consideration of improperness. So, when Smith proposes «[art educators] need to know from a philosophical framework who [art educators] really are» (Smith, 1998, p. 373), I cannot not ask: must art educators really *frame* work?

That is, why limit the tools, the resources, the practices, of the making of theory in art education to philosophical ones? Moreover, why limit the tools, the resources, the practices, of the making of theory in art education to poetic ones? Why limit the tools, the resources, the practices, for *making theory* in art education? Why not continue to ask *what is a tool for making theory in art education?* And these questions are not written with a latent desire for order in tools. So, not only a question like *what is a tool for making theory in art education?* is a concern, but also *how is a tool for making theory in art education?* And more. What questions can be made? In other words, it is not about suggesting the making of an infinite amount of typified tools — titles, properly named tools that name the controls assumedly operating art education. It is not about *making frameworks*. It is not about making walls. It is about imagining infinitely — working with titles so as to make improper what appears proper in art education theory, «clearing the overfull boxes» (Glissant, 1990, p. 223, translated here). Hence my preference to *layering work*. Clearing the «mass of literature at hand», *but*, rather than simply «see what [art educators] already know» from it (Smith, 1998, p. 374), make *with* what we cannot learn from what is *known*. Making space, learning with space.

What does it mean to make theory in art education?

Recollecting: This *fogginess*, vibrancy, unstableness, confusion and mess: questions are made *with* them. So, why must an answer deal away with them? Why deal away with this mingling of friends? This is why, in this study's first part, I posit the drifting and derivative *Derivas* as an interesting portrait of the making of theory in art education: a blurred portrait; work I hesitate to title. So, I ask again. *Fogginess*: questions are *made with* it. So, why must an answer deal away with it? Why deal away with the opaque fog that refuses to understand the name we call it? These are the «important questions that [*keep me*] thinking» (Smith, 1998, p. 375). And these questions are not *taken from* the «mass of literature at hand» (Smith, 1998, p. 374): they are *made with* such mass. As Smith (1998) suggests, I *believe* the mass of philosophy is useful. It is useful so clearing up is possible — to resist *filling* voids. The opaque mass must be *made* useful — it is not to about finding a pre-existing usefulness; rather, to *make* usefulness *with* it.

Again, Peter Smith (1998) when he suspects his «ego has *fogged* [his] *reason*» (p. 371, emphasis added), *proceeds* to *explain*. He deals away with fog. Lankford (1999) does ask whether «teachers [are] always to shy away from sticky and complicated abstract topics?», understanding «[s]uch an attitude would constitute a major setback to gains achieved in raising the status of the arts as academic subjects» (p. 15). But Lankford (1999) also suggests to treat artworks as «exemplars, archetypes, and paradigms of concepts» (p. 15). Again, naming what resists naming. Titling what resists titling. The sticky and complicated abstract topics are tamed. But this operativeness — this drawing towards fog so as to deal away with it — is not exclusive to Peter Smith (1998) and the art educators he invites to this conversation. This reasoning is also present in *Derivas*[193]; that is, a contrasting operativeness between clarity and obscurity.

Azevedo and Leite (2017) lament the «abandonment of the possibility of, in school, living in a state of *aphesis*, a state of rush to freedom, in a school thought to live its *praxis* and its *poesis*» (p. 105, translated here). This last claim not only hints at a separation between theory and practice, it also yearns for a state of impending release,

[193] I intentionally address examples that do not prioritise a systematic approach to the field, but which engage with obscure moments with an expectation for clarity. However, an example that is closer to Smith's proposal can be read in Pereira (2024). Recollecting: «philosophy of education, far from being merely theoretical, approaches the essence of what education must be» (Pereira, 2024, p. 119, translated here); this assumes the existence of an essence, something which is to be approached with *keys* only philosophy can provide.

a reasoning Dennis Atkinson (2014) also makes use of in another issue of the same journal (see Atkinson, 2014, pp. 15, 20). Paiva (2014) is committed to «stay in the obscure present, to face the predetermination of a future presented without alternative» (p. 1, translated here). And he (Paiva, 2014) sees that insisting on things such as «narratives of 'the salvation of art', the primacy of expressiveness and the latent genius, art's therapeutic effect or the motivating place of creativity, does not allow for *overcoming* an enduring simulacrum» (p. 1, translated here, emphasis added). John Baldacchino (2022), contrastingly to Peter Smith (1998) who sees value in the robustness of walls, writes «arts help us to value the temporary, the incomplete and the contingent, in the same way marks could never demarcate enduring borders, but instead, they enjoy continuously *finding* new marks» (p. 15, translated here, emphasis added). Still, marks exist to be *found*: they are already there and they are needed.

This language entails an expectation, an expectation placed in fogginess: its concealing of something; which is to say there is an assumption of something which already exists but that is, *in the moment*, hidden, concealed, veiled. This kind of expectation sustains theoretical endeavours that yearn to «embrace the chaos of *dicovering new worlds*» (Brásio, 2024, p. 97, translated here, emphasis added), and that ask «[h]ow is it possible to *discover* things we do not know *yet?* (Brásio, 2024, p. 105, translated here, emphasis added). This kind of expectation posits those enrolled in educational conversations as «subjects-*yet-to-come*» (Atkinson, 2014, p. 14, emphasis added). «If *we* were to know what and where something is likely to be, then there is nothing to *find*», Baldacchino claims (2014, p. 104, emphasis added). «*We* always *seek* to imagine what is not *yet* known» (Baldacchino, 2014, p. 104, emphasis added). Why finding, rather than making?

The problem with this operativeness of theory, that is, with such language of art education theory, is that it operates similarly to what sustains a theory to practice approach. In other words, it does not elude a binary operativeness that sets a theoretical endeavour in motion *towards finding what is hidden*. This is to say that it locates theory in the threshold between the time of confusion, of fogginess, of messiness, and the time of clarity, of lucidity, of revelation. It *upholds* theory as a «discourse that brings forth into the light an inverted representation of its opaque source» (Certeau, 1980/1988), thus not detached from reading the *opaque* as the *obscure*.

In terms of this study's guiding question — *what does it mean to make theory in art education?* —, making theory in art education means to release, to overcome, to find, to discover. It means to desire to evade the opacity of practicing theory. This making of theory cannot not alternate between ends; it does not stray away from established ends. And by established ends, I mean an *end established*, that is, it assumes there is an end, one which eventually enlightens the obscure. Making theory cannot be made without establishing an end, even if for speculation.

Art is in this way invested with an apocalyptical character, and the tangible labour of art education theory is assigned with a revelatory task when in presence of opacity — thereby rendered as momentary obscurity. Art is *read*: it has to be made legible so as to teach. It is not about letting art teach, but about *making art teach*.

making art teach

Recollecting: making art teach by revelation is what Manuel Barkan (1966) desires and makes. To slice the cake with the proper knife for the slice intended: to come to terms with what operates «in *competent* works by artists, critics and other engaged in art» (Barkan, 1966, p. 264, emphasis added). The correct inquiry *reveals* the already existent control, hitherto obscured. Expectation is quenched.

Recollecting: making art teach by revelation is what Allan Bloom (Rousseau, 1762/1979) desires and makes. To translate «so as to make others able to understand what he cannot understand» (Bloom, in Rousseau, 1762/1979, p. vii): to *reveal* the hidden treasures of *Émile*. The heart of the text, hitherto obscured, no longer alien. Expectation is quenched.

