

MESTRADO EM ESTUDOS AFRICANOS

Tensions Return to the Sands:

**-An Analytical Framework for the Analysis of the
Third Stage of the Western Sahara Conflict (2020–
2024)**

Jorge Fernando Silva Teixeira

M

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Tension Return to the Sands:

**-An Analytical Framework for the Analysis of the Third
Stage of the Western Sahara Conflict (2020–2024)**

**Dissertação realizada no âmbito do Mestrado em Estudos Africanos,
orientada pelo Professor Doutor José Maciel Honrado dos Santos**

Faculdade de Letras da Universidade do Porto

2025

Há sonhos que são impossíveis.

Há sonhos dos quais desistimos.

Mas há sonhos que são imprescindíveis, dos quais não abdicamos!

Aqueles que nos inspiram a lutar,

São a força que faz dos sonhos realidade.

São essas pessoas que nos impelem a transpor as tormentas do mar.

De quem aspira a um futuro melhor,

Ficam estas palavras escritas,

De quem nunca se esquecerá de quem o fez esquecer a dor,

De quem o ensinou a amar e o levaram a aspirar com lucidez.

Aos quatro anjos que por mim zelam,

No meu coração,

Não existe nada para além do amor e da gratidão.

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Declaração de honra / *Declaration of Honour*

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Matosinhos, 29 de setembro de 2025 / Matosinhos, 29th of September 2025

Jorge Fernando Silva Teixeira

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Resumo

A 13 de novembro de 2020, depois de um ataque marroquino contra uma manifestação pacífica de civis saharauí em Guergarat, a Frente POLISARIO, perante a impunidade marroquina, a inação da MINURSO e a apatia da comunidade internacional, declarou o fim do cessar-fogo e regressou à luta armada.

Marrocos, protegido pela França e pelos Estados Unidos, denegou o reinício do conflito e lançou uma campanha de desinformação. À semelhança do início da ocupação, o perigo de perda de informação é real. De forma a se conseguir preservar, disponibilizar e analisar informação, o CEAUP criou uma plataforma digital: Western Sahara War Archives. Esta plataforma é a base do trabalho desta dissertação.

Conflitos são sistemas dinâmicos por natureza, com múltiplas partes móveis que a qualquer momento podem alterar as dinâmicas de poder. Mesmo dentro deste sistema, conflitos prolongados são conflitos que se distinguem por serem sistemas com variáveis com que se autossustentam, autorregeneram, intra- e interinfluenciam. Partindo de um estudo de caso, o conflito do Sahara Ocidental, a presente dissertação procura contribuir para a compreensão de algumas das suas características.

Através da utilização de metodologias de análise de conflitos, pretende-se responder às seguintes questões: era o reinício do conflito inevitável? Quais os elementos diretamente e indiretamente envolvidos no conflito? Quais as redes de poder e influências? Como estão a decorrer as operações no terreno durante os primeiros quatro anos do conflito? Esta dissertação demonstra como o reinício do conflito era impossível de travar. Décadas de interferências externas, não ação por parte das instituições internacionais e uma agressiva política de aceitação de factos consumados, por parte de Marrocos, transformaram impossíveis os esforços dos processos de mediação.

Palavras-chave: Estudo de Conflitos, Conflitos prolongados e persistentes, Colonialismo, Sahara Ocidental

Abstract

On 13th of November of 2020, following a Moroccan attack on a peaceful demonstration by Sahrawi civilians in Guergarat, the POLISARIO Front, faced with Moroccan impunity, MINURSO inaction and international apathy, declared an end to the ceasefire and returned to armed struggle.

Conflicts are dynamic systems by nature, with multiple moving parts that can alter the dynamics of power at any moment. Even within this system, protracted conflicts are conflicts that are distinguished by being systems with variables that are self-sustaining, self-regenerating, and intra- and inter-influential. Based on a case study, the Western Sahara conflict, this dissertation seeks to contribute to the understanding of some of its characteristics.

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Key-words: Conflict Studies, Protracted Intractable Conflicts, Colonialism, Western Sahara

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List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

ACLED.....	ARMED CONFLICT LOCATION & EVENT DATA PROJECT
AU.....	AFRICAN UNION
CEAUP.....	CENTRO DE ESTUDOS AFRICANOS DA UNIVERSIADE DO PORTO
DMZ.....	DEMILITARIZED ZONE
ELPS.....	EJÉRCITO DE LIBERACIÓN DEL PUEBLO SAHARAUI
FAR.....	FORCÉS ARMÉ ROYAL
FRENTE POLISARIO ...	FRENTE DE LIBERACIÓN DE SAGUÍA EL HAMRA Y RÍO DE ORO
GIS	GEOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION SYSTEM
ICJ	INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
ISC.....	INTERNATIONAL SCIENCE COUNCIL
ISR.....	INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE
ISTAR.....	INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, TARGET ACQUISITION AND RECONNAISSANCE
MALE.....	MEDIUM ALTITUDE LONG ENDURANCE
MINURSO.....	MISSION DES NATIONS UNIES POUR L'ORGANISATION D'UN REFERENDUM AU SAHARA OCCIDENTAL
MUN-T.....	MANNED-UNMANNED TEAMING
NAM.....	NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT
OAU.....	ORGANISATION OF THE AFRICAN UNION
PESG.....	PERSONAL ENVOY OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
POTUS.....	PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
POW.....	PRISONERS OF WAR
SADR.....	SAHRAWI ARAB DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
SMACO.....	SAHRAWI MINE ACTION COORDINATION OFFICE
SPS.....	SAHARAN PRESS SERVICE
SRSG.....	SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
UAE.....	UNITED ARABS EMIRATES
UAV.....	UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
UCAV.....	UNMANNED COMBAT AERIAL VEHICLES
UN	UNITED NATIONS
UNCAT.....	UN COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE
UNDRR.....	UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR DISASTER RISK REDUCTION
UNGS	UNITED NATIONS GEOGRAPHICAL SERVICES
UNHRC.....	UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSION FOR REFUGEE
UNICEF.....	UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL CHILDREN'S EMERGENCY FUND
UNSC	UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL
UNSG	UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY GENERAL

US/USA.....	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
USSR.....	UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
WGAD.....	WORKING GROUP ON ARBITRARY DETENTION
WSWA.....	WESTERN SAHARA WAR ARCHIVES
WSWR.....	WESTERN SAHARA RESOURCE WATCH

Introduction

*"The lives of some men
If walls could talk to spill the lies*

We'd see the world through devil's eyes"

(Avenged Sevenfold-Doing Time, 2013; UN; 2025, 1948, 2024; UNGA; 1948)

Western Sahara War Archives¹ is a five-year-long project that the African Foreign Policies and Political Parties workgroup of the Centre of African Studies of the University of Porto has carried out². As a research line on the African territories and policies, this project was devised to be a digital platform that would follow the events that unfolded after the 13th of November 2020. The aim was to create a digital archive where information about the third phase of the Western Sahara Conflict could be stored, analysed, and made public through an open-source policy, as stated on its About WSWA page.

"[...] The control of the past by the ruling interests is today increasingly more blatant in what is not shown than in what it is made up by them. When a fresh new war is being waged at less than 3,000 km from Lisbon and not a single second of it is being broadcasted by one single European mainstream media, then, really, something must be done. [...]. In less than three months the ongoing Sahara War has already produced thousands of documents." [...] ("Western Sahara War Archives (WSWA)" 2021-About WSWA)

For this purpose, a multidisciplinary team was assembled, and a digital platform was created³. The team was composed of seven elements. The lead researcher was Maciel Santos. Luiz Brandão and Isabel Lourenço were the senior researchers. The junior researchers were Jorge Teixeira, André Serdoura, Jorge Guimarães and Nur Rabah. To facilitate the work, due to an overwhelming amount of information available, and to speed the process, the team was divided into two groups: News/Documents Team and Military/Statistical Analysis Team. Thus, from the start of the project, it was designed as

¹ WSWA

² CEAUP

³ <https://westernsaharawararchive.com>

an Area Study, with a heavy focus on conflict and media analysis. The geographical area was circumscribed to Western Sahara. It was decided that the timeframe of the analysis is exclusively from 2020 onwards.

The News/ Documents Team had the task of collecting, categorising and uploading news articles and official documentation issued by countries, institutions, and groups, like the United Nations⁴, and official state and private media, like the Saharan Press Service⁵, which talked about the 3rd phase of the Conflict. No blog or unconfirmed news source will be used. For the analysis, the team would use official documentation issued by the parties to the conflict and by third parties. This would be complemented by a media analysis, which brought the means to ascertain the scale of the coverage of the conflict. The media analysis would consist of analysing news articles produced about the 3rd phase of the conflict. We will expand on this in the methodology section.

The Military and Statistical Analysis Team was tasked with collecting, analysing, and cartographing military data issued by the conflicting parties and analysing the metadata collected by the News and Documentation Team.

The author of this dissertation is the team leader of the Military and Statistical Analysis Team. His main task was to create a data collection method, categorisation, and analysis process. His most important assignment was to communicate with Saharawi representatives, establish a matrix of analysis, and define the strategy the team would use for its analysis. This matrix of analysis will be discussed later. As of 2025, he became the *de facto* Principal Researcher of the project.

Thus, this dissertation is the result of data collection and reporting on the first four years of the 3rd phase of the conflict. It will also incorporate the contribution of essays written for some courses of the master's in African studies course, namely Metodologia de Trabalho Científico and Problemáticas da África Contemporânea.

⁴ UN

⁵ SPS

Part I-Methodology and conceptual issues

1. Introduction

1.1. The case study

This dissertation will have the conflict of Western Sahara as its central theme. We will approach this conflict in two ways. First, it will be done through the lens of the Conflict Studies discipline, focusing on protracted intractable conflicts. The second is a historical analysis of the conflict, from the events between the 1980s and 2024.

On the 13th of November 2020, a prolonged cease-fire in Western Sahara was broken, leading to the restart of the armed conflict (J. Teixeira 2022a; "The end of the ceasefire in Western Sahara" 2021). The conflict began after a Sahrawi civil and peaceful protest against another breach of the Moroccan military wall in a Demilitarized Zone⁶ to allow more illegal trade with Mauritania. Morocco's military attacked the protesters with heavy artillery and mechanised cavalry. Without any choice, and forced, to reengage militarily, the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic⁷ sent a letter to the United Nations Secretary-General⁸ denouncing the Military Agreement N°1 (Military Agreement N°1 1997, 107-108) and the resumption of the Conflict (Gali 2020). This restart has spotlighted a concept, assumed by Western countries, to be outdated: colonialism. Nevertheless, Morocco's claim over Western Sahara as part of its national territory should be inserted in colonial annexation practices.

Between 1975 and 1991, a violent all-out Conflict was fought all over the territory of Western Sahara. The POLISARIO Front was able to fend off Mauritania in 1979, but Morocco proved harder to drive off. Hassan II was an expert political actor. Taking advantage of the Cold War narrative, he portrayed himself as being on the side of the West while falsely accusing the Frente Popular para la Liberacion de Saguia El-Hamara e Rio de Oro⁹ of being under the guise of Algeria and the Union of Soviet Socialist

⁶ DMZ

⁷ SADR

⁸ UNSG

⁹ Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia El-Hamara and Rio de Oro, POLISARIO Front

Republics¹⁰ (J. Teixeira 2023) By doing this, he prolonged the relationship established during WWII and allowed Morocco to become an essential ally of the United States¹¹. In turn, the superpower of the West would use Morocco as its proxy within the Northern African context and in the so-called Islamic World, while training, arming and advising Morocco's military corps. - the Forcés Armé Royal¹². Under the advice of the US, Morocco started to build a military wall around the most important centres in Western Sahara (Jensen 2013, 47-53). This wall single-handedly turned an open, high-intensity guerrilla-style conflict into an attrition-style, low-intensity conflict.

A cease-fire agreement was reached in 1991 after a series of high-level negotiations. Both parties agreed to hold an auto-determination referendum. To determine voters' eligibility and the procedures for the referendum, a UN mission was established: the *Mission des Nations Unies pour l'Organisation d'un Référendum au Sahara Occidental*¹³.

Since then, Morocco has been a blocking force to the referendum. Shielded by the US and France, Morocco continued to enforce its rule over Western Sahara and to commit acts of genocide and ethnic cleansing, to erase the Sahrawi and to control Western Sahara (UN; 2025, 1948, 2024; A/RES/260(III)A-C ; Munadil 2019, 2020b).

After 29 years of a lengthy cease-fire, only held by the POLISARIO Front, Morocco opened a passage in the military wall in a MINURSO-controlled area, essential in the DMZ. This would lead the Sahrawi to engage in another peaceful protest. On the 13th of November 2020, this non-violent action was attacked by the FAR in the MINURSO-controlled area. This led the POLISARIO Front to denounce the 1991 Cease-fire agreement and resume the Conflict.

1.2. Chronological and Geographical Delimitations

¹⁰ USSR

¹¹ US

¹² FAR

¹³ MINURSO

Regarding spatial delimitation, as we intend to use the existing platform, with a well-defined object of study, for our dissertation, we will limit ourselves to the geographical space of Western Sahara.

As we will demonstrate, a protracted, intractable conflict is characterised by having extremely violent and active engagement phases followed by low-intensity military activity and high tensions on the political spectrum. The events of the low activity phases create the high activity phases. In turn, the extreme violence of the high activity phases creates the low activity phases. Essentially, all phases are interconnected. Thus, protracted intractable conflicts are a self-sustaining, self-feeding, interconnected process.

A deeper understanding of the events for the 3rd phase is needed. We must show how the 1st and 2nd phases contributed to the current events to achieve it. Therefore, we will start with the study of events that led to the signing of the cease-fire in 1991.

The analysis starts with the action of the Organisation of the African Union¹⁴. Their mediation efforts in the 1980s set the basis for the UN Cease-fire agreement. After this, we will examine the UN efforts between 1991 and 2020. The UN effort amounted to a failed, drawn-out mediation process, which opened the space for the cementing of the Moroccan control over the occupied Western Sahara. This constitutes the end part of the 1st phase and the 2nd phase of the conflict. Finally, we present an analysis of the events after the end of the cease-fire on the 13th of November 2020.

Using research and secondary sources, we will analyse the chronological range 1980 - 2024. However, we will add primary sources analysis between November 2020 and November 2024, the end of the 2nd and the beginning of the 3rd phases.

1.3. Research goals

This research seeks to advance scholarly understanding of the Western Sahara conflict by systematically enhancing the WSWA digital platform's dataset, thereby enabling the development of a comprehensive case study. It examines the sequence of political and military events from the 1980s to the present, with particular emphasis on the role of

¹⁴ OAU

the OAU, the involvement of the UN, the circumstances surrounding the 1991 cease-fire agreement, and the factors precipitating the resumption of hostilities on the 13th November 2020. The study aims to construct an authoritative, chronologically ordered account of these developments. We will test the hypothesis that Western Sahara is a case of protracted conflict. This is our fundamental question.

Our hypothesis stems from three reasons: 1) the region being in a state of permanent conflict or political tension since 1975, when the Morocco-Mauritanian invasion took place; 2) the hostilities continued, while less frequent, during the so called “Waiting Period”, after the 1991 cease-fire and installation of MINURSO and before 2020; 3) a clear resumption of the conflict in November 2020.

To achieve this objective, we will conduct a research analysis of secondary sources about protracted intractable conflicts. This will allow us to create a meta-framework/matrix that will help us define the characteristics of a protracted intractable conflict. Upon completing the meta-framework/matrix, we will assess the extent to which the Western Sahara conflict demonstrates these characteristics.

For this, we will have a two-prong approach: 1) constructing the timeline of events; 2) analysing the war data available.

All questions concerning Western Sahara and the secondary sources addressing them are imbued with partisan dimensions. The issue is highly polarising, and much academic literature favours or opposes one of the principal parties. A further challenge lies in the pronounced asymmetry in available written sources: scholarly production benefiting from Moroccan institutional support and funding is comparatively abundant. In contrast, Saharawi-authored or pro-Saharawi sources remain markedly scarce. The author’s point of departure is not partisan but grounded in the application of international law, which necessarily situates the analysis within a postcolonial framework.

We will also briefly describe the historical and social processes that have taken place after the 1980s. Understanding this will help us to examine how a conventional conflict was transformed into a conflict of attrition and prolonged over time. This transformation occurred when the military wall was constructed, separating Western Sahara into two

parts. Most natural resources are found in the 80% under Moroccan control. The remaining 20% is under SADR control.

We will analyse the data from the CEAUP project, WSWA, for the secondary objective. This project, and our subsequent analysis, is the direct result of the teamwork, as already mentioned, a team of which students have been an integral part since its conception.

1.4. Methodology

The research method we believe is most appropriate is the case study. A case study requires analysing data within a specific context that can be studied in-depth. It therefore requires a framework in a specific geographical area or within an analysis of a particular set of behaviours or social phenomena (Zainal 2017). It is a mixed research method that invites the use of quantitative and qualitative data, allowing us to get to the details needed to understand the phenomenon (Zainal 2017).

When we start with a conceptual framework for a case study, we are immediately forced to choose between type 1 - Single Case Study or type 2 - Multiple Case Study.

The Single Case Study is used when the researcher wants to know a particular case, such as the social effects of the 2023 Marrakech-Safin earthquake. Multiple case studies allow for examining a phenomenon with multiple sources of information obtained through replication rather than the collection of a sample (Gerring 2004; Tellis 1997; Zainal 2017). For this study, we will opt for the second type, since we have multiple sources of information that attest to the veracity of the phenomenon:

- News reports
- Official documentation

We have information from multiple governmental and non-governmental organisations within the official documentation.

1.5. Statistical data on the events on the ground

All of this information is already available on WSWA. This makes it easier to find and to systematise the information that will allow us to test our hypothesis.

As part of the case study, we will use a retrospective study. This type of statistical study is based on an existing database, elements or information, as opposed to a constructive approach, in which it would be necessary to build a model for collecting, processing and analysing information (Smith 1998). This approach is widely used in the medical sciences (Motheral et al. 2003), saving time processing information, as it is no longer in its raw state. This type of study uses data already collected and processed for other purposes over more extended periods and larger documentary samples (Smith 1998; Motheral et al. 2003).

However, this approach presents some limitations and preconditions, such as the requirement that the variables in the database to be used are the same as, or at least compatible with, the studied variables. This ensures that the science actor does not have to make additional assumptions (Smith 1998; Motheral et al. 2003).

This methodology is not unknown to historians. Their databases are the repositories of archives and libraries, especially their catalogues. It is with them that the historian will try to reconstruct the past. In this sense, it fits perfectly within the methodology of a case study, especially in our study. The significant innovative step here lies in the WSWA database's information source.

As a digital archive aggregating information on the reignition of the conflict in Western Sahara, it is not limited to simply making military-legal documents available. Its greatest asset is the availability of a wide range of statistical data, which has already been analysed and is available to form our retrospective database on the phenomenon.

Based on this data, we will try to draw up a statistical model that allows us to answer the questions inherent in a prolonged conflict.

We want to find a way of measuring the variables that correspond to a conflict through an analysis that focuses on:

- 1) Situation on the ground (number of attacks carried out, locations attacked, comparative evolution of attacks)
- 2) Dissemination of information around the world (by analysing journalistic sources - in which media are most news about the conflict broadcast, in which languages, in which countries)

- 3) Producers of official documentation (who are the leading political actors, what kind of documentation they produce, and in what language it is produced).

Also, as we analyse a conflict, we will use a set of conflict analysis tools. We will talk about these tools in the next chapter. In short, for the present dissertation, we will use a case study approach methodology, centred around a retrospective study, focusing heavily on a mixed-method study while employing conflict analysis tools.

1.6. Concepts

We opted to use the term Conflict or armed conflict in this dissertation based on the definition of Undrr.org “International armed conflict covers all cases of declared war and other the facto armed conflict between two or more States, even if the state of war is not recognised by one of them and/or the use of armed force is unilateral” (United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR) and International Science Council (ISC) 2025; ICRC 2016) – primary reference ICRC 2016 commentary on the first Geneva Convention, International Committee of the Red Cross.

As we will be applying conflict analysis methodologies, we must define the following terms (Mason and Rychard 2005; UNICEF 2016; Jeong 2008):

ACTORS/ PARTIES	People, organisations or countries involved in a conflict
CONFLICT PARTIES	People, organisations or countries directly involved in a conflict.
THIRD PARTIES	People, organisations or countries that become involved in a conflict and end up transforming it
STACKHOLDERS	People, organisations or countries that are directly interested in the conflict or

	its resolution but are not directly involved.
RELATIONS	A conflict is characterised as a frictional relationship between the parties. So, this term defines the type of relations between the parties.
ISSUE	Topic of the conflict
DYNAMICS	Level of escalation of the conflict
CONTEXT/STRUCTURE	Are the factors outside the conflict system, like structural violence caused by outside factors like political systems, economic systems,...
CAUSATION	Conflicts are a multi-cause system, meaning that different causes originated or influenced the conflict. This term applies when we describe a factor that creates or influences an aspect.
COIN	Counter-insurgency Operations
OPTIONS/STRATEGIES	Options deployed/used to deal with the conflict. The strategies that could be used, were used, or are used to de-escalate a conflict.

2. Conflict

2.1. Conflict - a definable concept?

What constitutes a conflict? How do we know that two parties are in conflict with each other? Is a formal declaration necessary for both parties to initiate hostilities? Or are we at conflict as soon as the first shots are fired?

Conflict is as old as humankind (Macías Fernández and Gómez Ochoa 2014, 11; Jeong 2008, 3). As long as there are written forms of human storytelling¹⁵, there are reports of violent conflicts between groups, villages, towns, cities, kingdoms and nations. Archaeology has pushed the existence of violence into the further depths of human history.

“Violence and conflict are frequently discussed as though they are specific to the period from the Neolithic onwards. [...] Although material evidence relating to battle is often lacking, many prehistorians consider it likely that violent clashes have occurred between different groups since the Palaeolithic. [...]” (Guilaine and Zammit 2005, 19)

If it is this old, one must ask, is it ingrained in the human psyche? Or is it something that we learned? Is Conflict an innate human behaviour or a sociological one? Research is still debating whether it is nature or nurture. One thing is sure: both play a role in conflict. However, the fact still stands that as long as humanity exists, conflict exists. So, how can we define it?

Conflict “[...] *es, pues, un acto de fuerza para obligar al contrario al cumplimiento de nuestra voluntad.*” (Clausewitz 2023, 21). In essence, it is an extreme form of action that lives outside any law or jurisdiction, intending to force the Will of A onto B. It is an emotional response that depends on the interest in conflict and the perpetuation of its intractability. These interests encapsulate both material objects and immaterial substances “[...] *The potential for conflict exists where opposing interests, values, or needs tinge our relationships with other. The latent conditions of conflict eventually translate into multiple forms of enmity in the visible issues.*” (Jeong 2008, 5).

It is a linear escalatory reciprocal Action-Reaction response. If A does X to B, B will respond with X² to A; Consequently, A will respond with X³ to B ... the escalation will only

¹⁵ Epic poetry, religious texts, hieroglyphs, cuneiform, steles and even pre-historic rock art, in all these examples is possible to find depiction of violent scenes.

stop with the imposition of will over the other (see Schematic 1). It is a dynamic system that requires at least two willing and active players to clash¹⁶.

“[...] es preciso o incapacitarlo de hecho o colocarle en tal estado que quede amenazado de este resultado, según toda probabilidad. De aquí se desprende que el desarme o derribo del adversario, como queramos llamarlo, debe ser siempre el fin del acto guerrero [...] En tanto yo no haya derribado al enemigo debo temer que él em derribe” (Clausewitz 2023, 24).

Since it is an imposition of Will, where any player can lose, there is a risk of loss or descent to a weaker position. Both players calculate the effort needed to win to avoid either of these results. The risk level must not exceed two key factors: 1) the means that are available for fighting; 2) the will of the players to fight. If the risk is bigger than any of these points, the chance of defeat is higher. These grants conflict with a new dimension. Thus, transforming it from something abstract into something tangible.

Therefore, we can affirm that Conflict is not an isolated event for two reasons: 1) as it is a linear, escalatory, reciprocal Action-Reaction response behaviour, it implies a sequence of events; 2) it has a will of its own, which arises from the will of the Players that foster the sequence of events. If we look at it this way, we can see it as an act of externalising an emotion with roots in the sociopolitical sphere. Power is the most important element in a conflict (Jeong 2008, 5). Humanity is a social animal; therefore, every social situation is prone to degenerating into a conflict. For clarification, in this dissertation, we will only be interested in Inter-State conflicts and will then follow the following definition

“[...] conflict is interpreted in the context of a serious nature of challenges to the existing norms, relationships, and rules of decision making [...] Contradictory interests, hostile sentiments, and irreconcilable values are signified by antagonistic attitudes and behaviour. Beyond these elements, a destructive type of conflict involves attempts to inflict physical harm on the other side. ” (Jeong 2008, 6-7).

¹⁶ A positive example of this process in action, where both players are actively engaging in the escalatory process, are both World War. A negative example, where only one player is actively engaging in the escalatory process is the 2nd Golf War, where the only player interested in escalating the conflict was the United States of America, Iraq was denning and trying to deescalate the situation.

Given that Conflict has its roots in the sociopolitical sphere, we can analyse the sequence that triggered it. We can reconstruct the main lines and actions which led to the clash. Which, where, how and for how long the tactics and methods were applied, shows us how the players tried to destabilise each other. It also tends to deploy all the technology, scientific knowledge and art forms to their full extension, provoking deviations and innovation (Clausewitz 2023, 21-23).

2.2. Conflict, a social construct?

As Tzu (2002) expressed, *“All warfare is based on deception.”* everything in a conflict resorts to power dynamics, primarily power imbalances (Jeong 2008, 9). For Player A to destabilise Player B, and vice versa, a deep knowledge of the opposing player is needed. So, an adversary will never be *“[...] una persona abstracta para el otro [...]”* (Clausewitz 2023, 26). The need for knowledge only reinforces what we suggested before, that a series of intentional preparatory steps towards it supports the act of expressing aggression. The fear “of being in a weaker position” forces the player to gauge the minimum number of assets needed¹⁷ to achieve victory. The deep knowledge thus becomes all the information collected through intel gathering processes¹⁸. This firmly grounds the act:

All these frames are acts of conflict in the sociopolitical realm, with an internal sphere of actions and an external sphere (Schematic 3). The internal sphere is related to the internal needs of a Player. The justification needed to mobilise and gather the people's will behind its political ruling class. What is needed for them to accept a conflict? On the other hand, the external sphere is related to framing the Conflict for its allies and neighbours. What is the justification for the act of aggression to obtain the consent of others? How and when can Player A mobilise its alliances? Both spheres, however, converge on one important thing: the act of Conflict must be framed so that all action is justified. *“[...] Policy, therefore, is interwoven with the whole action of war, and must*

¹⁷ The correct number of soldiers and equipment, for the X^n amount of time, to when it will be necessary to increase the number of soldiers and equipment or when to extend the time of the operations.

¹⁸ By actively sending operatives to the other country for spying or surveillance missions

exercise a continuous influence upon it, as far as the nature of the forces liberated by it will permit. [...]" (Clausewitz 2023)

To demonstrate how this grievance justifies a military action, one must demonstrate that the other, in some way, shape or form, affected negatively the first. This is propelled through manipulating sentiments such as fear, anger, rage, sense of rightness, outrage... In short, sentiments can and are weaponised (Jeong 2008, 9).

"The relationships between subjective and objective elements in each party's decision making also change along with the evolution of conflict. Negative psychological processes, which obscure objective reality, are derived from the escalation of hostilities. Emotional aspects, including anger, hate, pain, and fear, intensify following material loss and physical destruction." (Jeong 2008, 10).

All scenarios are open; therefore, Conflict is a game, where both Players have the odds/probabilities of not losing/losing, losing/not winning. The system becomes an interconnected web of smaller systems and moving parts—a dynamic system within a dynamic system.

Clausewitz (2023) defends that there is only one way to "end" the conflict. Player A or B has an advantage over the other and acts upon it. The conflict ends if the losing player accepts it. However, until this is achieved, the conflict will continue to escalate in means and form (see Schematic 2). In other words, the only way to end a conflict is for both the subjective and objective realms to converge; otherwise, the conflict will continue to ensue (Jeong 2008, 9).

Being a dynamic system, it evolves and adapts to new circumstances. Forcing both players to a perpetual stance of tension, where the danger of the conflict reemergence is ever-present. Thus, Conflict always has the potential to become something protracted and intractable. Conflict is consequently an objective and subjective activity, in essence, a game that serves a political purpose, which can be prolonged and/or be a never-ending affair.

