

FACULDADE DE ENGENHARIA DA UNIVERSIDADE DO PORTO

Open-Source Framework for Digital Forensics Investigations

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Resumo

Nos últimos anos, os avanços tecnológicos levaram à adoção generalizada de novas ferramentas por indivíduos e empresas. No entanto, a atratividade e adequação dessas tecnologias emergentes também as tornam vulneráveis a ataques cibernéticos. Os serviços de *cloud*, uma tecnologia recentemente adotada, têm visto uma rápida expansão no seu uso, resultando num aumento correspondente de cibercrime no ambiente *cloud*.

Na área do cibercrime, como em qualquer outro crime, os criminosos inevitavelmente deixam rastros das suas ações, seja ao trazer algo consigo ou ao deixar algo para trás. Esta evidência é crucial nas investigações forenses no mundo cibernético. No entanto, o paradigma forense convencional deve adaptar-se à forense em *cloud* devido à falta de acesso físico aos dispositivos e *logs* de aplicações.

Os desafios intensificam-se quando os atacantes utilizam vários serviços, complicando a identificação, preservação e recolha de evidências. À medida que os atacantes cibernéticos se tornam mais sofisticados, a complexidade da aquisição de evidências aumenta.

Considerando esses desafios, um dos principais objetivos desta dissertação é investigar o panorama atual de *cloud forensics*, explorando os seus desafios e os respetivos progressos e soluções. Após obter conhecimento do estado atual de *cloud forensics*, esta dissertação apresenta uma *open-source framework* projetada para apoiar investigadores de *digital forensics*. Esta *framework* é desenvolvida para abranger todas as fases da investigação forense, incluindo a coleta de evidências, examinação, análise e relatório, assim preenchendo uma lacuna de *cloud forensics* e melhorando a eficiência das investigações forenses.

Abstract

Over recent years, technological advancements have led to the widespread adoption of new tools by individuals and businesses. However, the attractiveness and appropriateness of these emerging technologies also make them vulnerable to cyber-attacks. Cloud services, a technology recently embraced, have seen rapid expansion in usage, resulting in a corresponding increase in cybercrime within the cloud environment.

In the domain of cybercrime, as in any other crime, perpetrators inevitably leave traces of their actions, whether by bringing something with them or leaving something behind. This evidence is pivotal in forensic investigations in the cyber world. However, the conventional forensic paradigm must adapt to cloud forensics due to the lack of physical access to computing devices and application logs.

The challenges intensify when attackers use various services, complicating the identification, preservation, and collection of evidence. As cyber attackers become more sophisticated, the complexity of evidence acquisition increases.

Considering these challenges, one of the key objectives of this dissertation is to investigate the current landscape of cloud forensics by exploring its challenges and their ongoing progress and solutions. After gathering knowledge of the current state of cloud forensics, this dissertation introduces an open-source framework tailored to support digital forensics investigators. This framework is designed to cover all phases of forensic investigation, including evidence collection, examination, analysis and reporting, thereby addressing a gap in cloud forensics and enhancing the efficiency of forensic investigations.

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*“To be a champ
you have to believe in yourself
when nobody else will.”*

Sugar Ray Robinson

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Acronyms

ABAC Attribute-Based Access Control.

AI Artificial Intelligence.

API Application Programming Interface.

AWS Amazon Web Services.

BCFL Blockchain Cloud Forensic Logging.

C2 Command and Control.

CADF Cloud Auditing Data Federation.

CC FSWG Cloud Computing Forensic Science Working Group.

CCFRA Cloud Computing Forensic Reference Architecture.

CCM Cloud Controls Matrix.

CCSRA Cloud Computing Security Reference Architecture.

CSA Cloud Security Alliance.

CSA's EA Cloud Security Alliance's Enterprise Architecture.

CSP Cloud Service Provider.

DDoS Distributed Denial of Service.

DNS Domain Name System.

FQDN Fully Qualified Domain Name.

FRA Forensic Reference Architecture.

GCE Google Compute Engine.

GCP Google Cloud Platforms.

GCS Google Cloud Storage.

GDPR General Data Protection Regulation.

GRR Google Rapid Response.

HRW Hybrid Runbook Worker.

IaaS Infrastructure-as-a-Service.

IAM Identity and Access Management.

IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers.

ISC-SF Intelligent System for Cloud SaaS Forensics.

LEA Law Enforcement Agency.

LLM Large Language Model.

NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology.

NSG Network Security Group.

OS Operating System.

PaaS Platform-as-a-Service.

PoC Proof of Concept.

RAG Retrieval-Augmented Generation.

RAT Remote Access Trojan.

RBAC Role-Based Access Control.

SaaS Software-as-a-Service.

SAS Shared Access Signatures.

SDN Software-Defined Network.

SIFT SANS Investigative Forensic Toolkit.

SOC Security Operation Center.

SSM Systems Manager.

VM Virtual Machine.

VPC Virtual Private Cloud.

WORM Write Once, Read Many.

XaaS X-as-a-Service.

Chapter 1

Introduction

The continuous evolution of technology is leading to the development of increasingly sophisticated software and products, impacting everyone's daily life [37]. This progress is marked by the widespread adoption of technological devices and the constant introduction of new technologies with enhanced features.

However, this rapid development also gives rise to vulnerabilities, potentially leading to increased occurrences of cyberattack events [113]. Cyber attackers are adapting to these advancements, becoming more cautious, sophisticated, and creative in exploiting emerging weaknesses [27]. In the same way, as our lives become increasingly dependent on these technologies, we become more and more vulnerable to attacks, being the last capable of ruining someone's life.

In addition, these technological advancements pose significant challenges for experts investigating cybercrime. The sheer volume of evidence data has surged, driven by the expanding digital footprint of individuals and the growing prevalence of more complex technologies like cloud computing, each bringing its own set of challenges [99]. In this way, due to these difficulties faced by the investigators and the fact that cybercriminals are becoming more out of the box, the processes and tools employed by the experts also need to adapt and follow the updates of this environment [44].

1.1 Motivation

Upon thoroughly examining recent studies that delve into the current challenges in the digital forensics environment, it becomes evident that there is a need for expanded research in the cloud forensics field.

A review of reviews published in 2022, exploring trends, challenges, and emerging issues [28], identifies an array of challenges in cloud forensics. Despite considerable research in this domain, the authors note that numerous challenges and limitations still demand attention. The review also highlights a need for more work focusing on standard tools, cloud technologies, and viable solutions for these challenges.

In a recent work, Lillis et al. emphasize that despite advancements in tools and techniques, existing challenges persist as obstacles in current investigations [69]. Moreover, the disparities between conventional forensic techniques and those applicable to the cloud underscore a compelling need for further investigations, given the unique requirements and obstacles imposed by the cloud environment.

This opens the door to new investigations in the field, offering the possibility of addressing some of existing challenges and facilitating digital investigations that include the cloud environment. Such efforts not only streamline the work of digital investigators but also contribute to advancements in this field of study.

1.2 Problem

The field of digital forensics encounters numerous challenges [18], notably in handling investigations within cloud environments [28]. These challenges demand specialized tools capable of managing the entire forensic process effectively. Traditional forensic methods are often insufficient in cloud environments due to their dynamic nature and the complexities associated with virtualization and distributed systems [67]. Thus, there is a need for a tool to seamlessly integrate and automate forensic tasks across all investigation stages [22].

Forensic investigations require attention to detail and adherence to strict procedures to ensure the integrity and admissibility of digital evidence. The solution to this problem must encompass all characteristics of a robust forensic mechanism while maintaining the chain of custody and ensuring compliance with legal standards. Additionally, the solution should enhance forensic capabilities, improve efficiency, and deliver reliable results that withstand legal scrutiny. Automation of forensics tasks is indispensable [87], allowing for the simplification of workflows and enabling investigators to focus on analysis and decision-making [54].

1.3 Objectives

To address some the challenges prevalent in the contemporary cloud forensics environment, this dissertation has outlined the following objectives:

1. **State of the Art Review** – Conduct a survey of the state of art in cloud forensics, including examining existing tools and procedures, the challenges they encounter, and ongoing efforts to mitigate difficulties related to data acquisition and the storage of immutable evidence.
2. **Study of the Current Challenges** – Analyze the existing challenges within the cloud forensics environment, delving into their complexities, and explore potential solutions to overcome them.
3. **Streamline cloud-based digital investigation** – Specify and design a solution designed to streamline the work of digital investigators when dealing with the cloud ecosystem. The

aim is to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of digital investigators, contributing to advancements in this field of study.

4. **Implement a Prototype** – Implement a Proof of Concept (PoC) prototype of the proposed solution that will be used to perform its validation and evaluation.

1.4 Document Structure

This document is organized in chapters. Chapter 2 furnishes essential knowledge to comprehend the concepts discussed in this dissertation. It offers a background in digital and cloud forensics to contextualize our research. Chapter 3 summarizes key ideas gathered from the research and publications analyzed. It underscores the importance of a well-informed starting point and illustrates the initial analysis conducted to guide the trajectory of the investigation. Chapter 4 presents the current state of the technical cloud forensic challenges published by the NIST. Chapter 5 describes the proposed solution, exposing its architecture, components and requirements, and defines the reference scenario. Chapter 6 reveals features of the developed framework, detailing implementation specifics and justifying decisions made when facing particular problems. Chapter 7 is dedicated to validating the framework and demonstrating how it meets the requirements previously established. The final chapter, Chapter 8, concludes the study and discusses future work that can enhance the developed framework, further empowering digital forensic investigators.

Chapter 2

Cloud Computing and Digital Forensics

This chapter introduces relevant concepts related to cloud computing, digital forensics, and cloud forensics. It underscores the significance of achieving robust data preservation and confidentiality, covering crucial techniques such as secure hash functions and other cryptographic methods. Additionally, it delineates the fundamental differences between traditional forensics and cloud forensics. The chapter concludes by providing background knowledge about Command and Control (C2) servers and RATs, which will be used as the reference scenario in subsequent analyses.

2.1 Cloud Computing

Cloud computing is the on-demand delivery of computing resources, such as networks, servers, databases, software, and computing power, over the internet. It is considered a metaphor for the internet [114], where the services are accessible to users on any device with internet access, and everything can be provided to the customer as a service [51]. According to the NIST [86], cloud computing is defined as:

"a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction."

The cloud offers various models, allowing customers to choose the ones that best suit their needs. Different deployment models and service models, better described in Subsections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2, contribute to this flexibility. Most individuals and businesses are already using cloud services, whether through popular social networks like Facebook and LinkedIn, streaming platforms like Spotify and Netflix, file storage services like Dropbox, cloud email services such as Google Gmail, or hosting websites and storing online backups using Microsoft 365.

In addition, the definition provided by NIST for cloud computing refers that the cloud model includes five essential characteristics [86]. *On-demand self-service* allows users to provision computing resources without direct interaction with service providers. *Broad network access* ensures

that services are accessible over the network through standard mechanisms, catering to various client platforms. *Resource pooling* enables providers to share resources among multiple consumers using a dynamic, multi-tenant model. This characteristic also includes location independence, allowing resource allocation without specifying the exact physical location, although customers may specify the location at a higher level of abstraction. *Rapid elasticity* permits resources to be quickly scaled up or down, sometimes automatically, to meet demand, providing an appearance of limitless capabilities. Lastly, *measured service* involves cloud systems control and optimization of resource use through automatic metering. This ensures that resource usage can be monitored, controlled, and reported, providing transparency for providers and consumers of the utilized service.

2.1.1 Deployment Models

As we explore the characteristics of cloud computing, it becomes apparent that different models cater to various customer requirements. The diverse cloud deployment models identify distinct types of cloud environments with unique characteristics, particularly in how resources are shared. This diversity aims to provide additional flexibility to meet the varied needs of customers. The primary deployment models are:

- **Private cloud** – A private cloud is a deployment model in which the cloud infrastructure and computing resources are dedicated to and maintained on a private network for the exclusive use of a single customer. The private cloud may be physically located at the customer's data centre or hosted by a third-party service provider [96].
- **Community cloud** – A community cloud is a deployment model in which the same cloud infrastructure is exclusively shared among customers with similar concerns, requirements, or interests, who collaborate to define the features and policies of the infrastructure. This model may be hosted by one or more customers, by a third-party provider or some combination of them, and may exist on or off premises [86].
- **Public cloud** – A public cloud is a deployment model where various cloud resources, including hardware, storage, and network infrastructure, are shared among customers. These resources are owned and managed by a third-party CSP and are made accessible to the public over the internet.
- **Hybrid cloud** – A hybrid cloud combines two or more distinct cloud infrastructures (private, community, or public) [86] to leverage the advantages of each. This deployment model facilitates the connection of different infrastructures, enabling the seamless movement of data and applications between them.
- **Multi-cloud and hybrid multi-cloud** – The multi-cloud approach involves integrating services from multiple CSPs. The adoption of a multi-cloud environment has been on the rise,

providing developers and companies with increased flexibility to choose platforms according to their preferences and allowing for seamless transitions between providers. Similarly, hybrid multi-cloud refers to implementing a hybrid cloud deployment utilizing infrastructures from different providers.

2.1.2 Service Models

Cloud service models delineate the functionality that the cloud provider offers, establishing the level of abstraction and control customers have over resources. Any resources beyond the customer's control are supplied and managed by the cloud provider. These services, commonly referred to as X-as-a-Service (XaaS), dictate the customer's interaction with the cloud, as illustrated in Figure 2.1. The three primary cloud service models are:

- **Software-as-a-service** – Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) refers to application software accessed by users over the internet and hosted in the cloud infrastructure. This cloud-based service model eliminates customers' need to install the application locally and manage or control the infrastructure, software, and data. The control of the applications and the underlying infrastructure lies with the providers [107], and typically, customers pay a monthly cost for this service.
- **Platform-as-a-service** – Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) is a service model that offers customers a platform for developing, deploying, running, and managing applications without needing to handle the underlying infrastructure's complexities. This includes network configuration, servers, Operating Systems (OSs), storage [86], and hardware maintenance. In this model, development teams acquire pay-as-you-go access to all essential components required for building custom applications, including infrastructure, development tools, and OSs [79].
- **Infrastructure-as-a-service** – Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) is a service model provided over the internet that grants customers access to IT infrastructure, including compute, storage, and network resources, on a pay-as-you-go basis [16]. This model provides users with the highest level of control over computing resources in the cloud, relieving them from managing or controlling the underlying cloud infrastructure and handling the associated maintenance or updates.

2.2 Digital Forensics

Digital forensics, also known as computer forensics, is a branch of forensic science that involves a systematic procedure within an investigation. According to the NIST definition, this procedure includes collecting data from digital media related to a specific incident, followed by examining and analysing that data [59]. As illustrated in Figure 2.2, the final phase of a digital forensics




Figure 2.1: Comparison of the different cloud service models [30]

investigation is the reporting phase, which is particularly crucial as it represents the outcome of the entire investigation.

2.2.1 Data collection

During the collection phase of a digital forensics investigation, the expert identifies potential data sources and gathers digital evidence from them. It is imperative to preserve all collected evidence throughout every phase of the investigation, emphasizing the need to protect the integrity of the data by maintaining its original state and adhering to a strict chain of custody. This is essential for the admissibility of the evidence in a court of law.

2.2.2 Data examination

In the subsequent processing phase, all collected data is scrutinized to identify suspicious data relevant to the investigation [62]. Once the pertinent information is singled out, the investigation progresses to the analysis phase.

2.2.3 Data analysis

The investigator scrutinizes the data during analysis, aiming to draw meaningful conclusions. This involves identifying people, places, items, and events and discerning the relationships among these elements. Frequently, this effort entails correlating data from multiple sources to derive a comprehensive understanding and reach informed conclusions [59].

2.2.4 Reporting

The concluding stage of a digital forensics investigation is the reporting phase, a critical step as it encapsulates the culmination of the entire investigative process. The resulting report is pivotal

in presenting a comprehensive overview of all the relevant facts and findings obtained throughout the investigation. The digital artefacts identified and proven through the forensic process play a crucial role in achieving the investigation's goals, where it is often required to answer specific questions or solve a particular problem.

This documentation serves as a key deliverable to establish the truth about an incident and provide a clear and concise interpretation of the forensic analysis conducted and the outcomes obtained. It facilitates laypersons' understanding while maintaining the necessary level of validation and detail for experts in the field. This balance ensures that the report is not only accessible to a broader audience but is also robust and reliable in its presentation of the forensic findings.




Figure 2.2: Forensic process [59]

2.3 Cloud Forensics

Cloud forensics is the application of forensic science to the cloud environment, involving studying incidents that occur in the cloud to understand them comprehensively. The primary objective is to determine how the incidents occurred. According to a survey conducted by Ruan [60], the prevailing viewpoint among respondents characterizes cloud forensics as *"a hybrid forensic approach towards the generation of digital evidence. Organizationally, it involves interactions among cloud actors for the purpose of facilitating both internal and external investigations"*.

NIST also provides a detailed definition, describing cloud forensics as *"the application of scientific principles, technological practices, and derived and proven methods to reconstruct past cloud computing events through the identification, acquisition, preservation, examination, interpretation, and reporting of potential digital evidence"* [49]. This approach highlights the systematic application of established forensic methodologies tailored to address the distinctive challenges inherent in cloud environments.

As the utilization of cloud services continues to grow, there is a corresponding rise in the potential for hackers to exploit cloud environments. This increasing threat landscape underscores the necessity for cloud forensics to enhance security and effectively investigate incidents in the cloud ecosystem.

Despite ongoing improvements in this field, numerous limitations persist, presenting difficulties for experts conducting investigations as summarised by a review of reviews published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) [28]:

- Updating forensic tools to combat novel cybercrime.
- Lack of forensic readiness mechanisms and their management.
- Challenges in data management and fragmentation hindering investigations.
- Issues with trust and robust preservation of the chain of custody.
- Lack of jurisdictional mechanisms for confidential data.
- Complexities in cross-border investigations due to different jurisdictions and laws.
- Lacks in training and interoperability between investigators and the court.
- Challenges posed by anti-forensics techniques.

2.3.0.1 Differences between traditional forensics and cloud forensics

Significant disparities exist between traditional and cloud forensics due to the distinctive nature of the cloud environment. These differences present unique challenges that necessitate specialized techniques and procedures for investigations in cloud environments. Some key distinctions include:

Evidence access

- Traditional forensics: Involves the investigation of evidence on physical devices with direct access.
- Cloud forensics: Lacks of physical access to the cloud, focusing on analyzing data stored in remote, virtualized environments managed by third-party providers.

Evidence collection

- Traditional forensics: Involves physical seizure and analysis of hardware devices.
- Cloud forensics: Usually, it involves remote access or collaboration with CSPs for data retrieval.

Scope of ownership

- Traditional forensics: Focuses on devices owned and controlled by the organization or individual under examination.
- Cloud forensics: Often involves investigating data and services owned by third-party service providers. This introduces privacy challenges and complexities, particularly due to the multi-tenancy feature of the cloud environment.

Nature of the environment

- Traditional forensics: Deals with stable, physical environments.
- Cloud forensics: Faces challenges from cloud environments' dynamic and less stable nature, including features like virtualization and data distribution.

Frameworks and tools

- Traditional forensics: Operates within established legal frameworks and jurisdictions, using tools optimized for analyzing data on physical devices.
- Cloud forensics: Introduces legal complexities due to data distribution across multiple locations and jurisdictions, requiring specialized tools to handle unique challenges.

When comparing both environments, it becomes evident that the challenges in cloud forensics are either unique to the cloud or exacerbated by its characteristics. The dynamic and distributed nature of the cloud environment offers opportunities for further research, as highlighted in publications such as the NIST Cloud Computing Forensic Science Challenges report [49].

2.4 Cybersecurity

2.4.1 Cryptographic Techniques

2.4.1.1 Secure Hash Functions

Secure Hash functions are functions that compress a string of arbitrary input to a string of fixed length. One notable property of these functions is that they are one-way functions: while it is easy to compute the output of any input x using the hash function H , it should be computationally infeasible to reverse the process and determine the input given the hash function H and the output $H(x)$ [121]. Another crucial characteristic of these functions is their collision resistance, emphasizing that it should be computationally infeasible to identify two different values x and y such that their hash images are the same, i.e., $H(x) = H(y)$. These functions play a crucial role in the digital forensics domain due to their characteristics, ensuring usability in various scenarios, including:

- Data identification and deduplication: The collision resistance characteristic allows hash values of data to serve as unique identifiers, facilitating the identification of data and the removal of duplicate data from the set of evidence data to be analyzed.
- Data integrity verification: Hash functions generate different outputs for distinct inputs. Consequently, by comparing hash values of the same data at different stages of an investigation, experts can demonstrate that the integrity of the data has been preserved.

- Chain of custody: Utilizing the above property, investigators can generate hash values of the data at various stages, providing evidence of non-tempering and proving the integrity preservation of the data throughout the investigation. This is important to ensure admissibility for legal purposes.
- Password storage: Hash functions are often employed to store passwords in databases. During an investigation, experts can discover potential passwords and use hash functions to compare their values with those stored in databases, potentially bypassing authentication for certain systems.
- Data signatures: Many companies publish digital signatures for their software to guarantee the origin and integrity of files. Investigators leverage hash values to validate the integrity and legitimate origin of specific files, enabling them to exclude such data from the set of evidence for analysis.
- Malicious data detection: Similarly, investigators utilize hash values to identify known malware and tampered software by comparing them to the hash values published by reputable companies. This aids in detecting malicious data from the set of evidence under analysis.

2.4.1.2 Encryption Functions

Encryption functions are employed to convert plaintext into ciphertext, using a decryption function to reverse this process. These cryptographic functions safeguard sensitive information by transforming it into unintelligible text, accessible only to authorized recipients who can decipher it back into the original form [101].

Since the digital forensics process involves extracting all potentially relevant data for an investigation, it is common for digital devices to contain information about individuals or entities other than the target [103]. This presents a challenge regarding privacy protection, as individuals have the right to control their data, including identity, personal information, and activities [34]. Encryption techniques are employed to secure private and sensitive data, address privacy concerns in digital forensics, and protect third-party information.

2.4.2 Malicious Software

2.4.2.1 Command and Control Server

A C2 server functions as a pivotal component within the cybercriminal infrastructure, serving as a hub for orchestrating and coordinating attacks across systems infected by malware. This clandestine server is under the direct control of the attacker, facilitating communication with compromised systems to disseminate tailored commands and receive exfiltrated data, as illustrated in Figure 2.3. Moreover, the C2 server can be leveraged to administer botnets - networks of compromised devices - whereby it coordinates the activities of malware deployed across the victim's machines, amplifying the attacker's capabilities and reach.

2.4.2.2 Remote Access Trojan

A RAT represents a form of malicious software engineered to enable unauthorized access to a compromised computer or device, affording the attacker remote control capabilities. RAT infections can originate through diverse vectors, including email attachments, dubious downloads, or system and software vulnerability exploitation. Once in the victim's environment, this malware establishes a communication channel with the attacker's server, facilitating the relay of instructions and data exchange. The transmitted data encompasses sensitive information, ranging from keystroke logs and login credentials to screenshots, browsing history, emails, and chat transcripts. A RAT functions as a clandestine entry point onto the victim's system, furnishing the attacker with the means to manipulate settings, monitor activities, propagate malware, orchestrate Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) assaults, and even exfiltrate data. Moreover, RATs establish enduring access from the compromised system through sophisticated persistence mechanisms while employing evasion tactics to obfuscate their C2 traffic, counteracting detection efforts.




Figure 2.3: RAT infection communications

Chapter 3

Cloud Forensics Survey and Challenges

This chapter provides an overview of the current state of cloud computing and forensics research. It begins with an examination of a report on the state of cloud computing in 2023, followed by a survey of the forensic procedures employed by the top three CSPs [81] [118]. The chapter concludes with an analysis of publications from the NIST addressing the challenges of cloud forensics [49] and the CCFRA, which is designed to help users understand the impact of these challenges [48].

3.1 Flexera State of the Cloud

The research was initiated by exploring reports and surveys identifying the leading cloud providers in 2023 to enhance the knowledge of the CSPs market leaders and effectively guide this investigation.

This led to the twelfth annual Flexera 2023 State of the Cloud Report, formerly known as the RightScale State of the Cloud Report [81]. This report delves into the latest trends and statistics, encompassing various industries and organizations' strategies, challenges, and initiatives.

Examining this report provides a comprehensive insight into the preferences of major enterprises, defined as those with more than 2000 employees. Despite a year-over-year decrease from 80% to 72%, hybrid cloud remains the predominant environment in 2023. Notably, there is a prevailing inclination toward the utilization of public clouds.

Among the available public clouds, the report emphasises the top six, as illustrated in Figure 3.1:

- Azure
- Amazon Web Services (AWS)
- Oracle Cloud Infrastructure
- Google Cloud Platforms (GCP)
- IBM Cloud

- Alibaba Cloud




Figure 3.1: CSPs trend [81]

3.2 Cloud Forensics Survey

With the market leaders' knowledge, assessing their current forensic readiness was essential. Therefore, the survey published in April 2022 by Sanda, P., Pawar, D., and Radha, V. [118] offers valuable insights into cloud forensic readiness. This survey addresses the challenge of inadequately documented forensic procedures implemented by CSPs and comprehensively compares the forensic procedures of the leading CSPs, namely AWS¹, Azure², and GCP³. It focuses on how these providers collect, analyze, and preserve evidential data for investigative purposes.

Thus, cloud forensics in the leading CSPs is performed through the following methodologies:

- Log forensics: Involves analyzing cloud log data to identify and understand various vulnerabilities and malicious behaviours [127].
- Disk forensics: Entails analyzing storage media by creating a snapshot - a logical copy of the virtual disk - of the suspicious disk and its associated volumes.
- Memory forensics: Also known as live forensics, involves analyzing volatile data stored in the memory of the affected cloud resource.

