Causes and Consequences of Reactions to Deviance:

A Subjective Group Dynamics Approach

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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The central topic of the present work is the relationship between deviance and social identity. Our goal is to analyze some situational and psychological factors involved in the emergence of negative reactions toward deviant individuals, and how such reactions help perceivers to maintain or to reinforce their sense of social self worth.

Deviance is a broad topic that encompasses sociological, psychological, and social psychological theory and research (e.g. Archer, 1985; Duyckaerts, 1966; Gibbs & Erikson, 1975; Levine, 1980; Levine & Thompson, 1996). It may be viewed as an important step towards adaptation, by confronting the majority with new, adaptive forms of behavior (e.g., Ben-Yehuda, 1985; Levine, 1980; Moscovici, 1976; Mugny, 1982), or it may be equated, for example, with “error”, “illness”, “crime”, or “sin”:

“In error, failure is due to ignorance or to the lack of control over the elements of action. Illness is also a lack of control […] over the body and the mind that renders the individual incapable of realizing his value commitments and of fulfilling his share of solidarity obligations […]. Crime and sin refer to failures to cooperate within the valued collectivities of the community or to demonstrate commitment to societal values. They are more severely punished than error or sin because the likelihood of their harming society is usually greater. […]” (Pitts, 1965, p. 702).

Deviance may also appear either as a more or less obvious deviation from common occurrences, or as a more or less intentional departure from conduct that a community or a group considers to be “desirable” or, at least, “adequate” (e.g. Axelrod, 1986; Cialdini & Trost, 1998; Hamilton & Rauma, 1995; Hawkes, 1975; Miller & Prentice, 1996). Obviously, the psychological concomitants of the perception of these distinct kinds of
deviance can be very different, let alone their material or social consequences, both for the deviants and for normative individuals.

Finally, the deviant label itself, may denote either a demarcation between individuals who are socialized in terms of conventional norms and individuals who are socialized in terms of other norms (e.g. DeLamater, 1968; Sutherland & Cressey, 1974), or the manifestation of a disruption or disagreement between individuals who share the same social definition (e.g. Durkheim, 1893; Levine & Moreland, 1998; Shaw, 1976). Clearly, a distinction between normal and deviant groups or social categories would entail more of a conflict between distinctive normative systems, possibly endowed with different power over the means to define what is deviant and what is normal (Hamilton & Rauma, 1995; Inverarity, 1980).

In the present work, we conceive of deviance as the perception of a disruptive process within a social group, rather than as the marginalization of ethnic or cultural groups in society, and we are concerned with individuals’ reactions to other members of their group who deviate from the standards that uphold that group’s positive image (cf. Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 2001). More specifically, we attempt to explore a set of assumptions which have been subsumed under the heading of subjective group dynamics (e.g. Marques & Páez, 1994; Marques, Páez & Abrams, 1998), deal with the conditions, internal and external to the group, under which individuals derogate in-group deviants.

Broadly, subjective group dynamics has a process stemming from individuals’ self-assimilation to a social category and application of internalized prescriptive norms to the construction and validation of beliefs in a positive social identity (Marques, 2004; Marques & Páez, 1994; Marques, Páez & Abrams, 1998). It has been defined as “a process by which people maximize and sustain descriptive intergroup differentiation whilst simultaneously
maximizing and sustaining the relative validity of prescriptive ingroup norms through intragroup differentiation” (Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 2001, pp. 401-402).

The simultaneous intergroup and intragroup differentiation process proposed by the subjective group dynamics model often arise in terms of hostile reactions towards those ingroup members who do not subscribe to valued ingroup standards. These reactions find parallel in two important instances of social life. On the one hand, they appear to be the psychological equivalent of interpersonal processes occurring in face to face groups (cf. Marques & Páez, 1994). On the other hand, they are comparable to the processes described by sociologists and historians when large communities have to deal with deviant individuals and subgroups (Marques, in preparation; Marques & Serôdio, 2000).

The foundations of our theoretical reasoning stem from classical sociology and more recent social psychological theory and research. From sociology, we borrow mainly from Durkheim’s (e.g. 1893) theory of social solidarity and social control. From social psychology, we borrow from the classic approach to social influence in face-to-face groups initiated by Festinger (1950), and from the social identification approach, including social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, 1975), and self-categorization theory (Hogg, 1992; Oakes, Haslam & Turner, 1994; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987).

In Chapter 2, we present the above mentioned theoretical foundations. Durkheim’s (1893) theory of social solidarity is particularly relevant to our concerns. We attempt to describe how this theory’s account for the function of punishment of deviants in the promotion of social cohesiveness, and the reinvigoration of individuals’ adherence to the violated norms, especially when internal (e.g. anomie) or external (e.g. a threat to the group’s definition) require the group’s normative system to be reinforced (e.g. Erikson, 1966). We argue that social identity may be the equivalent of Durkheim’s (1893) notion of
mechanical solidarity as far as reactions to deviants and the reinforcement of social identification are concerned.

Based on Festinger’s (1950) informal social communication theory, we elaborate on the process through which members of face to face groups acquire a sense of subjective validation of reality by establishing intragroup uniformity, and how they deal with deviance of opinions from other members that may jeopardize this validation. We argue that, although the processes according to which large communities and small groups deal with deviance may certainly be quite different in nature, they are driven by similar types of occurrences and their aim is, in both cases, to maintain or reinforce uniformity.

In applying to the social identification framework, we attempt to draw relevant implications from the two above mentioned theoretical fields to the main theoretical issue of this thesis: the significance of ingroup deviance for the identity of group members, and the external conditions that amplify it. We review research on the so-called “black sheep effect” (Marques, 1986; Marques, Yzerbyt & Leyens, 1988), from which the model of subjective group dynamics evolved (Marques & Páez, 1994). In line with the subjective group dynamics model, we assume that, when individuals define themselves as members of a social category, the emergence of ingroup deviance prompts them to adopt a prescriptive focus towards the deviants (Marques, Abrams, Páez & Taboada, 1998; Marques, Abrams & Serôdio, 2001). We hypothesize that such prescriptive focus decreases individuals’ tolerance of ingroup deviance and intensifies hostile reactions towards ingroup deviants, specifically when the ingroup is perceived to lack solidarity in terms of the breached norms, when the norm’s validity is threatened by lack of societal support, or the group’s identity is threatened in the context of intergroup relations.

We devote Chapters 3-4 to our empirical research. In Chapter 3, we focus on the idea that reactions to intragroup deviance are tributary to the more general intergroup
context in which they occur. In this chapter, Experiments 1-4 examine how internal and external threats to the ingroup increase derogation of ingroup deviants. In all experiments, participants judged ingroup and outgroup deviant and normative individuals. In Experiment 1, participants evaluated the ingroup deviant more negatively and the ingroup normative member more favorably than their outgroup counterparts, when they perceived that a relevant majority of ingroup members did not support a valued norm. In experiments 2 and 3, we found a similar effect when the ingroup status relative to the outgroup was insecure. Experiment 4, complemented findings of Experiment 1, by showing that lack of societal support, instead of lack of ingroup support, to the norm generates upgrading of normative ingroup members and derogation of deviant ingroup members relative to outgroup members.

In Chapter 4, Experiments 5-7 are mainly aimed at exploring the relationship between cognitive and emotional processes involved in the derogation of ingroup deviants. Specifically, experiments 6 and 7 show that derogation of ingroup deviants is stronger when the deviants are good ingroup representatives. In Experiment 6, we found that ingroup members, deviant or normative, were, respectively, more strongly derogated or upgraded relative to similar outgroup members, when they were typical than when they were atypical of their group. Results of Experiment 7, replicate this finding. Experiments 5 and 7 further show that participants’ emotional reaction to the targets, and their perception of the extent to which these targets positively or negatively contribute to the ingroup’s image significantly mediate derogation of ingroup members.

Chapter 5 concludes this thesis. Based on the collected evidence, we contend that an account of the antecedents and functions of normative individuals’ punitive reactions toward ingroup deviants requires one to consider the implications of deviance for the identity of these individuals, and the external conditions that, amplify the psychological
impact of deviance by decreasing normative individuals’ threshold of tolerance and increasing their negative experience of the situation.
CHAPTER 2
A THEORETICAL OUTLINE OF SUBJECTIVE GROUP DYNAMICS

The social psychological study of group processes evolved mainly from two research traditions, the small group approach (e.g. Cartwright & Zander, 1968; Forsyth, 1990; Shaw, 1976) and the social identification approach, including social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978) and self-categorization theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987). However, in what regards the study of uniformity and deviance, the two traditions differ in their assumptions about the processes involved in group members’ perceptions of their groups and of other members.

Firstly, whereas the small group approach has explored in detail the reactions of members of face to face groups to internal disagreement about valued opinions, social identity research has centered on the process whereby individuals disregard intragroup differences in order to bolster clear-cut intergroup differentiation. Secondly, whereas the small group approach focused itself on the part played by interpersonal similarity, interdependence, and face-to-face interaction in the construction of the group (cf. Lott & Lott, 1965; Shaw, 1976), the social identification approach has traditionally focused on the group as a representation that mediates inter-individual relationships (Hogg, 1992; Tajfel, 1978; cf. also, Wilder & Simon, 1998; Prentice, Miller & Lightdale, 1994; for distinctions between the two kinds of groups). Thirdly, whereas research driven by the small group approach, has centered mainly on processes occurring within the group to the detriment of the intergroup context, research driven by the social identification framework has devoted attention to the relationships between groups while generally disregarding how social categories deal with emerging deviance. In the present chapter, we argue that, although these two perspectives have evolved largely through independent paths, they may be heuristically combined into a general perspective of the interplay between intergroup and
intragroup processes. Interestingly, one way in which such combination can be attempted is by reference to sociological work inspired by the seminal theory of Durkheim about social solidarity, anomie, and social control (Durkheim, 1893, 1895).

Durkheim’s Approach to Deviance, Social Control, and Social Cohesiveness

Durkheim’s functionalist approach to deviance has been recognized as one of the most influential accounts of the process whereby groups construct and reinforce internal cohesiveness (e.g. Jones, 1981; Marks, 1974; Turner, 1990). The core idea of Durkheim’s theory can be subsumed as follows:

“…Society is essentially a set of ideas shared by individuals. Social facts are things, but things that exist only in the minds of individuals. Society, like religion, is abstract, normative, and emotional [...] The maintenance of consensus and the maintenance of order are the organizing principles of Durkheim’s society.” (Pitts, 1965, p. 686).

Social Control and Social Organization

A core aspect in Durkheim’s theory is the notion of social control. The term social control refers the set of mechanisms that society puts to work in order to insure individuals’ compliance with the principles that regulate the society, i.e., social norms, to the detriment of undisciplined individual impulses that, if unconstrained, would create a state of anomie, or social disorder. Similar notions were used by other classical authors, such as Mead (1925), Ross (1901), Thomas and Znaniecki (1927; cf. for example, Meier, 1982).

To Durkheim (1893, 1895), the organization of a community can be approached through the observation of how social control operates in that community. The characteristics of the social organization would be given by the observation of the predominant ways through which the society internally establishes social solidarity, i.e.,
the necessary uniformity of beliefs, rules for inter-individual cooperation, or latitudes of tolerable behavior to ensure its continuity over time.

*Forms of Social Control and of Social Solidarity*

In analyzing how different societies exert social control over their members, regardless of whether social control emerges in formal or informal ways¹, Durkheim (1893) distinguished between two general orientations that he designated as *repressive* and *restitutive*. Repressive social control, on the one hand, would find its formal manifestation in the criminal law, in which the penalty applied upon lawbreakers aims to directly punishing them for the harm that, by breaking the link of social solidarity with other people, they would have caused to society. Restitutive social control, on the other hand, would correspond more to civil, commercial or constitutional law, whose ultimate goal is, more than punishing the harm doer, to repair the harm done by bringing society back to the state of affairs that pre-existed the norm violation.

Importantly, Durkheim equated repressive and restitutive social control with two different forms of social organization. These two forms correspond to *mechanical solidarity* and *organic solidarity* (Durkheim, 1893). Mechanical solidarity and organic solidarity would be two ways in which individuals represent both the social units to which they belong and their position as members of those units.

Mechanical solidarity would be a property of simple communities, in which social cohesiveness is a function of individuals’ belief similarity and behavioral uniformity. It stands for the automatically, and fully, sharing of the same values, motives, beliefs and behavior patterns by socialized individuals. Clearly, this form of social coordination would

¹ From Durkheim’s (e.g. 1985) sociological standpoint, the formal social institutions to analyze, would thus be the Law, Education, and Religion, that is, the three institutions that more aptly regulate the minds and behavior of individuals, by creating, imposing, and ensuring their abidance by social norms. However, Durkheim admitted, informal social control mechanisms may be very effective in establishing social uniformity (e.g. Durkheim, 1893).
be impossible in the simpler group, all the more because differentiation would there be largely unaccepted.

In turn, organic solidarity would emerge in more complex social organizations, in which the increasing division of roles and functions (which Durkheim designates as “social labor”) leads to a greater differentiation between individuals. In this case, social cohesiveness would correspond to the functional complementarity between individuals whose different perspectives, motivations, beliefs, and skills would contribute to the effective operation of intertwined and mutually interdependent spheres of the social organization (cf. Durkheim, 1893)².

Anomie, Deviance, and Social Control: the Structuring Role of Punishment

Durkheim’s approach to social control and his conception of the social function of deviance and punishment cannot be dissociated. A core contention in Durkheim’s (e.g. 1893, 1895) theory is that deviance is a normal fact of social life, a functional aspect of every group that is vital for its common existence. In other words, groups create themselves their own deviance, without which they would not be able to maintain the required level of internal consensus that allow their continued existence. Although, at first glance, the theory appears to rest on the idea that groups need internal consensus, it argues, in fact, that the emergence of intragroup diversity is a necessary outcome of group life, whose crucial function is to bolster social uniformity. Durkheim (1895) exemplifies this idea by imagining a “community of saints” where

“…crime properly said, would there be unknown, but faults which would appear venial or current, would raise the same scandal as the ordinary offence does to the common mind. If, then, it had the power to judge and punish, such a society would qualify these acts as criminal and would treat
them as such […] Crime is, therefore, necessary; it is linked to the fundamental conditions of all social life and, for this very reason it is useful; because the conditions to which it is associated are themselves vital to the normal evolution of morality…” (pp. 68-70, our translation).³

Durkheim defines deviance with respect to the notion of collective mind (conscience collective). The collective mind refers to the set of beliefs and feelings that are shared by the members of a community. In this vein, an offence or deviant act is an act that offends the core aspects (the “strong states”, as Durkheim calls it) of the collective mind. The crucial implication of this fact is assumption, is that, to Durkheim (1893) an act becomes deviant to the extent it will be blamed by the collective mind, rather than the reverse. To put it in Inverarity’s (1980) words, “the social act of punishment has the primary consequence not of deterring potential troublemakers but rather of reaffirming commitment and solidarity among the virtuous” (p. 194). Deviance would thus be a product of punishment, rather than its instigator. Because punishment marks the threshold from which deviation from group norms is no longer accepted, punishment should increase as uniformity decreases within the group. As a result, deviance should be viewed as a collective construction that, by increasing punishment opportunities would force individuals to focus on the norm, and even to commit themselves more strongly to it by participating, actually, or tacitly, in the punishment of deviants (cf. also Marques & Serôdio, 2000). In other words, punishment primarily serves the function of reinforcing commitment and solidarity between normative individuals, rather than discouraging and

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² Interestingly, Durkheim (1893) initially conceived the two types of solidarity as the reflection of society’s evolutionary transition – i.e., modernity entails a progressive shift from mechanical to organic solidarity. He later reviewed his position considering that the two types may coexist (Durkheim, 1895).

³ In the original version: “… les crimes proprement dits y seront inconnus; mais les fautes qui paraissent vénielles ou vulgaires y souleveront le même scandale que fait le délit ordinaire auprès des consciences ordinaires. Si donc cette société se trouve armée du pouvoir de juger et de punir, elle qualifiera ces actes de criminels et le traitera comme tels […] Le crime est donc nécessaire; il est lié aux conditions fondamentales de toute vie sociale, mais, par cela même, il est utile; car ces conditions dont il est solidaire sont elles-mêmes indispensables à l’évolution normale de la morale…”. (pp. 68-70).
preventing dissidence. In fulfilling these functions, deviance and punishment are vital for the maintenance of social cohesiveness. As Durkheim (1895) put it,

“If, as societies change from inferior types to higher ones, the rate of criminality […] tended to decrease, one might believe that, in spite of remaining a normal phenomenon, crime would nevertheless tend to lose this quality. But we have no reason to believe in the reality of this decrease. Many facts seem to rather demonstrate the reverse phenomenon […]. In France, the increase is about 300%. There is no other phenomenon that more cogently presents all the symptoms of normality, because it appears to be closely associated with the conditions of collective life.” (Durkheim, 1895, pp. 65-66).4

In short, deviance is created by the group in order to increase punishment. Punishment, in turn, provides individuals with the opportunity to express (or to simply feel) their hostility towards those other individuals whose behavior falls aside the limits constructed by the group on relevant norms. Participation in punishment will allow the former to reinforce their commitment to the breached norm and, by the same token, to increase their attachment to the group.

Deviance thus appears as a seemingly paradoxical phenomenon. It strengthens the very norms it challenges, by leading normative individuals to engage in reactions towards deviants. It “not only revives and maintains common sentiments, but creatively establishes moral rules and redefines ‘normal’ behavior” (Coser, 1962, p. 173). Deviance thus crucially provides the necessary contrast between behavior that is deemed moral or immoral by the community. In doing so, it allows individuals to assess and to govern their

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4 In the original version: “Si, du moins à mesure que les sociétés passent des types inférieurs aux plus élevés, le taux de criminalité […] tendait à baisser, on pourrait croire que, tout en restant un phénomène normal, le crime, cependant, tend à perdre ce caractère. Mais nous n’avons aucune raison qui nous permette de croire à la réalité de cette régression. Bien des faits sembleraient plutôt démontrer l’existence d’un phénomène en sens inverse […]. En France, l’augmentation est de près de 300%. Il n’est donc pas de phénomène qui présente de la manière la plus irrécusée tous les symptômes de la normalité puisqu’il apparaît comme étroitement lié aux conditions de toute vie collective.” (Durkheim, 1895, pp. 65-66).
own behavior and the behavior of others in light of the community’s standards, and, hence, to establish their attachment and altruistic orientation towards the group (Durkheim, 1909). If no opportunities to engage in deviance punishment existed, individuals would lose sight of the specific values that should, in their eyes, establish their membership to a unique, and positively valued, social unit. Such an ignorance of the group’s norms and therefore, ignorance of its boundaries (the well-known durkheimian notion of *anomie*), would ultimately lead the social identity of members to fade, and condemn the group to non-existence (e.g. Durkheim 1893, 1895; cf. also Akers, 1968).

**Deviance and Social Control as an Intergroup Process**

Maybe due to its richly heuristic contents, research directly or indirectly inspired by Durkheim’s theory evolved into, at least, two distinct lines. One such line of reasoning views deviance as a disruptive process occurring within the community, and conceives social control as a process that opposes normative to deviant groups. To some extent, deviance would be a structural property that distinguishes between non-conventional and normative groups.

To some authors, research on deviance ensues from the assumption of a distinction between, consistent and consensual, normative individuals and periodically emerging deviant groups (cf. Inverarity, 1980). According to this general view, deviance originates either from individuals’ socialization in deviant groups, or from individuals’ lack of socialization, and thus deviance is viewed as the direct outcome of individuals’ membership in a particular social category. As DeLamater (1968) puts it,

“If one analyzes the background of many deviants, it appears that they were not originally socialized into conventional society. In some cases, childhood socialization occurred in a deviant subculture, and was explicitly in deviant (i.e. contraconventional) norms and values […] More frequently, the potential deviant’s socialization as a child was simply inadequate or lacking.
Either the parents made no attempt to systematically train the child to any set of norms, or there were no parents or other adults available to serve as effective socializing agents [...] This type of [...] socialization prepares the individual for deviant behavior fairly directly; it removes the necessity for him to neutralize conventional norms or withdraw legitimacy attributions from them [...]” (p. 447, emphasis in the original).

From a social psychological standpoint, then, we can say that, conceptualized in this way, deviance would be the manifestation of a conflict between “society” (a dominant or majority group), and a normative system (or the absence of such a system) adopted by a minority or dominated group (cf. Moscovici, 1976). Obviously, in this context, what is deemed as “normative”, as “effective” or “ineffective” socialization, or as “non-conventional”, strongly depends on the normative standards of the group that, at a particular historical moment, has access to the mechanisms of social control in society at large (cf. for instance, Chambliss, 1976; Hamilton & Rauma, 1995; Inverarity, 1980).

For example, according to Merton’s (1938, 1968) social disorganization theory, society imposes criteria of social success, mainly, material success, to individuals, but fails to endow certain groups with the means to achieve success by conventional, socially sanctioned, means. This contradiction would create a state of anomie by weakening the strength of social norms over these individuals, so that they would attempt to accomplish the socially valued goals by using non-conventional procedures. Akin to Merton’s theory is Parker and Stonequist’s (1937) account of deviance and marginality. To these authors, deviance (which they designate as marginality) would ensue from a contradiction between between broad role-commitments and incompatible social memberships. Thus, individuals who identify with a role that is not clearly spelt out may sooner or later discover that this role is in contradiction with previous commitments to incompatible other roles. This inconsistency would be solved either by strengthening their commitment with the present
role to the detriment of past commitments, or by deviating from their group, thus adopting a marginal position (cf. Pitts, 1965).

In a similar vein, with differential association theory, Sutherland and Cressey (1974) argue that the particular social organization that is found in urban areas weakens the more traditional, and more effective, mechanisms of social control that are found in primary groups and less complex forms of social organization. An outcome of this process is the emergence of deviant sub-cultures. Once individuals associate themselves to these cultures, individuals will assimilate their attitudes, motivations, and beliefs, while learning deviant techniques. Individuals will become deviant once the strength of attitudes, motivations and beliefs that favor the violation of social norms overpasses that of norm abiding attitudes, motivations and beliefs. Society would thus be composed by normative groups and by groups that differentiate themselves from the main stream in terms of their actions, goals, and representations of the world (e.g. Meier, 1982).

The other line of reasoning that emerged from Durkheim’s seminal ideas views deviance more as a process that, not only emerges within every social group, but also, and more importantly, as a process that is functional the groups’ very existence, and that becomes crucial exactly when the vicissitudes of group life require the reinforcement of social cohesiveness (e.g. Erikson, 1966). Authors in this line of reasoning have inquired into how individuals that were formerly normative, or considered as such, acquire a deviant status.

In this context, Becker’s (1963) societal reaction theory is a classical example. According to this author, society creates itself the very rules whose infraction is defined as deviance, following which it labels those who do not abide by those rules as deviant, prior to casting them off the group as outsiders. At the outset, then, these individuals are normative group members, in that their behavior has not yet been defined as deviant. They
become deviants only after their behavior is consensually viewed by others as deviant (primary deviance) and even more so when they accept that label themselves (secondary deviance). The representation of certain behavior as deviant is initiated through the action of “moral entrepreneurs”, that is, individuals or institutions who have the means to impose moral meaning upon these behaviors. When these “moral crusades” are effective in generating negative feelings about the target behavior in the remainder of society (societal reaction), deviants become to be viewed as outsiders and are subject to punitive treatment. Societal reaction thus corresponds to the creation of social consensus about which behavior is acceptable or unacceptable and, by the same token, about whose individuals are to be considered normative or deviant.

A classical example of this process is provided by Becker’s analysis of the criminalization of marijuana use in the United States. Whereas in the 1930s, the possession and use of marijuana was criminalized in only 16 North American states, and induced but generalized apathy on the part of public opinion and institutions (Becker, 1963), in 1937 it became criminalized in all 48 states. This seems to have been due to the action of mass-media, who started to refer to marijuana as “the killer weed”, “the burning weed from hell”, or “the sex-crazing drug menace”, and of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, who acted as moral entrepreneurs that generated the labeling of a new social category of marijuana consumers (cf. also Archer, 1985).

Moral panic is a process similar to a moral crusade that occurs when the role of moral entrepreneurs cannot be directly assigned to a particular group or institution, but rather appears diluted across society (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994). The term “moral panic” was coined by Cohen (1972) in his analysis of how minor social disorders can be amplified based on the exaggeration of the supposedly threatening character of a specific social category to society in general. According to this author, moral panics usually emerge
following an event that is considered as morally censurable. In being reported, namely by
the mass-media, the event may be subject to a *sensitization process*, whereby “harm,
wrongness, or deviance is attributed to the behavior, condition, or phenomenon that is
routinely ignored when the same consequences are caused by or attributed to more
conventional conditions” (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994, p. 156). Moral panics thus stand
for the amplification of social concerns that emerge following the exaggeration and the
misplacement of a perceived threat to society’s values by a specific social category
(Cohen, 1972) and the consequent increase in hostility towards this category that, as a
result, moves from the status of relatively anodyne subculture to that of a dangerous
deviant group.

In his classical illustration of this *deviance amplification spiral*, Cohen (1972)
analyzed the emergence of a large social concern about the “Mod” and “Rocker” British
youth movements, whose popular images involved, respectively, motor scooter-driving and
sophisticated clothing wearing, or motor bike-driving and black leather jacket wearing. On
Easter Sunday of 1964 members of the two groups gathered in a sea resort in southwest
England and were involved in minor scuffles, following which a few windows and beach
huts were broken and about one-hundred people were arrested and charged from abusive
behavior or resistance to arrest. Following mass-media coverage of this event, youth gangs
and vandalism emerged as a major news theme and as a source of social concern in
England for at least three years (Cohen, 1972), and mods and rockers became to be viewed
as potentially threatening deviant groups.

The association between deviance and opposing normative systems, or subcultures,
clearly endows it with an intergroup flavor. For example, Becker’s (1963) perspective
interestingly overlaps with social identity theory’s idea that the creation and permanence of

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5 Perhaps a more interesting example of moral panics is Ben-Yehuda’s (1980, 1985) analysis of witch
hunting in Medieval Central Europe, a study that we discuss below.
a social category requires the generation of social consensus about the category’s existence, both by those who categorize (external consensus), and by those who are categorized (internal consensus) as members of that social category (Tajfel, 1978). To a large extent, then, societal reaction theory subsumes deviance as a social categorization process (i.e. labeling) that is followed by a “downward” social mobility process (secondary deviance). That is, certain individuals who previously conceived of themselves as members of the normative majority, would, by the force of social pressures, be led to psychologically and behaviorally join a deviant, lower status, sub-category (cf. Marques, in preparation).

Deviance as a Contribution to Social Cohesion within the Group

In a previous section, we summarized theoretical perspectives that depict deviance in large communities as a process of social differentiation between normative and deviant groups. In the above section, we described evidence showing how members of face to face groups deal with other members who deviate from the group’s modal opinion, or fail to contribute to the achievement of material group goals. However, there is also evidence that large communities deal with deviance in a way analogous to that of small, or face-to-face, groups. This is illustrated in the following documental studies.

 Threat and Dogmatism in Catholic Canons

Rokeach, Toch and Rottman (1960) content-analyzed 403 canons issued by the Roman Catholic Church in 12 councils that took place between the 4th and 16th centuries (from the First Nicea Council, in the 4th century, to the Trent council, in the 16th century). These authors then had judges evaluate the degree of situational threat to the Church at the
time each council took place\(^6\), the level of religious authority invoked by each cannon, and the intensity of punishment prescribed to violators of these cannons. For the 12 councils, Rockeach, Toch and Rottman (1968) created three indexes, respectively, for the intensity of the threatening character to the Roman Catholic Church of the events that precipitated or merely contributed to the councils, the amount of punishment prescribed for violators of the canon, and level of authority invoked by the cannon\(^7\). The rank-order correlations between the three indexes show a significant relationship between threat and punitiveness \((r = .52)\) and between threat and absolutism \((r = .66)\), even though the correlation between punitiveness and absolutism was only \(r = .46\). As Rockeach, Toch and Rottman (1968) stated,

“Undoubtedly, the continued existence of an institution depends upon appropriate responses by its leaders to new situations. An important change in circumstances calls for the corresponding changes in the institution. On the other hand, groups also have to protect themselves against too much change, because beyond a certain point, the group would change itself out of existence. With too much modification, an Anabaptist is transformed into a Mennonite, and a Mennonite into an Amish.” (Rockeach, Toch & Rottman, 1968, p. 386).

Although it appeared from a different tradition, Rockeach, Toch and Rottman’s (1968) study cogently illustrates the major contention of authors whose research was

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\(^6\) For example, the Second Lateran Council, the Constance council, and the Basle council, were among those rated as being held under the higher threat. The Second Lateran Council (1139), was held during the schism that opposed Pope Innocent II to Cardinal Pietro Pierlone’s election as anti-pope, and the Constance (1414-1418) and the Basle (1431-1449) councils accompanied the emergence of Jean Hus’ and Martin Luther’s Reformation. Among those rated to be held under the least threatening conditions was, for example, the First Council of Constantinople (381), that took place as Arianism came to an end, or the First Nicea Council (325), in which the proper date for Easter celebration was debated (Rockeach Toch & Rottman, 1968)

\(^7\) For example, a canon high in authority and punitiveness is “Desiring with the grace of God to protect the recognized possessions of the Holy Roman Church, we forbid under penalty of anathema any military person to invade or forcibly hold Benevento, the city of St. Peter” (Rockeach, Toch & Rottman, 1968, p. 384), whereas another low in authority and punitiveness is “All the poor and those in need of help when travelling shall after an examination be provided with ecclesiastical letters of peace only and not with commendatory letters, because commendatory letters ought to be granted to those persons only who are in high estimation” (id., ib.)
directly inspired by the durkheimian theory of social control. Indeed, all differences considered (and in spite of methodological problems that were, besides, clearly recognized by the authors), Rockeach and colleagues’ findings suggest that group’s tolerance for deviation and tendency to prescribe their members’ behavior is a reverse direct function of the internal or external menaces to their existence.