In essence, Conflict is a tool with a political objective at its core, both internally and externally, laced with subliminal messaging and meaning (Clausewitz 2023; Jeong 2008, 10-11). Conflict is also a dynamic system that flourishes with inputs from both sides. It

can be maintained for long periods, depending on how it is framed, by whom, and towards a specific goal. It thrives in

“[...] The emotional realities, embedded in interactional dynamics, can be defined by the underlying psychological patterns of a struggle. Hostility and other related feelings can be ascribed to the cognitive appraisal of threat to one’s own interests and existence. The perceptions of threat, along with an affective reaction to the other’s aggressive behaviour, activate intense feelings of anger, anxiety, and fear [...]” (Jeong 2008, 11)

2.3. The moving elements of Conflict- Emotion

As we have seen in the previous part, Conflict has two internal and external spheres. Looking at the internal, we see that there are also moving parts: the army, the allies and the enemy. All these moving parts must be entered into one of two categories: mobilised/used or vanquished.

The goal of Conflict is to disarm the opposing player. This is the core motivation of Conflict. The idea is to take something from the opposing player. It can be the resources, the land, a strategic location, to gain a political upper hand, and so on. For that to be possible, there must be a certain amount of moderation on the exertion of violence. In this logic, the means and the effort used are directly proportional to the political capital one will gain.

“From the character, the measures, the situation of the adversary, and the relations with which he is surrounded, each side will draw conclusions by the law of probability as to the designs of the other and act accordingly.” (Clausewitz 2023)

So, the political objective will determine how the Conflict will be framed for internal consumption. The core of the armed forces is the people of the country. If the people do not support the political objective or change their stance, it will be harder for the political ruling class to mobilise the army effectively. The people must stand behind the reasons, because “[...] *war depends upon large numbers of people being prepared to slaughter large numbers of other people.* [...]” (Bourke 2001, 1). Otherwise, the Conflict will not produce the expected result. The ill sentiments towards the enemy and seeing

him as “lesser” must be present throughout the conflict. This is how the emotion is used, guided and deployed.

Keeping Conflict in the emotional realm also binds Conflict to the subjective realm of morality. Framing Conflict as a defence of something good and moral or a superior way of living will generate an equal emotional response. In this realm, just and unjust are a point of view in the eyes of the beholder “[...] war is only an extreme case of the anarchy of moral meanings [...]” (Walzer 2006, 11). Furthermore, what is cruel to one is justice to another. This happens because a group of social actors, albeit with the same interest, assign different values and meanings to the phenomenon (Walzer 2006, 12). This is another reinforcement of how emotion is used to influence the narrative of the Conflict. Through what means are emotions used?

One way is to fuel either the danger of an outside threat or the apparent superiority of the Group. By doing this, the ruling class can efficiently channel the group's aggressive feelings towards their objectives. Emotional manipulation is an effective way to divert attention from problems or to create justifications for an act of aggression, by scapegoating and blaming outside forces for internal problems. This is accomplished through Propaganda, by creating, diffusing, and constantly monitoring the narratives created to justify the act (Macías Fernández and Gómez Ochoa 2014, 13; Jeong 2008, 13). Books, maps, movies, music, posters, public speeches, anything and everything can be used to amplify/decrease tensions during confrontations. On the other hand, they are more important during peacetime. During the calm periods, the need to maintain the acceptance of conflict is far greater. For a social actor to be willing to fight and kill, that social actor needs to be:

- 1) desensitise to the horrors of Conflict, which is accomplished by glorifying and romanticising Conflict and battle. The medium utilised can be movies, books, or games that glorify killing, showing the rightness of the fight...

- 2) manipulated the sense of reality; this is attained through constructing a carefully thought-out rhetoric that supports the justifications needed for the act of violence. The medium preferably used is the Media and political discourse, “showing” the rightness of

the fight, the need for the fight, how evil the other is, and how the other threatens their way of living, identity or existence.

Nevertheless, the social actors of a Nation are incited to feel like they belong to that Nation. Moreover, that Nation is their Identity, so it must be defended at all costs. The ruling class can provoke an emotional response through Propaganda by playing to the group's emotions, especially fear and/or pride. Thus, creating/setting the conditions for an open conflict or maintaining/prolonging it for as long as needed.

On the minorities/dominated groups' side, this is even more feasible and easily achieved. The constant negation of their identity and culture, even if they are the majority, social apartheid conditions that they live in and removal from the power/political structures, create the favourable conditions for the exploitation of emotions. In other words, Conflict has the emotional realm as its main support base.

“ [...] In a situation featuring the severe imbalance of power, the more powerful are inclined to exploit or abuse the less powerful. Salient inter-group distinctions serve as a means of maintaining or strengthening one's predominant power base. In an ethnic or racial conflict, hierarchical relations have been established by a denial of access to decision making and the rejection of power sharing political institutions. Along with these circumstances, the deprivation of cultural autonomy and economic opportunities may instigate an uprising.[...] ”(Jeong 2008, 16)

Utilising various tools can maintain a conflict for a long time. Nevertheless, then again, Emotion is key. Fear and resentment cannot be easily cleaned or forgotten. Ethnocentric politics breed racism. So, does colonialism and sexism. Paradoxically, fuelling emotions on both spectrums, for the same reasons, tends to rejuvenate tension and spark a conflict or prolong an existing one.

2.4. Protracted Intractable Conflicts

Protracted intractable conflicts are a special type of conflict. They are a multilevel, multilayer, self-feeding, self-sustaining and self-reproductive conflict. They are a complex and dynamic system within an already complex and dynamic system. Usually they have a set of two core actors, with a multiple row of third parties (Jeong 2008, 12)

Due to the perverse nature of this type of conflict, which has roots in the prolonged timespan of its existence, the subjective side, aka the emotions, is transferred through the generations. This single factor gives this type of conflict a tendency to be almost immune to any resolutions (Jeong 2008, 12; Zoubir 1996, 173). They also tend to defy any international law or international treaty by alleging that they are the ones with the “veracity” on their side, even if there is plenty of evidence to the contrary.

Emotion is key. Players in protracted intractable conflicts tend to believe their core identities are at stake, and losing means absolute destruction. This is rooted in a worldview distorted by psychological scaring, usually embedded in prolonged systemic discrimination. The opposing player's existence is questioned at a certain intolerance level.

“[...] The denial by one party of the humanity of the other is a basis for the justification of the continuing conflict. One’s own beliefs on physical, territorial, cultural, and economic survival become justifications for every expression of conflict behaviour. Because of the emotional involvement and irreversibility, partisans have a strong desire for vengeance. Pessimism prevails in feelings of hopelessness about the potential for ending the vicious cycle of attacks and revenge. [...]”(Jeong 2008, 12)

Thus, the high and prolonged costs of the conflict are more easily accepted. Simply because there is no end to the cycle of revenge, and because this kind of conflict lives in cycles, during the calm phases of the cycle, there is an ever-present sensation that conflict can erupt at any given time. In addition, between each cycle, violent behaviour, either physical and/or psychological, tends to intensify. This only reinforces the sense of community, as the collective memory reinforces the emotional side. One side tends to be glorified, sometimes even mystified, while the opposing side is reduced to stereotypes and stripped of all humanity (Jeong 2008, 13).

Conflict is a dynamic process (Simeon 2023; Anderson 2019; Policinski and Kuzmanovic 2019; Coleman 2003; Colaresi and Thompson 2002; Gidron et al. 1999; Nyadera, Islam, and Shihundu 2023).

Everything depends on the results of the subjective experiences of each element involved, which govern behavioural reflexes: action-reaction (Coleman 2003). It can even pass from generation to generation, extending over time and space. It thus becomes a prolonged conflict. Based on this statement, we can conclude that modern states live in constant, prolonged internal conflict. The problem is therefore proportional to the scale of power of those involved. The greater the power scale, the greater the proportionality, scope and impact. Especially when these conflicts are prolonged over time.

They are also non-linear, as they can be “[...] *episodic, cyclical, “frozen”, long-lived insurgencies, long-standing situations of occupation, or wars between States where violence simmers at a relatively lower level than one might traditionally associate with armed conflict.*” (Policinski and Kuzmanovic 2019). It has a straightforward impact on populations, as it is taxing on access to education and health, constitutes barriers to humanitarian aid, limits movement and forces populations to move, facilitates the creation of internally displaced people and refugee camps, and can become constructive elements of identity-political radicalisation (Policinski and Kuzmanovic 2019).

Coleman (2003) points out, however, that all examples of protracted conflicts have five major cross-cutting fields: a) Context; b) Subject; c) Relations; D) Process; e) Outcome (Figure 1). Furthermore, that they all have the following characteristics: 1) a high degree of risk of mutual destruction of infrastructure, cultural heritage, identity and identification systems; 2) hostile intentions and actions are prolonged over time, becoming intergenerational; 3) they fluctuate between stages of calm and open conflict; 4) they involve all elements of a society and help define a national identity (us against them); 5) they have ambiguous boundaries, where one action ends and another begins (Colaresi and Thompson 2002). There is also a high degree of, or a history of, oppression of one group over another at all levels.

2.5. Conflict Analysis

In understanding conflict, it is imperative to examine the sources of discontent and animosity, to identify the phases of evolving relationships between adversaries, and to illuminate the escalation of their struggles and the eventual recession of violent cycles

to the peaceful resolution of differences (Jeong 2008, 4). This is important because a conflict is a dynamic system.

Therefore, conflict analysis is a set of scientific tools, used by the scientific field Conflict and Peace Studies, that has as its main body work the “[...] *the systematic study of the profile, causes, actors and dynamics of a conflict* [...]” (UNICEF 2016, 10).

The core of conflict analysis is a multidisciplinary approach, consolidating a multilayer analysis of an event, area, or group where violence was used. A conflict, independently of its size or scope, will always be part of something greater. Thus, a conflict is always a sub-system of a much larger system/context (Mason and Rychard 2005, 2). It is simultaneously a byproduct and an instrument of the extensive system where it is being applied.

A conflict never appears or develops in a vacuum. There is always a set of reasons that will inevitably lead to a confrontation. Let us take, for example, an internal dispute between two groups. This conflict at a surface level can be attributed to the different land use costs of the two groups. Thus, the conflict is a subsystem of land use. Nevertheless, the tensions between the two groups could have risen from ethno-political tensions created by a history of domination or ethnic cleansing within the larger nation. However, this ethno-political tension could have been created or exacerbated by the International Powers' confrontation/wants/needs (Mason and Rychard 2005, 2). When we consider all this information, we get the following picture:

- A) International Powers Confrontation (Mega-System) created a sub-system, ethno-political tension within country A (Macro-System).
- B) These tensions lead to prolonged political confrontation between two ethnic identities (Meso-System), which is a sub-sub-system
- C) These prolonged political confrontations, after a certain amount of time, created the conditions needed to actualise violent conflict between the two groups, with land use as the trigger that flares the conflict (sub-sub-sub-system)

This cycle can be seen in play within the Kashmir Protracted Conflict in India, a result of an ethno-political conflict created and exacerbated by the former colonial power, England. The separation and protracted conflict in the Korean Peninsula, a result of

WWII and Cold War politics, is another excellent example. A conflict is a tool utilised within a complex multi-layer conflict-by-proxy system. However, as a conflict will always be used on the weakest point of a chain of events, one must understand that the actual cause of the conflict lies outside the circumstances of its birth.

As we have seen, one of the primary conflict triggers is power imbalances (Jeong 2008, 9). The way groups relate to each other and to within themselves (internal dynamics); the way political superstructures play down or exacerbate differences in power dynamics, group differences, feelings of injustice or systemic repression, directly impact the conflict's evolution. Therefore, a layer dedicated to power relations must be present. Therefore, to perform a conflict analysis, one must first set boundaries. What will we study? When will we frame the study? Which are the active players involved? What are the power relations between the parties? For that, we will employ a set of conflict analysis tools: the conflict tree, stakeholder analysis, and the conflict map.

3. How to map a Conflict remotely

3.1. The information question

The following chapter will discuss how conflicts can be mapped remotely. The key to this is information. On the following pages, we will discuss the types of information used to remotely sense and gauge the events unfolding in our case study of Western Sahara.

When trying to understand the events of a conflict, the first question is, "Where can we find information about the conflict?" This is quickly followed by questions such as, 'Who is issuing the information?', 'Is it freely available?', and 'In what language?'

Why are these questions important? Information is not produced in a vacuum; it serves a purpose. Asking where information can be found and in which languages it is available tells us who is interested in disseminating information about the conflict. Who are they? What implications does divulging the information have for them? Are they one of the parties in the conflict? An ally? Or a third party? Why are they divulging the information? Where exactly is the information located? Is it physical, digital, or both? Was it disclosed at a press conference? Or on a digital platform? Was it an official document or a civilian report? Is it written down? Is it a video? Audio? A picture? How was it obtained? Was it

obtained legally? Or was it part of a large-scale data leak, meaning it was obtained illegally? Is it public or classified? Who produced it? In what context? When?

This directly impacts how, when and in what form the information was made public. For example, let us assume that the entity disclosing the information is a Western military power doing so legally and publicly. What does this tell us? It tells us that the information has passed through multiple types of layers and institutions before becoming publicly available. This means it could have been altered multiple times by different social actors with different wants and needs. Therefore, the "final" information that we access has been filtered. It does not matter how detailed the information is in its 'final form'. The fact remains that it is a diluted version.

Its scope and reach will also be far greater. Information produced by a Western military power will be the subject of mass media news cycles and coverage at least once.

It is reasonable to infer that, in all probability, the resource will be available across various platforms, media and formats. Furthermore, there have been multiple iterations of new interpretations, reinterpretations, alterations, and subsequent dilutions. Alternatively, it will be available in digital format or at a public library, as many countries have a policy of storing printed media in public libraries.

The role of language in this regard is also worthy of note. Except for Chinese, a Western language, English, French, Portuguese, and Spanish have a larger pool of speakers. The utilisation of these means will result in an expanded consumer base. Moreover, it is imperative to acknowledge that this will engender a heightened level of precision in translation. In order to facilitate the process of translation, it is recommended that the following measures be taken.

The potential for complications arises exclusively when the information pertains to a historical nature. For instance, the documentation of the public admitted and publicised meetings between Olof Rydbeck and the parties involved in the Western Sahara Conflict in 1975, whose records are stored by the International Red Cross, is still classified and thus unbeatable. A similar phenomenon pertains to the information about the conflict stored by the UN.

The organisation known as WikiLeaks serves as a prime illustration of the unlawful acquisition of information. The question posed by this particular source is of a different nature. The dilemma presented here is of a moral nature. If a third party leaks information, a dilemma arises as to whether the information should be used or not. Which of these should be used? The query pertains to selecting the entire component or its constituent elements. The following questions must be posed: firstly, what is the nature of the harm inflicted by the integral use of the information, and secondly, who will be the subjects of that harm? Furthermore, the relevance of the information must be considered. If this is the case, it is imperative to ascertain how this phenomenon manifests.

If we look at a non-Western military power, the information is less and less available. The main problem is the language. If you do not speak the language, there are two problems. First, it is hard to know if the translation is correct. The second issue is that there are translations available. They either have a direct effect on how information is shared. It can be more easily put into two groups: unimportant and important. For example, it can be divided into two groups: things that are regional conflicts or things that are simple local disputes. This means it is much easier for it to be hidden or stopped. So, we can say that information is key. Information is the most important thing when we study conflict or any conflict. But who made it, when and where, how it was made, who it was made for, how it was shared, and the circumstances of its production, all of this has even more value than the information itself

3.2. Problems about the information on the Western Sahara Conflict

As we talked about before, the Western Sahara conflict is made up of two big problems. These problems have made it difficult for people to study the conflict.

Western Sahara is still a problem for the UN because it is not yet independent. It is still listed as a non-self-governing territory by the UN. MINURSO, a UN mission, is still on the ground and its mandate is renewed yearly. Morocco's allies are the US, France, Israel and Saudi Arabia. They are some of the most important countries in the world. This was a big problem. This conflict could be considered a regional or non-issue, which would be

risky. So, information about the conflict could be ignored, given the wrong label, or lost altogether. If we look at history, this is clear. Morocco and Mauritania illegally invaded Western Sahara in 1975 after Spain had failed to take over. Since then, all attempts to negotiate have failed. Morocco is one of the leading countries stopping the referendum, and its allies are also stopping progress in the UNSC.

Despite the challenging political climate, the POLISARIO and its allies, primarily Algeria, have effectively mobilised public awareness. Furthermore, the issue has been maintained at the United Nations, with diplomatic representatives stationed outside Western Sahara. The Saharawi diaspora has also played a significant role in maintaining awareness of the issue.

Furthermore, the SADR is a full member of the African Union and plays an active role within this organisation.

A substantial corpus of scientific discussion and research exists on this issue. The repercussions of the Moroccan invasion and occupation on international law and scientific discussion and production are important. Consequently, the majority of the information is biased. The question arises as to whether the invasion and subsequent illegal occupation of Western Sahara was orchestrated by Morocco or its allies in order to align with their political objectives, or whether it was a deliberate act aimed at legitimising the occupation.

The second key issue is the language. The Saharawi people are a nomadic culture. This directly affects their mode of communication, as they place a higher value on spoken language than written language. Despite its historical association with Spain as a former colony, the official language of Western Sahara is Hassaniya, a form of Arabic unique to the Saharawi people. However, it should be noted that official documentation continues to be written in Arabic.

3.3. The War communiques

All previous points must be given due consideration when researching Western Sahara. In order to obtain information about the current phase of the conflict, it is necessary to consider who is producing the information and whether it is available for consultation. The response was unequivocal. The provision of direct information regarding the conflict

is SADR's responsibility. Morocco has formally denied the occurrence of the conflict. Consequently, the onus falls upon a single party to produce and guarantee public access to the requisite information. The information about the military operations is conveyed through an official report of the *Ministerio de Defensa Nacional*¹⁹, designated as "*Comunicado Militar*"²⁰ or "*Parte de Guerra*"²¹ (**Image 2**).

In the first phase, this report will be posted in the RASD Official Press Service, the Sahara Press Service website, with a daily periodicity in Arabic, Spanish, and French. In the second phase, although some war communiques would still be posted on the SPS website, an official Facebook page would be created in 2023, where this "*Comunicado Militar*" or "*Parte de Guerra*" would be posted with two modifications:

- 1) A weekly analysis would also substitute the daily analyses.
- 2) The publication language would be limited to Arabic.

About the data itself, the "*Comunicado Militar*" or "*Parte de Guerra*" would only present the following information:

- Number of attacks
- General location of the attacks (indicating the name of the zone and/or region of the attacks)
- Additional information such as type of base attack (Artillery Platform, Specific Base or Platoon base, Surveillance Point)

The Spanish version was selected for the data collection process for methodological reasons. These reports had the most information of all translations, being the closest to the Arabic report when compared.

These "*Comunicado Militar*" or "*Parte de Guerra*" would be posted alongside other news in the website's News section. To obtain the reports, we would need to look for the following aspects (**Image 1**):

- All Military Reports will have the word "ataques" or "bombardeos" in its title (black pointer and black underline)

¹⁹ Ministry of Nacional Defence

²⁰ War Communique

²¹ Report of War

- All Military Reports will have a photo of military equipment (orange pointer)
- Reference to ELPS (blue pointer and blue underline)

3.4. How to transform Qualitative Data into Quantitative Data

In order to comprehend the military operations on the ground and interpret the data accordingly, it was imperative to transform the qualitative data into quantitative data. Focusing on quantitative aspects, such as chronological data and battle data, and on geographical aspects of the reports, the information provided by the "*Comunicado Militar*" or "*Parte de Guerra*" becomes clearer for analysis.

3.5. Chronological Data

In order to systematise the data, it was first necessary to organise it by chronological order. Consequently, the data collection would adhere to the Western-based week distribution, with the initial day designated as Monday and the final day as Sunday. Furthermore, it was determined that adherence to the SPS daily publication would be mandatory. The sole exception to the aforementioned regulation was observed during the initial phase of the conflict. It was on Friday, 13th November 2020, that the conflict was first documented.

The initial information collected was the date of issue of the "*Comunicado Militar*" or "*Parte de Guerra*". As illustrated in **Image 3**, the data of the issue is indicated beneath the title and on the first line of text (highlighted by a blue rectangle). In contrast, the number of war communiqués is in the second paragraph (highlighted by a yellow line). Also, to understand the magnitude of the chronological data, we have decided to use a binary system to measure Event Day and Non-Event Day. An Event Day is when at least one attack was registered. Therefore, a Non-Event Day is a day with no attacks registered. The binary system utilised for this measure was that an attack was marked with a 1, regardless of the number of repeated attacks on the same target, day, or Sector. A day without an attack will be marked with a 0.

3.6. Geographical Data

Further perusal of the "*Comunicado Militar*" or "*Parte de Guerra*" revealed a more profound decomposition of the Theatre of Operations. As illustrated in Image 4, at least two distinct layers of action are suggested using specific terms in "*Comunicado Militar*" or "*Parte de Guerra*". The terms "zona" and "zonas", along with "sector" and "sectors", are indicative of this. The blue circle denotes the word "zona", while the red circle indicates "sector" in **Image 4**.

Following a series of meetings between the team and Saharawi representatives, the aforementioned information was confirmed, and the subsequent template was established (J. Teixeira 2024; J.F. Teixeira 2022b; J. Teixeira 2022a):

- 1) Theatre of Operations
 - a. It is the mega-level of the conflict
 - b. Two sectors of MR1 are located within Morocco
 - i. Due to this fact, to better understand the data, we have coded:
 1. Events that happened within Morocco as C01
 2. Events that happened within Western Sahara as C02
- 2) Western Sahara was divided into three military regions
 - a. They have a North-South orientation
 - b. They are named after the geographical area where they are inserted.
 - c. They are the macro-level of the conflict
 - d. Each Military Region was attributed the acronym MRx
 - e. It was attributed to each Military Region a unique colour, using the Hexadecimal colour code system:
 - i. The attribution of a Hexadecimal colour code allows for better organisation, thus for better reading, of the attack data
- 3) Each MR is composed of four (4) Sectors, except MR3, which has five Sectors (5)
 - a. They have a North-South orientation
 - b. They are named after the most important point within the Sector
 - c. They are the meso-level of the conflict
 - d. The Sectors are located along the Moroccan Military Wall
 - e. Each section was attributed the acronym Sx

- f. It was attributed to each Sector a unique colour, using the Hexadecimal colour code system:
 - i. Attributing a Hexadecimal colour code allows for better organisation and, thus, better reading of the attack data.
- 4) Each military Sector is composed of Zones
 - a. They are the micro-level or conflict zones, where the attacks take place
- 5) They are the micro-level or conflict zones, where the attacks take place

The final organisational structure can be observed in the matrix contained in **Erro! A origem da referência não foi encontrada.** It was hypothesised that all data would be present in graphical and cartographic form. Employing a colour-based coding system facilitates the reader's ability to establish a connection between the data presented in the analysis and the designated sector and military region. The subsequent discussion will address the methodology employed in the analysis.

A divergent approach was adopted in the cartographic format. As the sectors can be delineated with a greater degree of precision, the colour coding system was employed solely to demarcate the military regions.

A subsequent examination of the data revealed a secondary issue: the inconsistency of the spelling of the attacked zones. This aspect is likely to be derived from the nomadic culture of the Saharawi. As previously stated, the Saharawi people, inhabiting a desert environment, have developed a nomadic way of life. Consequently, the verbal aspect of cultural interactions assumes significant value, superseding the written form.

The Saharawi people speak *Hassaniya*, a dialect of Arabic that has a written form. However, issues arose when the war communiqués were transcribed into Spanish. The transliteration process resulted in significant confusion regarding the comprehension of micro-level geographical data. Following a thorough examination of numerous reports and subsequent consultation with the Saharawi, the correct spelling of a series of locations was successfully standardised (see **Erro! A origem da referência não foi encontrada.**, **Erro! A origem da referência não foi encontrada.** and **Erro! A origem da referência não foi encontrada.**). The process of systematisation facilitates a more profound level of comprehension by enabling the cataloguing and tallying of the attack

zones. This enables the subsequent ranking of these zones from the most to the least attack-prone.

As demonstrated by the analysis of the various reports, it became evident that multiple individuals were responsible for transcribing the war communiqués, and a single, consistent methodology was not employed. Information about the attacks would be contained in a bullet point following the date-sector-zone-number of attack indication or incorporated into the text. As illustrated in Image 6, the third issue identified in our analysis pertained to the inconsistency in how the reports were composed.

After this, the methodology underwent a further adaptation. The data systematisation required to modify the periodicity of the data collection from a Monday-Sunday period to a Sunday-Sunday period was identified as a necessary component of the study. Subsequent war communiqués began to incorporate information regarding the preceding day's attacks. The presentation of this new information has been observed to vary, with instances in which it is preceded and instances in which it succeeds the information from the day of collection. It is also possible for the information to be included in the title and/or the introduction paragraph. Using bullet points and/or sequential text is recommended to facilitate the comprehension of the text. These examples are further elaborated upon in Image 5.

3.7. Attack Data

The war communiqués exhibited a combination of approaches in the enumeration of attacks. Upon examination of the documents, the following terms were identified: "*intensos*," "*continuos*," and "*hostigada*" (see **Image 7**). These terms signify a continued and prolonged action. However, they do not quantify the attacks. This is the most common. Sometimes, however, they express a number using terms like *dos veces* (underline in red in **Image 7**).

All references to an attack were counted as one without a specific numerical value for the study. If the communiqué about the war enumerates a particular figure, said figure shall be regarded as definitive. Furthermore, in instances where the *Comunicado de Guerra*, *Parte de Guerra* or *Comunicado Militar* do not provide detailed information regarding the micro-level of attacks, the attack is documented as 'Unknown'.

3.8. Additional Information

The final aspect to be addressed pertains to collecting additional information presented in the war communiqués (**Image 8**). However, it is imperative to delineate the criteria that would qualify as additional information. This information category is inherently qualitative, and consequently, it is impossible to quantify it.

This umbrella is utilised to record various information, including attacks against specific military bases, such as radar stations, military outposts and military bases; particular locations, including the northern and southern coordinates of specific points; and reports of material destruction, including military vehicles. It is also employed to register military movements, such as columns and convoys moving from point A to point B. This type of information is distinct from the propaganda and discourse in other war communiqués. Notably, within the corpus of *Comunicado de Guerra, Parte de Guerra* and *Comunidado Militar*, a single instance of the number of casualties in the analysed period is mentioned.

4. Database Creation logic

We have detailed the methodology used to collect the data during the previous point. The goal was to create a database for the war data. We will discuss how the database was created, how the data was analysed, and what results were obtained. Therefore, our starting point describes the system used to process the data. Given that we convert the qualitative data into quantitative data, the best way to process it was to systematise it in an Excel spreadsheet.

Consequently, a table was constructed following the collection methodology: Chronological Data, Geographical Data (Macro-Meso-Micro-level), Attack Data, Additional Information, as seen in **Image 10** and **Image 9**. The information was sorted into a continuous table, organised from left to right, and divided into three macro-levels using a colour code system. **Image 9** gives us a detailed look. Highlighted by a red rectangle, we see the Macro-level and Meso-level geographical data slots. The fields for the dates are on the left, demarked by a blue rectangle, and between the two,

highlighted by a purple rectangle, are the fields for the micro-level geographical data, attack data, and additional information data.

Below the table, highlighted by an orange rectangle, we see Total Sectors, Total Region, TOTAL and Obs.: field slots. The Obs.: slot serves to indicate the additional information. As we can see, there is a slot in the table and another in front of the Obs.: When a war communique provides additional information, a numeric code (N*) is inserted into the Obs table slot. The additional information is transcribed in the Obs.: slot after a numeric code (N*). The number in the table slot corresponds to Obs.: field slot number, thus establishing a correspondence between them.

The first three fields were set up to count the number of attacks enumerated in the Attack Data slots of the table. Thus, the total values registered per S, MR, and week total are calculated. The values are subsequently converted into graphs. The variety of the data permits a breakdown into two types of graphical analysis:

- 1) Geographical analysis
 - a. Mega-level analysis- was not utilised for the weekly analysis
 - b. Macro-level analysis- the number of attacks registered that week per MR
 - c. Meso-level analysis- the number of attacks registered that week per S
 - d. Micro-level analysis- number of attacks registered in that week per Zone
- 2) Comparison analysis
 - a. Geographical comparison - inter and intra-geographical levels
 - b. Chronological comparison - between the present week in analysis and the previous week
 - c. Chrono geographical comparison - macro-level region between the present week under analysis and the previous week

The last level of analysis is of cartographical order. Much cartographical data was produced during the data collection and analysis process. We could deepen the comparative analysis since the theatre of operations was mapped out.