Recollecting: making art teach by revelation is what Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1762/1979) desires and makes. By momentarily obscuring a message, whilst always controlling its content and revelation, the instructor defers learning to whenever he deems it apposite; he grasps it and delivers it: in the end, *if* one is to stick to the path *chosen*; chosen by Rousseau. That is also how *Émile* (Rousseau, 1762/1979) is written and, I claim, it is part of *Émile*'s success. Rousseau makes his art teach: his tone makes proposals. The expectation *he* points at, *he* stages, *he* cares about, is quenched: all such journey written.

Recollecting: making art teach by revelation is what Gert Biesta, jan jagodzinski, Dennis Atkinson desire to make, even if not wishing to *control* the outcomes of revelatory encounters with art. Pointing at it because «one person actually *believes* that there is something to see that is worth seeing by another person» (Biesta, 2017a, p. 44). Staging it so as to place «the viewer in [a] vibrating gap to stir up an event; notice that this event 'happens,' [...] enabling the phenomenon of 'seeing [oneself] seeing'» (jagodzinski, 2017, p. 38). Caring about it so an interruption may grant «a situation the power, the challenge, to make [those engaged with it] think» (Atkinson, 2022, p. 93).

Recollecting: making art teach by revelation is what Socrates makes. Before death, Socrates acknowledges the language of poetry is built with different means than those of philosophy. However, this does not mean Socrates sees they *result* in different things: both are different shapes of the same dream — what matters is to decode it, to translate it, to bring its instruction; to attain truth. In other words, the unknown in the dream is to be addressed by an unknown language so as to knowingly pass it. The opacity of the unknown has to be matched, but such matching is made so as to control it: it is the correct knife to cut the cake. The unknown, hitherto obscured, no longer alien. Socrates makes the art of philosophy — his own art — teach. And he makes it by pointing, staging, caring.

This is all to express a life of art education theory composed by eventful disruptiveness — a momentary, syncopated, revelatory, eventfulness. Events, pivoting obscurity with clarity, thus compose educational time as a sequence of moments. It is a making concerned in giving clear readings *in contrast* to obscure encounters with art. Be it by redeeming — Barkan, Bloom, Rousseau — or puncturing — Biesta, jagodzinski, Atkinson —, the sequencing means the loss of intelligibility, by momentariness, gives way to presence as a coming. A yet to come. Presence as coming *logos*. Absence as hidden *logos*. Listening to the future in hindsight.

Art is made something else, which is made art; death is not death, but a representation of it. The unknown, the unnameable, the absence; the opaque: it *is*, after all, *not* unsurmountable. They *show* art, they make art *reveal*. Teaching is showing and pedagogical work is revealing; imagination imagines beyond what is opaque. *They make believe art speaks*, as intelligibility must be regained.

Loss is what we cannot *learn from* these texts.

Can we learn loss *with* these writings?

Can we *make* loss with them?

listening to what might be lost

Recollecting: this study's part IV evinces the writings of Gert Biesta, jan jagodzinski, and Dennis Atkinson, hint at a sonic lacking — there might be something lost in what is not yet heard. Listening is, perhaps, a way to compensate for what vision does not see. And Rousseau is also conscious of listening, he is conscious of tone. But unlike the three writers that hint at an opening to hitherto unknown languages, that is, at the possible emergence of the unknown via a sonic mean, Rousseau wishes to close such mean from other voices. Voices not *comprehensible* are to be kept away. Rousseau narrows the space of language, while Biesta, jagodzinski, and Atkinson hint at its expanding; they seem to call for it. Again, this aspect may be a space made weaving relation amidst them and Rousseau — their amassing can be pushed aside to listen.

While the momentary obscurity is where these three scholars and Rousseau overlap, the aspiration to listening to what is other is where there might be an otherwise space. Or, to put it in Glissant's (1990) terms, this is where the boxes are so full they can be pushed aside. Their weavings come together here, and it is here such weavings more firmly resist tightening: listening to the murmurs, to the ramblings, to the noise of an unknown language and to translate them to a known language — this is why art is summoned to education in Biesta, jagodzinski, and Atkinson: to provide a language to address the unknown. To compensate for what language lacks.

Tellingly, there are other hints for how the sonic — hearing a writing, sensing its tone — is regarded as potentially relevant to pedagogical work amidst Peter Smith's (1998) friends[194]. For example, George Geahigan (1984), addressing a book by John Hospers, writes «[t]here is much that is *pedagogically sound* about» it (p. 120, emphasis

[194] I am writing with Giorgio Agamben's (2007/2009) text: «[f]riendship is so tightly linked to the definition of philosophy that it can be said that without it, philosophy would not really be possible. The intimacy between friendship and philosophy is so profound that philosophy contains the *philos*, the friend, in its very name, and, as often happens with such an excessive proximity, the risk runs high of not making heads or tails of it» (p. 25).

added). Geahigan (1984) continues by saying its «style is informal, almost *conversational*, and even when arguing in opposition to certain views, the *tone* is *questioning* rather than dogmatic» (p. 120, emphasis added). Geahigan understands «[t]he book is not intimidating and this [...] would serve to promote student discussion» (p. 120). John Swift (1999b) is rather adamant on the importance of «listening to what each learner actually says» (p. 104), stressing a «dialogic [education] which *both listens and hears*» (p. 104, emphasis added). Recollecting: a sonic call can also be heard in *Derivas* (e.g., Andrade, 2023; Brásio, 2024; Martins, 2024).

And the sonic limit that is traced between writing and speaking is a limit I see Biesta, jagodzinski, Atkinson and Rousseau blur. And not merely speculatively: this study's part IV evinces these writers' *textual pedagogical gestures* as the very pedagogical strategies these teachers and theorists narrate and depict. Their texts *teach*, and this is the way of writing with which they *make* theory — this is the dual language they write. They are not only writing *about* pedagogy in art education, they are not only writing *about* art in education. They are *writing pedagogy in art education*, they are *teaching* by means of *what* and *how* is the text. So, pedagogy *both* becomes *the means* to articulate something and *what* is being articulated — there is an overlapping that, nevertheless, conflates neither. And theory *both* becomes *the means* to articulate something and *what* is being articulated — again, there is an overlapping conflating neither. They are teaching and theorising *at the same time*.

Hence my postulation: to *make* theory in art education as an artwork. Writing not limited to instructing, but also inviting imagination to follow it — writing made along an uncertain path of imagination. In other words, uncertain paths of imagination can be made tangible: they are made tangible by language. So, this *making* can be an uncertain path so as to inquire on the divide between theory and practice in pedagogical work; this is what Rousseau's, jagodzinski's, and Atkinson's, artworks make. They make me believe the relation of theory and practice is not necessarily one of contrasting operativeness. This relation of their writings, of their artworks, *with* my readings, is *expressed* by what I share, with writing. And by *with* writing, what I mean is that such relation is expressed at the same time writing expresses it, while such expression, as I write along, is effected by writing. In this respect, the labour of an art education theorist concerns the clear expression of opacity: a *precise* tangible labour.

Noticeably, Erwin Ziegfeld's account of, not only military but also poet, Herbert Read's delivery at a seminar[195] acknowledges such call as well. According to Ziegfeld, what «*gave the whole show its impetus and meaning*, was the address delivered by Herbert Read [which] *in itself was a work of art*» (Ziegfeld, as cited in Steers, 2005, p. 131, emphasis added). And Ziegfeld's language also echoes his art education: the work of art gives meaning.