The Puritan Community of New England

As a case in point, Erikson (1966), an author who is widely recognized as an adherent to the durkheimian tradition, contended that groups define themselves in terms of the norms they prescribe to their members (i.e. their moral boundaries), which distinguish themselves from other communities. Moral boundaries would thus define the identity of those that belong to the community, by prescribing their permissible actions and, hence, also those actions that are not to be tolerated. The normative or deviant quality of actions, or individuals would thus depend much less on their intrinsic attributes than on the current stand of the group regarding the threshold of tolerance for differences in its sphere:

“No deviance is not a property inherent in any particular kind of behavior; it is a property conferred upon that behavior by the people who come into direct or indirect contact with it. The only way an observer can tell whether or not a given style of behavior is deviant, then, is to learn something about the standards of the audience which responds to it.” (Erikson, 1966, p. 6)

The group would be led to narrowing or enlarging its tolerance for non-conformity, depending on whether or not it is at risk to lose its moral identity (Erikson, 1966). Conditions that would require narrowing moral boundaries would be, for example, the realignment of power, the maintenance of the status quo, or the increase of internal cohesiveness in the presence of an external threat.
Based on the above ideas, Erikson (1966) analyzed three cases that took place between 1630 and 1690 in the Puritan community of New England. The first case, known as the Antinomian controversy, dealt with Mrs. Anne Hutchinson’s campaign advocating the uselessness of the clergy as the mediator between God and the individual, in light of the Calvinist principle of the equality of all individuals in the eyes of God. Mrs. Hutchinson’s position was consistent with the Puritan emphasis on the private nature of the relationship between God and the individual, but as the Puritan community established itself as an autonomous colony, “the New England theorists [had begun] to argue that God had entered into a covenant with the people of the colony as a corporate group and was only ready to deal with them through the agencies they had built to govern themselves” (Erikson, 1966, p. 73). Mrs. Hutchinson’s position thus ran counter the new theology that forced the relationship of the individual with God to be mediated, and hence screened by the colony’s administration. Describing the long series of events that lead Mrs. Hutchinson and her husband to trial, and banishment from the colony, and their followers to be punished would be too space consuming and fall beyond our scope. But the way Erikson (1966) summarizes what was at stake in the whole process seems elucidative:

“Although it is convenient to place Mrs. Hutchinson in the center of the Antinomian controversy, […] it is far more important to understand the shifts of mood that made the settlers responsive to her arguments[...] In 1636 the townsfolk of Boston decided to join her […] and, in doing so placed her in the midst of a crucial historical crossroads. […] Massachusetts Bay was a community […] fashioned in the belief that each person was primarily responsible to the promptings of his new conscience […]. The verdict against her was a public statement of the new boundaries of Puritanism in Massachusetts Bay, for in passing sentence on Mrs. Hutchinson the magistrates were declaring […] that the historical stage she had come to represent was now past.” (pp. 106-107).
The second case analyzed by Erikson (1966) was the so-called “Quaker invasion” between 1656 and 1665, and the conflict between the progressive tendency of the Quaker movement (namely the refusal to defer to the religious and political authority) and the conservative Puritan position. The Quaker movement was composed by individuals recently arrived in New England who defended simplicity of life at all costs and who challenged authority in such ordinary acts as the refusal to display signs of respect to superiors or to the church itself. In doing so,

“…the Quakers had ignored a fundamental responsibility by failing to share […] that sense of firm ideological commitment, that willingness to participate fully in the rhythms of group life, the feeling of common heritage and common destiny which gives every society its underlying cohesion.” (Erikson, 1966, p. 130).

Such failure resulted in institutional outbursts of punishment. Besides ordering burning of any Quaker literature, the Puritan officials punished Quaker offences with fines, public beatings, banishment, imprisonment, and stigmatization such as cutting off the offenders’ ears or nose, or iron marking them in the forehead, and these punishments were often supported by the crowds.

The third case analyzed by Erikson (1966), known as the case of the witches of Salem, occurred in 1692, when, following the establishment of the Reformation as a relevant party in the international arena, and the new attitude of England towards the Puritan movement,

“[the settlers] were no longer […] members of that special revolutionary elite who were destined to bend the course of history according to God’s own word. They were only themselves, living alone in a remote corner of the world, and this seemed a modest end for a crusade which had begun with such light expectations […]” (p. 155).
Following an insignificant turn of events, a group of teenage girls began to convince people that they had seen witches and evil spirits. The issue acquired a disproportionate dimension, because the alleged sightings were reported almost everywhere in the village and directed to every person. Eventually, many people whose religious beliefs and allegiance to the community’s ways of life had never been questioned before were imprisoned. Some of these people suffered capital punishment.

According to Erikson (1966), the episode of the witches of Salem was, as were the former two cases, elicited by a threat to the founding beliefs and internal cohesiveness of the Puritan colony either from the inside or from outside the community. The laypeople’s insurgence against the increasing power of the clergy, and the spread of a progressive religious doctrine, found in the Antinomian controversy and the Quaker invasion, were paralleled, in the episode of the witches of Salem, by the political quarrels due to the war against the Indians, and the increasing administrative disorder.

All three cases suggest that, by devoting increased attention to certain issues and/or individuals, and by decreasing tolerance towards particular aspects of these issues and individuals, the group increases the opportunities for normative individuals to be confronted with deviance, and to directly or vicariously participate in punitive action that will strengthen their solidarity with, or commitment to, the group.

*The Lynching Mobs in Nineteenth Century Louisiana*

Inverarity (1976) describes a case with similar consonance, about the significant increase of lynching mobs in Louisiana between 1889 and 1896, after the American Civil War. Black and white small land owners and workers rallied together in the People’s Party, against the large industrial entrepreneurs, merchants and land owners of the southern states. The blurring of racial frontiers by the new focus on the conflict between the poor and the rich land owners, industrials and merchants, was a major breakdown in the
solidarity of white southerners that had been previously sustained by the threats posed to the Southern spirit by the occupation of Louisiana by the Union army, and by the newly established access of blacks to full citizenship.

According to Inverarity (1976), the community found a response to this new threat by increasing the number of informal ritual punishments, the lynching mob. Between 1889 and 1896, 80 blacks and 14 whites were summarily executed at the hands of mobs, with the tacit support of public opinion. Interestingly, these phenomena were more strongly correlated with events such as the proximity of elections, opposing the People’s party to the ruling Democratic party, or to the relationship between the punished act and the political struggle involving the two factions, than to any demographic factor, including increases in the population (Inverarity, 1976).

*The Great Red Scare and the Stalinist Purge*

Other authors, for example Gibson (1988) or Sullivan and colleagues (Sullivan, Piereson, & Marcus, 1979) describe how the *House of Un-American Activities Committee* (HUACC), controlled by the senator Joseph McCarthy at the time of the Great Red Scare of the 1940-1950’s in the United States of America, thousands of individuals suffered disqualification from public job careers, were denied the right to be run in any political election or from serving public duties even if elected for the position. In 22 of the 50 North-American states, 13 million workers – corresponding to about 20% of the country’s work force – were directly or indirectly affected by control measures by the HUACC. These measures resulted in the firing of eleven thousand workers, 100 convictions of anti-Americanism, and 135 citations for contempt. Interestingly enough, McCarthyism emerged as an intragroup normative process exactly at the beginning of the Cold War, in which the United States faced, for the first time in history a potential dangerous enemy.
A similar process is suggested by the so-called “Stalinist Purge” in the years of 1936-1938. Conquest (1968) and Connor (1972) estimate that about four million lives were lost and seven million sent to prison. Whereas in the McCarthyism period the victims proceeded from all social status - from working class persons to scholars or movie directors – in the Stalinist purge, the victims were mainly members of the elite: high officials of the party, people with relationships with foreign countries, industrial engineers or even agents of the NKVD that were considered incompetent in their investigation. However, in both cases, their persecution served the purpose to reaffirm the principles according to which the group (in this case, the large social category) could remain positively differentiated from competing groups.

The War of “Canudos”

We may find yet another example in the “war of Canudos”, that occurred in 1896-1897 in the Brazilian state of Bahia (Levine, 1988). The village of Canudos, was a rural community founded in the late XIXth century by a religious leader known among his followers by the name of António Conselheiro. This leader is nowadays celebrated as “Santo Antônio da Bahia” (Saint Anthony of Bahia). The community of Canudos advocated an alternative way of life, independent from the central government, and from the power of the called “colonels”, a class of land owners that dominated the rural states of Brazil. The Canudos community upheld values such as free property and the religious independence from the dominant clergy laws. For these reasons, the community was increasingly considered as a threat, both to the Catholic Church, and to the newly proclaimed Brazilian Republic (1889), which could hardly subsist without the colonels’ support. The land that the community proclaimed as their own was mostly infertile and abandoned by others, and the influence of the “Canudos” life style over neighbouring communities was objectively irrelevant (Levine, 1988). Nevertheless, the central
government ordered four consecutive military charges that lead to the killing of more than 20 thousand civilians and 5 thousand soldiers. After approximately one year of war, the community and its leaders were defeated and the “moral and religious righteousness” as well as the authority of the new republic were reinsured.

Case studies like the ones reviewed above are, obviously, susceptible to methodological and external validity criticism. Indeed, the documental studies about the structuring role of deviance in specific communities allow, at best, for correlational reasoning (cf. Gibbs & Erikson, 1975), or, as Inverarity (1980) contended,

“Although Erikson successfully translates Durkheim’s argument into researchable problems, he fails to consider the problem of scope. In particular, Erikson offers no explicit criteria for his choice of Puritan Massachusetts as a research site. Consequently, we are left uncertain about the external validity of his conclusion. Do boundary crises produce crime waves only in seventeenth-century Massachusetts, in theocracies in general or in all social systems?” (p. 197).

Indeed, Erikson’s case is supported by other relevant studies about social phenomena whose structural properties are quite different from those present in the cases analyzed by Erikson. Nevertheless, as Inverarity (1980) claims, after an analysis of capital punishment in the U.S.A., McCarthyism, and the Stalinist Soviet Purges, Inverarity (1980) concludes that:

“Other cases could be cited, but the above three should be sufficient to demonstrate the necessity of qualifying Durkheim’s theory, of distinguishing in general terms those kinds of social systems to which it is applicable from those to which it is not” (p. 198).
This qualification certainly applies to the remainder of the above reviewed case studies. However, as far as we are concerned, we believe that the kind of process uncovered by these studies can be relevantly traced to individuals’ sense of membership to their social group and the consequent motivation to uphold a positive identity as group members. A step towards this goal can be found in a study conducted by Lauderdale (1976). In that study, a partial replication of Schachter’s (1951; cf. above) classical experiment, participants were asked to join a discussion group whose task was to recommend correctional treatment to juvenile delinquents. After reading the case of a Johnny Martin, participants were faced with a confederate who behaved in a way similar to the “deviant” confederate in Schachter’s (1951) study. The discussion group was observed by an alleged “criminal justice officer” who, depending on conditions, either blatantly stated to the Experimenter that the group had few chances to succeed in the task (Threat Condition), or, instead, made an irrelevant comment (Non-Threat Condition). Participants were then informed that it would be necessary to reduce the number of members in the group, and were asked to rank each other in terms of their preferences for those to remain in the group as well as to evaluate those members to whom they assigned the highest and the lowest preference ranking. Not surprisingly, Lauderdale (1976) found that, in general, participants gave the confederate the lowest ranking. However, this ranking was significantly lower in the Threat than in the Non-Threat condition. A similar result emerged from evaluations. Although the confederate was systematically evaluated in a less favorable manner than every other member, this evaluation was the least favorable in the Threat condition. These results are consistent with the assumption that deviants are more strongly rejected, and more negatively evaluated when the group is subject to an outside threat than when no threat is present. These results were replicated in a similar set of
experiments by Lauderdale, Smith-Cunnien and Inverarity (1984). Experiments 4 and 5 in this work (see chapters 3 and 4) deal with a very similar question from an intergroup perspective.

*The Medieval Witch Hunting Crusades*

A final illustration of the social function of deviance in reinforcing the moral boundaries of groups comes from Ben-Yehuda’s (1980, 1985; Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1995) study of the witch-hunting moral panics that pervaded Europe in the end of the medieval period. Until the fourteenth century, the Catholic Church’s official position regarding magic and witchcraft was that it was an illusion. At that time, witchcraft was not part of the Church’s agenda, which was far more concerned with the struggle against the Cathari, Albigensian, and Waldense heresies. By the mid of the thirteenth century, the Roman Catholic Church was resolving the internal turmoil of its first centuries of life, and the outside threat that had been posed by the heresies came to an end with the defeat of the Cathari movement, in 1243 (cf. Ben-Yehuda, 1980). From that moment on, the Church started a process that ended with the burning of an estimated two-hundred to five-hundred thousand persons, charged of having consorted with the devil, with the support and applause of the general population (Delumeau, 1978).

In 1326, Pope John XXII issued a bull (*Super illius specula*) in which magicians and sorcerers were, for the first time, accused of consorting with the devil. Between 1428 and 1447, 110 people were executed in the Dauphiné, an event that was concomitant with the emergence of the first documented mass panic related to witches in the Swiss Valais. In 1484, Pope Innocent III elaborated on the art of sorcery (*Summis desiderantis*), and instigated the application of severe punishment measures against sorcerers in the Rhine Valley. Three years later, Dominicans Jacob Sprenger and Heinrich Kramer wrote the well-known *Malleus maleficarum* (“The sorcerers’ mallet”), in which they added to the
long list of heretics that had been drawn by their precursor Nicholas Eymerich (“Handbook of the Inquisitors” – ca. 1376), the new category of sorcerers and witches.

In our view, Ben-Yehuda’s (1980) conclusion deserves to be read, because it clearly establishes the social antecedents, of the public participation in the medieval witch panic, as well as the social psychological functions of such participation:

“In the medieval tradition, the moral boundaries of society were clearly defined. There was Christendom, ruled spiritually by Rome and structured in a uniformly conceived feudal order, firmly embedded in a finite cosmic order ruled by God [...]. In this sense, the witch craze could be called a ‘collective search for identity’ [...] Witches were the only deviants who could be construed as attacking the very core of the social system, through antireligion. [...] What could better explain the strain felt by the individual than the idea that he was part of a cataclysmic, cosmic struggle between the ‘sons of light’ and the ‘sons of darkness’? His personal acceptance of this particular explanation was further guaranteed by the fact that he could assist the ‘sons of light’ in helping to trap the ‘sons of darkness’ – the despised witches – and thus play a real role in ending the cosmic struggle in a way that would bring salvation nearer” (Ben-Yehuda, 1980, pp. 13-16)

Implications for the Study of Deviance in Social Psychology

How does the above reviewed theoretical field relates to research on deviance conducted in the realm of social psychology? One important feature of the above reviewed evidence is that it suggests that punishment of deviants emerges mainly when there is a need to reinforce individuals’ sense of cohesion and commitment to society’s norms. In this vein, this evidence is consistent with, and very clearly illustrates Durkheim’s (1893, 1998) ideas about mechanical solidarity. Specifically, it illustrates the processes according to which social groups increase the uniformity of their members’ behavior and beliefs, and their attachment to the group. Perhaps the citation below, issued from work by another
sociologist (Simmel, 1858/1918), helps one to find an answer to the question with which we initiated this paragraph. As Simmel put it in discussing the phenomenology of group life, every group includes members who generate

“a kind of (...) hostility whose intensification is grounded in a feeling of belonging together, of unity, which by no means always means similarity (...). This hatred is directed against the member of the group, not for personal motives, but because the member represents a danger to the preservation of the group” (Simmel, 1858/1918, pp. 48-49).

In our opinion, this idea subsumes the phenomenology of deviance in face to face groups, the traditional domain of study of this process by classical social psychology. However, the notion of mechanical solidarity and its supporting evidence also suggests that such phenomenology allows groups to maintain internal uniformity and cohesiveness, by reinforcing both the inter-individual ties among their members, and each individual’s ties with the group as a whole.

Uniformity and Deviance in Small Groups

Typically, social psychology has pictured small, or face to face groups, as social units in which individuals directly interact with one another and are associated to each other by common goals and mutual attraction (e.g. Cartwright & Zander, 1968; Levine & Moreland, 1994, 1998; Levine & Thompson, 1996; Shaw, 1976). For example, Shaw (1976, p.10) defined a group as “two or more persons who are interacting with one another in such a manner that each person influences and is influenced by each other person” (p.10). In a similar vein, Jones and Gerard (1967) proposed that a group is “an aggregation of persons [in which] all see their actions as interrelated and their fates to some extent interdependent. The members of a group usually expect that their continued affiliation will provide a means of obtaining desired goals” (p. 713).
The small group approach traditionally stresses the role of group members’ reciprocal influence in the various aspects of group life (e.g. Allport, 1924; Brown, 1988; cf. also Hogg, 1992, 1996; Wilder & Simon, 1998). In fact, two basic assumptions underlie the small group approach. First, social affiliation is moderated by the individuals’ interpersonal similarity and reciprocal attraction (cf. Hogg, 1992, for an extensive review), and/or by their interdependence regarding goal achievement. Second, social affiliation allows for the social validation of individual opinions through the construction and maintenance of group consensus, and helps individuals achieving shared, or complementary, goals (e.g. Backman, 1992; Festinger, Schachter & Back, 1950; Jones & Gerard, 1967; Newcomb, 1961).

*Social Reality and Group Locomotion*

Interdependence among group members importantly refers to the construction and maintenance of the group’s *social reality* (Festinger, 1950). To Festinger (1950), individuals position themselves in the social world according to a subjective assessment of the validity of their beliefs. However, because most beliefs cannot be validated in psychophysical ways, individuals will search for consensus as an alternative source of validation. The group would provide the context in which individuals validate their beliefs, not only about the outside world, but also about themselves, in terms of abilities, competencies, by providing them with a relevant context for social comparison. (e.g. Festinger, 1954; Hyman, 1942), and reciprocal social approval (Kelley, 1952; Lott & Lott, 1965).

A similar phenomenon occurs with respect to the achievement of group goals (e.g. Berkowitz & Howard, 1959; Jones & DeCharms, 1957). Indeed, Festinger (1950) proposed that individuals also affiliate and attempt to ensure unity within the group because, in acting together, they can more easily achieve shared or complementary goals. That is,
groups would have a *locomotion* function. Similarity of beliefs and the commitment of group members to implicitly or explicitly defined courses of action, would enable them to progress towards these goals (Cartwright & Zander, 1968; Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Newcomb, 1961; Thibaut & Strickland, 1956; Zander, 1968).

Clearly, an existing state of interdependence for the validation of the self as well as of other less, yet still, relevant aspects of social reality, would turn any dissent emerging in the group into a more or less dramatic threat to group members, either regarding their worth as individuals, or regarding the accuracy of their views of the world. Dissent would thus generate an unpleasant state of uncertainty (Festinger, 1950; Hogg, 1992). To overcome this state of uncertainty, group members would first attempt to persuade the deviants to join the group’s mainstream, show hostility towards deviants who consistently resist these persuasive efforts, and, ultimately, cast them out of psychological existence by expelling them from the group (cf. Cartwright & Zander, 1968; Israel, 1956, cited by Levine & Thompson, 1996; Levine, 1980).

In brief, social reality and group locomotion would cause groups to devote significant attention at reinforcing consensus and preventing intragroup deviance (Festinger, Schachter & Back, 1950). Each member would be motivated to accept group influence, to endorse group beliefs, and to enforce others to comply with such beliefs (Boyanowsky & Allen, 1973; Burnstein & Vinokur, 1975). Interpersonal interdependence within the group would translate itself in terms of individuals’ reciprocal commitment and consensus as regards fulfillment of such psychological goals and collective achievements. By the same token, interpersonal interdependence would prompt reactions against any forces with a potential to jeopardize the fulfillment of such goals, emerging within the group (see also Cota, Evans, Dion, Kilik & Stewart-Longman, 1995).
Groups would thus develop controlling mechanisms to insure uniformity and the maintenance of reciprocal commitment among group members (Levine & Moreland, 1994). Among these mechanisms, Deutsch and Gerard (1955) distinguished between informational influence and normative influence. Informational influence refers to the private acceptance of other people’s beliefs as a proof of reality. It would fulfill individuals’ motivation to hold a correct view of relevant aspects of the world. Normative influence refers to the public, but not private, acceptance of other people’s beliefs as a means to obtain social approval from these individuals. Its efficacy would thus depend on the anticipation of the negative reactions of other people to one’s dissent, and their consequences, such as status loss, marginalization, or eviction from the group (cf. Cartwright, 1968; Hare, 1962; Janis, 1982; Jones & Gerard, 1967; Levine, 1980; Shaw, 1976).

**Informational and Normative Influences**

Informational influence would correspond to the internalization of standards that are created or assimilated in the course of group life, whereas normative influence would correspond to external constraints that compel individuals to conform to other people’s expectations as a means to avoid the negative effects of deviance (cf. Forsyth, 1990; Kelley & Volkart, 1962; Levine & Thompson, 1996). These two forms of influence would be associated with individuals’ motivations to hold an accurate view of the world, and to obtain social approval from others (cf. Forsyth, 1990; Jones & Gerard, 1967; Moscovici, 1985).

Internalized standards thus correspond to the private, and, to a large extent, “automatic”, endorsement of beliefs that provide individuals with criteria that guide their perception, judgment, and behavior (Jones & Gerard, 1967). As Forsyth (1990) put it, these standards make group members “feel duty bound to adhere to the norms of the group since, as loyal members, they accept the legitimacy of the established norms and recognize the importance of supporting these norms” (p. 163). The private acceptance of norms is thus
related with their subjective validity, that is, the “confidence that some idea, judgment, or action is right (correct, proper, etc.)” (Turner, 1995, p. 562).

In turn, normative influence stands exclusively for the overt compliance with the expectations of other group members. As Marques (in preparation) pointed out, an interesting aspect of normative influence is that it is often cognitively mediated. That is, individuals do not necessarily conform because others directly enforce their compliance. Rather, they conform because they anticipate other members’ negative reactions, and the associated fear of loss in status, rejection, ostracism, etc. (cf. also Archer, 1985; Emler & Reicher, 1994; Levine & Thompson, 1996). Individuals expect fellow group members to conform to relevant group norms, and lack of conformity on the part of these members produces discomfort due to a decrease in the subjective validity of their beliefs. Concomitantly, individuals expect “deprecatory” reactions from other members when they deviate from the group’s standards themselves.

Reactions to Deviance in Small Groups

The above ideas are sustained by a vast body of evidence, from which we shall give but a few representative examples (for an extensive reviews, see, for example, Levine, 1980, and Marques & Páez, 1994). For example, Berkowitz and Howard (1959) had groups of four or five participants appraise an organizational conflict. According to conditions, participants would be rewarded for their work, either on the basis of collective performance, or on the basis of individual performances. In the course of the group discussion, participants learned that one member disagreed with the majority. Results showed that participants rejected this member more as a prospective co-worker, in the collective than in the individual reward condition. In a similar study, Jones and DeCharms (1957) had participants perform a task in groups of five or six, among whom there was a confederate instructed to systematically fail. Again, participants would be rewarded for
their success, either on the basis of the group performance, or on the basis of individual performances. When, after completing the task, participants evaluated each other, they judged the confederate more negatively in the collective than in the individual condition. However, this only occurred when participants attributed the confederate’s failure to lack of effort rather than lack of ability. Together, these studies indicate that deviants elicit more negative reactions from other members, in contexts in which the deviants hinder the positive rewards expected from group performance. This is not the case when rewards are based on individualistic criteria.

As we noticed above, there is a parallel between the material implications of deviance for group achievement, and its implications for the subjective validity of group members’ beliefs. In his well-known “Johnny Rocco” experiment, Schachter (1951) had university students to participate in discussion clubs. Three confederates in the group were instructed, respectively to fully and consistently agree (“modal”), or disagree (“deviant”), or to initially disagree and then increasingly agree (“slider”), with the majority. After the discussion, group members evaluated themselves reciprocally, and appointed each other to functions of varying prestige within the group. Among other things, Schachter observed that, as it became evident that the deviant confederate would not alter his position, participants stopped to communicate with him, rejected him in terms of sociometric choices, and appointed him to the less prestigious position in the group. These results increased as a function of the direct relevance of the discussion topic and of participants involvement with the issue (Schachter, 1951).

In another representative study, Sampson and Brandon (1964) had white participants, who had previously reported themselves to be against racial discrimination, working together in order to reach a solution for a case of delinquency involving a black youth. At the beginning of the group discussion, a confederate disclosed either a prejudiced
or an unprejudiced attitude. In the course of the discussion, the confederate deviated from the majority opinion about the solution to the case. Among other results, participants exerted stronger uniformity pressures and derogated more the unprejudiced than the prejudiced confederate. We may assume that the prejudiced-unprejudiced dimension stood either for a categorical distinction (and hence participants considered the unprejudiced confederate as an ingroup member), or for a dimension of interpersonal similarity (and hence participants considered the confederate as a similar other). In any case, the results suggest that individuals derogate more those deviants with whom they share common characteristics than deviants with whom they have less in common.

In a more recent study, Earle (1986) had groups of four participants discussing whether psychology undergraduates should participate as research subjects at the university. According to conditions, participants were informed either that the discussion was aimed to help each person to form a personal opinion (individual goal) or to help the group reach a consensual conclusion (group goal). A deviant confederate was instructed to systematically give an opinion divergent from that of the majority. Participants then anonymously indicated the extent to which they wished each other to remain in the group in an upcoming discussion. The confederate was more strongly rejected in the group goal than in the individual goal condition.

This result suggests that when individual goals are salient, individuals would reject deviants less, because deviants yield potential informational gain from dialogue. However, when group goals are salient, deviant opinions obstruct consensus, and this is particularly menacing when a relevant value (as opposed to information-seeking) is in order (Earle, 1986; cf. also Goethals & Nelson, 1973; Wiggins, Dill & Schwartz, 1965).
Implications for the Study of Deviance in Contexts in which Social Identity is Relevant

The above reviewed ideas and evidence have important implications to our work. Indeed, the parallel between the exertion of influence in small groups and the societal processes that we outlined in the preceding section seems easy to establish. In spite of the different tasks performed by participants and the different issues involved in experimental settings, the above summarized experiments seem to involve a similar mechanism. This mechanisms stands for the emergence of a punitive attitude towards those individuals who fail to contribute to the group’s reality and/or success. By behaving this way, such individuals disrupt the group’s certainty about relevant aspects of its reality, or show insufficient commitment to the group and the other members. In such conditions, the group reciprocates. This may involve a decrease in commitment to the deviant individuals, the downgrading of these individuals, or even, their eviction from the group (cf. Levine & Moreland, 1994, 1998). In other words, implicit in the reviewed evidence is the idea that punishing reactions by normative members are directed, in the long run, at ascertaining the validity of the group’s relevant beliefs and at reassuring the fulfillment of relevant group goals.

Nevertheless, if we limited ourselves to draw this straightforward analogy between interpersonal processes occurring in small groups and collective processes occurring in the large society, we would run the risk of make what Doise (1986) designated as a reductionism, i.e., explaining a phenomenon that occurs at a higher level (the society), in terms of a process that occurs at a lower level (the small group) of explanation (cf. Marques, in preparation). Our central purpose in the present work is to account for the way derogation of deviants relates to individuals’ social identity concerns. By definition, this purpose does not differentiate between the two levels of “groupness”. Indeed, as Turner (1975) pointed out,
“Any individual defines himself as well as others in terms of his location within a system of social categories - specifically social group memberships - and social identity may be understood as his definition of his own position within such a system.” (Turner, 1975, p.7).

Or, as Tajfel (1982) claimed,

“Social identity is defined as that part of the individuals’ self-concept which derives from their knowledge of their membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance of that membership.” (Tajfel, 1982, p.12).

Therefore, as long as membership to the group is psychologically defined by social identification, the psychological significance of deviance would be the crucial mediator between individuals’ identification with a social group and their reactions to other individuals who disrespect relevant standards, irrespective of whether this group is a large social category (e.g. defined in terms of race or gender, etc.) or a social unit in which a limited number of individuals actually interact with one another.

The above theoretical position is the central tenet of the subjective group dynamics model (Marques & Páez, 1994; Marques, Páez & Abrams, 1998). As this model suggests, in groups whose membership is psychologically defined by a shared, common identity, this identity would be a major aspect of the group’s social reality. Social identification entails the assimilation of the self to the ingroup’s representation. As a result, it would directly generate the perception of interdependence between ingroup members, in order to establish a positive social identity (Marques & Páez, 1994). In this psychological context, individuals should expect other ingroup members to contribute to a positive social identity. Social identity would function as a unique (perhaps, the single relevant) aspect of social reality. *Positive* social identity would thus be a major (perhaps, the ultimate) group goal (cf. also Marques, Páez & Abrams, 1998).
The above assumptions are central to the subjective group dynamics model. This model is deeply rooted in the principles of the social identification approach. Therefore, it is important to review such principles in order to better understand that model.

The Social Identification Approach

_Social Categorization, Social Identity, and Intergroup Behavior_

The social identification approach was developed as an account for the conditions in which individuals represent themselves and others as members of social categories and for the consequence of this process in terms of social identity and social comparison (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, 1975). It deals with the way individuals construe social situations so that their behavior is structured by their sense of membership to a social category, rather than by their personal, idiosyncratic characteristics.

_Intergroup Behavior and Self-Stereotyping_

According to Tajfel (1978), social behavior ranges along a continuum from _interpersonal_ to _intergroup_ behavior. Interpersonal behavior would correspond to “any social encounter between two or more people [that] is determined by the personal relationships between the individuals and by their respective individual characteristics”. Conversely, intergroup behavior would be “determined by [individuals’] membership in different social groups or categories” (Tajfel, 1978, p. 41).

Interestingly, the conception of social behavior to be found in the small group approach is closer to Tajfel’s definition of interpersonal than of intergroup behavior. This is not so much because, in most instances of research in small groups, the outgroup is

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8 Although, as we shall see in the “Subjective Group Dynamics” section, below, it also presents important departures from that approach.
objectively absent from the picture, but rather because, as we mentioned earlier in this work, this research considers that the main antecedents of social affiliation are the personal characteristics or motives of individuals that lead them to affiliate themselves to the group.

Turner (1984) elaborated on the continuum proposed by Tajfel (1978), with the notion of self-stereotyping, which he defined as the

“cognitive re-definition of the self - from unique attributes and individual differences to shared social category memberships and associated stereotypes - that mediates group behaviours.” (p.528).

The individuals’ notion of their group membership thus depends on the specification of a set of characteristics common to all group members that, in a context of social comparison, allow differentiating them from relevant contrasting outgroups (Turner et al, 1987).