Using the QGIS programme, a GIS programme, and the OpenStreetMap maps database, we created a map of the theatre operations (Map 3) with the specifications detailed in point 3.6.

Through further data collection, we were able to construct three types of maps:

- 1) Attack Maps - mapping the approximate locations of the attacked zones.
 - a. They are approximate locations due to the lack of geographical information provided.
 - b. When an Unknown attack is registered, it is mapped near the most important location of the Sector.
 - c. All additional information is indicated in a special legend at the bottom of the map
 - d. An explosion symbolises the attacks
 - e. This type of map has a highlight section, where the most attacked zone or if a particular event has occurred in a zone will be exposed
- 2) Statistical Maps
 - a. Colour code comparison map of the Macro-level, where the attack data of a select chronological period is represented. Using a colour gradient, one can compare the most attacked MR.
 - b. Colour code comparison map of the Meso-level, where the attack data of a select chronological period is represented. Using a colour gradient, one can compare the most attacked S.

Part II – The Conflict: The Project Western Sahara War Archives and its analytical outcomes, and a detailed view of the data

1. The Conflict Wheel

As discussed in part 1, we will use the conflict analysis tool to analyse the 3rd phase of the Western Sahara Conflict. The wheel comprises six parts: Actors/Relations; Issues; Dynamics; Context/Structures; Causations; Options/Strategies.

We will start by examining the actors and relations of the conflict through a stakeholder analysis. Then we will focus on the issues and design the conflict tree of the 3rd phase. We will then proceed to the dynamics and context. The data used for our Stakeholder Matrix will be constructed on the information put forward by Omar (2009), and we will

be using an intersection of the conflict mapping designed by Wehr (1979) and the Conflict Wheel designed by Mason and Rychard (2005).

1.1. Context- Western Sahara: Between Colonialism and Freedom

The territory that comprises Western Sahara is a strip of territory, mainly desert, with an area of 272.000 km² in north-western Africa, between Morocco, Mauritania and Algeria, as the land borders; and the Atlantic to the West (see Map 1). Although the UN Geographical Services depict the existence of a border between the Western Sahara and Morocco, the latter does not recognise it, claiming that Western Sahara is Morocco's Southern Provinces (Jensen 2013), and it remains one of the cornerstones of the Alawi family's claim to power.

The Sahrawi are a people whose way of life was historically defined by the desert environment. Before the territorial restructuring undertaken by Spain in the 1950s, the harsh conditions of the region sustained smaller, mobile communities and favoured nomadic, decentralised forms of organisation over sedentary urban centres.

Instead, there were small, nomadic-pastoral groups, denominated by the western world as tribes, that needed to travel between pastoral areas (S/2004/827). Moreover, even after the restructuring, this nomadic characteristic never entirely disappeared and still exists in some parts of the liberated areas under SADR control.

The UN classifies Western Sahara as a Non-Self-Governing Territory (UN 1963), one of the oldest territories in this list, standing since 1963, and it is considered the last colony in Africa; with Spain as the *de jure* administrator and Morocco as the *de facto* administrator. This ambiguous but unambiguous political situation started with the Moroccan invasion and Spanish withdrawal in 1975 (Jensen 2013). Being a desert country, this is one of the poorest regions in the world regarding agricultural potential, with low-quality soils, a lack of rain, sand, and extremely harsh winds. The coastal part, with its giant fishing banks and inland phosphates, oil, gold, and other minerals, makes the territory extremely rich in natural resources. Morocco controls over 85% of the territory, with the main known and exploited resources, while RASD controls the other

15%. Its population is divided into three great nuclei: the one under Moroccan control and the others living either in the Tindouf refugee camps or the Diaspora.

This dissertation will focus on the period immediately before and after the signing of the 1991 Ceasefire Agreement, while acknowledging the rich historical background of protracted conflicts. The 1991 Agreement marked a pivotal turning point: it ended the initial phase of open warfare between the POLISARIO Front and Morocco. It ushered in a second phase, often called the 'waiting period' or the 'MINURSO phase'.

1.2. The end of the 1st Phase of the Conflict and the start of the 2nd Phase of the Conflict

The protracted Conflict raging in Western Sahara²² would enter a new phase in the 1980s. Despite its poor military equipment, the POLISARIO Front gained terrain within the occupied Western Sahara, forcing Morocco into a losing position. This forced the invading country to a strategy shift. Advised by the US, Israel and France, Morocco started to build a series of military walls on the 24th of June 1981 (MINURSO), with the intention first to protect the most valuable occupied territories and then to gradually, by connecting each occupied position with a military wall, cement Moroccan control over Western Sahara.

POLISARIO Front guerrilla-style operations would come to be confronted and halted by these first series of military walls, and later by the unification of these walls, turning it into the largest military wall in the world. Consequently, the POLISARIO guerrilla units lost the ability to make incursions into the territory and lost the connections with the Sahrawi population in the occupied territories. This defensive structure single-handedly shifted the evolution of the Conflict. It forced a high-intensive, very mobile conflict into a low-intensive, stagnant conflict, resulting in a military deadlock. As Elaggoune and Aty (2018) argue, Algeria's policy towards Western Sahara should not be reduced to rivalry with Morocco or strategic calculations alone. Instead, Algeria's consistent support for the Sahrawi people's right to self-determination is rooted in its nationalist ideology, which has been shaped by its own anti-colonial struggle and revolutionary foreign policy.

²² Which had started in 1975, when Morocco invaded from the North and Mauritania from the South.

Since achieving independence, the Algerian government has consistently adopted a policy of opposition to colonialism, neo-colonialism and imperialism. This ideological stance is exemplified by its position on the Western Sahara issue, which reflects not only geopolitical considerations but also the nation's fundamental ideological principles. Vermeren (2016), conversely, accentuates the pivotal role played by Morocco's handling of the conflict during the 1980s and 1990s in maintaining the reign of King Hassan II. The monarchy utilised the concept of national integrity to frame the Sahara as a matter of national importance, thereby mobilising patriotic sentiment and consolidating its authority amidst considerable economic and social challenges. France's decisive diplomatic and military support enabled Morocco to withstand both battlefield setbacks and international criticism, thereby reinforcing Rabat's claim that the conflict was non-negotiable. Vermeren identifies the construction of the sand berms between 1980 and 1987 as a pivotal moment: while securing urban centres, communication lines and economic resources, they also consolidated Moroccan administration over the 'useful Sahara' and restricted Polisario's operational reach. The present author interprets this dual military and political strategy as a demonstration of sovereignty. Furthermore, Vermeren situates the 1991 UN-brokered ceasefire as the beginning of an internationally managed stalemate, in which Morocco consolidated de facto control while the international community assumed custodianship of an unresolved dispute. In this account, the Sahara dossier is revealed not only as an external territorial question, but also as a structural component of Morocco's internal political order and the consolidation of Hassan II's late reign. As demonstrated by Santos (2024); Inmaculada Cordero Olivero (2024); Zoubir (2018); Smith (2018), Morocco's external alliances extended beyond France and the United States to include a discreet but enduring partnership with Israel, which culminated in the 2020 normalisation agreement (Amer 2020). Despite its presentation as a breakthrough, the accord largely exposed decades of covert ties, ranging from intelligence cooperation in the 1950s to Mossad assistance in tracking dissidents and the construction of the Moroccan military wall in the 1980s. In exchange for public endorsement, the Trump administration acknowledged

Morocco's sovereignty over Western Sahara, emphasising the intricate relationship between Rabat's handling of the conflict and broader geopolitical alignments.

In 1990, this conflict became one of the longest-running conflicts in the world, developing into a protracted conflict (Zoubir 1996, 175).

Faced with a stalemate, both parties were more willing to enter into negotiations with the "winner takes all" scenario that the referendum could bring. However, the process was not smooth despite the mediation between the OAU/AU and the UN.

1.3. The complex negotiations

The OAU, and later the AU, from 1978 to 1984, was the institution driving the mediation process²³ in Western Sahara (Ferreira 2018, 11; Ohaegbulam 2004, 119; AHR/Res. 103 (XVIII)).

King Hassan had committed “[...] *to accept the holding of referendum in the Western Sahara to enable the people of that territory to exercise their right to self-determination* [...]” (AHR/Res. 103 (XVIII)) and accepted the recommendations of the Sixth Session of the Committee of heads of State and pledge to co-operate with the Committee “[...] *in the search for a just, peaceful and lasting solution, [...]*” (AHR/Res. 103 (XVIII)) he also stated on 18th OAU Summit in Nairobi, in 1981²⁴ that he would accept a referendum (Youssef 2019), albeit framing to the US that the referendum was his idea

“[...] A few days ago King Hassan sent an oral message to the President [less than 1 line not declassified] soliciting the President’s support for the referendum proposal on the Sahara which the King planned to make at the Nairobi OAU Summit.”²⁵ [...]” (USDS 1981. Emphases added).

Morocco was in the middle of severe economic crisis, between 1978 and 1983, Morocco National Debt rose from 8.5B USD to 13 USD (Vermeren 2016). Market fluctuation on the value of the phosphates, the petrol shock, followed by elevation on the cost of the

²³ On the founding document of the OUA existed a clause that compelled this organization to foster cooperation between African Nations-States, with the objective to try ending all forms of colonialism in Africa. When in 1982 the OUA became the AU, of which the SADR was a founding-member, that clause transition to the new institution, with a new stipulation: the respect for the inherited international borders of the African Nations-State.

²⁴ The event was held between the 24th and the 27th of June.

²⁵ Emphases add

war, made a severe hit on the economy. On the political spectrum, there an approximation between Spain and France with Algeria; the US, spite recognizing Morocco role that facilitated the accords of Camp David (Santos 2018; J. Teixeira 2023), would NOT sell the weapons need by Morocco.

From the start, Morocco had been a blocking force to any resolution that would go against its interests: the annexation of Western Sahara (Ohaegbulam 2004, 119). The axis Paris-Washington were the pillar of this stance. Morocco was one of the key allies in the region. The country was keeping in check²⁶ the international institution²⁷, the Maghreb²⁸, and other African countries²⁹.

From the beginning, the Kingdom constantly affirmed that Western Sahara was Moroccan and that the POLISARIO Front did not exist as an entity, and they added that the conflict was between Morocco and Algeria (Ohaegbulam 2004, 119). Refusing to enter into any negotiations with POLISARIO. The integration of the SADR as a founding member of the AU on the 1st of August 1982 (MINURSO), and previously as a member of the OAU, hindered the mediation process.

The OAU/AU lacked the proper international power to impose the referendum on Morocco (Ferreira 2018, 12) So, the institution on its 1983 summit in Addis Ababa, adopted Resolution 104, where they named Morocco and POLISARIO Front as the parties in confrontation; holding for direct negotiations of the involved parties; called for cease-fire; recommended a referendum to be held until December 1983; and to the establishment of a OAU-UN Peacekeeping mission for the region (AHG/Res. 104 (XIX)). Morocco had a nonchalant policy towards the OAU. First started to criticize and not participate in the meetings. After 1982³⁰ started to actively boycott summits (Youssef 2019; Santos 2018). Relying on the indirect influence of France, Morocco and its allies started to paralyze the normal function of the OAU (Santos 2018).

²⁶ For example, Morocco allowed Mossad to spy on the Casablanca summit of the Arab League.

²⁷ Like the OAU and the Arab League

²⁸ Keeping it a NATO friendly zone

²⁹ Morocco participated in military operations in Zaire and was a key political figure for Angola, as UNITA had training grounds in Morocco.

³⁰ Secretary-General of OUA, Edem Kudjo, after 26 members of the OUA had recognized SADR as Nation-State, unilaterally, without even call for a formal vote, officially seated the SADR in the Council of Ministers Conference as the lawful authority in Western Sahara.

After the full integration of SADR in 1984 in the AU, Morocco left the organisation in protest (MINURSO ; Ohaegbulam 2004, 120; Youssef 2019). However, when Morocco left the AU, the country had the support of 21 other member-states (Ohaegbulam 2004, 119). Thus, the move generated an internal struggle within the UA. As Sidi Omar's Omar (2018) analysis makes clear, the conflict in Western Sahara is portrayed as the final unresolved case of decolonisation in Africa, thereby posing a persistent challenge to both the AU and the broader international community. He traces the origins of the dispute to Morocco's 1975 occupation and explains how the OAU, and later the AU, positioned themselves in relation to the Sahrawi people's right to self-determination. From the outset, the OAU upheld the principles of territorial integrity and *uti possidetis juris*. However, in 1984 it admitted the SADR as a full member state, institutionalising the Western Sahara issue within Africa's continental agenda and ultimately leading Morocco to withdraw from the OAU. Omar further demonstrates that the AU has consistently advocated for Sahrawi self-determination, denouncing Morocco's ongoing occupation and calling for an UN-supervised referendum. This dual approach — solidarity with the Sahrawi people combined with diplomatic pressure on Morocco — has been accompanied by advocacy for stronger UN–AU cooperation. Finally, Omar contends that the AU's policies are indicative of its overarching role as guardian of Africa's decolonisation agenda. By recording the Union's repeated reaffirmations of Sahrawi rights despite internal divisions and external pressures, Omar stresses that the conflict is not merely bilateral or regional but a test of Africa's commitment to its foundational principles.

“[...] apesar dos esforços encetados dentro da OUA para que as partes dialogassem, tal situação parecia ser praticamente impossível devido à intransigente posição de Marrocos, que chegou inclusive a boicotar alguns dos encontros da organização. Assim, e para além de recusar reconhecer a RASD, o rei Hassan II declinava também a possibilidade de se encontrar pessoalmente com líderes da Polisário [...]” (Ferreira 2018, 11)

In 1984, after the request of the AU, the UN would join in the efforts for a referendum (Ohaegbulam 2004, 120). The heads of each organisation aligned efforts to push all

involved parties in the conflict to the negotiation table (UNGA Resolution 40/50). In addition, the UN would utilise the blueprint layout of the AU for its plans for the referendum. Meanwhile, Morocco's politics of actively blocking the referendum backfired, undermining its diplomatic position³¹. This demonstrated to Hassan II that the Sahrawi cause would continue gaining steam, as more countries recognised the SADR as a fully fledged country³². So, the king enacted a reversal of political stance in 1988. He became “more open” to the possibility of the referendum, to enact negotiations with POLISARIO Front, demonstrating good will (Ohaegbulam 2004, 120) However, this would also give him the chance to undermine the process from within and to drag it on as long as possible, with the intention to make the Moroccan occupation of Western Sahara an undisputed fact (Ferreira 2018, 13).

With the Conflict entering a stalemate³³, on the 3rd of January 1989, the first-ever meeting between King Hassan II and POLISARIO Front representatives would happen (Cooper, Grandolini, and Fontanellaz 2019, 70; Ohaegbulam 2004, 120). However, this meeting would end badly and almost break the negotiations process between the POLISARIO Front and Morocco; Morocco and Algeria would break diplomatic relations again (Ferreira 2018, 13-14). The loom of Conflict followed, with both parties attacking each other.

The UN-OAU continued to push their mediation efforts. In 1988, the beginning of an agreement was reached. On the 11th of August 1988, both SG, in separate meetings, presented the plan to Morocco and the POLISARIO Front. On the 30th of August 1988, both parties, while expressing concerns, accepted the plan. The UNSG Pérez de Cuéller informed the UNSC on the 20th of September 1988, that both parties had accepted the joint UN-OAU proposal³⁴ for the realisation of the self-determination referendum and were willing to cooperate for that end. Despite that, both parties actively distrusted each other (Ferreira 2018, 12; Ohaegbulam 2004, 120). In his communication to the UNSC, the UNSG asked for the nomination of a Special Representative for Western Sahara,

³¹ Regional instability, diplomatic isolation within Africa, a staggering increase of reports detailing humans' rights violations by Morocco, published by international organizations that were on the ground.

³² In 1989 a total of 75 other Nations-States had recognized the SADR

³³ And the cost with war rising for Morocco.

³⁴ Denominated as the Joint Mission of Good Offices

which would be granted (S/RES/621(1988)). Hector Gros Espiell would be nominated for the role (Ferreira 2018, 13). A technical commission would also be dispatched to Western Sahara, with a mandate to gather better information to refine the plan's administrative aspects (S/22464). The plan would come to be known as “The Settlement Proposal”. On the 18th of June 1990, the report on the situation concerning Western Sahara to the UNSC (S/21360), the UNSG outlined in Annexe 1.

With notification of agreement from both parties, the UNSC voted on the 29th of April 1991 resolution 690, which led to the establishment of the basis for the referendum³⁵, created MINURSO and, above all, outlined a ceasefire agreement, where the implementation day would serve as the date to begin the count for all process to be concluded (S/RES/690(1991)). Both parties agreed upon the realisation of a referendum on independence, autonomy or a different form of governance under the supervision of the UN (Ohaegbulam 2004, 121). According to this agreement, the referendum would occur in January 1992 and the ceasefire would take effect in September 1991 (Ohaegbulam 2004, 121). When the cease-fire was reached, Morocco had control over 80%, and SADR the remaining 20%. The ceasefire agreement established two important factors: reducing the FAR personnel in Western Sahara, limiting both forces to specific locations, and entrusting MINURSO with monitoring military activities on both sides. However, for this mission, the UN deployed 17000 soldiers; the FAR alone had 65000 soldiers in Western Sahara (Ferreira 2018, 14)—an impossible mission to bear. Since its independence in 1956, Morocco has been playing the utility card for the West. In the process, France and the USA, permanent members of the UNSC with veto power, became even stronger allies of Morocco. Therefore, those key allies of Morocco could become a hindrance, effectively killing the neutrality of the observers.

In 1990, when the Kuwait crisis overshadowed the situation in Western Sahara, Morocco took the opportunity to, once again, demonstrate its allegiance towards the Western Powers, “[...] *by deploying its troops on the side of the US-led coalition that then fought against Iraq [...]*” (Cooper, Grandolini, and Fontanellaz 2019, 70). This proximity to the

³⁵ The timeline in which it should be implemented, carried out, the number of days for the votes to be counted and the number of days to implement the decision of the referendum.

West allowed Morocco to act with impunity. After the announcement of the cease-fire, on the 4th of August 1991, FAR fighter-bombers were used to conduct air strikes against Tifariti, Meshiers and Mijek. On the 22nd of August, the POLISARIO Front claimed that another wave of Moroccan airstrikes targeted water wells. Furthermore, on the 25th of August, according to some reports, the FAR attacked Bir Lehlou, the provisional capital of SADR (Cooper, Grandolini, and Fontanellaz 2019, 72; Besenyö 2023, 12). The situation forced the UNSG Pérez de Cuéllar to unilaterally declare that the cease-fire would come into effect on the 6th of September 1991 (Ferreira 2018, 15). This was accepted immediately by POLISARIO, Morocco would only start withdrawing part of its forces on the 27th of October.

This would not be the end of Morocco's problematic behaviour. Soon after the cease-fire took effect, the UN deployed its personnel. Morocco created difficulties when the team arrived (Besenyö 2023, 14). They blocked all major roads into Western Sahara, and impeded the entrance of journalists, European diplomats and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees³⁶. They would also keep the Identification Commission for the referendum under constant surveillance (Human Rights Watch 1995). With some elements of the MINURSO security team describing the situation as Morocco waging a counterintelligence operation against the UN (Besenyö 2023, 14).

1.4. The referendum problem

Problems have arisen soon after the ceasefire agreement came into full effect. The key issue was the voter eligibility. Morocco was transferring into Western Sahara a large number of settlers since 1975 – in Rabat's view, they had the right to vote (to guarantee the victory); POLISARIO wanted to use the 1974 population census done by the Spanish, thus, excluding the Moroccan settlers (Ohaegbulam 2004, 121).

This issue became part of the formula that led to the intractability of the 2nd phase of the Conflict, making this phase much more of a political confrontation (Jensen 2013, 52). Discussions over voter eligibility were at the centre of the negotiations rounds between parties in the following years (Elaggoune and Aty 2018, 33) as neither party wanted to

³⁶ UNHRC

enter into a losing vote. To overcome the roadblock. Pérez de Cuéllar proposed to Hassan II a third option “[...] onde seria perguntado ao povo sarauí se aceitariam viver sob a soberania de Marrocos, mas com um grau significativo de autonomia [...]” (Ferreira 2018, 13), an idea that the King of Morocco outright refused. This would open a Pandora's box, inciting other regions of the country to demand equal treatment, thus effectively breaking the kingdom.

The identification process, which should have started in 1991, would only start in 1994, and a series of allegations, mainly against the Moroccan authorities, started to see the light of day (Besenyö 2023, 14). The Human Rights Watch report (1995), presents a list of complaints, like intimidation of the population, forced disappearances, constant surveillance and intimidation of MINURSO staff members, human rights abuse, neglect of former Moroccan Prisoners of War³⁷, continued obstruction of NGO's and also a threat of another Green March “[...] if their demands were not met. [...]” (Besenyö 2023, 14). However, the report also points to the inactivity or unwillingness by the UN institutions to call out or flat out accuse Morocco of the abuses.

“[...] The failure of the U.N., from the beginning, to stand up to challenges to its control by Morocco stronger both politically and militarily than Polisario and currently administering the disputed territory has led to accusations that the U.N. has not operated as a neutral party in the Western Sahara. [...] MINURSO staff members living in the Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara are under permanent surveillance. [...] Non-MINURSO staff cannot enter these hotels unless Moroccan security permits it. As MINURSO staff members live in the same hotels as Moroccan officials and dine in the same facilities, many told Human Rights Watch that they feel that they have no freedom to express their views. [...] The freedom of movement of MINURSO in the territory is also restricted. Based on Moroccan orders, MINURSO has forbidden its staff members to visit the "tent cities," where Moroccans transferred to the territory in 1991 currently live, or the surrounding areas [...]” (Human Rights Watch 1995)

³⁷ POW

This behaviour forms a pattern. Information about Western Sahara tends to fall into two categories: mysteriously classified or extremely vague. Access to any information is met with resistance. Information also tends to disappear, be vague, altered or manipulated in “favour of” or pro-Morocco. Even the UNSG Pérez de Cuéller favoured negotiating with Algeria and Morocco, having an almost neglecting stance towards the Sahrawi (Ferreira 2018, 14-15). The only reliable source of information is the Sahrawi. All the reports indicate that from the beginning, the Sahrawi tried to be helpful and achieve success. However, faced with Moroccan behaviour, non-action, and even complete compliance by the UN, the Sahrawi started to present objections and pushbacks (Human Rights Watch 1995).

In the following years, the UN would become even more pro-Moroccan. Boutros- Ghali was the new UNSG and Sahabzada Yaqub-Khan as the new SESG (Ferreira 2018, 16; Besenyö 2023, 14-15). The latter was a close friend of Hassan II, and the former was one of his main allies in the OAU. However, the chasm between the POLISARIO Front and Morocco was so large that the action of the new UNSG was completely ineffective (Ferreira 2018, 17). MINURSO was also unable to continue its work, as more and more reports showed its ineffectiveness, partly due to Morocco's actions. By 1996, all of MINURSO's Identification centres would be closed, and most of its personnel would leave Western Sahara (Ferreira 2018, 17).

Kofi Annan, nominated as UNSG on the 1st of January 1997, tried a new approach. He believed the conflict needed a strong mediator, so he nominated James Baker as the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General³⁸. Through his mediation with both active players in the Conflict, the *Houston Agreements*, known as Baker Plan I, were reached. Morocco and the POLISARIO Front agreed and signed a compromise simultaneously to realise the referendum (Besenyö 2023, 17).

1.5. A long and slow walk towards Conflict

From the very start, James Baker's mediation process was set up to fail. Shortly after his nomination, he initiated three rounds of negotiations. The first two rounds were held in

³⁸ PESG

London, between June and July 1997, and ended with a compromise concerning the identification process. The next round occurred in Lisbon during August, involving the POW and political detainees. The fourth and final round happened in Houston, Texas, in December 1997.

The Baker Plan I “[...] called for elected executive and legislative bodies and much local control in Western Sahara, with a referendum on the status of the territory to be held within 5 years.” (Jensen 2013, 53). With the MINURSO Identification Centres reopening, Morocco will continue to apply the same strategy, flooding the centres with new people requesting to be registered voters (Ferreira 2018, 19). This plan would, eventually, fail as well. It called for the autonomy of the Western Sahara to be controlled by the Moroccans. Therefore, not what had been agreed upon by both parties, which was a referendum on self-determination in accordance with and upholding international law. In March 1999, the head of MINURSO for the Identification Process refused to re-sign his contract due to

“[...] fruto da falta de apoio e de força do sistema internacional bem como das entidades competentes. Segundo Dunbar, Marrocos estava nesta altura a conseguir desacreditar a comissão de identificação, situação que tornava praticamente impossível a realização de um referendo. [...]”(Ferreira 2018, 19)

On the 23rd of July 1999, Hassan II died and was succeeded by his son, Mohammed VI. This, coupled with the discredit of MINURSO, would put into question the mediation process. In January 2003, the Baker Plan II would be presented. Baker Plan II did not require the consent of all four parties involved³⁹, and it narrowed the scope of discussions to three core options: integration with Morocco, autonomy, or independence. This plan was accepted by the POLISARIO Front but rejected by Morocco because they objected to any independence option even being discussed (Jensen 2013, 54; Ferreira 2018, 19). The following year, 2004, both UNSG and the PESG would present a dilemma to the UNSC: either both parties compromise to achieve the referendum, or the UN should declare that MINURSO was a failure and terminate the mission. The UNSC maintained MINURSO, and James Baker resigned. The position of PESG would remain

³⁹ SADR, Morocco, Algeria and Mauritania

vacant from 2004 to 2005. However, in 2004, there was an attempt to merge the role of the PESG and the Secretary-General's Special Representative⁴⁰ (S/2004/827). The acting SRSR was Álvaro de Soto, but the POLSARIO Front refused to accept him as PESG, only as SRSR, affirming that both roles must be separate and independent from each other (Ruiz Miguel and Blanco Souto 2020, 375). Kofi Annan's last nomination was Peter Van Walsum. By the time he started his role, two things were understood: 1) Morocco and the POLISARIO Front were in confrontation with each other, thus an agreement was unreachable; 2) it was clear that the UNSC was not putting enough pressure on Morocco (Besenyő 2023, 17; Ferreira 2018, 20). The POLISARIO Front tried to reach out to the US but was not met with a welcoming embrace; on the contrary, it was met with a cold reception.

In 2005, the Sahrawi 2nd Intifada started, a series of peaceful protests that tried to free the Sahrawi political prisoners in Moroccan prisons. These protests were met with violent repression from the Moroccan authorities, like all other Sahrawi protests (Besenyő 2023, 17; Lourenço 2017a, 24). In 2007, Ban Ki-Moon was appointed UNSG and had to face the *Gdeim Izik* protest (Lourenço 2017a, 23-30). In October 2010, a Sahrawi protest camp was set up 15km outside El Aaiún⁴¹ (S/2011/249),

“The origin of the camp was the desperation of the Saharawi population who lives under Moroccan occupation and is forcibly impoverished. The forced change in demographics due to the introduction of Moroccan settlers (violation of paragraph 6 of article 49 of the 4th Geneva Convention) has turned the Saharawi population into the minority and their access to housing and jobs is completely controlled by the Moroccan authorities. Jobs in Western Sahara are either available in administration and public services or state owned companies.”
(Lourenço 2017a, 23).