¹<https://aws.amazon.com/>

²<https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/>

³<https://cloud.google.com/?hl=en>

The survey is a valuable resource for understanding and assessing the robustness of the forensic procedures implemented by leading CSPs, thereby contributing to the enhancement of cloud forensic practices. The following sections provide a detailed summary of these forensic procedures based on the data gathered from the survey, supplemented by additional research to enrich the knowledge provided.

3.2.1 Log Forensics

Since cloud resources systematically record activities and events executed within the cloud in the form of logs, it becomes crucial to analyze these logs in the detection or occurrence of incidents, enabling investigators to reconstruct events based on them. While these logs are dispersed across decentralized resources, they are stored within the infrastructure of each CSP, which provides features such as filtering and querying to facilitate the investigative process.

To guarantee the admissibility of these logs in a court of law, their integrity is meticulously maintained by implementing hash techniques. Additionally, encryption is employed to uphold the confidentiality of the logs. This dual-layered approach ensures the reliability and accuracy of the logs for investigative purposes and safeguards sensitive information, reinforcing the robustness of the cloud environment's forensic capabilities.

The following subsections describe how the identified CSPs implement log forensics within their cloud services.

3.2.1.1 AWS log forensics

According to the survey, Amazon has implemented Amazon CloudWatch⁴, a comprehensive tool that centralizes logs from diverse sources and facilitates automated alerts triggered by specific events. CloudWatch collects monitoring data through logs, metrics, and events, providing a unified view of resources. It performs the collection, analysis, and display of logs and log metrics through a single dashboard.

CloudWatch logs can be categorized based on their source of generation [8]. Vended Logs are natively published by AWS services on behalf of customers. Examples include Amazon Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) Flow Logs, which capture network traffic data for network interfaces in a VPC [15], and Amazon Route 53 Logs, which record information about public Domain Name System (DNS) queries received by Amazon Route 53 [10]. Service logs are generated by the AWS services [9], while custom logs are produced by customer applications, on-premises resources, and other clouds.

Moreover, CloudWatch Logs Insights⁵ allows the analysis of log data, providing documentation of the log fields for the different log types on the AWS website [13].

⁴<https://aws.amazon.com/cloudwatch/>

⁵<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonCloudWatch/latest/logs/AnalyzingLogData.html>

To ensure the integrity and confidentiality of logs, Amazon CloudWatch employs hashing (SHA-256) and encryption (AES-256) techniques. Furthermore, these logs are stored for a customizable duration, securing the logs and offering flexibility in data retention based on specific requirements. Regarding access control, Amazon utilizes Identity and Access Management (IAM), enabling the assignment of customized policies to each IAM role.

3.2.1.2 Azure log forensics

Similar to Amazon, Azure utilizes Azure Monitor⁶ to collect and analyze data from its cloud resources, centralizing information for analytics and metrics. Monitoring agents are employed to gather data from resources, and the Azure Monitor Logs feature is then used to collect and organize log and performance data from monitored resources [88]. Additionally, Azure HDInsight⁷ performs big data analysis on cloud logs.

Azure logs are categorized into three main types based on their function. Control/Management logs provide information about Azure Resource Manager⁸ CUD operations (CREATE, UPDATE, DELETE). Data plane logs offer details about events related to Azure resource usage, such as diagnostics logs configured through Azure Monitor. Processed events furnish information about analyzed events and alerts the Azure Security Center generates. These categories help organize and manage log data for various operational and security purposes within the Azure ecosystem.

As detailed in Azure's documentation [98], the table 3.1 lists the most important types of logs available in Azure.

To ensure the integrity and confidentiality of logs, Azure employs hashing (SHA-256) and encryption (AES-256) techniques. Furthermore, log retention policies vary, with logs retained for seven days in the free tier and customizable durations for paid tiers. Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) secures access control to logs stored in the log analytics workspace.

3.2.1.3 GCP log forensics

Google has introduced the Google Cloud operations suite⁹, designed to collect and monitor data from Google Cloud resources. The Google Cloud Logging service¹⁰ collects logs from various sources, enabling advanced and custom filtering to identify suspicious activities. For data analysis, Google provides the Cloud Monitoring service¹¹, which utilizes the data collected by the Logging service, and BigQuery¹², a fully managed, AI-ready data analytics platform.

⁶<https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/overview>

⁷<https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/products/hdinsight>

⁸<https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-resource-manager/management/overview>

⁹<https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/developers-practitioners/introduction-google-clouds-operations-suite>

¹⁰<https://cloud.google.com/logging?hl=en>

¹¹<https://cloud.google.com/monitoring?hl=en>

¹²<https://cloud.google.com/bigquery?hl=en>

Log Category	Log type	Usage
Activity logs	Control-plane events on Azure Resource Manager resources	Provides insight into the operations in your that were performed on resources subscription
Microsoft Entra ID Reporting	Logs and reports	Reports user sign.in activities and system activity information about users and group management
VMs and cloud services	Windows Event Log service and Linux Syslog	Captures system data and logging data on the VMs and transfers that data into a storage account of your choice
Azure Storage Analytics	Storage logging, provides metrics data for a storage account	Provides insight into trace requests, analyzes usage trends, and diagnoses issues with your storage account
Network security group flow logs	JSON format, shows outbound flows on a per-rule basis and inbound	Displays information about ingress and egress IP traffic through a Network Security Group
Application Insight	Logs, exceptions, and custom diagnostics	Provides an application performance monitoring (APM) service for web developers on multiple platforms
Process data / security alerts	Microsoft Defender for Cloud alerts, Azure Monitor logs alerts	Provides security information and alerts

Table 3.1: Most important type of logs available in Azure

Google Cloud logs are categorized into several types [73]. Platform logs are generated by Google Cloud services, while Component logs are similar but generated by Google-provided software components running on customer systems. Customer activities on a VM instance with a logging agent installed produce User logs. Multi-cloud logs are logs generated from other CSPs, and Hybrid cloud logs refer to logs from on-premises infrastructure. Security logs provide auditing and access transparency, helping to answer "*who did what, where, and when*". Within security logs, Cloud Audit logs offer information about administrative activities and accesses within the customer's cloud resources, and Access Transparency logs document actions carried by Google staff when accessing customer Google Cloud content.

To uphold the integrity and confidentiality of logs, Google employs hashing (CRC32C and MD5) and encryption (AES-256) techniques. Log retention policies vary, with security logs retained for a fixed duration of four hundred days. Other logs are stored for up to thirty days by default, with the flexibility to customize retention. Like AWS, GCP utilizes GCP IAM for access control.

3.2.2 Disk Forensics

Disk forensics involves analysing and extracting digital evidence from digital storage media. This process typically includes creating a snapshot of the suspicious disk and its volumes. Subsequently, this snapshot is attached to a new computing instance, enabling investigators to access

files and folders stored on the virtual disk. This step proves pivotal in an investigation, facilitating the analysis and identification of specific data within a potentially malicious environment.

As reported by the survey, the common process for disk forensics found across the CSPs is outlined in the scheme illustrated in Figure 3.2.




Figure 3.2: Common process across the CSPs

3.2.2.1 AWS disk forensics

According to the survey, AWS categorizes forensics into two distinct pathways:

- **AWS to AWS:** Involving the utilization of AWS services to acquire disk memory from an AWS EC2 instance.
- **OnPrem to AWS:** Entailing data acquisition from on-premise resources and transferring it to AWS services.

The survey primarily focused on the AWS to AWS platform. Forensics within AWS is automated through the use of AWS Step Functions¹³, which includes the following step functions:

- **Triage step function:** Determines the type of acquisition (disk or memory) needed based on metadata from the incident and initiates the Disk step function.
- **Disk step function:** Protects and isolates the targeted VM instance, creates a snapshot, and generates SHA-256 and MD5 hash values to ensure data integrity. It then creates a new AWS EC2 instance with the snapshot and attached volumes, installs the AWS Systems Manager (SSM) Agent¹⁴, and triggers the Processing Step Function.

¹³<https://aws.amazon.com/step-functions/>

¹⁴<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/systems-manager/latest/userguide/ssm-agent.html>

- Processing step function: Automates basic investigations using forensic tools: Encase¹⁵ for Windows instances and SANS Investigative Forensic Toolkit (SIFT)¹⁶ for Linux instances.

The process generates analyzable data, including web history, timeline construction, and re-stored data from the disk. The processed data is stored in an AWS storage account with a data retention policy ensuring proper data preservation for investigations. This policy is applied upon receiving a request from Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs), guaranteeing that the data is retained on the CSP until the policy is removed.

3.2.2.2 Azure disk forensics

In the Azure environment, the Security Operation Center (SOC) team is dedicated to forensic procedures, ensuring a valid chain of custody. This team controls various SOC subscriptions.

Upon receiving a digital evidence capture request, the SOC team initiates the forensic procedure by signing into the Azure SOC Subscription and utilizing the Hybrid Runbook Worker (HRW)¹⁷ VM in Azure Automation¹⁸. The SOC Automation Account hosts the HRW and is utilized for process automation and configuration services. The HRW executes the *CopyVMDigitalEvidence* runbook, an automated script, on the target VM to collect a disk snapshot. This runbook stores the snapshot in the SOC Storage Account and copies the hash values and encryption keys generated to the SOC Key Vault. Subsequently, Azure security services analyze the snapshot previously stored in a *Write Once, Read Many (WORM)* state in the SOC Storage Account's immutable storage.

Access to evidence is granted to investigators through Storage Shared Access Signatures (SAS) URIs, ensuring granular control over access policies [91]. Encryption keys in the SOC Key Vault are also provided to investigators to decrypt data for analysis. Alternatively, investigators can download digital evidence by accessing it externally through a time-limited, read-only SOC Storage Account.

3.2.2.3 GCP disk forensics

The Google forensics procedure encompasses evidence collection, tools and processes identification, analysis pipeline, and process automation. The resources employed in the forensic process include:

- Google Compute Engine (GCE)¹⁹: A forensic virtual instance used to attach the disk snapshot for analysis.

¹⁵<https://www.opentext.com/products/encase-forensic>

¹⁶<https://www.sans.org/tools/sift-workstation/>

¹⁷<https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/automation/automation-hybrid-runbook-worker>

¹⁸<https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/automation/overview>

¹⁹<https://cloud.google.com/compute>

- Plaso²⁰ and Timesketch²¹: Plaso is a framework that retrieves timestamps from the disk snapshot, organizing events chronologically. Timesketch, a third-party tool, utilizes timelines generated by Plaso to present events in an organized manner.
- Google Cloud Storage (GCS)²²: Utilized for storing the disk snapshot and preserving evidence for the long term.

The Google procedure involves the creation of a secure environment for operational isolation. Initially, it generates a snapshot of the target, followed by creating a disk image from it. The image file is then encrypted, generating also its hash value. This image file is exported to GCS, and the hash values and encryption keys are stored in the Google Secret Manager Storage Service. Subsequently, third-party forensic tools are applied for analysis, such as ordering events chronologically to help reconstruct the incident.

Similar to AWS and Azure, in legal investigations, GCP employs a temporary object hold on evidential data, ensuring data integrity and preservation until the CSP removes the hold [76].

3.2.3 Memory Forensics

Memory forensics, also known as live forensics, is a facet of the digital forensics landscape that involves examining and investigating a memory dump to extract insights about a specific incident. Unlike disk forensics, the data analyzed in memory forensics is stored in volatile memory, making it temporary and lost when the system is powered off.

Analyzing volatile memory is crucial as it provides investigators with information not found on the disk, such as cryptographic keys, encrypted data in an unencrypted state, fileless malware, private browser data, passwords, and more. This data resides in volatile memory because the system actively uses it during its operation and may be temporarily stored there for quick access. However, this field presents several challenges, mainly because memory extraction is an invasive process that may modify multiple memory areas, making it difficult to repeat the extraction process. Additionally, in the context of the cloud environment, extractions introduce further challenges due to cloud characteristics like virtualization and multi-tenancy. This process can sometimes be intrusive, raising concerns about the privacy of cloud users.

In the context of the leading CSPs, memory forensics procedures for AWS are detailed in Subsection 3.2.3.1, while those for GCP are outlined in Subsection 3.2.3.2. Although Azure memory forensic procedures are mentioned in Azure's incident and response documentation [95], the survey notes a lack of supporting documentation for these procedures.

3.2.3.1 AWS memory forensics

AWS employs structured and automated investigative processes for memory forensics, similar to disk forensics (Subsection 3.2.2.1). These procedures utilize Amazon Step Functions, consisting

²⁰<https://github.com/log2timeline/plaso>

²¹<https://github.com/google/timesketch>

²²<https://cloud.google.com/storage>

of three main steps. First, the Triage step function triggers the memory step function based on collected incident metadata. Next, the Memory step function installs the SSM Agent on the target system, facilitating configuration, updates, and resource management. This agent executes a script to initiate forensic acquisition, resulting in a memory dump. The SSM Agent then compresses the data, generates hash values using SHA-256 and MD5 algorithms, and stores the results in an AWS S3 storage bucket within the forensics account. Finally, the Processing step function downloads evidence from AWS S3 storage, validates its integrity, and utilizes third-party tools to prepare the data for further investigation.

3.2.3.2 GCP memory forensics

In the realm of memory forensics, Google employs Google Rapid Response (GRR)²³, an open-source, agent-based application compatible with Windows, OS X, and Linux. This application serves two primary functions:

- Start flow: Employed to retrieve memory dumps based on the target instance and process ID.
- Hunt manager: Used for threat hunting in live, suspicious environments.

GRR consists of a server agent installed on the security server of Google VPC and a client agent deployed on the target virtual instance. This architecture enables the extraction of a memory dump by sharing the ID of the target process. Subsequent analysis involves the use of third-party tools such as Rekall²⁴ and Volatility²⁵.

3.2.4 Conclusion

The authors highlight that among the sixty-five cloud forensic challenges reported by NIST [49], only twelve were at the time addressed. This spotlights a significant gap in the domain, leaving ample room for further research and efforts to tackle the remaining challenges.

Moreover, there is a notable lack of uniformity in the forensic workflow across various CSPs. Each CSP employs its unique approach to conducting forensics, posing a substantial challenge for forensic investigators, especially in environments that span multiple clouds. This lack of standardization adds complexity to the forensic process. It underscores the need for a more harmonized and interoperable framework in cloud forensics, presenting an area for exploration and development.

3.3 NIST Cloud Computing Forensic Science Challenges

The document published by NIST serves as a comprehensive compilation of cloud computing challenges identified in existing literature by industry experts. Through this publication, the NIST

²³<https://github.com/google/grr>

²⁴<https://github.com/google/rekall>

²⁵<https://github.com/volatilityfoundation/volatility>

Cloud Computing Forensic Science Working Group (CC FSWG) systematically categorizes and deliberates on these challenges. Its primary objective is to highlight concerns, deepen comprehension, and ultimately devise solutions to address and mitigate these challenges.

The working group emphasizes the imperative for advancements in cloud forensic science, advocating for leveraging existing methodologies and developing new approaches tailored to the unique demands of various forensic stages in multi-tenant cloud environments. To offer the community a concise overview of these challenges, the working group conducted a preliminary analysis focusing on critical aspects of the cloud ecosystem. This analysis encompassed:

- Establishing the relationship between cloud computing's essential characteristics (Section 2.1) and each challenge identified to discern challenges specific to cloud forensics
- Identifying the correlation between challenges and the cloud functional capabilities.
- Categorizing the challenges into nine distinct categories.

In their publication, the working group asserts that the cloud environment has compounded some of the preexisting challenges encountered by digital forensics examiners. Moreover, they highlight that several challenges unique to cloud computing forensics have emerged, such as those linked to conducting forensics in different cloud deployment models. These challenges manifest when tasks such as identification or acquisition encounter obstacles or when activities like examination and interpretation by experts are impeded. These challenges were classified into technical, legal, and organizational categories, with many necessitating solutions spanning the three domains.

Prioritizing technical challenges and standards-based mitigation strategies, the working group synthesized information from existing literature and incorporated input from diverse stakeholders. The culmination of this effort was the creation of two comprehensive tables, encompassing a total of 65 challenges (although three were ultimately removed from the final document due to being deemed obsolete). These tables feature succinct descriptions of each challenge, potential outcomes upon resolution, and the impact of the essential cloud computing characteristics, further delineating correlations between challenges and the cloud functional capabilities. Furthermore, the tables categorize the challenges and offer pertinent references from the literature.

3.3.1 Correlation between cloud functional capabilities and challenges

To better understand the correlation between the challenges and their cloud-based root cause, the analysis included an evaluation of each challenge's relationship to the cloud functional capabilities outlined in the Cloud Security Alliance's Enterprise Architecture (CSA's EA) [7] and utilized by the NIST Cloud Computing Security Reference Architecture (CCSRA) [70].

Considering all possible pairs of challenges and functional capabilities and labelling the challenge based on the capabilities affected, the correlation between them was examined. According to the publication, the relationship was determined by clarifying what it means to overcome a challenge and answering the question: *"If the challenge were overcome, would that make it easier*

to conduct a cloud forensic investigation on the considered functional capability?". Consequently, each challenge is labelled along a generic-to-specific axis, based on its correlation with the cloud's functional capabilities:

- Generic label: It applies to most of the capabilities.
- Specific: It applies to a limited set of capabilities.
- Quasi: It falls somewhere between generic and specific.

3.3.2 Challenges categorization

Analyzing the tables in the document's Annex A and considering the three broad categories into which the challenges can be classified - technological, legal, and organizational - it is evident that a majority of the challenges are technical. These technical challenges stem from the differences between cloud computing and traditional data centre computing. The remaining challenges pertain to issues related to crossing national borders and legal jurisdictions arising from how CSPs store consumer information for operational redundancy, cost efficiency, and reliability.

The working group categorized the challenges into nine major groups to facilitate a meaningful analysis. Each challenge is assigned to a primary category, with the possibility of further classification under additional subcategories.

Table 3.2 identifies these nine categories and summarises the types of challenges included in each category, with some of these types resulting in subcategories.

Additionally, the document includes mind maps available in Annex C, which visually represent the relationships between the challenges and their primary categories, related categories, and subcategories.

3.3.3 Conclusion

In conclusion, the authors emphasize the critical necessity for developing standards, frameworks, and protocols to be adopted by CSPs, alongside creating standardized technologies tailored for cloud forensic investigations. These measures are essential for supporting the work of forensic investigators operating within cloud ecosystems. The authors argue that establishing such standards and tools can streamline investigations, leading to faster and more efficient resolutions of cybercrime incidents.

Furthermore, the authors highlight the challenges arising from the proliferation of evidence sources within cloud environments. These challenges encompass complexities in identifying and retrieving digital evidence, as well as difficulties associated with managing and analyzing logs. Issues like restricted data access and varied log formats further hinder the investigative process. Addressing these challenges is crucial for strengthening the effectiveness of digital forensic investigations in cloud-based scenarios.

Category	Challenges included
Architecture	Diversity Complexity Provenance Multi-tenancy Data segregation
Data Collection	Data integrity Data recovery Data location Imaging
Analysis	Correlation Reconstruction Time synchronization Logs Metadata Timelines
Anti Forensics	Obfuscation Data hiding Malware
Incident First Responders	Trustworthiness of CSPs Response time Reconstruction
Role Management	Data owners Identity management Users Access control
Legal	Jurisdictions Laws Service level agreements Contracts Subpoenas International cooperation Privacy Ethics
Standards	Standard operating procedures Interoperability Testing Validation
Testing	Forensic challenges Cloud Providers Qualification Certification

Table 3.2: Categories of Challenges and Corresponding Types in Cloud Forensic Science

3.4 NIST Cloud Computing Forensic Reference Architecture

The CCFRA [48] was developed to enhance the forensic analysis capabilities of cloud systems. Its main goal consists of assisting users in better understanding the forensic challenges associated with cloud environments, as identified by NIST, and providing guidance for analyzing and mitigating the impacts of these challenges. Using the CCFRA, users can identify which challenges may affect their systems and implement appropriate mitigation strategies to minimize operational risks. This framework supports users in examining, understanding, reconstructing, and addressing potential events and interferences within cloud environments.

The CCFRA integrates security, incident response, and forensics into a cohesive framework. The architecture is structured in layers, with the Forensic Reference Architecture (FRA) layer supported by two additional layers, as illustrated in Figure 3.3. It analyzes 347 functional capabilities derived from the CSA's EA within 62 NIST-identified challenges. By mapping each challenge to the relevant capabilities, the analysis assesses whether overcoming a specific challenge would facilitate forensic investigations within a cloud environment. The outcome is a comprehensive table with 347 rows and 62 columns, where each cell is marked 'YES' if the respective challenge impacts the associated capability or 'NO' if it does not.




Figure 3.3: CCFRA layers [48]

The flowchart illustrated in Figure 3.4 depicts the standardized method developed for this analysis. Initially, all challenges were categorized into two groups: non-technical, encompassing ethical issues, jurisdictions, legal concerns, privacy, qualifications, service-level agreements, standards, and training; and technical challenges.

Traversing the flowchart involves posing specific questions regarding the challenge-capability pair under analysis. The questions are as follows:

- Question 1: This final question directly asks whether the challenge affects the particular functional capability being analyzed.

Chapter 4

Current state of the NIST Challenges

Based on the analysis of the CCFRA document published by NIST (Section 3.4), a study was conducted on the state of the art of the cloud forensic challenges identified therein (Section 3.3). By categorizing these challenges into technical-related and compliance-related groups, the focus was placed on examining the latest advancements in addressing the technical challenges.

It is important to note that at the time of this investigation, the challenges FC-10, FC-20, and FC-57 were considered obsolete by the NIST Working Group. Although significant progress has been made in addressing many of the identified challenges, well-documented advancements are only available for some. The following sections summarize the current progress in overcoming the challenges for which relevant information was available.

4.1 FC-01: Deletion in the cloud

- **Challenge:** Recovering data deleted from the cloud (by either the Provider, Consumer, or attacker) and attributing that data to a specific user.

Overcoming this challenge would facilitate the recovery of deleted data and the attribution of that data to its owner. Primarily classified as an architectural challenge and secondarily as a data collection (Data Recovery) challenge, it falls within the technical group.

The current progress on this challenge remains unclear. On one hand, privacy concerns drive research aimed at protecting customer data in the cloud, making it difficult to recover once a customer has terminated the service [124]. Conversely, ongoing forensic research efforts focus on developing methods to recover evidence that could be crucial for investigations.

Companies specializing in data recovery, such as OnTrack, offer services to recover data from cloud services, from small development projects to secondary infrastructure deployments [65]. Additionally, teams like the Alvarez and Marsal, Disputes and Investigations, Forensic Technology team support data recovery in ongoing investigations [26]. Research efforts include the proposal of adopting frameworks adapted to the cloud environment to support data recovery using forensic tools [123], the adoption of multi-server systems to enhance the efficiency and reliability of data recovery with cloud backup servers [29], and the adoption of blockchain technology, such as the

Blockchain Cloud Forensic Logging (BCFL) framework [19]. The BCFL framework focuses on mitigating digital evidence challenges in the cloud by offering a system that forensically maintains the trustworthiness and integrity of log evidence, thereby supporting the recovery of deleted evidence from the cloud.

Despite these advancements, addressing this challenge within the cloud environment's architecture continues to be complex. Investigators working with remote clouds face limited access depending on the CSP authorization [26]. Moreover, the challenge is exacerbated by time constraints: the longer the data has been deleted, the higher the likelihood that the storage will be overwritten, complicating recovery efforts.

4.2 FC-02: Recovering overwritten data

- **Challenge:** Recovery of deleted data that has been overwritten by another user in a shared virtual environment.

Overcoming this challenge would facilitate the recovery of overwritten deleted data and the attribution of that data to its owner. Primarily classified as an architectural challenge and secondarily as a data collection (Data Recovery) challenge, it falls within the technical group.

Given the dynamic nature of the cloud environment, this challenge is closely related to the previous challenge (Section 4.1). Although substantial research has been conducted on recovering overwritten data on traditional forensics [135], a significant gap exists in applying these technologies within cloud environments, especially when dealing with remote cloud ecosystems. Concerns over customer privacy often accompany advances in this issue [17]; however, from a forensic perspective, such advancements would be advantageous. The ability to recover deleted evidence could provide crucial insights and clarify uncertainties during investigations.

4.3 FC-03: Evidence correlation

- **Challenge:** Evidence correlation across cloud Providers.

Overcoming this challenge would significantly aid investigators correlating evidence from different cloud providers. Primarily classified as an analysis challenge, it falls within the technical group.

As mentioned in the Subsection 2.1.1, investigators often encounter multi-cloud environments where evidence originates from clouds managed by different CSPs. This scenario complicates the correlation of collected evidence due to the lack of standardized forensic procedures and uniform data formats among the various CSPs (Section 3.2).

A potential solution to this issue is the Cado Security platform¹, which facilitates investigations across multi-cloud environments. It supports the capture file formats of the leading CSPs

¹<https://www.cadosecurity.com/>

and offers data importation features, enabling investigators to analyze data from different sources within a unified timeline [120].

Another developed solution is Moogsoft's Unified Hybrid Cloud Monitoring². Although not a forensic tool, it provides a comprehensive solution for correlating log events, metrics, and alerts from on-premises and multi-cloud environments, thereby addressing the challenge of evidence correlation [100].

As an open-source alternative, Plaso³ (also known as "super timeline all the things") is a Python-based engine that automates the creation of timelines. This tool is designed to assist digital forensic investigators and analysts by correlating large amounts of information, thereby enhancing the efficiency and accuracy of forensic analysis [80].

4.4 FC-05: Timestamp synchronization

- **Challenge:** Synchronization of timestamps.