**Social Comparison, Ingroup Favoritism, and Ingroup Bias**

One important consequence of self-stereotyping is that it converts a positive orientation towards the self into a positive orientation towards the ingroup, that is, into *ingroup favoritism*. Turner (1981) defined ingroup favoritism as

“any tendency to favour ingroup over outgroup members on perceptual, attitudinal or behavioural dimensions. It includes partisan intergroup attitudes, sociometric preferences for the ingroup, discriminatory intergroup behaviour and more favourable evaluations of the products and performances of the ingroup than the outgroup.” (Turner, 1981, p.66).

Ingroup favoritism characteristically emerges from situations that involve a direct comparison between the ingroup and a relevant outgroup, or between their respective

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9 The social identification approach is a major topic in contemporary social psychology. In the same way we did with respect to the durkheimian and the small group approaches, we will focus exclusively on those aspects that bear direct implications to our subject matter.
members. The most representative of such kind of situations in social identity research is the *minimal group paradigm* (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy & Flament, 1971). Typically, participants are put in a situation in which the only relationship they have with each other is their membership to the same or to opposite groups in which they have been (unknowingly to them) arbitrarily included, on the basis of some (purportedly relevant) criterion of categorization (e.g. artistic preferences, answers to a bogus test, etc.). Following the categorization, participants are usually asked to perform some task (e.g. assigning money rewards, or points to, or judging the favorability of, ingroup and outgroup stimuli, in terms of performances, attitudes, personality traits, etc.) that has no direct relationship to the categorization. Also typically, the outcome of this task has no personal implications to the participants, so that every potential intervening variable other than the participants’ and the targets’ group membership, is controlled for, or eliminated. The minimal group paradigm thus creates the conditions required to observe how intergroup comparison works to generate pure intergroup judgments. The consistent pattern of results observed in experiments that employ the minimal group paradigm is that participants generate the greatest possible positive differentiation between the ingroup and the outgroup, or their respective members. This pattern of responses is generally known as *ingroup bias* (Tajfel, 1978; cf. also Brewer, 1979; Brewer & Cramer, 1985; Tajfel, 1982; Turner, 1981, for reviews). Ingroup bias indicates that, in contexts of social comparison, group members strive to maximize the positive difference between the value they assign to the ingroup and the value that they assign to the outgroup.

In short, intergroup comparison settings generally lead individuals to assimilate the self to the ingroup category, to develop ingroup favoring attitudes, and to attempt to maximize the positive difference between ingroup and outgroup (cf. Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner et al, 1987; see, also, e.g. Hinkle &
Brown, 1990 for a discussion of exceptions). However, it seems logical to suppose that the cognitive construction of the social categories that prompt the emergence of the above mentioned processes takes precedence over these processes. This justifies the significant attention devoted by self-categorization theory to the *metacontrast principle* (Turner et al, 1987).

**Self-Categorization Theory**

Self-categorization theory ensued from social identity theory with the specific purpose of establishing the interplay between the social context in which intergroup relations take place and the cognitive processes that sustain such relations (e.g. Oakes, Haslam & Turner, 1994). Its core assumption is that the basic motivation underlying social categorization is the construction of cognitive clarity in social stimulus settings (e.g. Oakes, Haslam & Turner, 1994). The important notions associated with this theory are *comparative fit*, the *metacontrast principle*, and *normative fit*.

**Comparative Fit, the Metacontrast Principle, and Normative Fit**

Self-categorization theory strongly focused itself on social identity theory’s assumption that individuals are motivated to achieve a clear-cut representation of their social identity, by exaggerating intergroup differences and intragroup similarities (e.g. Tajfel, 1969, 1978). This idea first emerged in terms of the well-known *perceptual accentuation* process (Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963), an inductive judgmental process according to which stimulus arrays that emerge in association with opposite category-labels are perceived as more different from each other than if no such association existed. Perceptual accentuation allows individuals to construe continuous stimulus properties in terms of discrete categories, and is at the basis of categorization (Bruner, 1957; Tajfel, 1969).

Self-categorization theorists (Oakes, Haslam & Turner, 1994; Turner et al, 1987) developed the above idea with the notion of *comparative fit*. Comparative fit corresponds to
the match between the properties of the stimuli present in a context of judgment and the category-labels that, being accessible to the individual, better contribute to construe the situation in terms of an opposition between categories (Oakes, Haslam & Turner, 1994). Thus, in a given social setting, individuals will begin by appraising whether the characteristics of the people involved match a cognitively accessible categorical opposition that is susceptible to provide a clear cut definition of these people in terms of their memberships to the opposite categories.

The above process corresponds to what Turner and colleagues (1987; cf. also Hogg, 1992; Hogg & McGarty, 1990) designated as the metacontrast process. Assuming that the salient attributes (e.g. skin color, attitudinal positions, etc.) of relevant individuals in a judgmental setting fit into an accessible categorical opposition (e.g. “black people vs. white people”, “pro-abortionists vs. anti-abortionists”, etc.), the metacontrast process would led perceivers to ascertain whether, on the basis of these salient attributes, inter-category differences would be, on the average, higher than intra-category differences (cf. also Marques, Páez & Abrams, 1998). If this were the case, such categorical opposition would become informative, in that it would allow to construe the situation in terms of clear-cut differences between two groups of people (Oakes, Haslam & Turner, 1995). In this case, the situation would also allow defining, for each group, the attribute values (e.g., perceived intensities of skin pigmentation, or intensities of pro- and anti-abortion attitudes) that better summarized, in the whole, the similarities between members of the same group and, at the same time, the differences between the two groups. Group members who held these attribute values would be in position to represent their respective groups, i.e., to define the most clear-cut possible contrast between the two groups. Their positions would correspond to the group’s prototypes (Turner et al, 1987).
The metacontrast principle thus appears highly functional, in that it allows condensing the wide array of individual differences into a simple distinction between opposing category prototypes. From this moment on, perceivers will appraise the degree of correspondence between group members and the attribute values that represent their respective categories. In other words, perceivers will expect a normative fit between the attributes of group members and the prototypical specifications of their respective categories. Where normative fit existed, perceiver would continue to focus on the established intergroup contrast. In contrast, low normative fit should decrease the cognitive clarity of intergroup differences. In this case, perceivers would switch to alternative categorizations that better account for the stimulus setting (Oakes, Haslam & Turner, 1994).

Comparative fit and normative fit are thus two crucial components of social interaction, both in terms of the way individuals conceive of social reality in specific social settings, and in terms of their behavior in such settings. As Oakes, Haslam and Turner (1994; cf. also Oakes, Haslam & Turner, 1998) pointed out,

“Since the internal structure of a social category, the relative representativeness of members, naturally varies with the comparative context, these aspects of its […] content will vary likewise. As […] different dimensions of social comparison become relevant, redefining the basis of relative prototypicality, the judgment of the category as a whole will change. […] Comparative and normative fit are therefore interactive and inseparable.” (p. 123).

The Metacontrast Principle and Referent Information Influence

The metacontrast principle would not be limited to this cognitive simplification process, though. It also fulfils a self-regulatory function (cf. Hogg & Abrams, 1988, 1993). By assimilating themselves to their group’s prototype, individuals would commit
themselves to the ingroup-typical criteria of judgment and behavior (cf. also Turner & Hogg, 1987). This would explain how the salience of social identity generates a feeling of interdependence and similarity between ingroup members and increases the uniformity of their behavior (Turner, 1991). Social behavior would therefore ensue from this shared feeling of identification to a group, rather than from interpersonal similarity, opinion convergence, or coincidence of personal goals. It follows that the crucial role assigned by classic small group theory and research to informational and normative influence in creation of uniformity within the group would be replaced by the impact of individuals’ assimilation to the ingroup prototype on their behavior as group members (Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Turner, 1991; Turner, Wetherell & Hogg, 1989). As they assimilate to the prototype, individuals would incorporate the ingroup norms that distinguish the ingroup from the outgroup, and therefore, would behave in line with the ingroup’s prototype. This would correspond to an influence process which directly ensues from the ingroup as a reference for behavior. Such behavior would be primarily directed at ensuring the persisting and clear-cut differentiation from the outgroup rather than at simply holding an accurate view of reality or obtaining approval from others (cf. Abrams, Wetherell, Cochrane, Hogg & Turner, 1990, for a set of studies illustrative of this process). This is why Turner (1991; Hogg & Turner, 1987) designated it as referent information influence, as opposed to the dichotomy between informational and normative influence that had been widely accepted by small group theory and research.

Implications for the Interplay between Self-Categorization and Deviance

In brief, comparative fit should provide individuals with the judgmental and behavioral criteria that allow for the most effective and clear-cut description of social settings in terms of contrasting categories. In addition, normative fit should define the extent to which any existing intragroup differences and intergroup similarities allow for a
given categorization to remain effective or, alternatively, to be replaced by another who better accounts for the stimuli present in a social situation.

Importantly to our concerns, comparative fit would define the extent to which group members may deviate from their groups’ prototype while still being perceived as members in those groups. For example, if individuals who had been first categorized as members of one category (e.g. “anti-abortionists”) started to display characteristics that drove them enough away from their category’s prototypes (e.g. distributing pro-abortion leaflets), they would be included in the other category, rather than being viewed as “anti-abortionist deviants”. This would stand for a phenomenon close to defection (cf. Levine, Moreland & Hausmann, 2005). Concomitantly, normative fit would define the extent to which deviance, as a form of intragroup differentiation, would be conceivable from the standpoint of self-categorization theory. Assuming that lack of fit to the prototypical specifications of the group would lead perceivers to switch to an alternative intergroup dimension, deviance, as an intragroup event leading to punishment reactions, or negative appraisals of ingroup members would hardly be conceivable from a straightforward reading of self-categorization theory. Indeed, if both pro-abortionists and anti-abortionists started to distribute anti-abortion and pro-abortion leaflets indiscriminately, the pro- vs. anti-abortionist categorization would cease to fulfill its function of providing perceivers with a clear-cut representation of social reality (cf. Oakes, Haslam & Turner, 1994), and the distribution of leaflets would no longer be viewed in line of the specifications attached to that categorization. As Oakes, Haslam, and Turner, (1994) put it, from self-categorization theory’s standpoint,

“the only instances (...) where intergroup attraction may be negative are: (1) where a specific ingroup member is highly non-prototypical; this is relatively rare, since categorisation of individuals as ingroup members accentuates their prototypicality, and highly non-prototypical ‘members’ are
likely to be categorised as outgroupers or non-ingroupers; (2) where the ingroup prototype is perceived to be highly negative” (p. 123).

However, there are many situations in social life in which individuals are faced with members of their group whose actions clearly deviate from tolerable limits, and yet they cannot be re-categorized as outgroup members, or in which the situation cannot be reconstructed according to an alternative dimension of categorization. In such circumstances, ingroup deviants may attract negative evaluations while encouraging attempts of normative members to reinforce the subjective validity of their social identity. Research on the black sheep effect (e.g. Marques, 1990; Marques & Paez, 1994; Marques, Yzerbyt & Leyens, 1988) supports this idea which, we believe, is consistent with the durkheimian perspective that we presented above.

Subjective Group Dynamics

As we stated above, the model of subjective group dynamics was inspired by an attempt to solve a number of apparent inconsistencies between evidence on the black sheep effect and assumptions of self-categorization theory. Specifically, the black sheep effect shows that individuals can strongly differentiate between normative and deviant ingroup members while, simultaneously, differentiating between ingroup and outgroup as a whole. This fact is problematic in light of self-categorization theory’s principles. As we saw above, the theory clearly states that the operation of comparative and normative fit necessarily generate a functional antagonism between levels of categorization (Oakes, Haslam & Turner, 1984), so that individuals cannot apply to a superordinate level of categorization (e.g. “pro-abortionists” vs. “anti-abortionists”) simultaneously with an internal differentiation within the categories existing at that level (e.g. “male and female pro-abortionists” vs. “male and female anti-abortionists”).
The term black sheep effect was coined by Marques (1986, Marques, Yzerbyt & Leyens, 1988) to describe how people upgrade likable ingroup members and downgrade unlikable ingroup members, relative to comparable outgroup members. According to Marques, Yzerbyt and Leyens (1988), likable ingroup members contribute positively to the overall positive image of the ingroup, and thus their evaluation relative to outgroup members reflects an ingroup bias. In turn, unlikable ingroup members contribute negatively to the overall image of the ingroup. This would be reflected in the derogation of ingroup deviants relative to comparable outgroup members.

![Figure 2.1. Attractiveness of Likable, Unlikable and Unqualified targets as a function of Group Membership (Adapted from Marques et al, 1988: Experiment 1).](image)

This idea was supported in a series of studies conducted by Marques and colleagues. In one illustrative study, Marques, Yzerbyt, and Leyens (1988, Experiment 1) had Belgian students evaluate “Belgian students”, “North African students”, “Likable
Belgian students”, “Likable North African students”, “Unlikable Belgian students”, and “Unlikable North African students”. Participants’ evaluations of ingroup and outgroup targets did not differ significantly when their “quality” as group members was unspecified (i.e. Belgian Students and North African Students). However, participants judged Likable Belgian Students more favorably than Likable North African Students, whereas Unlikable Belgian Students were judged more unfavorably than Unlikable North African Students (see Figure 2.1.)

In their next study, Marques, Yzerbyt and Leyens (1988, Experiment 2) had Belgian students evaluate ingroup or outgroup members on one of two dimensions of behavior relevant to student life on the university campus. One dimension applied equally to ingroup and outgroup: “Belgian (vs. Moroccan) students who always lend their course notes to fellow students”, or, “Belgian (vs. Moroccan) students who never lend their course notes to fellow students” (Superordinate Norm condition). The other dimension applied only to the ingroup: “Belgian (vs. Moroccan) students who preferred to participate in parties at university clubs, instead of staying at home to work”, or, “Belgian/Moroccan students who preferred to stay at home to work, instead of participating in parties at university clubs” (Ingroup-Specific Norm condition). The results revealed that participants in the superordinate norm condition judged likable ingroup and outgroup members equally favorably, and judged unlikable ingroup and outgroup members equally unfavorably. In other words, the targets’ Belgian or Moroccan group membership did not seem to matter to participants, who exclusively focused on whether these targets’ behavior was consistent or inconsistent with the superordinate, student, norm. In the ingroup-specific norm condition, participants judged likable and unlikable ingroup members as favorably and as unfavorably as in the superordinate norm condition. However, judgments of likable and unlikable
outgroup members were significantly less extremely differentiated (see also Marques & Páez, 1994).

In a second set of experiments, Marques and Yzerbyt (1988) had Law students listening to two tape-recorded speeches and rating the speakers and their "discursive ability" Whereas in one study (Marques & Yzerbyt, 1988, Experiment 1) the speaker’s group (Law vs Philosophy student) was a within-subject factor, and the performance of the speaker (Good vs Poor) was a between-subjects factor, in the other study (Marques & Yzerbyt, 1988, Experiment 2), speakers’ group membership was a between-subjects factor and speech performance was a within-subject factor. Regardless of whether the experimental situation evoked an intergroup comparison (Experiment 1) or an intragroup comparison (Experiment 2), participants upgraded the good ingroup speaker relative to the good outgroup speaker, and derogated the bad ingroup speaker relative to the bad outgroup speaker. However, when at the end of each experiment, participants were asked to evaluate ingroup’s and outgroup’s average speech ability, in both experiments, they considered the ingroup to be significantly better than the outgroup on this dimension.

In another study, Marques (1990) had students of a military school rank a set of norms issued from the code of military students from most to least important. Participants then evaluated a fellow student who consistently complied with, and another, who consistently failed to comply with either the four most relevant, or the four most irrelevant norms. Half of the participants were instructed to evaluate students of their own school (Ingroup condition) whereas the other half were instructed to evaluate students of another military school (Outgroup condition). Marques (1990) predicted and found that, when the norms were relevant, participants would evaluate normative ingroup members and counter-normative ingroup members respectively more favorably and more unfavorably than their outgroup counterparts. This result was not significant when the norms were irrelevant.
Implications of the Black Sheep Effect for the Process of Intergroup Differentiation

The studies reviewed above have three interesting implications. First, they suggest a correlation between positive ingroup differentiation, as shown by Marques and Yzerbyt’s (1988) finding that participants upgraded likable ingroup members and derogated unlikable ingroup members as compared to similar outgroup members while, at the same time, judging the ingroup more favorably than the outgroup as a whole. This relationship was replicated by Marques, Robalo and Rocha (1992, Experiment 2). In that experiment, participants evaluated ingroup and outgroup as whole, and likable and unlikable ingroup or outgroup members on the same set of judgmental dimensions. The results showed that upgrading of likable ingroup members and derogation of unlikable ingroup members relative to outgroup members, and more positive evaluations of the ingroup than the outgroup occurred on exactly the same judgmental dimensions. Branscombe, Wann and Noel (1994) found similar results and showed that participants who identified with the ingroup, judged a “loyal” or a “disloyal” ingroup member, respectively, more favourably and more unfavourably than a loyal or a disloyal outgroup member, respectively. This did not happen for participants whose ingroup identification was weak.

The second implication, is that derogation of ingroup deviants occurs mainly on those dimensions that are, in the eyes of participants, relevant criteria of positive ingroup differentiation (Marques, Yzerbyt & Leyens, 1988, Experiment 2; Marques, 1990), a result that reminds one of Durkheim’s claim that punishment of deviants occurs mainly when deviance offends the “strong states of the collective mind” (cf. above). This result supports the idea that individuals expect fellow group members to conform to relevant group norms, and lack of conformity on the part of these members produces discomfort due to a decrease in the subjective validity of their beliefs on positive ingroup differentiation. In derogating ingroup deviants, normative members would subjectively enforcing normative solidarity
for the purpose of enhancing and protecting a positive social identity. In more inconsequential situations, for instance when the deviants are outgroup members, or when ingroup members’ deviance emerges on dimensions unimportant to social identity, individuals’ reactions to these members would be less extreme.

The third implication of evidence on the black sheep effect bears with the basic principles of self-categorization theory. This evidence shows that individuals are less attracted to unlikable ingroup members than to outgroup members, likable or unlikable, while showing more favourable attitudes towards likable ingroup than outgroup members. This general pattern can hardly be assigned only to the operation of comparative and normative fit. In some of the above reviewed studies, there was strong intergroup rivalry (e.g. Branscombe, Wann & Noel, 1994; Marques, Robalo & Rocha, 1992) or prejudice (e.g. Marques, Yzerbyt & Leyens, 1988). It is likely that, in these studies unlikable outgroup members present strong normative fit. However, unlikable ingroup members would present, to say the least, weak normative fit.

As a result, based on the operation of normative fit, one could expect that participants showed a more favourable attitude to likable and unlikable ingroup members than to likable and unlikable outgroup members, respectively. In this case, the intergroup dimension would have been more salient than the likability dimension, and fit applied to the former dimension. Alternatively, if fit applied to the likability dimension more than to the intergroup dimension, participants would have shown more favourable attitudes to likable members than unlikable members, irrespective of their group membership. In this case, target characteristics did not normatively fit the intergroup dimension, and perceivers would have switched from this dimension to the likability dimension.

Clearly, the above reasoning does not match results obtained in the black sheep effect studies. Indeed, the black sheep effect suggests that perceivers do not restrain
themselves to differentiate between ingroup and outgroup prototypes. This idea is reinforced by two facts. On the one hand, individuals differentiate ingroup and outgroup as a whole, while internally differentiating their likable and unlikable members. To account for this result in terms of the single operation of the metacontrast principle, one would have to suppose that participants switched back and forth between levels of categorisation, from judgments of group members, to intergroup differentiation judgments. On the other hand, individuals can upgrade likable ingroup members and derogate unlikable ingroup members as compared to their outgroup correlatives, both in intergroup settings and in intragroup settings (Marques & Yzerbyt, 1988). Intragroup settings, by definition, endow the likability dimension with strong comparative fit, particularly if judgments are made within the ingroup (cf. Marques & Paez, 1994; Marques, Páez & Abrams, 1998). If comparative fit alone explained participants’ judgments, then, participants should differentiate equally strongly between likable and unlikable ingroup members as they did between likable and unlikable outgroup members.10

The Subjective Group Dynamics Model

From the above reasoning, it follows that the black sheep effect and self-categorization theory’s metacontrast principle need to be theoretically articulated. On the one hand, the black sheep effect’s basic assumption is that derogation of ingroup deviants ensues from individuals’ strong identification with their group, and consequent motivation to uphold a positive ingroup differentiation. In this aspect, the black sheep effect is consistent with self-categorization theory’s central tenets. On the other hand, the pattern of judgments that corresponds to the black sheep effect appears inconsistent with the core

10 In partial support of this idea, Marques and Yzerbyt (1988) found that judgments of likable and unlikable members of the same group were more differentiated than were judgments of similar members, in intergroup comparison settings. However, this difference still allowed for the black sheep effect to significantly emerge from both kinds of comparison settings (cf. Marques & Yzerbyt, 1988, Experiments 1-2).
predictions of self-categorization theory, according to which individuals strive to increase intergroup differentiation while decreasing intragroup differences. The notion of subjective group dynamics was largely encouraged by an attempt at solving this apparent inconsistency.

*Figure 2.2. Subjective group dynamics. In Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg (2001, p. 414).*

The notion of subjective group dynamics is founded on three core ideas. First, deviance may help legitimating the positive social identity of normative ingroup members. Second, these members’ reactions to intragroup deviance must be understood in the more general context of intergroup relations. Third, these reactions are the expression of the individual’s cognitive representation of the social order. We hope that the theoretical roots
of these ideas can now be easily traced back to the theoretical contexts that we reviewed until now.

The model proposes that individuals’ reactions toward ingroup deviance involve two distinct, but interrelated processes. In relevant social contexts, individuals will, firstly, attempt to establish a clear-cut difference between ingroup and outgroup (the metacontrast process), and will assimilate themselves to the representation of the ingroup (self-stereotyping). As proposed by social identity theory, this cognitive construction of the situation as an intergroup context will motivate individuals to achieve and to maintain a positive ingroup representation. Individuals will thus focus exclusively on intergroup differences in search for positive differentiation of the ingroup as a whole by comparison with the contrasting outgroup (Tajfel, 1978). This intergroup differentiation process would be satisfactorily concluded if positive ingroup distinctiveness was achieved with no emergence of any relevant intragroup differentiation in the judgmental context. In this case, individuals would achieve a sense of legitimated positive social identity. (Marques, Abrams & Páez, 1998), as illustrated in the upper part of the model of Figure 2.2.

However, there can be situations in which ingroup deviance by ingroup members may become salient. For example, certain ingroup members may display characteristics or behavior that contradict ingroup standards (crooked politicians who are prominent members of one’s own party, traitors to one’s cause, or otherwise socially undesirable ingroup members would be illustrative) and therefore be perceived as a menace against the legitimacy of the ingroup’s superior position. Self-stereotyping generates a subjective full interdependence with the ingroup, which transforms self and ingroup into interchangeable, completely equivalent psychological objects. As a result, the deviants will be perceived as a menace to the self, and will trigger responses intended to restore the threatened subjective validity of the standards that legitimize the positive value assigned to the
ingroup. Obviously, the most direct way to restore such subjective validity would be by showing disagreement with, and rejection of, those who oppose them. Roughly, this corresponds to the lower part of the model displayed in Figure 2.2.

In support of this idea, Marques et al (1998, Experiment 4) categorized participants in two groups (X and Y), supposedly according to their reasoning about a murder case. Participants were asked them to rank-order six characters involved in that case, from most to least responsible by the murder. They were informed that a norm existed, according to which people who belonged to their category should rank the characters in a given order (which was always the order each participant had chosen), whereas people who belonged to the outgroup category should choose the opposite ranking order. Participants were then asked to evaluate ingroup or outgroup members who had, supposedly, follow their respective groups’ ranking norm and another ingroup or outgroup member who deviated from the prescribed ranking order. Importantly, participants were to report their identification with ingroup and outgroup categories, both immediately after they were categorized (pre-identification) and after they evaluated the normative and deviant ingroup or outgroup members (post-identification). Not surprisingly, participants reported higher ingroup than outgroup identification both before and after they judged the target group members. In addition, they evaluated normative ingroup members more favorably than the ingroup deviant, and, the outgroup deviant member more favorably than outgroup normative members. But, the most interesting result is that derogation of deviant ingroup members significantly mediated between the two measures of ingroup identification. The more participants identified with the ingroup as compared to the outgroup immediately after the categorization, the more they derogated members who deviated from ingroup norms as compared to ingroup normative members, and the more they derogated these members, the more they reinforced their identification with the ingroup. This result clearly
supports the idea that derogation of ingroup deviants reinforces individuals’ solidarity with their group.

*Descriptive and Prescriptive Norms*

Marques, Páez and Abrams (1998) proposed that intergroup differentiation and intragroup differentiation stem from different normative processes, which entail, respectively, a *denotative* and a *prescriptive* focus on the part of perceivers. According to these authors, descriptive norms allow individuals to differentiate between groups, in that they provide the criteria for category inclusion (race, gender, nationality, for example). Descriptive norms are denotative tools individuals use in order to recognize the features that allow them to impose labels on targets of judgment by reference to these targets’ membership categories (e.g. a “white person”, a “woman”, a “Portuguese person”). In turn, prescriptive norms are endowed with a moral character. They do not allow to establish the category membership of the persons to whom they apply, because, by definition they “ought” to apply to everyone, but they allow to judge whether these persons are “good” or “bad” (cf. Cialdini, Kallgreen & Reno, 1991; Cialdini & Trost, 1998; Forsyth, 1990). As Marques, Abrams and Serôdio (2001) suggested,

> “one ought to wear the kippah at the Shabbat whether one is Jewish or not, and one should not wear shoes in a Mosque whether one is Muslim or not. These norms thus do not function as criterion attributes for defining group membership, as in the case of other norms. They correspond more to societal norms because they involve generic values and standards of conduct.” (p. 437).

A good example of a prescriptive norm is the norm of loyalty to the group (cf. Cooley, 1902; Levine, Moreland & Hausmann, 2005). To perceivers, the fact that an individual is loyal or disloyal to their group is not diagnostic of the individual’s group membership. However, it is highly diagnostic of the individual’s “moral character”. 
In other words, descriptive norms would help defining relevant contrasts between social categories (cf. Turner et al., 1987). In turn, prescriptive norms, with their injunctive, moral, character, would function as generic evaluation criteria. As Durkheim (1912) would put it, descriptive norms would be utilitarian devices that provide individuals with frames of reference that allow them to guide their behavior and adapt to their objective environments. They would to a large extent correspond to what Miller and Prentice (1996) designated as “local standards”, i.e., judgmental and behavioral anchors that help individuals to extract meaning from initially ambiguous situations. In turn, prescriptive norms would carry intrinsic social value. Therefore, prescriptive norms would reflect the operation of social control mechanisms at the psychological level (Marques, in preparation). To a large extent, then, subjective group dynamics would be, itself, the outcome of the interiorization of social control by the individual (Mead, 1918, 1925, 1934; Vigotsky, 1977, 1997; cf. Marques, in preparation).

Marques et al (1998) analyzed the interplay between the descriptive and prescriptive norms in the subjective group dynamics process in a series of experiments. In one of those experiments, Marques et al (1998, Experiment 3) had participants examining a murder case, purportedly as part of a research on jury decision-making. Participants were informed that two opposite decision-making patterns (X and Y) existed, and, purportedly as a means to determine to which pattern they belonged, they were asked to write a short account of the way they appraised the case. Participants then ranked the six characters involved in the case, in terms of their responsibility for victim’s death. In a second session, one week later, participants were informed that, according to the contents of their written account (but not according to their ranking), they belonged to one pattern. They were reminded of their own rankings and presented with the rankings made by five other ingroup or outgroup members. Participants were then divided in two conditions. In one condition
(norm condition), participants were informed that a norm existed according to which those who belonged to their pattern should rank the characters in a defined order (which was always similar to the participant’s ranking), and that members of the opposed pattern should show the reverse ranking, and, importantly, it was made clear that rankings were not a criterion for defining membership to a pattern. In another condition (no norm condition), intragroup norms were not mentioned. Participants were then presented with the responses of five ingroup or five outgroup members. Ingroup members’ rankings were constructed such that four ingroup members (normative members) displayed exactly the same response, and one ingroup member (deviant member) displayed a response similar but not identical to the outgroup. In the outgroup condition, this pattern of information was reversed. Finally, participants judged the normative and deviant group members as well as their group as a whole.

Marques and colleagues (1998) predicted and found that participants judged the ingroup more favorably than the outgroup as a whole, irrespective of the experimental conditions. In addition, when no mention to norms had been made, normative and deviant ingroup members were always judged more favorably than outgroup members. However, when participants were made aware of prescriptive ingroup or outgroup norms they judged ingroup or outgroup members who attuned to the prescriptive ingroup norm more favorably than those who opposed it.

In a similar study, Marques, Abrams, Páez & Taboada (1998, Experiment 2) examined another way in which individuals adopt a prescriptive focus. The procedure was similar to that of the summarized above study, except that all participants were aware of the prescriptive norm. Moreover, half of the participants were informed that their evaluations of other members would be, later, scrutinized either by ingroup members or by outgroup members. The authors reasoned that accountability to ingroup members should
increase participants’ prescriptive focus and that this would be reflected in their judgments of normative and deviant members. Consistent with this reasoning, participants derogated deviant ingroup members more strongly when they were made accountable to the ingroup than the outgroup. In addition, when they were accountable to the ingroup, participants differentiated the ingroup from the outgroup as a whole more strongly than when they were accountable to the outgroup. Together with the results of the preceding study, evidence collected by Marques and colleagues suggests that in the absence of a prescriptive focus, individuals are concerned only with generating positive ingroup distinctiveness. However, prescriptive focus leads individuals to strongly differentiate between those who support and those who do not support the ingroup norm, while simultaneously, positively differentiating the ingroup from the outgroup as a whole.

Marques et al (1998) did not explore this aspect of their data. However, their results illustrate a relevant aspect of normative thinking. Participants in the Marques et al’s (1998, Experiment 2) study showed stronger ingroup bias and derogated ingroup deviants more when they knew that their judgments would be scrutinized by other individuals. This result might be viewed as a case for normative influence (cf. above). However, such an interpretation seems to be inadequate for two reasons. First, participants did not act in the same way when they knew that the scrutinizers were outgroup members. Second, even when the scrutinizers were ingroup members, normative influence would hardly be effective, because participants were entirely aware of the anonymity of their judgments, and they did not expect any interaction with these ingroup members. In brief, these results suggest that participants acted not only on the basis of their expectancies about the desirable behaviour of target ingroup members, thus upgrading normative individuals and derogating the deviants, but also that they acted on the basis of what they thought were the expectancies of other members regarding their judgments. Although we recognize the
speculative character of this reasoning, if it nevertheless applied, then the process uncovered by Marques et al (1998) in this experiment would present a strong parallel with Durkheim’s contention that normative individuals define themselves by their solidarity with the collective mind. To put it in the words of Cooley, the participants seem to have experienced a sense of

“the pains and inconveniences of non-conformity […] the source of the pain appearing to be a vague sense of deprecatory curiosity which one imagines that he will excite. His social self-feeling is hurt by an unfavourable view of himself that he attributes to others.” (Cooley, 1902/1992, pp. 293-294).