The camp was under constant military grade surveillance, with heavy machinery and the construction of a sand berm. To enter and exit the camp, it was necessary to pass

⁴⁰ SRSR, the Head of MINURSO

⁴¹ The capital city of Western Sahara. We will utilize the Spanish version of the term; due to the fact it's the original name for the city. Terms like Laayoune, utilized in the UN reports derived from the French transliteration of the Spanish name.

through a military checkpoint (Lourenço 2017a, 25). Supplies were also under Moroccan control “[...] *The food and water supplies were also under the control of the Moroccan authorities that stopped a humanitarian solidarity caravan transporting medicines and food. [...]*”(Lourenço 2017a, 25). According to the Report of the Secretary-General of the UN, on its point 4

“[...] MINURSO was not able to monitor the situation in the camp because the Moroccan authorities impeded its access. Attempted military patrols and visits by United Nations security and police personnel were prevented or stopped on several occasions. Moroccan authorities in Laayoune and at the Permanent Mission of Morocco to the United Nations protested against MINURSO attempts to approach the camp, advising that the Mission should not interact directly with the population on what was described as a purely internal and social matter. [...]” (S/2011/249. Emphases added)

On point 6, the report states that a 14-year-old Sahrawi boy was shot dead in unclear circumstances. Point 8 mentions that several letters were sent by the POLISARIO Front to the UNSG, alerting the high number of Human Rights Violations occurring in the camp. The camp would be subject to a

“[...] security operation [...] In the early morning hours, Moroccan auxiliary forces and police officers forcefully dispersed the protesters and destroyed the camp using tear gas, water cannons, batons and loudspeakers mounted on vehicles and helicopters. [...] Violence immediately erupted in the city of Laayoune, with groups of Saharans taking to the streets to protest against the raid, amid rumours of a high death toll, throwing improvised explosives and stones against Moroccan forces and attacking public and private buildings. Later that day, groups of Moroccans attacked Saharan civilian homes and their residents.” (S/2011/249. Emphases added)

The environment in Western Sahara, which was already tense, escalated (Besenyö 2023, 17). With other smaller protests happening throughout the occupied territory, amid waves of Moroccan repression, illegal detention and forceful disappearance, a continued Moroccan behaviour (Lourenço 2017a, 2014, 2019a, 2018, 2019b, 2017b). In

2012, Morocco, as an elected Non-Permanent Member of the UNSC, formally presented a complaint against PESG Christopher Ross, describing his work as biased (MINURSO). Ban Ki-Moon would visit Western Sahara and Morocco in 2016 (UN 2016; MINURSO). His use of the term “occupation”, referring to the Moroccan control over the territory, led to the expulsion of MINURSO (REUTERS 2016, 19; Markey 2016; Besenyő 2010). António Guterres would succeed Ban Ki-Moon as UNSG in 2017 (A/RES/71/4). The new PESG Horst Köhler 2018 started a tour to gather support for a permanent resolution to the conflict. While visiting Morocco, SADR and the neighbouring countries, he discovered that the ceasefire had been violated several times (Besenyő 2023, 17; Cooper, Grandolini, and Fontanellaz 2019, 73). He described the situation in Guerguerat as a point of tension; Morocco opened a pathway in a region that should be under the jurisdiction of MINURSO and was using it to conduct illegal trade to Mauritania. The Sahrawi mounted a peaceful protest action, but were repressed by the Moroccan (Besenyő 2023, 17), another violation, because it is a DMZ, under the protection of MINURSO ("The end of the ceasefire in Western Sahara" 2021), that considered the zone peaceful (Besenyő 2023, 17) A new round of negotiations took place on the 5th and 6th of December 2018 and another on the 21st and 22nd of March 2019, all with no concrete advancements.

The tension in Guerguerat would continue to mount “[...] By 2020, the situation had become increasingly worse, and due to the renewal of hostilities, even an armed conflict became probable, which indeed erupted at the end of 2020 due to the escalation of the Guerguerat conflict. [...]” (Besenyő 2023, 19). When the PESG Horst Köhler stepped down, alleging health concerns, Morocco tried to gain an upper hand by allying several States to open consulates in Western Sahara. POLISARIO Front responded by blocking Guerguerat, impeding Moroccan illegal trade to Mauritania and Senegal. Morocco deployed the FAR and on

“[...] 13 November 2020, they began removing roadblocks and even used weapons against the Saharawi protesters. Militants of the Polisario Front intervened and rescued the demonstrators, after which the organisation

cancelled the existing ceasefire and launched attacks against the Moroccan forces [...]"(Besenyö 2023, 19)

The deployment of the FAR in a DMZ and their attack on peaceful civilians' protesters forced the POLISARIO Front to send a letter to the UNSG denouncing the violation of the Ceasefire agreement (S/2020/113). The denouncing of the Ceasefire left the POLISARIO Front with only one option: restarting the armed conflict (J. Teixeira 2024, 2022a; "The end of the ceasefire in Western Sahara" 2021; Lourenço 2020; Besenyö 2023, 19).

1.6. A low-intensity protracted conflict enters a new phase (2020-onwards)

The following pages will focus on the most important political events between October 2020 and November 2024. The trigger that ignited the conflict had its traces earlier, in October. Keeping with our conflict analysis framework and Protracted Intractable conflicts matrix, we will create a timeline of the prime political events. However, this dissertation has a specific timeframe of analysis; the dates were chosen following the analysis of the actual conflict. We will start in October 2020 and will end in November 2024. Therefore, the event dates will be the cornerstones of creating a clear timeline.

1.7. 2020

The sequence of events leading to the end of the ceasefire on the 13th of November 2020 started much earlier. Morocco, following the resignation of the PESG Horst Köhler in May 2019, started to invite African and Middle Eastern nations to open consulates in occupied Western Sahara (ISG 2021)⁴². On the 19th of October 2020, a caravan of Sahrawi protesters left the refugee camps in Algeria, towards Guerguerat (PUSL 2020a; International Crisis 2025). Morocco indiscreetly opened another entry point on the Military Wall, connecting Morocco and Mauritania. This new opening was being used for illegal trade, drug and human trafficking. This opening was not in the cease-fire agreement but in a UN DMZ. On the 30th of October 2020, the UNSC passed the

⁴² S/2021/843 indicates that Bahrain, Burkina Faso, Equatorial Guinea, Eswatini, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Jordan, Libya, Malawi, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Suriname, the UAE and Zambia, either inaugurated or announced that would open a consulate in El Aaiún or Dakhka.

resolution S/RES/2548 (2020), with which they renewed the MINURSO mandate for another year. By this time, the Sahrawi protested peacefully for weeks against this new breach, having arrived and closed it, by blocking the road on the 21st of October 2020 (PUSL 2020b).

These manifestations tried to stop the incoming and outgoing illegal trade conducted through a MINURSO-controlled zone. By the 21st of October, at least 50 Sahrawi people, including women and children, were at the site, obstructing all forms of traffic. The presence of Sahrawi civilians was not a breach of the military agreement. Nonetheless, according to the UNSG report (S/2021/843), Morocco's Coordinator with MINURSO demanded

“[...] “ the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of POLISARIO from the buffer strip”, while noting that Morocco “reserve[d] the right to take any necessary actions, including intervention on the ground, to ensure the free circulation of civilian and commercial traffic and to re-establish the status quo ante” [...]” (2)

After this, MINURSO noticed the presence of what was assumed to be POLISARIO armed⁴³ members, between the 22nd and 29th of October. When enquired, the POLISARIO Front representative in New York assured that the service members were there to protect the civilians. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General⁴⁴ advised him that the presence of military personnel would breach the military agreement, so they should be withdrawn. Aerial surveillance, on the 29th of October, confirmed that most of the forces had done so. However, on the 26th of October, 16 Royal Moroccan Army vehicles, equipped with heavy machinery⁴⁵ west of the military wall, were spotted in the Bir Guendouz Sector (Guerguarat). The same warning was given, but

“[...] the Mission, in accordance with its role under military agreement No. 1, requested that the Royal Moroccan Army withdraw the equipment. The Royal

⁴³ A total of 12 elements dressed in POLISARIO Front armed forces uniform and 8 military-style light vehicles, with at least two armed with heavy weaponry

⁴⁴ SRSG

⁴⁵ The report indicates heavy-duty earth-moving machinery; it also indicates that no new construction or maintenance was scheduled, a clear violation of the military agreement

Moroccan Army assured MINURSO that it would comply, although no withdrawal was observed. [...]" (S/2021/843)

The Moroccan contingent was, in fact, reinforced with 250 vehicles⁴⁶, well within the DMZ⁴⁷, on the 6th of November. The next day, the 7th of November, Mohammed VI declared that Morocco would respond with firm action. Reaffirming his intention in a letter sent to the UNSG on the 12th of November. At the same time, the Chairperson of the African Union urged for a de-escalation of the tension in Guerguarat and the intervention of the UNSG (PUSL 2020c).

The Sahrawi protest group was attacked in the DMZ by nearly 1000 FAR soldiers on the 13th of November (ISG 2021; REUTERS 2020; MEE 2020; S/2021/843, 3; International Crisis Group 2024; Borsari 2021). A clear violation of the cease-fire agreement. Pressed by another Moroccan violation and with the compliance of the international institution, there was no other solution than returning to the armed struggle for the POLISARIO Front. When the events of the 13th of November were unfolding, after the civilians evacuated the area, shots were overheard alongside the sound of heavy weaponry being used on the Moroccan side. It also reports by the UNSG that:

"[...] three new breaches across the berm south-east of Guerguerat. Approximately 6 km east of the paved road, MINURSO helicopter reconnaissance observed that Royal Moroccan Army bulldozers had begun constructing a new sand wall through the buffer strip. [...]" (S/2021/843)

Up north, near Mahabes⁴⁸ immediately after the event in S13, a clash between the POLISARIO Front and the FAR was registered (Kasraoui 2020). SADR immediately accused Morocco of attacking civilians. Accusations that Morocco immediately denied (International Crisis Group 2024).

On the 14th of November, the Secretary-General of the POLISARIO Front and RASD President formally declared the end of the ceasefire and the return to open conflict (Dahir 2020). This decision was reaffirmed in a letter addressed to the UNSG on 24th November (S/2020/113). On the 21st of November, the Sahrawi Mine Action

⁴⁶ That were equipped with heavy weaponry

⁴⁷ 12km North-east of Guergarat

⁴⁸ Sector 3 (S3)

Coordination Office⁴⁹ issued a public communiqué denouncing that the FAR deployed a new set of anti-personnel and anti-tank land mines, around a 3km radius of a newly built section of the military wall in Guergarat.

The year ended with another twist. Donald J. Trump, using his personal Twitter⁵⁰ account, not the official account of the President of the United States, would recognise the sovereignty of Morocco over Western Sahara. This recognition, however, is illegal and, therefore, void of legal status (Lourenço 2023, 75). The sovereignty of a Non-Self-Governing Territory, which is the case of Western Sahara (A/5514), cannot be transferred without the consent of its people (Lourenço 2023, 75). This happened on the 10th of December, following the normalisation of relations between Morocco and Israel (Kestler-D'Amours 2020; International Crisis Group 2024; Profazio 2021).

POLISARIO, on the same day, would condemn this action. Algeria rejected the Trump recognition. Stating that this undermined the resolution of the conflict. On the 24th of December, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo would announce the process of opening a consulate in Dakhla, Western Sahara (International Crisis Group 2024). However, to date, the consulate does not exist. Meanwhile, Berlin would request that the situation in Western Sahara be discussed in a closed-door session of the UN (Escola de Cultura de Pau 2022, 98).

The Moroccan Court of Cassation confirmed the judgment of the trial of the Gdeim Izik Group (2017) with sentences ranging from 20 years to life imprisonment on the 25th of November 2020 (Munadil 2020a; La Rédaction 2020).

1.8. 2021

At the beginning of 2021, POLISARIO would continue its military campaign. While affirming they would not lay down their weapons even if the negotiation process were to restart. The negotiation would effectively restart on the 19th of January. In previous days, Algeria carried out military exercises in Tifariti. While POLISARIO, keeping their word, on the 23rd of January, would fire four rockets against the Guergarat Zone. Despite being under MINURSO control, Moroccan soldiers were still present in the zone

⁴⁹ SMACO

⁵⁰ Now this social media platform is known as X

(International Crisis Group 2024). POLISARIO would also reject the appointment of Petre Roman as the UN Envoy for Western Sahara, citing that the nominee had relations with Morocco and, therefore, would not be impartial.

The following month, we would see the continuation of the shelling. However, on the 8th of February, the Ejército de Liberación del Pueblo Saharaui⁵¹ would raid a Moroccan military outpost in Ouarkiz. The SADR leadership claimed that they had killed three Moroccan soldiers (Profazio 2021; International Crisis Group 2024; Escola de Cultura de Pau 2022, 97). The Moroccan Government promptly denied this claim on the 10th of February. Seven days later, on the 17th of February, a bipartisan group of US Senators⁵² pressed and urged the newly elected President Biden to reverse President Trump's illegal recognition of Moroccan sovereignty. Stating that the conflict should be resolved through the Self-Determination Referendum. During the month, POLISARIO affirmed that the UN had a high degree of responsibility for what happened on the 13th of November and what followed. Also, Human Rights activist Mahmoud Lemaadel asserted that Morocco had launched a brutal crackdown on Western Sahara's civil society (Osman 2021).

During March, Morocco reinforced the security and detection system on the East-West side of the Military Wall. They would also suspend diplomatic relations with Germany, starting on the 1st of March. This was due to Berlin's request of the previous month of December.

The major event of this month was the AU Peace and Security Council meeting on the 9th of March. For the first time, on a statement made on the 18th, the AU would reverse its decision, made in 2019, to only assist the UN-led process and reactivate its role as mediator, to try to reach a political solution for the conflict. The AU would also urge the UNSG to request the UNLC provide a legal opinion on opening consulates in occupied Western Sahara. Meanwhile, the US urged the UNSG to speed up the appointment of the new PESG.

⁵¹ ELPS is the official name of the SADR Armed Forces

⁵² 27 in total

The first recorded use of unmanned aerial vehicles⁵³, as a combat weapon, was documented on the 6th of April. Morocco launched a drone strike within the Tifariti region, another UN-controlled zone, killing POLISARIO gendarmerie chief Addah al-Bendir (International Crisis Group 2024). However, there are conflicting reports about the actual date. The SPS was the source of the information, and despite it being short-lived, it was picked up by other news outlets. Le Monde reported that he died between the 7th and the 8th. This news was then picked up by the Spanish ABC, reporting the same (Le Monde and Agence France-Presse 2021; ABC 2021). According to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project,⁵⁴ the first UAV strike was on the 3rd of April (ACLED (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project) 2025). Regardless of the dates, one thing is clear among all sources: this was the first time that Morocco used UAVs (Escola de Cultura de Pau 2022, 97).

On the precious day, the 5th of April, Senegal opened its consulate in Dakhla, in the occupied Western Sahara. On the UNSG side, the focus was on nominating a new Envoy. POLISARIO rejected Luis Amado, a former Portuguese Foreign Minister. Staffan de Mistura would be indicated by the end of the month. Being accepted by POLISARIO on the 20th of May.

In the meantime, the UNSC on the 21st of April, failed to adopt a US-draft that would call for a speed-up of the nomination of a new Envoy. Spain would reveal, on the 26th of May, that Brahim Ghali, SADR President and POLISARIO Front Secretary-General, had been treated for COVID-19 in Spain since April (Escola de Cultura de Pau 2022, 98). This led to the heightening of tensions between Rabat and Madrid (Swissinfo (SWI) 2021). Morocco would prove its willingness to use migrants and refugees as retaliation. By allowing more than 9000 migrants and refugees into Ceuta in mid-May, Morocco demonstrates the danger of the externalisation of migration policies in Europe (Escola de Cultura de Pau 2022, 98).

On the 1st of June, as indicated by Madrid, Brahim Ghali would testify before the Spanish High Court, on accusations of alleged crimes of genocide and torture. The court would

⁵³ UAV or drone

⁵⁴ ACLED

allow him to leave the country, and on the 2nd of June, he would arrive in Algiers. On October 4, 2021, Judge Santiago Pedraz of Spain's National Court officially closed the genocide case against Polisario leader Brahim Ghali without prosecution, ruling that the alleged acts—spanning from 1974 to 1990—had already expired under the applicable 1973 Criminal Code. He also noted that the evidence presented lacked sufficient specificity and consistency to substantiate a genocide charge (Comunicación Poder Judicial 2021).

The following month of July saw a new low point in the relations between Algeria and Morocco, and increased pressure on Morocco. At the start of the month, on the 1st of July, UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders Mary Lawlor pressed Morocco to stop criminalising Human Rights Activists, especially those working on issues related to Western Sahara. The Special Rapporteur denounced “cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment and torture” of imprisoned activists (International Crisis Group 2024). Calling attention to also Sultana Khaya,⁵⁵ who was under siege for over one year in her house, being repeatedly attacked and raped. Her sister, mother and the small children of her sister were also victims of violence during this period, living in the same house (Amnesty International 2021a).

Several cases involving Saharawi prisoners have been thoroughly reviewed by the Committee Against Torture, which has issued binding decisions in CAT/C/72/D/871/2018, CAT/C/72/D/923/2019, CAT/C/74/891/2018 and CAT/C/75/D/999/2020 concerning, respectively, Sidi Abdallah Abbahah, Mohamed Bourial, Abdeljalil Laaroussi, and Mohamed Bani. These decisions affirm the existence of torture and inhuman treatment, and call for effective remedies, including immediate medical care, cessation of ongoing abuse, and relocation closer to families and have follow-up communications to date without change in their conditions and in some cases increased harassment after the end of the ceasefire.

Likewise, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention⁵⁶ has issued clear and consistent opinions—most notably A/HRC/27/48/Add.5 and A/HRC/WGAD/2023/23—concluding

⁵⁵ Under house arrest since November 2020

⁵⁶ WGAD

that the detention of all members of the Gdeim Izik group is arbitrary under international law.

Amnesty International, on the 19th of July, reported 22 cases of human rights violations by Morocco against the Sahrawi Activists and the increase and intensification of the repression against the Sahrawi population in the occupied territories.

On the political side, on the 14th of July, on a virtual Non-Aligned Movement⁵⁷ meeting, Ramtane Lamamra⁵⁸, asked for an acceleration of the nomination of a new PESG. Omar Hilale⁵⁹, on the same day, incited the Kabylia region, especially the Amazigh, to request their right to self-determination. This ended with Algiers recalling its ambassador to Morocco on the 18th of July.

August saw the breakdown of diplomatic relations between Algeria and Morocco on the 24th of August. This was processed by a protest by the SADR Representative in Spain, Abdulah Arabi, on the 7th of August. The airline company Binter Canarias is restarting its commercial flights to the occupied Western Sahara, violating International Law⁶⁰. On the 27th of August, the UNSG appointed Alexander Ivanko as the new head of MINURSO. The month ended with the opening of the Sierra Leone consulate in Dakhla on the 30th of August.

The continuation of souring of the Morocco-Algeria diplomatic relations prolonged throughout September. On the 22nd of September, Algiers closed its airspace to any Moroccan aeroplanes. Both countries' Foreign Ministers will exchange words at the UNGA on the 27th of September. However, the month would start with the final green light from Morocco for the nomination of Staffan de Mistura as PESG for Western Sahara. Nonetheless, it ended with the EU Court of Justice annulling the EU-Morocco Agriculture and Fishing Agreements on the 29th of September (Western Sahara Resource Watch (WSWR) 2025). This agreement allowed goods produced in Western Sahara to be exported to the EU, which is illegal under international law. Any goods exported by any territory must be done with the full agreement of its population. Western Sahara is not

⁵⁷ NAM

⁵⁸ Algeria Foreign Minister

⁵⁹ Morocco Permanent Representative to the UN

⁶⁰ Any commercial enterprise or economic activity within Western Sahara must have the consent of the Sahrawi.

part of Morocco. Western Sahara's legal representative is the POLISARIO Front. Therefore, any commercial trade or natural resource exploitation agreement must be done with the POLISARIO Front.

The month of October was marked with renewal of the MINURSO mandate by the UNSC for one more year, on the 29th and the appointment of Steffan de Mistura as the new PESG on the 6th. On the 27th, the Crisis Group, citing ACLED, reported Moroccan strikes against POLISARIO in Tifariti and El Mahabes (International Crisis Group 2024). Also of note is the continuation of the tension between Rabat and Algiers. The latter accused the former of an attack that killed an Algerian soldier on the 13th in the Tlemcen province, near the border. The ACLED database (2025) indicates that there was a Remote explosive/landmine/IED⁶¹ on the 9th, which exposed seventeen civilians.

The UAV strikes continued in November. An attack on the 3rd of November would kill three Algerians (France24 2021). Between the 14th and 15th, in the SADR Miyek area, a UAV would kill eleven civilians. On the political spectrum, Mohammed VI would not accept the decision of the EU Court of Justice⁶², refusing to sign any commercial or economic deal that would not include Western Sahara (International Crisis Group 2024). SADR nominated Mohamed Wali Akeik as the Chief of Staff of the ELPS.

The year would end with the SADR's withdrawal from the UN negotiations in Switzerland in early December. The reason for the present silence of the UN on the Moroccan repression in the occupied Western Sahara is that it would only accept AU-Bilateral negotiations. In 2021 (Amnesty International 2021a), Amnesty International would divulge the Pegasus Scandal (Amnesty International 2022). Its research discovered that after normalising relations with Israel, Morocco would use the malware developed by an Israeli company to spy on high Algerian officials, Sahrawi Officials and Sahrawi Human Rights activists (Escola de Cultura de Pau 2022, 98). This conflict also brought an important dimension: the galvanisation of the youth. For years, the youth claimed that

⁶¹ ACLED codes this type of event as “[...] sub-event type is used when remotely- or victim-activated devices are detonated in the absence of any other engagement. Examples include landmines, IEDs — whether alone or attached to a vehicle, or any other sort of remotely detonated or triggered explosive. Unexploded ordnances (UXO) also fall under this category.” (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) 2023)

⁶² The fifth time that this Court would declare this agreement illegal.

the only solution was the resort to arms. So, the youth from the Diaspora started to concentrate in the refugee camps as soon as POLISARIO declared the end of the Ceasefire (Moreno 2020; López 2024).

1.9. 2022

The new PESG started 2022 with a tour of the region to gather support for a new round of negotiations. On the 13th of January, he meets with Nasser Bourita, the Foreign Minister of Morocco, in Rabat. Three days later, on the 16th of January, in the Refugee Camps, PESG met with Brahim Ghali. On the 17th of January, he meets with the Ould Ghazouani, the Mauritanian President, in Nouakchott. Finally, on the 19th of January, in Algiers, I met with Ramtane Lamamra, Algerian Foreign Minister. Despite his efforts, the new year brought no de-escalation of the conflict. On the contrary, Morocco increased the utilisation of UACV. Attacking and killing in areas that are under UN supervision (Verdier 2022). Brahim Ghali was re-elected for another term as Secretary-General of POLISARIO during the sixteenth Congress of POLISARIO.

The UACV continued throughout January and February. The Kingdom representative stated, on the 14th of February, that they would only participate in round-table negotiations, with Algeria as a party to the conflict, and that its autonomy plan was the best solution (International Crisis Group 2024). POLISARIO reported killing eleven Moroccan soldiers on the 11th of February. The PESG held a meeting with the US Secretary of State, Anthony Blinken, on the 3rd of February.

March was one of the most important months in terms of political events. A vote condemning Russia for its invasion of Ukraine was held during the UNGA on the 2nd of March. Morocco missed the vote, and Algeria abstained on the 18th of March. Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez publicly and officially endorses the Moroccan Autonomy Plan (International Crisis Group 2024). Despite being part of the conflict, this marked the end of the country's neutrality.

Following these public endorsements, Pedro Sánchez officially visited Mohammed VI in Rabat on the 7th of April. A political plan was announced to normalise relations between the two countries. POLISARIO responded on the 9th of April by suspending relations with Spain. Meanwhile, on the 12th of April, Algiers accused Rabat of killing three Algerian

civilians on the 10th of April with a UCAV strike. The month ended with a hearing of the new PESG by the UNSC in a closed-door meeting and with the announcement of another tour of the region on the 20th of April.

May saw two more governments following in the footsteps of Spain, the Netherlands and Turkey, all on the 11th of May. On the 12th of May, however, the latter clarified its position by adding that this recognition would only extend to internationally recognised borders. Previously, on the 7th of May, the POLISARIO representative in Spain, Abdullah Arabi, asked Pedro Sánchez to rectify his position on the Western Sahara conflict.

In June, the relations between Spain and Algeria reached a new low. Algeria suspended the 2002 treaty of friendship and cooperation, followed by the halting of bilateral cooperation on the 8th and 9th of June. On the 9th of June, a group of NGOs and lawyers filed complaints with the UN Committee Against Torture⁶³ against Morocco. The PESG cancelled the tour for July. POLISARIO on the 4th of July accused Rabat of interference, while media outlets stated that Morocco imposes limits on the actions of the PESG and on its planned schedule. On the 29th of July, Mohammed VI directly mentioned the recognition of Israel of the Kingdom's sovereignty over Western Sahara.

The month of August brought another political shift. Morocco's King publicly appealed to the international community to support the Autonomy Plan on the 20th of August. POLSARIO affirmed, on the 22nd of August, that with the legal status of Western Sahara clearly defined, it is a different and separate country from Morocco. On the 26th of August, the Tunisian President Saïed met with the SADR President Brahim Ghali. On the same day, Morocco recalled its Ambassador to Tunisia. On the 27th of August, citing that Tunisia held a neutral position on the conflict, it recalled its Ambassador to Morocco. Another event worth mentioning happened on the 24th of August. Due to problems with funding for the World Food Program, the UN team in Algeria alerted the possibility that the refugee camps in Algeria had their food rations cut by 75%; therefore, the refugees were on the verge of severe food security and malnutrition.

Two apparent U-turns happened in September. On the 14th of September, the new President of Kenya used Twitter to announce the retraction of the country's recognition

⁶³ UNCAT

of the SADR. However, the Tweet would be deleted, and on the 16th of September, the Foreign Minister of Kenya would later clarify that the country's position had not changed. Meanwhile, Pedro Sánchez, on the 22nd of September, would backtrack on his March position, saying that Spain was in favour of a mutually acceptable political solution. The PESG met with the President of SADR, Brahim Ghali and the POLISARIO UN Representative, Sidi Mohamed Omar, in Tindouf on the 3rd and 4th of September. The meeting was held in preparation for the UNSC meeting about the Western Sahara, which will be held next month.

October began with the UNSG releasing its annual report on the situation of Western Sahara (S/2022/733). Where it was confirmed, the attacks claimed by POLISARIO were classified as a low-intensity conflict, with most of the incidents concentrated in El Mahabes. The conflict had a direct effect on MINURSO, forcing it to implement measures, such as maintaining a safe distance from the zones with live fire to the west of the military wall.

This report also confirmed the possibility of the Moroccan drone strikes. Being only able to confirm the existence of casualties in one case, Mijek. However, a MINURSO team, including a Mines Action Expert, visited the Bir Lahlou site. In there, they found

"[...] two trucks with Algerian licence plates parked parallel to each other, which had suffered extensive damage and charring. Shrapnel was found in the truck that appeared to have been hit. Observation by MINURSO suggested that the trucks were transporting fuel and that the damage was caused by the explosion of an air-to-ground projectile and the resulting fire. [...]" (S/2022/733, 1-2)

Morocco denied ever targeting civilians. However, regarding the Mauritania UCAV strike, Morocco claimed that they were POLISARIO men disguised as civilians, and that they had all the right. The mandate of MINURSO would be extended for another year during the UNSC meeting.

UNSG would meet with Mohammed VI in Rabat on the 23rd of November. During the meeting, the Moroccan King would stress that the Western Sahara conflict should be treated within the "national" integrity of the Kingdom (International Crisis Group 2024).

The year of 2020 would end with an UK court declaring legal an economic trade agreement between the UK and Morocco (HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE OF ENGLAND AND WALES KING'S BENCH DIVISION ADMINISTRATIVE COURT 2021), on the 5th of December and with France Foreign Minister declaring support for the Morocco Autonomy Plan, declaring it was the most credible proposal, on the 16th of December.

1.10. 2023

The fourth year of the conflict began with the news that Morocco was pressuring Israel. The Kingdom asked for the latter recognition of the former, over the sovereignty of Western Sahara. In exchange, Morocco would open an embassy in Tel Aviv. This was on the 4th of January. Twelve days later, on the 16th of January, Aziz Akhannouch, Morocco's Prime Minister, declared to L'Opinion that France could no longer be just an observer. On the 13th of January, this would be preceded by the speech of Mandla Mandela, Nelson Mandela's Grandson, on the opening ceremony of the African Nations Championship. In the speech, he called for the liberation of Africa's last colony, Western Sahara.

Brahim Ghali was re-elected on the 20th of January as the Secretary General of the POLISARIO Front and as President of the SADR during the 16th Congress of the POLISARIO. He won an election against Bechir Mustapha Sayed.

Joseph Borell, EU Foreign Policy Chief, on the 17th of February, declared that he had no information on the claim that POLISARIO were working with another known terrorist group in the SAHEL. He also said no evidence of humanitarian aid diversion from the refugee camps. On the previous day of 14th February, Brahim Ghali proceeded to restructure the SADR Government⁶⁴. SADR and Algeria, on one side, and Morocco, on the other, blocked the nomination of a former representative as VP of an AU bureau during the AU Summit held in Addis Ababa, between the 18th and 19th of February. These three events were the highlights of the second month of 2023.