Noticeably, Louis Lankford writes «[a]rt educators have their own elusive grail: The Perfect Art Education, being a harmonious amalgam of research, theory, and practice that meets the needs and expectations of every constituent» (Lankford, 1992a, p. 195). Perhaps, Jean-Jacques Rousseau reads Lankford's (1992a) ironic remark as desirable and feasible, that is, not at all elusive. Aside harmony and meeting needs and expectations, then, I believe the writings of Gert Biesta, jan jagodzinski, Dennis Atkinson, *make* such confusion of research, theory and practice. An imperfect — not complete — art education theory. Notwithstanding these three authors' reliance on a contrasting operativeness between obscurity and clarity, the theory and practice divide is blurred. «If the art of speaking is itself an art of operating and an art of thinking, practice and theory can be present in it» (Certeau, 1980/1988, p. 77). This can be learnt with their writings, which make such art of practice (Certeau, 1980/1988) tangible.

Their gestures *stay*: they are memorable as they teach, as they depict. They compose their artworks, their songs: they share memory by the tone of their writing, which is to say they fable *to* the reader.

Recollecting: if *what* is written in the texts of Biesta (2017a), of jagodzinski (2017), of Atkinson (2022), such coherent pieces, is written with caring ever so intensely about writing, about practice, about making; why should such opacity be interrupted? Why must an opaque encounter with art be interrupted, broken through, irrupted, so as to regain an intelligibility that is deemed lost?

I want to hesitate to understand. What cannot be learnt from their writings?

What about *loss*?

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[195] UNESCO seminar on *The Visual Arts in General Education*, in 1951.

what might be lost is not loss

Recollecting: John Drabinski (2019) writes opacity appeals «to think outside the binary of the legible and illegible» (p. 20). Opacity «is something other than illegibility; History's sign is not unreadable *and that's it*» (Drabinksi, 2019, p. 20).

Recollecting: Édouard Glissant (2009) writes «[*t*]*he archipelagic thought,* thought of the essay, of intuitive temptation, [...] could be affixed to continental thoughts, which would be mostly systematic [*de système*]» (p. 45, translated here).

For this study, I am not making an overarching analysis of Drabinski's (2019) writings on Glissant. Recollecting these snippets, however, serves to engage with the previous sub-chapter by inviting here how Drabinski (2019) makes use of Édouard Glissant's writings in relation to Continental thought. By Continental thought, I am alluding to that which can be the narrative of History[196] by stressing its idea of unity: of comprehension — a compression. That is, a mode of thinking that operates *within* its own domain, that moves within absoluteness — that listens to itself. Hence *recollection* as protagonist in *Meno*: the unknown, the unnameable, the absence — the opaque —, *can* always be comprehended in retrospect, in recollection. No space for insurmountability. Hence the *philosophy of art education* (Smith, 1998) which *can* look into «the mass of literature at hand [so as to find] pointers for future research» (Smith, 1998, p. 374). The opaque is read as momentary obscurity; that is how it is accepted.

But — as with systematicity, as with recollection, as with philosophy —, I do not intend to deal away with Continental thought: this study is *not* about dealing away.

To address Continental thought with Édouard Glissant, and following John Drabinski (2019), is to also consider Martin Heidegger. And Martin Heidegger is brought to this study — rather modestly, I must write — particularly because of how Drabinski (2019) sees the contrast between Heidegger and Glissant: namely, by *loss*.

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[196] A summarising of the narrative of Western thought is written in Tervo (2022): «briefly, the 'West' was birthed by the Greeks, systematized by the Romans, reinvigorated by European Renaissance humanists, globalized by the great discoverers and secularized by science, only to find its historical culmination in the global power of the modern liberal, capitalist democracies of today. This story of 'Western' civilization has offered those who affiliate themselves with it a frame for historicization that *not only connects the present to a particular past but* also, [...] to a future that the present ought to unfold» (p. 244, emphasis added). This summary is made in relation to passages by art educators who call for the retrieving of some idyll — *alliance, large culture*, *harmony* — assumedly present in the past but lacking in the present: therefore, desirable in the future. Bringing this here, is to stress this lacking, this loss, is compensated by the construction of a narrative — of History — that *enables* the very making of such idyll.

> for all the *aspiration to full presence*, Heidegger is plenty aware of how historical experience might build *irretrievable loss* into the sign, how the sign might be loss itself (and so not just an expression of loss). In Heidegger's sense of loss, what ought to gather to the word does not come. And so the *reader of the sign of loss* is always an interpreter who comes too late and finds little or almost nothing at the heart of a given signification. In a well-known example from "Origin of the Work of Art," Heidegger brings this sense of historical experience — loss, reactivation, presence, and radical absence — to bear on the encounter with the Greek temple. It is always the Greeks with Heidegger. Always. (Drabinski, 2019, pp. 7–8, emphasis added)

To come to terms with such loss — of Historical experience, of *The* past, of *Art* —, Heidegger's work *cannot not compensate* for it. That is, it «bear[s] witness to historical experience in the fullest and most honestly tragic sense: the promise of reactivation (anticipation and openness to presence) and the failure of gathering (disappointment, radical absence)» (Drabinski, 2019, p. 8). Heidegger's past is nostalgic (Drabinski, 2019), it is a painful wish to return home which, in Heidegger's lexicon, would be a return to language, which, in Heidegger's lexicon, is that which reveals. It is language that which speaks (Silverman, 1994). So, in the same way, Heidegger makes art teach, reactivating what is lost — a paradox. Considering Heidegger's reactivating is intrinsic to «a description of how historical experience renders a sign legible or illegible» (Drabinski, 2019, p. 10), *therein lies the interest of art*. Making legible the unknown, the unnameable, the absence — the opaque —, which *can* always be comprehended; in retrospect, in recollection. «[F]or such a purpose [of teaching the world] philosophy at least always comes too late» (Hegel, 1820/2011, p.20). «To find art's essence, that truly reigns in the work of art, *we seek* the true work and we ask the work what is and how it is» (Heidegger, 1977/2008, p. 12, translated here). Art discloses truth within a closed domain — the triangle of artist, work, art. Art is made to name, art is made to teach.

Art explains the past once it is read. Therein Manuel Barkan's (1966) historicising of art education operates; therein Peter Smith's (1998) philosophy of art education operates. Once read, truth is revealed; once read, the future of art education can *be*[197]. The past, the unknown, the unnameable, the absence — the opaque. Art is made something else, which then is assumed to *mean* art. Death is not death, but a

[197] As Drabinski (2019) writes, and to complement the previous footnote, «the white West [...] begins with barely legible (or even allegedly illegible) signs of the past, not *as* past, but as the condition of the possibility of any future whatsoever. An interval» (p. 10).

representation of it. The past — that which is absent — is made present, but it is made so by speaking on its behalf. By *writing over it*. «Even in loss and failure, we can say that Heidegger's thought is precisely what Glissant calls a [Continental thought]: thought committed to the presencing of roots, even in the experience of absence» (Drabinski, 2019, p. 8).