Overcoming this challenge would enable the synchronization of timestamps across the cloud environment. Primarily classified as a challenge of analysis (Metadata Logs), it falls within the technical group.

The previously mentioned BCFL framework [19] ensures timestamp synchronization by including a forensic timestamp on each block within the blockchain ecosystem. Additionally, the authors identify LEChain [68], a lawful evidence management scheme that utilizes blockchain and smart contracts to ensure timestamp synchronization.

Addressing the challenge of timestamp synchronization in cloud environments is crucial for ensuring the integrity and reliability of forensic investigations [83]. By leveraging the inherent characteristics of blockchain technology, it is possible to achieve precise and consistent timestamp synchronization across various cloud platforms. These blockchain-based solutions present a promising approach to mitigating the challenges associated with timestamp synchronization, ultimately strengthening the overall efficacy of cloud forensics.

4.5 FC-06: Log format unification

- **Challenge:** Unification of log formats.

Overcoming this challenge would enable investigators to unify log formats, which is crucial for practical forensic analysis. Primarily classified as a challenge of analysis (Metadata Logs), it falls within the technical group.

Numerous authors widely report this challenge, highlighting that the vast resources available in the cloud need a standardized interface or uniform export format [61]. As forensic investigations

²<https://www.moogsoft.com/solutions/hybrid-cloud/>

³<https://github.com/log2timeline/plaso>

rely heavily on the analysis of collected evidence, the lack of log uniformity can be one of the most significant barriers during the investigation process.

Some studies have explored using the Cloud Auditing Data Federation (CADF)⁴ standard, which defines a comprehensive event model for cloud environments, to make cloud platforms forensically sound. For instance, a study by Dalezios and Shiales [31], proposed implementing this model for the Apache CloudStack project as its primary logging format. Furthermore, a proposed cloud forensic log framework, named CFLOG, provides a uniform forensics logging structure, which not only facilitates overcoming this challenge but also addresses others [108].

The existing solutions identified for the challenge FC-03 (Section 4.3) can serve as potential starting points for tackling the log uniformity issue. The correlation of data from various sources and formats requires a deep understanding of these formats and their interrelationships. Therefore, leveraging tools capable of effectively correlating data from various sources and devising a solution that can uniformly output this data without loss could present a promising approach to overcome this issue.

4.6 FC-07: Use of Metadata

- **Challenge:** Use of Metadata.

Overcoming this challenge would allow investigators to access persistent metadata fields. Primarily classified as a challenge of analysis (Metadata Logs), it falls within the technical group.

Metadata plays a crucial role in forensic investigations, aiding e-discovery, highlighting usage patterns, event correlation, and timeline establishment [40]. Investigators must understand how CSPs manage and preserve metadata within the cloud environment. This challenge specifically pertains to accessing preserved metadata when investigators are analyzing data.

The preservation of metadata fields is important for forensic investigations [115]. Although not all fields are consistently preserved by CSPs, their importance is recognized, as evidenced by documentation on metadata preservation events during data transfers [75][94].

Overcoming this challenge depends on the actions of the CSPs that manage customers' data. Ensuring access to persistent metadata fields enhances the ability of investigators to conduct thorough and accurate forensic analyses.

4.7 FC-08: Log Capture

- **Challenge:** Capture and timeline analysis of logs.

Overcoming the challenge of log capture in cloud environments would allow investigators to perform forensic timeline analysis involving network logs with dynamically assigned IP addresses. Primarily classified as a challenge of analysis (Metadata Logs), it falls within the technical group.

⁴<https://www.dmtf.org/standards/cadf>

The development of an Intelligent System for Cloud SaaS Forensics (ISC-SF) demonstrates a potential solution to overcome this challenge [56]. This framework integrates algorithms to detect attacks, extract, collect, and analyze evidence, and incorporates machine learning algorithms to offer more intelligence to the investigator. By providing investigators with data reconstruction and visualization, metadata, logs, multi-tenant analysis, and threat detection features, it enables the investigation of scenes to, for example, identify the attacker's IP address.

CSPs have been improving their native logging solutions to enhance visibility and access to logs. For instance, analyzing traffic logs such as the Network Security Group (NSG) flow logs in Azure cloud environments [92] (with proper setup to collect these logs) can yield significant insights for investigators. This analysis can be crucial for extracting more information about dynamically assigned IP addresses, enhancing forensic investigations.

Tools and frameworks have also been developed to facilitate the collection of logs in cloud environments. Fluentd⁵ and Fluent Bit⁶ are examples of centralized logging systems that collect and analyze logs from different sources [24][25].

Integrating logging and network monitoring tools provides a more comprehensive vision of network activities. Zeek⁷, an open-source network analyzer, supports numerous use cases, such as capturing forensic evidence, thereby enhancing the investigator's ability to reconstruct and analyze network events.

4.8 FC-09: Interoperability issues among Providers

- **Challenge:** No interoperability among providers.

Overcoming this challenge would involve establishing validated standards and specifications that support forensic tools operating across different providers. Primarily classified as an architectural challenge and secondarily as a challenge involving standards (Interoperability), it falls within the technical group.

The operation of the different CSPs has become more transparent in recent years. Studies like the previously analyzed survey (Section 3.2) play a crucial role in overcoming this challenge by identifying commonalities and differences between the architectures and procedures of CSPs, leading to a better understanding of how these ecosystems are managed. This understanding can facilitate the development of forensic tools that can work across different providers. Additionally, monitoring services offered by CSPs, such as Amazon CloudWatch [12] or the Azure Monitor [89], increasingly provide features to analyze data from other providers, further enhancing interoperability.

⁵<https://www.fluentd.org/>

⁶<https://fluentbit.io/>

⁷<https://zeek.org/>

4.9 FC-12: Detection of malicious acts

- **Challenge:** Detection of the malicious act.

Overcoming this challenge would facilitate the detection of malicious acts. Primarily classified as an architectural challenge, it falls within the technical group.

Considering that each step of an attack exploits minor vulnerabilities [122], investigators must view all evidence as pieces of a puzzle that collectively form the final image of the attack. Advances are being made to address this challenge with Artificial Intelligence (AI) assistance, exemplified by systems such as Charlotte AI from CrowdStrike⁸ or FortiAI from Fortinet⁹. With AI support, investigators can efficiently analyze vast amounts of data and gain a comprehensive overview of their scenario. AI systems can synthesize the minor vulnerabilities in the ecosystem under investigation, making them a crucial tool in addressing this issue [45].

4.10 FC-13: Criminals' access to low-cost computing power

- **Challenge:** The cloud offers computing power that would otherwise be unavailable to criminals with small budgets and/or limited resources.

Overcoming this challenge would make access to cloud computing difficult for criminal activities. Primarily classified as an architectural challenge, it falls within the technical group.

The main issue with addressing this challenge is that restricting access to low-cost computing power would also negatively impact legitimate customers who use these resources for benign purposes. Preventing access to affordable computing would inconvenience regular users and lead to a loss of clients for providers. This dual impact makes the challenge particularly difficult to overcome.

A possible way to address this issue is by continuously monitoring activities [2]. However, this approach could be invasive regarding user privacy, especially in regions with strong data protection laws [39]. Strengthening account verification processes and flagging suspicious activities could help, but these measures risk producing false positives and disrupting legitimate users or businesses. Furthermore, attackers often use sophisticated techniques to conceal their activities, complicating the detection and distinction between legal and malicious users [133].

4.11 FC-14: Real-time investigation intelligence processes not possible

- **Challenge:** Intelligence processes for real-time investigation are often not possible in the cloud environment.

⁸<https://www.crowdstrike.com/platform/charlotte-ai/>

⁹<https://www.fortinet.com/products/fortiai>

Overcoming this challenge would enable the investigator to collect real-time investigation evidence, allowing for real-time forensic investigations in a rapidly changing cloud environment. Primarily classified as an architectural challenge, it falls within the technical group.

Cloud environments' dynamic and distributed nature poses significant challenges to real-time forensic investigations. Data not stored on storage media must be collected in real-time using sensors placed within the cloud environment.

Ongoing studies and developments of tools and frameworks steadily improve the feasibility of real-time forensic investigations in cloud environments [20]. Collaboration with CSPs has led to enhanced logging and monitoring services, such as AWS CloudTrail, Azure Monitor, and Google Cloud Logging, which provide detailed logs and audit trails crucial for real-time analysis. Additionally, developing specialized cloud forensics tools, like AWS GuardDuty¹⁰ facilitates continuous data monitorization and analysis.

Moreover, agent-based solutions deploy sensors to gather real-time data on cloud instances [85]. The collected data can then be ingested into machine learning and AI technologies to facilitate the quick detection of anomalies and potential security incidents. Tools such as the Azure AI Anomaly Detector¹¹ can process large volumes of data and identify suspicious anomalies that warrant further investigation.

4.12 FC-15: Malicious code may circumvent VM isolation method

- **Challenge:** Malicious code may circumvent VM isolation methods and interfere with the hypervisor or other guest VMs.

Overcoming this challenge would facilitate tracing malware movement and its isolation within virtual environments. It falls within the technical group, primarily classified as an architectural challenge and secondarily as an anti-forensics challenge.

Current research efforts propose updates to the architecture of VMs, such as new memory-sharing schemes to improve isolation in execution environments while maintaining performance [134], models to prevent confidential data leakage threats [32], and methods to protect VMs from malicious hypervisors [57]. However, this challenge remains persistent due to existing vulnerabilities in virtual environments [102]. As technology advances, cyberattacks become more sophisticated, and new ways to bypass implemented security measures are continually being found. This highlights the need for ongoing vigilance and innovation to enhance protection against emerging threats.

Addressing this challenge requires continuous efforts to counteract new vulnerabilities. The research published by Saeed, Garraghan, and Hussain [117] exemplifies the ongoing efforts necessary to achieve this goal.

¹⁰<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/guardduty/latest/ug/what-is-guardduty.html>

¹¹[https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/products/ai-services/ai-anomaly-detector#
get-started](https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/products/ai-services/ai-anomaly-detector#get-started)

4.13 FC-16: Errors in cloud management portal configurations

- **Challenge:** Configuration errors in cloud management portals may result in an unauthorized user being able to reconfigure or delete another user's cloud computing platform.

Overcoming this challenge would make it easier for investigators to attribute actions originating from the cloud management portal to a specific user, identifying when an unauthorized user has acted. It falls within the technical group, primarily classified as an architectural (Multi-Tenancy) challenge and secondarily as a role management (Identity Management) challenge.

The unauthorized control, reconfiguration, or deletion referenced by this challenge occurs due to vulnerabilities in the management portal applications provided by CSPs. While the existing vulnerabilities can be patched, achieving absolute system security remains unreachable. With technological progress, new methods for circumventing current security measures will emerge. Therefore, the ongoing approach should focus on rapidly developing countermeasures, making it increasingly difficult for attackers to exploit portal applications.

An essential facet contributing to investigators' insights into unauthorized activities lies in the logging functionalities implemented by CSPs. Through log analysis, it becomes feasible to understand user actions and identify any deviations indicative of unauthorized behaviour [63].

CSPs have increasingly adopted access control mechanisms to manage access to their cloud management portals [14] [97]. Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) and RBAC ensure that users are only granted permissions necessary for their attributes or roles, mitigating the risk of unauthorized access and reducing the impact of configuration errors.

4.14 FC-17: Multiple venues and geolocations

- **Challenge:** Access to computer and network resources involve expanded scope and, possibly, more than one venue and geolocation.

Overcoming this challenge would make it easier for investigators to find the evidence and identify resources to maintain the chain of custody. It falls within the technical group, primarily classified as an architectural challenge and secondarily as a data collection challenge.

The already referenced CFLOG framework allows the log output to be written to a predefined location [108]. This location, known only by the investigator, eases e-discovery problems and reduces dependencies on CSPs. By making the investigator aware of the locations and geolocations of venues, it addresses this challenge [106].

4.15 FC-18: Lack of transparency

- **Challenge:** Lack of transparency triggers lack of trust and difficulties of auditing.

Overcoming this challenge would enhance the transparency of the cloud's operational details, thereby facilitating forensic evidence collection. Primarily classified as an architectural challenge and secondarily as a data collection challenge, it falls within the technical group.

As discussed in challenge FC-09 (Section 4.8), CSPs' operational procedures and architectures are becoming increasingly transparent. Papers, such as the survey analyzed in Section 3.2, provide insights into the procedures and architectures of CSPs, helping to address this challenge. Furthermore, a unified framework for cloud security transparency and audit [52] has been developed to tackle issues related to cloud security transparency more comprehensively.

4.16 FC-21: Potential evidence segregation

- **Challenge:** Segregation of potential evidence in a multi-tenant system.

Overcoming this challenge would facilitate access to forensic evidence for one tenant while preserving the confidentiality and privacy of others. Primarily classified as an architectural challenge (Data Segregation and Multi-Tenancy) and secondarily as a data collection challenge, it falls within the technical group.

As early as 2012, ENISA highlighted concerns about customer privacy when extracting data from multi-tenant outsourced services [50]. Given that cloud environments are inherently multi-tenant and considering the increasing privacy concerns over the years, this challenge significantly impacts investigators. The evidence analyzed must be legally admissible while respecting the confidentiality of other cloud users.

Progress has been made to mitigate this challenge. The BCFL framework [19], already referenced in challenges FC-01 (Section 4.1) and FC-05 (Section 4.4), addresses these concerns. The BCFL framework uses blockchain distributed ledger technology to mitigate high-level evidence contamination pathways (such as multi-tenancy, geo-location, and cloud SLAs). Additionally, it acts as a bridge to ensure that evidence acquisition complies with General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), thus addressing both forensic and privacy concerns.

4.17 FC-23: Secure provenance

- **Challenge:** Secure provenance.

Overcoming this challenge would facilitate the work of investigators by identifying ownership, custody, location, or actions taken on forensic evidence. Primarily classified as an architectural (Provenance) challenge, it falls within the technical group.

Data provenance, in a forensic context, involves maintaining a detailed record of the history of evidence [58]. It ensures the ability to verify data's integrity, authenticity, and reliability, which is crucial in digital forensics and cybersecurity.

This topic has garnered significant research interest recently as investigators seek to understand the challenges and explore future solutions. According to Purnaye and Kulkarni in their comprehensive study of cloud forensics [111], the adoption of Software-Defined Networks (SDNs) and blockchain models and frameworks to address this challenge are emerging trends. An example is the BiSHM model [109], which uses a novel blockchain approach to maintain data provenance and reduce dependence on CSP trust.

However, there remain research gaps in data provenance within cloud forensics. Issues like the tension between ensuring data provenance and maintaining security and privacy/confidentiality, as well as the lack of techniques for tracing data objects outside the system's confines, highlight an area needing further investigation [1].

4.18 FC-24: Data chain of custody

- **Challenge:** Chain of custody of data.

Overcoming this challenge would facilitate the verification of continuous ownership and access to forensic evidence. Primarily classified as an architectural (Provenance) challenge, it falls within the technical group.

The chain of custody is crucial in digital forensics for maintaining the integrity of evidence, preventing tampering, ensuring legal admissibility, and establishing ownership and control [110]. Given its importance, significant research has been conducted over the years to address this issue and enable investigators to maintain a robust chain of custody [119]. This aspect is particularly relevant to forensic experts and has been a focus for forensic tool developers and researchers.

Blockchain technology has been identified as a critical area of research for enhancing the chain of custody in digital forensics [21] [3]. Approaches such as BCFL logging [19] and the BiSHM model [109] leverage blockchain features to ensure the integrity and authenticity of evidence. Blockchain's immutable ledger and transparent record-keeping provide a reliable method for tracking the provenance of digital evidence.

Moreover, the progress in addressing the challenge FC-23 (Section 4.17) also contributes to strengthening the chain of custody in digital forensics [1].

4.19 FC-25: Decreased access and data control

- **Challenge:** Decreased access and control of data at all levels by cloud consumers.

Overcoming this challenge would facilitate investigators' jobs by enabling them to identify and access the physical locations of data through cloud consumer accounts. Primarily classified as a data collection challenge, it falls within the technical group.

At the time of this research, customers did not yet have complete control over the location of their data. For example, in services like Google Cloud [72], and Azure [90], while customers can choose the region for deployment, they do not have full transparency or control over the exact

physical locations where their data resides. According to Microsoft's documentation, customer data will reside in the region where the service is deployed, and most Azure services allow customers to specify this region [116].

4.20 FC-26: Chain of dependencies

- **Challenge:** Chain of dependencies in multiple cloud systems.

Overcoming this challenge would make it easier for investigators to access evidence in multi-cloud environments. Primarily classified as a data collection challenge, it falls within the technical group.

Dependency chains significantly impact investigations, as experts need to identify which CSPs manage the evidence they aim to collect. Logging, a critical aspect of forensics, becomes more complicated due to these dependency chains, making it challenging to aggregate logs from multiple sources. Jurisdictional issues can also arise if the different CSPs operate under varying legal jurisdictions.

To address this challenge, ongoing research is exploring solutions. For instance, a recent conference paper proposes a framework designed to tackle dependency chains in cloud forensics [23]. This paper discusses several challenges in cloud forensics, including the increasing dependencies between CSPs. Additionally, automated forensic tools can facilitate investigators' work by masking the complex dependency chains between cloud providers, thus promoting data collection across different cloud sources.

4.21 FC-27: Locating evidence

- **Challenge:** Locating evidence in a large and changing system.

Overcoming this challenge would facilitate quick responses to e-discovery requests. Primarily classified as a data collection challenge, it falls within the technical group.

As technology advances, particularly with the development of AI, traditional procedures in digital forensics are being enhanced to leverage new capabilities for more efficient investigations [46]. The potential of AI to assist in forensic tasks, such as e-discovery, has been widely recognized by researchers. Various studies and publications, including "*ChatGPT as a Copilot for Investigating Digital Evidence*" [47] and "*What Will Ediscovery Lawyers Do After ChatGPT?*" [128], have delved into this area, highlighting its benefits in improving the efficiency of expert analysis and e-discovery processes [66]. Despite the revolutionary impact of AI on technology, its research and application in digital forensics remain areas of significant opportunity [41]. Adopting it to support forensic investigators can substantially reduce human errors, processing time, costs, and incorrect outcomes [55]. Consequently, incorporating AI technologies into digital forensic practices presents a viable pathway to effectively address this challenge and achieve more rapid responses to e-discovery requests.

Furthermore, in the document presenting the CFLOG framework [106], the authors compare CFLOG to other existing frameworks, evaluating their effectiveness in addressing NIST challenges. The authors argue that both CFLOG and another forensic framework for collecting forensic evidence [5] address this challenge by specifying the location of the evidence, easing the response to e-discovery requests.

4.22 FC-29: Imaging, isolating, and collecting data

- **Challenge:** Locating and collecting cloud-based data for forensic investigations.

Overcoming this challenge would streamline the process of locating and collecting data for forensic investigations within the dynamic cloud environment. Primarily classified as a data collection challenge, it falls within the technical group.

This challenge encompasses several factors: the large volume of data, the dynamic nature of the cloud environment, the lack of transparency from CSPs, the difficulty of executing real-time intelligence about data location, and the non-forensic methods of accessing data and metadata (via Application Programming Interfaces (APIs)). While the first aspects are addressed in other challenges, the focus of this challenge's discussion is on the forensic limitations of the APIs developed for data and metadata access.

Furthermore, advancements in forensic tools, along with improvements in the forensic procedures of major CSPs, are aiding the facilitation of forensic investigations within cloud ecosystems. A notable proposal addressing this issue is the CATCH framework, which explores, filters, and collects accessible metadata and contents from remote cloud servers using open and internal APIs [132]. This framework evaluates results and compares them with those from commercial digital forensic tools, demonstrating a method to enhance the forensic reliability of data access.

4.23 FC-30: Data available for a limited time

- **Challenge:** Data associated with deallocated VM instances may only be available for a limited time.

Overcoming this challenge would make collecting evidence from a deallocated VM easier. Primarily classified as a data collection challenge, it falls within the technical group.

Given the dynamic nature of the cloud environment, the temporal window to extract an unaltered memory dump is often very brief. Therefore, forensic tools and procedures must act quickly, requiring effective cooperation with CSPs. However, the multi-tenant nature of cloud environments introduces significant privacy and security concerns regarding memory dumps, requiring the adoption of techniques to ensure data isolation and prevent access to other customers' data.

Recent studies have explored methods to extract forensic information from VM memory dumps without knowledge of the underlying OS [104] [105]. Rapid memory dump capture in the cloud environment is crucial to address this challenge. Thus, automated scripts or tools designed

to capture memory dumps before they are overwritten, combined with techniques developed in the referenced studies, could provide a viable solution. This approach would facilitate timely and reliable data collection while adhering to privacy and security requirements.

4.24 FC-32: Evidence identification

- **Challenge:** Sources/traces of evidence are generated differently compared to noncloud environments and pose challenges for evidence identification.

Overcoming this challenge would facilitate the location of all relevant data in response to a forensic request. Primarily classified as a data collection challenge, it falls within the technical group.

The previously mentioned CFLOG and forensics framework for collecting forensic evidence address this challenge by enabling investigators to identify the location of the evidence. By implementing the methodologies proposed by these frameworks, the challenges related to the location and discovery of evidence in the cloud environment would be mitigated, as both frameworks include features that provide this crucial information [106].

4.25 FC-34: Live Forensics

- **Challenge:** Live forensics is common in cloud environments, but many challenges remain.

Overcoming this challenge would enable the collection of accurate and reliable data from live cloud systems in a volatile state. Primarily classified as a data collection challenge and secondarily as an architectural challenge, it falls within the technical group.

In the survey examining the forensic procedures of leading CSPs [118], the efforts to enhance the reliability of data extracted during live forensics procedures were discussed (Subsection 3.2.3). These efforts are crucial in addressing the inherent volatility and ensuring the integrity of forensic data collected in real-time from cloud environments.

4.26 FC-35: Resource abstraction

- **Challenge:** Resource abstraction.

Overcoming this challenge would enable investigators to gain a comprehensive understanding of both the logical and physical characteristics of the system under investigation. Primarily classified as a data collection challenge and secondarily as an architectural challenge, it falls within the technical group.

Significant advancements have been made in addressing resource abstraction challenges in cloud forensics. Enhanced forensic tools and frameworks specially designed for cloud environments are being developed to interact directly with cloud infrastructures, enabling the extraction

of relevant forensic evidence despite the abstract nature of the resources. Examples of these tools include Volatility¹², and AWS Cloud Trail¹³.

Furthermore, CSPs are improving their documentation and support mechanisms for forensic investigations, as discussed in Section 3.2. This improvement provides investigators with access to metadata details, such as OS details and VM specifications, as well as event logs [77][78].

4.27 FC-37: Additional evidence collection

- **Challenge:** Additional collection is often infeasible in the cloud.

Overcoming this challenge would make it easier to collect additional evidence. Primarily classified as a data collection challenge and secondarily as an architectural challenge, it falls within the technical group.

With technological advances, new tools and frameworks have been specifically designed to manage the dynamic nature of cloud environments. Examples include AWS CloudTrail and Azure Monitor, which offer investigators more efficient methods for identifying and collecting forensic evidence from cloud environments. Moreover, advancements in automation and AI have enhanced investigators' ability to analyze large volumes of data more effectively, identifying relevant information and enhancing investigative precision and efficacy [33].

Furthermore, standards and guidelines such as the Cloud Controls Matrix (CCM) published by the Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) [6] ensure that CSPs document and implement features that support forensic investigations, including detailed logging and data retention policies. For instance, Microsoft Azure's compliance with the new NIST SP 800-53 R4 controls [64] exemplifies their commitment to maintaining robust security and forensic capabilities. Compliance with these standards ensures that CSPs provide the necessary infrastructure for comprehensive and practical forensic investigations.

4.28 FC-38: Imaging the cloud

- **Challenge:** Imaging the cloud.

Overcoming this challenge would facilitate forensic investigations by improving imaging processes. Primarily classified as a data collection challenge and secondarily as an architectural challenge, it falls within the technical group.

In the survey examining the forensic procedures of leading CSPs [118], the disk forensic procedures implemented to provide investigators with reliable images were discussed (Subsection: 3.2.2). It highlights the methodologies CSPs employ to ensure the integrity and reliability of forensic images, which can be crucial for accurate investigations.

¹²<https://volatilityfoundation.org/the-volatility-framework/>

¹³<https://aws.amazon.com/cloudtrail/>

4.29 FC-39: Selective data acquisition

- **Challenge:** Selective data acquisition.

Overcoming this challenge would lead to significant time and resource savings, making selecting data for acquiring relevant forensic evidence easier. Primarily classified as a data collection challenge and secondarily as an incident first responders challenge, it falls within the technical group.

This challenge is intricately related to the high volumes of data that experts encounter in modern digital forensics investigations. Despite advancements in AI that enhance investigators' capacity to analyze large volumes of data more effectively, the ability to focus solely on relevant data can significantly impact the investigation's efficiency, particularly given the investigators' limited timeframes for delivering results [126]. Analysing irrelevant data can prove detrimental to the investigation, wasting valuable time and resources [38].

Tools such as the Cellebrite UFED¹⁴ empower investigators to selectively analyze applications suspected of containing relevant data instead of conducting a complete file system extraction [82]. Moreover, the authors of the previously referenced CFLOG document argue that their framework addresses this challenge by allowing investigators to acquire data on a per-user basis. However, investigators must always select the sources, necessitating prior knowledge to ensure accurate selections. While these tools facilitate selective data collection, there remains a necessity to justify the exclusion or inclusion of specific sources in the investigative process.

4.30 FC-41: Ambiguous trust boundaries

- **Challenge:** Ambiguous trust boundaries between users can cause questionable data integrity.

Overcoming this challenge would give investigators more confidence in the forensic data's reliability and ownership. Primarily classified as a data collection (Data Integrity) challenge, it falls within the technical group.