The preparation for the April meeting of the UNSC marked March. With the PESG, Staffan de Mistura is inviting the Parties in Conflict and Concerned Parties to informal

⁶⁴ Foreign Minister Mohamed Ould Salek was replaced by Mohamed Sidati; Merlem Saleck Hamada was nominated as Interior Minister; Bechir Mustapha Sayed was removed of his role as presidential adviser

bilateral consultations. Nevertheless, the main political event was the deterioration of the Moroccan-Algerian relations. In late February, the Bahija Simou, the director of the Moroccan Royal Archives, declared that both Western Sahara and the Eastern Sahara were part of Morocco. Eastern Sahara is the Tindouf region of Algeria. On the 15th of March, Saïd Chengriha, the Algerian Army Chief of Staff, said Algeria would not allow its national sovereignty to be threatened; on the 21st of March, Algeria's President, in an interview with Al Jazeera, said that the bilateral relations were at a point of no return. After months of tense talks, MINURSO was able to resupply its teams operating in the liberated areas of Western Sahara between April 5 and 7. Meanwhile, the PESG held talks with the Concerning Parties in the Conflict, with Permanent Members of the UNSC⁶⁵, France, the US, the UK, and Russia, and with Spain, between the 3rd and 10th of April. The UNSC meet on the 19th of April.

May of 2023 was marked by the attempts of the US to give momentum to the PESG work. On the 14th of May, the US Secretary of State and the Moroccan Foreign Minister, Nasser Bourita, held a phone conversation on the issue. The US Ambassador to Algeria, Elizabeth Moore Aubin, meets with the Algerian Foreign Ministry's Secretary-General, Amar Belani, in Algiers in mid-May.

June marked the stabilisation of Morocco-Israel relations. On the 8th of June, Amir Ohana, Israel's Parliament Speaker, declared that Israel was working on recognising Morocco's sovereignty over Western Sahara during his visit to Morocco. There were plans to upgrade the liaison offices to full embassies and the possibility of free trade agreements. During the month, there was an incident on the Foos Bucraa conveyor belt. Reportedly, there was an explosion, but neither party to the conflict have either claimed it or blamed the other.

On the 17th of July, Israel formally recognised Morocco's claim over Western Sahara. This ultimately led to the normalisation of the two countries' relations. Tel Aviv officially appointed a military attaché to Rabat. Algiers criticised this on the 20th of July, while Mohammed VI congratulated the move on the 29th of July. Also, on the 17th of July, the

⁶⁵ P5

EU-Morocco fishing deal officially expired. Its renewal becomes part of a legal decision by the European Union Court of Justice, because it includes Western Sahara.

Brahim Ghali attended a BRICS meeting in South Africa between 22nd and 24th of August 2023. On the 31st of August, up to the 4th of September, Joshua Harris, the US Deputy Assistant Secretary for North Africa, visited Algeria, Morocco and met Brahim Ghali. His objective was to revive the peace process. Meanwhile, the PESG began its first visit to the Occupied Western Sahara.

October was marked with the annual renewal of MINURSO by the UNSC on the 30th of October and by the release of the UNSG Report on Western Sahara on the 3rd of October. However, again, the report confirms the attacks done by POLISARIO (S/2023/729). Due to this fact, MINURSO could not entirely conduct its monitoring role. However

“[...] At the request of the Royal Moroccan Army and with their escort, since November 2022 MINURSO has visited sites adjacent to the berm where such incidents were alleged to have taken place, and in several cases observed traces of exploded mortar ammunition. Owing to security concerns, these visits often took place several days after the alleged event, making reaching conclusive findings challenging. [...]” (S/2023/729, 1)

After being reported to MINURSO by POLISARIO or social media, investigators were sent to investigate the alleged Moroccan UACV strikes. The President of SADR sent another letter to the UNSG, where he affirmed the usage, by Morocco, of UACV to target civilians. Morocco’s Permanent Representative to the UN responded in a letter as well. He said that POLSARIO were using soldiers disguised as civilians and unmarked vehicles. However, according to the UNSG recount, Morocco did not deny the usage of UACV. Between the 28th and the 29th of October, four explosions happened in occupied Smara. This was claimed by POLISARIO, citing that they had attacked military targets. However, one civilian died and three others were injured. On the 15th of November, Morocco's Foreign Minister, Nasser Bourita, claimed that a formal investigation was underway because a new round of attacks hit Smara on the 5th of November. The result of the report would be the basis of Morocco's official response to POLISARIO.

The year ended with a new visit by the US. Deputy Assistant Secretary for North Africa, Joshua Harris. With the tension rising in Gaza, the US feared an escalation of the

Western Sahara conflict. So, on the 7th of December, Joshua Harris met with the Algerian Foreign Minister Ahmed Attaf in Algiers. On the 17th of December, I met with the Moroccan Foreign Minister Nasser in Rabat. On the 31st of December, a possible Moroccan UCAV strike killed three Mauritanian civilians in the Guerguerat, a UN-controlled DMZ.

1.11. 2024

At the beginning of 2024, the Spanish newspaper, La Razón, on the 16th of January, reported that Moroccan Heavy Artillery were being deployed and moving around in Bir Guendouz, a UN-controlled DMZ. Local news speculated that Morocco was on the verge of a limited military operation against POLISARIO or trying to take over the DMZ.

Meanwhile, as a retaliatory strike for the killing of its three civilians, Mauritania increased its customs duties on the 1st of January. Furthermore, on the 10th of January, Morocco obtained the chairmanship of the UN Human Rights Council, against the protest of South Africa and Algeria.

February was marked by two key issues: the PESG visit to South Africa, which provoked an angry reaction from Rabat, and the statement of Mansur Omar, the POLISARIO Front representative to the EU.

On the 3rd of February, Rabat condemned the PESG visit to South Africa because it did not want the intervention of South Africa, a key supporter of the POLISARIO Front. On the 10th of February, Mansur Omar told Nueva Revolución, a Spanish left-wing outlet, that POLISARIO were trying to contain the conflict against Morocco. This directly contradicts what Brahim Ghali said in January 2023, at the end of the POLISARIO Congress. This statement created a backlash from part of the POLISARIO that wants to escalate the conflict.

On the 10th of March, with the looming transfer of the airspace management of Western Sahara from Spain to Morocco, the POLISARIO Front representative in Geneva, threatened with legal action. This would be another breach of international law. On the 21st of March, the Advocate General of the EU Court of Justice said that the Morocco-EU fishing agreement failed to safeguard Western Sahara. Western Sahara is a separate country from Morocco; therefore, the agreement failed to consider the needs and

agreement of the Western Sahara population. So, the case should be sent to the Lower courts so that more information and opinions can be gathered before the court's final decision.

The month of April began with the news that France was preparing to invest, by financially supporting Moroccan projects, in the Occupied Western Sahara. This drew the criticism of POLISARIO on the 6th of April. Despite meetings of PESG with the Moroccan Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita on the 4th of April, with the POLSARIO Front representative to the UN, Sidi Omar, on the 15th of April, and with Algerian Foreign Minister Ahmed Attaf, on the 16th of April, nothing was achieved. Morocco would not consider anything outside its Autonomy Plan. Both POLISARIO and Algeria defended their positions on the right of self-determination. Also on the 16th of April, the UNSC held another closed-door meeting on Western Sahara.

During a UN decolonisation committee meeting in Caracas, Venezuela, between the 14th and the 16th of May, the Algerian UN Representative, Amar Bendjema, declared in favour of the right of self-determination of the Sahrawi. In response, Morocco's UN Representative, Omar Hilale, said his country favoured the Berber community's right to self-determination. POLISARIO said that they hit another set of Military targets near Smara, 12km from the city, inside the occupied Western Sahara, on the 18th of May. Morocco confirmed the attacks, but said the zone was empty. On the 23rd of May, at least thirty UK lawmakers signed an open letter. In this letter, they called on the UK to support the Moroccan Autonomy Plan.

During June, Moroccan media claimed that a video where, allegedly, some exposures to the conveyor belt can be seen, was caused by POLISARIO. Neither Morocco nor POLISARIO claimed the latter caused the event. This event was claimed by a pro-POLISARIO movement on the 4th of June.

The growing dissatisfaction with POLISARIO leadership marked July. On the 6th of July, Oubi Bouchraya, POLISARIO representative in Geneva, on a social media platform, to criticise POLISARIO, alerted to the growing dissatisfaction in the camps. Also, Bachir Moustafa, on the 7th of July, asked the General Congress to intervene publicly. He is the brother of Bechir Mustapha Sayed, who lost to Brahim Ghali, and his reason for this

request is the need to increase the attacks against Morocco. In camps, on the 16th of July, one hundred ELPS soldiers laid down their weapons in front of Brahim Ghali in Rabuni, as a signal of protest against some military personnel appointments. The month ended with the publication of an alleged letter from Emmanuel Macron to the King of Morocco. In this letter, which was made public on the 30th of May by Moroccan officials and not by French entities⁶⁶, the French President claimed that the Autonomy Plan of Morocco was the only credible basis for a solution in the region. This supposed letter was, either way, condemned by the POLISARIO Front and strained the relations between France and Algeria.

In August, the fallout of the French letter continued to develop. However, Chad opened a consulate in Dakhla on the 14th of August, and the Dominican Republic announced that it intends to open a consulate on the 17th of August. On the SADR side, the POLISARIO ambassador to Algeria, Abdelkader Taleb Omar, declared on the 5th of August that the French letter had no legal stance. Meanwhile, Lamine Baali, the SADR Representative to the AU, attended the AU African development summit in Japan on the 23rd of August. This led to a fray between the Moroccan and Algerian representatives. Moroccan media outlets tried to create a misinformation campaign during September. On the 3rd of September, those outlets claimed that the brother of the founder of POLISARIO had stepped down from his position as a presidential advisor to challenge Brahim Ghali. On the 18th of September, a group of Sahrawi merchants protested in Rabuni. They wanted the reopening of the trade routes with Mauritania and Algeria, which had been closed since the beginning of the conflict.

In October, POLISARIO claimed a significant victory as the European Court of Justice ruled the Fishing Agreement between the European Commission and Morocco to be illegal, on the basis that the right of self-determination of the Sahrawi was breached. Morocco was illegally trading goods obtained in Western Sahara, without the Sahrawi consent. These products should be labelled as coming from Western Sahara and not Morocco. The European Commission, on the same day, on the 4th of October, noted that

⁶⁶ As this was an official letter from the presidency of France to the King of Morocco, it should be able to be found on the official French Presidency Web site. However, this letter cannot be found.

decision, but would not drop the bilateral relations with Morocco. While POLISARIO called it a historic and important achievement, Morocco criticised the decision, demanding that the bilateral relations between the kingdom and the EU be preserved. The most important event, however, was the presentation of the partition plan of Western Sahara by the PESG on the 16th of October, during another closed-door meeting of the UNSC. The PESG said three possible solutions to the conflict were the Moroccan Autonomy Plan, the POLISARIO Plan, and the Partition of Western Sahara. During this meeting, the PESG also asked the UNSG to assess the utility of the PESG's position if no progress was made in the next six months. On the 31st of October, the UNSC renewed MINURSO's mandate for another year.

A series of key incidents marked November 2024. On the 9th of November, POLISARIO fired rockets against El Mahabes. In return, Morocco launched a series of UCAV strikes against POLISARIO. French Ambassador Christophe Lecourtier visited El Aaiún and Dakhla on the 12th and 13th of November. On the 21st of November, Panama suspended the recognition of the SADR.

The military operations continue to this date; however, as we have stated, we would recount the first four years of the conflict, from the 13th of November 2020 to the 12th of November 2024.

1.12. The Stakeholders Analysis- A Triad masked as a Dyad

Identifying the Actors is one of the most crucial parts of any conflict. Morocco, SADR and Spain are in direct conflict, or the Parties to the Conflict. The concerned parties are Algeria and Mauritania. The Third Parties are the US, France, UAE, Israel, Saudi Arabia, the UN and the AU. We can also count the EU, NATO and the Arab League as Third Parties to the Conflict (**Heatmap 1** and **Table 3**).

This conflict is a one-of-a-kind conflict. Despite all the contradictory information, Spain is still part of it; therefore, we have a triad, not a dyad. The main dyad is the SADR-Morocco dyad; they are the core of the conflict. Spain is still the de jure administrator of the UN and is responsible for decolonisation. However, Spain is avoiding its duty. Nevertheless, with no soldiers on the ground, one assumes that Spain would be a Third Party. However, Spain is the third party to the conflict because of its status and legal

standing. Thus, the Western Sahara conflict is marked by the triad: SADR-Morocco-Spain (**Figure 3**).

There is clearly direct interference by the Third Parties. France and the US play an important role, as they have direct influence over NATO, the EU, and the UN, as well as an indirect influence in the Arab League through the Gulf States (**Graphic 1**, **Graphic 2** and **Graphic 3**). Also, by looking at the SIPRI Weapons Trade Database (**Table 2**), we see that the USA and France are the two biggest weapons suppliers to Morocco, having between them 72,05% of the total of weapons export to the Kingdom (**Graphic 1**). The Gulf States financed many of the weapons purchased by Morocco. However, these numbers do not tell the whole story, as many weapons are transferred as gifts or straight loans (Hodges 1983b, 293-306; Shelley 2004, 46).

The relation between Morocco and Israel is long-standing (Shelley 2004). The former was the one who mediated the agreement that would later become the Camp David Agreement. Morocco has been one of the staunchest defenders of Israel, despite an official fallout. With the normalisation of relations in 2020, Israel

“[...] has become one of Morocco's most important suppliers of military equipment and technology, including attack, surveillance and reconnaissance drones, and even suicide drones. For the acquisition of these innovative devices, Morocco is counting on the traditional financial support of Arab monarchies, which are reportedly covering the costs of these purchases.”(Sahrawi Mine Action Coordination Office (SMACO) 2023, 4)

Algeria and UA are their many support pillars on the SADR side of the equation. We can also see that, while part of the triad, Spain is trying to neglect their role by actively supporting Morocco. There is a broken political connection between Algeria and Morocco. The latter insists this is an issue with Algeria, while the former defends it is an issue between SADR and Morocco, and a clear-cut case of self-determination.

In essence, the conflict is an asymmetric power conflict. On one side, we have a Nation, on the other, a Liberation Movement. Morocco is the one with the most power in this conflict. In terms of political alliances and the capability of buying military equipment. Its allies, France and the US, have sway over the UNSC; they are P5 members.

1.13. The Conflict Tree

The Western Sahara conflict tree can be seen in **Figure 2**. The core problem identified throughout our study is the restart of the conflict in Western Sahara. As roots causes, we have identified the Moroccan political manoeuvres impeding the realization of the Self-determination referendum; the continuation of the illegal occupation and settlers transfer to Western Sahara by Morocco; the inaction of MINURSO; third party interference in favour of Morocco (USA and France); the ethnic cleansing and continued violations of the Sahrawi Human rights; illegal extraction of Western Sahara natural resources.

The trigger that ignited the conflict was the events of the 13th of November 2020. Within the first four years, we have measured the following consequences: reinforcement of campaigns of disinformation, misinformation and fake news about Western Sahara, POLISARIO Front, the conflict and about the Moroccan occupation of the territory; further destabilisation of the region; environmental degradation; increase attacks against civilians (inside the occupied territory, on the liberated areas and on neighbouring countries) by Morocco, through the utilization of UCAV; further degradation of all root causes.

1.14. Dynamics

1. Interaction Patterns

- a. Moroccan provocations, human rights violations and utilisation of UCAV; settlers transfer to the Occupied Western Sahara
- b. Mutual accusations of Human Rights Violations
- c. Morocco's insistence that SADR does not exist, and this is a conflict with Algeria
- d. Block access to the Occupied Western Sahara for independent journalists and Human Rights Groups
- e. No formal means of communication between the Parties to the Conflict; heavy use of Propaganda by Morocco

2. Escalation

- a. Illegal occupation of more SADR land by Morocco
 - b. Attack against peaceful Sahrawi Protesters by the FAR or the use of UCAV
 - c. International Community and Organisations Inaction/Complacency
- 3. Behaviour Cycles
 - a. Moroccan military incursion into SADR territory and attack against ELPS military personnel or land grab → MINURSO Inaction/complacency → Response by POLISARIO Front
- 4. Emotional Influences
 - a. Collective trauma heavily influences Sahrawi, as they live in refugee camps, suffered Napalm and white phosphorus attacks; continue human rights violations, sexual assault and torture
- 5. External Influences
 - a. International pressure on Morocco is nonexistent; quite the contrary, there is covert support, under the guise of neutrality, by the US and open support by France
 - b. Natural Resources are a key component as well, as Clean Energy facilities
- 6. Power and Control Mechanisms
 - a. Territory is divided into two parts, 80% controlled by Morocco, 20% controlled by SADR
 - b. Morocco uses military and para-military forces to intimidate, torture and create the forced disappearance of Sahrawi, especially Human Rights Activists
- 7. Resolution/Obstruction Strategies
 - a. The active distrust of international institutions, like the UN, by the Sahrawi, makes the negotiation difficult.
 - b. Morocco is actively blocking any action that leads to the realisation of the Self-determination referendum; actively blocking the Committee for Decolonisation

- c. Shadow support of the US, active support by France and Israel, prevents any UNSC resolution from being upheld or applied. France and the US are P5

1.15. Causations

This conflict continues to exist for two reasons:

- 1) The necrosis of international law (Lourenço 2025)
- 2) Morocco's control of important natural resources and human resources, like phosphates, fishing banks and migration routes to Europe and out of Africa

Morocco is the blocking force, as it wants the official consolidation of its control of the Territory, the fait accompli policy. To keep control of the Occupied Western Sahara and to create tension with Algeria. Also, not recognising POLISARIO, the existence of the conflict and maintaining the narrative of a dissident group trying to break the National cohesion, has artificially prolonged the conflict. Morocco's allies also had direct implications for the conflict. The US and France are P5 members with Veto Power, meaning they can actively block and nullify any UNSC resolution that would pressure Morocco, as it happened in the past. This is further illustrated by **Graphic 1**, **Graphic 2** and **Erro! A origem da referência não foi encontrada.** and **Graphic 3**.

1.16. Options Strategies

Upholding the Self-determination referendum and direct sanctions and political pressure on Morocco and its allies are the only possible strategy to end the conflict.

2. The 3rd Phase of the conflict: a detailed view of the data

2.1. The Theatre of Operations: Western Sahara – The Data

To understand a conflict, one must first understand the Theatre of Operations where the events will unfold. What type of terrain is the Theatre? What type of manoeuvres does it favour?

“Over the years, the geographical characteristics of the northern part of Western Sahara have facilitated guerrilla attacks against security forces, providing cover for insurgent movements and small, scattered base areas. Also in the north, the Ouarkiz Mountains have provided similar opportunities for hiding. [...] Although not as conducive to guerrilla activities, the flat, sparsely populated regions to the south are so vast that they have proved difficult for government forces—whether French, Spanish, Mauritanian, or Moroccan—to control fully, even with the benefits of airpower.” (Jensen 2013, 5-6)

For this analysis we will start with the chronological data ensued by the geographical data: mega-level; macro-level and meso-level. At the mega-level, we will present the general data of all the attacks to give a more holistic view of the first four years. Subsequently, we will see the data by semester and finally by month. Afterwards, we will discuss the data based on what happened for each MR at the macro-level and sequentially the meso-level. We will finish by looking at the data at the micro-level. Totalling four levels of analysis

2.2. The Chronological Analysis

For the analysis part of the present dissertation, as shown in **Table 4**, the data were collected during a longitudinal study of the 3rd phase of the Western Sahara Conflict. The period of analysis encapsulates the first four years. It started on the 13th of November 2020 and ended on the 12th of November 2024. A total of 744 war communiques, covering 48 months, 210 weeks and 1457 days were analysed (see Appendix 11 - **Table 4**).

During this period, 4437 events were registered (**Table 11**). As we have mentioned, the first day of the new conflict phase was the 13th of November 2020; therefore, the period between the 13th of November 2020 and the 12th of November 2021 is considered Year 1. Hence, maintaining the exact dates, we can establish that Year 2 is between the 13th of November 2021 and the 12th of November 2022, Year 3 is between the 13th of November 2022 and the 12th of November 2023, Year 4 is between the 13th of November 2023 and the 12th of November 2024 (**Table 12**).

The numbers show that Year 1 had the most registered events, with 1808 events. During that year, when an event was registered, the minimum number of events registered was

1, and the maximum events registered in a single day was 4. The year with the most events registered in a single day was year 2, with 16 events (**Table 12**). Observing the monthly prism, we see that only months 1, 2, and 23 had events above the 200-event mark (**Table 12**)

Overall, we can denote a downward trend in the number of events registered during the analysis (**Graphic 4**). Also, we have noted a continuous rise in the number of days on which Non-Events occurred (**Table 14**). In the first year, Event Days occur 97.3% of the time, while in the last year, Non-Event Days occur 57,7% (**Table 14** and **Table 15**).

When we look at the seasons, we see that most events are registered between autumn and winter. However, they are all evenly spread out. Thus, there is no specific pattern to the ELPS attacks against the Moroccan Military Wall (**Table 16**, **Table 17** and **Graphic 6**).

2.3. The Geographical Analysis

2.4. Mega-Level: Occupied Western Sahara

At the Mega-level, as we have mentioned, S1 and S2 are located within Morocco. Considering this, we can synthesise the data as shown in **Table 18** and in **Graphic 8**.

Of the 4437 attacks registered over the analysis period, 47 occurred within C01, while 4390 occurred within C02. Most of the events occurred in Occupied Western Sahara (C02), an unsurprising 98,94% of the events (**Table 19**).

Again, we see that the year with the most events registered, in both sublevels of the Mega-Level, was Year 1. In C01, 31 events were registered, while in C02, 1777 were registered. An overall comparison can be seen on **Map 6**

Diving deep into the military distribution of the events, we begin to see a more specific scenario. These results will be further analysed in the next chapter.

2.5. Macro-Level: The MRs

The Macro-Level comprises the three RM, MR1: Oued Daraa, MR2: Saguia El-Hamra and MR3: Rio de Oro. By looking at the data, we can confirm that year 1 of the conflict was the most attacked. We have registered 914 events in MR1, 507 in MR2, and 387 in MR3 (**Table 22**). MR1 was the most attacked MR, with 2363 events registered, representing

53.26% of the total events (**Table 23** and **Graphic 9**). We also confirm the downward tendency, with all MR showing significant drop-offs between years (**Graphic 10** and **Graphic 11**). **Map 7, Map 8, Map 9** and **Map 10** represents a systematization of the information.

2.6. Meso-Level: The Sectors

The last level of analysis is the Meso-Level, and here we find some interesting data. Of all sectors, the most attacked was S3-El Mahabes, which had 1761 out of the 4437 registered events. S3 represents 39.56% of all events during the analysis period (**Table 25, Graphic 12** and **Graphic 13**). Also, this Sector alone has more than events registered in MR2 and MR3 as a unit. The nearest ranking sector is S5 with 928 events. The difference between them is 833, meaning that the difference between S3 and S5 is roughly the combined number of events of the eight least attacked sectors, S6, S7, S8, S9, S10, S12 and S13, which would be 855 (**Table 24**). On the other spectrum, we could not register any events in S1. **Map 11, Map 12, Map 13** and **Map 14** represents a systematization of the information.

2.7. The UAV/UCAV question

A Drone can be defined as a terrestrial, naval or aerial vehicle that is either remotely or automatically operated by a human operator or a technological system. As a weapon, they are not a novelty, nor as a surveillance system or as a weapon. Any self-propelled grandee or ballistic missile is, in fact, a drone. They have been in use since WWI. The difference between the first generation and the newest is the range, operational capacity and the combination of the two possibilities, surveillance and attack.

The capacity to operate in every field, including desert, with access to high-resolution cameras and real-time broadcast of the feed, sensors, infrared and satellites, enhances their operational capacity to a high degree of precision. Thus, making them the perfect weapon system.

Returning to the Western Sahara Conflict, overall, by compiling multiple reports, what is clear is that, after the normalisation of relations with Israel, Morocco was able to procure UAVs. In December, they were on the verge of buying 4 General Atomic's MQ-

9B SeaGuardian from the US, and 12 Bayraktar TB2 Medium Altitude Long Endurance⁶⁷ UAVs with three ground control stations, technical and training support from the Bayraktar, a Turkish company. The Kingdom claims it only has intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance drones, not unmanned combat aerial vehicles⁶⁸. However, they have Heron 1⁶⁹, EADS Harfangs⁷⁰, Escadron Drones⁷¹ and possibly, General Atomics' Predator XP⁷² and Wing Loong 1⁷³. This, coupled with the fact that Morocco, in 2021, did not have manned-unmanned teaming⁷⁴ technology, a must to use combination attacks between fighter-jets or attack helicopters with ISR UAV, can only lead to one conclusion. The lack of this equipment helps to question the possibility of a UAV-F16 or UAV-AH64E helicopter attack as the first UAV attack, which gives more credence to an actual UCAV strike (Profazio 2021). One must recall that Morocco has a 35-year-long history of drone utilisation for ISR (Borsari 2021). Also, by looking at the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (2025), the first UAV purchase was in 1986, six units of the R4E Skyeeye from the US⁷⁵. This database registered the first actual UCAV purchase in 2020, three units of the Wing Loong-1. Purchased from the United Arab Emirates⁷⁶. This purchase was followed by twelve UCAV Bayraktar TB-2 units in 2021 from Turkey, and another six units. From Israel, ten units of ThunderB UAV, a small Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance UAV, which can transport a small payload up to 3.5kg. Many of these UAVs and UCAVs can be used for covert operations, as they are equipped with low acoustic emissions, thermal, visual and radar signatures technology and features. Moreover, like ThunderB, many have technology that protects against communication or GPS jamming.

⁶⁷ MALE

⁶⁸ UCAV

⁶⁹ Israeli Drone

⁷⁰ A French altered version of Heron

⁷¹ French Drone

⁷² The export version of the US MQ-1 Predator

⁷³ Chinese Drone

⁷⁴ MUN-T

⁷⁵ A ISR UAV, but can be retrofit to deliver chemicals, as it is widely used by the agriculture industry for pesticide spraying

⁷⁶ UAE

So, a question immediately comes forward: was this the first attack? Or, in fact, was the first reported attack?

Sahrawi Mine Action Coordination Office (SMACO) (2023) reports that Morocco has started to use UCAV heavily since the normalisation of political relations with Israel. They also report that most attacks were against civilians, in remote, desolate areas, with a clear line of sight, some being as far as 20km away from the military wall (6). The reported attacks happened in areas where the ELPS did not operate or had any presence. This led to the instillation of a fear environment, especially in the northern parts of the liberated areas (Tifariti, Mherizm Agueinit, Miyec and Bir Lehlu); 61% of the attacks happened near international borders (Sahrawi Mine Action Coordination Office (SMACO) 2023, 7). The rate of attacks increased between 2020 and 2023, where 73 UCAV strikes were registered (Sahrawi Mine Action Coordination Office (SMACO) 2024, 3; 2023, 10). Also, there is the possibility that Morocco uses thermobaric weapons. A thermobaric bomb is a dual-charge, vacuum bomb. The first charge disperses fuel, and the fuel mixes with the oxygen in the atmosphere. When the second charge detonates, it ignites the mix in the air, creating a vacuum response as the oxygen is sucked in, which results in a high-temperature explosion with a longer blast duration.

Conclusions

As we mentioned, a conflict is a dynamic system, with ever-changing pieces and cogs. Protracted intractable conflicts are an even more dynamic system. As they revolved around continuous cycles of oppression and violence followed by calm periods, emotion becomes key. This emotion transcends the barrier of time, being inherited through the generations. Although the phases of the cycles can be distinguished from one another, every single phase has its origins in the previous.

Since the 1975 Moroccan invasion of Western Sahara, the Sahrawi have lived under violent repression. As a Protracted intractable conflict is compressed into a system of following cycles. After a phase of extreme violence, 1975-1991, which we can designate

as the 1st phase, a relatively calm phase, 1991-2020. The new phase started with constructing the military wall, which divides the country into two halves.

This 2nd phase, however, as we have seen, and as it was expected, it was anything but calm. On paper, it is marked by the intense level of political negotiation. On the ground, however, it was everything but that. As the control over the Occupied Western Sahara settled in favour of Morocco, the Sahrawi population that was unable to leave the territory was the target of violent campaigns of oppression and repression. Morocco started an immediate campaign of terror against the population. At the same time, provoking the POLISARIO Front whenever they could. This period is also marked by an active political campaign favouring the Moroccan agenda and creating an ever-increasing distrust of the international institution.