Furthermore, results reported by Marques, Abrams, Páez and Taboada (1998) suggest that denotative and prescriptive norms simultaneously operate in judgments of groups and their members. As was the case with evidence on the black sheep effect, these results cannot be accounted for simply in terms of the operation of the metacontrast principle. As we suggested above, a salient intergroup dimension would lead participants to assimilate ingroup and outgroup members to their respective prototypes. In turn, salience of prescriptive intragroup norms, should decrease the salience of intergroup differentiation, and this should be mirrored by participants’ judgments of ingroup and outgroup as a whole. This was not the case. For example, reinforcement of prescriptive intragroup focus reinforced intergroup differentiation, as shown in Marques and colleagues’ (1998) Experiment 4. This result in particular suggests that when prescriptive norms are salient, individuals simultaneously value intergroup distinctiveness and ingroup normativity. This idea is also consistent with Durkheim’s (1912, 1982) view that, in setting off punitive reactions, deviance ultimately contributes to the reinforcement of the group’s normative system.

Another study that supports the idea that derogation of ingroup deviants ensues from individuals’ attempts to reinforce the group’s normative system was reported by
Marques, Abrams & Serôdio (2001, Experiment 2). In that study participants answered to a
bogus test purportedly aimed at detecting to which of two opposed types of imagination
they belonged (Intragroup condition) or, instead, supposedly aimed to know their personal
imagination characteristics (Interpersonal condition). All participants were asked to report
their position along a continuum of attitudes of increasing social desirability. One week
latter, in a second session, all participants received feedback about the first session.
Participant in the intragroup condition false feedback about the position of ingroup or
outgroup members along the continuum of attitudes. Participants in the interpersonal
condition received feedback about the responses of individuals that were simply presented
as interpersonally similar to, or different from, them in terms of their imagination
characteristics. From the five targets participants were presented with, four adopted
socially desirable positions on the continuum (normative targets) and one target adopted a
socially undesirable position (deviant target). The normative targets were either highly
consensual in their attitudes (High Uniformity condition) or somewhat dispersed, although
their attitudes still espoused the socially desirable half of the continuum (Low Uniformity
condition). Among other tasks, participants evaluated one normative and the deviant target.
The positions of the normative and deviant targets were constant across conditions.

Figure 2.3 shows the mean evaluations of these targets as a function of their group
membership or interpersonal similarity with the participants, and the uniformity of
normative targets’ positions. As can been seen in that figure participants evaluated the
socially desirable target more favorably and the socially undesirable target more
unfavorably when they were presented as ingroup members than when they were presented
as outgroup members, or simply as individuals. More importantly, Figure 2.3 clearly shows
that this result was stronger when the ingroup lacked normative uniformity, than in every
other condition.
Figure 2.3. Evaluations of Normative and Deviant Targets as a function of Interpersonal or Intragroup Context, High or Low Uniformity and Stimulus Set (Ingroup vs. Outgroup or Similar vs. Different Set of Targets). Adapted from Marques, Abrams & Serôdio, 2001, Experiment 2, p. 442)
These results indicate that evaluations of norm validating (socially desirable) and norm undermining (socially undesirable) targets are a function of their group membership. This result is, obviously, consistent with the black sheep effect (cf. above). It demonstrates that any influence of interpersonal similarity between participants and targets on derogation of ingroup deviants can only be considered in the broader context of their common group membership. That is, participants derogated in-group deviants precisely because they were in-group members. More importantly, this derogation occurred mainly when other in-group members showed but questionable support of the normative attitude position. Although no data were collected regarding the effects of derogation of the ingroup deviant on the reinforcement of the subjective validity of this position, the present results are consistent with the idea that judgments of ingroup members who deviate from prescriptive norms ensue from individuals’ motivation to reinforce the subjective validity of the standards that sustain the ingroup’s positive image, and that this is achieved by generating internal conformity to valued in-group standards.

Concluding Remarks: Guidelines for the Reported Research

To conclude this theoretical outline, we must stress that our aim is not to dispute the theoretical ideas of the well-established work we refer to. Rather, we attempted to explore these ideas in order to organize the framework that underlies the studies reported in the following chapters.

*Deviance and Social Control*

The durkheimian perspective, stresses the fact that deviance is not to be viewed as a social dysfunction, but rather, as an intrinsic property of groups, that allows them to reinvigorate their normative systems and, by doing so, to resist the constraints and vicissitudes that impinge on them in particular contexts. Therefore, deviance is not a built-
in property of behavior. To take an example given by Durkheim (1893), the act of killing a fellow human is not punished because of the harm done to the victim. Indeed, it may even be praised as an heroic act, for example, in times of war.

By the same token, deviance is not an indissociable characteristic of deviant individuals. Rather, it is a burden that those who happen to be “in the bad place at the wrong time”, will have to endure at a particular moment of the group’s life. This was the case of sorcerers in the final years of the European Middle Ages (e.g. Ben-Yehuda, 1985), of the Antinomian advocates in Puritan New England (Erikson, 1966), or of Black and White persons who advocated miscegenation in late nineteenth-century Louisiana (Inverarity, 1976).

Specifically, deviance is a collective construction aimed to generate reactions from normative group members, whom by associating themselves to the punishment process, learn the group’s norms and commit themselves to these norms, so that the group ends up with an increased internal normative solidarity (Marques & Serôdio, 2000). This normative solidarity helps the group to differentiate from other groups, possibly, in terms of a shared representation by its members of their moral superiority (Erikson, 1966).

**Deviance in Face to Face Groups**

The above idea matches, to some extent, the individuals’ behavior observed in small group research. This research shows that group members expect other members to conform to valued opinions (the *social reality* function) and to settle for commonly agreed courses of action (the *group locomotion* function). This is due to the fact that group members are interdependent for the reciprocal validation of their opinions and the achievement of their goals. Group members who fail to meet these requirements are subject to pressures to conform, and when these pressures fail, they face consequences that, all differences considered, are equivalent to those suffered by deviants in large
communities. However, research in small group processes considers that the main determinant of group members’ negative reactions to deviance is their interpersonal indeterdependence (e.g., Cartwright & Zander, 1968; Levine & Moreland, 1994; Levine & Thompson, 1996). This fact may hinder a full understanding of deviance processes in large-scale social categories, where group behavior of a common group identity (e.g., Hogg, 1992; Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 2001).

**Deviance and Social Identity**

The social identification framework, on the other hand, emphasizes the role of individuals’ representation of the group and the impact of such representation on the way they define themselves and others. In the context of this framework, interdependence would be a consequence of a shared group identity, rather than the cause of individuals’ commitment to the group (Hogg, 1992; Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 2001).

Whereas the small group perspective frames deviance as a failure in meeting the expectancies derived from such interdependence, a view of deviance inspired by the social identification framework would see deviance as a departure from the criteria that define the ingroup’s shared identity. Therefore, solidarity among group members would be the outcome of their common attraction to the ingroup’s representation (Hogg, 1992; Hogg, Cooper-Shaw & Holzworth, 1993; Hogg & Hains, 1996; Hogg, Hardie & Reynolds, 1995).

In a nutshell, the social identification framework offers a theoretically sound account of the process according to which individuals may conceive themselves as members of large-scale social categories and uniformly behave according to that self-conception. However, this framework is directly concerned about the way in which individuals cognitively maximize intergroup differences and minimize intragroup differences. By contrast, deviance corresponds to an emphasis on intragroup differentiation, as shown by the black sheep effect studies. At face value, then, the general
principles of the social identification framework would lead one to expect that the emergence of intragroup deviance in a given intergroup distinction would lead individuals to cognitively abandon this distinction, because it no longer allowed them to construct the situation in terms of a clear-cut categorical contrast.

Deviance and Subjective Group Dynamics

The subjective group dynamics model, to which the present work subscribes, attempts to deal with this inconsistency. This model is based on the idea that social order largely depends on social categorization. In line with the social identification framework, it assumes that a salient social identity motivates individuals to ascertain the overall positiveness of their group. As a result, when social identity is salient, normative and deviant ingroup members are viewed as social objects that, respectively, enhance, or jeopardize, positive ingroup differentiation. Individuals will therefore react to these members according to the valence of their contribution to social identity and, in doing so, they engage in the equivalent of social control actions aimed to reinforce the positive meaning of their membership category.

The subjective group dynamics model inspires itself from durkheimian theory, in that it suggests that the above outlined process emerges when, following a denotative intergroup differentiation (or, social categorization), individuals adopt a prescriptive focus in their appraisals of other group members. In addition, also in accordance with the durkheimian theory, the model assumes, at least implicitly, that this prescriptive focus should be more in order when ingroup members construe the intergroup situation as menacing the perceived legitimacy of positive ingroup differentiation.

Overview of Hypotheses

The following chapters are devoted to the presentation of our studies. Based on the above outlined ideas, we conducted seven experiments. These experiments were aimed to
test three general ideas. The first idea is that reactions of normative individuals to ingroup deviance depend on the intragroup and intergroup characteristics of the situation in which that deviance occurs. This idea thus deals with predictions directly issued from the durkheimian theory. Specifically, as regards the impact of the social situation, we may expect that (1) lack of support of a valued norm by salient ingroup members, (2) a threatened ingroup status relative to the outgroup, and (3) the lack of validation of an ingroup norm by the society at large, will increase individuals’ prescriptive focus and, hence, their derogation of ingroup deviants (and upgrading of ingroup normative members), but that these factors have no impact on evaluations of outgroup members whom, by definition, are less relevant to individuals’ social identity.

The second idea is that these reactions depend on the implications of that deviance to the ingroup, considering the denotative characteristics of the deviants. This idea more directly deals with the implications of self-categorization theory’s assumptions about the role of prototypical group members in the definition of the group, and its relationship with the subjective group dynamic model’s distinction between descriptive and prescriptive norms. Specifically, as regards the prescriptive implications of deviance to the ingroup, we may expect that individuals who are, denotatively, the best ingroup representatives will have the strongest prescriptive impact on the subjective validation of ingroup standards that legitimate beliefs in a positive social identity. Indeed, as we discussed in a previous section, typical ingroup members, by definition represent the group’s essence. As a result, the value of their behavior or characteristics should directly and totally revert to the image of the group as whole. In turn, behavior of less typical members, who are, by definition, less representative of the group, should have a lower perceived contribution to the group’s value. As a result, the former members’ behavior or characteristics should have an increased impact on individuals’ judgments. These members should be more negatively
judged than less typical ingroup members or outgroup members whom, by definition matter less to the overall ingroup’s value.

The third idea also draws from durkheimian theory and is generally consistent with social identity theory’s contention that social categorization involves cognitive, evaluative and emotional processes. We reasoned that in the same way a comparatively negative social identity generates negative feelings in the individuals, also should ingroup deviants generate such feelings. To be consistent with the previous hypotheses, this process should emerge more strongly in situations that induce prescriptive focus. Therefore, we expected that negative emotional reactions should mediate between individuals’ attachment to the ingroup (in the forms of social identification or commitment to ingroup norms) and their judgments of normative and deviant ingroup members, especially in situations in which ingroup norms are not supported by societal consensus, or when ingroup prescriptive deviants are, descriptively, strong ingroup representatives.11

11 Indeed according to Tajfel (1978), following social categorization individuals comparatively appraise the ingroup’s value relative to the outgroup on relevant social value-laden dimensions. This evaluative process has emotional implications. When the social comparison yields relative ingroup superiority individuals’ social identity will be satisfactory. Otherwise individuals will be unsatisfied with their group membership. This is a major issue in the realm of social identity theory (cf. Tajfel, 1978), with important implications to the kinds of social behavior (social mobility, social creativity, or social change) individuals may engage in. However this issue falls beyond the scope of the present work.
CHAPTER 3

EFFECTS OF INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THREATS TO THE LEGITIMACY OF INGROUP STANDARDS

As we noted in Chapter 2, deviance within a group, may it be a small group, a large community or society in the broader sense, represents a challenge to the collective within which it emerges (e.g. Cartwright & Zander, 1968; Durkheim, 1893; Simmel, 1955). However, the menacing potential of deviant ingroup members to the image of the ingroup as a whole is emphasized in contexts in which ingroup’s normative positioning as a whole is not clearly established. This idea was illustrated, for example, by Erikson’s (1966) studies (cf. Chapter 2). We may suppose that, as part of the same process, those ingroup members who support the norm – the normative members – should meet individuals’ expectations about ingroup members in general. That is, these members should be perceived as instrumental to the subjective validation of the norm, hence contributing to the perceived legitimacy of the group’s positive differentiation. They should thus be judged in a favorable manner. Clearly, in contexts in which individuals perceive their positive identity to be well established, deviants pose a much less important threat. As a consequence, individuals’ reactions towards these deviants should be more lenient in the latter than in the former case.

Hypotheses

In Experiment 1, we analyze whether the relative dispersion of ingroup members around a prescriptive normative position increases the extremity of participants’ positive or negative reactions, respectively to normative and deviant ingroup members. The basic idea

12 Experiments 1 and 2 in the present chapter were previously published in Marques, J. M., Abrams, D. & Serôdio, R. G. (2001). Being better by being right: Subjective group dynamics and derogation of ingroup deviants when generic norms are undermined. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81*, 3, 436-44 (Experiments 1 and 3, respectively). In the present work we present extended versions of those experiments.
in this experiment is that the perceived legitimacy of the positive value assigned to the ingroup should be undermined when, while remaining within an acceptable latitude, ingroup members’ positions are relatively scattered. When this is the case, any position that clearly opposed the norm (a deviant position) emerging within the ingroup should be perceived as potentially more threatening than if the former members cohesively adopted the normative position. As a consequence, ingroup deviants should be derogated more strongly, and submitted to stronger pressures to conform in the former than in the latter situation.

In experiments 2 and 3, we addressed ourselves to a different sort of moderator of judgments of normative and deviant ingroup members which, nevertheless should have implications similar to the preceding one. This moderator is the status of the ingroup relatively to the outgroup as a whole. In these experiments, we tested the assumption that uncertainty about social identity, resulting from a non-decisive intergroup comparison, should elicit more favorable and more unfavorable judgments of normative and deviant ingroup members, respectively, than of similar outgroup members. By contrast, when the ingroup’s positive status is clearly established, there should be no such need to reinforce the subjective validity of ingroup standards. As a result, judgments of outgroup members should be less extreme. Because outgroup members, normative or deviant, are irrelevant to the participants’ identity, their judgments should always be less extreme and not affected by the ingroup validating or undermining context.

In Experiment 4, we pursued an idea akin to that of Experiment 1. Specifically, we checked for whether a prescriptive focus can be induced, not only when the norm is undermined from inside the ingroup, as we found in Experiment 1, but also when the norm is challenged from outside, by the lack of “societal” support to it. We reasoned that group members should feel more secure about the perceived legitimacy of the norms that sustain
a positive social differentiation when there is general recognition, outside the group, of the interest and value of such norm. In turn, if they are aware that the norm does not attract sympathy from the society at large, group members should respond to this threat by reinforcing their prescriptive focus. This would emerge in the form of upgrading of ingroup members who endorse the norm and derogation of those who challenge it.

Experiment 1

To test our assumption that individuals should be more sensitive to deviant behavior within the ingroup when the group as a whole seems to fail at exhibiting clear support to a prescriptive norm, we run an experiment with Psychology and Law students. At the time of the experiment the two groups shared the same building, and had, to say the least, a “tense” relationship. However, regardless of inter-faculty rivalries or conflict, there is widespread consensus among university students about the value of ragging practices passed on first-year students as a means of integration into the student life. These practices evoke great amounts of activity by students’ associations, are tacitly sanctioned by university’s authorities, and are a relevant part of the student culture. Support to such practices and, specifically, to first-year students’ ragging, may thus be viewed as a highly important student norm. We asked participants issuing from the two faculties to examine information regarding the answers that had been purportedly given by a sample of 50 other Psychology or Law students to a previous survey on “freshmen ragging practices”. Depending on Group Opinion conditions, the distribution of responses of the 50 target students was asymptotic, either in the direction of support to these practices (Norm-Validating condition) or in the opposite direction (Norm-Undermining condition). Participants also had to indicate, on a pro-ragging – anti-ragging continuum (1) the position they most agreed with, (2) the position they most disagreed with, and (3) the position from which on they would disagree with. Participants
then evaluated group members issuing either from the ingroup or the outgroup faculty who adopted each of these positions. Finally, participants indicated to which extent they considered these targets to convey a bad or a good image of the faculty they belonged to.

In line with our rationale, we expected participants to express stronger prescriptive focus in the Ingroup/Norm-Undermining condition than in all other conditions. First, we expected a lower threshold of rejection in this condition than in all others. That is, participants in the Ingroup/Norm-Undermining condition, should express disagreement with positions that are objectively more normative (i.e., more pro-ragging) than in the remaining conditions (Boundary Narrowing hypothesis). Secondly, we expected participants in the Ingroup/Norm-Undermining condition to derogate ingroup deviants relative to outgroup deviants and to upgrade normative ingroup members as compared to normative outgroup members more than participants in all other conditions (Black Sheep hypothesis).

Finally, we predicted that, in the Norm-Undermining condition, participants would consider that the deviant ingroup members conveyed a more negative image of the ingroup than would deviant outgroup members convey of the outgroup. We expected the reverse, regarding the image of the group conveyed by the normative members (Group’s Image hypothesis).

Pilot Study

Prior to the main experiment, we tested whether the continuum of statements we devised for this experiment accounted for the normative standings of the participants. With this purpose, we presented a continuum of 7 statements about first-year student ragging in the university to a convenience sample of 13 Law (6 male and 7 female) and 13 Psychology (6 male and 7 female) students, aged between 18 and 23 years old (Mean age = 19.27; SD =
1.76). These students were asked to indicate which of the 7 statements best represented their personal opinion on the issue. These 26 students did not participate in the main experiment.

The seven statements were listed in the continuum were as follows: “Ragging is…:

Statement 1. “unnecessary, I definitely disagree with it, and it should be forbidden”;

Statement 2. “very useless, I disagree with it, and it should be discouraged”; Statement 3. “useless, I tend to disagree with, and one should be critical about it”; Statement 4. “neither useful nor useless, and I neither agree nor disagree with it”; Statement 5. “useful, I tend to agree with it, and I think it should be regarded favorably”; Statement 6. “very useful, I agree with it, and I think it should be encouraged”; and Statement 7. “necessary, I strongly agree with it, and I think it should be mandatory”» (cf. Appendix 1). Not surprisingly, 24 participants endorsed Statement 6, and two participants (one male Psychology student and one female Law student) endorsed Statement 5, indicating a strong norm in favor of ragging practices.

Method

Participants and Design

Forty female and 18 male \((N = 58)\) Law and Psychology undergraduates \((n = 38\) and \(n = 20\) respectively), ranging from 19 to 23 years old \((\text{Mean age} = 20.64; \text{SD} = 1.07)\), volunteered to participate in the main experiment. Gender, \(\chi^2(3, N = 58) = 4.24, ns\), Age, \(F(1, 54) = 1.87, ns\), Faculty, \(\chi^2(3, N = 58) < 1\), and Year of Studies, \(F(1, 54) < 1\), were similarly distributed across conditions.

The design of the experiment was a 2 (Group: Ingroup vs. Outgroup) x 2 (Group Opinion: Norm-Validating vs. Norm-Undermining) x 2 (Member: Normative vs. Deviant). Group and Group Opinion are between-subjects factors, and Member is a within-subject
factor. Participants were assigned randomly to conditions (12 to 16 participants per condition).

Procedure

The experiment was conducted by questionnaire (cf. Appendix 2). An interviewer approached lone participants in public places in the Faculty building and asked them whether they agreed to answer to a questionnaire about “student ragging practices”. Upon agreement, the interviewer handed the questionnaire to the participant.

On Page 1, participants read the following information about the purported goal of the experiment: “As you know, student’s ragging practices have recently caused some debate, and are, at the same time, one of the most important aspects of student life, inside and outside the University. As one part of a series of studies in which we inquire students of the several faculties about different aspects of their life at the university, we are now conducting a survey regarding student ragging practices. In the first phase of this study, we asked a sample of 50 Psychology (vs. Law) students to indicate, which of the 7 sentences written on the next page, they agreed the most. […]”. In this same page, following the text setting the “scenario” for the experiment, participants answered a few identification questions (such as faculty they study at, age, sex, etc) and then the questions measuring participants’ Endorsement of student ragging.

On top of Page 2, participants read an instruction which introduced both the Group and the Group Opinion manipulations: “You may see bellow the same sentences which we have previously presented to those 50 students of the Psychology Faculty (vs. Law Faculty)”.

Depending on the Group manipulation, participants were shown a distribution of responses given by members either from the ingroup or from the outgroup. According to the Group Opinion conditions, that distribution of responses either validated (Norm-Validating condition), or undermined (Norm-Undermining condition) the prescriptive norm.
Specifically, in the Norm-Validating condition, the number of ingroup or outgroup members who chose each of the 7 statements was, 2, 3, 4, 6, 17, 16, and 2, respectively for statement 1 to statement 7. This distribution was reversed in the Norm-Undermining condition. Participants were fully debriefed on the deceptions involved in the experimental procedure after completing the questionnaire.

Dependent Measures

Endorsement of student ragging practices. Prior to the manipulation of Group Opinion, participants indicated their opinion about student ragging using the following four questions: questions 1 and 2 began with the phrasing “In you opinion, student ragging is …”, followed by 7-point bipolar scales ranging from very negative, very useless, to very positive, very useful; (3) “In you opinion, student ragging…”, 1 = should be forbidden, 7 = should be mandatory; (4) “In general, as regards student ragging, you …”, 1 = fully disagree, 7 = fully agree. We averaged these four scales to create a Norm Endorsement Score (Cronbach’s $\alpha = 0.80$).

Participants were also asked to estimate the consensus about student ragging by writing down the percentage of target faculty students that were pro-ragging and anti-ragging. We named this measure Perceived Consensus Estimates.

Personal opinion and rejection threshold. In page 2, participants were asked to indicate with a plus sign (+) which of the 7 statements best represented their opinion about student ragging. This measure was named Personal Opinion. Participants also had to indicate with a minus sign (-) the statement on the continuum from which on they would disagree with. For example, if the participant indicated Statement 4, this meant that he or she disagreed not only with this statement but also statements 3, 2 and 1. We labeled this measure the Rejection Threshold.
Attractiveness of normative and deviant members. In the last page of the questionnaire, participants were asked to evaluate ingroup or outgroup members whose personal opinion was the same as their own or whose personal opinion fell within their rejection threshold. With this procedure we obtained participants’ judgments of group members that were subjectively normative and deviant, respectively. Participants had to evaluate each target in turn and in response to the following statement: “Your opinion about the students of the [Psychology vs. Law] Faculty who adopted this position is …”.

The bipolar scales ranged from 1 to 7 and were as follows: very favorable - very unfavorable, bad classmates - good classmates, lack a lot of solidarity - show a lot of solidarity, and contribute nothing to student cohesion - contribute very much to student cohesion. We averaged these measures to create a Normative Member Attractiveness Score and a Deviant Member Attractiveness Score (Cronbach’s α = 0.84, and 0.78, respectively).

Image conveyed by normative and deviant members. Finally, participants were asked whether they considered that the normative and the deviant members conveyed a good image of the ingroup or of the outgroup: “In your opinion the image conveyed by the students of the [Psychology vs. Law] Faculty who adopted your personal opinion [rejection threshold] position about their Faculty in general is …”. The response scale ranged from very bad (= 1) to very good (= 7).

Results and Discussion

We found no significant effects involving Participants’ Faculty (Law vs. Psychology) as covariate in any of the dependent measures (highest $F_1, 53 = 2.45, \text{ns}$). Apart from the change in their respective magnitude, the analyses involving the factors in

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13 The effects involving Participants’ Faculty as covariate in the analyses reported in the results section were the following: on Endorsement of Student Raging Practices, $F (1, 53) = 2.45, \text{ns}$, and on Perceived
the design of the experiment were similar to those reported below. We thus disregarded Participants’ Faculty in the subsequent analyses and employed the 2 x 2 x 2 design described earlier.

Endorsement of Student Ragging Practices

Norm endorsement. To check for the consensual endorsement of student ragging, we ran a Group (Ingroup vs. Outgroup) x Group Opinion (Norm-Validating vs. Norm-Undermining) ANOVA on the Norm Endorsement Score. This analysis yielded no significant effects (all Fs1, 54 < 1). All participants were significantly in favor of student ragging (Overall Mean = 5.49, SD = 0.70), as shown by the significant difference between this score and the scale midpoint (4), t (57) = 16.21, p < .001.

Perceived consensus estimates. A Group (Ingroup vs. Outgroup) x Group Opinion (Norm-Validating vs. Norm-Undermining) ANOVA with perceived consensus estimates (pro-ragging vs. anti-ragging) as a within-subject factor, indicated that participants considered that a higher percentage of students would endorse a pro-ragging position, M = 64.98%, SD = 21.17, than an anti-ragging position, M = 26.48%, SD = 19.14, F (1, 54) = 62.40, p < .001, η² = .54. All remaining effects were non significant (all Fs < 1.60, ns). In addition, both the pro-ragging and the anti-ragging percentage were significantly different from 50%, respectively t (57) = 5.39, p < .001 and t (57) = 9.36, p < .001.

In the whole, these results validate the choice of student ragging as a relevant normative dimension to test our hypotheses. Participants agreed with, and expected more others to agree than to disagree with student ragging.

Consensus Estimates, all Fs (1, 53) < 1; on Personal Opinion, F (1, 53) < 1 and on Rejection Threshold, F (1, 53) < 1; on the Black Sheep Effect, all Fs (1, 53) = 2.33, ns.
Personal Opinion and Rejection Threshold

Personal opinion. As expected, the position with which participants agreed the most did not vary across conditions (all $F_{s1, 54} < 1$). Also, in line with the pilot study, there was strong agreement with ragging ($Overall Mean = 5.71, SD = 0.73$).

Table 3.1

Rejection Threshold as a Function of Group Opinion and Membership (Experiment 1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group Opinion</th>
<th>Norm-Validating</th>
<th>Norm-Undermining</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ingroup</td>
<td>Outgroup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$M$</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>1.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(SD)$</td>
<td>(1.50)</td>
<td>(2.18)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Ratings range from 1 (most anti-ragging) to 7 (most pro-ragging).

Rejection threshold. More importantly, our Boundary Narrowing hypothesis states that participants’ rejection threshold score should be higher in the Ingroup/Norm-Undermining condition than in all other conditions. To test this hypothesis, we ran a contrast analysis on the rejection threshold scores, by assigning the values $-1$, $+3$, $-1$, and $-1$, respectively to the Ingroup/Norm-Validating, Ingroup/Norm-Undermining, Outgroup/Norm-Validating, and Outgroup/Norm-Undermining conditions. This analysis supported the hypothesis, $t(54) = 2.80, p = .007$.\(^{14}\) The results presented in Table 3.1 show that the rejection thresholds were significantly more pro-ragging in the Ingroup/Norm-Undermining

\(^{14}\) To examine the possibility that there were significant differences among the three conditions made equal in our contrasts, we first checked for differences among the two outgroup conditions, by assigning the values 0, 0, $+1$, and $-1$, to the Ingroup/Norm-Validating, Ingroup/Norm-Undermining, Outgroup/Norm-Validating, and Outgroup/Norm-Undermining conditions, respectively. This analysis revealed no significant difference, $t(54) < 1$. We also compared the Ingroup/Norm-Validating condition with the Outgroup condition as a whole, $M = 2.13$, by assigning the values $-1$, 0, and $+1$, to the Ingroup/Norm-Validating, Ingroup/Norm-
condition than in the remaining three conditions. That is, in this condition participants expressed, on the average, their disagreement with all statements of the continuum that were below Statement 4 (“Ragging is neither useful nor useless, and I neither agree nor disagree with it”). In support of our Boundary Narrowing hypothesis, this indicates that, in this condition, participants were less tolerant to deviations from the norm than in all other conditions, and even that they were intolerant to positions that, objectively, were not against first-year student ragging.

*Attractiveness of Normative and Deviant Members*

With the Black Sheep hypothesis, we predicted that participants would upgrade normative ingroup members and derogate deviant ingroup members as compared to their outgroup counterparts, more strongly in the Norm-Undermining than in the Norm-Validating condition. To test this hypothesis, we examined judgments of ingroup or outgroup members who adopted participants’ personal opinion and of ingroup or outgroup members who adopted an opinion that was within the participants’ threshold of tolerance respectively. We submitted these judgments to a Group (Ingroup vs. Outgroup) x Group Opinion (Norm-Validating vs. Norm-Undermining) x Member (Normative vs. Deviant) repeated measures ANOVA, with Member as a within-subject factor. To control for possible effects of Personal Opinion and Rejection Threshold, we entered these scores as covariates in the analysis.

We found significant effects of Member, $F(1, 53) = 30.51, p < .001, \eta^2 = .37$, Group x Member, $F(1, 53) = 5.11, p < .03, \eta^2 = .09$, and Group x Group Opinion x Member, $F(1, 53) = 7.62, p = .008, \eta^2 = .13$ (remaining $Fs1, 53 < 1.81, ns$). The effect of Member indicates that, overall, participants judged normative members more favorably, $M = 5.37, SD = 0.96$, than deviant members, $M = 3.24, SD = 1.08$. The Group x Member interaction indicates that, Undermining, and the Outgroup condition as a whole, respectively. Again, the analysis revealed no significant difference, $t(55) < 1$. 
independently of Group Opinion factor, participants upgraded the normative ingroup members, $M = 5.69$, $SD = 0.85$, relative to the normative outgroup members, $M = 5.07$, $SD = 0.97$, $F(1, 55) = 6.46$, $p = .01$. However, participants did not differentiate between deviant ingroup, $M = 3.17$, $SD = 1.19$, or outgroup members, $M = 3.31$, $SD = 0.97$, $F(1, 55) < 1$.