To come to terms with «the disappointment generated by the *expectation of presence* [...] certain things become readable» (Drabinski, 2019, p. 12, emphasis added). Which is to say they are *made* readable. This is why that, rather than merely addressing this loss as *loss*, as Drabinski (2019), I prefer to gently hone it: *what might be lost*; so as to convey the expectation that is placed *onto* loss. Something is assumed to be already there, and it is to be shown. One must care enough to point at such stage, and stage it so as to point it. So, the matter is not reduced to Continental thought; the matter is not reduced to systematicity; the matter is not reduced to philosophy; the matter is not reduced to a particular language of art education. It is not about a *title*. The issue is the very *reducing*. It is about a *working*. The matter is theory as an explanatory discourse, as generalisation. The matter is the very foreclosing of language to uncertain paths, from a thought or frame that borders it. The matter is the very foreclosing of the Other of thought (Glissant, 1990) — the other as other. The matter is the *reducing* of languages. It is about workings, it is about *what* is made and *how*. The matter is the reducing of otherness to what one comprehends. The matter is forcing other to speak what one says. The matter is the very reducing of uncertain paths of theory *from* a system that dictates its steps.

More precisely: what this study addresses is the constricting of tools to *make* an opaque path of thought clear in the expression of its opacity.

In terms of this study's guiding question — *what does it mean to make theory in art education?* —, making theory in art education means to make art speak. It means to make art teach. By pointing, by staging, by caring. Not only expecting the world, the sign, the idiotic event, the idiot; but also placing expectation on it to *speak*. Making theory in art education means to ask what can art make, and to expect the answer. To expect the opaque to be momentarily obscure. Making theory in art education concerns ends: dealing away with the opacity of practicing theory; showing clarity, overcoming obscurity.

Recollecting: Édouard Glissant's writings on opacity challenge this very contrasting operativeness between obscurity and clarity, between «legible and illegible» (Drabinski, 2019, p. 20). Drabinski (2019) writes opacity «asks [to] think outside [such] binary» (p. 20). Recollecting this study's part III: perhaps it can be written opacity invites to think *with* obscurity and *with* clarity *at the same time*. So, it is not about evading contrast; rather, to stay with it so as to blur what it delimits, and what delimits it — to inquire on what makes such divide *believable*. To make such divide strange: encountering the divide and refusing to comprehend it; in other words, to unceasingly *make* a familiar language strange, to a point recognition cannot be recollected. Therein, the question: how to make theory with art otherwise? Does art teach?

Recollecting: *how* the encounter *is*, as that which refuses to reduce the opaque to the obscure; an obscure encounter *reveals* something as it is expected to do so, even if patiently; an opaque encounter does not promise it. In other words, dealing with obscurity entails the encounter to happen, *eventually*, it entails waiting, placing expectation — it entails reading; it is encountering as reading. With opacity, revelation is not *necessarily* expected. How, then, to learn *with* art? Staying with an opaque understanding of art is more than *reading it*. It entails, it calls, it *asks* writing. It is not concerned with *encountering by finding*, rather, it is concerned with *continuously making the encounter*. It addresses without controlling: it may understand, but it does not comprehend. More precisely: the question is addressed by writing with the encounter, not writing *over* the encounter. This is an evidence of Glissant's relational poetics made tangible by his writing, that is, by his *opaque textual gesture*. That is, *opacity* is not only something Glissant *shows* by the content of his writing; it is also *shown* by the manner of his writing: it enacts what it postulates. He *shows* opacity by *sharing* it: he *writes opacity*, and shares it so. In other words, theory can be made in a *certain*, as in *precise*, way — in a way that not only presents what it claims, but, simultaneously, declaims what it claims. It is a making that says itself.

That is, it is a writing of theory that writes in name of its own language: it tells its story and nothing else. It fables, sharing the fabling. More precisely, then: it is about *writing the very encounter*: postulating an event across the span of text. And making *this* event, writing *this* text, means to address theory as a very singularity that is made along with the honing of language — tooled by textual pedagogical gestures. It is about expressing a question *clearly* by the *opacity* of what it unceasingly does not know.

And I believe this is what Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Gert Biesta, jan jagodzinski, Dennis Atkinson, make. Their writings imbricate theory and practice, they teach and theorise *at the same time*. Is it not believable their art of thinking is an art of operating (Certeau, 1980/1988) which is how their texts speak? This is what they pass on: their very singular artworks.

Recollecting: these authors' writings complicate a structure, that of theory as a privileged point of view which structures what it observes. These authors' writings complicate a structure, that of pedagogy as a guided view which explains what it observes. By teaching and theorising at the same time, they complicate teaching by theorising, and they complicate theorising by teaching. Rather than dividing one and the other, they complicate them — they *mingle* them. They make me believe I am present — they teach me by their theorising: and I am present insofar as I hear them. My imagination thus makes my presence tangible — to me. While Jean-Jacques Rousseau desperately desires mastering, *absolutely*, he does so paradoxically: he masters Émile by loosening the limits of theory and pedagogy. Contrastingly, the desire of mastering in Gert Biesta, jan jagodzinski, Dennis Atkinson, is *not* one of controlling learners, but, rather, of inspiring them. Yet, they *all* articulate pedagogical proposals by means of their theoretical endeavours: they all invite presence — so I write.

Recollecting: their textual pedagogical gestures *stay*: they are memorable as they teach, as they depict. They compose their artworks, their songs: they share memory by the tone of their writing, which is to say they fable *to* the reader; they sing to the learner. They *grant the power to remember* (Blanchot, 1969/2003).

And they all rely on a contrasting operativeness between obscurity and clarity. To what concerns Gert Biesta, jan jagodzinski, and Dennis Atkinson, more specifically, such reliance occurs when it comes to the teachings of an *external* art written *about* in their texts. They point, they stage; perhaps, caring comes closer. Their making of theory deals away with loss, as an expectation is placed *onto* the opacity of art. They wave goodbye to loss: making art obscure enables for an *eventual* clarity, *replacing* such loss. This is also what they pass on: what their writing cannot make.

So, the task is to *recollect with* the memories these texts share: continuing to sing, but not necessarily the same song.

waving hello to loss

> The opaque is not the obscure, but it can be it and it can be accepted as such. It is the non-reducible, which is the most perennial guarantee of participation and confluence. We are far from the opacities of the Myth or of the Tragic, from where the obscure would carry exclusion, and from where transparency strived to «comprehend». There is within this verb «to comprehend» the movement of hands which take contexture [*l'entour*] and pull it back to themselves [*ramènent à soi*]. A gesture of imprisonment if not appropriation. Let us prefer the gesture of giving-with, which finally opens onto totality. (Glissant, 1990, pp. 205–206, translated here)

Pointing, staging, caring: Gert Biesta, jan jagodzinski, Dennis Atkinson, make use of these textual pedagogical gestures to make theory, which is to say these gestures structure their writing. Their discursive spaces are thus made. And such spaces are spaces where art conceals a message to be delivered by revelation. In other words, within those domains, art makes a gesture of captivity — it conceals a truth, being expected to release it, to reveal it. This is also an effect of their very textual pedagogical gestures. How can an otherwise gesturing be? How can a gesture be invested in forgetting walls, more than it is in concealing a discursive space?

Rather than waving goodbye to the unknown, the unnameable, the absence — the opaque —, wave otherwise. Perhaps, hello. This is the aspiration of this study: to make a textual pedagogical gesture that does not aim at comprehending what might be lost upon an unintelligible encounter with art. So, while I can learn with these writers the divide between theory and practice is less of a groove than it is an undulation, I wish to foreground what I cannot learn with these writers *alone* — to wave hello to loss. To make so, I recollect Glissant's (1990) encounters with the silent person who walks who refuses to speak. And this account must be precise.