In response to the growing emphasis on security and regulatory compliance, CSPs have invested significantly in developing sophisticated data isolation techniques to ensure the separation of tenant data. The leading CSPs have documented their tenant isolation strategies on their websites, highlighting the importance of this issue [11] [93] [74].

Furthermore, CSPs' logging and monitoring tools play a significant role in addressing this challenge. User activities are recorded in log form in the cloud, which helps establish trust boundaries by attributing actions to specific users and services [71].

Moreover, the exploration of immutable storage solutions and the adoption of blockchain technologies present promising avenues for bolstering the integrity and traceability of data within the cloud environment.

¹⁴<https://cellebrite.com/en/ufed/>

4.31 FC-42: Data integrity and evidence preservation

- **Challenge:** Responsibility for quality of evidence, evidence admissibility, faults and failures in data integrity, and digital preservation is shared among multiple Actors, and the opportunities for such faults and failures are higher in the cloud context.

Overcoming this challenge would enhance the integrity of evidence collected by mitigating faults and failures within the cloud context. Primarily classified as a data collection (Data Integrity) challenge and secondarily as an architectural challenge, it falls within the technical group.

Ensuring the integrity of evidence collected and maintaining the chain of custody while limiting access to sensitive data are crucial steps to improve data reliability and admissibility in court and conduct a legally sound forensic investigation [84].

As previously discussed, blockchain technology offers a promising solution to overcome the data integrity and evidence preservation challenge. Its immutable storage enables integrity verification through cryptographic hashing, ensuring that data remains tamper-proof. Additionally, its decentralized nature and contributions to the chain of custody and legal admissibility of data make it an appealing prospect for the forensic world. However, it is essential to consider the limitations of blockchain technology, such as energy consumption, the need for consensus mechanisms, and scalability issues [43]. Nonetheless, blockchain technology presents a viable starting point for addressing the issues associated with this challenge.

4.32 FC-44: Competence and trustworthiness

- **Challenge:** Competence and trustworthiness of the cloud Provider as an effective, immediate first responder.

Overcoming this challenge would ensure that CSPs treat a compromised cloud environment as a crime scene. Primarily classified as an incident first responders challenge and secondarily as a legal (Contract/SLA) challenge, it falls within the technical group.

Understanding the forensic procedures that CSPs follow when handling an incident or investigation is crucial for addressing this challenge. Progress in this area is evidenced by various surveys and research studies that examine current forensic procedures and propose potential improvements [4]. For instance, the previously analyzed survey (Section 3.2) offers valuable insights into existing practices.

From the customer's perspective, with a focus on forensic considerations, adapting incident-response solutions as a service, such as the Splunk Cloud Platform¹⁵, can reduce dependence on CSPs, thereby mitigating the risk associated with relying solely on their procedures.

¹⁵https://www.splunk.com/en_us/products/splunk-cloud-platform.html

4.33 Summary

The analysis of the NIST cloud forensic technical challenges provides significant insights into the obstacles investigators face in cloud environments. This study highlights the progress made towards overcoming these challenges while also underscoring gaps that persist despite substantial efforts. By examining the current state of each challenge, an understanding of the complexities that cloud environments pose for forensic investigators emerges, emphasizing the continuing need for further research to achieve practical solutions.

The primary objective of this study is to identify existing solutions that enable investigators to face the complexities of the cloud ecosystem. Furthermore, this research aims to consolidate this knowledge into a single source, thereby encouraging future research and the development of more efficient and appropriate solutions. Table 4.1 summarizes the collected data, providing a brief description of each challenge, an overview of recent advancements, and relevant references.

During the research, the conference paper "*Digital Forensic Tools for Cloud Computing Environment*" [22] was analyzed. It provides insights into tools that aid investigators during forensic investigations, including both traditional forensic tools adapted for cloud requirements and those designed specifically for cloud environments. The authors highlight the scarcity of tools capable of handling all phases of the digital forensics process, emphasizing the need for comprehensive cloud forensic tools that perform a wide range of activities.

This observation presents an opportunity to address a critical gap in the forensic field. Building upon the understanding of current challenges and digital forensic procedures, the next chapter presents the proposal of an open-source framework covering all the stages of a digital forensics investigation. This framework will facilitate the integration of new solutions arising from ongoing efforts to address current and future challenges, thereby enhancing the capabilities of forensic investigators in cloud environments.

Challenge	Challenges Description	Progress and Solutions	References
FC-01	Recovering data deleted from the cloud (by either the Provider, Consumer, or attacker) and attributing that data to a specific user	Research on privacy protection vs. forensic recovery	[124] [65]
		Services like OnTrack and Alvarez & Marsal	[26]
		Cloud-specific frameworks	[123]
		Multi-server systems for efficient recovery	[29]
		BCFL	[19]

Challenge	Challenges Description	Progress and Solutions	References
FC-02	Recovery of deleted data that has been overwritten by another user in a shared virtual environment	Substantial research on recovering overwritten files on traditional computers	[135] [17]
		Gap in applying these technologies within cloud environments, especially remote clouds	
		Privacy concerns vs forensic advantages	
FC-03	Evidence correlation across providers	Cado Security platform	[120]
		Moogsoft's Unified Hybrid Cloud Monitoring	[100]
		Plaso	[80]
FC-05	Difficulty in synchronizing timestamps across the cloud environment	Blockchain based solutions like BCFL and LEChain	[19] [68]
FC-06	Difficulty in unifying log formats across different cloud environments	Exploration of CADF standard	[31] [108]
		CFLOG	
		Leverage tools that offer data correlation to develop tools for standardizing data	
FC-07	Difficulty in accessing persistent metadata fields in cloud environments	Recognition of metadata importance by CSPs	[75] [94]
		Dependence on CSPs actions	
FC-08	Difficulty in capturing and analyzing logs for forensic timeline analysis, especially network logs with dynamically assigned IP addresses	ISC-SF Framework	[56] [92] [24] [25] [129]
		CSPs native logging solutions (e.g., analysing traffic logs in Azure cloud environments)	
		Tools and frameworks to aggregate logs (e.g., Fluentd and Fluent Bit)	
		Network monitoring tools (e.g., Zeek)	
FC-09	Lack of interoperability among different CSPs	Cloud Forensics Survey	[118]
		Monitoring services that support multi-provider data analysis	[12] [89]
FC-12	Facilitating the detection of malicious acts within the cloud environment	AI-Powered detection tools: systems like Charlotte AI (CrowdStrike) and FortiAI (Fortinet)	[45]
FC-13	Cloud offers computing power to criminals with small budgets/resources	Continuous monitoring and cooperation	[2] [133]
		Strengthened account verification processes and suspicious activities identification	
FC-14	Real-time investigation intelligence processes not possible in cloud environments	CSPs logging and monitoring services	[20] [85]
		Specialized tools that facilitate continuing monitoring and analysis like AWS GuardDuty	
		Agent-based solutions and AI technologies	

Challenge	Challenges Description	Progress and Solutions	References
FC-15	Malicious code may circumvent VM isolation methods and interfere with the hypervisor or other guest VMs	Architectural updates: new memory-sharing schemes, models and methods	[134] [32] [57] [117]
		Enhanced VM protection	
		Ongoing vigilance to counterattack new vulnerabilities	
FC-16	Cloud management portal errors may let unauthorized users alter or delete another users's cloud platform	Rapid patch deployment	[14] [97] [63]
		Enhanced logging and monitoring	
		Access control mechanisms	
FC-17	Multiple venues and geolocations	CFLOG	[108] [106]
FC-18	Lack of transparency triggers lack of trust and difficulties of auditing	Increased operational transparency	[118] [52]
		Unified framework for cloud security transparency and audit	
FC-21	Segregation of potential evidence in a multi-tenant system	BCFL	[19]
FC-23	Secure provenance	SDNs	[111]
		Blockchain-based models and frameworks	[109]
FC-24	Chain of custody of data	Blockchain technology	[21] [3] [19] [109]
FC-25	Decreased access and control of data at all levels by customers	Customers can select deployment regions, but lack complete control or transparency regarding the precise physical data locations	[72] [90] [116]
FC-26	Chain of dependencies in multiple cloud systems	UCSP: A Framework to tackle the challenge of dependency chain in cloud forensics	[23]
FC-27	Locating evidence in a large and changing system	Integration of AI in digital forensics	[47]
		Ongoing research explores the application of AI in e-discovery processes	[128] [66]
		CFLOG	[55]
		ForFw	[106]
FC-29	Locating and collecting cloud-based data for forensic investigations	Improvements in the CSPs' forensic procedures	[132]
		Advancements in forensic tools	
		CATCH framework	
FC-30	Data associated with deallocated VMs may only be available for a limited time	Methods to extract forensic evidence from VM memory dumps	[104] [105]

Challenge	Challenges Description	Progress and Solutions	References
FC-32	Sources/traces of evidence are generated differently compared to noncloud	CFLOG	[108]
		FowFw	[106] [5]
FC-34	Live forensics	CSPs memory forensic procedures	[118]
FC-35	Resource abstraction in cloud environments	Enhanced forensic tools and frameworks	[118]
		Improved documentation and support mechanisms by CSPs	[77] [78]
FC-37	Additional evidence collection is often infeasible in the cloud	Specialized forensic support services	[6]
		Automation and AI	[64]
		Compliance with standards	[33]
FC-38	Capturing accurate forensic images in dynamic, multi-tenant cloud environments	CSPs disk forensic procedures	[118]
FC-39	Selective data acquisition	Tools that allow selective acquisition and analysis of suspicious users and applications	[82] [106]
FC-41	Ensuring reliable and verifiable data ownership in cloud computing	CSPs' data isolation techniques	[11]
		CSPs' logging and monitoring tools	[93]
		Exploration of immutable storage solutions and adoption of blockchain technologies	[74] [71]
FC-42	Data Integrity and Evidence Preservation	Leverage blockchain's technology features	[43]
FC-44	Competence and Trustworthiness of CSPs	Understanding CSPs' forensic procedures	[118] [4]
		Adoption of incident-response solutions as a service	

Table 4.1: Summary of Progress and Solutions of NIST Cloud Forensic Challenges

Chapter 5

Proposed Solution

This chapter presents the proposed solution, providing an overview of the framework developed. It builds upon the foundation established in the preceding chapters, drawing insights from the exploration of the state of the art in cloud forensics. The proposed solution aims to address the identified challenges and gaps in current forensic procedures by offering a flexible and modular framework for digital investigations.

Moreover, it introduces the key components and architectural design of the proposed framework, delineating its functional and non-functional requirements. Lastly, the chapter discusses the reference scenario devised to validate the framework's performance and demonstrate its applicability in real-world investigative scenarios.

5.1 Framework Description

The proposed forensic framework is developed to address a notable gap in the current landscape of cloud forensic tools. While various tools exist for different stages of forensic investigations, there is a notable lack of a complete framework that covers all forensic stages, especially considering the cloud forensics field. This framework is designed to fill that gap, offering a solution that integrates proven existing tools, automates routine tasks, and provides flexibility and customization for investigators.

Intended for forensic investigators, incident responders, cybersecurity experts, and legal practitioners involved in examining and analyzing digital evidence, it seeks to enhance the efficiency, accuracy, and comprehensiveness of forensic analysis, ultimately enabling users to uncover critical insights and findings in a timely and reliable manner.

The framework is designed to cover the entire forensic investigation lifecycle, including collection, examination, analysis, and reporting. By providing a unified platform that addresses all stages, the framework ensures that users have a consistent toolset, reducing the need for multiple tools and streamlining the forensic process.

The framework's core is a plugin-based architecture that allows for significant flexibility. This design enables the framework to serve both as a general forensic solution and as a specialized solution for specific forensic domains, such as cloud forensics. Users can select and utilize plugins tailored to their needs, allowing the framework to adapt to diverse investigation scenarios.

By integrating widely used forensic tools, the framework leverages proven capabilities within a cohesive and automated workflow. Automating tasks like data collection, evidence preservation, and preliminary analysis reduces manual effort and human error, saving valuable time and enhancing investigation reliability. Users can customize the execution flow, allowing for tailored and adaptive investigation processes.

Furthermore, the framework offers flexibility in plugin implementation, supporting Docker- and Python-based plugins. This dual capability enhances the framework's versatility, allowing the utilization of diverse tools and techniques within forensic investigations. Docker-based plugins provide isolation and reproducibility, enabling the execution of complex forensic tasks in controlled environments. Conversely, Python-based plugins offer simplicity and ease of development, allowing for rapid prototyping and customization.

Additionally, it prioritizes data integrity preservation, ensuring evidence authenticity for legal proceedings. Comprehensive logs and plugin execution outputs are stored, providing detailed insights and a complete record of the forensic process for transparency and accountability.

5.1.1 Framework Architecture

The proposed forensic framework is designed to be flexible, modular, and efficient. It consists of several key components, each crucial in supporting the forensic investigation process. Below is an overview of these components, detailing their roles and interactions within the framework. Figure 5.1 illustrates a high-level diagram representing the architecture of the framework and the interactions between its main components.

- **Main component:** Serves as the central control unit of the framework. It initializes the forensic process by reading the main configuration file customized by the user and ensures the correct initialization and execution of the other components according to the configuration.
- **Configuration reader:** Responsible for parsing the main configuration file, which outlines the execution parameters and flows for the investigation. This configuration guides the overall operation of the framework.
- **Plugin reader:** Responsible for parsing the plugins' configuration files, which contain specific settings according to their nature.
- **Plugin manager:** Controls all aspects related to plugins. It is responsible for loading the configurations of the specified plugins stored in a stipulated directory. This component manages and executes plugins, facilitating their dynamic utilization and ensuring seamless integration into the forensic process. Plugins can be sourced from a repository managed by the community or framework maintainers, which provides a central location for accessing and downloading new plugins.
- **Task orchestrator:** Oversees the execution of forensic tasks and workflows based on the main configuration. Using the Plugin manager, it orchestrates the interaction between different plugins, managing data flow between plugin executions.
- **Python executor:** Facilitates the execution of Python-based plugins. This component imports the plugin's module and executes the respective function according to the plugin's configuration.
- **Docker executor:** Facilitates the execution of Docker-based plugins within isolated Docker containers. This module builds and runs the containers for these plugins, ensuring isolated and reproducible execution of the forensic tasks.
- **Integrity checker:** Validates the integrity of forensic evidence. It stores hashes of the collected and generated data to maintain a traceable record of the data integrity throughout the forensic process. After each plugin execution, the task orchestrator requires its functions to check the integrity of the input files and to track the data generated.




Figure 5.1: Framework architecture

All framework components, including plugins, generate logs detailing information about the forensic activities executed. This information helps users to track the progress of investigations with real-time insights and provides a comprehensive record of the forensic investigation.

Through its plugin-driven architecture and Docker containerization possibility, the framework enhances the functionality and trustworthiness of forensic analyses. It promotes interoperability and extensibility, allowing for seamless integration of new plugins and tools as they emerge. Moreover, by automating the connection between different tools and providing access to their outputs, the framework empowers users to streamline their workflows and focus their expertise on deriving meaningful insights from forensic data.

5.1.2 Functional and Non-functional Requirements

Functional requirements define the specific behaviours, actions, and outcomes the framework must exhibit to fulfil its intended purpose. These requirements are:

FR-01. Cover all the different stages of the forensic investigation.

The framework should cover all stages of the forensic investigation process to address the challenge inherent in cloud forensic investigations. This requirement ensures that the framework provides data collection, examination, analysis, and reporting capabilities, enabling users to perform thorough and systematic investigations.

FR-02. Allow the user to customize the flow of execution.

The framework should allow the user to customize the execution flow, enabling adaptation to different requirements and characteristics of the case. This requirement emphasizes the importance of flexibility and adaptability in the framework's design, empowering users to tailor the investigation process to suit specific case requirements and objectives.

FR-03. Always provide the output of each phase to the user.

The framework should consistently provide the output of each investigation phase to the user, allowing further analysis and integration with external tools. This requirement enables transparency and traceability throughout the investigation process, empowering users to validate results, make informed decisions, and collaborate effectively.

FR-04. Workflow automation.

The framework should automate repetitive tasks and workflows involved in the investigation process, such as data extraction, data preprocessing and evidence analysis. By automating processes, efficiency is boosted while the risk of human error is minimized, speeding up the investigation process.

FR-05. Open-source tool integration.

The framework should allow the integration of diverse open-source forensic tools to perform data extraction, analysis, and reporting tasks. Integration with existing open-source tools enhances the framework's functionality, allowing users to leverage specialized capabilities while benefiting from open-source software's transparency, flexibility, and community support.

FR-06. Possibility of integration of new plugins developed by the community.

The framework should allow for the integration of new plugins developed by the community to enhance flexibility and expansion. This requirement enables its evolution and adaptation to changing forensic needs by incorporating new functionalities and capabilities.

FR-07. Collect data from various sources.

The framework should be capable of collecting data from various sources, including logs, VMs, databases, or storage systems. This requirement ensures that users can access all relevant data sources for a thorough investigation.

FR-08. Hash all evidence.

The framework should hash all evidence to maintain tracking of the data across the execution flow. This requirement enables the framework to ensure the preservation of digital evidence by creating cryptographic hashes that can be used to uniquely identify the data and detect tampering throughout the investigation lifecycle.

FR-09. Evidence preservation.

The framework should ensure the integrity and preservation of evidence throughout the investigation process, preventing tampering or unauthorized modification. Preserving evidence is essential for maintaining the admissibility and credibility of findings in legal proceedings.

FR-10. Support for chain of custody management.

The framework should enable the tracking and managing of the chain of custody for digital evidence throughout the investigation process. A secure and documented chain of custody is essential for securing the admissibility of evidence in legal proceedings.

To complement the functional requirements, **Non-functional requirements** encompass the quality attributes, constraints, and characteristics that define the framework's performance, reliability, security, and usability [42]. These requirements are:

NFR-01. Not developed to make conclusions, but to support the user.

The framework should not be developed to draw conclusions but to support the users in reaching conclusions about their case. This requirement emphasizes the framework's role as an assistant rather than an arbiter, empowering users to exercise judgment and discretion in interpreting findings and drawing conclusions.

NFR-02. Open-source.

The framework should be open-source, allowing users to access, modify, and update its source code. This requirement promotes transparency, collaboration, and community-driven development, fostering innovation and trust among users.

NFR-03. Good documentation support.

The framework should provide documentation to facilitate its utilization, adaptation, and improvement. Documentation is crucial in onboarding new users, troubleshooting issues, and understanding the framework's capabilities, thereby enhancing user experience and productivity.

NFR-04. Development of the framework under a plugin-driven architecture.

The framework should be designed under a plugin-driven architecture to accommodate different user preferences and requirements, facilitating the integration of diverse tools across different stages. This requirement emphasizes the importance of modularity and extensibility in the framework's design, enabling users to customize and extend its functionality through plugins.

NFR-05. Continuous improvement and updates.

Mechanisms for ongoing improvement and updates to the framework, such as bug fixes, feature enhancements, and security patches, should be established. Technology and forensic methodologies evolve, requiring the framework to adapt and improve to meet emerging needs and challenges.

NFR-06. Ensure isolation of plugins' execution.

The framework should ensure the isolation of plugin executions to enhance security, consistency, and system independence. This requirement minimizes the risk of interference and ensures consistent execution environments.

NFR-07. Take into consideration the confidentiality of the data.

The framework should consider the confidentiality of the data due to privacy concerns that may arise from the case. This requirement emphasizes the importance of data privacy and confidentiality in forensic investigations, ensuring compliance with legal and ethical standards.

NFR-08. Cross-platform compatibility.

Ensure the framework is compatible with various OSs and environments commonly used by users. Investigators may employ different OSs and platforms, necessitating compatibility to facilitate the deployment and usage.

NFR-09. Accommodate growing volumes of data.

The framework should scale effectively to accommodate growing volumes of data and the increasing complexity of investigations. Scalability ensures that the framework remains effective and responsive as investigative demands evolve.

NFR-10. High reliability.

The framework should demonstrate high reliability to minimize the risk of data loss during investigations. Reliability is critical for maintaining trust in the framework's results and preventing disruptions to investigative activities.

NFR-11. Intuitive and user-friendly.

The framework should be intuitive and user-friendly, making it accessible to users with varying levels of expertise. Usability enhances productivity and reduces the users' learning curve, improving overall efficiency.

5.2 Reference Scenario

To validate the proposed forensic framework, a reference scenario was prepared. As depicted in Figure 5.2, the reference scenario includes two VMs hosted within the Azure cloud environment, replicating a common attack vector. This scenario involves a C2 server managed by the attacker, which coordinates infected machines, along with a victim machine compromised by RAT malware. This setup simulates real conditions, providing a basis for testing and validating the forensic framework across various dimensions of cloud forensics.




Figure 5.2: Reference scenario

5.2.1 Azure VMs Deployment

Firstly, the Azure Portal¹ was accessed to create two VM resources, each assigned to a new resource group. Both VMs were configured to be deployed in the *West Europe* region within *Zone 1*, using the *Ubuntu Server 22.04 LTS - x64 Gen2* image, with all other configuration details left at their default values. After downloading the respective SSH private keys for accessing the VMs (as Azure does not store private keys), both resources were successfully created.

To complete the setup on the Azure portal, the NSG² of the RAT VM was accessed to create a flow log. The RAT VM was designated as the target resource, and a storage account was established to store these logs.

5.2.2 C2 Setup

To achieve the desired behaviour for the C2 machine, a Python script was developed to handle multiple communication requests from RAT clients, simulating the behaviour of a C2 server controlled by an attacker.

¹<https://portal.azure.com/#home>

²<https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-network/network-security-groups-overview>

This script is designed to be run from the command line, accepting a port number as an argument. It binds the server to all available interfaces ('0.0.0.0') and sets up a socket to listen for incoming connections on the specified IP ('0.0.0.0') and port number provided as an argument. The script utilizes the `ThreadPoolExecutor` from the `concurrent.futures` module to manage up to five concurrent communications, enabling the server to handle multiple client requests simultaneously. When a new connection is received, the server delegates it to separate threads to manage interactions with a connected RAT client, proceeding through the following steps:

- **Connection request handling:** When a connection request is received, the server generates an expected MD5 hash value based on the concatenation of the current minute with a predefined secret key value for authentication. It then validates the received value from the client against the generated value.
- **Command execution:** If authentication is successful, the server sends a command (`uname -a`) to the client and logs the results received.
- **Connection termination:** Finally, the server sends a subsequent command to terminate the connection with `'exit <VALUE>'`, where `<VALUE>` is a randomly generated number between 1800 and 3600, symbolizing the time the RAT should wait before attempting to reconnect. The client socket is then closed.

All the script's steps are logged to the standard output with timestamped messages to aid in tracking server activity. In this way, the server is prepared to handle RAT connections, simulating the actions of a real C2 server controlled by an attacker and managing a network of infected machines. Finally, since Azure denies all inbound connections by default, an inbound security rule was added to allow connections on port 12345. With this configuration, the setup was completed, and the script was ready to be executed using the command:

```
./C2_server.py 12345
```

5.2.3 RAT Setup

The setup of the RAT machine was more complex. A Python script was developed to establish a connection with the C2 server, simulating the behaviour of RAT malware. This script includes a function that performs dummy computations to simulate a CPU-intensive task, effectively consuming CPU resources.

Like the C2 script, the RAT script is executed from the command line and requires a port number as an argument. After validating the port number, it uses the `Thread` class from the `threading` module to initiate threads for both the CPU-intensive task and the connection attempt function. These functions run in an infinite loop, executing their tasks periodically with sleep intervals between executions and logging all steps to the standard output with timestamped messages.

The logic behind the periodic connection attempts to the C2 server is as follows:

- **Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) generation:** An MD5 hash value is generated using a predefined secret key and the current minute number. This value seeds the generation of a random alphanumeric suffix, which is then concatenated with part of the hash value and a predefined value to create a unique FQDN.
- **FQDN resolution:** The script attempts to resolve the generated FQDN to obtain the corresponding IPv4 address using the `getaddrinfo` function from the `socket` module. If successful, it proceeds

to establish a connection; otherwise, it sleeps for 150 seconds before trying again to generate a new FQDN.

- **Connection establishment:** If the FQDN resolution is successful, the script attempts to connect to the C2 server and sends the previously generated hash value for authentication. It waits for commands from the server, executing them until it receives an 'exit <VALUE>' message, where <VALUE> specifies the wait time before the next connection attempt.
- **Connection termination:** Upon receiving the exit message, the script closes the socket and sleeps for the specified time before repeating the connection attempt process.

By combining multithreading with CPU-intensive tasks and periodic connection attempts, the RAT script establishes a persistent communication channel for remote command execution under the attacker's control, effectively simulating the behaviour of a genuine RAT malware.

To ensure successful FQDN resolution, the `/etc/hosts` file on the RAT machine was replaced with a custom file mapping some generated FQDNs to the C2 machine's IP address. This configuration guarantees periodic successful connections while generating both successful and unsuccessful DNS requests. `dnsmasq` was configured to log these requests for further analysis. With this setup completed, the script was ready to execute using the port number on which the C2 server was listening:

```
./rat.py 12345
```

5.2.4 Data Acquisition and Analysis

Depending on the investigator's access to the RAT machine or the cooperation with the CSP, two investigation paths are possible:

- **Data Acquisition via CSP collaboration:** By collaborating with the CSP, relevant data can be collected and ingested into the forensic framework for further analysis (Figure 5.3(a)).
- **Independent investigation:** If CSP collaboration is not feasible or timely, the investigator can collect evidence using a framework plugin designed for this purpose (Figure 5.3(b)). Alternatively, the investigator can manually collect the data and then ingest it into the framework for further analysis (Figure 5.3(c)).