Table 3.2

*Attractiveness of Normative and Deviant Members as a Function of Group Opinion and Group Membership (Experiment 1)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Group Opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Norm-Validating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ingroup Outgroup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normative Members</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$M$</td>
<td>5.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(SD)$</td>
<td>(0.83)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deviant Members</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$M$</td>
<td>3.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(SD)$</td>
<td>(1.12)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Ratings range from 1 (*non attractive*) to 7 (*attractive*).

More important to our predictions is the significant Group x Group Opinion x Member effect. By decomposing this interaction we found that in the Norm-Validating condition the Group x Member effect was not significant, $F(1, 54) < 1$ (remaining $F1, 54 = 3.23$, $p = .08^{15}$). However, in the Norm-Undermining condition, the Group x Member effect was significant, $F(1, 54) = 12.52$, $p = .001$ (remaining $F1, 54 < 1$). As presented in Table 3.2, and in line with our predictions, in this condition, participants upgraded normative

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$^{15}$ Although the effect of Group is irrelevant to our predictions and even with no relevant sense, the fact that it is marginally significant may require its interpretation. This effect indicates that in the Norm-Validating condition participants tend to judge the ingroup members more favorably, $M = 4.64$, $SD = 0.66$, than the outgroup members, $M = 4.21$, $SD = 0.34$, irrespective of their normative or deviant prescriptive status.
ingroup members relative to normative outgroup members, $F(1, 54) = 6.83, p = .012$ and, in contrast, they derogated deviant ingroup members relative to deviant outgroup members, $F(1, 54) = 4.87, p = .03$.

**Derogation of Deviants and Rejection Threshold**

We also tested the idea that deviant members would be more strongly derogated in the Ingroup/Norm-Undermining condition than in the remaining conditions. To do so we performed a contrast analysis entering the contrast values of 1, 1, -3 and 1, respectively for the Ingroup/Norm-Validating, the Outgroup/Norm-Validating, the Ingroup/Norm-Undermining, and the Outgroup/Norm-Undermining conditions.

We found support to our idea. Consistent with the predicted pattern, $t(54) = 1.88, p < .05$, one-tailed, deviants were more strongly derogated in the Ingroup/Norm-Undermining condition than in the remaining conditions, in which the deviants were similarly evaluated (see Figure 3.1).

In the Ingroup/Norm-Undermining condition, the judged deviant members were objectively less deviant than the deviants in all other conditions. In fact, in this condition participants were judging deviant members who, in average, adopted Statement 4 or lower, whereas, in the remaining conditions, participants were judging deviant members who adopted Statement 2, or lower. Nevertheless, the former objectively less deviant members

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16 To further explore the results on group members’ attractiveness, we computed an Intrigroup Differentiation Score by subtracting the Deviant Member Score from the Normative Member Score. Thus, higher intragroup differentiation values indicate stronger upgrading of normative members and derogation of deviant members. We submitted the scores of the four conditions to a contrast analysis with the values -1, -1, 3, and -1, assigned respectively to the Ingroup/Norm-Validating, the Outgroup/Norm-Validating, the Ingroup/Norm-Undermining, and the Outgroup/Norm-Undermining conditions. Although marginally significant, $t(54) = 1.91, p = .06$, results indicate that participants differentiate more strongly between the normative and the deviant member in the Ingroup/Norm-Undermining condition, $M = 2.86, SD = 1.23$, than in the Outgroup/Norm-Undermining condition, $M = 1.21, SD = 1.75$, in the Ingroup/Norm-Validating condition, $M = 2.27, SD = 1.47$, or in the Outgroup/Norm-Validating condition, $M = 2.38, SD = 1.28$.16
were more strongly derogated than the latter. This result thus suggests that individuals tend to adopt a stronger prescriptive focus when faced with a context that poses a meaningful threat to the ingroup’s standards.

We ran a Group (Ingroup vs. Outgroup) x Group Opinion (Norm-Validating vs. Norm-Undermining) x Image repeated measures ANOVA, with image conveyed by the normative and the deviant members as a within-subject factor, and personal opinion and rejection threshold as covariates. We found significant effects of Image, $F(1, 53) = 15.48, p < .001, \eta^2 = .23$, Group x Image, $F(1, 53) = 7.65, p = .008, \eta^2 = .13$, and Group x Group

To discard the possibility that evaluations of deviants differed among the three conditions to which we gave the same contrast value, we performed a contrast analysis entering the values 1, -2, 0 and 1. The result was not significant, $t(54) = 1.51, ns$. 

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**Figure 3.1.** Attractiveness of Normative and Deviant Members as a function of Context and Group Membership (Experiment 1).

**Image Conveyed by Normative and Deviant Members**

We ran a Group (Ingroup vs. Outgroup) x Group Opinion (Norm-Validating vs. Norm-Undermining) x Image repeated measures ANOVA, with image conveyed by the normative and the deviant members as a within-subject factor, and personal opinion and rejection threshold as covariates. We found significant effects of Image, $F(1, 53) = 15.48, p < .001, \eta^2 = .23$, Group x Image, $F(1, 53) = 7.65, p = .008, \eta^2 = .13$, and Group x Group
Opinion x Image, $F(1, 53) = 10.25, p = .002, \eta^2 = .16$ (highest remaining $F1, 53 = 1.31, ns$). The effect of Member indicates that, overall, participants considered that normative members convey a better image of the group they belong to, $M = 5.43, SD = 1.13$, than do the deviants, $M = 3.55, SD = 1.32$. The Group x Image interaction indicates that, irrespective of whether the context validates or undermines the norm, participants tend to consider that the normative ingroup members convey a better image of the ingroup, $M = 5.71, SD = 0.98$, than the normative outgroup members do of the outgroup, $M = 5.17, SD = 1.21, F(1, 55) = 3.34, p = .07$. However, the image that ingroup deviants, $M = 3.32, SD = 1.47$, or outgroup deviants, $M = 3.77, SD = 1.66$, convey of their respective groups did not differ significantly, $F(1, 55) = 1.52, ns$.

Table 3.3

Image Conveyed of Own Group by Normative and Deviant Members as a Function of Group Opinion and Group Membership (Experiment 1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group Opinion</th>
<th>Norm-Validating</th>
<th>Norm-Undermining</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ingroup</td>
<td>Outgroup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normative Member</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$M$</td>
<td>5.69</td>
<td>5.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(SD)$</td>
<td>(1.01)</td>
<td>(0.83)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deviant Member</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$M$</td>
<td>3.69</td>
<td>3.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(SD)$</td>
<td>(1.40)</td>
<td>(1.45)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Ratings range from 1 (bad image) to 7 (good image).

More important to our predictions is the fact that by decomposing the second-order interaction we found results consistent with those of the black sheep effect: whereas in the
Norm-Validating condition, we found no significant effects of Group or of Group x Member (all $F$s 1, 54 < 1), on the contrary, in the Norm-Undermining condition, the Group x Member effect was highly significant, $F(1, 54) = 16.95, p < .001$ (remaining $F1, 54 < 1$). As shown by Table 3.3, consistent with our predictions, in this later condition participants considered that the normative ingroup members conveyed a better image of the ingroup than did the normative outgroup members of the outgroup, $F(1, 54) = 9.30, p < .01$. In contrast, when judging the image that ingroup and outgroup deviants convey of their respective groups, participants considered that the ingroup deviants conveyed a worse image than did the equivalent outgroup members, $F(1, 54) = 3.69, p = .06$. As expected, judgments of the extent to which the normative and the deviant members contribute to the good image of their respective groups paralleled participants’ judgments of these members’ attractiveness. In both cases, participants’ judgments were moderated both by the targets’ group membership and by the supporting or undermining context in which these judgments occurred.

In our view, the most important results of this experiment may be summarized as follows: contexts that undermine the perceived legitimacy of positive ingroup differentiation lead individuals to narrow their tolerance to deviations from the group’s standards. This process magnifies the deviant character of ingroup members who stand off track. They are perceived as a stronger threat to the ingroup’s overall image than they would be in more securing contexts, and, possibly as a consequence, they evoke evaluations that are more negative than they would be if judgments occurred in the latter contexts.

Experiment 2

In Experiment 1 we tested the idea that individuals may derogate deviant ingroup members as a response to intragroup constraints that pose a menace to the perceived legitimacy of the ingroup’s value. With the present experiment, we examined the idea that
similar reactions would emerge when factors external to the ingroup undermine its value of as compared to a relevant outgroup. In addition, we examined whether the derogation of ingroup deviants is concomitant with motivation to exert normative pressure upon these members.

To examine the above ideas, we created an intergroup situation using artificial groups. In a first session of the experiment, we asked participants to respond to two ostensibly unrelated bogus tasks: an “imagination test” and a “Condensed Ethical-Value Survey”. In a second session, participants were given false feedback about their own performance and the performance of other target individuals in the imagination test and the survey. We also provided participants with information about the ingroup and the outgroup as wholes, in terms of their respective ethical levels. This information allowed us to manipulate the validity of the ingroup’s position relative to the outgroup. In the Secure Identity condition, participants learned that ingroup’s ethical level was superior to that of the outgroup. In the Insecure Identity condition, they were informed that there was no certainty about which group had the higher ethical level. Participants then indicated the extent to which they believed that target normative and deviant members contributed to their respective group’s image, and evaluated these target members in a series of items similar to those used in the previous experiment. Finally, participants reported their willingness to persuade the target members to change their opinion.

In line with subjective group dynamics model, and consistent with the results of the preceding experiment, we expected participants to show a stronger prescriptive focus in the Insecure Identity condition than in the Secure Identity condition. The Insecure Identity condition provides a context that challenges the subjective validity of participants’ social identity. Such threat would thus reflect in participants’ attitude towards others within this context. Therefore, we expected participants in this condition to upgrade normative, and to
derogate deviant ingroup members relative to equivalent outgroup members, to consider normative and deviant ingroup members to convey, respectively, a better and a worse image of their group than normative and deviant outgroup members, and to be more willing to convince the deviant ingroup member to change his or her opinion, than in the Secure Identity condition.

Method

Participants and Design

Fifty-eight female second year Psychology students, aged 18 to 34 years old (Mean age = 20.11, SD = 2.50; age was equivalent across conditions, F3, 54 = 1.21, ns) volunteered to participate in the experiment. These students had no prior courses in social psychology.

The design of the experiment was a 2 (Group: Ingroup vs. Outgroup) x 2 (Context: Secure Identity vs. Insecure Identity) x 2 (Member: Normative vs. Deviant). Group and Context are between-subjects factors, and Member is a within-subject factor. Participants were randomly assigned to conditions and ranged between 14 and 15 per condition.

Procedure

The experiment was conducted in two sessions. In the first session, the experimenter informed participants that the goal of the study was to “examine the relationship between the psychological profile of people in terms of their imagination characteristics and their ethical values”. The experimenter then handed each participant a bogus “Creative Imagination Test” (see Appendix 3) consisting of a series of questions that were ostensibly aimed to evaluate people’s imagination characteristics. After completing the imagination test, participants received the “Condensed Ethical-Value Survey”. The experimenter made it clear to participants that this survey was unrelated to the imagination
test. For realism’s sake, the “survey” was composed by five “social topics” about which participants had to state their personal opinion: abortion, aids, homosexuality, attitudes towards fellow students, and “the wallet dilemma” (see Appendix 3). Each “topic” of the Ethical-Value survey consisted of a list of 7 statements that our previous work (Serôdio, 1999) had established to represent equal interval steps on a liberal-conservative continuum. Within each “topic”, the statements were organized in a manner similar to that of the student ragging continuum used in Experiment 1, and ranged from the most counter-normative to the most normative positions. However, to add realism to the manipulation of secure versus insecure social identity, the experimenter emphasized the fact that each individual would receive an “Ethical Level” score resulting from their responses across the five “topics”. Based on our pilot work and previous studies (Marques et al., 2001, Experiment 2; Serôdio, 1999; Serôdio, Marques and Abrams, in preparation) we decided to use the “homosexuality” continuum to manipulate normative and deviant targets. In this continuum, we expected that almost all participants would adopt a normative position, specifically that “Homosexual people, like everyone else, are entitled to choose their own sexual life” (position 6). The “homosexuality” continuum was as follows: Statement 1. “Homosexuals should be exiled to appropriate facilities so that they could not endanger normal people”; Statement 2. “Homosexuals should receive the appropriate treatment for their illness”; Statement 3. “Homosexuals should try to hide their sexual tendencies”; Statement 4. “Although they are normal people, homosexuals should be helped finding a better course in life”; Statement 5. “Despite their sexual choice, homosexuals, as everyone else, are entitled to choose their own sexual life”; Statement 6. “It makes no sense to make any kind of discrimination against homosexual people”; Statement 7. “Homosexuality is a reality in the modern society, therefore homosexuals should be appointed to Government positions”. At the end of the session, participants enclosed their response-sheets in a folder,
on which they had to write a “personal-code”. While ensuring participants’ anonymity, this code would allow us to give them personal feedback results in the session that would take place one week later.

In the second session, that was named the “validation session”, the experimenter handed back the folder from the previous session to each participant. This folder contained the participant’s responses to the imagination test, as well as information about their imagination characteristics, and about responses to the Ethical-Value survey.

Firstly, participants were instructed to carefully read the feedback about their personal results in the “Creative Imagination Test”. This information was written in a “Coding Sheet” and allowed us to categorize participants in groups: “You belong to the Abstract-Pictorial Type. Abstract-Pictorials’ imagination ensues from their grasp of the external world, their values and expectations. These features distinguish between Abstract-Pictorial and Picto-Experiential persons. For Picto-Experientials, the external factors articulate with the self-concept to convey a general view of the world.”

All participants received the same feedback, i.e. they were all categorized as belonging to the Abstract-Pictorial Type of Imagination. After reading this information, participants were given a booklet in which they answered a series of questions tapping group attraction and the manipulation check. While ostensibly disclosing the experiment’s goal to participants, the experimenter then informed them that, in fact the study had been designed to reveal which of the two types of imagination is superior to the other in terms of ethical values”. In the Secure Identity condition, the experimenter proceeded to inform participants that the results in Session 1 were entirely clear and had left no doubt about the ethical superiority of the Abstract-Pictorial type of imagination over the Picto-Experiential type. The purpose of Session 2, the experimenter added, was simply to confirm that result. In the Insecure Identity condition, the experimenter explained that the results in Session 1
were totally ambiguous and had not allowed to decide which of the two types of imagination is superior to the other. He added that the purpose of Session 2 was to clarify the data he had obtained so far. In both conditions, the experimenter showed an obscure data listing to participants, as a justification for this claim.

Participants were then provided with a second booklet that included photocopies of the responses to the liberal-conservative continuum about homosexuals that had purportedly been given by two target individuals who had participated in the first session. These targets were described, by means of a photocopy of their alleged “Coding-Sheet”, as being either ingroup or outgroup members. One target (normative member) adopted a norm validating position (Statement 6, which was the one endorsed by almost all participants). The other target (deviant member) adopted a norm undermining position (Statement 2). Participants were fully debriefed in the end of the experiment.

**Dependent Measures**

*Manipulation checks.* Immediately after being categorized as Pictorials, participants answered the following question: “To what extent do you think the Creative Imagination Test is correct about your imagination type?” (1 = *probably is wrong*, 7 = *probably is correct*). After all dependent measures were collected in Booklet 2, participants were instructed to answer to a third booklet, supposedly in order to “improve the presentation of future studies as well as to help preparing the presentation of the results of the present study”. In this booklet they were asked to remember: (1) their own type of imagination, (2) the type of imagination of the two target persons they had to judge, (3) which statement of the continuum each of the targets chose as personal opinion, and (4) what did the results of Session 1 indicate about the Ethical Level of the two types of imagination. Finally, to check for suspicion, participants were invited to write down in their own words which were the goals the experiment.
Group attraction. After being informed that they belonged to the Pictorial type and prior to any manipulation, participants answered to four questions tapping group attraction. These questions were answered on a scale ranging from 1 (= not at all) to 7 (= very much) and were the following: (1) “How much do you like belonging to the Abstract-Pictorial type of imagination?”; (2) “How much do you feel that you belong to the Abstract-Pictorial type of imagination?”; (3) “How much do you identify with your Imagination Type?”; (4) “How much do you like your Imagination Type?”. We averaged these responses to create a Group Attraction Score (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .88$).

Attractiveness of normative and deviant members. After answering to the Group Attraction questions, and after the Group and Context manipulations, participants judged the normative and the deviant members on five bipolar dimensions aimed to tap member attractiveness: (1) “What is your opinion about this person?” (1 = negative; 7 = positive); (2) “In your opinion, this person is...” (1 = unlikable; 7 = likable); (3) “In your opinion, this is a...” (1 = bad person; 7 = good person); (4) “In your opinion, this person is a...” (1 = bad colleague; 7 = good colleague); (5) “In your opinion, this person is...” (1 = insensitive; 7 = sensitive). We pooled these judgments for each target to create a Normative Member Score and a Deviant Member Score (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .75$, and .86, respectively).

Image conveyed by normative and deviant members and willingness to influence the deviant member. Participants were then asked: “In your opinion, the image this person conveys about their Imagination Type is...” (1 = very bad; 7 = very good), and reported their willingness to influence the deviant member to adopt a more norm-validating position: “In the third session, we will ask you to discuss ethical values with this person. How willing would you be to attempt to convince this person to change his or her opinion?” (1 = not at all; 7 = very much).
Results and Discussion

Manipulation Checks

The manipulation check for the categorization of participants in artificial groups was collected before any other manipulation. Nonetheless, we submitted participants’ answers to a Group x Context ANOVA. The analysis revealed no significant effects (Highest $F(1, 54) = 2.62, \text{ns}$). Also as required, the Overall Mean = 5.71, SD = 0.96 was significantly different from the scale’s midpoint (4 = neither correct nor incorrect), $t(57) = 13.61, p < .001$. This result indicates that participants considered that the imagination test was indeed correct in depicting their type of imagination and that this result did not vary across experimental conditions.

The post-experimental questionnaire (booklet 3) revealed that all participants correctly remembered their own type of imagination as well as that of the normative and the deviant targets. Participants also correctly indicated the personal opinion of these targets along the homosexuality continuum. In accordance with Context manipulation, all participants in the Secure Identity condition correctly recalled that the alleged results of Session 1 indicated that the Pictorials showed a superior Ethical Level, whereas those in the Insecure Identity condition recalled that the results had not been conclusive.

Group Attraction

Group attraction measures were collected before the Group and Context manipulations. However, in order to be sure of the equivalence of participants across conditions, we submitted the group attraction score to an ANOVA with these two factors. This ANOVA showed no significant effects, highest $F(1, 54) = 2.30, \text{ns}$. When we compared the mean of this score with the midpoint (4) of the scale, we found a is highly significant difference, $M = 5.35, SD = 0.88; t(57) = 11.75, p < .001$. These results show
that participants’ strong attraction to the ingroup was equivalent across conditions, confirming that group membership manipulation was successful and meaningful to participants.

Table 3.4

*Attractiveness of Normative and Deviant Members as a Function of Context and Group Membership (Experiment 2)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context</th>
<th>Secure Identity</th>
<th>Insecure Identity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ingroup</td>
<td>Outgroup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normative Member</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>5.97</td>
<td>5.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(SD)</td>
<td>(0.57)</td>
<td>(0.83)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deviant Member</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td>2.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(SD)</td>
<td>(0.95)</td>
<td>(0.79)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Ratings range from 1 (*non attractive*) to 7 (*attractive*).

*Attractiveness of Normative and Deviant Members*

A Context x Group x Member ANOVA on normative and deviant member scores, yielded significant effects of Member, Context, and Group x Member, respectively,  $F\left(1, 54\right) = 520.11, p < .001, \eta^2 = .91, F\left(1, 54\right) = 3.96, p = .05, \eta^2 = .07, \text{ and } F\left(1, 54\right) = 4.12, p = .05, \eta^2 = .07$. More importantly, and in support of our predictions, there was a significant effect of Context x Group x Member,  $F\left(1, 54\right) = 4.49, p = .04, \eta^2 = .08$; highest remaining $F$s(1, 54) = 1.75, *ns*. In the Secure Identity condition, the Group x Member interaction was not significant,  $F\left(1, 55\right) < 1$. However, in the Insecure Identity condition the same interaction was significant,  $F\left(1, 55\right) = 8.24, p = .006$. In line with the Black Sheep
hypothesis, in this condition, participants judged the normative ingroup member more favorably than the normative outgroup member, \( F(1, 55) = 5.65, p = .02 \), while derogating the deviant ingroup member as compared to the deviant outgroup member, \( F(1, 55) = 5.02, p = .03 \) (see Table 3.4).18

**Image Conveyed by the Normative and the Deviant Members**

A Context x Group x Member ANOVA yielded significant effects of Group, Member, and Group x Member, respectively \( F(1, 54) = 5.09, p < .05, \eta^2 = .09 \), \( F(1, 54) = 313.43, p < .001, \eta^2 = .85 \), and \( F(1, 54) = 4.99, p = .05, \eta^2 = .08 \). These effects were qualified by a significant Context x Group x Member effect, \( F(1, 54) = 10.13, p = .002, \eta^2 = .16 \).

As shown in Table 3.5, the results are parallel to those obtained in Experiment 1. Also, these results are consistent with results for target attractiveness. In the Secure Identity condition, we found no significant Group x Member effect, \( F(1, 55) < 1 \). However, in the Insecure Identity condition, the Group x Member effect was highly significant, \( F(1, 55) = 13.79, p < .001 \). In support of our hypothesis, in this condition, participants considered that the normative ingroup member conveyed a better image of the ingroup than did the normative outgroup member of the outgroup, \( F(1, 55) = 14.53, p < .001 \). Conversely, participants considered that the deviant ingroup member conveyed a worse image of the ingroup than did the deviant outgroup member convey of the outgroup, \( F(1, 55) = 4.53, p = .04 \).

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18 As in Experiment 1, we computed an Intragroup Differentiation Score by subtracting the Deviant Member Score to the Normative Member Score: higher values of the intragroup differentiation represent stronger upgrading of the normative and stronger derogation of the deviant member. We performed a contrast analysis on the scores of intragroup differentiation entering the values -1, -1, 3, and -1, respectively for the Ingroup/Secure Identity, Outgroup/Secure Identity, Ingroup/Insecure Identity, and Outgroup/Insecure Identity conditions. In line with our reasoning, results revealed that participants differentiated more strongly between the normative and the deviant member in the Ingroup/Insecure Identity condition, \( M = 4.27, SD = 0.78 \), than in the Outgroup/Insecure Identity, \( M = 3.01, SD = 1.13 \), in the Ingroup/Secure Identity, \( M = 3.25, SD = 1.27 \), and in the Outgroup/Secure Identity conditions, \( M = 3.28, SD = 1.33, t(54) = 3.08, p = .003 \).
Table 3.5

*Image Conveyed by Normative and Deviant Members as a Function of Context and Group Membership (Experiment 2)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Context</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secure Identity</td>
<td>Insecure Identity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ingroup</td>
<td>Outgroup</td>
<td>Ingroup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Outgroup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normative Member</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$M$</td>
<td>5.87</td>
<td>6.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$(SD)$</td>
<td>(0.74)</td>
<td>(0.47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deviant Member</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$M$</td>
<td>2.67</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$(SD)$</td>
<td>(1.45)</td>
<td>(0.52)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Ratings range from 1 (*bad image*) to 7 (*good image*).

*Willingness to Influence the Deviant Member*

A Context x Group ANOVA revealed a significant two-way interaction, $F(1, 54) = 6.66, p = .01, \eta^2 = .11$ (highest remaining $F(1, 54) = 1.84, ns$). In the Secure Identity condition, participants were equally willing to exert influence on the deviant ingroup member, $M = 5.60, SD = 1.77$, as on the deviant outgroup member, $M = 6.00, SD = 1.13, F(1, 55) < 1$. However, in the Insecure Identity condition, participants were significantly more willing to influence the deviant ingroup member, $M = 6.79, SD = 0.58$, than the deviant outgroup member, and $M = 5.50, SD = 1.16, F(1, 55) = 7.47, p = .008$. This result thus supports our hypothesis.
In our third experiment, we examined the same idea as in Experiment 2, namely, that a potentially inferior status relative to an outgroup (specifically, an outgroup with which the ingroup has a history of competition), should trigger stronger derogation of ingroup deviants, and, concomitantly, upgrading of normative ingroup members, than a secure superior ingroup status. The difference between this experiment and Experiment 2 is that, this time, we used natural social categories instead of artificial groups.

**Method**

*Participants and Design*

In this experiment, 40 female and 16 male Psychology ($n = 32$) and Dentistry ($n = 24$) students in a private school, aged 18 to 35 years old ($\text{Mean age} = 20.52, \text{SD} = 2.33$) volunteered to participate in the experiment. Gender, $\chi^2 (3, N = 56) = 1.06, n$s, age, $F (3, 52) < 1$, and faculty, $\chi^2 (3, N = 56) = 6.54, n$s, were similarly distributed across conditions.

The design of the experiment was a 2 (Group: Ingroup vs. Outgroup) x 2 (Context: Secure Identity vs. Insecure Identity) x 2 (Member: Normative vs. Deviant). Group and Context are between-subjects factors, and Member is a within-subject factor. Participants were randomly assigned to conditions and ranged between 13 and 15 per condition.

*Procedure*

The procedure was inspired by that of Experiment 2 with some adjustments required by the use of natural social categories. The experiment was also conducted in two sessions, but, this time, the goal of the study was described in a slightly different manner than in the previous experiment. In the first session, the experimenter informed participants that the study was part of a larger research program aimed to, “learn about the social values
that people use in their daily life, and whether there is any relation between such values and the different university courses that people choose”. “Individuals who had previously participate in the research program” the experimenter continued, “had answered to a Value Inventory that was in the process of adaptation to the Portuguese population”. Participants were also informed that previous research had, allegedly, proved that this inventory “established with a high degree of precision the level of moral development of each individual”. Once participants gave their consent to participate in the research, the experimenter handed them a “Value Inventory – Short Version” (cf. Appendix 4). This inventory was composed by five questions addressing the same social topics as described in Experiment 2 (abortion, aids, homosexuality, attitudes towards fellow students, and “the wallet dilemma”).

Once the value inventory had been answered, the experimenter informed that, from the participants’ university, only the students from the Psychology and the Dentistry departments were chosen to participate in the research. At this point the experimenter explained that the adaptation of any “measurement instrument” required that the sample used in the research should be thoroughly described, in terms of a large set of indicators. Therefore, participants “would have to answer a series of question in a separate booklet”. In this booklet, amongst other questions, participants could find a series of questions measuring their attraction to the ingroup and to the outgroup. Because their responses were anonymous and confidential, they would have to identify themselves by means of a personal-code known only to them. As in Experiment 2, this code would allow them to receive feedback regarding their answers to the value inventory, while conserving their anonymity. In the second booklet, participants could find a written presentation of the study in which all verbal instructions were restated (see Appendix 4). Once they finished
answering all the questions, participants were asked to insert the two booklets in a folder, on which they wrote their “personal-code”.

The second session of the experiment was conducted one week latter. At the beginning of the session, the experimenter informed the participants that they would not be provided with the feedback concerning their personal level of moral development because, due to the pattern of results obtained in the first session, some additional data were required. At this point, the experimenter presented one of the results obtained in the first session that, “in light of previous data, request further inquiry”. This was intended to manipulate Context. As in Experiment 2, in the Secure Identity condition participants learned that “the results from the first session conclusively showed that the level of moral development was superior amongst the Psychology [vs. Dentistry] students than among Dentistry [vs. Psychology] students”. In the Insecure Identity condition participants were told that “the results from the first session were not at all conclusive about the superiority of any of the two groups of students”. All participants were then told that, these results had led the research team “to prepare a series of additional questions aimed to explore further the data gathered thus far”. This second phase of the study was identified in a new booklet entitled “Complementary Phase”. Finally, the experimenter informed participants that “the results of this second session will also allow the research team to devise a third phase of study in which the social issues listed in the value inventory would be discussed by some of the people who participated in the second phase of the study”, and, “those who volunteer to continue will be asked to pick their envelope from the first session and to start filling Booklet 1”. This booklet was similar to the corresponding one in our Experiment 2.

In the first page of Booklet 1, participants found written instructions about how they should carefully analyze the photocopies of the responses given by two students (A and B) to the liberal-conservative continuum about homosexuals. Depending on conditions, “student
A” and “student B” were presented either as Ingroup or Outgroup students who participated in the first session. Similarly to Experiment 2, the photocopies showed that one of these students adopted a normative position in the continuum (Statement 6) whereas the other adopted a deviant position (Statement 2).

Dependent Measures

Manipulation checks. At the end of the experiment, participants were instructed to fill a third booklet that was similar to the one employed in Experiment 2. In this booklet, participants were asked to remember: (1) which of the two courses showed a superior level of moral development (“Psychology”, “Dentistry”, “it wasn’t possible to determine”), (2) to which course students A and B belonged, and (3) which statement of the continuum had been chosen by each target. A final open-ended question invited participants to describe the study in their own words.

Attraction to the ingroup and to the outgroup. In the first session, participants answered six question measuring their attraction to their own course and to the opposite course: (1) “I like to be a student of the [ingroup] course” vs. “Sometimes I feel I would rather be in another course, for instance that of [outgroup]” (both questions, 1 = totally disagree, 9 = totally agree); (2) “To what extent are you pleased to belong to the [ingroup] course” vs. “To what extent would you feel more pleased if you belonged to the [outgroup] course” (both questions, 1 = not at all, 9 = very much); (3) “To what extent do you identify with the [ingroup] course?” vs. “To what extent do you identify with the [outgroup] course?” (both questions, 1 = I don’t identify much, 9 = I identify very much). We averaged these items to an Attraction to the Ingroup Score (Cronbach’s α = .95) and an Attraction to the Outgroup Score (Cronbach’s α = .81).
Attractiveness of normative and deviant members. Participants judged students A and B, each, on ten bipolar items: (1) “What is your opinion about this student?” (1 = negative; 9 = positive); (2 through 10) “In your opinion, student A [B] is a...” (1 – 9: bad person – good person, dishonest – honest, selfish – altruistic, insincere – sincere, envious – generous, insensitive – sensitive, bad colleague – good colleague, unsolidary – solidary, disloyal – loyal). The judgments across the ten items were averaged to create a Normative Member Score (Cronbach’s α = .88) and a Deviant Member Score (Cronbach’s α = .86).