There is no appearance to recollect: Glissant (1990) does not try to describe the silent person who walks, being «inappropriate to put in scene such drift, so relentless» (p. 136, translated here). Respecting the silent person who walks' «tireless muteness [*mutité*]», Glissant (1990) «labour[s] to communicate with this absence» (p. 136, translated here). In a pique for «not making [himself] «comprehended» or accepted» (p. 136, translated here), Glissant still wishes «to *inaugurate with the walker* a *system of relation* that would *not be based on words*» (pp. 136–137, translated here, emphasis added,). Glissant «[makes] him a silent call, a gesture whose movement [he] really did not know how to calculate» (p. 37, translated here); but still, he tries.

At some point, as Glissant (1990) «insisted without insisting»[198] (p. 137, translated here), the silent person who walks replies:

> he gave back an imperceptible sign, at least to my eyes, maybe because this gesture was the peak [*comble*] of what he could express: «I comprehend that which you are trying to set about. You are trying to know why do I walk in non-presence like this. I accept that you try. But look around you, and see if it is worth to explain. You, yourself, are you worth me explaining it to you? So, let us leave it at that. We went together as far as possible.» (Glissant, 1990, p. 137, translated here)

The imperceptible sign: «[a] sort of swaying of the barely raised hand, which bec[omes] (for [Glissant] adopt[s] it in turn) [their] sign of complicity [*connivence*]» (Glissant, 1990, p. 137, translated here). Such language is «nuanc[ed] as [they go] along [...] shar[ing] this language of gestures» (Glissant, 1990, p. 137, translated here). This sharing is *not* the passing of one's comprehension so as to instruct the other; neither the other's comprehension by the one. This sharing is the very practice of sharing, of making a language with. The silent person who walks that waves at Glissant invites him to enrol in complicity, which Glissant accepts: they weave themselves with language, which is to say they share the making of their relation — and they do it singularly. Glissant and the silent person who walks *share* a gesture — they share the making of a language continuously with such tool, with such improper gesture, where the correctness of language is figured out as they go along. Systematicity is not dealt away with, but it does not bind the construction of language to a *certain*, that is, predetermined, path.

But, with the silent walker's imperceptible sign — to Glissant's (1990) *eyes* —, what thought makes Glissant hesitate to *make* the silent walker speak, notwithstanding Glissant's desire of installing some kind of ground? Perhaps, the thought of opacity, the thought that «distracts [him] from absolute truths, of which [he] would believe to be the guardian» (Glissant, 1990, p. 206, translated here). The thought which makes him *not* read, that is, which makes him unconcerned with the legible and the illegible: the thought which stays with *making* sense, rather than *finding* sense. The clearly expressed thought of writing when reading.

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[198] Recollecting, John Drabinski (2019) writes: «Paradoxical paradox. The imperative is to *think both at once*, to think how a site can be so saturated with sadness that it drowns expression *at the same time* that one thinks the beauty of inheritance, survival, and creation» (p. 26, emphasis complemented). Indeed, to *make both at once*.

That might as well be how one may resist to act when believing there might be something obscured which should not be prevented from revealing itself. The very thought which makes Glissant *write* language, *make* language *with* absence — the merely possible writing — rather than making absence speak his own language. This is how Glissant writes how he waves hello to loss. He addresses loss without controlling it. The silent person who walks keeps silent, the silent person who walks keeps walking: such drift is not to be put in scene. «His energy is *without limits*, his *withdrawal absolute*» (Glissant, 1990, p. 224, translated here, emphasis added).

Glissant keeps on with the silent person, that is, he does not try to extract this person from a territory. Rather, Glissant moves himself to the silent walker's place, to the silent walker's pace. Glissant is not invested in some privileged gaze before the silent person who walks, some gaze that allows him to speak on the silent person's behalf, to capture such limitless energy — to *read* that person. He *tries* to listen to the silence, and he shares the procedure, the movement, to do so: he imitates silence, insisting to speak without speaking. Imitating: he clearly expresses listening *to* opacity.

Glissant waves hello to loss, *waving goodbye to his own language*.

It is a gesture of giving-with, a movement he does not *know*. But the only one he can do: an unrehearsed wave — impatiently patient and unceasingly *made* — waving in its singularity. And this is not to say this unrehearsed wave appears *ex nihilo*: this is a wave amidst an ocean of attempts, «the amassing and the infinitely recommenced indefinite impatience» (Glissant, 1990, p. 223, translated here). A singularity that, perhaps, may meet with the singularity of the unknown, the absent, the opaque — but it never matches. An encounter always to be made. Work always to be made.

To make this language is not without uncertainty, but that is the «chance [*bonheur*] of poetics», the «accident» (Glissant, 1990, p. 153, translated here). And that is also the joy, the pleasure, the chance — *bonheur* — of poetics: together at the same time, without expecting it.

The accident — *ad-cadere*: towards the fall. It is not reducible to a rehearsal.

Part V is a recollection. This is not to say it is a making of nostalgia, but, rather, an inquiry on nostalgia as I recollect this very study.

What does it mean to make theory in art education? Following Édouard Glissant's writings, or, *walking with* Édouard Glissant's errantry, making theory in art education can be the addressing of loss, that is, the making of loss without resorting to *make* it a nostalgic endeavour. This is made by inquiring on the divide of, on the one hand, theory and practice, and, on the other hand, clarity and opacity. *What* theory writes and *how* theory writes is put in question — *at the very same time*. And I mean literally: *placing* theory *in* question. Not knowing what making theory in art education means and staying with such inquiry: intentionally hesitating to understand. Insisting. Impatiently.

And to begin to imagine opaquely is already part of *making* opaquely: *not forgetting* the singularity of what *does not have to* be *made comprehensible* so as to — *try* to — ensure what is not known can, in its absence, be present. Again, as this reading and study are made with *writing*, this endeavour is impatient: it is to continuously make hesitantly, rather than simply waiting. To *make* sense of opacity is to amass and recommence impatiently: it is about refusing to resort to proper languages. It is about making sense; *making* is what is emphasised. In other words, it is to express the very imagination of theory without dealing away with the practice of writing.

In this light, to literally place theory in question is to question theory literarily.

This is what this study is: writing to insist on a question, asking and answering, yes, but never definitely so. Staying with the question and, *with it* — with the question and with the staying —, make art education theory a question. That is, it is about the *making* of a question where the *making* is emphasised and expressed. This is what this study proposes: making theory in art education without being merely a philosopher, without being merely a poet, without being merely. Without resorting to a title that defines the paths of theoretical working, that is, to unceasingly hesitate to settle on ends. An art education theorist: clarity and confusion, that is, sharing clarity without dealing away with confusion, sharing confusion without dealing away with clarity — all at the same time — again, not settling on ends. Teaching and theorising at the same time. Making theory in art education as the impatiently patient enduring of weaving sources, by expressing a relation amidst them *with* the very opacity of their texts. Thereby, at the very same time, expressing the very relation with sources.

> Just as Reverdy tried to give us the ability to touch the roughness of things, even through a poem, Leiris wanted to unfold speech that would be a live fabric, patient and revealing, of those very things that are true to the one who lives them, feels them, and refuses to name them in an ideal conclusion. Reverdy seeks ineffable contact, and Leiris *the Relation that states itself*. (Glissant, 1992, p. 27, emphasis added)

Recollecting: this passage, again, highlights the focus of Glissant in *making*, and, more importantly, in *making with*. And, as argued in this study, as sung with this fairytale, Glissant does not deal away with revelation, even if lamenting such word. He chooses not to be concerned with it, as an *end*. That is, the revelatory word does not come first — neither as a predetermined beginning nor as a predetermined end. Rather, it *may*, perhaps, come then — but for it to come, and such coming is never promised, something must be made, something must be continuously made, renouncing an absolute. So, rather than a Godlike entity that comes over and *names*, thus inaugurating knowledge by rapture — an encounter predicated on an irruptive revelation —, what comes over is «the *amassing* and the *infinitely recommenced indefinite impatience*» (Glissant, 1990, p. 223, translated here, emphasis added). Perpetually waving; waving goodbye to the language one knows so as to wave hello to languages one does not know.