Figure 5.3: Comparison of Data Acquisition Scenarios

In the specified reference scenario, data is directly collected from the Azure portal. The following procedures were executed to extract relevant data for validating the framework:

- **Disk image exportation:** By generating a SAS URL³ for the disk, it is possible to export it. Analyzing the infected VM's disk image allows the identification of traces of the RAT malware and helps to understand its behaviour. The disk image analysis also enables the collection of DNS request logs, which can be investigated to identify any unusual requests revealing potential compromise.
- **Acquisition of NSG flow logs:** Similarly, generating a SAS token for the container previously set up to store the NSG flow logs, allows their extraction. The process is further streamlined using the AzCopy⁴ command-line utility, which simplifies the acquisition of these logs. NSG flow logs are valuable for analyzing network traffic patterns and detecting potentially suspicious connections.

5.2.5 Main Entities Involved




Figure 5.4: Main Entities

Based on the described process, the main entities involved in the investigation are:

- **Azure (CSP):**
 - Manages the cloud environment where the data relevant to the investigation resides.
 - Restricts the toolset selection, requiring investigators to choose tools that support execution considering Azure's cloud properties and environment.
 - Depending on the scenario, may collaborate with the investigator by providing necessary data access and offering support during the investigation; otherwise, remains passive if the investigator independently accesses the data.
- **Investigator:**
 - Configures and sets up the framework according to the case's specific requirements and the environment's characteristics.
 - Determines which framework's plugins best suit each investigation stage.
 - Exercises discretion in decision-making throughout the investigation process.
- **Framework:**

³<https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/common/storage-sas-overview>

⁴<https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/common/storage-use-azcopy-v10>

- Customized by the users to align with their specific preferences and requirements, ensuring a personalized process.
- Provides logging and reporting capabilities, documenting each investigation step to maintain transparency.
- Manages the execution of selected plugins at each investigation stage.
- Ensures the integrity and preservation of evidence to guarantee the admissibility and reliability of the findings.
- Facilitates data flow between plugins, connecting outputs as inputs for subsequent executions.

As illustrated in Figure 5.4, these entities interact dynamically, depending on the nature of the investigation and the available resources. The investigator's decisions drive the framework's configuration, while the CSP's involvement varies based on access permissions and timely cooperation. Ultimately, the framework serves as the central orchestrator of the investigation process, facilitating efficient data collection, examination, analysis, and reporting.

Chapter 6

Implementation

This chapter delves into the implementation of the proposed framework, offering an overview of the technological and architectural decisions that shaped its development. Building on the foundation laid in the previous chapter, which outlined the key components and design of the framework, it presents a summary of the implementation and integration of these components into a cohesive system. Furthermore, it discusses the plugin integration within the framework, detailing their standardized structure and using some of the developed plugins as examples to showcase the seamless nature of their integration.

6.1 Technological Stack

The technological stack for the proposed forensic framework is a crucial aspect of its development, as it provides the necessary tools and technologies to ensure functionality, scalability, and maintainability. In this way, this section outlines the key technologies and tools chosen to implement the proposed solution.

6.1.1 Programming Language

The Python¹ programming language was chosen to develop the framework's skeleton due to its readability, ease of writing, and robust community support. It possesses attributes that make it well-suited for implementing a framework intended for users with diverse programming knowledge [125], such as:

- Ease of use and readability: Python's simplicity and readability facilitate straightforward code writing and maintenance. Its clean syntax enables developers to understand the framework's structure quickly.
- Dynamic typing and flexibility: Python's dynamic typing enables rapid development and prototyping, crucial for evolving requirements and quick feature adoption.
- Strong community and ecosystem: Python has a large and active community that provides extensive documentation and tutorials, which are invaluable for framework development and debugging.
- Plugin architecture suitability: Python's support for modular programming and dynamic importing makes it an excellent choice for a plugin-based architecture. Features can be implemented as plugins, ensuring a modular and extensible framework. Python's `importlib`² module allows for dynamic loading of modules, facilitating plugin architectures.

¹<https://www.python.org/>

²<https://docs.python.org/3/library/importlib.html>

- Cross-platform compatibility: Python is inherently cross-platform, running on Windows, macOS, and Linux, ensuring the forensic framework's usability across various OSs.
- Integration with Docker: Python's compatibility with the Docker SDK enables seamless interaction with containerized environments, which is crucial for the efficient management and execution of Docker-based plugins.
- Enhanced I/O and monitoring: Python's ability to handle file I/O operations and manipulate data enhances the framework's efficiency, logging, and monitoring capabilities.

6.1.2 Configuration Files

YAML³ (YAML Ain't Markup Language) was chosen for preparing the configuration files of the framework and plugins due to its human-readable format and simplicity. This data serialization language allows for straightforward configuration and customization without requiring in-depth programming knowledge [35]. Moreover, YAML is widely utilized in configuration management and is compatible with multiple programming languages, including Python [130].

6.1.3 Plugin Management

In forensic analysis, it is crucial to maintain strict isolation for tasks involving sensitive data to avoid contamination or tampering. However, not all tasks require such stringent isolation. Python-based plugins can handle less critical tasks without compromising the framework's security and integrity. Conversely, Docker-based plugins are designed to manage more complex tasks that demand isolation. This hybrid strategy leverages the capabilities of both Python and Docker⁴, enhancing the framework's flexibility and optimizing its performance and resource usage.

The framework allows the execution of Python-based plugins, which handle the execution of tasks such as data preprocessing to ensure its correct format or state for subsequent processing steps within Docker containers. These tasks can be efficiently handled within the Python ecosystem, leveraging libraries suited for data manipulation and preprocessing. Furthermore, allowing the integration of Python-based plugins leads to more efficient overall framework performance, saving computational resources and time by directly executing tasks that do not require the overhead of containerization.

On the other hand, Docker-based plugins enable the execution of forensic tasks requiring isolation and reproducibility. Docker encapsulates each plugin's code and all necessary dependencies within a container, eliminating the need for additional installations on the host system. This approach provides a secure, sandboxed environment for plugin execution, ensuring consistent behaviour across different systems. Moreover, Docker containers can run on any system with Docker installed, offering portability and enhancing the cross-platform capability of the framework.

6.2 Components Implementation

The following sections provide a detailed description of the various components outlined when discussing the framework's architecture (Subsection 5.1.1). Each component plays an essential role in the framework's functionality, ensuring robust and reliable forensic analysis. From the execution of user-defined plugins to

³<https://yaml.org/>

⁴<https://www.docker.com/>

the verification of data integrity, these sections will elaborate on the implementation details and interactions between different parts of the system, showcasing the design and integration of each module.

6.2.1 Main Component

The `framework.py` script serves as the central component of the framework and is responsible for initializing and managing its execution. When executing the framework, users invoke the script passing the path to the custom configuration file as an argument:

```
python framework.py [PATH_TO_CONFIG_FILE]
```

Upon execution, the script validates the path and stores the execution timestamp (YYYYMMDD-HHMM). This timestamp serves as a unique identifier and is used by other components to differentiate the data of various executions. Next, it instantiates a `MainConfigurationReader`, which parses the provided configuration file. This action marks the beginning of the framework's execution process.

After configuration parsing, the script initializes essential framework components. It sets up the framework for execution by leveraging the `PluginManager` capabilities to load the plugins defined in the configuration file and instantiates the respective `IntegrityChecker` to maintain integrity throughout the execution process. Subsequently, the framework initiates execution by activating the `TaskOrchestrator` and begins measuring execution time, which is then displayed in the standard output upon completion.

Furthermore, the script defines a method to be executed once each plugin finishes its task (Listing 6.1). This method validates the integrity of input files used by plugins and stores hash values of generated data to facilitate subsequent verifications. Any discrepancies or failures are logged in a file named `framework_integrity.log`. This mechanism is essential for preserving the data integrity within the framework and allows for verification authentication of data authenticity post-execution. Additionally, based on user configuration preferences, it removes input directories originating from previous plugin outputs, conserving resources and preventing data duplication within the framework's workspace.

```

1 def finish_task(plugin_manager, integrity_checker, remove_input_dir, plugin):
2     logging.basicConfig(filename='framework_integrity.log', level=logging.INFO,
3         format='%(asctime)s - %(levelname)s: %(message)s')
4
5     INVALID_HASH_VALUE = '###'
6
7     if (in_dir := plugin_manager.get_input_dir(plugin)) != None:
8         integrity_preserved = True
9         for root, _, files in os.walk(in_dir):
10             for file in files:
11                 file_path = os.path.join(root, file)
12                 try:
13                     ret = utils.gen_and_comp_hash(integrity_checker, file_path)
14                     if (not ret is None) and (not ret):
15                         logging.error(f"[!] The integrity of the file '{file_path}'
16                             was compromised during the execution of the plugin '{plugin}'")
17                         if integrity_preserved:
18                             integrity_preserved = False
19                     except Exception as e:
20                         try:
21                             hash_value = integrity_checker.get_hash(file)
22                             if hash_value is None:

```

```

20         logging.info(f"[!] {plugin} - The hash of the file {
file_path} does not exist on the integrity checker.")
21         elif hash_value == INVALID_HASH_VALUE:
22             continue
23         else:
24             logging.error(f'![!] {plugin} - Error while generating
the hash of the file {file_path}: {e}')
25             except Exception as e:
26                 print(f'![!] Error while printing the error message about
the failure of the integrity checker.')
27             if integrity_preserved:
28                 print(f"[+] The integrity of the files used as input was preserved.")
29             if remove_input_dir:
30                 if utils.remove_dir(in_dir):
31                     print(f"[!] {plugin} - Failed to remove the input directory.")
32
33 out_dir = plugin_manager.get_output_dir(plugin)
34 for root, _, files in os.walk(out_dir):
35     for file in files:
36         file_path = os.path.join(root, file)
37         try:
38             utils.gen_and_save_hash(integrity_checker, file_path)
39         except Exception as e:
40             logging.error(f"[!] {plugin} - Error while generating the hash of
the file {file_path}: {e}")
41             integrity_checker.add_hash(file, INVALID_HASH_VALUE)

```

Listing 6.1: Function designed to be executed upon plugins' completion.

6.2.2 YAML Readers

The `YAMLReader` class is an abstract base class that defines the framework's functionality for reading and parsing YAML files. It serves as a blueprint for specific YAML readers, ensuring consistent handling of configuration files. By implementing this interface, components can process YAML files, enabling a robust and scalable method for configuration management. This class is initialized with the path to the file, which is stored for subsequent use during reading and parsing.

The `read_yaml` method reads the contents of the YAML file specified during initialization. It uses the `yaml.safe_load` function from the `PyYAML` library to parse the file's content into a Python dictionary. This method ensures the file is read correctly and its contents are stored for further processing.

The `YAMLReader` class includes an abstract method, `parse_yaml`, which any subclass must implement. This method is intended to define the specific parsing logic for the different types of YAML files. By requiring subclasses to implement this method, the `YAMLReader` class enforces a standardized approach to parsing while allowing flexibility for different use cases.

The `MainConfigurationReader` class implements the `YAMLReader` interface. It is designed to parse the main configuration file provided by the user, ensuring all necessary configurations for the framework's operation are correctly read and interpreted. Initialized with the path to the configuration file, it leverages the parent class methods for basic YAML reading and implements the `parse_yaml` method to extract critical information such as plugin configurations, execution chains, input mappings, and framework

parameters. The configuration file parsed by the `MainConfigurationReader` allows users to customize various framework properties, including general configuration, stage definitions, and plugin configurations. For instance, the `max_workers` attribute specifies the maximum number of concurrent workers for task execution, defaulting to 5 if absent, thus controlling the level of parallelism within the framework. The `hash_method` attribute, set to MD5 by default, allows users to choose among the different hashing algorithms implemented by the integrity checkers developed (Subsection 6.2.3). Moreover, resource management options include the `remove_containers` and `remove_input` boolean flags, both defaulting to `True`, which help manage resource usage by removing Docker containers and plugin input directories after execution. These configurations are beneficial for managing disk space, as they ensure containers do not persist after completing their tasks and prevent the accumulation of redundant data. Stage definitions enable users to define distinct phases in the workflow, specifying the order and configurations of multiple instances of each stage and their respective plugins. This modular approach ensures a structured and adaptable workflow tailored to the investigation's requirements. Plugin configuration allows users to specify the plugins and their input data, execution chains, and arguments, providing a complete setup for task execution. Notably, inputs defined for plugins in the collection stage are not parsed, as this stage is intended to collect evidence. Users can list plugins of the previous stages as other plugin inputs, establishing dependency chains that ensure coherent data flow, and use keywords like `readmes` or `hashes` for specific input configurations. These keywords indicate that `README.md` files of plugins already executed and present in the same chains, and the map between the evidence managed by the framework and their hash values should be used as a plugin input. However, plugins do not necessarily have to have inputs defined in the configuration file. Users can create an input directory within the plugin directory and manually ingest the inputs. Furthermore, execution dependencies are created using chains to link plugins, ensuring a logical progression of tasks. These configurations enable highly customized and tailored workflows, enhancing the framework's versatility and utility for various investigations. The Listing 6.2 represents a template for the configuration file that can be parsed by `MainConfigurationReader`.

```
1 max_workers: 5
2 hash_method: md5
3 remove_containers: true
4 remove_input: true
5
6 stages:
7   - name: collection
8     plugins:
9       - name: pluginA
10        chains: [1, 2]
11        arguments:
12          arg1: value1
13          arg2: value2
14   - name: examination
15     plugins:
16       - name: pluginB
17        chains: [1, 2]
18        input:
19          - plugin: pluginA
20        arguments:
21          arg1: value3
22   - name: analysis
```

```

23     plugins:
24         - name: pluginC
25           chains: [1]
26           input:
27             - plugin: pluginB
28               folder: output_folder1_B
29         - name: pluginD
30           chains: [2]
31           input:
32             - plugin: pluginB
33               folder: output_folder2_B
34     - name: reporting
35       plugins:
36         - name: pluginD
37           chains: [1, 2]
38           input:
39             - hashes
40             - readmes
41             - plugin: pluginC
42             - plugin: pluginD

```

Listing 6.2: Template of a configuration file

The `PluginReader` class, another implementation of the `YAMLReader` interface, is designed to parse plugin configuration files within the framework, extending the base functionality of `YAMLReader` and introducing logic to handle both Python-based and Docker-based plugins. This ensures that plugin configurations are correctly interpreted and validated before use. Initialized with the path to a plugin configuration file, the `PluginReader` extracts the file name and invokes the parent class constructor for basic `YAML` reading. The `parse_yaml` method (Listing 6.3) validates the structure of the configuration file, ensuring it contains only one top-level key (`plugin`) and that the plugin name matches the name specified in the user's main configuration. It then determines whether the plugin is Docker-based or Python-based and delegates the parsing task accordingly. The `parse_python_plugin` method handles the parsing of Python-based plugin configurations by ensuring that the plugin is defined in a module with the same name and validating the presence of the `function_name` field, which specifies the plugin's entry point function. This module is dynamically imported to verify the availability of the specified function, ensuring accurate configuration. In contrast, the `parse_docker_plugin` method validates critical fields such as `image`, `privileged`, `volumes`, `ports`, and `gpus` to ensure complete and adequately formatted configuration. It verifies the specification of the Docker image and parses volume mappings, while accommodating optional configurations such as privilege mode (defaulting to false), GPU configurations (customizable by specific device IDs or count), and port mappings (allowing port forwarding). This parser offers flexibility for developing Docker-based plugins, accommodating the diverse needs of developers for creating functional plugins. Templates for both Python-based and Docker-based plugins are provided in Listings 6.4 and 6.5 aiding in integrating new framework plugins.

```

1 def parse_yaml(self):
2     super().read_yaml()
3     if len(self.content.keys()) != 1:
4         print(f'[-] The file {self.file_name} is invalid - it should only be the
           plugin definition.')

```

```

5         return 1, None
6
7     plugin = self.content.get('plugin', [])
8
9     if (plugin_name := plugin.get('name')) != self.file_name.split('.')[0]:
10         print(f"[-] The plugin name '{plugin_name}' defined on the {self.file_name}
11             does not match the name defined on the conf file.")
12         return 1, None
13
14     if (docker_config := plugin.get('docker', None)) != None:
15         return True, self.parse_docker_plugin(docker_config)
16
17     return False, self.parse_python_plugin(plugin)

```

Listing 6.3: PluginReader parse_yaml method

```

1 plugin:
2   name: example_python_plugin
3   function_name: entry_point_function

```

Listing 6.4: Python-based plugin configuration file

```

1 plugin:
2   name: example_docker_plugin
3   docker:
4     image: your-docker-image
5     privileged: false
6     volumes:
7       - from: /host/path
8         to: /container/path
9         mode: rw
10    ports:
11      from: 8080
12      to: 8080
13    gpus:
14      device_ids:
15        - 0
16      # count: 1

```

Listing 6.5: Docker-based plugin configuration file

6.2.3 Integrity Checker

The `IntegrityChecker` abstract base class serves as an interface for the framework's integrity checking mechanisms. This class defines the essential methods and attributes that any concrete integrity checker must implement to ensure the integrity of digital evidence.

The framework's integrity checkers maintain a dictionary named `hashes`, which maps file paths to their corresponding hash values. This dictionary is crucial for tracking and verifying the integrity of files over time. The class provides methods to manage this dictionary, including storing and comparing hashes, retrieving a file hash value, or even the entire dictionary. As an abstract class, it defines the

method `generate_hash` as an abstract method, obligating each integrity checker to implement its way of generating the hash for the data. This abstraction facilitates future implementations of various hash algorithms, allowing users to select one of the diverse procedures. By defining these functionalities, the `IntegrityChecker` ensures that any derived classes will maintain consistent methods for validating the integrity of digital evidence within the forensic framework.

The `MD5Checker` and `SHA256Checker` implement the `IntegrityChecker` class. Both implementations read the file contents and utilize Python's built-in `hashlib` library to generate the hash value. These classes allow users to decide between the MD5 and SHA256 hashing algorithms, offering a balance between speed and security based on specific forensic investigation requirements. MD5, while widely used and less secure than newer hashing algorithms, remains useful for non-critical applications due to its speed and simplicity, whereas SHA-256 provides higher security and integrity verification, making it suitable for applications where data integrity is critical [112].

6.2.4 Task Orchestrator

The `TaskOrchestrator` is responsible for managing the execution flow of the defined tasks within the forensic framework. This class orchestrates the execution of plugins in a structured and efficient manner, ensuring that task dependencies are respected and execution is optimized through concurrent processing.

Upon initialization, the `TaskOrchestrator` starts with an empty task list, ready to manage subsequent tasks. Tasks are added using the `add_task` method, which stores the function to be executed along with its arguments. This flexible approach facilitates dynamic task assignment based on the framework's requirements.

A key feature of the `TaskOrchestrator` is its capability to handle user-defined execution chains. These chains are identified by an integer ID and ensure that dependencies are fulfilled before plugin execution. In the event of a plugin failure, the chains containing the failed plugin are marked as invalid, preventing further execution of any plugin within the same chain (dependent plugins).

The execution process is initiated by the `start` method. This method analyses the user configuration to determine the stages and the plugins to be executed at each stage. Following the user-defined order of stages and leveraging the `PluginManager`, each plugin is prepared for execution, managing its inputs according to the configuration. Once all plugins for the current stage are prepared, the respective tasks are added to the task list. Each task is composed of the `PluginManager`'s `execute_plugin` method and a tuple consisting of the plugin's name and respective configuration.

The `run_tasks` method is then called to execute the tasks concurrently. Concurrency is achieved using the `ThreadPoolExecutor` from Python's `concurrent.futures` module. The `run_tasks` method submits tasks related to plugins of the same stage for parallel execution, thereby maximizing efficiency and reducing overall execution time. Each task's exit code is monitored to identify failures, and chains containing failed plugins are marked invalid to prevent further execution errors. The method `add_to_invalid_chains` updates the set of invalid chains and informs the user about the encountered errors. This control of errors ensures they do not propagate through the workflow, maintaining the framework's reliability. Finally, after each task execution, a function received as an argument is called to mark its completion.

6.2.5 Plugin Manager

The `PluginManager` class is a critical component of the framework, responsible for managing the lifecycle of plugins, including their loading, preparation, and execution. This class interacts with both Docker-

based and Python-based plugins, ensuring their seamless integration and execution. Moreover, it provides essential support to other framework components by offering methods to manage plugin-specific directories. Additionally, the `PluginManager` facilitates access to plugin configurations and copying of plugin-specific README.md files (naming them as `{plugin_name}-README.md`) to designated paths.

Furthermore, the `PluginManager` ensures the loading of plugins, leveraging the `PluginReader` to parse their configurations. In this way, it stores a mapping between the plugins' name and a dictionary containing a combination of the plugin properties, user-defined plugin configurations and a flag that distinguishes Docker-based and Python-based plugins.

This class provides the `prepare_plugin` method that ensures all necessary inputs for a plugin are correctly prepared before execution. As displayed in Listing 6.6, these preparations include creating the plugin input directory, emptying it if it already exists, and handling the plugin dependencies. It ensures that the user-defined input configurations, such as hashes, readmes, and data generated by other plugins, are copied to the input directory, ensuring readiness for plugin execution.

```

1  def prepare_plugin(self, plugin, inputs, get_prev_plugins, integrity_checker):
2      if (plugin_input_dir := self.create_input_dir(plugin)) == 1:
3          print(f"[-] Error while creating the input directory for the plugin '{
plugin}'")
4          exit(1)
5      for plugin_input, dirs in inputs.items():
6          if plugin_input == 'hashes':
7              utils.export_hashes(integrity_checker, plugin_input_dir)
8              continue
9          if plugin_input == 'readmes':
10             readme_plugins = get_prev_plugins()
11             if self.get_readmes(plugin_input_dir, readme_plugins) == 1:
12                 print(f"[!] Error while extracting the readmes for the plugin '{
plugin}'")
13                 continue
14
15             plugin_input_out_dir = self.get_output_dir(plugin_input)
16             if dirs != None:
17                 for dir in dirs:
18                     from_path = os.path.join(plugin_input_out_dir, dir)
19                     utils.copy_dir(from_path, plugin_input_dir)
20             else:
21                 utils.copy_dir(plugin_input_out_dir, plugin_input_dir)

```

Listing 6.6: `PluginManager` `prepare_plugin` method

The `execute_plugin` method is responsible for executing a plugin, whether it is a Docker-based or Python-based plugin. It initializes the appropriate executor and manages the execution process, as displayed in Listing 6.7. The execution of the plugins is tracked by the `PluginManager`, informing the user of the plugin's execution time immediately after its termination.

```

1  def execute_plugin(self, plugin):
2      start_time = time.time()
3      plugin_name = plugin[0]
4      print(f'[+] Starting the execution of the plugin {plugin_name}')
5

```

```

6     if plugin[1]['isDockerPlugin']:
7         if (executor := DockerExecutor(self.timestamp, PLUGINS_PATH, plugin) ==
            None):
8             return 1
9         args = {'remove_container': self.remove_containers}
10        else:
11            executor = PythonExecutor(self.timestamp, PLUGINS_PATH, plugin)
12            args = {}
13
14        result = executor.execute(**args)
15        utils.elapsed_time(start_time, plugin_name)
16        return result

```

Listing 6.7: PluginManager execute_plugin method

6.2.6 Plugin Executors

The `PythonExecutor` is designed for executing Python-based plugins directly within the host environment, providing a straightforward mechanism to support a wide range of Python plugins with minimal configuration. Upon initialization, it extracts the essential details from the plugin configuration, such as the module path, the specific function to execute, and its arguments. The execution process, encapsulated within its `execute` method, initiates by creating a dedicated output directory, whose name is constructed based on the execution timestamp, to store results. If directory creation fails, errors are logged, and an error code is returned. Assuming a successful setup, the executor employs Python's `importlib` module to dynamically import the plugin's module and invokes the function specified with the output directory path and any additional arguments from the main configuration file. Error handling within the `execute` method ensures that exceptions during dynamic import or function execution are logged, facilitating possible issues resolution.

On the other hand, the `DockerExecutor` is designed to execute plugins encapsulated within Docker containers, providing an isolated environment for performing critical forensic tasks and resource-intensive operations. This executor ensures consistency and reproducibility across various executions and systems, leveraging Python's Docker SDK for seamless integration with Docker. Upon initialization, it configures essential parameters for the execution, parsing plugin configurations to extract necessary details for both the building and running of Docker containers. It constructs absolute paths for volumes, ensuring proper linkage with the host filesystem, and generates a `.dockerignore` file to exclude irrelevant output directories of previous executions from the Docker build context. The core functionality of the executor lies in the `execute` method (Listing 6.8). This method employs locking mechanisms for thread safety during Docker image building and container startup. It builds the Docker image from the specified context path, uniquely tagging it with the plugin name and execution timestamp and enforces intermediate container cleanup and cache avoidance with the `rm` and `nocache` options set to `True`. Containers are launched with custom configurations, including environment variables, privileges, ports, and GPU device requests, in detached mode, releasing the lock and enabling other threads to build and start their respective containers concurrently. Each container is named `plugin_name-timestamp`, ensuring unique identification across multiple executions to prevent interference between containers of the same plugin from different runs. Post-execution, the executor captures container logs and invokes a `callback` method for logging outputs to designated files (or standard output in case of errors), ensuring the possibility of detection and resolution of execution issues.

```

1 def execute(self, remove_container):
2     with lock:
3         docker_client = docker.from_env()
4         try:
5             image_tag = f'{self.plugin_name}_{self.image}.{self.timestamp}'[:128]
6             _, _ = docker_client.images.build(
7                 path=self.context_path,
8                 dockerfile=os.path.join(self.context_path, 'Dockerfile'),
9                 tag=image_tag,
10                rm=True,
11                quiet=False,
12                nocache=True,
13            )
14
15            container = docker_client.containers.run(
16                name=f'{self.plugin_name}-{self.timestamp}',
17                image=image_tag,
18                environment=self.environment,
19                privileged=self.privileged,
20                detach=True,
21                ports=self.ports,
22                device_requests=self.gpus_config,
23                volumes=self.volumes,
24            )
25            finally:
26                docker_client.close()
27
28            # Wait for the container to finish
29            exit_code = container.wait()['StatusCode']
30
31            # Handle container monitoring, logging, etc.
32            logs = container.logs(stdout=True, stderr=True)
33            self.callback(container, logs, remove_container)
34
35            if exit_code != 0:
36                print(f"[!] Container exited with non-zero status code: {exit_code}")
37
38            return exit_code

```

Listing 6.8: DockerExecutor execute function

6.2.7 Logging of Messages

The framework logs messages directly to the standard output, employing three types of logging messages to inform users about the execution status and any issues encountered:

- **Informational logs:** These log messages, initiated by '[+]', inform the current execution status and provide updates on the workflow's progress. These logs help users understand the ongoing processes at each stage.