Normative and deviant members’ perceived impact on the group. We asked participants to what extent the normative and the deviant target might affect their respective group in a positive or negative way: “To what extent do you consider that, during the third session of the study, this student will affect what others think about [Psychology vs. Dentistry] students in general?” (1 = very positively; 9 = very negatively).

Image conveyed by the normative and the deviant members. Participants were also asked whether students A and B portrayed a good or bad image of their course: “In your opinion, what image does this student convey of Psychology [vs. Dentistry] course as a whole?” (1 = very bad image; 9 = very good image).

Willingness to influence the deviant member. Finally, participants were asked how willing they were to attempt to make the deviant member adopt a different opinion on the issue: “If you participated in the third session along with this student, to what extent are you willing to convince this person to change their opinion?” (1 = not at all; 9 = very much).
Results and Discussion

Participants’ course (Psychology vs. Dentistry) revealed no significant effects as a covariate throughout the dependent measures (highest $F_{1, 51} = 3.39, \text{ns}$), and the effects involving the factors in our experimental design were similar to those we present below. Therefore, we collapsed participants in a Context x Group between-subjects design, while disregarding participants’ course.

Manipulation Check

The post-experimental questionnaire (Booklet 3) revealed that participants in the Secure and Insecure Identity conditions remembered correctly the respective manipulation of the alleged results of Session 1. In addition, all participants correctly reported the personal opinions of normative and deviant targets, as well as the targets’ group membership.

Attraction to Ingroup and to the Outgroup

The measures of attraction to the two rival courses were collected in the first session. Nevertheless, to be sure of the equivalence of participants across experimental condition in these measures, we submitted the two attraction scores (Attraction within-subject factor) to an ANOVA, entering Group and Context as between subjects factors. The analysis revealed only an effect of Attraction, $F (1, 52) = 480.92, p < .001, \eta^2 = .90$ (highest remaining $F_{1, 52} = 2.87, \text{ns}$). Not surprisingly, participants reported stronger

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19 All analyses reported in this experiment were first conducted by including participants’ course as a covariate. The effects of the covariate in these analyses are the following: Attraction to the ingroup and to the outgroup, all $F$s $(1, 51) < 1$; attractiveness of normative and deviant targets, $F (1, 51) = 1.27, \text{ns}$; normative and deviant targets’ impact on the group, all $F$s $(1, 51) < 1$; image conveyed by the normative and deviant targets, all $F$s $(1, 51) < 1$;and willingness to influence the deviant Member, $F (1, 51) = 3.39, \text{ns}$. This shows that participants’ course had no impact on the relevant dependent measures.
attraction to the ingroup, $M = 8.08$, $SD = 1.23$, than to the outgroup, $M = 2.02$, $SD = 1.16$. No differences were found across conditions.

Table 3.6

*Attractiveness of Normative and Deviant Members as a Function of Context and Group Membership (Experiment 3)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context</th>
<th>Secure Identity</th>
<th>Insecure Identity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Normative Member</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$M$ (SD)</td>
<td>$M$ (SD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ingroup</td>
<td>7.16 (0.84)</td>
<td>7.59 (0.90)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outgroup</td>
<td>6.78 (0.82)</td>
<td>6.69 (0.73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deviant Member</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$M$ (SD)</td>
<td>$M$ (SD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ingroup</td>
<td>4.16 (0.78)</td>
<td>3.48 (0.80)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outgroup</td>
<td>4.25 (0.93)</td>
<td>4.04 (0.94)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Ratings range from 1 (*non attractive*) to 9 (*attractive*).

*Attractiveness of Normative and Deviant Members*

The results reported in Table 3.6 are consistent with those of Experiment 2, and in line with the black sheep effect hypothesis. The Context x Group x Member ANOVA computed on the normative and deviant member attractiveness scores, revealed significant effects of Member, $F(1, 52) = 336.16, p < .001, \eta^2 = .87$, Group x Member, respectively, $F(1, 52) = 14.45, p < .001, \eta^2 = .22$, and Context x Group x Member, $F(1, 52) = 5.39, p = .02, \eta^2 = .09$ (highest remaining $F1, 52 = 1.16, ns$). The three-way interaction shows that, consistent with our predictions, in the Insecure Identity condition, the Group x Member effect is significant, $F(1, 53) = 19.17, p < .001$, whereas in the Secure Identity condition it is not, $F(1, 53) = 1.11, ns$. The interaction within the Insecure condition indicates that
participants judge the normative ingroup member more favorably than the corresponding outgroup member, $F(1, 53) = 8.49$, $p = .005$, and, on the contrary, the deviant is more strongly derogated than that of outgroup, $F(1, 53) = 12.37$, $p = .001$.20

Table 3.7

Perceived Impact of Normative and Deviant Members on the Group as a Function of Context and Group Membership (Experiment 3)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context</th>
<th>Secure Identity</th>
<th>Insecure Identity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ingroup</td>
<td>Outgroup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normative Member</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$M$</td>
<td>3.08</td>
<td>2.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(SD)$</td>
<td>(2.63)</td>
<td>(1.45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deviant Member</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$M$</td>
<td>6.46</td>
<td>6.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(SD)$</td>
<td>(2.15)</td>
<td>(1.95)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Higher values indicate the perception of a more negative impact on the group.

Normative and Deviant Members’ Impact on the Group

Table 3.7 shows the means and standard deviations of participants’ judgments about the perceived impact of normative and deviant members on their respective group. As we can see, the general pattern is consistent with the idea that the judgment of whether the targets have a positive or negative impact on their respective group matches participants’ evaluations of the normative and deviant members’ attractiveness. The

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20 We submitted the intragroup differentiation scores to a contrast analysis with the values -1, -1, 3, and -1, respectively for the Ingroup/Secure Identity, Outgroup/Secure Identity, Ingroup/Insecure Identity, and Outgroup/Insecure Identity conditions. Consistent with our predictions and with the results of the previous experiment, the analysis revealed a stronger differentiation between the normative and the deviant members in the Ingroup/Insecure Identity condition, $M = 4.10$, $SD = 0.37$, than in the remaining conditions, $t(52) = 4.16$, $p < .001$ (Outgroup/Insecure Identity, $M = 2.14$, $SD = 0.98$; Ingroup/Secure Identity, $M = 3.01$, $SD = 1.47$; Outgroup/Secure Identity conditions, $M = 2.54$, $SD = 0.91$.)
highest negative impact is that of the ingroup deviant member in the insecure identity condition, and the highest positive impact is that of the normative ingroup member, in that same condition.

Unfortunately, although the ANOVA revealed an effect of Member, \( F(1, 52) = 336.16, p < .001, \eta^2 = .73 \), the predicted Context x Group x Member effect was but marginally significant, \( F(1, 52) = 3.13, p = .08, \eta^2 = .06 \) (highest remaining \( F(1, 52) = 2.48, ns \)). In decomposing this interaction, we found that the Group x Member effect was only marginally significant in the Insecure Identity condition, \( F(1, 53) = 3.06, p = .09 \), and non-significant in the Secure Identity condition, \( F(1, 53) < 1 \). In addition, these results did not indicate that in the Insecure Identity condition the judgments of normatives, \( F(1, 53) < 1 \), and deviants, \( F(1, 53) = 2.49, ns \), differed depending on their group membership.

In short, although they are but marginally consistent with our hypothesis, these results encourage the idea that the context in which normative and deviant ingroup individuals are judged may affect the extent to which they are perceived, respectively, as a threatening or as shielding the group’s social identity. In support of this idea, we found that decomposing the two-way interaction as a function of Group and not of Context, the Context x Member interaction is significant when judging ingroup members, \( F(1, 53) = 5.55, p = .02 \), but not outgroup members, \( F(1, 53) < 1 \). This interaction indicates that participants tended to perceive the normative ingroup member’s more positive impact on when the group’s status is insecure, \( M = 1.93, DP = 1.39 \), than when it is secure, \( M = 3.08, DP = 2.63, F(1, 53) = 5.55, p = .09 \). Conversely, participants considered that the deviant has a more strongly negative impact on the ingroup when the group’s status is threatened, \( M = 7.79, DP = 1.93 \), than when it is secured, \( M = 6.46, DP = 2.15, F(1, 53) = 2.80, p = .10 \).
**Image Conveyed by Normative and Deviant Members**

The ANOVA conducted on the scores relative to perceptions of the image conveyed by the normative and deviant members revealed significant effects of Member, $F(1, 52) = 352.83, p < .001, \eta^2 = .87$, and Group x Member, $F(1, 54) = 6.08, p = .02, \eta^2 = .10$ (highest remaining $F_{1, 52} = 2.14, ns$). The Group x Member interaction indicates that, regardless of context, participants considered that ingroup deviants, $M = 2.37, DP = 1.28$, convey a worse image of the ingroup than outgroup deviants convey of the outgroup, $M = 3.10, DP = 1.18$, $F(1, 54) = 5.01, p = .03$. In turn, participants tend to perceive that normative ingroup members promote a better image of the ingroup, $M = 7.81, DP = 1.18$, than do the their outgroup equivalents of their respective group, $M = 7.28, DP = 0.99, F(1, 54) = 3.43, p = .07$ (see Table 3.8).

Table 3.8

*Image Conveyed by Normative and Deviant Members as a Function of Context and Group Membership (Experiment 3)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context</th>
<th>Secure Identity</th>
<th>Insecure Identity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ingroup</td>
<td>Outgroup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normative Member</td>
<td>$M$</td>
<td>7.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>($SD$)</td>
<td>(1.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deviant Member</td>
<td>$M$</td>
<td>2.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>($SD$)</td>
<td>(1.28)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Ratings range from 1 (*very bad image*) to 9 (*very good image*).
Willingness to Influence the Deviant Member

Finally, in the same way as we did in Experiment 2, we checked for the idea that participants would be more willing to attempt to influence the deviant member to change their opinion about homosexuals, when the deviant belonged to the ingroup member and the context is insecure. However, the present results do not support this prediction (see Table 3.9). Indeed, the Context × Group ANOVA on the participants’ responses to this question revealed no significant effects, all $F$s (1, 52) < 1. At odds with our hypothesis and with the results of Experiment 2, participants reported to be similarly willing to exert influence on the deviant across conditions.

Table 3.9

Willingness to Influence the Deviant Member as a Function of Context and Group Membership (Experiment 3)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context</th>
<th>Secure Identity</th>
<th>Insecure Identity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ingroup</td>
<td>Outgroup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$M$</td>
<td>7.46</td>
<td>7.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(SD)$</td>
<td>(1.61)</td>
<td>(1.58)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Higher values indicate stronger willingness to influence the deviant member.

Experiment 4

In this experiment we asked Sciences and Arts students to participate in a survey about student ragging practices in the university. Allegedly the survey had already been answered by people that were not students of the University of Porto and we wanted them to give their opinion regarding the results gathered so far. Depending on the Context
manipulation, participants found out either that the majority of Porto’s inhabitants were in favor of ragging rites in the university (Norm-Validating condition) or that the majority was against these rites (Norm-Undermining condition). Subsequently, participants were invited to state their reaction to this alleged result. With a similar procedure to the one described for Experiment 1 participants then indicated their personal opinion along the pro-ragging – anti-ragging continuum, as well as the position in the continuum they disagreed the most with. Finally, participants judged the attractiveness of group members that had adopted each one of these two positions.

We expected participants to express a more negative emotional reaction in the Norm-Undermining condition than in the Norm-Validating condition. As a consequence of the stronger prescriptive focus elicited in that context, we expected stronger derogation of deviant ingroup members (and upgrading of normative ingroup members) in the Norm-Undermining condition than in the Norm-Validating condition.

Method

Participants

Participants were 44 female and 14 male Arts ($n = 26$) and Sciences ($n = 32$) students, from 18 to 26 years-old (Mean age = 21.12; SD = 1.97) who volunteered to participate in an alleged survey about student ragging. Gender, $\chi^2 (3, N = 58) = 1.73, \text{ ns}$, age, $F (1, 54) = 1.20, \text{ ns}$, faculty, $\chi^2 (3, N = 58) < 1$, and year of studies, $F (1, 54) = 1.55, \text{ ns}$, were similarly distributed across conditions.
Procedure and Design

The study was conducted by means of a questionnaire. An interviewer asked Arts and Sciences students to participate in a survey “aiming to know the opinions of the student population and the public in general about students’ ragging in the university”. In the first page of the questionnaire, participants read information about the study’s alleged objective: “As you know, student ragging at the university has recently become an issue of debate, not only among students, but also in the general public. […] This questionnaire is part of a two-phase survey about this issue. In the first phase, a representative sample of the students of the Arts faculty and the Sciences faculty, as well as of the inhabitants of Porto has stated their opinions regarding student ragging […]. In this second phase our purpose is to validate the results obtained in the first phase […]”.

In that same page, participants were presented with a series of questions about which faculty they belonged to, for how many years they studied in that faculty, and their age and gender. The interviewer insured that participants completed each page of the questionnaire before going forward and that they did not go back to correct any answer in previous pages.

In the second page of the questionnaire, participants were presented with questions aiming to measure their attraction to their own school. In the third page, participants were given information about the alleged results of the first phase of the study that, purportedly, had already been concluded. This information was used to manipulate Context. In the Norm-Validating condition participants learned that the data collected thus far indicated that “the large majority of the public in general clearly supports student ragging”. Conversely, in the Norm-Undermining condition participants read that “the large majority of the public in general clearly is against student ragging”. Subsequent to this information, participants answered to questions aiming to assess their emotional reaction to the results
they had just learned about (Emotional Reaction to Threat). In the same page, they were
asked to indicate, in the same continuum of opinions about student ragging as the one
employed in Experiment 1, the statement with which they agreed the most and the
statement with which they disagreed the most. As we did in Experiment 1, we used these
positions to manipulate Normative and Deviant target members (see Appendix 5).

Finally, in the last page of the questionnaire, participants were asked to judge
students issuing either from their faculty (Ingroup condition) or from the opposed faculty
(Outgroup condition) who had chosen the normative, or the deviant position. Once the
questionnaire was complete, participants were fully debriefed.\textsuperscript{21}

The design was a 2 (Context: Norm-Validating vs. Norm-Undermining) x 2
(Group: Ingroup vs. Outgroup) x 2 (Member: Normative vs. Deviant) mixed-design, in
which Context and Group are between-subjects factors, and Member is a within-subject
factor. Participants were randomly assigned to conditions and their numbers were 14 or 15
by condition.

\textit{Dependent Measures}

\textit{Attraction to the ingroup.} Before any manipulation, participants answered to four
questions aimed to measure attraction to their own faculty: (1) “I like being a student of my
faculty”; (2) “I have strong bonds with my faculty and my colleagues”; (3) “I identify with
my faculty”; (4) “I see myself as a member of my faculty”. All response scales ranged
from 1 (\textit{I completely disagree}) to 9 (\textit{I completely agree}). We averaged these questions
to an Attraction to the Ingroup score (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .80$).\textsuperscript{22}

\textsuperscript{21} Eleven participants were not considered for data analysis either because they said to be suspicious while
answering to the questionnaire (two participants), for not answering all the questions (seven participants) or
did not complied with the experiment instructions on how to answer the questionnaire (two participants).
\textsuperscript{22} We did not include measures of attraction to the outgroup based on the fact that, in a brief test to the
questionnaire, more than one person pointed out that the presence of such questions made them suspect about
the real purpose of the study.
Emotional reaction to threat. After reading the information stating that the public in general was either clearly supportive of, or clearly opposed to, student ragging (Norm-Validating condition vs. Norm-Undermining condition), participants were asked about how they felt after having learnt about this result, in 3 bipolar scales: “Now that you know this result you feel …” (1 = very happy, very pleased, in a very good mood; 9 = very unhappy, very annoyed, in a very bad mood). Although the Cronbach’s Alpha was somewhat low (Cronbach’s α = .61), we averaged the three items to create an Emotional Reaction to Threat score.

Attractiveness of normative and deviant members. After having chosen the statement with which they agreed the most (normative position) and the statement with which they most disagreed (deviant position), participants were asked to judge students who had chosen these positions. These judgments were made in five bipolar items (1 = very unfavorable opinion, bad schoolmate, very disloyal, lack a lot of solidarity, contributes to disharmony among students; 9 = very favorable opinion, good schoolmate, very loyal, show a lot of solidarity, contributes to cohesion among students). We averaged the scores of the five items to create a Normative Member Score (Cronbach’s α = .89) and a Deviant Member Score (Cronbach’s α = .84).

Results and Discussion

For all the dependent measures, we ran the analyses reported below, by entering Participant’s Faculty (Arts vs. Sciences) as a covariant. These analyses revealed no significant effects involving Participant’s Faculty, in any of the dependent measures: on Attraction to the Ingroup, $F(1, 53) < 1$; on Emotional Reaction to Threat, $F(1, 53) < 1$; on

---

23 The Normative and the Deviant positions chosen by participants were equivalent across conditions. The Context x Group ANOVA revealed, as required, no significant effects in the Normative position chosen by the participants, highest $F(1, 54) = 2.73$, ns (positions ranged from 5 to 7 in the continuum), or in the Deviant position, highest $F(1, 54) = 3.11$, ns (positions ranged from 1 to 3 in the continuum).
the normative position chosen by participants, $F(1, 53) = 2.23, ns$; on the deviant position chosen by participants, $F(1, 53) < 1$; on the attractiveness to normative and deviant members, $F(1, 53) = 2.33, ns$. Given these results we disregarded Participant’s Faculty from the following analyses.

**Attraction to the Ingroup**

Although we measured attraction to the ingroup before any manipulation, we nonetheless computed a full factorial ANOVA on the Attraction to the Ingroup score that revealed no significant effects (highest $F(1, 54) = 2.91, ns$). Participants reported to be equally attracted to their own school across conditions, Overall Mean = 6.60, SD = 1.37. In addition, the difference between this score and the scale midpoint (5), shows that participants were without any doubt attracted to the ingroup, $t(57) = 8.89, p < .001$.

**Emotional Reaction to Threat**

In this experiment, we wanted to test the idea that the negative emotional reaction associated with the sense of threat that results from the undermining of ingroup standards would trigger strong derogatory attitudes towards ingroup deviants and appreciation towards normative members. To test this prediction we must ensure that the Context manipulation is effective in generating a more negative emotional reaction in the Norm-Undermining than in the Norm-Validating condition.

Although participants’ emotional reaction was measured before the manipulation of Group, we submitted the Emotional Reaction to Threat score to a full factorial ANOVA. The results showed that participants reported a more negative emotional reaction in the Norm-Undermining condition, $M = 5.60, SD = 1.96$, than in the Norm-Validating condition, $M = 3.88, SD = 0.98, F(1, 54) = 36.15, p = .001, \eta^2 = .40$ (remaining $Fs < 2.79, ns$). In addition, when compared with the midpoint (5) of the scale, these values indicate
that whereas in the norm-validating condition participants had a positive emotional reaction, \( t(27) = 6.06, p < .001 \), on the contrary in the norm-undermining condition the participants had a negative emotional reaction, \( t(29) = 2.74, p = .01 \).

*Attractiveness of Normative and Deviant Members*

The fact that participants’ emotional reaction was more negative in the Norm-Undermining than in the Norm-Validating condition, allows us to examine the idea that participants will more strongly differentiate between normative and deviant ingroup members in the former than in the latter condition.\(^{24}\)

Table 3.10

*Attractiveness of Normative and Deviant Members as a Function of Context and Group Membership (Experiment 4)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context</th>
<th>Norm-Validating</th>
<th>Norm-Undermining</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ingroup</td>
<td>Outgroup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normative Member</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( M )</td>
<td>6.51</td>
<td>6.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( (SD) )</td>
<td>(1.48)</td>
<td>(1.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deviant Member</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( M )</td>
<td>4.47</td>
<td>4.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( (SD) )</td>
<td>(1.24)</td>
<td>(1.17)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Ratings range from 1 (*non attractive*) to 9 (*attractive*).

Table 3.10 shows the means and standard deviations of judgments of normative and deviant members across conditions. A Context x Group x Member ANOVA revealed

\(^{24}\) We decided to enter the normative and the deviant positions chosen by participants as covariates in the analyses reported in this section. The results were similar to those reported, with no significant effects involving the covariates, highest \( F(1, 52) = 1.71, \text{ns} \).
significant effects of Member, $F(1, 54) = 76.53, p < .001, \eta^2 = .59$, of Group x Member, $F(1, 54) = 5.77, p = .02, \eta^2 = .10$, and, more important to our predictions, of Context x Group x Member, $F(1, 54) = 4.98, p = .03, \eta^2 = .08$ (remaining $Fs_{1, 54} < 1.79, ns$).

The main effect of Member indicates that the normative member was judged more favorably than the deviant member, $M = 6.57, SD = 1.34$ and $M = 4.36, SD = 1.22$, respectively. The Group x Member interaction indicates that, whereas judgments of the normative member were not affected by the Group factor, $F(1, 56) = 1.79, ns$, participants judged the deviant ingroup member more negatively, $M = 3.97, SD = 1.29$, than the deviant outgroup member, $M = 4.74, SD = 1.01, F(1, 56) = 6.53, p = .01$.

![Graph](image)

**Figure 3.2.** Attractiveness of normative and deviant members as a function of context and group membership (Experiment 4)

We decomposed the Context x Group x Member interaction. The analysis revealed that, whereas no significant effects emerged in the Norm-Validating condition (all $Fs_{1, 55} < 1$), On the contrary, a significant Group x Member interaction, $F(1, 55) = 11.18, p =$
.001 emerged in the Norm-Undermining condition (remaining $F_{1, 55} < 1$). As shown in Figure 3.2, in the Norm-Validating condition participants upgraded normative members and derogated deviant members, irrespective of their group membership. However, as predicted, in the Norm-Undermining condition, participants upgraded normative ingroup member, $F_{1, 55} = 4.98$, $p = .03$, and, simultaneously, derogated deviant ingroup members, $F_{1, 55} = 9.21$, $p = .004$, as compared to their outgroup counterparts.25

Table 3.11
Correlations between Emotional Reaction and Intragroup Differentiation in each Condition (Experiment 4).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ingroup/Norm-Validating</th>
<th>Outgroup/Norm-Validating</th>
<th>Ingroup/Norm-Undermining</th>
<th>Outgroup/Norm-Undermining</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$r = -.49^\dagger$</td>
<td>$r = -.27$</td>
<td>$r = .45^\dagger$</td>
<td>$r = -.01$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>($n = 14$)</td>
<td>($n = 14$)</td>
<td>($n = 15$)</td>
<td>($n = 15$)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: $^\dagger p < .10$

Emotional Reaction to Threat and Intragroup Differentiation

We may expect that upgrading of normative and derogation of deviant ingroup members in the norm-undermining context should be negatively correlated with the emotional reaction score, especially in the Ingroup/Norm-Undermining condition. In order

25 We computed an Intragroup Differentiation Score by subtracting the Deviant Member Score to the Normative Member Score so that a higher value indicates stronger intragroup differentiation. The scores of the four conditions were submitted to a contrast analysis with the values -1, -1, +3, and -1, respectively for the Ingroup/Norm-Validating, Outgroup/Norm-Validating, Ingroup/Norm-Undermining, and Outgroup/Norm-Undermining conditions. The analysis revealed that, as expected, participants differentiated more strongly between the normative and the deviant member in the Ingroup/Norm-Undermining condition, $M = 3.57$, $SD = 1.90$, than in the Outgroup/Norm-Undermining, $M = 1.24$, $SD = 2.14$, in the Ingroup/Norm-Validating, $M = 2.04$, $SD = 1.84$, and in the Outgroup/Norm-Validating conditions, $M = 1.96$, $SD = 1.75$, $t(54) = 3.18$, $p = .002$. Since the mean observed in the Outgroup/Norm-Undermining condition, $M = 1.24$, is apparently lower than that of the other two condition to which we attributed the same contrast value we decided to perform a second contrast analysis with the values +1, +1, 0 and -2. We thus compare only the three conditions with lower intragroup differentiation scores. The analysis revealed a non-significant result, $t(54) = 1.24$, ns.
to explore this idea, we correlated the two scores within each condition, even though the number of participants per condition may hinder the power of such an analysis.

As we may see in Table 3.11, although they were only marginally significant, the product-moment correlations between the two measures indicate that, when judging normative and deviant ingroup members in the Ingroup/Norm-Undermining condition, the more negative were participants’ emotional reactions, the more strongly they differentiated between the normative member and the deviant ingroup members, \( r = .45, p = .09 \). The reverse pattern emerges in the Ingroup/Norm-Validating condition, in which the more negative were participants’ emotional reactions, the less they differentiated between the two targets, \( r = -.49, p = .07 \). In the outgroup conditions, correlations are negligible, respectively, \( r = -.01 \), and \( r = -.27, ns \). We return to this issue in more detail in Experiment 5. For the time being, it seems enough to notice that this result suggests that perceived threat to a prescriptive ingroup norm elicits negative emotional reactions from individuals. As a result, they may display stronger derogatory attitudes towards ingroup deviants while upgrading normative ingroup members.

**General Discussion and Conclusions**

Altogether, the results of the four experiments reported in this chapter support our hypotheses. In Experiment 1, we manipulated the extent to which a relevant norm is supported or challenged by ingroup or outgroup members. We found that, when salient ingroup members undermined the subjective validity of the norm, and therefore, the group’s perceived legitimacy for a comparatively positive stand with respect to the outgroup, participants decreased their level of tolerance for deviant positions. Interestingly, the deviants judged in the ingroup norm undermining condition were objectively more close to the normative standard than were the deviants judged in the three remaining conditions. In spite of this fact, participants derogated deviants more negatively in the former than in the
latter conditions. In Experiments 2 and 3, we manipulated the extent to which participants could feel secure or insecure regarding the comparative position of the ingroup relative to the outgroup as a whole. In both studies, we found that participants derogated ingroup deviant members more and upgraded normative ingroup members more when the ingroup’s position as a whole was insecure. In Experiment 4, we manipulated the existing agreement outside the group with a valued norm. We found, in consonance with Experiment 1, that when such agreement did not exist, participants became significantly more prescriptive in their appraisals of ingroup normative and deviant members than when such agreement helped validating the norm’s legitimacy. We also found that, when no agreement existed, emotional reactions were more negative than when agreement existed. In addition, we found a correlation of differentiation between normative and deviant ingroup members with the emotional reaction evoked by whether there existed or not an outside agreement with the norm. When no such agreement existed, differentiation between normative and deviant ingroup members emerged in association with negative emotional reaction.

To conclude, results of the four reported experiments appear to be consistent. Derogation of ingroup deviants and upgrading of ingroup normative members seem to be associated to internal (Experiment 1), or to external conditions (experiments 2, 3, and 4), that are endowed with the potential of jeopardizing the ingroup’s stand relative to an outgroup. We also found, in all experiments, that outgroup normative members and outgroup deviant members elicited, respectively, favorable and unfavorable evaluations. However, not only were these evaluations much less strong than evaluations of their ingroup correlatives, but they were also impervious to contextual changes. This is not surprising, and, in fact, is fully consistent with the principles of the subjective group dynamics model. Indeed, outgroup members are irrelevant because intergroup boundaries prevent them from having significant impact on the subjective legitimacy of a positive social identity. Interestingly, this
finding is in line with the idea that derogation of deviants by other ingroup members involves more of an inclusive rather than an exclusive attitude towards them (cf. Levine, 1980; Levine & Thompson, 1996, for discussions). In further support of this idea, and consistently with research reported elsewhere (Marques et al., 2001, Experiment 2; cf. Chapter 2), we found that individuals are motivated to exert influence upon deviant ingroup members by willing to attempt to persuade them to change their normative stand.

The above result replicates well-established findings in the realm of small group research. Notice however, that it clearly emerges from our results that this motivation is not directed at simply generating consensus about an issue of dissent. Participants’ are particularly concerned with establishing consensus with dissenting ingroup members, and not so much with dissenting outgroup members. This result thus appears to support the notion of referent information influence (Turner, 1991; cf. also Abrams et al, 1990; Chapter 2) in that, for participants, the relevant source of validation lies more in the ingroup than outside of it, even though, general consensus, rather than ingroup consensus exclusively, might, in principle offer stronger social validation. Finally, we found that this process is correlated with the actual perception of ingroup deviants as a threat (as indicated by negative emotional reaction), in such identity jeopardizing conditions.
As we discussed in Chapter 2, the subjective group dynamics model posits that social situations in which salient ingroup members violate relevant criteria that support positive ingroup differentiation makes individuals switch from a descriptive focus to a prescriptive focus (e.g. Marque et al, 2001; Marques, Abrams & Páez, 1998). Descriptive focus refers to the fact that individuals concentrate their attention on those characteristics that differentiate between ingroup and outgroup as a whole, and operates at the intergroup stage of the subjective group dynamics model (cf. Marques, Abrams & Páez, 1998; Figure 2.2). In line with self-categorization theory, descriptive focus would depend on the operation of the metacontrast process, according to which individuals establish the criteria which better account for perceived intergroup differences and intragroup similarities. In adopting a descriptive focus, individuals will equally attempt to fulfill their motivation to uphold a positive social identity, by attempting to generate positive differentiation between the ingroup and the outgroup as a whole. However, according to the subjective group dynamics model, while adopting a descriptive focus, individuals may be faced with undesirable behavior of ingroup members. Evidence shows that prescriptive focus is heightened by the violation of group norms (e.g. Cialdini & Trost, 1998). Therefore, when such behavior is not correlated with the criteria that specify group membership, and thus cannot be reconstructed as outgroup behavior, individuals will adopt a prescriptive focus. In this case, individuals will focus

“on norms that legitimate [their] beliefs about positive in-group distinctiveness. These norms anchor judgments of what individuals believe
ought to be consistent with in-group membership [...] Often, in such situations, individuals cannot or do not wish to recategorize deviants as members of another group (e.g. when groups are defined by race, ethnicity, or gender, or when group solidarity is a highly valued group norm)” (Marques, Abrams & Serôdio, 2001, pp. 445).

To summarize, descriptive norms and prescriptive norms would have different psychological properties and functions. On the one hand, descriptive norms would help to inductively establish group prototypes and to deductively establish intergroup positions from these prototypes. On the other hand, prescriptive norms would “provide standards on which individuals base their judgments about the legitimacy of positive ingroup distinctiveness” (Marques et al., 2001, p. 419; cf. also Marques, Abrams & Serôdio, 2001). Therefore, when we refer to individuals’ hostile reactions to deviants, we are referring to the emotional consequence of salient violations of such injunctive, “oughtness-based” criteria that are not definitional properties of group membership but are definitional of the moral value of those who attune to, or who violate them.