This is the textual pedagogical gesture I make, I *share*, along the educational *traverse*, *journey*, *errantry*, this study writes. Waving. Waving across ends. Waving hello to absence. Waving hello to loss. Waving hello to the uncertain paths of theory. Waving hello to the opacity of *practicing theory*.

So, for art to teach, must I make art teach? How do I share this waving?

This is this study's overarching endeavour: to make art teach resisting unceasingly to control it; that is, to make art teach, but not in the name of[199]. Making theory in art education without placing expectation onto art. That is, to resist mobilising art as a representation of something else, something already known which is assumed to be concealed by art, which theory then delivers. Rather, it is to make art teach without speaking on its behalf.

With the aid of this study's guiding question — *what does it mean to make theory in art education?* — I address several writings by making them closer, and closer, together. That is, this study is a *studying*: making myself write *with* these writings and *with* this study's guiding question, expressing the relation amidst the writings addressed with their very complexity, inviting myself to the opacities of texts, of writing; by writing.

This is why I labour to stay *in* inquiry, here, *in* text, and hesitate to comprehend, that is, to reduce texts to either affiliation or opposition. On the one hand, this is to resist the narrowing of the relational imaginaries that can be made with references. On the other, this is to express the very inquiry into the legacy of my language, indebted to a Continental dependence on contrasting operativeness. To do so, I regard these writings as artworks, as poems: opacities which I cannot be done with — opacities which I cannot control, texts I hesitate to comprehend — turbulent makings. I thus have to address them by moving with them, respecting their language rather than pulling them with my grasp.

Can this endeavour be written so as to be conveyed? Can it be *made*?

How am I learning? Not limiting teaching, and teaching. How am I teaching? Not limiting learning, and learning.

How am I making art teach?

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[199] This is a nod to Juuso Tervo's (2020) text, *Not in The Name Of: Time and Disappearances in Ethics of Art Education*. The present study is also a continuing of the conversation in this piece, «a work of education without a sense of direction; a work that, nevertheless, does not stop working» (p. 165). A working title.

This study is the very endeavour of *sharing* these writers' texts as artworks — not merely *showing* them. And this is not *giving* these writers' artworks as they are. That is, this is not about theorising so as to appropriate a truth *about* the object of this study and giving such truth as an absolute, as an enlightened point of view I, finally, reveal.

Again, this is not about giving artworks as they are: I simply cannot. I am already pointing at them; I am already staging them; I am already caring about them — I am already touching them. I am making their artworks teach not by sharing *them*, but by sharing what and how I learn with them. And I am also sharing what and how I cannot learn with them alone. Pointing, staging, caring: these gestures are used to make up the fables these theorists and teachers pass on. Pointing, staging, caring: with these gestures I pass on the texts' moves: *as* such moves move my writing. I pass on their makings: *as* I make *with* their makings this study. This is not about passing on truths; rather, about sharing the very making of my singular position[200]: making the encounter with the addressed texts *clearly expressed in its opacity*, thereby sharing a *traverse*, *journey*, *errantry*[201]: the *event* I propose is thus not limited to an irruption, a break through, an interruption. It is as wide as the wave the span of this study waves with: this is how an opaque text teaches.

In this respect, the matter I invite to consider is *writing art education in a theoretical key*: the practice of writing as a pedagogical practice and as a creative practice. It does not offer *a view* onto anything else, other than itself: it is more about sharing learning, but at the same time being about teaching as well. *Sharing learning* — the gerund — does not have to be limited to sharing what is known: it can also be about sharing and passing on what is not. So, then, it is an endeavour aiming to make opacity legible, without rendering it obscure, without claiming an absolute: a text than can be read — legible —, yet it emphasises the *making* of sense — *means* whose meaning does not have to *necessarily* mean. Paradoxical paradox.

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[200] I am writing with Juuso Tervo's (2023c) text and with Anne Carson's (1995) text: «A scholar is someone who takes a position. From which position, certain lines become visible. You will at first think I am painting the lines myself; it's not so. I merely know where to stand to see the lines that are there. And the mysterious thing, it is a very mysterious thing, is *how* these lines do paint themselves. Before there were any edges or angles or virtue — who was there to ask the questions? *Well, let's not get carried away with exegesis*. A scholar is someone who knows how to limit himself to the matter at hand. [...] *Now move along*.» (Carson, 1995, pp. 93–94, emphasis added). I have complemented Tervo's (2023c) quotation with the last three sentences, as they can converse with the *matters at hand* in this study, the gestures with which it *moves along*: this is to say *the study does not take position*, definitely.

[201] Recollecting: I am writing with texts by, respectively, Maurice Blanchot (1984/2016), Michel de Certeau (2013/2015), and Édouard Glissant (1990). Bringing these three authors here — Blanchot, Certeau, Glissant — yet again is a nod to Juuso Tervo, who brings them to my attention during the first moments of our *collaboration* — working *with*: I cannot see this study otherwise. Still these writings cause a great impression on me. Along the uncertain paths of this study, more than guiding me, they stay with me. As Tervo. This is a lesson.

What does it mean to make theory in art education? This is the question I pass on.

farewell, keep in touch with

We move ourselves on the surface, within the span, weaving our imagination, and not filling the voids of a knowledge: but on the contrary clearing the overfull boxes, as we go, to finally conceive volumes of the infinite. (Glissant, 1990, p. 223, translated here)

What does it mean to make theory in art education?

This study is the making of a textual pedagogical gesture. This making — gerund, this is to say, the *how-ness* of this gesture: how it is *and* how it comes to be — is documented along this study.

Recollecting the first of two specific questions brought fore in this study: if Jean-Jacques Rousseau's (1762/1979) textual pedagogical gestures in *Emile, or On Education* can be read to overlap those of educators Gert Biesta, jan jagodzinski, and Dennis Atkinson, what does this entail to the *making* of art education theory?

The writings by Rousseau, Biesta, jagodzinski, Atkinson, brought fore in this study imbricate theory and practice, that is, they teach and theorise *at the same time*. Their art of thinking is an art of operating which is how their texts speak. This is what they pass on with their theories: their pedagogies; this is how they pass on their pedagogies: by their theories. Rather than mastering one and the other, they mingle theory and pedagogy. They pass on their artworks, their singular makings, their singular positions by means of textual pedagogical gestures. They show it is possible to inquire on the divide between theory and practice by blurring such divide: convincingly so. They invite me to believe I am being taught. It is possible, with their writings, to state a relation of theory and practice where *relation* is emphasised; the question is the very relation of them — means, rather than ends. So I take on such invitation, of making a singular position. As I make my textual pedagogical gesture, throughout this study I foreground a making of theory in art education that relies on eventful disruptiveness — a momentary, syncopated, revelatory, eventfulness. Single events, alternating opacity with clarity, thus compose educational time as a sequence of moments, a making which is concerned in giving clear readings *in contrast* to opaque encounters with art. This is evinced by amassing the writings of these scholars along with other institutional, Historical, and contemporary examples. This trait is that of a dependence on a contrasting operativeness in art education theory, a contrast between opacity and clarity, which, in turn interplay. The thesis is this interplay between opacity and clarity operates under an acceptance of opacity as obscurity. In other words, a loss of intelligibility is regarded as momentary; therefrom, clarity is expected. I argue this is entailed to a trait of Continental thought, that of addressing by contrast. This is not just «an exclusive opposition, rather [an] *inevitable interdependency*»

fed by Classical rhetorics' way of «*describing and proving things by way of their opposites*» (Mehtonen, 2003, pp. 17–18, emphasis added). In this regard, contrast is «a methodological accessory» (Mehtonen, 2003, p. 17) so as to *obtain meaning*. So, absence, loss, always gives way to presence, to gain, as a coming. A yet to come. Presence as coming *logos*. Absence as hidden *logos*. Listening to the future in hindsight — finding the revelation which is already written.