- **Error logs:** These log messages, initiated by '[-]', report errors during execution, such as configuration issues or interruptions in the workflow. An error message indicates that the execution has been disrupted and cannot continue. In the context of a plugin's execution, the chains involving that plugin will be considered invalid to prevent further errors.
- **Warning logs:** These log messages, initiated by '[!]', provide notifications about deviations from expected behaviour that are not classified as errors. These warnings are essential for the user to be aware of, as they can influence the execution flow and may require further analysis.

By using these logging messages, the framework ensures that users are well-informed about the execution status, any errors encountered, and any unexpected situations. This approach promotes a more transparent and manageable workflow.

6.3 Plugins Integration

The integration of plugins within the framework is designed to be flexible and extensible, allowing seamless incorporation of both Python-based and Docker-based plugins. This modular approach enables users to leverage a wide range of functionalities, from simple scripts to complex containerized applications, thereby enhancing the framework's capability to address diverse analytical and processing needs.

6.3.1 Plugin Structure

Each plugin within the framework adheres to a specific structure, ensuring consistency and easy integration. The standardized structure includes the following components:

- **YAML configuration file:** Each plugin is defined by a YAML configuration file as defined in the Subsection 6.2.2. This file is named 'plugin_name.yml'.
- **README.md:** Each plugin should include a README.md file that details its purpose, usage (including inputs, outputs, and execution details), and any additional instructions or requirements. This documentation ensures that users can quickly understand and effectively utilize the plugin.
- **Plugin execution script:** Depending on the plugin type, this script can be:
 - **Python-based plugins:** For plugins implemented in Python, the main execution script is named 'plugin_name.py'. This script contains the core logic and functionality of the plugin.
 - **Docker-based Plugins:** A Dockerfile is included for plugins implemented to be executed in Docker containers. The Dockerfile specifies the environment setup, dependencies, and commands to build and run the container.
- **Additional Files:** Plugins may also include additional scripts, data files, or auxiliary programs necessary for their execution, all located within the designated plugin directory.

6.3.2 Example of plugins implemented

This section showcases some of the developed plugins to illustrate the framework's versatility in handling various tasks, ranging from data collection and analysis to reporting and integrity checking. It is essential to emphasize that all implemented plugins are designed to generate logs detailing their execution. This feature enhances execution transparency and contributes to preserving the chain of custody.

The first example is the `import_azure` plugin, a Python-based plugin designed to facilitate data import from Azure environments for forensic analysis. This plugin enables ingestion of disk images and NSG flow logs, copying them from a specific host path to the designated directory within the plugin output directory. Users can specify two dates as plugin arguments to selectively extract NSG flow logs generated within the specified period to the framework's workspace. Additionally, the plugin computes SHA256 hashes for the imported files and exports them to a CSV file, enabling the validation of the ingested data integrity.

The `analyse_azure_ubuntu_disk` plugin serves as an example of a Docker-based plugin designed for the forensic analysis of Azure Ubuntu disk images. This plugin ensures data integrity by comparing the disk image MD5 hash values generated before and after the data extraction. Its execution is driven by a bash script that mounts the disk image in a read-only mode, avoiding data tempering, and executes the extraction of specific directories (`/var`, `/home`, `/usr`) to a directory named `copy` within its output directory. The associated Dockerfile ensures proper environment setup, while the plugin configuration file specifies the volumes to facilitate data accessibility on the host system. This setup ensures integration and execution within the Docker environment, allowing for controlled and reproducible forensic analysis.

The `process_dnsmasqlogs` plugin processes DNS logs generated by `dnsmasq`⁵, extracting relevant information from queries and replies, such as domains, IP addresses, and tags. The processed data is then outputted in CSV format for further analysis or integration with other forensic tools. This Docker-based plugin includes mandatory and optional arguments to specify the logs' year and the optional start and end dates to limit the plugin's processing window. Additionally, the plugin logs its operations and ensures that any processed log failing to meet the specified criteria is documented so the information can be reported to the user. Given its Docker-based nature, the plugin incorporates a Dockerfile that ensures the transfer of all necessary execution files into the container environment. This includes a bash script responsible for installing the Python script's dependencies and executing it, along with the Python script itself and required inputs.

Finally, the `privategpt` plugin illustrates an implementation of a reporting plugin. It sets up a local LLM using the `privateGPT` project⁶, leveraging `Ollama`⁷ technology and a Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) architecture to enhance the LLM's capabilities. It exposes a user interface on port 8585, allowing users to ingest files and interact with the LLM via chat to assist in investigations. The plugin accepts three optional arguments to specify token limits, the Ollama model, and embeddings, defaulting to the `llama2:13b` model with `nomic-embed-text` embeddings and a 20,000 token limit. This flexibility allows users to select the model and embeddings that best meet the investigation needs and adjust the token limit based on the size of the files the user wishes to ingest. Furthermore, the plugin does not implement automatic ingestion of user-specified inputs, requiring manual handling of file ingestion. Since `PrivateGPT` only allows the use of either a single file as context for answers or all ingested files collectively, data ingestion must be performed by the user. By providing a local LLM, the `privategpt` plugin only requires internet access for dependency installation and model retrieval, ensuring that the privacy requirements of the investigation are not compromised. However, since the LLM runs locally, users must ensure their hardware possesses sufficient resources to run it efficiently to fully leverage the plugin's capabilities. Lastly, the plugin ensures optimal adaptability to various hardware configurations by allowing the specification of GPU device(s) to be used within the Docker container through modifications to the `gpus` field on the plugin's YAML configuration file.

⁵<https://thekelleys.org.uk/dnsmasq/doc.html>

⁶<https://github.com/imartinez/privateGPT>

⁷<https://ollama.com/>

Chapter 7

Validation

The framework's validation ensures its reliability and alignment with specified requirements. This chapter focuses on validating the developed forensic framework against the functional and non-functional criteria previously outlined. Furthermore, it provides a practical demonstration of the framework's capabilities through a specific use case, showcasing its application in action and highlighting its usefulness in supporting forensic investigations within cloud environments.

In summary, this chapter assesses the developed framework, aiming to illustrate its practical utility and potential impact on forensic investigations. Through examination and practical demonstration, it seeks to establish the framework as a valuable solution for the problem defined.

7.1 Requirements Validation

7.1.1 Functional Requirements

This section evaluates how the framework meets the functional requirements previously defined. In addition, Table 7.1 summarizes the status of the validation of each requirement, classifying them as Validated, Partially Validated or Not Validated.

Requirement FR-01: Cover all the different stages of the forensic investigation.

The developed framework allows users to define customizable workflows, specifying plugins for each forensic stage - from data collection and examination to analysis and reporting. This integration of stage-specific plugins, coupled with the framework's capability to facilitate data transition between them, automates and standardizes forensic procedures. Moreover, it is essential to emphasize that integrating plugins tailored for the cloud environment enables this solution to address the problem identified in the previous chapters. Consequently, the solution **addresses requirement FR-01**.

Requirement FR-02: Allow the user to customize the flow of execution.

The framework's execution flow is specified by a user-defined YAML configuration file. This file, supplied as an argument during the framework's script execution, delineates the sequence of tasks across the various stages of the investigation. This flexibility empowers users to tailor the investigative process to suit specific case requirements and objectives, enhancing the framework's usability in complex investigative scenarios. Thus, the developed solution **meets the requirement FR-02**.

Requirement FR-03: Always provide the output of each phase to the user.

FR	Requirement	Status
FR-01	Cover all the different stages of the forensic investigation	Validated
FR-02	Allow the user to customize the flow of execution	Validated
FR-03	Always provide the output of each phase to the user	Validated
FR-04	Workflow automation	Validated
FR-05	Open-source tool integration	Validated
FR-06	Possibility of integration of new plugins developed by the community	Validated
FR-07	Collect data from various sources	Partially Validated
FR-08	Hash all evidence	Validated
FR-09	Evidence preservation	Validated
FR-10	Support for chain of custody management	Validated

Table 7.1: Functional Requirements Validation

Based on the implementation previously described, the framework ensures that upon executing each plugin, its outputs are stored in a dedicated directory named 'output_<timestamp>' within the respective plugin directory. This structured approach ensures that outputs from all executed plugins are accessible to the user, regardless of their execution order during the investigation process. Moreover, by naming these directories with the execution timestamp, the framework facilitates the preservation of outputs across multiple executions. This functionality enhances traceability, promotes transparency and facilitates further analysis and integration with external tools. Consequently, the framework's **requirement FR-03 is validated**.

Requirement FR-04: Workflow automation.

The framework offers the capability to integrate diverse plugins designed to automate various aspects of the investigative process. These plugins streamline forensics tasks while the framework manages transitions between them. This reduces the need for user manual intervention, enhancing investigation efficiency and minimizing the risk of human error. Automating these processes facilitates the forensic examinations, allowing users to focus on critical analysis and decision-making tasks. Therefore, the developed solution **meets the requirement FR-04**.

Requirement FR-05: Open-source tool integration.

The framework's plugin-driven architecture is specifically designed to facilitate the integration of third-party open-source tools. An example is the `privategpt` plugin, which integrates the open-source privateGPT and Ollama projects to set up a local and private LLM. This architectural choice not only expands the toolkit available to users, enhancing the framework's utility, but also promotes community collaboration

and innovation. For this reason, the solution **fulfils the requirement FR-05**.

Requirement FR-06: Possibility of integration of new plugins developed by the community.

As detailed in this document, the framework was developed under a plugin architecture that promotes the workflow and structure necessary for developing and integrating new plugins. This design encourages community involvement, allowing users to create and share plugins that address specific forensic needs, thereby continuously evolving the framework's functionalities. By facilitating the integration of new capabilities, the framework ensures adaptability to changing forensic requirements and promotes collaborative problem-solving among users. Consequently, the developed solution **meets the requirement FR-06**.

Requirement FR-07: Collect data from various sources.

The framework's core architecture supports this requirement by promoting the development of diverse plugins that facilitate data collection from different sources. However, the validation of this requirement is inherently dependent on the availability and functionality of community-developed plugins, such as the `import_azure` and `analyse_azure_ubuntu_disk`. These plugins demonstrate the framework's capability to ingest manually acquired data from Azure and to extract specific directories from a Ubuntu disk image. Therefore, while the core framework supports the integration of plugins to meet this requirement, its complete validation relies on the community's continued development and contribution of plugins. Consequently, the developed framework **partially validates the requirement FR-07**.

Requirement FR-08: Hash all evidence.

Based on the described implementation, the developed framework implements two integrity checkers that allow the hashing of all collected and generated data. These integrity checkers utilize the SHA-256 and MD5 cryptographic hash algorithms, allowing users to select their preferred method. By providing these hashing mechanisms, the framework enables data integrity verification, tampering detection, and unique identification of data throughout the investigation lifecycle. For this reason, this implementation **fulfils the requirement FR-08**.

Requirement FR-09: Evidence preservation.

The framework includes a hashing capability integrated into the execution flow, designed to meet the preceding functional requirement. After executing a plugin, the framework computes the hash values for both the generated data and the input files used during the process. These hash values are then compared with pre-existing values to ensure the preservation of data integrity throughout the framework's execution. This approach enhances the reliability of forensic investigations by providing a mechanism to detect unauthorized alterations to digital evidence, thereby **meeting the requirement FR-09**.

Requirement FR-10: Support for chain of custody management.

The developed solution implements standardized logging mechanisms that systematically record all events occurring during execution. Furthermore, it encourages plugins to integrate logging capabilities, ensuring the reporting of actions performed on evidence. Each plugin includes a README.md file that describes its mechanisms and operations on data, enhancing transparency and facilitating understanding of the forensic procedures applied. By promoting logging practices and thorough documentation, the framework strengthens the integrity of the chain of custody, thereby **fulfilling the requirement FR-10**.

7.1.2 Non-functional Requirements

Similar to what was done with the functional requirements, this section assesses the framework's behaviour against the previously defined non-functional requirements. Additionally, Table 7.2 summarizes the validation status of each requirement, classifying them as Validated, Partially Validated, or Not Validated.

NFR	Requirement	Status
NFR-01	Not developed to make conclusions, but to support the user	Validated
NFR-02	Open-source	Validated
NFR-03	Good documentation support	Validated
NFR-04	Development of the framework under a plugin-driven architecture	Validated
NFR-05	Continuous improvement and updates	Validated
NFR-06	Ensure isolation of plugins' execution	Partially Validated
NFR-07	Take into consideration the confidentiality of the data	Not Validated
NFR-08	Cross-platform compatibility	Validated
NFR-09	Accommodate growing volumes of data	Validated
NFR-10	High reliability	Validated
NFR-11	Intuitive and user-friendly	Validated

Table 7.2: Non-functional Requirements Validation

Requirement NFR-01: Not developed to make conclusions, but to support the user.

The framework is designed to automate tasks, thereby empowering users to formulate hypotheses, evaluate evidence, and generate reports. It produces results intended for further analysis, ensuring that the ultimate interpretation and judgment remain with the user. This design philosophy underscores the framework's role in supporting investigative work, aligning with the requirement to empower rather than replace the user's judgment and discretion. Consequently, the developed framework **meets requirement NFR-01**.

Requirement NFR-02: Open-source.

The framework was developed and designed as an open-source tool, promoting transparency and encouraging collaboration and community-driven development. By allowing community contributions and support, the framework facilitates the creation of new plugins and the reporting and resolution of issues. This collaborative environment enhances the framework's robustness while promoting innovation and building trust among users. Therefore, **the requirement NFR-02 is fulfilled**.

Requirement NFR-03: Good documentation support.

This document provides detailed insights into the framework's implementation, covering execution flows, component interactions, and overall structure. By elucidating the standardized structure of the plugins, it facilitates the community's development of new ones. Additionally, each plugin must include a README.md file, aiding users in understanding its functionalities and determining its suitability for specific investigative requirements. This thorough documentation enhances user experience, aids in troubleshooting, and supports the framework's productive use and continuous improvement. Therefore, the developed solution **validates the requirement NFR-03**.

Requirement NFR-04: Development of the framework under a plugin-driven architecture.

The framework was developed using a plugin-driven architecture, supporting the dynamic loading and execution of plugins across various stages of the investigation. This design allows users to integrate diverse tools and customize the framework's functionality to meet specific requirements. The plugin-driven architecture has enabled the framework to satisfy most of the established functional and non-functional requirements, underscoring its flexibility and robustness in forensic investigations. Consequently, **the requirement NFR-04 is validated**.

Requirement NFR-05: Continuous improvement and updates.

As an open-source framework, it promotes community involvement in developing custom updates and plugins, fostering integration with other open-source tools and enhancing its adaptability to evolving technologies and forensic methodologies. The framework's openness facilitates continuous updates driven by the community, making it well-suited to the dynamic nature of digital forensics, which frequently incorporates new technologies and techniques [36]. Its public availability on GitHub¹ emphasizes its transparency and accessibility, thereby ensuring that the developed framework **fulfils the requirement NFR-05**.

Requirement NFR-06: Ensure isolation of plugins' execution.

The developed framework integrates Docker-based plugins, leveraging containerization technologies to encapsulate the execution of various tasks within isolated environments. This approach ensures reproducibility and minimizes conflicts between different plugins' execution environments. However, since the framework also allows the integration of Python-based plugins, which may not guarantee execution isolation, the validation of this requirement is not uniformly ensured across all plugins. Consequently, the framework **partially fulfils requirement NFR-06** as complete isolation across all plugins is not guaranteed.

Requirement NFR-07: Take into consideration the confidentiality of the data.

The developed framework itself does not incorporate built-in mechanisms to ensure data confidentiality. However, individual plugins are encouraged to implement such measures. For instance, plugins like `import_azure` and `process_dnsmasqlogs` enable users to specify a date interval for which data is valid for use, respecting confidentiality requirements pertinent to the investigation. Consequently, as the framework relies entirely on plugins to implement these measures, it **does not satisfy requirement NFR-07**.

Requirement NFR-08: Cross-platform compatibility.

The framework was developed with cross-platform compatibility in mind. It achieves this characteristic by employing the methods provided by the `os` module for constructing directory and file paths and utilizing

¹<https://github.com/TiagoCaldasSilva/DigitalForensicsFramework>

its `sep` attribute to ensure paths are appropriately formatted for different OSs. This approach guarantees that the framework can operate on any system that supports Docker and Python. By adhering to these principles, the framework **meets the requirement NFR-08**, facilitating deployment and usage across diverse environments.

Requirement NFR-09: Accommodate growing volumes of data.

To enable memory savings and accommodate growing volumes of data, the framework allows users to delete the input directory and Docker container (in the case of Docker-based plugins) after plugin execution. Since plugin inputs are typically data generated by other plugins, removing these directories post-execution prevents unnecessary memory usage due to duplicated data. Additionally, as outputs generated within containers are stored in a log file, deleting Docker containers after execution saves space, particularly for investigations involving large data volumes. This scalable and adaptable design ensures that the framework **meets the requirement NFR-09**.

Requirement NFR-10: High reliability.

The framework implements integrity checks after the execution of each plugin, storing the hash values of the generated data to monitor and ensure data integrity. This monitorization enables the detection of any tampering or loss during execution. Additionally, the framework uses copies of the data as inputs, preserving the original data in case of any loss or modification. These measures ensure the framework maintains high reliability, sustaining trust in its results and preventing disruptions to investigative activities. Consequently, the framework **meets the requirement NFR-10**.

Requirement NFR-11: Intuitive and user-friendly.

Based on the details outlined in the previous chapter, the framework is designed to be easily executed via a single command that runs the script with the YAML-formatted configuration file path as an argument. The framework's logging capabilities enhance transparency, allowing users to easily monitor the execution process. Furthermore, plugins that interact with users must provide an intuitive interface to support framework utilization across varying levels of expertise. A notable example is the `privategpt` plugin, facilitating user interaction with the LLM through a user-friendly chat interface. These features ensure that users only need basic knowledge of writing a YAML file to operate the framework, enhancing usability and reducing the learning curve. Therefore, the framework **satisfies the requirement NFR-11**.

7.2 Reference Scenario

The developed framework was tested using the reference scenario outlined in Chapter 5 to evaluate its performance in a real-world case. This section provides insights into the configuration file customized to meet the requirements and specific characteristics of the cloud environment encountered. It also presents the execution times for both the framework and plugins, accompanied by an analysis of the results obtained. Particular emphasis is placed on evaluating the functionality and support offered by the `privategpt` plugin, highlighting its contributions to the framework's capabilities.

7.2.1 Configuration File

The configuration file is a critical element of the framework, defining the workflow and execution details specified by the user. Listing 7.1 presents the configuration file used to test the framework in the prepared reference scenario.

```
1 max_workers: 2
2 hash_method: sha256
3 stages:
4   - name: collection
5     plugins:
6       - name: import_azure
7         chains: [1, 2]
8         arguments:
9           disk_path: C:\Users\user\azure_disk_image
10          nsglogs_path: C:\Users\user\azurecopy
11          between_dates:
12            from: 20/05/2024
13            to: 27/05/2024
14   - name: analysis
15     plugins:
16       - name: process_nsglogs
17         chains: [1]
18         input:
19           - plugin: import_azure
20             folder:
21               - 'nsgflow'
22       - name: analyse_azure_ubuntu_disk
23         chains: [2]
24         input:
25           - plugin: import_azure
26             folder:
27               - 'disk'
28   - name: examination
29     plugins:
30       - name: extract_symlinks
31         chains: [2]
32         input:
33           - plugin: analyse_azure_ubuntu_disk
34             folder:
35               - 'copy/var/'
36   - name: analysis
37     plugins:
38       - name: process_dnsmasqlogs
39         chains: [2]
40         input:
41           - plugin: extract_symlinks
42             folder:
43               - 'log/'
44         arguments:
45           LOGS_YEAR: 2024
46           START_DATE: 20/05/2024
47           END_DATE: 27/05/2024
48   - name: reporting
49     plugins:
```

```

50     - name: privateGPT
51     chains: [1, 2]
52     input:
53         - hashes
54         - readmes
55         - plugin: process_nsglogs
56         - plugin: process_dnsmasqlogs
57     arguments:
58         TOKEN_LIMIT: 2000000
59         LLM_MODEL: llama2:7b
60         # LLM_MODEL: llama2:13b
61         # LLM_MODEL: llama2-uncensored
62         EMBEDDINGS: nomic-embed-text

```

Listing 7.1: Configuration file utilized for the reference scenario

This configuration file outlines a multi-stage workflow designed to handle the ingestion, processing, examination, and reporting of data from an Azure environment. The `max_workers` parameter was set to two, aligning with the peak concurrency demand in the pipeline. Throughout the execution flow, only during the first analysis stage do plugins run concurrently (`process_nsglogs` and `analyse_azure_ubuntu_disk`), making it optimal to limit the concurrent execution to two workers.

The plugin `import_azure` was selected to ingest the data from the Azure environment, with the date range arguments set from 20/05/2024 to 27/05/2024. Subsequently, the plugins `process_nsglogs` and `analyse_azure_ubuntu_disk` were defined to process the collected data. The `process_nsglogs` plugin processes the ingested NSG flow logs, converting them into a CSV format for further analysis. The `analyse_azure_ubuntu_disk` plugin analyzes the 30GB Azure disk image, mounting it in an isolated environment to extract specific directories, preparing the data for subsequent examination. As the directories extracted by the plugin contained some symlinks pointing to nonexistent files on the host machine, the `extract_symlinks` plugin was configured to clean the data. This plugin removes the symlinks from the extracted directories to prevent issues when using this data as input for the Docker-based `process_dnsmasqlogs` plugin. Subsequently, the `process_dnsmasqlogs` plugin processes dnsmasq logs found in the processed data, constrained by the same date range used earlier (20/05/2024 to 27/05/2024). Finally, the `privategpt` plugin was configured to provide more intuitive data analysis and reporting support. By incorporating the processed data, README.md files, and SHA256 data hashes, this setup facilitates interaction with an LLM to test its support in a real investigation.

Furthermore, as illustrated in Figure 7.1, two distinct chains were defined to streamline the workflow:




Figure 7.1: The two chains defined

- Chain 1: Includes `import_azure`, `process_nsglogs`, and `privategpt`. This chain focuses on NSG flow logs processing, analysis and reporting.
- Chain 2: Encompasses `import_azure`, `analyse_azure_ubuntu_disk`, `extract_symlinks`, `process_dnsmasqlogs`, and `privategpt`. This chain handles disk image analysis, symlink extraction, DNS log processing, analysis and reporting.

This configuration ensures a logical and sequential processing pipeline by delineating the workflow into these stages and chains. Each stage builds on the outputs of the previous one, culminating in a reporting phase powered by an LLM, thus facilitating an in-depth analysis of the collected data.

7.2.2 Execution Times

The performance of each plugin was assessed based on the execution times recorded during the test. These times, provided by the framework's logging capabilities, offer insight into the framework's efficiency and help identify potential bottlenecks. Table 7.3 summarizes the execution times for each plugin. The execution time for `privategpt` corresponds to the time taken until the user interface was available, as it depends on user interaction with the LLM and can vary significantly. It is necessary to emphasize that the execution times of Docker-based plugins are also affected by the container preparation process, which introduces some latency, as they require data transfer to the container environment. This latency can be particularly time-consuming for plugins like `analyse_azure_ubuntu_disk` that handle large datasets, such as the 30GB disk image.

Component	Execution Time (seconds)
<code>import_azure</code>	429
<code>process_nsglogs</code>	79
<code>analyse_azure_ubuntu_disk</code>	2191
<code>extract_symlinks</code>	45
<code>process_dnsmasqlogs</code>	64
<code>privategpt</code>	738
Framework	4284

Table 7.3: Execution Times

The last row of the table presents the total execution time of the framework. It is essential to note that the recorded times for each plugin solely reflect their execution durations and do not include the framework's integrity verification mechanisms. As a result, the sum of all the plugins' execution times differs from the overall framework execution time. This discrepancy allows the conclusion that the plugins took 3546 seconds (59 minutes and 6 seconds) to execute, and the framework took 738 seconds (12 minutes and 18 seconds) to manage the workflow and data integrity.

7.2.3 Performance Comparison

To evaluate the efficiency of the `analyse_azure_ubuntu_disk` plugin, its execution time was compared with that of the Azure disk image analysis performed by Autopsy² 4.21.0, a well-known open-source digital forensics platform used for hard drive investigations.

²<https://www.autopsy.com/>

The evaluation began by initiating a new case in Autopsy, setting up the case, and adding a `Disk Image` or `VM File` data source with the Azure disk image path. The ingest process was configured to run the `Data Source Integrity`³ module, which completed the analysis in 1695 seconds (28 minutes and 15 seconds). It is crucial to note that the analysis performed by the Autopsy platform is ampler than that performed by the framework's plugin. Autopsy is a widely accepted digital forensic tool with significant community contributions, as evidenced by its GitHub repository⁴ [131]. This highlights the potential for automating tasks performed within this tool through a plugin integrated into the developed framework.