The road was set. It was impossible to avert the restart of the conflict in the region. The only thing missing was a starting point or a trigger. After several near misses, on the 13th of November 2020, after a month of protest, another breach on the military wall in the DMZ, a group of Sahrawi protesters was violently attacked by the FAR. As the events were explained in the UNSG report, Morocco deliberately ignored the orders to reduce its military personnel in the DMZ. They did not just ignore the warnings but also increased the number of personnel and heavy military equipment. All the indicators were there. As the events unfolded on the 13th of November 2020, alongside the inaction of MINURSO and the international community, SADR was left with no other option than to declare the end of the cease-fire and resume the conflict. Five years have passed since that day, but the issue remains the same: difficulty in accessing information. After the 13th of November 2020 events, SPS started to publish RASD War Communiques, detailing the attacks against the Moroccan Military wall, being the only party to the conflict to do so. The Conflict can be summed up in one concept: low-intensity conflict (S/2022/733). MINURSO kept declaring that it had received unconfirmed reports of military incidents throughout the years, of both attacks against the military wall and unconfirmed UCAV attacks.

If we recall, a protracted intractable conflict is primarily constituted through phases of extreme violence, relative calm/diminution of the violent outbreaks without a complete

stop, followed by another phase of extreme violence. When we apply this logic to the Western Sahara Conflict, we see three phases: 1975-1991- 1st phase of the Conflict (extreme violence phase); 1991-2020- 2nd phase (Moroccan violence against civilians; political manoeuvrings- relative violence phase) and 2020-...- 3rd phase (restart of the conflict- extreme violence phase).

We have also seen that the 1st and 2nd phases directly influence the 3rd phase: the military wall began to be built during the 1st phase, but the crimes committed during this phase created both the narrative and memory at the core of the conflict. The 2nd phase deepened the narrative and the memory. The political moves made by Morocco, which blocked and halted the referendum, are the prime example. However, the long list of crimes committed by Morocco in the occupied territories also exacerbated the emotional aspect. A new phase of extreme violence was inevitable.

According to Escola de Cultura de Pau (2022), Rabat recognised that between November 2020 and August 2021, more than 1000 remote attacks were registered against the military wall. This report also states that at least 30 people were killed due to military activities.

Regarding the Human Rights Issue,

“Not only do human rights defenders working on issues related to human rights in Morocco and Western Sahara continue to be wrongfully criminalised for their legitimate activities, they receive disproportionately long prison sentences and whilst imprisoned, they are subjected to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment and torture [...] intimidation, harassment, death threats, criminalisation, physical and sexual assault, threats of rape and surveillance.”(UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 2021)

A close reading of the AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (2021b) Public Statement shows how the restart of the conflict affected the Sahrawi Activists within Occupied Western Sahara. A prime example is Sultana Khaya. Her house was put under siege by the Moroccan officials, and during repeated raids, Sultana Khaya and her sister were physically and sexually assaulted (Munadil 2021a, 2021b; International Crisis Group 2021, 7).

The resumption of the conflict and the difficulty of information access clearly show how well the disinformation campaigns and media influence Morocco's allies. The power asymmetry between the conflicting parties is also clearly confirmed by this fact. The US, France and Israel are the prominent supporters of Rabat, which, through proxy-states, gifts and loan deals, arms, trains and supplies Morocco. Also, France and the US are UNSC P5 members, with veto power, which gives them a high degree of influence over the UN action, especially MINURSO. This explains the continued extension of the MINURSO mandate, without incorporating a Human Rights mandate. On the POLISARIO side, the only stable ally is Algeria. Despite being one of the founding members of AU and being recognised by several countries, SADR is yet not seen as a proper country, and POLISARIO is seen as independentist and not a Liberation Movement, as it should. These clearly indicate that the Western Sahara conflict fits the moulds of a Protracted Intractable Conflict.

Regardless of the power dynamics and world influence over international institutions, a conflict is happening in the sands of Western Sahara. For our analysis period (13th of November 2020 and 12th of November 2024), we have registered a total of 4437 attacks by ELPS against the Moroccan Military Wall. Moreover, as all the reports indicate, POLSARIO is, thus far, unable to cause damage or bypass the Military wall.

The Moroccan defensive system, built through phases since the 1980s and modernised through the decades, has yet again shown to be an effective stall strategy. Impeding the advancement of ELPS forces took away the most powerful asset of POLISARIO, the guerrilla forces. Another important key factor is Morocco's utilisation of UCAV, which has been spreading terror throughout the Liberated Areas. The Sahrawi Mine Action Coordination Office (SMACO) (2024, 2023) reports clearly indicate that Morocco's primary targets are civilians.

Thus, we must conclude that without a shift of strategy by POLISARIO, the war will continue to be a low-intensity conflict. It will not lead to a conclusive ending of the Moroccan Occupation.

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
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
Appendix

Appendix 1- Linear escalatory reciprocal Action-Reaction response of a conflict




Schematic 1- Linear escalatory reciprocal Action-Reaction response of a conflict. Source: (Clausewitz 2023)

Appendix 2-Conflict Cycle




Schematic 2- Conflict Cycle. Source: (Clausewitz 2023)

Appendix 3- Spheres of Conflict



Schematic 3. The Spheres of Conflict


Appendix 4- Political Map of Western Sahara



Map 1- Political Map of Western Sahara. Source: MINURSO & OCHA. Author: Jorge


Appendix 5-The Conflict Wheel

The Conflict Wheel




Schematic 4- The Conflict Wheel. Source: (Mason and Rychard 2005)

Appendix 6-Protracted Intractable Conflicts Matrix



Appendix 7-Action of James Baker as PESG

Action of James Baker as PESG



Schematic 5-Action of James Baker as PESG

Appendix 8-SIPRI Arms Transfers Database

SIPRI Arms Transfers Database

Recipient	Supplier	Designation	Description	Weapon Category	Order Year	Number Ordered
Morocco	United States	T-34C	(armed) trainer aircraft	Aircraft	1975	12
Morocco	France	Mirage F-1C	FGA aircraft	Aircraft	1975	25
Morocco	Italy	Bell-212	helicopter	Aircraft	1975	5
Morocco	Italy	Bell-205A	helicopter	Aircraft	1975	24
Morocco	Italy	Bell-206	light helicopter	Aircraft	1975	24
Morocco	United States	HH-43 Huskie	helicopter	Aircraft	1976	1
Morocco	United States	C-130H Hercules	transport aircraft	Aircraft	1976	6
Morocco	France	SA-342 Gazelle	light helicopter	Aircraft	1976	6
Morocco	France	Mirage F-1C	FGA aircraft	Aircraft	1977	5
Morocco	Switzerland	AS-202 Bravo	trainer aircraft	Aircraft	1977	10
Morocco	France	Mirage F-1E	FGA aircraft	Aircraft	1977	20
Morocco	Italy	CH-47C Chinook	transport helicopter	Aircraft	1978	6
Morocco	France	Alpha Jet	trainer/combat aircraft	Aircraft	1978	24
Morocco	Germany	Do-28D	light transport aircraft	Aircraft	1979	10
Morocco	United States	C-130H Hercules	transport aircraft	Aircraft	1980	5

Morocco	United States	KC-130H Hercules	tanker/transport aircraft	Aircraft	1980	2
Morocco	United States	OV-10	ground-attack aircraft	Aircraft	1980	6
Morocco	United States	F-5E Tiger-2	FGA aircraft	Aircraft	1980	24
Morocco	Italy	CH-47C Chinook	transport helicopter	Aircraft	1981	3
Morocco	United States	King Air	light transport aircraft	Aircraft	1981	3
Morocco	France	SA-342 Gazelle	light helicopter	Aircraft	1981	24
Morocco	United States	R4E Skyeye	UAV	Aircraft	1986	6
Morocco	Spain	CN-235 -	transport aircraft	Aircraft	1989	7
Morocco	United States	F-5E Tiger-2	FGA aircraft	Aircraft	1989	10
Morocco	United States	T-37B	(armed) trainer aircraft	Aircraft	1995	14
Morocco	France	AS-565M	helicopter	Aircraft	2000	3
Morocco	France	MF-2000	FGA aircraft	Aircraft	2005	27
Morocco	Italy	C-27J -	transport aircraft	Aircraft	2008	4
Morocco	United States	F-16C Block-50	FGA aircraft	Aircraft	2008	24
Morocco	United States	T-6 Texan-2 -	(armed) trainer aircraft	Aircraft	2009	24
Morocco	United States	CH-47D Chinook	transport helicopter	Aircraft	2012	3
Morocco	France	Heron UAV	UAV	Aircraft	2013	3

Morocco	United States	King Air	light transport aircraft	Aircraft	2016	2
Morocco	United States	King Air ISR	ground surveillance aircraft	Aircraft	2018	2
Morocco	United States	Bell-412 ASW	anti-submarine helicopter	Aircraft	2019	2
Morocco	UAE	Wing Loong-1	armed UAV	Aircraft	2020	3
Morocco	United States	AH-64E Apache	combat helicopter	Aircraft	2020	24
Morocco	United States	F-16V Viper	FGA aircraft	Aircraft	2020	24
Morocco	Turkiye	Bayraktar TB-2	armed UAV	Aircraft	2021	13
Morocco	Israel	ThunderB	UAV	Aircraft	2021	10
Morocco	Turkiye	Bayraktar TB-2	armed UAV	Aircraft	2021	6
Morocco	China	Wing Loong-2	armed UAV	Aircraft	2022	
Morocco	Germany	EC-135	light helicopter	Aircraft	2022	12
Morocco	unknown supplier(s)	DA-42	light aircraft	Aircraft	2022	3
Morocco	Austria	DA-40	light aircraft	Aircraft	2022	8
Morocco	Turkiye	Akinci	armed UAV	Aircraft	2024	


Table 1- Morocco purchased aerial military heavy equipment between 1975 and 2024. Source(Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 2025)

Appendix 9-Ranking of the Major Weapons Exporting Countries to Morocco

Ranking of the Major Weapons Exporting Countries to Morocco							
Decade							
Country	1980	1990	2000	2010	2020	Total	Percentage
USA	868	453	30	2107	686	4144	42,61%
FRA	898	212	160	1439	154	2863	29,44%
NED	43	0	0	514	0	557	5,73%
ESP	439	63	0	0	0	502	5,16%
CHN	0	0	0	478	8	486	5,00%
ITA	100	0	0	106	0	206	2,12%
ISR	28	0	40	0	115	183	1,88%
BLR	0	51	120	0	0	171	1,76%
RUS	1	0	165	0	0	166	1,71%
RSA	98	0	0	0	0	98	1,01%
AUS	38	0	0	0	0	38	0,39%
DEN	36	36	0	0	0	72	0,74%
GER	25	0	0	5	19	49	0,50%
BEL	0	0	55	0	0	55	0,57%
TUR	0	0	0	0	31	31	0,32%
CAN	0	0	0	8	0	8	0,08%
UK	0	0	0	4	0	4	0,04%
UKR	0	0	0	16	5	21	0,22%
SUI	0	0	18	0	0	18	0,19%
LBA	17	0	0	0	0	17	0,17%
EGY	16	0	0	0	0	16	0,16%
KSA	0	12	0	0	0	12	0,12%
UAE	0	0	0	0	4	4	0,04%
SWE	4	0	0	0	0	4	0,04%
QAT	0	0	0	0	2	2	0,02%
Total exports	2611	827	588	4677	1022	9725	100,00%

Table 2-Ranking of the Major Weapons Exporting Countries to Morocco. Source: (SIPRI 1966)

Ranking of the Major Weapons Exporting Countries to Morocco



Graphic 1-Ranking of the Major Weapons Exporting Countries to Morocco

Appendix 10- Conflict Tree




Figure 2- Western Sahara Conflict Tree

Appendix 11- Stakeholder Matrix Analysis

Stakeholder Matrix Analysis

Stakeholder	Type of Actor	Characteristics	Capacities	Positions in the conflict	Strategic Interests	Needs	Level of Influence	Conflict Studies Terminology
SADR (Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic)	Regional/International Actor	Government-in-exile (proclaimed 1976); AU member since 1982; ≈29 UN member states still recognise the SADR (≈84 historically); UNGA (Res. 34/37, 1979) recognises the Polisario as the legitimate representative of the Sahrawi people.	Exercises limited governance in exile; controls parts of “liberated zones”; mobilises Sahrawi refugees (≈170,000 in Tindouf camps); relies on asymmetric guerrilla tactics through SPLA; diplomatic recognition	The direct party is in armed conflict against Morocco; it demands the implementation of the UN-backed referendum; it rejects the autonomy plan.	Self-determination; Liberation of occupied territories; Recognition as a sovereign state.	Realisation of self-determination; liberation of occupied territories.	Medium-Low (symbolic legitimacy > material power).	Party to the conflict (<i>colonised people</i>). Dyad: <i>SADR–Morocco</i> .

remains
fragmented but
symbolically
significant.

Morocco	Regional Actor	Occupying power de facto; controls ~80% of Western Sahara, including main cities and resources. Centralised monarchy; enjoys strong Western backing.	Strong conventional forces; modernisation via the US, Israel, Turkey; strong alliances with the US, France, Israel, Spain; entrenched defensive wall; advanced drone warfare; political	Rejects referendum; imposes autonomy plan; de facto administrator.	- Sovereignty over Western Sahara. Maintain sovereignty claim; regional hegemony ("Greater Morocco").	International acceptance of autonomy plan; weakening of Polisario recognition; prolonged <i>status quo</i> .; Continued Western support; Neutralisation	High	Party to the conflict (de facto coloniser). Dyad: Morocco– SADR; structural dyad: Morocco– Spain.

			leverage through bilateral deals (the US, Gulf States, EU).			of AU/UN pressure.		
Spain	Regional Actor	According to the UN, the former colonial power still has de jure administrative authority over Western Sahara; it tries to deny formal responsibility; and supports Morocco's autonomy plan.	NATO member; modern military but limited projection; strong EU/NATO influence; diplomatic leverage in Maghreb.	Publicly supports Moroccan autonomy plan; legally remains the administering power but avoids role; Avoids confrontation; aligns with Morocco.	Protect economic interests; Maintain enclaves (Ceuta & Melilla); Manage migration/secu rity with Morocco.	Avoid legal accountability as a colonial administrator; Maintain the status quo; Balance domestic and EU pressures.	Medium	Party to the conflict (reluctant and de jure coloniser). Dyad: Spain– Morocco.

Algeria		Historic rival of Morocco; host of Sahrawi refugees; claims to defend anti-colonial principles.	A strong conventional army (Russian-equipped), a large defence budget, regional diplomatic activism, influence in the AU, and no foreign bases.	Openly supports SADR; frames the issue as decolonisation, not bilateral.	Counterbalance Morocco; uphold the principle of self-determination; preserve regional hegemony.	Referendum implementation, International recognition of SADR, and safeguarding refugees.	Medium-High.	Concerning the party (structural dyad: Algeria–Morocco).
Mauritania	Regional Actor	Neighbouring state; fragile internal stability; shares long border with Western Sahara; pragmatic neutrality since 1979	Moderate conventional forces; limited regional projection; sensitive to border security.	Neutral but vulnerable; historical claims renounced (1979); avoids alignment.	Border security; Prevent spillover of conflict & extremism; Maintain neutrality vis-	Non-involvement guarantees border security cooperation.	Low-Medium.	Concerning Party

		peace agreement with Polisario.			à-vis Morocco & Algeria			
France	Global Actor (UNSC P5)	Former colonial power in North Africa; key ally of Morocco.	Advanced military power with global projection; veto power at UNSC; economic- financial penetration in Francophone Africa; Modern expeditionary military; Sahel presence; arms exporter.	Strongly supports Morocco's autonomy plan; shields Rabat diplomatically.	Preserve influence in Maghreb/Sahe l; protect economic interests; maintain Moroccan monarchy as a stable partner.	Maintain Moroccan alignment; Preserve Moroccan control over Western Sahara; Maintain regional instability; Keep veto leverage.	High	Third party (aligned with Morocco; UNSC P5 veto).
USA	Global Actor (UNSC P5)	Strategic ally of Morocco; Trump's 2020 proclamation	Global military superpower; strategic basing in	The Trump administration issued a 2020	Regional stability; counter-	Preserve the Moroccan monarchy as a	High	Third party (aligned with

supporting Moroccan sovereignty lacked legal status as Congressional recognition.	Atlantic & Mediterranean; bilateral exercises (African Lion); diplomatic leverage; NATO leader; strategic access to Atlantic/Mediterranean.	proclamation in support of Moroccan sovereignty, but no Congressional recognition. It supports the Moroccan autonomy plan, provides political- military backing, and avoids binding recognition.	extremism and counterterror in Sahel; naval access to Atlantic & Mediterranean ; Support Israel via Morocco.	stabiliser; Prevent escalation with Algeria; maintain the continuity of the alliance; Protect the Sea routes.	Morocco; UNSC P5 veto).
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Saudi Arabia	Regional Actor	Gulf monarchy; close ally of Morocco; arms supplier and financier.	Financial leverage over Morocco; political influence in the so-called “Arab world”.	Strong diplomatic support to Morocco.	Preserve the monarchy's stability in Morocco.	Continuity of the Moroccan monarchy; prevention of separatism.	Medium	Third party (aligned with Morocco).
United Arab Emirates (UAE)	Regional Actor	Gulf monarchy; first Arab state to open consulate in El Aaiún, 2020.	Financial influence; diplomatic recognition of Moroccan claims.	Strong support for the Moroccan position.	Deepen the alliance with Morocco and expand influence in North Africa.	Consolidation of Moroccan control.	Medium	Third party (aligned with Morocco).
United Nations (MINURSO)	Institutional Actor	International mediator; peacekeeping mission since 1991; limited mandate.	+/- 500 unarmed observers; no enforcement power; no coercive mandate; relies	Neutral, but ineffective in implementing the referendum.	Implement UN resolutions; Avoid escalation; Uphold legitimacy.	Stronger mandate; UNSC consensus; Cooperation of parties.	Medium-Low	Third-party mediator (limited capacity).

on Security
Council decisions.

African Union (AU)	Institutional Actor	SADR has been a member since 1982; Morocco rejoined the AU in 2017 after decades of absence.	Provides diplomatic legitimacy to SADR; no standing military power.	Recognises SADR; backs self-determination.	Uphold colonial borders; prevent separatist domino effects; and support African-led conflict resolution.	Implementing international law, sustained diplomatic support, and Alignment with the UN.	Medium	Third party (aligned with SADR).
Arab League	Regional Actor	Morocco is a member; SADR is not recognised.	Diplomatic bloc; limited enforcement.	Supports Morocco's sovereignty claims.	Arab solidarity with Morocco; avoid separatist precedents.	Preservation of Morocco's territorial claims.	Medium	Third party (aligned with Morocco)

European Union (EU)	Institutional Actor	Political-economic bloc; divided positions (Spain, France pro-Morocco vs Nordic/others cautious).	Economic leverage (trade agreements, incl. fisheries & phosphates).	Implicitly endorses Morocco's autonomy plan.	Economic access to resources; regional stability.	Legal clarity on trade/resource use; avoid destabilisation of Maghreb.	Medium	Third party (aligned with Morocco)
NATO	Institutional Actor	Military alliance; Spain & France members; Morocco partner in Mediterranean Dialogue.	Collective defence capacity; indirect influence through members.	No formal role, but implicit support via allies.	Security of the Mediterranean & Atlantic; stability of the Maghreb.	Avoid escalation in NATO's southern flank.	Medium	Third party (security)

Table 3-Stakeholder Matrix

Appendix 12-Coding Scheme for Actor Scores

Coding Scheme for Actor Scores

Category	Coding Criteria
Military	Based on relative force projection, military expenditure (SIPRI), and Global Firepower Index, this was measured by using the data available on: Global Firepower Index, SIPRI military expenditure, and regional balance.
Diplomatic	Membership in the UN Security Council (permanent or elected), influence in regional/multilateral organisations (EU, NATO, AU, Arab League, OIC).
Economic	GDP size (World Bank/IMF), resource dependence (oil, gas, phosphates), and trade leverage.
Interest	degree of involvement in the Western Sahara conflict, following conflict analysis typologies (<i>parties, concerning parties, third parties</i>)

Scale	Value
Very High	0.8-1.0
High	0.6-0.7
Medium	0.3-0.5
Low	0.1-0.2

Appendix 12- Multidimensional Scores

Actor Coding Table								
Actor	Military	Why	Diplomatic	Why	Economic	Why	Interest	Why
USA	1.0	Largest military worldwide (GFP #1, global reach)	1.0	UNSC P5 + hegemon in NATO	1.0	World's largest GDP	0.8	Alliance with/ Morocco + stability in MENA
France	0.8	Strong EU military, nuclear power	0.9	UNSC P5, EU, NATO	0.8	Major EU economy	0.8	Historic ties, colonial legacy
Morocco	0.7	Strongest Maghreb army after Algeria	0.6	Active diplomacy, AU/Arab League	0.6	Medium economy, energy importer	1.0	Existential, territorial integrity
Algeria	0.6	Large military, key in Maghreb	0.5	Regional actor, AU/Arab League	0.7	Hydrocarbons, OPEC member	0.8	Supports SADR, a rival to Morocco
SADR	0.1	No conventional military	0.2	Limited recognition, AU member	0.1	Exile gov., no economy	1.0	Existential survival as a state
Spain	0.3	Medium EU army, limited projection	0.6	EU/NATO member, former coloniser	0.5	The EU economy, dependent on fishing	0.8	Historic role, Ceuta/Melilla, migration
EU	0.3	No unified army	0.8	Strong diplomatic bloc	0.7	2nd largest global economy	0.6	Regional stability & migration

NATO	0.7	Military alliance (US + Europe)	0.9	Major global institution	0.6	Collective budgets/resources	0.6	Regional security relevance
UN	0.2	Peacekeeping, no hard power	1.0	UNSC + legitimacy	0.2	Relies on member states	0.7	Credibility of international law
Mauritania	0.2	Weak army, border only	0.3	Arab League/AU member	0.2	Small GDP	0.6	Border security, migration pressure
Saudi Arabia	0.7	Top 5 global spenders on defence	0.7	Arab League, OIC influence	0.9	Oil giant, G20	0.5	Supports Morocco indirectly
Arab League	0.1	No army	0.8	Regional diplomacy	0.1	No economy itself	0.5	Forum for Arab consensus
UAE	0.6	Modernised army, regional projection	0.6	Gulf diplomacy, AU/Arab League	0.8	Diversified economy, strong FDI	0.6	Financial + political support to Morocco
Israel	0.8	Regional military power, nuclear ambiguity	0.6	Limited Arab League ties, bilateral diplomacy	0.8	Strong high-tech economy	0.7	Alliance with Morocco post-Abraham Accords

Multidimensional Scores¹

Actor	Military ²	Diplomatic ³	Economic ⁴	Interest ⁵
USA	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.8
France	0.8	0.9	0.8	0.8
Morocco	0.7	0.6	0.6	1.0
Algeria	0.6	0.5	0.7	0.8
SADR	0.1	0.2	0.1	1.0
Spain	0.3	0.6	0.5	0.8
EU	0.3	0.8	0.7	0.6
NATO	0.7	0.9	0.6	0.6
UN	0.2	1.0	0.2	0.7
Mauritania	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.6
Saudi Arabia	0.7	0.7	0.9	0.5
Arab League	0.1	0.8	0.1	0.5
UAE	0.6	0.6	0.8	0.6
Israel	0.8	0.6	0.8	0.7

1-This multidimensional score was constructed based on John, Bryson, and Humphrey (2004); Brugha and Varvasovszky (2000); Saaty (1987)

2- Based on Military Strength Ranking (<https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.php>)

3- Based on a combination of military power, economic power, and UN influence

4- Based on GDP (USD) value (<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD>)

5-Based on a combination of the Level of Influence, Positions in the conflict, Strategic Interests and Needs of the Stakeholder Matrix Analysis


Stakeholder Power VS Interest Map

Actor	Power ¹	Interest ²
USA	1	0.8
France	0.8	0.8
Morocco	0.6	1
Algeria	0.6	0.8
SADR	0.1	1
Spain	0.5	0.8
EU	0.7	0.6
NATO	0.7	0.6
UN	0.2	0.7
Mauritania	0.2	0.6
Saudi Arabia	0.7	0.5
Arab League	0.1	0.5
UAE	0.6	0.6
Israel	0.8	0.7

1-Assessed through the calculation of the mean of the Military, Diplomatic and Economic value of the Multidimensional Scores Table

2- Interest value of the Interest Dimension of the Multidimensional Scores Table


Appendix 13-Stakeholder Power vs Interest Map



Graphic 2-Stakeholder vs Interest Map


Appendix 14- Heatmap-Multidimensional Comparison of the Parties to the Conflict

Heatmap-Multidimensional Comparison of the Parties to the Conflict



Heatmap 1-Multidimensional comparison of the Parties to the conflict

Appendix 16- Radar Chart-Multidimensional Profiles



Graphic 3-Radar Chart-Multidimensional Profiles

Appendix 17- Western Sahara Conflict Triad

Western Sahara Conflict Triangle:
Conflict Triad





Figure 3-Western Sahara Conflict Triangle: Conflict Triad

Appendix 18- Conflict Map-Western Sahara

Conflict Mapping - Western Sahara
(Parties to the conflict, Concerning Parties, Third Parties)



Map 2-Conflict Map-Western Sahara

Appendix 19- War Communiques Analysis

INICIO NOTICIAS ZONAS OCUPADAS INTERNACIONAL SOLIDARIDAD PRENSA DOSSIERS QUIENES SOMOS

[17]

NOTICIAS

XXV seminario de Partidos y Organizaciones Políticas de AL y el Caribe exige el cumplimiento de la reciente sentencia del TJUE

SPS 24/10/2021 - 11:34



Ciudad de M... DE octubre de 2021(SPS)-.

Continúan ataques del ELPS a posiciones enemigas a lo largo del muro militar marroquí

SPS 23/10/2021 - 19:17



Bir Lehlu (República Saharaui), 23 de octubre de 2021(SPS)-. El Ejército Popular de Liberación Saharaui (ELPS), continúa con sus bombardeos a guarniciones y atrinchamientos de las fuerzas de ocupación a lo largo del muro militar marroquí.

En el marco de la guerra a llevar la guerra a todo el territorio y al interior de Marruecos, las fuerzas saharauis han continuado hostigando las bases y posiciones de las fuerzas enemigas.

Zimbabue, al igual que muchos países africanos, lamenta que se sigue negándole al pueblo saharaui su derecho a la autodeterminación

SPS 23/10/2021 - 18:32

... NUEVA YORK 23 de octubre de 2021(SPS)- La República de Zimbabue lamenta que

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Noticias de actualidad

24/10/2021

[11:34] : XXV seminario de Partidos y Organizaciones Políticas de AL y el Caribe exige el cumplimiento de la reciente sentencia del TJUE

23/10/2021

[19:17] : Continúan ataques del ELPS a posiciones enemigas a lo largo del muro militar marroquí

[18:32] : Zimbabue, al igual que muchos

Image 1-Example of “Comunicado Militar” or “Parte de Guerra” as posted in SPS

Continúan ataques del ELPS a posiciones enemigas a lo largo del muro militar marroquí

SPS 23/10/2021 - 19:17



Bir Lehlu (República Saharaui), 23 de octubre de 2021(SPS)-. El Ejército Popular de Liberación Saharaui (ELPS), continúa con sus bombardeos a guarniciones y atrincheramientos de las fuerzas de ocupación a lo largo del muro militar marroquí.

En el marco de sus ofensivas de combate para llevar la guerra a todo el territorio y al interior de Marruecos, las fuerzas saharauis han continuado hostigando las bases y posiciones de las fuerzas enemigas.

El Ministerio de Defensa Nacional ha informado este viernes en su 345 comunicado militar que destacamentos avanzados de nuestro ejército, lanzaron intensos bombardeos a posiciones enemigas convirtiendo vastas extensiones del muro militar marroquí en ruinas y devastación.

Las fuerzas saharauis han bombardeado este sábado ,345 día de la Guerra, las zonas de Tanuchad y Grarat Alaatasa, ambas en el sector de Mahbes.

También el parte militar habla de ataques a la zona de Ddums, en el sector de Bagari. El Parte Militar informes de ataques a la zona de Um Ajjud en el sector de Auserd.

Las fuerzas saharauis han bombardeado este viernes ,344 día de la Guerra, las zonas de Udey Damrán, Grarat Alfarsik y la zona de Angáb Laabad, ambas en el sector de FARSÍA.