While the works of Biesta, jagodzinski, Atkinson, I share in this study do not claim any desire to *instruct a certain path to make theory*, they do partake of a language that can be traced along, and traces, such Continental mode of comprehending, that is, of *reading*: finding meaning by unveiling the clarity opacity assumedly conceals. That is, opacity is read as obscurity. Moreover, the textual pedagogical gestures brought fore in this study by means of the three scholars' writings are gestures Jean-Jacques Rousseau also makes use of. Therein, such textual pedagogical gestures — resources of writing — are not detachable from a legacy of modern education. This momentariness of opacity is also where these three scholars and Rousseau overlap. To what concerns the making of theory in art education, the argument is art is invested with an apocalyptical character, in that it conceals something hitherto hidden: art is expected to reveal teachings. Pedagogical work, which in these authors is not detached from theoretical work, is assigned with a revelatory task when in presence of art. Pedagogy and theory read art; art is to be made legible so as to teach. Ultimately, pedagogy and theory *make art teach*. This is not to say that these three scholars' writings and Rousseau's *say* the same — they overlap, but they do not conflate with each other: the latter has no interest other than control, contrastingly to the former. However, the procedures for saying it, the textual pedagogical gestures they make use of, are intimate. This mode of comprehending is part of my very education as a Continental person, that is, a person whose language is comprised by a specific heritage: an archive (Foucault, 1970/1981) where obscurity and clarity are interdependent and sequential (Mehtonen, 2003). A person whose language operates within a domain, a discursive space that is made with gestures — in this study foregrounded as pointing, staging, caring.

This is already a pitfall of this study: am I reading myself onto the object of study? Am I learning what I already know? Am I making what I hold? Am I, rather than writing a fairytale, writing a myth?

Recollecting the second of two specific questions brought fore in this study: how can Édouard Glissant's postulation of *opacity* be made a tool for overlapping such textual pedagogical gestures *and*, therewith, in *making* an otherwise gesture *with* them?

The mentioned pitfall is why I make use of Édouard Glissant's writings. Even though the very same question can be posed — am I reading myself *onto* the other? —, I believe the specificity, the poetic precision (Tervo, 2018) in Glissant's work provides a path to hesitate before the tendency to *read*. And by path, I mean an uncertain one: one of uncertainty, a constant reminder that *the* path is merely *a* path, and one which is to be unceasingly *made*, rather than discovered. Regarding *Poetics of Relation* (Glissant, 1990), more specifically, Glissant writes the book constantly revisits the very lines of force of the poetics he wishes to share. And this revisiting, this recollecting, «this very repeating [*ressassement*] sufficiently indicates such poetics does not draw in a qualitative absolute» (Glissant, 1990, p. 47, translated here).

> For Relation in reality is not an absolute towards every work will tend to, but a totality — even if it means for us to unravel [*débrouiller*] on that which it does not hold on to [*elle ne s'y tient*] — which by poetic force and by practice and without ceasing seeks to perfect itself, that is to say simply to complete itself (Glissant, 1990, pp. 47–48, translated here)

To what concerns my position, my singular position: it is endlessly made until relation is expressed, by itself — the present is never done with. Thus I try to «never [be] finished with the present» (Tervo, 2018, p. 43). Thus the present is made a poem, a poem I resist to comprehend, as a «poem comprehended is a finished poem» (Glissant, 1993, p. 122, translated here). This is why I consider these writings — Rousseau's, Biesta's, jagodzinski's, Atkinson's, Glissant's, as artworks, as poems I am not done with, opacities which I *cannot* be done with, opacities I must not comprehend — opacities which I hesitate to understand. As for opacity, something I learn with Glissant's writings for this study's purposes: as much as I unravel in it I have tried to not *secure* it but to share it. An opacity which is not finished, as I share my singular position *with* it; that is, I try to state this study's and opacity's very relation — without desiring to claim any generalisation of its understanding for other applications. The opacity of the encounter with these writings is to be maintained by endlessly making this encounter. And this encounter is made by addressing them, that is, moving with

them towards their language rather than seizing them with a comprehension of *mine*: implicating myself in the place of the other, the *Other of thought* (Glissant, 1990). And I can only *make* so, also because the writers I write with in this study write their language and they share their tools for thinking. I learn *with* them, and I make use of the textual pedagogical gestures that define their *making* of theory. And Glissant reminds me of the precision, namely, the precise recollecting of the relation of difference in obscurity and opacity. And here I refer to *them*, in unspecified manner, because of the very specificity of language they *speak*: they make me believe I am being taught when reading their theorising. They make me believe by means of textual pedagogical gestures I *hear*: there is a tone in their proposals. Not wanting to deal away with the confusion of this writing, I nevertheless risk a sequence: I make these writings artworks; I make art teach; I learn with them; I teach by sharing such learning: I write the very singular moving position of an educational journey.

I thus make this study's textual pedagogical gesture by amassing: pointing, staging, caring. I thus make this study's textual pedagogical gesture by amassing: opacity and clarity. I thus make this study's textual pedagogical gesture by amassing: theory and practice. I thus make this study's textual pedagogical gesture by amassing: theory and pedagogy. I thus make this study's textual pedagogical gesture by amassing: writing and reading. I thus make this study's textual pedagogical gesture by amassing: listening and singing. I thus make this study's textual pedagogical gesture: writing it as I go along.

This is the textual pedagogical gesture I make with this study: *waving* at the totality of what I know — *trying* — to share what I learn. This is the box I try to make clear, this is the *opaque mass* I try to make clear. This is how opacity is made a tool in the making of this overlapping: the making of a mass as I go along this study, a mass that stays opaque, notwithstanding its desire to share clarity. A confusion that I try to pass on clearly by means of a textual pedagogical gesture. This textual pedagogical gesture is a *wave*: a way to address without controlling, which is to say that, again, it intends to teach by sharing learning. This study is the making of a fairytale (Cardigos, 1996), *reflecting* the order of theory, rather than upholding it, where «[m]oves, not truths, are recounted» (Certeau, 1980/1988, p. 23).

Unlike Glissant (1990), who writes he shares teachings without desiring to teach, I *do* aspire to teach — by sharing learning. So, then, what does this *how* teach? What does the learning I share teach?

This study expresses the making of a textual pedagogical gesture. This making — gerund, this is to say, the *how-ness* of this gesture: how it is *and* how it comes to be — is documented along this study. But *what* does this gesture mean? Why *wave*?