The `analyse_azure_ubuntu_disk` plugin's script utilizes the `time` command to detail resource usage and performance information. By reviewing the container logs in the `DockerExecutor`'s log file, which stores the outputs of the Docker containers, it was determined that the plugin's wall-clock time was 453 seconds (7 minutes and 33 seconds). The measured time corroborates the latency issues discussed in the previous section.

Comparing these execution times reveals a trade-off between execution speed and the isolation benefits provided by the Docker-based environment. While the analysis performed by the plugin's script was shorter than that of the Autopsy platform, it executed fewer tasks as it was tailored for the given environment. However, considering the overall execution times, the framework's plugin exhibited longer durations, highlighting the additional latency introduced by the Docker container building and execution processes.

7.2.4 Results and Analysis

To evaluate the performance of the `privategpt` plugin, various LLMs were tested. This section presents the inputs provided to the LLMs, the responses received from the different models, and a comparison to illustrate how the choice of model impacts the quality of the support. The models tested were:

- `llama2:7b`⁵ - A model pretrained on 2 trillion tokens and with a model size of 7B parameters, requiring at least 8GB of RAM.
- `llama2:13b`⁶ - A model pretrained on 2 trillion tokens and with a model size of 13B parameters, requiring at least 16GB of RAM.
- `llama2:uncensored`⁷ - An uncensored version of the llama2 model with 7B parameters, also requiring at least 8GB of RAM.

Thus, questions were posed to the LLMs to assess the quality of the support provided. These questions aimed to obtain the following information:

1. Support for understanding the execution of the plugins, aiding in the reporting stage.
2. Understanding the typical behaviour of a RAT malware infection.
3. Support for analyzing logs to identify suspicious patterns.
4. Assistance in searching for a malware script.

³https://sleuthkit.org/autopsy/docs/user-docs/4.21.0//data_source_integrity_page.html

⁴<https://github.com/sleuthkit/autopsy>

⁵<https://ollama.com/library/llama2:7b>

⁶<https://ollama.com/library/llama2:13b>

⁷<https://ollama.com/library/llama2-uncensored>

Support for understanding the execution of the plugins.

Given the need for digital forensics investigators to document findings and understand procedures, the README.md files of other plugins were ingested, and inquiries about their procedures were posed (Appendix A.1). The LLMs successfully extracted and summarized key aspects from the README.md files. This demonstrates the importance of well-structured plugins' documentation and the LLMs' capability to provide users with detailed information about actions performed during framework execution.

Understanding the typical behaviour of a RAT malware infection.

The ability of the LLMs to instruct users was further tested. Given the framework's intended audience with varying levels of expertise, the LLMs capacity to summarize the typical behaviour of a RAT malware infection was evaluated, with detailed results presented in Appendix A.2. As anticipated, the LLMs provided valuable recommendations for the investigation analysis. Furthermore, since the plugin operates a local LLM, its integration offers significant advantages, ensuring that both user privacy and the confidentiality of investigation procedures are maintained within the local environment. Additionally, this test demonstrated that the LLMs not only assist in analysis tasks but also provide robust support and guidance, helping users better understand the environment and scenarios they face.

Support for analyzing logs.

Next, the LLMs' support for analyzing log files to detect suspicious patterns was evaluated. As can be found in Appendix A.3, the LLMs provided notable support in this topic by offering detailed responses with recommendations and identifying the domain name `randomfqdn.com` used for the RAT and C2 communication. However, it was observed that some responses contained inaccuracies, emphasizing the importance of validating responses before drawing conclusions.

Assistance in searching for a malware script

The final test assessed the LLMs' ability to search for hash values in two files: the CSV file containing hash values of data managed by the framework and the CSV file containing hash values of various malware samples, including the hash of the RAT script. The results, detailed in Appendix A.4, were unsatisfactory as neither the most advanced LLM tested succeeded in providing the correct hash. Instead, it identified hash values that were either present only in one of the files or absent in both files. Nevertheless, some of the models did offer recommendations for manually comparing the files, providing support for users with varying levels of expertise in handling such tasks.

The same inputs were provided to all models, revealing varying response qualities depending on the task's complexity. While more straightforward tasks like summarizing README.md files were proficiently handled across all models, more sophisticated tasks, such as searching for the malware script, required more advanced models. It is crucial to note that the input quality significantly impacts the responses generated [53], underscoring the importance of the user interaction with the LLM for optimal outcomes.

Upon comparing the models tested, several distinctions emerged:

- The model `llama2:uncensored` responded faster than the other models, albeit with less detail.
- `llama2:13b` delivered more accurate responses, reflecting its larger model size (13B parameters compared to 7B of the other models).
- When comparing `llama2:7b` and `llama2:13b`, the 7B parameter model generated more extensive answers, whereas the 13B model provided more concise and precise responses.

Advanced models such as `llama2:13b` offer superior analysis and accuracy at the expense of increased computational resources. Users must balance their need for detailed insights with their hardware

capabilities. Selecting an appropriate model that meets analytical requirements while aligning with available computational resources is essential for optimizing the performance of the `privategpt` plugin, enhancing its support for forensic investigations.

7.3 Summary

The validation conducted on the developed framework confirms that it meets the majority of the predefined functional and non-functional requirements. In addition, its performance was assessed in a real-world context using the reference scenario, demonstrating the framework's reliability and capability to manage data and workflows effectively while preserving data integrity.

The validation process not only underscored the adaptability of the framework but also provided a clear roadmap for future development and refinement. Furthermore, it proved the framework's capacity to support all stages of a digital forensics investigation within a cloud environment, establishing it as a capable solution to the defined problem.

Chapter 8

Conclusion

The work herein proposes a framework to support digital forensics investigators, intending to address an existing gap in cloud forensics. The analysis of the state of the art, combined with the challenges identified by NIST in cloud forensics, produced a consolidated view of the *status quo*. This view, summarized in Table 4.1, highlights ongoing research efforts aimed at addressing the challenges.

There are tailored solutions for the different stages of the forensic process in cloud environments, but there is no unified tool capable of addressing all stages of digital forensics investigation. To fill this gap, a plugin-driven framework capable of covering all stages of forensic investigations, was proposed. Depending on the plugins loaded by the user, the framework can be tailored to meet the specific demands of various digital forensics investigations, including cloud forensics. This flexible architecture ensures that the framework can adapt to requirements beyond cloud environments, thereby providing a versatile tool for forensic investigators.

The framework's design also aims to automate investigative tasks, saving time that would otherwise be spent on manual execution and data management, often involving the moving of data between different tools while maintaining data integrity. By automating these processes, the framework not only enhances efficiency but also reduces the likelihood of human error. Moreover, plugins like the `privategpt` plugin demonstrate the framework's utility in facilitating reporting and analysis, thereby streamlining the investigative workflow.

The plugin-driven nature of the framework encourages the forensics community to develop and integrate new plugins, which, in turn, expand the framework's capabilities. This collaborative approach aims to enhance the efficiency of forensic investigations and save investigators time by incorporating community-approved open-source tools.

Lastly, the experiments conducted using the framework against a prepared reference scenario, demonstrated effective data management and workflow execution. Despite the potential latency introduced by the execution of the Docker-based plugins, the successful implementation of the framework in these experiments underscores its potential to enhance the accuracy and efficiency of forensic investigations.

Despite the achievements realized with the development of the proposed digital forensics framework, several areas could benefit from future improvements.

One such area for improvement is the isolation of Python-based plugins. Currently, complete isolation of plugin execution has yet to be fully achieved. Future improvements could focus on implementing robust isolation mechanisms for these plugins, addressing a missing non-functional requirement. Additionally, these plugins currently operate without dependencies, relying solely on standard libraries or user-installed

modules. Integrating comprehensive isolation and automated dependency management would significantly enhance the framework's robustness.

Another area for exploration concerns the latency associated with the execution of Docker-based plugins. By optimizing data management between the host system and Docker containers, the overall efficiency of the framework can be improved. The reduction of this latency would make the framework a more effective and efficient solution for digital forensics investigators.

The framework's capabilities are intrinsically linked to those offered by its plugins. Therefore, future work should include the development of more diverse and robust plugins. Encouraging the forensic community to create and integrate high-quality plugins will enhance the framework's utility, leading to a richer and more versatile toolset.

In summary, while the developed framework addresses a gap in cloud forensics by providing an adaptable and automated solution, there is still room for improvement. These enhancements will further increase the framework's utility and efficiency in various forensic contexts, solidifying its role as a valuable tool for digital forensic investigators.

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Appendix A

LLMs inputs and answers

This appendix presents the inputs used to evaluate the local LLMs as part of the forensics framework. These inputs were designed to assess the models' capabilities in supporting users during forensic investigations by simulating real-world forensic analysis scenarios. The same set of inputs was provided to different LLMs to facilitate a comparative analysis of their performance.

Each set of inputs is followed by the responses generated by the different models, providing an overview of each model's behaviour. Presenting these inputs and their corresponding outputs provides a transparent and detailed account of the validation process, supporting the conclusions drawn in the validation chapter (Chapter 7).

A.1 Support for understanding the execution of the plugins

Input: I'm using a framework that uses the plugins `extract_symlinks` and `process_dnsmasqlogs` to extract some information for a digital forensics investigation that I'm leading. Given the `README.md` files provided, can you summarise the procedures taken by these plugins so I can report it and the chain of custody of the evidence?

```
1 Based on the context provided, here are the procedures taken by the `
   extract_symlinks` and `process_dnsmasqlogs` plugins:
2
3 1. extract_symlinks plugin:
4     * The plugin generates a log file (`outputs/extract_symlinks.log`) that
   captures details of its execution, including any encountered errors.
5     * It creates a CSV file (`outputs/symlinks.csv`) containing information
   about each symlink found in the input directory tree, including the symlink
   path and its target.
6     * The plugin does not create any other output files.
7 2. process_dnsmasqlogs plugin:
8     * The plugin processes DNS logs generated by dnsmasq to extract relevant
   information such as DNS queries, actions taken, associated domains, IP
   addresses, and tags.
9     * It outputs the processed data in CSV format (`outputs/dnsmasqlog.csv`)
   for further analysis or integration with other forensic tools.
10
```

```

11 In terms of chain of custody, both plugins output their findings to files located
    within the 'outputs' directory. Therefore, the evidence collected by these
    plugins consists of the following:
12     + The original input directory tree (excluding symlinks) stored in 'inputs
      /'.
13     + The log file generated by 'extract_symlinks' ('outputs/extract_symlinks.
      log').
14     + The CSV files containing information about each symlink and DNS queries
      processed by 'process_dnsmasqlogs' ('outputs/symlinks.csv', 'outputs/dnsmasqlog
      .csv').
15
16 As the investigator, you should ensure that these evidence files are properly
    handled, stored, and preserved throughout the investigation process to maintain
    chain of custody and admissibility in court.
17
18 Sources:
19
20
21
22 1. extract_symlinks-README.md (page -)
23
24 2. process_dnsmasqlogs-README.md (page -)

```

Listing A.1: llama2:7b

```

1 Sure! The 'extract_symlinks' plugin is designed to extract symlink information from
    a directory tree. It takes in a source directory as input, copies all files
    except for any symbolic links (which are copied separately), and then outputs
    the resulting directory structure with only non-symbolic links present.
2 The output of this process will be a copy of the original directory tree without
    symlinks, along with an additional file containing information about each
    symlink encountered during processing. This includes the path to the source
    symbolic link (i.e., where it was originally located), its target location and
    any associated tags or metadata that may have been applied at the time of
    creation.
3 The 'process_dnsmasqlogs' plugin is designed to process DNS logs generated by
    dnsmasq, extracting relevant information such as queries made, actions taken (e
    .g., forwarded or blocked), associated domains and IP addresses, and tags that
    may have been applied at the time of creation.
4 The output of this process will be a CSV file containing all processed data in
    tabular format for further analysis or integration with other tools.
5
6 Sources:
7
8
9
10 1. process_dnsmasqlogs-README.md (page -)
11
12 2. extract_symlinks-README.md (page -)

```

Listing A.2: llama2-uncensored

```
1 Sure! Based on the provided README.md files, here is a summary of the procedures
  taken by the 'extract_symlinks' and 'process_dnsmasqlogs' plugins:
2
3 1. 'extract_symlinks':
4     * The plugin generates three output files:
5         - 'extract_symlinks.log': Log file capturing execution details,
          including any encountered errors.
6         - 'symlinks.csv': CSV file containing information about each
          symlink, including the symlink path and its target.
7         - 'errors.txt': Text file listing the files where errors occurred
          during copying.
8     * The plugin copies the directory tree received as input, excluding the
          symlinks.
9 2. 'process_dnsmasqlogs':
10    * The plugin processes DNS logs generated by dnsmasq, extracting relevant
        information such as DNS queries, actions taken, associated domains, IP
        addresses, and tags.
11    * The processed data is outputted in CSV format for further analysis or
        integration with other forensic tools.
12
13 In terms of chain of custody, it's important to note that the plugins are merely
    processing and extracting information from the input files, rather than
    modifying them. Therefore, the original input files should be preserved as part
    of the chain of custody, along with any output files generated by the plugins.
    Additionally, it may be helpful to document the specific parameters used for
    each plugin execution, such as the log file paths and filtering options, in
    order to maintain a complete record of the analysis process.
14
15 Sources:
16
17
18
19 1. extract_symlinks-README.md (page -)
20
21 2. process_dnsmasqlogs-README.md (page -)
```

Listing A.3: llama2:13b

A.2 Understanding the typical behaviour of a RAT malware infection

Input: I'm a forensic investigator, and I'm facing an environment where I have access to the DNS requests logs file. By analysing the DNS requests logs file, I want to understand if the environment I'm investigating could be infected with a Remote Access Trojan. What can you recommend me to analyse?

1 Thank you for trusting me with your inquiry. As a responsible and ethical assistant
2 , I must inform you that analyzing DNS requests logs alone may not be
3 sufficient to determine if an environment has been infected with a Remote
4 Access Trojan (RAT). RATs are designed to remain stealthy and avoid detection
5 by monitoring tools, so it's crucial to combine multiple lines of evidence
6 before drawing any conclusions.

7 That being said, here are some recommendations on what you could analyze in the DNS
8 requests logs file to help identify potential signs of a RAT infection:

- 9 1. Unusual or suspicious DNS queries: Look for unusual or unfamiliar domains or IP
10 addresses that were queried by the system. This could indicate the presence of
11 a RAT, which may be communicating with its command and control (C2) servers.
- 12 2. Inconsistencies in DNS query patterns: Analyze the frequency and pattern of DNS
13 queries to identify any unusual behavior. For example, if there are sudden
14 spikes or decreases in DNS queries that cannot be explained by normal system
15 activity, it could indicate a RAT trying to communicate with its C2 servers.
- 16 3. Unusual network traffic patterns: In addition to analyzing the DNS requests logs
file, also look for unusual network traffic patterns, such as increased
outgoing traffic or unexpected incoming connections. This could indicate that
the environment is being controlled remotely through a RAT.
4. System configuration changes: Check if there have been any recent changes in
system configurations, especially those related to networking and security
settings. A RAT may modify these settings to facilitate its communication with
C2 servers or to evade detection.
5. File access patterns: Analyze file access logs to identify any unusual activity
that could indicate a RAT is present. For example, if there are files being
accessed from unfamiliar locations or in an unexpected manner, it could be a
sign of a RAT's presence.
6. User behavior analysis: Monitor user behavior and look for signs of suspicious
activity, such as unusual login times, rapid file access patterns, or changes
to system settings without proper authorization. These behaviors could indicate
that the environment has been compromised by a RAT.
7. System event logs: Review system event logs to identify any unusual events
related to networking, security, or user activity. This can help you detect
potential signs of a RAT infection.
8. Network traffic analysis tools: Utilize network traffic analysis tools, such as
Wireshark or Tcpdump, to capture and analyze network traffic. These tools can
help identify suspicious communication patterns that may indicate the presence
of a RAT.
9. Sandboxing and behavioral analysis: Use sandboxing techniques to isolate
potential malware samples and observe their behavior under controlled
conditions. This can help you determine if a RAT is present in the environment.
10. Collaboration with other security teams: Share your findings with other
security teams, such as incident response or threat hunting, to gain additional
perspectives and insights on potential threats.

16 Remember that these recommendations are not exhaustive and may require further
investigation based on the specifics of each environment. Always follow

established protocols for handling sensitive data and consulting with relevant stakeholders before taking any action.

Listing A.4: llama2:7b

```
1 To determine whether an environment is infected with a remote access trojan (RAT),
  there are several steps that can be taken based on the DNS requests logs file.
  First, identify any suspicious patterns or anomalies in the log files such as
  unusual traffic volumes, unfamiliar IP addresses, and/or unexpected domain
  names being accessed. Secondly, look for any evidence of data exfiltration from
  the environment by analyzing the DNS request logs to determine if there are
  any requests that appear to be sending information outside of the network.
  Finally, use a tool like Wireshark or tcpdump to capture and analyze packet
  captures to identify any suspicious activity such as port scanning or brute
  force attacks on vulnerable services within the environment.
```

Listing A.5: llama2-uncensored

```
1 As a helpful and respectful assistant, I would recommend that you exercise caution
  when analyzing DNS request logs to determine if an environment is infected with
  a Remote Access Trojan (RAT). While DNS requests can provide valuable
  information about the system's activity, it is important to approach this
  analysis with a critical eye and not jump to conclusions based on limited data.
2
3 Here are some recommendations for your analysis:
4
5 1. Look for unusual or suspicious patterns in the DNS request logs. These could
  include repeated requests to known malware command and control (C2) servers,
  uncommon domain name resolutions, or unexpected IP addresses being contacted.
6 2. Check for any anomalies in the DNS response codes. If a RAT is actively
  communicating with its C2 server, it may return non-standard response codes
  that can indicate an infected system.
7 3. Analyze the timestamps of the DNS requests to see if there are any patterns or
  trends that could suggest malicious activity. For example, you might look for a
  sudden increase in DNS requests during certain times of day or from specific
  sources.
8 4. Use a network protocol analysis tool (e.g., Wireshark) to capture and analyze
  the actual network traffic. This can provide more detailed information about
  the communication between systems and help identify any malicious activity that
  may not be evident from the DNS logs alone.
9 5. Compare your findings with known RAT behavior and indicators of compromise (IoCs
  ). This will help you determine if the system is infected with a RAT or another
  type of malware.
10 6. Consider consulting with a subject matter expert in forensic analysis or malware
  research to provide additional context and insight into your findings.
11
12 It's important to note that while DNS request logs can be useful for detecting
  malware, they are not a definitive indicator of an infected system. Other
  factors such as system performance, user behavior, and other security
```

monitoring data should also be considered when evaluating the environment for potential infections.

Listing A.6: llama2:13b

Input: I want to better understand the behaviour of a RAT malware infection, can you support me?

```
1 Of course! I'd be happy to help you understand the behavior of a RAT (Remote Access
  Trojan) malware infection. Please keep in mind that I'm just an AI and not a
  security expert, so my explanations should not be considered professional
  advice.
2
3 A RAT is a type of malware that allows an attacker to remotely access and control a
  compromised system. The behavior of a RAT infection can vary depending on the
  specific strain of malware and the goals of the attacker, but here are some
  common behaviors you might observe:
4
5 1. Network communication: A RAT will typically communicate with its C2 (Command and
  Control) server to receive instructions or transmit data. You may notice
  unusual network traffic patterns, such as increased outgoing connections from
  the compromised system to unfamiliar IP addresses.
6 2. File access and modification: A RAT can modify files on the compromised system
  to suit the attacker's needs. This could include adding new malicious code,
  deleting sensitive data, or modifying system settings to give the attacker more
  control over the system. You may notice unusual file activity, such as files
  being accessed from unfamiliar locations or modified in an unexpected manner.
7 3. System configuration changes: A RAT can modify system configurations to evade
  detection or improve its ability to communicate with the C2 server. This could
  include changing network settings, disabling security features, or modifying
  user account settings. You may notice unusual changes to system settings that
  cannot be explained by normal usage patterns.
8 4. Data exfiltration: A RAT can extract sensitive data from the compromised system
  and transmit it to the attacker's C2 server. This could include login
  credentials, financial information, or other sensitive data. You may notice
  unusual network traffic patterns related to data transfer.
9 5. Lateral movement: If the RAT has been successful in gaining access to multiple
  systems within a network, it can use those systems as pivot points to move
  laterally within the network and infect more systems. This could lead to an
  increased risk of data breaches or other security incidents.
10 6. Persistence mechanisms: A RAT may implement persistence mechanisms to ensure
  that it remains active on the compromised system even after a reboot. This can
  include hiding itself in various locations, such as the boot sector, registry,
  or hidden files and folders.
11 7. Evasion techniques: To avoid detection by security software, a RAT may use
  evasion techniques such as code obfuscation, anti-debugging measures, or
  encryption to hide its malicious activity.
12 8. Command and control: The attacker can issue commands to the compromised system
  using the C2 server, allowing them to perform actions such as data exfiltration
  , file modification, or even taking control of the system's keyboard input.
```

- 13 9. Stealth mechanisms: A RAT may implement stealth mechanisms to avoid detection by security software and network monitoring tools. This can include hiding itself in various locations, using encryption, or disguising its traffic as legitimate network activity.
- 14 10. Customized malicious functionality: Depending on the specific strain of RAT, it may have customized malicious functionality tailored to the attacker's needs. For example, some RATs may be designed specifically for financial fraud, while others may be geared towards espionage or data exfiltration.
- 15
- 16 It is important to note that these behaviors are not exclusive to RAT infections and can also occur due to other types of malware or security incidents. Therefore, it's crucial to have a comprehensive incident response plan in place to handle any potential security threats effectively.

Listing A.7: llama2:7b

1 Certainly! A remote access trojan (RAT) is a type of malicious software that allows an attacker to remotely control and monitor another computer's activity. Once installed on the target system, it typically establishes a connection with its command-and-control server which can then be used by the attacker to execute commands or download additional payloads onto the infected machine.

2

3 One common behaviour of RAT malware is that it will often attempt to disable security software and other anti-malware tools on the target system in order to prevent them from detecting its presence. Additionally, some variants may also try to modify firewall settings or install additional rootkits which can further increase their ability to evade detection by security solutions.

4

5 Another common behaviour of RAT malware is that it will often attempt to gather as much information about the infected system and user as possible in order to facilitate future attacks against them. This may include collecting sensitive data such as passwords, credit card numbers or other personal identifiable information (PII).

6

7 Finally, some RAT variants are designed specifically for targeted attacks on high-value targets like government officials or corporate executives and will often use advanced techniques to evade detection by security solutions. These may include using encryption algorithms that can be decrypted only with a specific key known only to the attacker or employing sophisticated obfuscation methods which make it difficult for automated tools to identify their presence on an infected system.

Listing A.8: llama2-uncensored

1 As a helpful and respectful assistant, I would recommend that you exercise caution when analyzing DNS request logs to determine if an environment is infected with a Remote Access Trojan (RAT). While DNS requests can provide valuable information about the system's activity, it is important to approach this analysis with a critical eye and not jump to conclusions based on limited data.

2

```
3 Here are some recommendations for your analysis:
4
5 1. Look for unusual or suspicious patterns in the DNS request logs. These could
   include repeated requests to known malware command and control (C2) servers,
   uncommon domain name resolutions, or unexpected IP addresses being contacted.
6 2. Check for any anomalies in the DNS response codes. If a RAT is actively
   communicating with its C2 server, it may return non-standard response codes
   that can indicate an infected system.
7 3. Analyze the timestamps of the DNS requests to see if there are any patterns or
   trends that could suggest malicious activity. For example, you might look for a
   sudden increase in DNS requests during certain times of day or from specific
   sources.
8 4. Use a network protocol analysis tool (e.g., Wireshark) to capture and analyze
   the actual network traffic. This can provide more detailed information about
   the communication between systems and help identify any malicious activity that
   may not be evident from the DNS logs alone.
9 5. Compare your findings with known RAT behavior and indicators of compromise (IoCs
   ). This will help you determine if the system is infected with a RAT or another
   type of malware.
10 6. Consider consulting with a subject matter expert in forensic analysis or malware
   research to provide additional context and insight into your findings.
11
12 It's important to note that while DNS request logs can be useful for detecting
   malware, they are not a definitive indicator of an infected system. Other
   factors such as system performance, user behavior, and other security
   monitoring data should also be considered when evaluating the environment for
   potential infections.
```

Listing A.9: llama2:13b

Input: What is the best approach to detect this type of infection in the scenario that I am facing? I can access network traffic logs, DNS request logs, and a disk image of the suspected virtual machine.

```
1 Thank you for providing me with more information about your situation. Based on
   what you've shared so far, here are some steps you could consider taking to
   detect a potential RAT infection in the scenario you described:
2
3 1. Analyze network traffic logs: Reviewing network traffic logs can help identify
   unusual communication patterns or suspicious activity that may indicate a RAT
   infection. Look for signs of outgoing connections to unfamiliar IP addresses,
   increased network traffic volume, or unexpected protocol usage.
4 2. Examine DNS request logs: DNS requests logs can provide valuable information
   about the system's internet connectivity and potential communication with C2
   servers. Check for unusual domain name queries, frequent changes in DNS
   settings, or any unknown domains that were queried.
5 3. Inspect disk image of suspected virtual machine: Examining the disk image of the
   suspected virtual machine can help identify signs of malware activity, such as
   hidden files, modified system configurations, or unexpected software
   installations. Use tools like Volatility to perform a memory dump analysis and
   identify potential indicators of compromise (IoCs).
```

- 6 4. Leverage network traffic analysis tools: Utilize tools like Wireshark or Tcpdump to capture and analyze network traffic. This can help you detect suspicious communication patterns, such as unusual protocol usage, data exfiltration, or command-and-control interactions between the system and an external entity.
- 7 5. Perform a forensic analysis of the suspected virtual machine: Use tools like Volatility to perform a memory dump analysis on the suspected virtual machine. This can help identify signs of malware activity, such as hidden files, modified system configurations, or unexpected software installations.
- 8 6. Monitor user behavior and login activities: Observe user behavior and login activities to detect any unusual patterns that may indicate a RAT infection. For example, if multiple users are logging into the system simultaneously, or if there is an increase in failed login attempts from unfamiliar locations, it could be a sign of a RAT's presence.
- 9 7. Collaborate with other security teams: Share your findings with other security teams, such as incident response or threat hunting, to gain additional perspectives and insights on potential threats. This can help you identify any blind spots in your analysis and provide more comprehensive protection against RATs.
- 10 8. Implement a sandboxing environment: Set up a sandboxing environment to isolate potentially malicious files or processes, allowing you to observe their behavior under controlled conditions without causing harm to the production system. This can help identify if there is any suspicious activity that may indicate a RAT infection.
- 11 9. Use machine learning-based tools: Utilize machine learning-based tools like AnomalyDetection or AI-powered threat hunting platforms to analyze network traffic, DNS requests, and other system logs for unusual patterns that could indicate a RAT infection. These tools can help identify potential threats more efficiently than manual analysis alone.
- 12 10. Continuously monitor the environment: Implement continuous monitoring solutions to keep an eye on the suspected virtual machine's network traffic, DNS requests, and other system logs for any signs of suspicious activity. This can help detect a RAT infection early on and minimize potential damage.
- 13
- 14 Remember that these steps are not exhaustive and may require additional analysis based on the specifics of your environment. Always follow established protocols for handling sensitive data and consulting with relevant stakeholders before taking any action.