Image 2- “Comunicado Militar” number 345 of the 23rd of November 2021

El ELPS continúa sus bombardeos contra las posiciones del ejército de ocupación marroquí en los sectores de Smara, Mahbes y Farsía

SPS 07/09/2021 - 19:12



Bir Lehlu (República Saharaui), 7 de septiembre de 2021 (SPS) – Las unidades del Ejército de Liberación Popular Saharaui (ELPS) continuaron este martes sus bombardeos contra las posiciones del ejército de ocupación marroquí en los sectores de Smara, Mahbes y Farsía.

Según el Parte de Guerra N° 300 emitido por el Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, las unidades del

ELPS lanzaron intensos y concentrados ataques que provocaron pánico y miedo dentro de las filas de los soldados enemigos en las siguientes posiciones:

- Región de Guerat Uld Blal, sector de Mahbes.
- Región de Beirat Tanuchad, sector de Mahbes.

Image 3-Where to find the chronological indicator in a *Comunicado de Guerra* or *Parte de Guerra*. Source: *Comunicado Militar* number 300 of 7th of September 2021

SPS 13/06/2021 - 20:34



Bir Lehlu (República Saharaui), 13 de junio de 2021(SPS)-. El Ejército Popular de Liberación Saharaui (ELPS), continúa con sus bombardeos a guarniciones y atrincheramientos de las fuerzas de ocupación.

En el marco de sus ofensivas de combate para llevar la guerra a todo el territorio y al interior de Marruecos, las fuerzas saharauis han continuado hostigando las bases y posiciones de las fuerzas

enemigas.

El Ministerio de Defensa Nacional ha informado este domingo en su 214 comunicado militar, que destacamentos avanzados de nuestro ejército, lanzaron intensos bombardeos a posiciones enemigas contenidas en el muro militar marroquí.

La jornada de este sábado 214 día de la guerra, Unidades del ELPS han efectuado nuevos y continuos ataques a las zonas de Amagli Dachra en el sector de Amgala, la zona de Um Dagan en el sector de Bagari. También ha sido hostigada con artillería la zona de Eadgad en el sector de Mahbes y la zona de Erkeyez en el sector de Guelta.

Aunque Marruecos niega la destrucción y caos en sus bases. El enemigo ha sufrido pérdidas en su arsenal y bajas en sus filas.

Desde la ruptura del Alto al Fuego y el comienzo de la guerra el 13 de noviembre, las unidades del ELPS han estado hostigando las fuerzas de ocupación en estos sectores y sectores adyacentes al muro militar marroquí.SPS/090/099TRAD

Image 4-Specific word indicating the existence of multi layers of military action. Source: *Comunicado militar* number 214 of 13th of June of 2021.

El ELPS continúa sus bombardeos contra las posiciones del ejército de ocupación marroquí en los sectores de Smara, Mahbes y Farsía

SPS 07/09/2021 - 19:12



Bir Lehlu (República Saharaui), 7 de septiembre de 2021 (SPS) – Las unidades del Ejército de Liberación Popular Saharaui (ELPS) continuaron este martes sus bombardeos contra las posiciones del ejército de ocupación marroquí en los sectores de Smara, Mahbes y Farsía.

Según el Parte de Guerra Nº 300 emitido por el Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, las unidades del

ELPS lanzaron intensos y concentrados ataques que provocaron pánico y miedo dentro de las filas de los soldados enemigos en las siguientes posiciones:

- Región de Guerat Uld Blal, sector de Mahbes.
- Región de Beirat Tanuchad, sector de Mahbes.
- Región de Binkerat, sector de Smara.

El mismo Parte de Guerra informa también que unidades de nuestro ejército habían concentrado ayer, lunes, el fuego de su artillería contra los sectores de Farsía y Mahbes, así como las regiones de Udeiyat Achadida, Gararat Lahdid y Sabjat Tanuchad.



Bir Lehlu (República Saharaui), 16 de abril de 2021 (SPS)– El Ejército Popular de Liberación Saharaui (ELPS), continúa con sus bombardeos a guarniciones y atrincheramientos de las fuerzas de ocupación.

En el marco de sus ofensivas de combate para llevar la guerra a todo el territorio y al interior de Marruecos, las fuerzas saharauis han continuado hostigando las bases y posiciones de las fuerzas

enemigas.

El Ministerio de Defensa Nacional ha informado este viernes en su 156 comunicado militar, que destacamentos avanzados de nuestro ejército, lanzaron intensos bombardeos a posiciones enemigas convirtiendo vastas extensiones del muro militar marroquí en ruinas y devastación.

La jornada de este jueves 155 días de la guerra, Unidades del ELPS han efectuado nuevos y continuos ataques a los sectores de Tichla Mahbes y Auserd.

Por su parte este viernes, 156 día de la guerra, Unidades del ELPS han efectuado nuevamente intensos y continuos bombardeos al sector de Mahbes.

Aunque Marruecos niega la destrucción y caos en sus bases. El enemigo ha sufrido pérdidas en su arsenal y bajas en sus filas.

Desde la ruptura del Alto el Fuego y el comienzo de la guerra el 13 de noviembre, las unidades del ELPS han estado

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<https://www.spsrad.info/news/es/articles/2021>

hostigando las fuerzas de ocupación en estos sectores y sectores adyacentes al muro militar marroquí.

Los ataques del Ejército Popular de Liberación Saharaui contra las fuerzas de ocupación marroquíes a lo largo del muro militar marroquí, continúan hasta el fin de ocupación y la consecución de la plena independencia y la soberanía sobre nuestra patria.

Aunque continúa con su hermetismo en relación a sus bajas en los bombardeos de las fuerzas saharauis, no puede seguir ocultando el hecho de una guerra que se extiende al interior de Marruecos . SPS/090/099TRAD

Image 6- Different forms of *Comunicado de Guerra* or *Parte de Guerra*. On the left, the *Comunicado Militar* number 300 of 7th of September 2021, on the right *Comunicado Militar* number 156 of 16th of April 2021. Source: SPS

El ELPS continúa sus bombardeos contra las posiciones del ejército de ocupación marroquí en los sectores de Smara, Mahbes y Farsía

SPS 07/09/2021 - 19:12



Bir Lehlu (República Saharaui), 7 de septiembre de 2021 (SPS) – Las unidades del Ejército de Liberación Popular Saharaui (ELPS) continuaron este martes sus bombardeos contra las posiciones del ejército de ocupación marroquí en los sectores de Smara, Mahbes y Farsía.

Según el Parte de Guerra Nº 300 emitido por el Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, las unidades del

ELPS lanzaron intensos y concentrados ataques que provocaron pánico y miedo dentro de las filas de los soldados enemigos en las siguientes posiciones:

- Región de Guerat Uld Blal, sector de Mahbes.
- Región de Beirat Tanuchad, sector de Mahbes.
- Región de Binkerat, sector de Smara.

El mismo Parte de Guerra informa también que unidades de nuestro ejército habían concentrado ayer, lunes, el fuego de su artillería contra los sectores de Farsía y Mahbes, así como las regiones de Udeiyat Achadida, Gararat Lahdid y Sabjat Tanuchad.



Bir Lehlu (República Saharaui), 16 de abril de 2021 (SPS)– El Ejército Popular de Liberación Saharaui (ELPS), continúa con sus bombardeos a guarniciones y atrincheramientos de las fuerzas de ocupación.

En el marco de sus ofensivas de combate para llevar la guerra a todo el territorio y al interior de Marruecos, las fuerzas saharauis han continuado hostigando las bases y posiciones de las fuerzas

enemigas.

El Ministerio de Defensa Nacional ha informado este viernes en su 156 comunicado militar, que destacamentos avanzados de nuestro ejército, lanzaron intensos bombardeos a posiciones enemigas convirtiendo vastas extensiones del muro militar marroquí en ruinas y devastación.

La jornada de este jueves 155 días de la guerra, Unidades del ELPS han efectuado nuevos y continuos ataques a los sectores de Tichla Mahbes y Auserd.

Por su parte este viernes, 156 día de la guerra, Unidades del ELPS han efectuado nuevamente intensos y continuos bombardeos al sector de Mahbes.

Aunque Marruecos niega la destrucción y caos en sus bases. El enemigo ha sufrido pérdidas en su arsenal y bajas en sus filas.

Desde la ruptura del Alto el Fuego y el comienzo de la guerra el 13 de noviembre, las unidades del ELPS han estado

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<https://www.spsrad.info/news/es/articles/2021>

hostigando las fuerzas de ocupación en estos sectores y sectores adyacentes al muro militar marroquí.

Los ataques del Ejército Popular de Liberación Saharaui contra las fuerzas de ocupación marroquíes a lo largo del muro militar marroquí, continúan hasta el fin de ocupación y la consecución de la plena independencia y la soberanía sobre nuestra patria.

Aunque continúa con su hermetismo en relación a sus bajas en los bombardeos de las fuerzas saharauis, no puede seguir ocultando el hecho de una guerra que se extiende al interior de Marruecos . SPS/090/099TRAD

Image 5-Where to find information in different forms of *Comunicado de Guerra* or *Parte de Guerra*. On the left, the *Comunicado Militar* number 300 of 7th of September 2021, on the right *Comunicado Militar* number 156 of 16th of April 2021. Source: SPS

ELPS continúa bombardeando posiciones enemigas a lo largo del muro militar marroquí

SPS 12/06/2021 - 22:32



Bir Lehlu (República Saharaui), 12 de junio de 2021(SPS)-. El Ejército Popular de Liberación Saharaui (ELPS), continúa con sus bombardeos a guarniciones y atrincheramientos de las fuerzas de ocupación.

En el marco de sus ofensivas de combate para llevar la guerra a todo el territorio y al interior de Marruecos, las fuerzas saharauis han continuado hostigando las bases y posiciones de las fuerzas enemigas.

El Ministerio de Defensa Nacional ha informado este sábado en su 213 comunicado militar, que destacamentos avanzados de nuestro ejército, lanzaron intensos bombardeos a posiciones enemigas contenidas en el muro militar marroquí.

La jornada de este viernes 212 día de la guerra, Unidades del ELPS han efectuado nuevos y continuos ataques a las zonas de Tanuchad(dos veces seguidas), la zona de Russ Udey Damán, todas ellas en el sector de Mahbes. También ha sido hostigada con artillería la zona de Amagli Dachra en el sector de Amgala.

Por su parte este sábado, 213 día de la guerra, Unidades del ELPS han efectuado nuevamente intensos y continuos bombardeos a las fuerzas de ocupación estacionadas en la zona de Guerat ULD Blal en el sector de Mahbes. También el fuego del ELPS alcanzó la zona de Fadrat Alaach en el sector de Hauza.

Image 7- Quantification of attacks expressed in *Comunicado de Guerra* or *Parte de Guerra* or *Comunicado Militar*.

Source: *Comunicado de Guerra* number 213 of 12th of June 2021.

SPS 04/06/2021 - 21:50



Bir Lehlu (República Saharaui), 30 de mayo de 2021(SPS)-. El Ejército Popular de Liberación Saharaui (ELPS), continúa con sus bombardeos a guarniciones y atrincheramientos de las fuerzas de ocupación.

En el marco de sus ofensivas de combate para llevar la guerra a todo el territorio y al interior de Marruecos, las fuerzas saharauis han continuado hostigando las bases y posiciones de las fuerzas enemigas.

El Ministerio de Defensa Nacional ha informado este viernes en su 205 comunicado militar, que destacamentos avanzados de nuestro ejército, lanzaron intensos bombardeos a la base N° 1 ubicada en el norte de la zona de Laagsebiyin en el sector de Hauza.

También ha sido bombardeada la base 18 ubicada en una zona del sector Mahbes.

Aunque Marruecos niega la destrucción y caos en sus bases. El enemigo ha sufrido pérdidas en su arsenal y bajas en sus filas.


Image 8- Example of additional information present in *Comunicado de Guerra*, *Parte de Guerra* or *Comunidad Militar*. Source: *Comunidad Militar* number 205 of 30th of May 2021

Appendix 20- Information Processing

Summary of the data analysed	
Starting date	13th of November 2020
Ending date	12th of November 2024
Time Frame of Analysis	4 years (2020-2024)
Total of Months analysed	48
Total of Weeks analysed	210
Total of Days analysed	1457
Total of Semesters analysed	8
Total number of countries analysed	2
Total of Military Regions analysed	3
Total of Sectors analysed	13
War communiques	744
Month N	13th of X to 12th of Y

Table 4- Summary of the data analysed

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Map 5-Example of an Analisis Attack Map- Western Sahara War Map-Year 2. General Map. Author: Self.

Source: WSWA

Appendix 21- Data standardisation

Matrix of the composition of the Theatre of Operations in Western Sahara

Oued Daraa • Acronym: MR1 • Northern Region • Hexadecimal colour code: #E2EFD9	Saguia El Hamara • Acronym: MR2 • Central Region • Hexadecimal colour code: #FEF2CB	Rio de Oro • Acronym: MR3 • Southern Region • Hexadecimal colour code: #FBE4D5
Aaga • Acronym: S1 • Northern Sector • Hexadecimal colour code: #BED5B4	Haouza • Acronym: S5 • Northern Sector • Hexadecimal colour code: #FFDDAD	Oum Dreiga • Acronym: S9 • Northern Sector • Hexadecimal colour code: #FF6161
Touizigui • Acronym: S2 • Centre-Northern Sector • Hexadecimal colour code: #90BB7A	Smara • Acronym: S6 • Centre-Northern Sector • Hexadecimal colour code: #FFCA69	El Bagari • Acronym: S10 • Centre-Northern Sector • Hexadecimal colour code: #FF3737
El Mahabes • Acronym: S3 • Centre-South Sector	Amgala • Acronym: S7 • Centre-South Sector	Auserd • Acronym: S11 • Centre-South Sector

Hexadecimal colour code: #68A242	Hexadecimal colour code: #EFB300	Hexadecimal colour code: #FF1D1D
Farsia - Acronym: S4 - South Sector - Hexadecimal colour code: #568736	Guelta Zemmour - Acronym: S8 - South Sector - Hexadecimal colour code: #C89600	Techla - Acronym: S12 - Centre-South Sector - Hexadecimal colour code: #D20000
		Bir Guendouz - Acronym: S12 - Centre-South Sector - Hexadecimal colour code: #A80000

Table 5-Matrix of the composition of the Theatre of Operations in Western Sahara

MR1 most common attack locations incorrect-correct name spelling correspondence matrix

S3 Correct Zone Name	S5 Incorrect Zone Name Variations	S4 Correct Names	S5 Incorrect Zone Name Variations
Abeirat Tanuchad	Abeiràt TANUSHAD	Al Faiiyin	ALFEYIN
	Beirat Tanuchad		Afaeyìn
	Abeiràt Tanuchad		Al-Feiyin
Acheidmía	Cheidmiya		Alfeyìn
	Acheidmiya		Alfeiyin
Agraret Al-Fersig	GRARAT AL FARSIK	Graret Achadida	GRARAT SHDEIDA
	Grarat Alfarsik		Grarat Chdida
	Gararat Al-Firsik		Grarat Chdeida
Aguerat ULD Blal	Guerat Uld Blal		Gararat Achadida
	Güerat ULD Blal	Legsebiyin	RUSS LAGSEBIYİN
Al-Ariya	Al-Aariya	Rus Ben Zaca	Rus Bin Zakka
	Alairiya		
Amaitir Lamjeinza	Ameitir Lamjeinza		
Rus Asabti	Russ Sabti		
	Rus Asabti		
Rus Udei Ummercba	Udey Emarkba		
	Udei Um Rakba		
Sabjat Tatushat	Sabjat Tanuchad		
	SABJAT TANUSHAD		
	sabjat Tanuchad		
Laaràn	Laaran		

Table 6-MR1 most common attack locations incorrect-correct name spelling correspondence matrix

MR2 most common attack locations incorrect-correct name spelling correspondence matrix

S5 Correct Zone Name	S5 Incorrect Zone Name Variations	S6 Correct Zone Name	S6 Incorrect Zone Name Variations
Rus Dirit	Rus Dirit	Udei Asfaa	Udei Al-Safa
	Russ Dirit		
	Russ Dirit		
	RUS DIRIT		
Ben Zaca	BANZAK-KA		
	Ben Zak-ka		
Targanet	TARGÂNAT		

	Targànt
Rus Lagteitira	LAGTEITIRA
	Lagteitira
	Fadtrat Lagleita
Udey Al-Safa	Rus Udei Asfaa
Fadtrat Al-ich	Fadtrat Aaach
	Fadtrat Al-Ich
Diret	Dirit
Gleib Diret	Gleib Dirit
Lemceitab	Lamkeitib
Fasel Bem Zaca	Fasel Bin Zakka
Targanet	Taraganit
Fadtrat Al Tamat	Fadtrat Tamât

Table 7- MR2 most common attack locations incorrect-correct name spelling correspondence matrix

MR3 most common attack locations incorrect-correct name spelling correspondence matrix

S11 Correct Names	S11 Incorrect name variations
Agleibat Al-agaya	Gleibât Alaagaya
	Agleibat Al-Agaya
Galb An-nas	Galb Nass
	GALB NASS

Table 8- MR3 most common attack locations incorrect-correct name spelling correspondence matrix

Appendix 22- Event Day/Non-Event Day Relation Matrix

Event Day/Non-Event Day Relation Matrix

Date	S1	S2	S3	S4	S5	S6	S7	S8	S9	S10	S11	S12	S13	Status
13/11/2020	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
14/11/2020	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	Event Day
15/11/2020	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	Event Day
16/11/2020	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	Event Day
17/11/2020	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
18/11/2020	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	Event Day
19/11/2020	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	Event Day
20/11/2020	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
21/11/2020	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
22/11/2020	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	Event Day
23/11/2020	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	Event Day
24/11/2020	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	Event Day
25/11/2020	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	Event Day
26/11/2020	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	Event Day
27/11/2020	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	Event Day
28/11/2020	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	Event Day
29/11/2020	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
30/11/2020	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
01/12/2020	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	Event Day
02/12/2020	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
03/12/2020	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	Event Day
04/12/2020	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	Event Day
05/12/2020	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	Event Day
06/12/2020	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
07/12/2020	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	Event Day
08/12/2020	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	Event Day
09/12/2020	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
10/12/2020	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
11/12/2020	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
12/12/2020	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	Event Day
13/12/2020	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
14/12/2020	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	Event Day
15/12/2020	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
16/12/2020	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
17/12/2020	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	Event Day
18/12/2020	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
19/12/2020	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
20/12/2020	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	Event Day
21/12/2020	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
22/12/2020	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
23/12/2020	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	Event Day
24/12/2020	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	Event Day

25/12/2020	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
26/12/2020	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
27/12/2020	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	Event Day
28/12/2020	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	Event Day
29/12/2020	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	Event Day
30/12/2020	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
31/12/2020	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
01/01/2021	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
02/01/2021	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	Event Day
03/01/2021	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
04/01/2021	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	Event Day
05/01/2021	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
06/01/2021	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
07/01/2021	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	Event Day
08/01/2021	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	Event Day
09/01/2021	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	Event Day
10/01/2021	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	Event Day
11/01/2021	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	Event Day
12/01/2021	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
13/01/2021	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
14/01/2021	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
15/01/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
16/01/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	Event Day
17/01/2021	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	Event Day
18/01/2021	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
19/01/2021	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	Event Day
20/01/2021	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	Event Day
21/01/2021	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	Event Day
22/01/2021	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
23/01/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	Event Day
24/01/2021	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
25/01/2021	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
26/01/2021	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	Event Day
27/01/2021	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	Event Day
28/01/2021	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
29/01/2021	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
30/01/2021	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	Event Day
31/01/2021	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	Event Day
01/02/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
02/02/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
03/02/2021	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
04/02/2021	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
05/02/2021	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
06/02/2021	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	Event Day

07/02/2021	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
08/02/2021	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	Event Day
09/02/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	Event Day
10/02/2021	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	Event Day
11/02/2021	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
12/02/2021	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
13/02/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	Event Day
14/02/2021	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
15/02/2021	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
16/02/2021	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
17/02/2021	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	Event Day
18/02/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
19/02/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
20/02/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	Event Day
21/02/2021	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	Event Day
22/02/2021	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
23/02/2021	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	Event Day
24/02/2021	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
25/02/2021	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
26/02/2021	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
27/02/2021	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	Event Day
28/02/2021	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
01/03/2021	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
02/03/2021	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	Event Day
03/03/2021	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	Event Day
04/03/2021	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
05/03/2021	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
06/03/2021	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
07/03/2021	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	Event Day
08/03/2021	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
09/03/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
10/03/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
11/03/2021	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
12/03/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
13/03/2021	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
14/03/2021	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
15/03/2021	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
16/03/2021	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
17/03/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	Event Day
18/03/2021	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	Event Day
19/03/2021	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
20/03/2021	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
21/03/2021	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
22/03/2021	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day

23/03/2021	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
24/03/2021	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
25/03/2021	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
26/03/2021	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
27/03/2021	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
28/03/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
29/03/2021	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	Event Day
30/03/2021	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	Event Day
31/03/2021	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
01/04/2021	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
02/04/2021	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
03/04/2021	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
04/04/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
05/04/2021	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
06/04/2021	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
07/04/2021	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
08/04/2021	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
09/04/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
10/04/2021	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	Event Day
11/04/2021	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
12/04/2021	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
13/04/2021	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
14/04/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
15/04/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
16/04/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
17/04/2021	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	Event Day
18/04/2021	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
19/04/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
20/04/2021	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
21/04/2021	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	Event Day
22/04/2021	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
23/04/2021	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	Event Day
24/04/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
25/04/2021	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
26/04/2021	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
27/04/2021	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
28/04/2021	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
29/04/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	Event Day
30/04/2021	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
01/05/2021	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
02/05/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
03/05/2021	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
04/05/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
05/05/2021	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	Event Day

06/05/2021	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
07/05/2021	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
08/05/2021	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
09/05/2021	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
10/05/2021	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
11/05/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
12/05/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
13/05/2021	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
14/05/2021	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
15/05/2021	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
16/05/2021	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
17/05/2021	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
18/05/2021	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
19/05/2021	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
20/05/2021	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
21/05/2021	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
22/05/2021	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
23/05/2021	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	Event Day
24/05/2021	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	Event Day
25/05/2021	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
26/05/2021	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
27/05/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
28/05/2021	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
29/05/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
30/05/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
31/05/2021	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
01/06/2021	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
02/06/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
03/06/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
04/06/2021	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
05/06/2021	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
06/06/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
07/06/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
08/06/2021	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
09/06/2021	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
10/06/2021	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
11/06/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
12/06/2021	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
13/06/2021	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
14/06/2021	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
15/06/2021	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
16/06/2021	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
17/06/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
18/06/2021	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day

19/06/2021	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
20/06/2021	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
21/06/2021	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
22/06/2021	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
23/06/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
24/06/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
25/06/2021	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
26/06/2021	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
27/06/2021	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
28/06/2021	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
29/06/2021	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
30/06/2021	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
01/07/2021	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
02/07/2021	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
03/07/2021	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
04/07/2021	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
05/07/2021	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
06/07/2021	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
07/07/2021	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
08/07/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	Event Day
09/07/2021	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
10/07/2021	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
11/07/2021	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
12/07/2021	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
13/07/2021	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
14/07/2021	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
15/07/2021	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
16/07/2021	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
17/07/2021	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
18/07/2021	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
19/07/2021	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
20/07/2021	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
21/07/2021	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
22/07/2021	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
23/07/2021	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
24/07/2021	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
25/07/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
26/07/2021	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
27/07/2021	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
28/07/2021	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
29/07/2021	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
30/07/2021	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
31/07/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
01/08/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day

02/08/2021	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
03/08/2021	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
04/08/2021	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
05/08/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
06/08/2021	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
07/08/2021	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
08/08/2021	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
09/08/2021	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
10/08/2021	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
11/08/2021	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
12/08/2021	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
13/08/2021	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
14/08/2021	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
15/08/2021	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
16/08/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
17/08/2021	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
18/08/2021	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	Event Day
19/08/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
20/08/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
21/08/2021	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
22/08/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
23/08/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	Event Day
24/08/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
25/08/2021	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
26/08/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
27/08/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
29/08/2021	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
30/08/2021	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	Event Day
31/08/2021	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
01/09/2021	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
02/09/2021	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
03/09/2021	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
04/09/2021	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
05/09/2021	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
06/09/2021	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
07/09/2021	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
08/09/2021	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
09/09/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	Event Day
10/09/2021	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	Event Day
11/09/2021	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
12/09/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
13/09/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
14/09/2021	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
15/09/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day

16/09/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
17/09/2021	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
18/09/2021	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
19/09/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
20/09/2021	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
21/09/2021	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	Event Day
22/09/2021	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
23/09/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
24/09/2021	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
25/09/2021	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
26/09/2021	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
27/09/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	Event Day
28/09/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	Event Day
29/09/2021	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
30/09/2021	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
01/10/2021	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	Event Day
02/10/2021	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
03/10/2021	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	Event Day
04/10/2021	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
05/10/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
06/10/2021	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
07/10/2021	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
08/10/2021	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
09/10/2021	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
10/10/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
11/10/2021	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
12/10/2021	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
13/10/2021	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	Event Day
14/10/2021	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	Event Day
15/10/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
16/10/2021	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
17/10/2021	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	Event Day
18/10/2021	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
19/10/2021	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	Event Day
20/10/2021	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	Event Day
21/10/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	Event Day
22/10/2021	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
23/10/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	Event Day
24/10/2021	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	Event Day
25/10/2021	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
26/10/2021	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	Event Day
27/10/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
28/10/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
29/10/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day

30/10/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	Event Day
31/10/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
01/11/2021	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
02/11/2021	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
03/11/2021	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	Event Day
04/11/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
05/11/2021	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
06/11/2021	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
07/11/2021	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
08/11/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	Event Day
09/11/2021	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	Event Day
10/11/2021	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
11/11/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	Event Day
12/11/2021	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
13/11/2021	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
14/11/2021	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	Event Day
15/11/2021	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	Event Day
16/11/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
17/11/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
18/11/2021	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	Event Day
19/11/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
20/11/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
21/11/2021	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
22/11/2021	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
23/11/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	Event Day
24/11/2021	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
25/11/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
26/11/2021	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
27/11/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	Event Day
28/11/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
29/11/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
30/11/2021	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
01/12/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	Event Day
02/12/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
03/12/2021	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
04/12/2021	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	Event Day
05/12/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	Event Day
06/12/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
07/12/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
08/12/2021	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
09/12/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
10/12/2021	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
11/12/2021	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
12/12/2021	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day

13/12/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
14/12/2021	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
15/12/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
16/12/2021	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
17/12/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
18/12/2021	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
19/12/2021	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
20/12/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	Event Day
21/12/2021	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
22/12/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
23/12/2021	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
24/12/2021	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	Event Day
25/12/2021	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
26/12/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
27/12/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
28/12/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
29/12/2021	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
30/12/2021	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
31/12/2021	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
01/01/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
02/01/2022	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
03/01/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
04/01/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
05/01/2022	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
06/01/2022	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
07/01/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
08/01/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
09/01/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
10/01/2022	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
11/01/2022	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
12/01/2022	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
13/01/2022	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
14/01/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
15/01/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
16/01/2022	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
17/01/2022	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
18/01/2022	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
19/01/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
20/01/2022	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
21/01/2022	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
22/01/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
23/01/2022	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
24/01/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
25/01/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day

26/01/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
27/01/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
28/01/2022	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
29/01/2022	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
30/01/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
31/01/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	Event Day
01/02/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
02/02/2022	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
03/02/2022	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
04/02/2022	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
05/02/2022	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
06/02/2022	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
07/02/2022	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
08/02/2022	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
09/02/2022	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	Event Day
10/02/2022	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
11/02/2022	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
12/02/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	Event Day
13/02/2022	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
14/02/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	Event Day
15/02/2022	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
16/02/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
17/02/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
18/02/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
19/02/2022	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
20/02/2022	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
21/02/2022	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
22/02/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	Event Day
23/02/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
24/02/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	Event Day
25/02/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
26/02/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
27/02/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
28/02/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
01/03/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
02/03/2022	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
03/03/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
04/03/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
05/03/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
06/03/2022	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
07/03/2022	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
08/03/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
09/03/2022	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
10/03/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day

11/03/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
12/03/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
13/03/2022	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
14/03/2022	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
15/03/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
16/03/2022	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
17/03/2022	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
18/03/2022	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
19/03/2022	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
20/03/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
21/03/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
22/03/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	Event Day
23/03/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
24/03/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
25/03/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
26/03/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
27/03/2022	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
28/03/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
29/03/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
30/03/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
31/03/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
01/04/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
02/04/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
03/04/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
04/04/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	Event Day
05/04/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
06/04/2022	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
07/04/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
08/04/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
09/04/2022	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
10/04/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
11/04/2022	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
12/04/2022	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
13/04/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
14/04/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
15/04/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
16/04/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
17/04/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
18/04/2022	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
19/04/2022	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
20/04/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
21/04/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
22/04/2022	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
23/04/2022	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day