What does it mean to make theory in art education? For my part, and solely for my part, without desiring to answer but to continue to share this question, I address this question[202]: making theory in art education means to let go of what we know. To let go of what we comprehend. To wave. Waving goodbye to what we know, waving hello to what we do not know — at the same time. To wave goodbye is to amass the stories that uphold us — the History that makes our beliefs —, to overfill boxes as we go: to clear them, to make them *clear*. And, as we go, we «conceive volumes of infinity» (Glissant, 1990, p. 223, translated here) — making theory so as to make space for loss. Making theory in art education as the unceasing waving at loss, never a rehearsal, unceasingly resisting nostalgia. As with science, as with philosophy, as with theory: the unknown is a driving force — I do not have to take the wheel.

Recollecting the four aims set up in this study's inaugural pages: one; *making* theory in art education as the impatiently patient enduring of weaving sources by the plural complexity of their relations: resisting the onset of relations dictated by *either* affiliation *or* opposition. By means of *opacity*, with Glissant's (e.g., 1990) texts, throughout this study I try to share *how* the authors, concepts, references, times and places — the legacy I carry — can be read to overlap. This is made without a design to achieve an end, that is, a predetermined one. In other words, rather than making theory so as to give a privileged gaze over an object, I am invested in making theory so as to move myself towards the object, *not* to capture it. To do so, I place emphasis in the very *makings* of the object of research, that is to say I account for moves, rather than truths (Certeau, 1980/1988). This leads me to another strategic aim: two; inviting attentiveness to the textual pedagogical gestures one may make by writing, trying to be conscious of the History that informs such making *and* not foreclosing — perhaps, uncertain — paths of theory. This study shares the relevance of such textual

[202] I am waving to Édouard Glissant: «[f]or my part, and solely for my part, that is to say, without desiring to teach, I will resume [these teachings from the poetic perception of the chaos-world]» (Glissant, 1990, p. 217, translated here)

pedagogical gestures by showing how they are an integral part of the language of art education theory, that is, how they tool the writing of theoretical proposals. And writing is considered the very practice that collects, better put, *recollects* the makings of theory *and* where theory is made. So, three; writing as a creative practice where limits are more blurred than they are affirmed, so as to forward an educational life premised on *sharing*. These limits can be, for example, the ones between learning and teaching, reading and writing, sonics and text: writing as the very place for inquiring on divide. What I mean by creative practice, is that I regard writing as a procedure that is not neutral, where language can be put in practice. In this regard, language is a resource, but a product as well. That is, writing installs a discursive space, which is to say that it *makes* language. This is not to be considered as a given, but as a very *making* that can be inquired on — and inquiry serves to make inquiry, and so on. In this respect, even if arguing writing is not a neutral activity, it does not mean I intend to keep it as not neutral, or to propose its neutrality. I am arguing for the very contingency of writing, which, paradoxically, means there is an immediate neutrality to writing, in that what can be written is not predefined[203]: it can be imagined so, it can be fabled so. To what concerns this study, I have tried to render this text, this discursive space, as one that resists reducing other discourses. A space that aspires to not foreclose others, by emphasising the commitment to an unceasing making of a not absolute space; writing opaquely. Four: making theory in art education without being merely a scientist, without being merely a philosopher. Without being merely a teacher, without being merely a learner. Without being merely. Rather, as an art education theorist: clarity and confusion. That is, sharing clarity without dealing away with confusion, sharing confusion without dealing away with clarity: all at the same time. This fourth aim encompasses this study's endeavour, thus its very proposal: writing art education in theoretical key. That is, considering one's own text an artwork, that is, one's singular theory that is *never* seen. Always to be *made* in the most precise manner possible: writing imagination, belief, sound; sharing art education itself. Theory as genre offers a focus, a set of anchors to navigate the opaque wavy grounds

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[203] I cannot not consider Maurice Blanchot's (1969/2003) text in neutral manner, when writing this sentence: «[w]e call this relation neutral, indicating already in this manner that it cannot be recaptured, either when one affirms or when one negates, demanding of language in this way not an indecision between these two modes, but rather a possibility of saying that would say without saying being and without denying it either. And herein we characterize, perhaps, one of the essential traits of the "literary" act: the very fact of writing» (p. 73, italics removed).

that are to be addressed. At the same time, look into the references, the sources of study, as opacities one must not be finished with. The practice of writing art education is thereby, I invite to consider, a practice of writing as pedagogical practice, in that it makes use of textual pedagogical gestures to *learn* and to *teach*; unceasingly. With the opacity of texts, with a confusion of practice: share clearly an opaque understanding.

Again, the four strategic aims are not meant to be limited to this study. They all point to, stage a, care about — wave at: work to be unceasingly made. To make theory without being finished with being critical of what one believes one knows, to make theory trying to not ignore what one does not know, to make theory addressing what one does not know without generalising it. With this study, and for future academic work, the title of art education theorist must not settle on ends. It must remain; it must remain a working title — a title working on the singularities that *make* language.

What does it mean to make theory in art education? What does it mean to wave goodbye to what we know while, at the same time, waving hello to loss? What it may mean, I believe, it may mean *with* committing to the tasks these aims call for.

But this singular position I try to continuously make is this study's main pitfall. In this study, I foreground making theory in art education as waving goodbye to what we know while, at the same time, waving hello to what we do not. This waving hello to loss is not without suggesting to make art teach without speaking on its behalf. At the same time, I may incur in *sounding* I know when art *speaks*, that is, as if there were an essential voice of art I, from my position, can hear and listen to. This is not this study's pretension. What I mean by making art teach without speaking on its behalf is *not* about revealing art's teachings, it is *not* about hearing or listening to art. Rather, it is about sharing my learnings *with* art. And this *sharing* is indeed what I wish to *make* with this study; and I share it with my modest artwork, that is, with my artificial making: this study, this non-heroic story; this thesis.

I do not comprehend when art speaks — I do not even know if it speaks. As far as I may comprehend, it remains silent. But I can try to address the procedures that make such opaque encounter sound *and* continuously make such encounter by recollecting it. Not a recollection which gives way to absolute truth — Rousseau's desire —, that is, a recollection which brings back to oneself, taking the place of the other. Rather, a small, modest, singular understanding, a recollection that aims the making of space. A gesture that does not foreclose discourse.

Singular: this is the only gesture I can make, an unrehearsed wave that is continuously made. Perhaps, a wave may come — but for it to come, I must continue waving: making waves, making impressions; writing. Extending an event of inquiry, an amassing on a question across these pages: making believe these sculptures are not tied down. Recollecting songs I imagine and making such imagining tangible by composing an opaque album: this is it.

This singular position which I write and this study expresses does not *stand out*, it stays here: this is certain. The layering work I make with this study is intentionally pedagogical, yes. And a pitfall it is. Art may teach; but it is not solely up to me, a make-believe teacher to call it.

The *reader*; you: if you learn *from* this, a pedagogical work it is, as you *read* it.

But you; the *writer* I want to believe in: if you learn *with* this, then I believe in my desire of this study being an educational endeavour. Until then, that is, until the point of when such educational relation is stated by itself, my position is to be unceasingly made. It is up to the silent person to *call* it, to express this singular position with an-Other singularity, to, in the uncertainty of other paths of theories, carry it away along the believable paths of imagination.

As I wave goodbye to, and with, this study — this working I hesitate to title —, may I wave hello to you? This is my postulation, my invitation to believe — to believe we can converse.

Do you believe it?

Thank you,
farewell;
keep in touch with.

references; or, opacities

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working

title

making theory in art education with opacity,
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