Compelling as it may be, the idea that there is an interplay between group prototypes and prescriptive norms has never been directly addressed by research on subjective group dynamics. This is the central point of the present chapter. However, before comparing between the two types of norms, descriptive norms, or prototypical specifications of group membership on the one hand, and prescriptive norms, or moral injunctions susceptible to generate punitive reactions from individuals, we need to demonstrate the emotional properties of the reactions evoked by prescriptive norms. This is the goal of Experiment 5. We may then progress in our attempt to establish the relationship

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26 As a case in point, Marques et al (1998) have shown that participants simultaneously applied to an intergroup and an intragroup level of judgment, when the prescriptive focus was directly induced in the context of judgments. However, these authors did not directly deal with the impact of prototypicality as a
between these emotional reactions and the, descriptive, prototypical, characteristics of normative and deviant members towards whom individuals direct such reactions. This is the general goal of experiments 6 and 7.

Experiments 6 and 7 were partly inspired by the above reasoning. Participants were categorized in artificial groups using a similar procedure to that of Experiment 2 (cf. Chapter 3). The alleged goal of the experiments was to examine the relationship between people’s perceptual profile” and their ethical values. Participants were categorized in one of two opposite perception types and were asked to state their ethical positions on an issue. They were asked to judge ingroup or outgroup members who were depicted either as typical or atypical of their perceptual type. In addition, these target members could be either normative or deviant in terms of their ethical positions. Following the reasoning we outlined above, we expected participants to show a stronger prescriptive focus when judging typical ingroup group members than atypical ingroup members, or outgroup members. Therefore, we predicted that participants would upgrade descriptively typical/prescriptively normative ingroup members compared to equivalent outgroup members, and, conversely, that they would more strongly derogate descriptively typical/prescriptively deviant ingroup members compared to equivalent deviant outgroup members. In other words, we expected a black sheep effect to emerge only from judgments of highly typical ingroup members.

In Experiment 7, we made two additional sets of predictions, one set regarding the impact of emotional reactions to targets on their evaluations, and the other, regarding the perceived impact of these targets on the group’s overall image. With respect to the first set, we made three predictions. First, we predicted that, compared to the remaining conditions,
descriptively typical normative and deviant ingroup members would elicit, respectively, more positive and more negative emotional reactions than all other members. Second, we hypothesized that, in the Ingroup/High Typicality condition, the higher is participant’ attraction to the ingroup, (1) the more negative will be their emotional reaction to the deviant, (2) the more positive will be their emotional reaction to the normative member, and (3) the more strongly they will derogate the former and upgrade the later member. Third we predicted that participants’ emotional reaction to deviant and normative members should mediate the extent to which their attraction to the ingroup predicts judgments of deviant and normative ingroup members.

With respect to the perceived impact of targets on their group’s overall image, we predicted that, when judging descriptively typical ingroup members, the more participants are attracted to the ingroup, (1) the more they will perceive the deviant member as a threat to, and the normative member as protective of, the group’s overall image, and (2) this difference would mediate the extent to which attraction to ingroup predicts stronger intragroup differentiation.

Experiment 5

In Experiment 4, we found a correlation between individuals’ emotional reaction to a threat to an ingroup norm and the extent to which they upgraded normative ingroup members and derogated deviant ingroup members. We speculated that this result may indicate that emotional reaction is a mediator between perceived threat and judgments of ingroup members. In the present experiment, we reasoned that the logical next step would be to account for participants’ endorsement of the prescriptive norm, in order to show that their emotional reaction actually mediates between such endorsement and their judgments of ingroup members.
In the present experiment, we examine whether, in a context that potentially threatens an ingroup prescriptive norm, derogatory reactions to ingroup deviants (and favorable reactions towards ingroup normative members) depend on the endorsement of such a norm, as mediated by negative emotional reactions that, in turn, instigate individuals’ hostile reactions to ingroup deviance. The procedure of this experiment is similar to that of Experiment 4.

To test the above idea, we measured participants’ endorsement of student ragging before any manipulation, followed by measures of emotional reaction to threat and, the, by judgments of normative and deviant ingroup or outgroup members. This allowed us to regress participants’ emotional reaction to threat (mediator) and their judgments of target group members (outcome) on their endorsement of the prescriptive norm (predictor). In addition, we hypothesized that this process would be significant only in the Ingroup/Norm-Undermining condition. In this condition, the more strongly participants endorse a norm: (1) the more negative will be their emotional reaction; and (2) the more strongly they will differentiate between normative and deviant members.

Method

Participants

Participants were Arts ($n = 35$) and Sciences ($n = 38$) students (42 female and 31 male; Mean age = 21.00, $SD = 2.94$) who volunteered to participate in a “survey about student ragging”. Gender, $\chi^2 (3, N = 73) = 1.82$, $ns$, age, $F (1, 69) < 1$, faculty, $\chi^2 (3, N = 73) < 1$, and year of studies, $F (1, 69) = 1.01$, $ns$, were similarly distributed across conditions.
Procedure and Design

The design of the experiment was a 2 (Context: Norm-Validating vs. Norm-Undermining) x 2 (Group: Ingroup vs. Outgroup) x 2 (Member: Normative vs. Deviant) in which Context and Group are between-subjects factors and Member is a within-subject factor. The number of participants randomly assigned across conditions was as follows: Ingroup/Norm-Validating, \( n = 20 \); Outgroup/Norm-Validating, \( n = 17 \); Ingroup/Norm-Undermining, \( n = 18 \); Outgroup/Norm-Undermining, \( n = 18 \).

The procedure was similar to that of the Experiment 4 (cf. Chapter 3). The major difference with that experiment is that in the second page of the questionnaire, before all manipulations, we measured participants’ level of endorsement of student ragging.

Dependent Measures

Attraction to the ingroup. Before any manipulation, participants answered to the same four questions as those used in Experiment 4, in order to measure their attraction to their own faculty. We averaged the four items to a Group Attraction Score (Cronbach’s \( \alpha \) = .85).

Endorsement of student ragging. In the second page of the questionnaire, we asked participants to which extent they endorsed student ragging by means of five items: (1) “In your opinion, student ragging in your faculty is …”, 1 = worse than in other faculties, 9 = better than in other faculties; (2) “In your opinion, student ragging is …” 1 = very negative, 9 = very positive; (3) “In your opinion, student ragging is …” 1 = very useless, 9 = very useful; (4) “In general, as regards student ragging, you …” 1 = fully disagree, 9 = fully agree; (5) “In your opinion, as regards the integration of the new students in the university, ragging is …” 1 = not at all important, 9 = very important. The five items were averaged to a Norm Endorsement Score (Cronbach’s \( \alpha \) = .81).
Emotional reaction to threat. Immediately after reading the information used to manipulate Context, participants were asked to answer to the same three items that we used in Experiment 4 to create the Emotional Reaction Score (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .81$).

Attractiveness of normative and deviant members. Finally, participants had to judge the normative and the deviant members in the same items as those employed in Experiment 4. The five items were averaged to a Normative Member Score and a Deviant Member Score (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .83$ and .81, respectively).

Results and Discussion

Attraction to the Ingroup

We submitted the Group Attraction Score to a full factorial ANOVA. This ANOVA revealed no significant effects (all $F_1, 69 < 1$). Participants’ attraction to their own faculty did not vary across conditions, Overall Mean = 6.63, $SD = 1.61$. The comparison with the scale midpoint (5) shows that participants were positively attracted to the ingroup, $t(72) = 8.60$, $p < .001$.

Endorsement of Student Ragging

The Norm Endorsement Score was obtained before any manipulation. Nevertheless, we submitted this score to a Context x Group ANOVA, to insure its equivalence across conditions. The analysis revealed no significant effects (highest $F_1, 69 = 2.94$, $ns$). Participants endorsed the student ragging norm, Overall Mean = 6.96, $SD = 1.04$, as

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As we did in the preceding experiments, for all dependent measures we ran the analyses reported below by using Participant’s Faculty (Arts vs. Sciences) as a covariate. Again, the analyses revealed no significant effects involving Participant’s Faculty, in any of the measures: Group Attraction, highest $F(1, 68) = 2.26$, $ns$; Emotional Reaction, $F(1, 68) < 1$; normative position chosen by participants, highest $F(1, 68) < 1$; deviant position chosen by participants, $F(1, 68) < 1$; attractiveness of normative and deviant members, $F(1, 68) < 1$. We thus disregarded this variable and proceeded we the 2 (Context: Norm-Validating vs. Norm-Undermining) x 2 (Group: Ingroup vs. Outgroup) x (Member: Normative vs. Deviant) design described above.
revealed by the comparison of this score with the midpoint (5) of the scale, \( t(72) = 16.15, p < .001 \).

**Emotional Reaction to Threat**

The Context x Group ANOVA on the Emotional Reaction to Threat score revealed only an effect of Context, \( F(1, 69) = 57.83, p < .001, \eta^2 = .46 \) (highest remaining \( F(1, 69) = 1.58, \ ns \)). Participants reported a more negative emotional reaction in the Norm-Undermining, \( M = 5.14, SD = 1.10 \), than in the Norm-Validating condition, \( M = 3.05, SD = 1.28 \). Consistent with Experiment 4, in the Norm-Validating condition, participants showed a “positive” emotional reaction, as given by the comparison between their mean scores and scale midpoint, \( t(36) = 9.26, p < .001 \). However, in the Norm-Undermining condition, the score did not significantly differ from the scale midpoint, \( t(35) < 1 \). This result indicates that participants’ emotional reaction was not as negative as the one we have found in Experiment 4. We may only deem their emotional reaction as less positive than the one elicited in the Norm-Validating condition.

**Attractiveness of Normative and Deviant Members**

We tested the equivalence of both the Normative and the Deviant positions chosen by participants across conditions. The Context x Group ANOVA on these positions revealed no significant effects either for the Normative (highest \( F(1, 69) = 1.78, ns \), positions ranged from 5 to 7 in the continuum), or for the Deviant position (all \( F(1, 69) < 1 \), positions ranged from 1 to 3 on the continuum).\(^{28}\)

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\(^{28}\) As in Experiment 4 we found no significant effects involving the normative or the deviant positions chosen by the participants as covariates in the ANOVA, highest \( F(1, 67) = 2.51, ns \).
Table 4.1

*Attractiveness of Normative and Deviant Members as a Function of Context and Group Membership (Experiment 5)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context</th>
<th>Norm-Validating</th>
<th>Norm-Undermining</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ingroup</td>
<td>Outgroup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normative Member</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$M$</td>
<td>6.58</td>
<td>6.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(SD)$</td>
<td>(1.09)</td>
<td>(0.77)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deviant Member</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$M$</td>
<td>4.20</td>
<td>4.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(SD)$</td>
<td>(0.82)</td>
<td>(1.29)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Ratings range from 1 (*non attractive*) to 9 (*attractive*).

The Context x Group x Member ANOVA revealed significant effects of Member, $F(1, 69) = 119.02, p < .001, \eta^2 = .63$, Context, $F(1, 69) = 10.65, p = .002, \eta^2 = .13$, Context x Group, $F(1, 69) = 4.97, p = .03, \eta^2 = .07$, Group x Member, $F(1, 69) = 7.43, p = .008, \eta^2 = .10$. More important for our predictions, the Context x Group x Member effect was also significant, $F(1, 69) = 5.46, p = .02, \eta^2 = .07$ (remaining $Fs < 1$).

By breaking down the Context x Group x Member interaction according to the Context factor, we found, as predicted, a significant Group x Member effect within the Norm-Undermining condition, $F(1, 70) = 12.85, p = .001$ (remaining $F1, 70 = 2.14, ns$). In this condition, participants upgraded the normative ingroup member as compared to the normative outgroup member, $F(1, 70) = 17.59, p < .001, and derogated the deviant ingroup member as compared to the deviant outgroup member, $F(1, 70) = 4.43, p = .04$ (see Table 4.1). No significant effects emerged within the Norm-Validating condition, all $Fs1, 70 < 1$. 
In sum, consistent with our findings in all the previous experiments, we found a black sheep effect in the condition in which some sort of threat to the group is present.  

**Mediational Status of Emotional Reaction to Threat**

The results obtained with Norm Endorsement and Emotional Reaction to Threat scores allow us to test the assumption that, individuals’ emotional reaction to a threatening context mediate their judgments of normative and deviant ingroup members. To test this assumption, we used the Intragroup Differentiation Score as criterion variable. As described earlier, the higher is this score, the more strongly participants derogate the deviant and upgrade the normative member.

There are four prerequisites to test the mediational status of any given factor (e.g. Baron & Kenny, 1986; Kenny, Kashy & Bolger, 1998). First, the predictor variable (Norm Endorsement) must be correlated with the outcome (Intragroup Differentiation Score). Second, the predictor must be correlated with the mediator (Emotional Reaction to Threat). Third, the mediator must have an effect over the outcome variable. In our case, this is tested by checking for the effect of Emotional Reaction to Threat on the Intragroup Differentiation Score while controlling the effect of Norm Endorsement. We analyzed these relationships by means of a multiple regression of Intragroup Differentiation Score on both the predictor (Norm Endorsement) and the mediator (Emotional Reaction to Threat). Fourth, the effect of the predictor over the outcome variable must decrease when

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29 We computed an Intragroup Differentiation Score by subtracting the Deviant Member Score to the Normative Member Score so that a higher value indicates stronger intragroup differentiation. We submitted these scores to a contrast analysis ascribing the contrast values of -1, -1, +3 and -1, respectively to the Ingroup/Norm-Validating condition, $M = 2.38$, $SD = 1.63$, to the Outgroup/Norm-Validating condition, $M = 2.21$, $SD = 1.69$, to the Ingroup/Norm-Undermining condition, $M = 3.54$, $SD = 2.57$, and to Outgroup/Norm-Undermining condition, $M = 1.34$, $SD = 1.29$. Consistent with the findings of the previous experiment, results show that participants differentiate more strongly between normative and deviant members when these targets are ingroup members and when such judgments are made in a context in which a prescriptive ingroup norm, and hence the group itself, is threatened, $t(69) = 3.11$, $p = .003$. We also ran a contrast analysis comparing the three conditions with lower intragroup differentiation entering the contrast values +1, +1, 0 and -2 respectively for the Ingroup/Norm-Validating, Outgroup/Norm-Validating, Ingroup/Norm-
controlling the effect of the mediator. This means, in the present case, that the effect of
norm endorsement on intragroup differentiation should decrease when emotional reactions
to threat are controlled.\textsuperscript{30}

As predicted, the above mentioned pre-requisites emerged only in the Norm
Undermining condition.\textsuperscript{31} The regression analysis conducted in this condition showed,
firstly, that, in the norm-undermining condition, the more participants endorsed student
ragging, the more they derogated the deviant, while upgrading the normative ingroup
member, $\beta = .55$ ($R^2 = .30; F1, 16 = 6.86, p = .02$). Concomitantly, the more participants
endorsed the norm, the more negative was their emotional reaction to the context, $\beta = .58$
($R^2 = .34; F1, 16 = 8.20, p = .01$). Secondly, when Emotional Reaction was entered in the
equation, the multiple regression was significant, $R = .71$ ($R^2 = .50), F (2, 15) = 7.50, p =
.006$.\textsuperscript{32} This indicates that, on the one hand, the more negative was participants’ emotional
reaction, the more they differentiated between deviant and normative ingroup members ($\beta =
.55, p = .03$). Further, as predicted, the effect of norm endorsement on intragroup

\textsuperscript{30} More formally, the $\beta$ value from Step 1 must be higher than the $\beta$ corresponding to the effect of Norm
Endorsement over Intragroup Differentiation obtained in the regression of Step 3. In sum, our prediction is
that these requisites will be fully met only for the judgments of normative and deviant members in the
Ingroup/Norm Undermining condition.

\textsuperscript{31} As predicted, the requisites for a mediation emerged only in the Norm Undermining condition. The results
for the first two steps in the remaining three conditions were as follows, respectively for Ingroup/Norm-
Validating, Outgroup/Norm-Validating and Outgroup/Norm-Undermining conditions: (1) regression of
Intragroup Differentiation on Norm-Endorsement: $\beta = .32$ ($R^2 = .10; F1, 18 = 2.02, ns); $\beta = -.36$ ($R^2 = .13;
F1, 15 = 2.18, ns); $\beta = -.05$ ($R^2 = .00; F1, 16 < 1$); (2) regression of Emotional Reaction on Norm-
Endorsement: $\beta = -.36$ ($R^2 = .13; F1, 18 = 2.65, ns); $\beta = -.52$ ($R^2 = .27; F1, 15 = 5.51, p = .03$); $\beta = .68$ ($R^2 =
.46; F1, 16 = 13.66, p = .002$). Despite the fact that we make no predictions for these conditions and, more
important, that in none of these conditions the regression analyses fit the mediation requirements, we may
nonetheless look at the results that revealed to be significant. Only in the second regression, we found other
significant results. However, these results are simply the reflex of the manipulation of Context. This means
that it is not surprising that we find positive and negative correlations respectively in the norm-validating and
in the norm-undermining conditions. Indeed, in the former conditions the more participants endorse the norm
the more positive is their emotional reaction ($\beta = -.36$ and $\beta = -.52$, respectively for the Ingroup and Outgroup
conditions); in the later conditions the pattern is the reverse ($\beta = .58$ and $\beta = .68$, respectively for the Ingroup
and Outgroup conditions).

\textsuperscript{32} For the remaining three condition the results obtained in the regression of Intragroup Differentiation on
Norm-Endorsement and Emotional Reaction were the following: Ingroup/Norm-Validating condition, $R =
.37$ ($R^2 = .14, F2, 17 = 1.36, ns), Outgroup/Norm-Validating condition, $R = .49$ ($R^2 = .24, F2, 14 = 2.25, ns$);
Outgroup/Norm-Undermining condition, $R = .14$ ($R^2 = .02, F2, 15 < 1$).
differentiation decreased from the initial $\beta = .55$ to a non-significant $\beta = .23$ ($p = .33$) with emotional reaction as a mediator (see Figure 4.1).

We may thus conclude that group members’ emotional reaction to the undermining of the prescriptive norm accounts for 58.18 percent $[1 - (.23/.55)]$ of the effect of norm-endorsement on differentiation between deviant and normative ingroup members. Furthermore, the decrease of this effect that is due to the mediation of Emotional Reaction is significant, $z = 1.93$, $p = .054$.\(^{33}\)

\[z = \frac{a \times b}{\sqrt{(b^2 \times S_a^2 + a^2 \times S_b^2 - S_a^2 \times S_b^2)}}; a = \text{beta coefficient of Mediator predicted from IV alone}, \ b = \text{beta coefficient of DV predicted from Mediator with IV also in the model}, \ S_a = \text{standard error of } a, \ S_b = \text{standard error of } b.\]
awareness of the threatening character of the context, mediates their more extreme judgments of normative and deviant ingroup members.

The present results thus yield further support the idea that, a threat to the legitimacy of norms that contribute to establish positive ingroup differentiation leads individuals to attempt to restore such legitimacy by, simultaneously, derogating ingroup deviants, and by upgrading normative ingroup members. Perhaps more importantly in the present experiment is the fact that it shows that these responses depend on the extent to which individuals endorse the threatened norm and its emotional consequences.

Experiment 6

An assumption that underlies the experiments we reported thus far is that different types of threat to the ingroup (e.g. an uncertain ingroup status, lack of intragroup uniformity around a valued standard, or lack of external consensus about such a standard) elicit individuals’ adoption of a prescriptive focus in their judgments of ingroup members. This assumption is also present in previous experiments that have been in the context of subjective group dynamics research. However, this research has not directly address the impact of group members’ descriptive features on how they are judged. For example, across our five previous experiments, targets were described solely in terms of their group membership and their “prescriptive status”. These targets were always described as being either normative or deviant in light of a prescriptive norm, but the extent to which they were typical of their group has never been varied.

An assumption of self-categorization theory is that individuals strive to maintain a clear-cut perception of intergroup differences to the detriment of intragroup differences, the metacontrast ratio (cf. Chapter 2). Typical group members are instrumental to increase that ratio, and, therefore, individual’s certainty about the correctness of their perceptions of the situation in terms of their distinctive group memberships (e.g. Hogg & Hardie, 1992;
Hogg et al., 1995). An important implication of this assumption is that individuals prefer typical to atypical group members because whereas the former help clarifying intergroup boundaries, the latter tend to blur such boundaries (e.g. Hogg, 1992; Turner et al., 1987).

Further, as Turner (1999) pointed out, as regards referent information influence, the more a group member is prototypical “… the more he or she will be perceived as representative of the ingroup as a whole […], and the more influential will he or she be within the ingroup” (p. 17; cf. Chapter 2). Therefore, it seems reasonable to suppose that behavior and attitudes of typical ingroup members will be highly relevant in the creation of intergroup distinctiveness and, specifically, of positive ingroup differentiation.

The subjective group dynamics model proposes that behavior or attitudes of group members that emerge along prescriptive norm are tributary of previously constructed intergroup differentiation. As a result, such behavior and attitudes should not affect the actors’ perceived group membership. On the contrary, it would be the actors’ perceived group membership that affected the perception of their behavior and attitudes. This assumption suggests that prescriptive deviance exhibited by typical ingroup members will elicit stronger prescriptive focus than similar prescriptive deviance exhibited by less representative ingroup members.

We may thus predict that individuals will more strongly derogate descriptively typical ingroup members who act in a prescriptively deviant way than other members. By the same token, individuals will more strongly upgrade descriptively typical ingroup members who act in a prescriptively normative way than they will upgrade other members. However, it is more easily to disentangle the relative impacts of descriptive and prescriptive norms in reactions to deviant than normative ingroup members, because the latter are always expects to be more favorably judged than outgroup members. In turn, ingroup prescriptive deviants would be judged more favorably than similar outgroup
members if descriptive focus had a greater impact than prescriptive focus. However, if ingroup deviants are more negatively judged than similar outgroup members, we may rule out the impact of descriptive norms in this result. Therefore, if descriptively typical, but prescriptively deviant, ingroup members were more negatively evaluated than similar outgroup members, we could be reasonably convinced that this effect stems from the adoption of a prescriptive focus by those who make such evaluations.

**Method**

**Participants**

Forty-two (10 male and 32 female) second year students from a nursing school, aged from 18 to 22 years-old (*Mean age* = 18.38; *SD* = 0.77), volunteered to participate in the experiment. Gender and age, *F*(1, 36) < 1, were similarly distributed across conditions. Participants were randomly assigned to conditions and ranged between 10 and 12 per condition.

**Procedure and Design**

The procedure was inspired by that of Experiment 2 with the necessary modifications to test the present hypotheses. Therefore, we will only refer to the procedural specificities of the present experiment.

In the first session, the test that allowed categorizing participants in two perceptual types (“Abstract-Pictorial” vs. “Picto-Experiential”) included a task that was purportedly aimed to determine the extent to which the person would be typical of each type of perception. This task consisted in having participants estimating the number of dots

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34 Twelve students that took part in the first session of the experiment did not participate in second session. The causes for this dropout were completely unrelated with the experiment itself. Other eight participants were discarded from the analyses either for failing in any of the manipulation checks (five participants) or for not answering most of the questions (three participants).
contained in a picture that was presented to them for less than one second and completing a “meaningless” picture (see Appendix 7).

In the validation session, all participants could read that they were highly typical members of the Abstract-Pictorial type, and that the judgmental targets (normative and deviant members) were either highly typical or atypical of their perceptual types (typicality manipulation). The design of the experiment is thus a 2 (Group: Ingroup vs. Outgroup) x 2 (Typicality: Low Typicality vs. High Typicality) x 2 (Member: Normative vs. Deviant). Group and Typicality are between-subjects factors, and Member is a within-subject factor. Participants were fully debriefed at the end of the experiment.

**Dependent Measures**

Dependent measures were the same as in Experiment 2 with two exceptions. First, the post-experimental manipulation checks included questions aimed to insure that participants accurately remembered their level of typicality in their perceptual type, as well as the levels of typicality of the normative and deviants target members in their perceptual types. Second, we adapted the questions used in Experiment 3 to measure attraction to the ingroup and to the outgroup as a whole to the present artificial categories.

From the participants’ answers, we computed Attraction to the Ingroup and Attraction to the Outgroup scores (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .91$, and .87, respectively). We also created a Normative Member and Deviant Member scores (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .93$, and .81, respectively).

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35 Given the small number of male participants in all conditions we do not report a $\chi^2$ for Gender. However the number of male participants was similarly distributed across conditions (from 2 to 4 per condition). Two participants did not report their age.
Results and Discussion

Manipulation Checks

The group categorization was equally effective across conditions. A Group x Typicality ANOVA, revealed no significant effects on participants perceptions of the tests’ accuracy (highest $F(1, 38) = 1.98, ns$). Participants considered that the test had correctly detected their type of perception, Overall Mean = 7.62, $SD = 1.38$, as shown by the comparison with the scale midpoint (5), $t(41) = 12.31, p < .001$.

The manipulation checks collected at the end of the study revealed that all participants were able to remember correctly their own type of perception, their typicality in that type, as well as the perceptual types and typicality of the target members, as well as their personal positions on the homosexuality continuum. An open-ended question revealed that none of the participants suspected of the real purposes of the study.

Attraction to the Ingroup and to the Outgroup

As in the previous studies, we submitted the group attraction measures to an ANOVA, with Attraction to the Ingroup and Attraction to the Outgroup as repeated measures. The analysis revealed only a significant effect of Group Attraction, $F(1, 38) = 124.68, p < .001, \eta^2 = .77$ (remaining $F(1, 38) < 2.11, ns$). Participants reported higher attraction to the ingroup, $M = 7.30, SD = 1.21$, than to the outgroup, $M = 3.55, SD = 1.23$. The comparison with the midpoint (5) of the scale showed that participants were positively attracted to the ingroup, $t(41) = 12.35, p < .001$, and negatively attracted to the outgroup, $t(41) = 7.65, p < .001$. 
Table 4.2

Attractiveness of Normative and Deviant Members as a Function of Group Membership and Typicality (Experiment 6)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Typicality</th>
<th>Low Typicality</th>
<th>High Typicality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ingroup</td>
<td>Outgroup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Normative Member</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>7.22</td>
<td>6.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(SD)</td>
<td>(1.12)</td>
<td>(1.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deviant Member</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>4.06</td>
<td>3.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(SD)</td>
<td>(0.95)</td>
<td>(1.03)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Ratings range from 1 (non attractive) to 9 (attractive).

Attractiveness of Normative and Deviant Members

We submitted the normative and the deviant members’ attractiveness scores to a Typicality x Group x Member ANOVA. This analysis revealed significant effects of Member, $F(1, 38) = 147.46, p < .001, \eta^2 = .80$, Group x Member, $F(1, 38) = 5.67, p = .02, \eta^2 = .13$, and Typicality x Group x Member, $F(1, 38) = 5.46, p = .03, \eta^2 = .13$ (highest remaining $F1, 38 = 2.15, ns$).

The effect of Member shows that participants judged the normative target more favorably, $M = 7.16, SD = 1.29$, than the deviant target, $M = 3.60, SD = 1.35$. The Group x Member interaction indicates that, irrespective of their descriptive typicality, normative ingroup members, $M = 7.66, SD = 1.29$, were judged more positively than normative outgroup members, $M = 6.71, SD = 1.15, F(1, 40) = 6.42, p = .02$, whereas deviant
ingroup, $M = 3.38$, $SD = 1.35$, and outgroup members, $M = 3.81$, $SD = 1.34$, were similarly judged, $F (1, 40) = 1.06$, $ns$.

We broke down the Typicality x Group x Member second-order interaction in terms of the Typicality factor. No significant effects emerged in the Low Typicality condition, in which the target group members were presented as descriptively atypical of their group, highest $F (1, 39) = 1.95$, $ns$. However, consistent with our hypothesis, in the High Typicality condition, the Group x Member interaction was significant, $F (1, 39) = 10.36$, $p = .003$ (remaining $F(1, 39) < 1$). As illustrated in Figure 4.2 (cf. also Table 4.2), this result indicates that participants judged the normative ingroup member more favorably than the equivalent outgroup member, $F (1, 39) = 6.91$, $p = .01$. Simultaneously, participants derogated the deviant ingroup member more than the corresponding outgroup member, $F (1, 39) = 5.60$, $p = .02$.

![Figure 4.2. Attractiveness of Normative and Deviant Members as a Function of Group Membership and Typicality (Experiment 6)](image-url)
Descriptive and Prescriptive Typicality

According to our second hypothesis, judgments within the ingroup should differ as a function of targets’ typicality, but this should not occur in judgments of outgroup members. Indeed, participants similarly judged the normative and the deviant outgroup members, both $F(1, 39) < 1$, regardless of whether they were typical or atypical of their group. Partly consistent with our predictions, participants more strongly derogated the descriptively typical deviant ingroup member, $M = 2.70$, than the descriptively atypical deviant ingroup member, $M = 4.06$, $F(1, 39) = 5.60$, $p = .02$. However, contrary to our predictions, judgments of normative members, typical, $M = 8.10$, or atypical, $M = 7.22$, did not differ significantly, $F(1, 39) = 2.34$, $ns$.\(^{36}\)

The present findings support the idea that individuals may perceive typical ingroup members to be particularly relevant to the group’s positive image. Typical ingroup targets those targets that are in a better position to help differentiate the ingroup from the outgroup. However, when they deviate from prescriptive norms, these targets are more strongly derogated than similarly deviant, but less typical ingroup targets. Overall, this seems consistent with a joint operation of prescriptive and descriptive focus on the judgments of groups and their members as proposed by the subjective group dynamics model.

\(^{36}\) We computed an Intragroup Differentiation Score by subtracting the Deviant Member Score to the Normative Member Score described earlier: higher intragroup differentiation scores indicate stronger differentiation between the normative and the deviant member. The scores of each condition were submitted to a contrast analysis entering the values -1, -1, +3, and -1, respectively for the Ingroup/Low Typicality, Outgroup/Low Typicality, Ingroup/High Typicality, and Outgroup/High Typicality conditions. Results were consistent with our prediction showing that intragroup differentiation was stronger in the Ingroup/High Typicality, $M = 5.40$, $DP = 1.97$, than in the Outgroup/High Typicality, $M = 2.62$, $DP = 2.43$, Ingroup/Low Typicality, $M = 3.16$, $DP = 1.58$, and Outgroup/Low Typicality, $M = 3.13$, $DP = 1.57$, conditions, $t(38) = 3.52$, $p = .001$. A contrast analysis comparing the three conditions with lower intragroup differentiation entering the contrast values +1, +1, 0 and -2, respectively for the Ingroup/Low Typicality, Outgroup/Low Typicality, Ingroup/High Typicality and Outgroup/High Typicality, revealed a non-significant result, $t(38) < 1$. 