24/04/2022	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
25/04/2022	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
26/04/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
27/04/2022	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
28/04/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
29/04/2022	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
30/04/2022	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
01/05/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
02/05/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
03/05/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
04/05/2022	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
05/05/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
06/05/2022	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
07/05/2022	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
08/05/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
09/05/2022	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
10/05/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
11/05/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
12/05/2022	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
13/05/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
14/05/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
15/05/2022	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
16/05/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
17/05/2022	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
18/05/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
19/05/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
20/05/2022	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
21/05/2022	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
22/05/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
23/05/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
24/05/2022	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
25/05/2022	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
26/05/2022	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
27/05/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
28/05/2022	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
29/05/2022	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
30/05/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
31/05/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	Event Day
01/06/2022	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
02/06/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
03/06/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
04/06/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
05/06/2022	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
06/06/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	Event Day

07/06/2022	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
08/06/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
09/06/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
10/06/2022	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
11/06/2022	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
12/06/2022	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
13/06/2022	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	Event Day
14/06/2022	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
15/06/2022	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
16/06/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
17/06/2022	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
18/06/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
19/06/2022	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
20/06/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
21/06/2022	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
22/06/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
23/06/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
24/06/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
25/06/2022	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
26/06/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
27/06/2022	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
28/06/2022	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
29/06/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
30/06/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
01/07/2022	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
02/07/2022	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	Event Day
03/07/2022	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
04/07/2022	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
05/07/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
06/07/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	Event Day
07/07/2022	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
08/07/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
09/07/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
10/07/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
11/07/2022	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
12/07/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
13/07/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
14/07/2022	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
15/07/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
16/07/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	Event Day
17/07/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
18/07/2022	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
19/07/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	Event Day
20/07/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day

21/07/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
22/07/2022	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
23/07/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
24/07/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
25/07/2022	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
26/07/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
27/07/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
28/07/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
29/07/2022	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
30/07/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
31/07/2022	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
01/08/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
02/08/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
03/08/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	Event Day
04/08/2022	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
05/08/2022	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
06/08/2022	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	Event Day
07/08/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	Event Day
08/08/2022	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	Event Day
09/08/2022	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
10/08/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
11/08/2022	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	Event Day
12/08/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
13/08/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
14/08/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
15/08/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
16/08/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
17/08/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
18/08/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
19/08/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	Event Day
20/08/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
21/08/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	Event Day
22/08/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	Event Day
23/08/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	Event Day
24/08/2022	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
25/08/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	Event Day
26/08/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
27/08/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
28/08/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
29/08/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
30/08/2022	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
31/08/2022	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
01/09/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
02/09/2022	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day

03/09/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
04/09/2022	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
05/09/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
06/09/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
07/09/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
08/09/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
09/09/2022	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
10/09/2022	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
11/09/2022	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	Event Day
12/09/2022	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
13/09/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
14/09/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
15/09/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
16/09/2022	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
17/09/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
18/09/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
19/09/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
20/09/2022	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
21/09/2022	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
22/09/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
23/09/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
24/09/2022	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
25/09/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
26/09/2022	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	Event Day
27/09/2022	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	Event Day
28/09/2022	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
29/09/2022	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
30/09/2022	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
01/10/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
02/10/2022	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
03/10/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
04/10/2022	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
05/10/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
06/10/2022	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	Event Day
07/10/2022	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
08/10/2022	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
09/10/2022	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
10/10/2022	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
11/10/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	Event Day
12/10/2022	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
13/10/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
14/10/2022	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
15/10/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
16/10/2022	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	Event Day

17/10/2022	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	Event Day
18/10/2022	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
19/10/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
20/10/2022	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
21/10/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	Event Day
22/10/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	Event Day
23/10/2022	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
24/10/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
25/10/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	Event Day
26/10/2022	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
27/10/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
28/10/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
29/10/2022	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	Event Day
30/10/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
31/10/2022	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
01/11/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
02/11/2022	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
03/11/2022	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
04/11/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
05/11/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
06/11/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
07/11/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
08/11/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
09/11/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
10/11/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
11/11/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
12/11/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
13/11/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
14/11/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
15/11/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
16/11/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
17/11/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
18/11/2022	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
19/11/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	Event Day
20/11/2022	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
21/11/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	Event Day
22/11/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	Event Day
23/11/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
24/11/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
25/11/2022	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
26/11/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
27/11/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
28/11/2022	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
29/11/2022	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day

30/11/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
01/12/2022	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
02/12/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
03/12/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
04/12/2022	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
05/12/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
06/12/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
07/12/2022	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
08/12/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
09/12/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
10/12/2022	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
11/12/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
12/12/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
13/12/2022	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
14/12/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
15/12/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
16/12/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
17/12/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
18/12/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
19/12/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
20/12/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
21/12/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
22/12/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
23/12/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
24/12/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
25/12/2022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
26/12/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
27/12/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
28/12/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
29/12/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
30/12/2022	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
31/12/2022	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
01/01/2023	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
02/01/2023	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
03/01/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
04/01/2023	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
05/01/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
06/01/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
07/01/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
08/01/2023	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
09/01/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
10/01/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
11/01/2023	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
12/01/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day

13/01/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
14/01/2023	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
15/01/2023	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
16/01/2023	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
17/01/2023	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
18/01/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
19/01/2023	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
20/01/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
21/01/2023	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
22/01/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
23/01/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
24/01/2023	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
25/01/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
26/01/2023	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
27/01/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
28/01/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
29/01/2023	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
30/01/2023	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
31/01/2023	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
01/02/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
02/02/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
03/02/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
04/02/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
05/02/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
06/02/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
07/02/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
08/02/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
09/02/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
10/02/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
11/02/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
12/02/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
13/02/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
14/02/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
15/02/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
16/02/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
17/02/2023	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
18/02/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
19/02/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
20/02/2023	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
21/02/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
22/02/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
23/02/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
24/02/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
25/02/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day

26/02/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
27/02/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
28/02/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
01/03/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
02/03/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
03/03/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
04/03/2023	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
05/03/2023	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
06/03/2023	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
07/03/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
08/03/2023	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
09/03/2023	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
10/03/2023	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
11/03/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
12/03/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
13/03/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
14/03/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
15/03/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
16/03/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
17/03/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
18/03/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
19/03/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
20/03/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
21/03/2023	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
22/03/2023	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
23/03/2023	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
24/03/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
25/03/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
26/03/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
27/03/2023	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
28/03/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
29/03/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
30/03/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
31/03/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
01/04/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
02/04/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
03/04/2023	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
04/04/2023	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
05/04/2023	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
06/04/2023	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
07/04/2023	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
08/04/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
09/04/2023	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
10/04/2023	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day

11/04/2023	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
12/04/2023	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
13/04/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
14/04/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
15/04/2023	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
16/04/2023	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
17/04/2023	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
18/04/2023	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
19/04/2023	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
20/04/2023	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
21/04/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
22/04/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
23/04/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
24/04/2023	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
25/04/2023	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
26/04/2023	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
27/04/2023	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
28/04/2023	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
29/04/2023	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
30/04/2023	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
01/05/2023	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
02/05/2023	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
03/05/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
04/05/2023	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
05/05/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
06/05/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
07/05/2023	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
08/05/2023	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
09/05/2023	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
10/05/2023	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
11/05/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
12/05/2023	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
13/05/2023	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
14/05/2023	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
15/05/2023	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
16/05/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
17/05/2023	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
18/05/2023	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
19/05/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
20/05/2023	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	Event Day
21/05/2023	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
22/05/2023	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
23/05/2023	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
24/05/2023	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day

25/05/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
26/05/2023	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
27/05/2023	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
28/05/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
29/05/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
30/05/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
31/05/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
01/06/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
02/06/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
03/06/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
04/06/2023	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
05/06/2023	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
06/06/2023	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
07/06/2023	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
08/06/2023	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
09/06/2023	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
10/06/2023	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
11/06/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	Event Day
12/06/2023	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	Event Day
13/06/2023	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
14/06/2023	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
15/06/2023	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
16/06/2023	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
17/06/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
18/06/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
20/06/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
21/06/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
22/06/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
23/06/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
24/06/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
25/06/2023	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
26/06/2023	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
27/06/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
28/06/2023	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
29/06/2023	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
30/06/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
01/07/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
02/07/2023	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
03/07/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
04/07/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
05/07/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
06/07/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
07/07/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
08/07/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day

09/07/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
10/07/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
11/07/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
12/07/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
13/07/2023	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
14/07/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
15/07/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
16/07/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
17/07/2023	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
18/07/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
19/07/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
20/07/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
21/07/2023	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
22/07/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
23/07/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
24/07/2023	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
25/07/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
26/07/2023	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
27/07/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
28/07/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
29/07/2023	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
30/07/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
31/07/2023	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
01/08/2023	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
02/08/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
03/08/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
04/08/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
05/08/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
06/08/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
07/08/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
08/08/2023	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
09/08/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
10/08/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
11/08/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
12/08/2023	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
13/08/2023	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
14/08/2023	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
15/08/2023	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
16/08/2023	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
17/08/2023	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
18/08/2023	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
19/08/2023	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
20/08/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
21/08/2023	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day

22/08/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
23/08/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
24/08/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
25/08/2023	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
26/08/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
27/08/2023	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
28/08/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
29/08/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
30/08/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
31/08/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
01/09/2023	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
02/09/2023	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
03/09/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
04/09/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
05/09/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
06/09/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
07/09/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
08/09/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
09/09/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
10/09/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Event Day
11/09/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
12/09/2023	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
13/09/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
14/09/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
15/09/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
16/09/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
17/09/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
18/09/2023	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
19/09/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
20/09/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
21/09/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
22/09/2023	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
23/09/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
24/09/2023	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
25/09/2023	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
26/09/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
27/09/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
28/09/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
29/09/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
30/09/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
01/10/2023	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
02/10/2023	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
03/10/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
04/10/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day

05/10/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
06/10/2023	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
07/10/2023	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
08/10/2023	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
09/10/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
10/10/2023	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
11/10/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
12/10/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
13/10/2023	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
14/10/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
15/10/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
16/10/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
17/10/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
18/10/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
19/10/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
20/10/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
21/10/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
22/10/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
23/10/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
24/10/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
25/10/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
26/10/2023	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
27/10/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
28/10/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
29/10/2023	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
30/10/2023	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
31/10/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
01/11/2023	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
02/11/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
03/11/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
04/11/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
05/11/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
06/11/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
07/11/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
08/11/2023	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
09/11/2023	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
10/11/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
11/11/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
12/11/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
13/11/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
14/11/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
15/11/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
16/11/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
17/11/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day

18/11/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
19/11/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
20/11/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
21/11/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
22/11/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
23/11/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
24/11/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
25/11/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
26/11/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
27/11/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
28/11/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
29/11/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
30/11/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
01/12/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
02/12/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
03/12/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
04/12/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
05/12/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
06/12/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
07/12/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
08/12/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
09/12/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
10/12/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
11/12/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
12/12/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
13/12/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
14/12/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
15/12/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
16/12/2023	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
17/12/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
18/12/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
19/12/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
20/12/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
21/12/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
22/12/2023	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
23/12/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
24/12/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
25/12/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
26/12/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
27/12/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
28/12/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
29/12/2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
30/12/2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
31/12/2023	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day

[illegible]

13/05/2024	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
14/05/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
15/05/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
16/05/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
17/05/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
18/05/2024	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
19/05/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
20/05/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
21/05/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
22/05/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
23/05/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
24/05/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
25/05/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
26/05/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	Event Day
27/05/2024	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
28/05/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
29/05/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
30/05/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
31/05/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
01/06/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
02/06/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
03/06/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
04/06/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
05/06/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
06/06/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
07/06/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
08/06/2024	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
09/06/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
10/06/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
11/06/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
12/06/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
13/06/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
14/06/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
15/06/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
16/06/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
17/06/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
18/06/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
19/06/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
20/06/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
21/06/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
22/06/2024	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
23/06/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
24/06/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
25/06/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day

26/06/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
27/06/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
28/06/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
29/06/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
30/06/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
01/07/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
02/07/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
03/07/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
04/07/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
05/07/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
06/07/2024	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
07/07/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
08/07/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
09/07/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
10/07/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
11/07/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
12/07/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
13/07/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
14/07/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
15/07/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
16/07/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
17/07/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
18/07/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
19/07/2024	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
20/07/2024	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
21/07/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
22/07/2024	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
23/07/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
24/07/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
25/07/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
26/07/2024	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
27/07/2024	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
28/07/2024	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
29/07/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
30/07/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
31/07/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
01/08/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
02/08/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
03/08/2024	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
04/08/2024	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
05/08/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
06/08/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
07/08/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
08/08/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day

09/08/2024	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
10/08/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
11/08/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
12/08/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
13/08/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
14/08/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
15/08/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
16/08/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
17/08/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
18/08/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
19/08/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
20/08/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
21/08/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
22/08/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
23/08/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
24/08/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
25/08/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
26/08/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
27/08/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
29/08/2024	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
30/08/2024	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
31/08/2024	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
01/09/2024	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
02/09/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
03/09/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
04/09/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
05/09/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
06/09/2024	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
07/09/2024	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
08/09/2024	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
09/09/2024	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
10/09/2024	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
11/09/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
12/09/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
13/09/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
14/09/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
15/09/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
16/09/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
17/09/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
18/09/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
19/09/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
20/09/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
21/09/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
22/09/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day

23/09/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
24/09/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
25/09/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
26/09/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
27/09/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
28/09/2024	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
29/09/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
30/09/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
01/10/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
02/10/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
03/10/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
04/10/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
05/10/2024	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
06/10/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
07/10/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
08/10/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
09/10/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
10/10/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
11/10/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
12/10/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
13/10/2024	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
14/10/2024	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
15/10/2024	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
16/10/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
17/10/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
18/10/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
19/10/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
20/10/2024	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
21/10/2024	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
22/10/2024	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
23/10/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
24/10/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
25/10/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
26/10/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
27/10/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
28/10/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
29/10/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
30/10/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
31/10/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
01/11/2024	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
02/11/2024	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
03/11/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
04/11/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
05/11/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day

06/11/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
07/11/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
08/11/2024	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
09/11/2024	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
10/11/2024	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Event Day
11/11/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day
12/11/2024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Event Day

Table 9-Event Day/Non-Event Day Relation Matrix

Appendix 17- Relation between Event Days vs Non-Event Day YoY

Relation between Event Days vs Non-Event Day YoY					
Year	Event Day (%)	Event Day YoY	Non-Event Day (%)	Non-Event Day YoY	Year Difference
1	98.6%	-	1.4%	-	97.3%
2	87.1%	-11.7%	12.9%	837.4%	74.2%
3	70.6%	-19.0%	29.4%	128.3%	41.2%
4	21.2%	-70.0%	78.8%	168.2%	-57.7%

Table 10-Relation between Event Days vs Non-Event Day YoY

Appendix 23- Chronological analysis


Matrix of relations of the year of the conflict and the civil year						
Conflict Year/ Civil Year	N_of_Event registered	Max. of N_of_Event	Min. of N_of_Event	Average of N_of_Event	StdDev of N_of_Event	
1	1808	4	1	1,072997033	0,306328117	
2020	358	3	1	1,108359133	0,35773368	
2021	1450	4	1	1,064610866	0,292339425	
2	1529	16	1	1,0352065	0,515458371	
2021	174	2	1	1,011627907	0,10751701	
2022	1355	16	1	1,038314176	0,546940943	
3	985	2	1	1,00101626	0,031878836	
2022	110	1	1	1	0	
2023	875	2	1	1,001144165	0,033825505	
4	115	1	1	1	0	
2023	17	1	1	1	0	
2024	98	1	1	1	0	
Grand Total	4437	16	1	1,041304858	0,360857854	

Table 11-Number of events registered during the first 4 years of the 3rd phase of the Western Sahara Conflict.

Number of events registered during the first 4 years of the 3rd phase of the Western Sahara Conflict.	
Conflict Year	Number of Events registered
1	1808
2	1529
3	985
4	115
Grand Total	4437

Table 12- Matrix of relation of the year of the conflict and the civil year

Tendency of the registered events of the first four years of the 3rd phase of the Western Sahara War



Graphic 4-Tendency of the registered events of the first four years of the 3rd phase of the Western Sahara War

Western Sahara Conflict Monthly tendency					
Conflict Month	Number of Events	Max. Number of Events	Min. of Number of Events	Average of the Number of Events	Std. Dev of the Number of Events
1	208	3	1	1.136612022	0.389312577
2	248	4	1	1.07826087	0.353345238
3	174	4	1	1.167785235	0.525082806
4	124	2	1	1.008130081	0.090166963
5	141	3	1	1.068181818	0.30749373
6	109	2	1	1.028301887	0.166621737
7	126	2	1	1.125	0.332205299
8	153	3	1	1.167938931	0.395215068
9	125	2	1	1.008064516	0.089802651
10	122	2	1	1.008264463	0.090909091
11	140	2	1	1.02189781	0.146886976
12	138	2	1	1.00729927	0.085435766
13	97	2	1	1.010416667	0.102062073

14	113	2	1	1.027272727	0.163622463
15	158	16	1	1.224806202	1.687455139
16	121	1	1	1	0
17	100	2	1	1.041666667	0.200875278
18	102	1	1	1	0
19	124	1	1	1	0
20	109	1	1	1	0
21	117	1	1	1	0
22	125	2	1	1.059322034	0.237233805
23	244	2	1	1.029535865	0.16966129
24	119	2	1	1.008474576	0.092057462
25	58	1	1	1	0
26	86	1	1	1	0
27	77	1	1	1	0
28	81	1	1	1	0
29	88	1	1	1	0
30	114	1	1	1	0
31	143	1	1	1	0
32	64	1	1	1	0
33	63	1	1	1	0
34	65	2	1	1.015625	0.125
35	86	1	1	1	0
36	60	1	1	1	0
37	6	1	1	1	0
38	15	1	1	1	0
39	8	1	1	1	0
40	5	1	1	1	0
41	2	1	1	1	0
42	15	1	1	1	0
43	10	1	1	1	0
44	4	1	1	1	0
45	13	1	1	1	0
46	14	1	1	1	0
47	5	1	1	1	0
48	18	1	1	1	0
Grand Total	4437	16	1	1.041304858	0.360857854

Table 13-Western Sahara Conflict Monthly Tendency


Relation between Event Days vs Non-Event Days

Status	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Year 4	Total
Event Day	359	318	257	77	1011
Non-Event Day	5	47	107	287	446

Table 14-Relation between Event Days vs Non-Event Days

Relation between Event Days vs Non-Event Day YoY					
Year	Event Day (%)	Event Day YoY	Non-Event Day (%)	Non-Event Day YoY	Year Difference
1	98.6%	-	1.4%	-	97.3%
2	87.1%	-11.7%	12.9%	837.4%	74.2%
3	70.6%	-19.0%	29.4%	128.3%	41.2%
4	21.2%	-70.0%	78.8%	168.2%	-57.7%

Table 15-Relation between Event Days vs Non-Event Day YoY




Graphic 5-Event Day vs Non-Event Day Relation Matrix

Western Sahara Conflict: Seasonal Tendency					
Season	Number of Events	Max. Number of Events	Min. of Number of Events	Average of the Number of Events	Std. Dev of the Number of Events
Autumn	1187	3	1	1.034873583	0.201662066
Spring	1096	3	1	1.026217228	0.165614693
Summer	991	3	1	1.032291667	0.182666378
Winter	1163	16	1	1.070902394	0.640809192
Grand Total	4437	16	1	1.041304858	0.360857854

Table 16- Western Sahara Conflict Season tendency

Western Sahara Conflict Season tendency (%)		
Season	Number of Events	Number of Events (%)
Autumn	1187	26.75%
Spring	1096	24.70%
Summer	991	22.33%
Winter	1163	26.21%
Total Geral	4437	100.00%

Table 17- Western Sahara Conflict Season tendency (%)



Graphic 6- Western Sahara Conflict Season tendency (%)

Appendix 24- Geographical analysis: Mega-level

Mega-Level Analysis					
Mega-Level	Number of Events	Max. Number of Events	Min. of Number of Events	Average of the Number of Events	StdDev of Number of Events
C01	47	1	1	1	0
C02	4390	16	1	1.041765543	0.362838607
Grand Total	4437	16	1	1.041304858	0.360857854


Table 18-Mega-Level Analysis

Events		
Mega-Level	Number of Events	Number of Event (%)
C01	47	1.06%
C02	4390	98.94%
Grand Total	4437	100.00%

Table 19- Mega-Level Analysis (%).

Mega-Level Analysis-Detailed Overview-Yearly Evolution					
Mega-Level	Number of Events	Max. Number of Events	Min. of Number of Events	Average of the Number of Events	StdDev of Number of Events
C01	47	1	1	1	0
1	31	1	1	1	0
2	15	1	1	1	0
3	-	-	-	-	-
4	1	1	1	1	#DIV/0!
C02	4390	16	1	1.041765543	0.362838607
1	1777	4	1	1.074365175	0.309022505
2	1514	16	1	1.035567715	0.518085296
3	985	2	1	1.00101626	0.031878836
4	114	1	1	1	0
Grand Total	4437	16	1	1.041304858	0.360857854


Table 20-Mega-Level Analysis-Detailed Overview-Yearly Evolution



Graphic 7-Mega-Level Analysis (%)


Mega-Level Analysis-Detailed Overview-Military Distribution					
Mega-Level	Number of Events	Max. Number of Events	Min. of Number of Events	Average of the Number of Events	StdDev of Number of Events
C01	47	1	1	1	0
MR1	47	1	1	1	0
S1	-	-	-	-	-
S2	47	1	1	1	0
C02	4390	16	1	1.041765543	0.362838607
MR1	2316	13	1	1.036705461	0.31742227
S3	1761	3	1	1.017919075	0.141144026
S4	555	13	1	1.101190476	0.611095691
MR2	1356	16	1	1.040675365	0.454406828
S5	928	16	1	1.045045045	0.535333503
S6	164	2	1	1.031446541	0.17507263
S7	123	2	1	1.008196721	0.090535746
S8	141	3	1	1.052238806	0.254793568
MR3	718	4	1	1.0605613	0.299202556
S10	220	4	1	1.067961165	0.30482737
S11	338	3	1	1.062893082	0.29044803
S12	36	1	1	1	0
S13	5	4	1	2.5	2.121320344
S9	119	3	1	1.034782609	0.22674024
Grand Total	4437	16	1	1.041304858	0.360857854

Table 21-Mega-Level Analysis-Detailed Overview-Military Distribution



Map 6--Western Sahara War Map: Mega-level analysis (four years comparison). Source: WSWA. Author: Self

Evolution of the 3rd phase of the Western Sahara Conflict 2020-2024 (Mega-Level)



Graphic 8-Evolution of the 3rd phase of the Western Sahara Conflict 2020-2024 (Mega-Level)


Appendix 25- Geographical analysis: Macro-level

Macro-Level -Year Analysis					
Macro-Level /Year	Number of Events	Max. Number of Events	Min. of Number of Events	Average of the Number of Events	StdDev of Number of Events
MR1	2363	13	1	1.035949145	0.314176849
1	914	3	1	1.067757009	0.282159785
2	812	13	1	1.030456853	0.444175972
3	560	1	1	1	0
4	77	1	1	1	0
MR2	1356	16	1	1.040675365	0.454406828
1	507	3	1	1.062893082	0.275441615
2	468	16	1	1.051685393	0.722563062
3	348	1	1	1	0
4	33	1	1	1	0
MR3	718	4	1	1.0605613	0.299202556
1	387	4	1	1.099431818	0.39048471
2	249	2	1	1.020491803	0.141966509
3	77	2	1	1.013157895	0.114707867
4	5	1	1	1	0
Total Geral	4437	16	1	1.041304858	0.360857854


Table 22-Macro-Level -Year Analysis

Macro-Level -Year Analysis (%)		
Macro-Level/Year	Number of Events	Number of Events (%)
MR1	2363	53.26%
1	914	20.60%
2	812	18.30%
3	560	12.62%
4	77	1.74%
MR2	1356	30.56%
1	507	11.43%
2	468	10.55%
3	348	7.84%
4	33	0.74%
MR3	718	16.18%
1	387	8.72%
2	249	5.61%
3	77	1.74%
4	5	0.11%
Total Geral	4437	100.00%


Table 23-Macro-Level -Year Analysis (%)




Graphic 9-Macro-Level -Year Analysis (%)




Graphic 10-Macro-Level -Year Analysis




Map 7-Number of POLISARIO attacks registered during Year 1 of the Third Phase of the Western Sahara Conflict (Macro-Level). Author: Self




Map 8-Number of POLISARIO attacks registered during Year 2 of the Third Phase of the Western Sahara Conflict (Macro-Level). Author: Self



Map 9-Number of POLISARIO attacks registered during Year 3 of the Third Phase of the Western Sahara Conflict (Macro-Level). Author: Self



Map 10-Number of POLISARIO attacks registered during Year 4 of the Third Phase of the Western Sahara Conflict (Macro-Level). Author: Self



Graphic 11-Evolution of the 3rd phase of the Western Sahara Conflict


Appendix 26- Geographical analysis: Meso-level

Macro-Level /Meso-Level-Total Analysis					
Macro-Level /Meso-Level	Number of Events	Max. Number of Events	Min. of Number of Events	Average of the Number of Events	StdDev of Number of Events
MR1	2363	13	1	1.035949145	0.314176849
S1	-	-	-	-	-
Aaga	-	-	-	-	-
S2	47	1	1	1	0
Touizgui	47	1	1	1	0
S3	1761	3	1	1.017919075	0.141144026
El Mahbes	1761	3	1	1.017919075	0.141144026
S4	555	13	1	1.101190476	0.611095691
Farsia	555	13	1	1.101190476	0.611095691
MR2	1356	16	1	1.040675365	0.454406828
S5	928	16	1	1.045045045	0.535333503
Haouza	928	16	1	1.045045045	0.535333503
S6	164	2	1	1.031446541	0.17507263
Smara	164	2	1	1.031446541	0.17507263
S7	123	2	1	1.008196721	0.090535746
Amgala	123	2	1	1.008196721	0.090535746
S8	141	3	1	1.052238806	0.254793568
Guelta Zemmour	141	3	1	1.052238806	0.254793568
MR3	718	4	1	1.0605613	0.299202556
S9	119	3	1	1.034782609	0.22674024
Oum Dreiga	119	3	1	1.034782609	0.22674024
S10	220	4	1	1.067961165	0.30482737
El Bagari	220	4	1	1.067961165	0.30482737
S11	338	3	1	1.062893082	0.29044803
Auserd	338	3	1	1.062893082	0.29044803
S12	36	1	1	1	0
Techla	36	1	1	1	0
S13	5	4	1	2.5	2.121320344
Bir Guendouz	5	4	1	2.5	2.121320344
Grand Total	4437	16	1	1.041304858	0.360857854


Table 24-Macro-Level /Meso-Level-Total Analysis

Macro-Level /Meso-Level-Total Analysis (%)		
Macro-Level /Meso-Level	Number of Events	Number of Events (%)
MR1	2363	53.26%
S1		0.00%
S2	47	1.06%
S3	1761	39.69%
S4	555	12.51%
MR2	1356	30.56%
S5	928	20.92%
S6	164	3.70%
S7	123	2.77%
S8	141	3.18%
MR3	718	16.18%
S9	119	2.68%
S10	220	4.96%
S11	338	7.62%
S12	36	0.81%
S13	5	0.11%
Total Geral	4437	100.00%


Table 25-Macro-Level /Meso-Level-Total Analysis (%)




Graphic 13-Number of Events per Sector




Graphic 12-Macro-Level /Meso-Level-Total Analysis (%)




Map 11- Number of POLISARIO attacks registered during Year 1 of the Third Phase of the Western Sahara Conflict (Meso-Level). Author: Self



Map 12-Number of POLISARIO attacks registered during Year 2 of the Third Phase of the Western Sahara Conflict (Meso-Level). Author: Self



Map 13-Number of POLISARIO attacks registered during Year 3 of the Third Phase of the Western Sahara Conflict (Meso-Level). Author: Self



Map 14-Number of POLISARIO attacks registered during Year 4 of the Third Phase of the Western Sahara Conflict (Meso-Level). Author: Self