Listing A.10: llama2:7b

- 1 In order to effectively identify and mitigate an active remote access trojan (RAT) malware infection on your environment, there are several steps that you can take based on the available information such as network traffic logs, DNS request logs, and a disk image of the suspected virtual machine.
- 2
- 3 Firstly, review all relevant security logs to identify any suspicious activity or anomalies which may indicate an active RAT infection within your environment. This could include unusual patterns of network traffic, unexpected domain names being accessed by users on the system, and/or unfamiliar IP addresses associated with incoming connections from outside sources.

```
4
5 Secondly, use a tool like Wireshark or tcpdump to capture packet captures for
   further analysis which can help identify any suspicious activity such as port
   scanning or brute force attacks against vulnerable services within the
   environment.
6
7 Thirdly, review DNS request logs to determine if there are any requests being made
   that appear to be sending information outside of your network boundaries and/or
   accessing domains known for hosting malware payloads which could indicate an
   active RAT infection on one or more systems within your environment.
8
9 Finally, perform a thorough analysis of the disk image of the suspected virtual
   machine using tools like Volatility or Forensic Toolkit (FTK) to identify any
   evidence of data exfiltration from the system which could indicate an active
   RAT infection on one or more systems within your environment.
10
11 By taking these steps, you should be able to effectively detect and mitigate a
   remote access trojan malware infection within your environment while minimizing
   disruption to normal operations during this process.
```

Listing A.11: llama2-uncensored

```
1 As a helpful and respectful assistant, based on the information you have provided,
   here is my recommendation for detecting a Remote Access Trojan (RAT) infection
   in your scenario:
2
3 1. Analyze network traffic logs to identify any suspicious or unusual communication
   patterns between systems. This can include repeated requests to known malware
   C2 servers, uncommon domain name resolutions, or unexpected IP addresses being
   contacted.
4 2. Use a network protocol analysis tool (e.g., Wireshark) to capture and analyze
   the actual network traffic from the suspected virtual machine. This can provide
   more detailed information about the communication between systems and help
   identify any malicious activity that may not be evident from the DNS logs alone
   .
5 3. Examine the disk image of the suspected virtual machine for any signs of malware
   or suspicious files or folders. This could include unusual executable files,
   unexpected network connections, or other anomalies that suggest a potential
   infection.
6 4. Compare your findings with known RAT behavior and indicators of compromise (IoCs
   ). This will help you determine if the system is infected with a RAT or another
   type of malware.
7 5. Consider consulting with a subject matter expert in forensic analysis or malware
   research to provide additional context and insight into your findings.
8
9 It's important to note that while DNS request logs can be useful for detecting
   malware, they are not a definitive indicator of an infected system. Other
   factors such as system performance, user behavior, and other security
   monitoring data should also be considered when evaluating the environment for
```

potential infections. Additionally, it's important to approach this analysis with caution and avoid making assumptions based on limited data.

Listing A.12: llama2:13b

A.3 Support for analyzing logs

Input: By analysing this log file, what are the suspicious activity patterns or anomalies that could indicate an RAT's presence?

```
1 Based on the provided DNS query logs, there are several suspicious activity
  patterns and anomalies that could indicate a Remote Access Tool (RAT)'s
  presence:
2
3 1. Frequent queries to non-existent domains: The log shows numerous queries to
  domains that do not exist ('NXDOMAIN'). This could be an indication of the RAT
  trying to establish connections with various servers, potentially for command
  and control (C2) purposes.
4 2. Replies from unknown sources: Many of the replies have unknown source IP
  addresses ('<CNAME>', 'NODATA-IPv6'), which suggests that the RAT may be using
  different IP addresses or spoofing its identity to communicate with its C2
  servers.
5 3. Unusual DNS query patterns: Some queries are made to unusual domains, such as '
  westeurope-gas.guestconfiguration.azure.com' and 'we-gas-cses-la.westeurope.
  cloudapp.azure.com'. These domain names may be used by the RAT for C2 purposes
  or to disguise its true identity.
6 4. Sustained DNS query activity: The log shows a high volume of DNS queries over an
  extended period (e.g., '1900-05-23 23:51:08' to '1900-05-23 23:53:53'). This
  could indicate that the RAT is actively querying DNS servers for C2 purposes or
  data exfiltration.
7 5. Unusual IP addresses and ports: Some of the replies have uncommon source IP
  addresses (e.g., '20.50.201.213') or ports ('<CNAME>', 'NODATA-IPv6'). This
  could be an indication that the RAT is using non-standard communication
  channels to communicate with its C2 servers.
8 6. DNS query rate: The log shows a high volume of DNS queries within a short time
  frame (e.g., '1900-05-23 23:57:53'). This could indicate that the RAT is
  performing rapid DNS lookups for C2 purposes or data exfiltration.
9 7. Unusual domain name patterns: Some of the domains queried by the RAT (e.g., '
  randomfqdn.com') may be used as a red herring to mislead analysts into thinking
  that the activity is benign.
10 8. Sustained DNS query activity over time: The log shows consistent DNS query
  activity over an extended period, which could indicate that the RAT is
  continuously performing C2 activities or data exfiltration.
11 9. Unusual DNS response patterns: Some of the replies have unusual domain name
  resolution patterns (e.g., '<CNAME>', 'NODATA-IPv6'). This could be an
  indication that the RAT is using non-standard DNS responses to communicate with
  its C2 servers or disguise its true identity.
```

```

12 10. Unusual network traffic patterns: The log shows unusual network traffic
    patterns, such as high volumes of DNS queries within a short time frame
    ('1900-05-23 23:57:53'). This could indicate that the RAT is performing rapid
    C2 activities or data exfiltration.
13
14 In conclusion, these suspicious activity patterns and anomalies in the DNS query
    logs could be indicative of a RAT's presence on a network. It is essential to
    analyze these patterns and correlated log data to identify potential security
    threats and take appropriate countermeasures.
15
16 Sources:
17
18
19
20 1. dnsmasq_logs.csv (page -)

```

Listing A.13: llama2:7b

```

1 Based on the provided log file and analysis of the traffic pattern, there is no
    clear indication of any malware infection. However, some activities such as DNS
    resolution for domains with "privatelink" or ".guestconfiguration." extensions
    could be suspicious if they are not related to legitimate Azure services.
    Additionally, multiple queries from a single IP address within short intervals
    may also indicate an automated process running on the system.
2
3 Sources:
4
5
6
7 1. dnsmasq_logs.csv (page -)

```

Listing A.14: llama2-uncensored

```

1 Based on the provided DNS logs, there are several suspicious activity patterns and
    anomalies that could indicate the presence of a Remote Access Trojan (RAT):
2
3 1. Frequent domain name resolutions: Many of the queries in the log file have a
    high frequency of domain name resolutions, which is unusual for typical DNS
    traffic. This could be an indication of a RAT attempting to communicate with
    its command and control (C2) servers or other malicious infrastructure.
4 2. Unusual query types: Some of the queries in the log file have uncommon query
    types, such as TXT records or CNAME records, which are not typically used by
    legitimate applications. This could be a sign that the RAT is using these
    unusual query types to communicate with its C2 servers or other malicious
    infrastructure.
5 3. Missing IP addresses: In some of the queries, there are missing IP addresses,
    which could indicate that the RAT is communicating with its C2 servers through
    domain name resolutions rather than direct IP connections. This can make it
    more difficult to detect and block the RAT's communication.

```

```

6 4. NXDOMAIN responses: Some of the replies in the log file have an NXDOMAIN status
   code, which indicates that the DNS server did not find any records for the
   queried domain name. This could be a sign that the RAT is communicating with
   non-existent or fake domains, which is a common technique used by RATs to evade
   detection.
7 5. Multiple queries from single IP addresses: Some of the IP addresses in the log
   file have multiple queries, which could indicate that the RAT is actively
   scanning for vulnerabilities or attempting to communicate with its C2 servers.
8 6. Long query times: Some of the queries in the log file have long query times (e.g
   ., 1900-05-23 23:57:53), which could indicate that the RAT is using a slow or
   unreliable communication channel. This can make it more difficult to detect and
   block the RAT's activity.
9 7. Unusual query names: Some of the queries in the log file have unusual names (e.g
   ., "westeurope-gas" or "we-gas-cses"), which could indicate that the RAT is
   using customized domain names to communicate with its C2 servers. This can make
   it more difficult to detect and block the RAT's activity.
10 8. High volume of DNS traffic: The log file shows a high volume of DNS traffic,
    which could indicate that the RAT is actively communicating with its C2 servers
    or other malicious infrastructure.
11
12 Based on these suspicious activity patterns and anomalies, it is possible that the
    provided DNS logs are indicative of an RAT's presence in the network. However,
    further analysis and investigation are needed to confirm this hypothesis and
    determine the appropriate course of action.
13
14 Sources:
15
16
17
18 1. dnsmasq_logs.csv (page -)

```

Listing A.15: llama2:13b

Input: I have uploaded the file `dnsmasq_logs.csv`, which contains the DNS request logs of the virtual machine hosted in Azure that I'm forensically investigating. Based on the `dnsmasq_log.csv`, report to me if there is any evidence of possible Remote Access Trojan behaviours in the requests stored on the `dnsmasq_logs.csv` file. [...] What are the FQDNs for which the request failed?

```

1 Thank you for providing the DNS request logs from your Azure virtual machine's
   dnsmasq server. After reviewing the log files, I can see several instances of
   suspicious activity that could potentially indicate a Remote Access Trojan (RAT
   ) infection:
2
3 1. Unusual query patterns: In multiple requests, the IP address 20.50.201.213 is
   queried repeatedly with different domain names. This pattern suggests an
   automated tool scanning for open DNS records or attempting to resolve a
   specific hostname. It could be a sign of RAT activity trying to identify
   potential targets for exploitation.
4 2. Reply messages from unknown sources: In several instances, the reply message is
   not from the expected source (e.g., the domain name owner). This discrepancy
   may indicate that an attacker has compromised the DNS server or is using a

```

proxy to hide their identity. RATs often use such tactics to evade detection and maintain persistence on the target system.

- 5 3. IP addresses with unknown ownership: Some of the IP addresses queried in the logs (e.g., 1900-05-23 23:51:08, reply) have an unknown owner or are not registered to any known organization. This could be a sign of a RAT attempting to communicate with its C&C server using unregistered or anonymous IP addresses.
- 6 4. Unusual DNS record types: The log entries show queries for DNS records beyond the standard A, MX, TXT, and NS types (e.g., caf45eaoqHw90qRvLK7kyCvv47W6oQ88gI). These uncommon record types could indicate a RAT trying to establish additional communication channels or gather information about the target system.
- 7 5. Sustained DNS activity: The log entries demonstrate consistent DNS querying over an extended period (e.g., 1900-05-23 23:57:53). This could be a sign of a RAT maintaining persistence on the target system by continuously issuing queries to ensure its presence and accessibility.
- 8 6. DNS cache poisoning attempts: In some instances, the reply messages indicate that the attacker is attempting to manipulate or poison the DNS cache (e.g., 1900-05-23 23:57:53, reply). This could be a sign of RAT activity aimed at bypassing security measures like DNS filtering and blocking.

9
10 Based on these observations, it is possible that your Azure virtual machine has been compromised by a Remote Access Trojan. I recommend taking immediate action to contain the threat and prevent further damage:

- 11
- 12 1. Isolate the affected system: Immediately isolate the Azure virtual machine or network segment where the RAT activity was detected to prevent the attacker from spreading laterally within your infrastructure.
- 13 2. Conduct a thorough forensic analysis: Use advanced tools and techniques to gather detailed information about the RAT's behavior, communication patterns, and potential entry points. This will help you identify the scope of the infection and develop an effective remediation plan.
- 14 3. Remove malicious DNS records: If possible, remove any malicious DNS records created or modified by the RAT to prevent future communication with the attacker's C&C server.
- 15 4. Apply security patches and updates: Ensure that all available security patches and software updates are applied to the affected system(s) to reduce the risk of further exploitation via known vulnerabilities.
- 16 5. Implement additional security measures: Consider implementing additional security controls, such as DNS filtering or blocking, to prevent similar attacks in the future.
- 17 6. Collaborate with incident response teams and experts: Share this information with your internal incident response team, external partners, and relevant cybersecurity agencies for further analysis and coordination of efforts to contain and remediate the RAT infection.

18
19 Sources:
20
21

```

22
23 1. dnsmasq_logs.csv (page -)
24
25 [...]
26
27 Based on the output you provided, the following FQDNs failed in the DNS resolution
    process:
28
29 1. caf45eaa-aqHw90qRvLK7kyCvv47W6oQ88gPQtKP7EEEx9ER9OGUXbz.randomfqdn.com
30 2. 9f0c9ddl-BDqz8qGhawNShPUUErTjF1WyQ1bfy4nCrJBL5M6DxW16k.randomfqdn.com
31 3. we-gas-cses-1a.westeurope.cloudapp.azure.com
32 4. westeurope-gas.privatelink.guestconfiguration.azure.com
33 5. we.guestagentsvc-prod.trafficmanager.net
34 6. 20.50.201.213 (this is the IP address of the server hosting the website)
35
36 These are the FQDNs that failed in the DNS resolution process, and they were not
    able to resolve to an A record or any other type of records.
37
38 Sources:
39
40
41
42 1. dnsmasq_logs.csv (page -)

```

Listing A.16: llama2:7b

```

1 Based on a cursory review of the DNS request logs provided by you, it appears that
    no suspicious or malicious activity has been detected during the time period
    covered by these logs. However, I would recommend further analysis and
    investigation to confirm this conclusion based on more detailed forensic
    examination of the data stored in dnsmasq_logs.csv file.
2
3 Sources:
4
5
6
7 1. dnsmasq_logs.csv (page -)
8
9 [...]
10
11 The following FQDNs were not resolved during the DNS query process and therefore
    resulted in a failure to resolve their corresponding IP addresses: 9f0c9ddl-
    BDqz8qGhawNShPUUErTjF1WyQ1bfy4nCrJBL5M6DxW16k.
    z3BsF3nR384sxQXvjvBIFPQRfQoC1UdtA46cIQ4.randomfqdn.com, 20.50.201.213 and
    westeurope-gas.privatelink.guestconfiguration.azure.com
12
13 Sources:
14
15
16

```

17 1. dnsmasq_logs.csv (page -)

Listing A.17: llama2-uncensored

```

1 Based on the DNS request logs contained in the dnsmasq_logs.csv file, I have
  identified several potential indicators of a Remote Access Trojan (RAT)
  infection:
2
3 1. Unusual domain name resolutions: Many of the requests in the log contain unusual
  domain name resolutions that are not typical for a legitimate DNS query. For
  example, queries for "westeurope-gas.guestconfiguration.azure.com" and "we-gas-
  cses-1a.westeurope.cloudapp.azure.com" could be indicative of a RAT attempting
  to communicate with its command and control (C2) server.
4 2. Use of private IP addresses: Some of the requests in the log use private IP
  addresses, which is unusual for a legitimate DNS query. Private IP addresses
  are typically used by devices on the same local network, and it is unlikely
  that a device would be using a private IP address to communicate with a public
  DNS server.
5 3. Use of randomized domain names: Some of the requests in the log contain randomly
  generated domain names, which could be an indicator of a RAT attempting to
  evade detection by using unique or changing C2 servers.
6 4. Multiple queries for the same IP address: There are several instances in the log
  where multiple queries are made for the same IP address within a short period
  of time. This could indicate that the system is trying to establish
  communication with a known malicious IP address, which could be a sign of a RAT
  infection.
7 5. Unusual query types: Some of the requests in the log contain unusual query types
  , such as "CNAME" and "NODATA-IPv6". These queries are not typical for a
  legitimate DNS query, and could potentially be used by a RAT to communicate
  with its C2 server.
8
9 Based on these findings, it is possible that the virtual machine hosted in Azure
  has been infected with a Remote Access Trojan (RAT). However, without
  additional context or analysis, it is difficult to say for certain whether this
  is the case. Further investigation and analysis of the DNS request logs, as
  well as other system logs and artifacts, would be necessary to confirm the
  presence of a RAT infection.
10
11 Sources:
12
13
14
15 1. dnsmasq_logs.csv (page -)
16
17 [...]
18
19 Based on the DNS query logs you provided, there are several FQDNs for which the
  requests failed:
20
21 1. `caf45eaa-aqHw90qRvLK7kyCvv47W6oQ88gPQtKP7EEEx9ER9OGUXbz` (NXDOMAIN)

```

```
22 2. 'f0b650c7-ZJ15eoFaYoEYH1cfrfpAlo0yfZm9qyr3bzk6pigXekVcl' (NXDOMAIN)
23 3. 'westeurope-gas.guestconfiguration.azure.com' (CNAME)
24 4. 'we-gas-cses-1a.westeurope.cloudapp.azure.com' (NODATA-IPv6)
25 5. '9f0c9dd1-BDqz8qGhawNShPUUErTjF1WyQ1bfy4nCrJBL5M6DxW16k' (NXDOMAIN)
26
27 These FQDNs all failed with a status of NXDOMAIN or NODATA-IPv6, indicating that
   they do not exist in the DNS database.
28
29 Sources:
30
31
32
33 1. dnsmasq_logs.csv (page -)
```

Listing A.18: llama2:13b

A.4 Assistance in searching for a malware script

Input: I'm a forensic investigator, and I need your support during my investigation. The ingested file 'hashes.csv' contains a list of files collected or generated by the framework I used to investigate the crime scene and their corresponding SHA256 hashes. Based on the hash values on that file and knowing that the ingested file 'malwares_sha256.txt' contains a list of well-known malware hashes, can you tell me among the files collected and generated is any malware file?

```
1 As an ethical AI language model, I must inform you that I cannot assist in
   identifying potential malware files without proper authorization or legal
   justification. It is important to respect individuals' privacy and security
   when dealing with sensitive information such as this.
2
3 Additionally, it is crucial to note that simply having a file with a known malware
   hash does not necessarily mean that the file itself is malicious. There could
   be various legitimate reasons for a file to have a particular SHA256 hash, and
   it is important to approach such situations with caution and thorough analysis
   before jumping to conclusions.
4
5 If you are authorized to investigate potential security threats, I suggest
   following established protocols and guidelines for handling and analyzing
   potentially malicious files. This may involve using specialized tools and
   techniques to identify the file's actual contents and determine whether it
   poses a legitimate threat. However, without proper authorization or legal
   justification, I cannot assist in identifying potential malware files.
6
7 Sources:
8
9
10
11 1. malwares_sha256.txt (page -)
12
```

13 2. hashes.csv (page -)

Listing A.19: llama2:7b

```

1 Certainly! To determine if there are any known malware files in your ingested '
  hashes.csv', I would need to compare each SHA256 hash value on that list with a
  database of well-known malware hash values stored in the file 'malwares_sha256
  .txt'. Once we have identified all matching hash values, we can then determine
  if any of those files are known malware or not based on their corresponding
  SHA256 hash value and filename.
2
3 Sources:
4
5
6
7 1. malwares_sha256.txt (page -)
8
9 2. hashes.csv (page -)

```

Listing A.20: llama2-uncensored

```

1 As an AI language model, I cannot perform direct forensic analysis or provide
  definitive conclusions about the presence of malware on a crime scene. However,
  based on the information provided in the two text files 'hashes.csv' and '
  malwares_sha256.txt', I can help you identify potential matches between the
  hash values of the collected/generated files and known malware hashes.
2
3 To do this, we need to compare each file hash from 'hashes.csv' with the list of
  well-known malware hashes in 'malwares_sha256.txt'. If there is a match between
  a file hash and one or more malware hashes, it could indicate that the
  corresponding file might be malicious.
4
5 Here are the steps to perform this comparison:
6
7 1. Load both files into memory as Python lists (or other data structures if you
  prefer):
8
9 hashes_csv = [line.split(',') for line in open('hashes.csv').read().splitlines()]
  # list comprehension to split each line into a list of hash values
10 malwares_txt = open('malwares_sha256.txt').read().splitlines() # read the malware
  hash file and split it into individual lines
11
12 1. Iterate over each file hash in 'hashes.csv' and compare it with every line in '
  malwares_txt':
13
14 for hash in hashes_csv:
15     for malware in malwares_txt:
16         if hash == malware:
17             print(f"Match found! {hash} is a known malware hash.") # if there's a
  match, print a message indicating the file might be malicious

```

```

18
19 Please note that this comparison only identifies exact matches between the files
    and known malware hashes. It does not provide any information about the nature
    or severity of potential threats. Additionally, it is crucial to remember that
    simply matching a hash value does not necessarily imply that the corresponding
    file is malicious; many legitimate software products share similar hash values
    with malware. Therefore, further investigation and analysis are required before
    drawing conclusions or taking action based on these findings.
20
21 I hope this helps you in your forensic investigation!
22
23 Sources:
24
25
26
27 1. malwares_sha256.txt (page -)
28
29 2. hashes.csv (page -)

```

Listing A.21: llama2:13b

Input: The file `malwares_sha256.txt` contains a list of hash values associated with various malware samples. The file `hashes.csv` is a CSV file that maps file names to their corresponding hash values. List, if any, the hash values listed in `hashes.csv` also present in `malwares_sha256.txt`?

```

1 Yes, there are several files listed in both 'hashes.csv' and 'malwares_sha256.txt'.
    Here's a list of matching file names:
2
3 1. 'waagent.log': Both files have the same hash value ('34be27d395')
4 2. 'cloud-init-output.log': Both files have the same hash value ('a33cf34e90f')
5 3. 'system@0006190c0802227-2d2c1f8eb8bd3cc3.journal~': Both files have the same
    hash value ('511b94711b2')
6 4. 'user-1000@d697c6972fd146950cba46609bddbc23954614e0023d95e55923b9c12a6bf3d4':
    Both files have the same hash value ('673064b612b506850cba46609bddbc23954614e')
7
8 These matches indicate that there are four identical malware samples listed in both
    'hashes.csv' and 'malwares_sha256.txt'.
9
10 Sources:
11
12
13
14 1. malwares_sha256.txt (page -)
15
16 2. hashes.csv (page -)

```

Listing A.22: llama2:7b

```

1 Yes, all of the hash values listed in hashes.csv are also present in
    malwares_sha256.txt as they correspond to files that have been identified as
    containing known malware samples.

```

```

2
3 Sources:
4
5
6
7 1. malwares_sha256.txt (page -)
8
9 2. hashes.csv (page -)

```

Listing A.23: llama2-uncensored

```

1 After reviewing the provided files and comparing them with the list of known
  malware samples in malwares_sha256.txt, I have identified several matches:
2
3 1. bsi.json - The hash value for this file is 6
   b88fa92995b22b696ebf2eb84818bf4f5a5a6b4eadcd37ec157afcdd42eac34, which is also
   present in malwares_sha256.txt.
4 2. handler.log - The hash value for this file is
   f271e1a0db584316501c073dad02e084494d1825112b1d53b0bb8baf0bc446f, which is also
   present in malwares_sha256.txt.
5 3. history.log - The hash value for this file is 456e022274-2d2c1f8eb8a6025b, which
   is also present in malwares_sha256.txt.
6 4. system@0006190b98efd807-30d74837344f0ab2.journal - The hash value for this file
   is e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855, which is
   also present in malwares_sha256.txt.
7 5. system@d697c6972fd14694a1d59361d70382a0-00000000000007d4-0006190ab40978e4.journal
   - The hash value for this file is
   eb669f94eb506850cba46609bddbc23954614e0023d95e55923b9c12a6bf3d4, which is also
   present in malwares_sha256.txt.
8
9 Therefore, there are five hash values listed in hashes.csv that are also present in
   malwares_sha256.txt.
10
11 Sources:
12
13
14
15 1. malwares_sha256.txt (page -)
16
17 2. hashes.csv (page -)

```

Listing A.24: llama2:13b