Experiment 7

In our final experiment, we attempted to replicate findings of Experiment 6, but, more importantly, we attempted to explore further the factors associated with individuals’ tendency to more strongly derogate typical than atypical deviant ingroup members. We employed the same experimental paradigm as that of Experiment 6, but introduced additional measures to test the operation of two factors that we expected to mediate participants’ reactions to normative and deviant members. Specifically, we introduced the same three measures of emotional reaction we used in Experiments 4 and 5, and we created three measures of threat to the group derived from the results regarding “image conveyed of the group” used in experiments 1 through 3. These measures are reported along with the results.

As in the previous experiment, we hypothesized that descriptively typical ingroup members would be more strongly upgraded, if they are prescriptively normative, or derogated, if they are prescriptively deviant, than less typical ingroup members, or typical or atypical outgroup members. Further, we expected a mediating effect of both emotional reaction and perceived threat of ingroup targets on differentiation between normative and deviant ingroup members. But, in line with the preceding experiment, we predicted that this mediation would emerge only in the Ingroup/High Typicality condition.

Method

Participants

Sixty-one (7 male and 54 female) first year students of a Communication course, aged from 17 to 27 years-old (Mean age = 19.57; SD = 1.81), volunteered to participate in
the study. Gender\textsuperscript{37} and age, highest $F (1, 57) = 3.00, ns$, were similarly distributed across conditions.\textsuperscript{38}

**Procedure and Design**

The procedure was similar to that of the previous experiment. The design was a 2 (Group: Ingroup vs. Outgroup) x 2 (Typicality: Low Typicality vs. High Typicality) x 2 (Member: Normative vs. Deviant). Group and Typicality are between-subjects factors and Member is within-subject factor. Participants were assigned randomly to conditions and ranged between 15 and 16 per condition.

**Dependent Measures**

We used the same manipulation checks described in the previous experiment. The dependent measures were also the same, except that we included measures of emotional reaction to targets and perceived threat of target members to their group’s image, in the questionnaire that was presented to participants. These measures allowed us to test the mediating effect of emotional reaction and perceived threat of ingroup targets on judgments of normative and deviant ingroup members

*Emotional reaction.* In the second session, before judging each of the target members, participants were asked to state how they felt when they learned which were the statements chosen by person A and person B in the seven statement continuum. Participants answered to the following statement: “After knowing the answer given by Person A (B) to the value inventory you felt …” (1 = *very happy*, *very pleased*, *in a very good mood*, 9 = *very unhappy*, *very annoyed*, *in a very bad mood*). We averaged the three

\textsuperscript{37}Given the small count of male participants in all conditions, we do not report a $\chi^2$ for Gender. However, the number of male participants was similarly distributed across conditions (from 1 to 2 per condition).

\textsuperscript{38}Eleven students that took part in Phase 1 of the experiment did not participate in Phase 2. Again, the causes for this to occurrence were completely unrelated with the experiment itself. Other twelve participants were
items to create two scores: Emotional Reaction to the Normative Member and Emotional Reaction to the Deviant Member (*Cronbach’s* α = .76 and .74, respectively).

We also created a single score representing participants’ emotional reaction to both the normative and the deviant member. Emotional Reaction to Target Members Score corresponds to the subtraction of the Emotional Reaction to the Deviant Member score to the Emotional Reaction to the Normative Member score, so that a higher score represents a more negative emotional reaction.

*Perceived threat.* Participants also indicated the extent to which each target member represented a threat to the group as a whole: (1) “To what extent can this person affect negatively the way others think about this person’s perceptual type?” (1 = *not at all*; 9 = *very much*); (2) “To what extent can this person represent a threat to the good image of their type?” (1 = *not at all*; 9 = *very much*); (3) “In your opinion, what kind of image does this person convey about people who belong to their type?” (1 = *very good image*; 9 = *very bad image*). These items were averaged to a Normative Member Threat Score and a Deviant Member Threat Score (*Cronbach’s* α = .81, and .74, respectively). With these two scores we computed a Perceived Threat Score, by subtracting the former from the latter. Thus, a higher score indicates a higher perceived threat.

*Attraction to the ingroup and to the outgroup.* We averaged the questions used to tap attraction to the ingroup and to the outgroup to and Attraction to the Ingroup Score and an Attraction to the Outgroup Score (*Cronbach’s* α = .91, and .87, respectively).

*Attractiveness of normative and deviant members.* We averaged the six items used to measure attractiveness of normative and deviant members to a Normative Member Score and a Deviant Member Score (*Cronbach’s* α = .87, and .84, respectively).
Results and Discussion

Manipulation Checks

The minimal group categorization was equally effective across conditions, as shown by the Group x Typicality ANOVA (highest $F_1, 57 = 2.29$, ns). Participants considered that the test was accurate in identifying their perception type, Overall Mean = 7.84, $SD = 1.24$. This score’s difference from the scale midpoint (5) was also significant, $t(60) = 17.85$, $p < .001$. In addition, the post-experimental manipulation checks, showed that all participants correctly recalled the information used to manipulate their own group membership and typicality, as well as the equivalent information concerning the target group members. None of the participants revealed suspicion regarding the experiment’s goals or the manipulations involved.

Attraction to the Ingroup and to the Outgroup

An ANOVA conducted on Attraction to the Ingroup and Attraction to the Outgroup revealed only a significant effect of Group Attraction, $F(1, 57) = 99.01$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .63$ (remaining $F_1, 57 < 1.69$, ns). Participants felt more attracted to the ingroup, $M = 7.06$, $SD = 1.29$, than to the outgroup, $M = 4.23$, $SD = 1.21$. The comparison of these two means with the scale midpoint (5), shows that participants were positively attracted to the ingroup, $t(60) = 12.46$, $p < .001$, and negatively attracted to the outgroup, $t(60) = 4.99$, $p < .001$.

Attractiveness of Normative and Deviant Members

We submitted the normative and deviant member scores to a Typicality x Group x Member ANOVA. We found significant effects of Member, $F(1, 57) = 284.93$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2$
= .83, and Typicality x Group x Member, $F(1, 57) = 8.43, p = .005, \eta^2 = .13$ (highest remaining $F(1, 57) = 1.68, ns$).

By decomposing the second-order interaction, we found results consistent with our predictions and with the findings of Experiment 6. In the Low Typicality condition, the effects of Group and Group x Member were not significant, highest $F(1, 58) = 1.81, ns$. However, in the High Typicality condition we found a significant Group x Member interaction, $F(1, 58) = 7.89, p = .007$ (remaining $F(1, 58) = 1.52, ns$). As predicted, and consistent with results of Experiment 6, participants upgraded the normative ingroup member, $F(1, 58) = 4.19, p < .05$, and concomitantly derogated the deviant typical ingroup member, $F(1, 58) = 5.09, p = .03$ as compared to the equivalent outgroup member (see Table 4.3).

Table 4.3

*Attractiveness of Normative and Deviant Members as a Function of Group Membership and Typicality (Experiment 7)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Typicality</th>
<th>Low Typicality</th>
<th>High Typicality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ingroup</td>
<td>Outgroup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normative Member</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$M$</td>
<td>7.30</td>
<td>7.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(SD)$</td>
<td>(0.82)</td>
<td>(1.37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deviant Member</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$M$</td>
<td>3.90</td>
<td>3.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(SD)$</td>
<td>(1.33)</td>
<td>(1.73)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Ratings range from 1 (*non attractive*) to 9 (*attractive*).
Regarding our second hypothesis involving targets’ attractiveness, results were similar to those of Experiment 6 and again only partially corroborated our predictions. In line with our hypothesis, participants more strongly derogated the descriptively typical than the atypical deviant ingroup member, $F(1, 58) = 4.08, p = .05$. However, participants only marginally differentiated between typical and atypical normative ingroup members, $F(1, 58) = 2.81, p = .10$. In the outgroup condition, participants did not differentiate between typical and atypical normative members, $F(1, 58) < 1$, but tended to judge atypical outgroup deviants more negatively than typical outgroup deviants, $F(1, 58) = 3.49, p = .07$.\(^{39}\)

*Emotional Reaction and Perceived Threat*

We predicted that participants’ emotional reaction to the deviant and the normative targets would be stronger in the Ingroup/High Typicality condition than in all others. Participants would react more negatively to the deviant and more positively to the normative targets in the Ingroup/High Typicality condition than in all the other conditions. Concomitantly, in this condition more than in all the others, participants should consider the deviant to be a stronger threat to, and the normative to be more protective of, the group’s image.

To test these predictions we performed a contrast analysis on the Emotional Reaction score and on the Perceived Threat score across the four conditions. We used the

\(^{39}\) We computed an Intragroup Differentiation Score by subtracting the Deviant Member Score to the Normative Member Score: higher values indicate stronger differentiation between the normative and the deviant member. The scores we submitted to a contrast analysis assigning the values -1, -1, +3, and -1 on the scores of Intragroup Differentiation, respectively for the Ingroup/Low Typicality, $M = 3.40$, $DP = 1.70$, Outgroup/Low Typicality, $M = 4.28$, $DP = 2.31$, Ingroup/High Typicality, $M = 4.89$, $DP = 1.80$, and Outgroup/High Typicality, $M = 3.08$, $DP = 1.28$, conditions. Results were consistent with those of the Experiment 6 and showed that participants differentiated more strongly between deviant and normative targets when these were ingroup members and were highly typical of that category, $t(57) = 2.47, p = .02$. We also performed a contrast analysis comparing the three conditions with lower intragroup differentiation entering the contrast values -1, +2, 0 and -1, respectively for the Ingroup/Low Typicality, Outgroup/Low Typicality, Ingroup/High Typicality and Outgroup/High Typicality. The result of the analysis was non-significant, $t(57) = 1.83, ns.$
contrast values of -1, -1, +3, and -1, in the two analyses, respectively for the Ingroup/Low Typicality, Outgroup/Low Typicality, Ingroup/High Typicality, and Outgroup/High Typicality conditions.

Table 4.4

*Emotional Reaction to Target Members and Perceived Threat to the Group as a Function of Group Membership and Typicality (Experiment 7)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Typicality</th>
<th>Low Typicality</th>
<th>High Typicality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ingroup</td>
<td>Outgroup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional Reaction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Deviant-Normative)</td>
<td>$M$</td>
<td>$M$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.48</td>
<td>5.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(SD)</td>
<td>(5.40)</td>
<td>(2.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived Threat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Deviant-Normative)</td>
<td>$M$</td>
<td>$M$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.04</td>
<td>2.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(SD)</td>
<td>(2.15)</td>
<td>(2.74)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 1. In the Emotional Reaction score, the higher the values the more participants react negatively to the deviant and positively to the normative member; 2. In the Perceived Threat score, the higher the values the more participants consider the deviant to pose a threat to the group and the normative less so.

As we may see in Table 4.4, contrary to our prediction, the effect was not significant on participants’ emotional reaction to the deviant and normative targets, $t(57) < 1$. As the means across conditions illustrate, participants negative emotional reaction to the deviant and the simultaneous positive emotional reaction to the normative member were equivalent, regardless of whether the targets were typical or atypical, or ingroup or outgroup, members. In turn, results on the score of Members’ Threat to the Group were consistent with our hypothesis. As predicted, when judging highly typical ingroup members, participants considered the deviant as a threat and the normative to be protective.
of the group’ image as a whole, more strongly than in all other conditions, \( t(57) = 2.24, p = .03 \).40 Also consistent with our hypothesis, in this condition, the correlation between the deviant member’s and the normative member’s perceived threat scores, was stronger than in all the other conditions, \( r = -.87, p < .001 \).41

**Mediators of Intragroup Differentiation: Emotional Reaction and Perceived Threat**

We predicted that participants’ emotional reaction to the target members and the extent to which they would perceive targets as threatening to the group should mediate their judgments. Specifically, we expected that, in contrast with the remaining conditions, in the Ingroup/High Typicality condition, stronger attraction to the ingroup predicts stronger upgrading of the normative member and stronger derogation of the deviant member (i.e., stronger intragroup differentiation). However, we also expect this effect to be mediated, on the one hand, by the intensity of participants’ emotional reaction to these members, and, on the other hand, by how threatening to the group they perceive them to be.

We used the Intragroup Differentiation Score as outcome variable, the Attraction to the Ingroup Score as a predictor, and, Emotional Reaction or Perceived Threat as a mediator.

*Emotional reaction as a mediator.* In Figure 4.3, we illustrate the mediating effect of participants’ emotional reaction on judgments of the deviant and normative members. As predicted, in the Ingroup/High Typicality condition attraction to the ingroup predicted

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40 We also performed a contrast analysis comparing the three conditions with lower intragroup differentiation entering the contrast values -1, +2, 0 and -1, respectively for the Ingroup/Low Typicality, Outgroup/Low Typicality, Ingroup/High Typicality and Outgroup/High Typicality. The result of the analysis was non-significant, \( t(57) = 1.83, ns \).

41 In the remaining conditions the highest correlation was obtained in the Ingroup/Low Typicality condition, \( r = -.43, ns \); lowest \( z = 4.70, p < .001 \).
participants’ judgments of normative and deviant members, only when they were typical ingroup members.\(^{42}\)

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Attraction to the Ingroup} & \quad \beta = .55 \quad (\beta = .29) \\
\text{Intragroup Differentiation} & \quad \beta = .42 \\
\text{Emotional Reaction} & \quad \beta = .62 \\
(\text{Deviant – Normative}) & \\
(\text{Normative – Deviant}) & \\
\end{align*}
\]

**Figure 4.3.** Mediation analysis in the Ingroup/High Typicality condition: Attraction to the Ingroup as predictor, Intragroup Differentiation as outcome and Emotional Reaction to Target Members as mediator.

As expected, when participants evaluated normative and deviant highly typical ingroup members, the more they were attracted to the ingroup the more they differentiated between these members, \(\beta = .55 \quad (R^2 = .30; \ F1, 14 = 6.08, \ p = .03)\). Furthermore, in line with our predictions, results show that attraction to the ingroup marginally predicts stronger negative emotional reaction to the deviant ingroup member, and positive emotional reaction to normative ingroup member, \(\beta = .42 \quad (R^2 = .18; \ F1, 14 = 3.04, \ p = .10)\). This result indicates that the more participants were attracted to the ingroup the more

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\(^{42}\) The results for the first two steps in the remaining three conditions were as follows, respectively for Ingroup/Low Typicality, Outgroup/Low Typicality and Outgroup/High Typicality conditions: (1) regression of Intragroup Differentiation on Attraction to the Ingroup: \(\beta = -.07 \quad (R^2 = .00; \ F1, 13 < 1); \ \beta = .28 \quad (R^2 = .08; \ F1, 13 = 1.05, \ ns); \ \beta = .22 \quad (R^2 = .05; \ F1, 13 < 1)\); (2) regression of Emotional Reaction to Target Members on Attraction to the Ingroup: \(\beta = .32 \quad (R^2 = .10; \ F1, 13 = 1.50, \ ns); \ \beta = .33 \quad (R^2 = .11; \ F1, 13 = 1.54, \ ns); \ \beta = .56 \quad (R^2 = .31; \ F1, 13 = 5.92, \ p = .03)\).
negative were their emotions relative to the deviant ingroup member, and the more positive were their emotions with respect to the normative ingroup member.

The results of these two regression analyses show that only the first requisite for mediation is significantly met. However, given the somewhat restrict number of observations involved (n = 16), we decided to undertake the remaining step of the mediation analysis (cf. Kenny et al., 1998; Shrout & Bolger, 2002). Indeed, the results of the multiple regression entering Emotional Reaction to Target Members in the equation fit our prediction, \( R = .78 \) (\( R^2 = .61, F_{2, 13} = 10.33, p = .002 \)).\(^{43}\) As predicted, the analysis revealed that the more participants experienced negative emotions about the deviant and positive emotions about the normative member, the more they differentiated between the two members in terms of their attractiveness \( \beta = .62 \) (\( p = .007 \)). Finally, results also show that the effect of attraction to the ingroup on intragroup differentiation decreased from the initial \( \beta = .55 \) to a non-significant \( \beta = .29 \) (\( p = .15 \)). These findings indicate that 47.27 percent of the initial effect of attraction to the ingroup on intragroup differentiation may be attributed to participants’ emotional reaction to the prescriptive status exhibited by the target members. Likely due to the small sample size, the test of the reduction of the initial effect due to the mediation of Emotional Reaction to Target Members only approached significance, \( z = 1.60, p = .11 \).\(^{44}\)

**Perceived threat as a mediator.** Figure 4.4, shows the results of the regression of Members’ Threat to the Group on Attraction to the Ingroup and Intragroup Differentiation scores, in the Ingroup/High Typicality condition.\(^{45}\)

\(^{43}\) Results in the remaining three conditions were the following: Ingroup/Low Typicality condition, \( R = .13 \) (\( R^2 = .02, F_{2, 12} < 1 \)); Outgroup/Low Typicality condition, \( R = .80 \) (\( R^2 = .63, F_{2, 12} = 10.40, p = .002 \)); Outgroup/High Typicality condition, \( R = .40 \) (\( R^2 = .16, F_{2, 12} = 1.11, ns \)).

\(^{44}\) In this analysis we employed the following modification of Sobel’s test: \( z = \frac{a \cdot b}{\sqrt{b^2 \cdot S_a^2 + a^2 \cdot S_b^2 - S_a^2 \cdot S_b^2}} \); \( a = \) beta coefficient of Mediator predicted from IV alone, \( b = \) beta coefficient of DV predicted from Mediator with IV also in the model, \( S_a = \) standard error of \( a \), \( S_b = \) standard error of \( b \) (e.g. Kenny et al., 1998).

\(^{45}\) Results of the regression of Members’ Threat to the Group on Attraction to the Ingroup in the remaining three conditions were as follows: Ingroup/Low Typicality condition, \( \beta = .05 \) (\( R^2 = .00; F_{1, 13} < 1 \));
The results show that the more participants were attracted to the ingroup the more they differentiated between the contributions of the normative and deviant members to the group’s image, $\beta = .51$ ($R^2 = .26$; $F1, 14 = 5.01, p = .04$). The multiple regression analysis entering Members’ Threat to the Group in the equation was significant, $R = .71$ ($R^2 = .50$, $F2, 13 = 6.43, p = .01$). This analysis revealed that the more participants consider the deviant member as a threat, and the normative member as having a positive impact on the ingroup, the more they upgraded the normative member and derogated the deviant member, $\beta = .51$ ($p = .04$). In addition, results indicate that initial effect of attraction to the ingroup on intragroup differentiation decreased from the initial $\beta = .55$ to a non-significant $\beta = .29$ ($p = .23$; 47.27 percent of the effect may be attributed to the mediator). The test to

Outgroup/Low Typicality condition, $\beta = .17$ ($R^2 = .03$; $F1, 13 < 1$); Outgroup/High Typicality condition, $\beta = .25$ ($R^2 = .06$; $F1, 13 < 1$). The results for the regression of Intragroup Differentiation on Attraction to the Ingroup were presented in the previous mediation analysis.

Results in the remaining three conditions were the following: Ingroup/Low Typicality condition, $R = .71$ ($R^2 = .50$, $F2, 12 = 5.95, p = .02$); Outgroup/Low Typicality condition, $R = .54$ ($R^2 = .29$, $F2, 12 = 2.43, ns$); Outgroup/High Typicality condition, $R = .54$, ($R^2 = .29$, $F2, 12 = 2.41, ns$).
the reduction of the initial effect due to the mediation of Targets’ Threat to the Group approached significance, $z = 1.67, p = .09$. As in the previous analysis we employed a modification of Sobel’s test: $z = a * b / \sqrt{(b^2 * S_a^2 + a^2 * S_b^2 - S_{ab^2})}$; $a = \beta$ coefficient of Mediator predicted from IV alone, $b = \beta$ coefficient of DV predicted from Mediator with IV also in the model, $S_a =$ standard error of $a$, $S_b =$ standard error of $b$ (e.g. Kenny, Kashy & Bolger, 1998).

General Discussion and Conclusions

The experiments reported in this chapter draw a general picture of the interplay between threats to the overall positive ingroup’s image, individuals’ emotional reactions to such threats, and their judgments of normative and deviant ingroup members. In Experiment 5, we found that the perception of an outside threat to the validity of the ingroup’s norm lead participants to comparatively derogate ingroup deviants and upgrade ingroup normative members as compared to their outgroup counterparts. This was a function of participants’ level of endorsement of the threatened norm, so that the higher this endorsement, the more strongly they derogated the deviant members and upgraded the normative members of their group. However, we also observed that this process was mediated by participants’ emotional reaction to threatening context. In short, a context that threatens a strongly endorsed norm leads individuals to react more harshly to those who oppose that norm, while acknowledging the contribution of those who support the norm. Yet, this emerges exclusively with respect to ingroup members, who are directly relevant to the individuals’ identity.

In Experiment 6, we observed the impact of deviant and normative members on individuals’ judgments from another angle. We found that ingroup members who deviate from valued standards are not always equivalent in terms of the reactions they evoke. Deviant members whose characteristics led them to be perceived as best ingroup

47 As in the previous analysis we employed a modification of Sobel’s test: $z = a * b / \sqrt{(b^2 * S_a^2 + a^2 * S_b^2 - S_{ab^2})}$; $a = \beta$ coefficient of Mediator predicted from IV alone, $b = \beta$ coefficient of DV predicted from Mediator with IV also in the model, $S_a =$ standard error of $a$, $S_b =$ standard error of $b$ (e.g. Kenny, Kashy & Bolger, 1998).
representatives, are more harshly treated than less representative ingroup deviants. This is likely due to the extent to which the former threaten the individuals’ identity. We directly addressed this question in Experiment 7.

In Experiment 7, we found that individuals more strongly derogate ingroup deviants who are descriptively typical, than less typical ingroup deviants. More importantly, we found that this process is associated with the extent to which individuals are attracted to their group in association with the emotional concomitants of the perceived deviance (either in terms of evoked emotions, or in terms of the perceived threat of deviants to the group).

The above process clearly establishes the existence of two levels of judgment in subjective group dynamics. One level, at which individuals are concerned with the characteristics that define their social category, and one level, at which individuals are more concerned with the criteria that sustain such that category’s positiveness. Our results suggest that, rather than corresponding to different levels of abstraction used for judgment, as might be proposed by self-categorization theory, these two levels strongly, and simultaneously, interact with each other, in promoting a distinctive, positive social identity.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION

The study of large-scale reactions to deviance is typically a subject matter for sociology. In social psychology, deviance has most often been dealt with in terms of opinion disagreement in the realm of face to face groups. Throughout the present work, we hope to have convincingly demonstrated that social psychology is not only well equipped to contribute an explanation for reactions to deviance in large scale social categories, both theoretically and empirically, but also that such a contribution is required for a proper understanding of the antecedents and functions of social deviance.

As we wrote elsewhere (Marques & Serôdio, 2000), the work of Gustave Le Bon (1841-1931) is often referred to as being at the origin of the study of how individuals behave in group settings (e.g. Hogg, 1992; Hogg & Abrams, 1988). Le Bon made a case to the central idea of this thesis,

“suppressing internal conflict is a fundamental requirement for our national life. We would be helpless against outside foes if, at the same time, we had to fight against inside enemies […]. No society would survive for long without keeping internal peace. From the ancient Greeks to the modern Poles, those peoples who were unable to relinquish from their dissensions succumbed to servitude and lost the very right to hold an history” (LeBon, 1916, pp. 13-14, our translation).48

This contention appears to be in line with a large amount of literature that has been produced by social psychological research, and, specifically, by research inspired in the small group approach. As we saw in Chapter 1, that research assumes that group members

48 In the original, “Supprimer les luttes intestines est une condition indispensable de notre vie nationale. Contre les ennemis du dehors nous serions impuissants si nous devions en même temps lutter contre les ennemis du dedans (…). Sans le maintien de la paix à l’intérieur une société ne saurait subsister longtemps. Des Grecs de
attempt to establish consensus about important beliefs, congregate their efforts to achieve collective goals, and expect other members to behave in the same way, especially when they face outside challenges (e.g. Festinger, 1950; Jones & Gerard, 1967; Shaw, 1976). In addition, there is little doubt that normative group members appear motivated to eradicate deviance from their group, and, as illustrated in Le Bon’s contention, that such motivation is increased when the group faces external pressures for the successful accomplishment of collective tasks (e.g. Festinger, Schachter & Back, 1950). In the present work, we argued that this is one component of the more general process according to which deviance contributes to increase individuals’ commitment to the group and, most likely, to reinforce intragroup cohesiveness.

However, contrary to a common assertion by authors in the small group approach, we disagree with the idea that such cohesiveness corresponds to the reinforcement of interpersonal ties within the group. Based on the subjective group dynamics model, we argued ingroup deviance facilitates this process. Ingroup deviance should increase individuals’ awareness of the prescriptive standards that underlie their positive social identity. As a result, in deprecating ingroup deviants, individuals’ would reinforce their commitment to such standards. Therefore, negative reactions towards ingroup deviants and increased intragroup cohesiveness would be caused by social identity concerns, but would also have as one of its consequences, the reinforcement of social identity.

The above assumption is one major claim of subjective group dynamics (cf. Marques, 2004, in preparation; Marques, Páez & Abrams, 1998) and clearly shows that this model is strongly indebted to the social identification framework. However, as we also discussed in Chapter 1, the social identification framework raises one general problem to this general idea. Specifically, it assumes that social behavior is primarily organized in
terms of inter-categorical distinctions, and that any distinctions arising within such previously established distinctions will be automatically re-elaborated in terms of alternative inter-category distinctions. In other terms, individuals will mainly focus on the prototypical features of groups and of group members. Where the situation is not consistent with these features, they will reconstruct it in terms of new inter-categorical positions that will better fit the situation. This corresponds to the interplay between comparative fit and normative fit that we discussed in Chapter 1.

Obviously, the above idea challenges the assumption that ingroup deviance may increase individuals’ commitment to ingroup norms, if only because the operation of the metacontrast principle would automatically convert a deviant occurrence within the ingroup into an outgroup occurrence based on an alternative categorization. The subjective group dynamics therefore needed to find other support to the structuring function it assigns to deviance in large social categories. Previous theoretical work has attempted to do so by resorting to classical work on the sociology of deviance, and, specifically, within the durkheimian tradition (cf. Marques, 2004; Marques, Páez & Abrams, 1998; Marques, in preparation). In the present work, we followed this path by establishing a parallel between large societal processes and group processes. Durkheimian theory and research proposes that groups counteract anomie, by defining more strict limits for behavior, thus creating a larger number of opportunities for their members to engage in punitive action against deviance. In so doing, groups ascertain their boundaries and insure their uniqueness relative to other groups (e.g. Erikson, 1966).

Based on previous work by Marques and colleagues, we espoused the idea that a similar process occurs in groups defined by a common social identity of their members. Therefore, our most important assumption throughout the present work has been that in order to fully understand the antecedents, implications, and consequences of individuals’
reactions to deviance, one must account not only for the intragroup context created by the emergence of such deviance, but also to the more general context which surrounds the group, including the relationships the group entertains with other groups (Marques & Páez, 1994; Marques, Páez & Abrams, 1989).

As proposed by the subjective group dynamics model, deviance, specifically, ingroup deviance would lead individuals to adopt a prescriptive focus that is, nevertheless tributary to a descriptive focus in terms of which individuals had previously defined their group membership and associated identity. In common-identity groups, then, ingroup deviance would decrease normative members’ tolerance while reinforcing their commitment to the violated norms, would engender feelings of threat as regards their identity, and would generate negative emotions that lead these members to engage in hostile reactions towards the deviants. Those attitudinal, belief, and behavioral reactions would contribute to the maintenance of a subjectively valid positive social identity. In a nutshell, this is the thesis we defended in this work.

We believe that the results of our experiments provide relevant support to that thesis, while supporting some claims of the subjective group dynamics model that had not yet been empirically tested (cf. Chapters 2 and 3). Obviously, we did not, and could not, directly test all the relationships involved in the general process that we described above. But, in the end of this work, we hope to have been able to contribute to the development of the subjective group dynamics model and to have been able to persuade our readers that this effort was worth to be pursued.
REFERENCES


APPENDIXES

Appendix 1. Materials used in the Pilot Study of Experiment 1.

Appendix 2. Materials used in Experiment 1.

Appendix 3. Materials used in Experiment 2.

Appendix 4. Materials used in Experiment 3.

Appendix 5. Materials used in Experiment 4.

Appendix 6. Materials used in Experiment 5.

Appendix 7. Materials used in Experiment 6.

Appendix 8. Materials used in Experiment 7.
Appendix 1

Materials used in the Pilot Study of Experiment 1
SONDAGEM SOBRE A PRAXE ACADÉMICA

Como sabe, a praxe é um tema que tem levantado alguma polémica, tratando-se, ao mesmo tempo de um dos aspectos mais marcantes da vida académica tanto no interior como no exterior da Universidade.

No quadro de um grupo de estudos acerca de diferentes aspectos da vida universitária, estamos a conduzir um inquérito acerca do que os estudantes das várias faculdades da Universidade do Porto pensam acerca da praxe.

Pedimos-lhe que responda a um pequeno número de questões, que não lhe tomarão muito tempo. Não precisa de se identificar. As suas respostas são anónimas e confidenciais e serão utilizadas apenas com fins estatísticos. Desde já agradecemos a sua colaboração.

FACULDADE QUE FREQUENTA: __________________________ ANO DE ESTUDOS: __________________________
CURSO: __________________________ ANOS DE FREQUÊNCIA: __________________________
IDADE: ________ anos SEXO: __________________________

Em frente a cada uma das 7 afirmações do quadro abaixo encontra-se um quadrado:
- Inscreva um sinal de mais (+) no quadrado que corresponda à afirmação que melhor traduz a sua opinião acerca da praxe.

| AFIRMAÇÃO 1: A praxe é algo extremamente necessário e extremamente útil, com que eu concordo absolutamente, e que deve ser obrigatória |   |
| AFIRMAÇÃO 2: A praxe é algo muito positivo e muito útil, com que eu concordo muito, e que deve ser encorajada |   |
| AFIRMAÇÃO 3: A praxe é algo positivo e útil, com que eu concordo, e que devia ser bem vista |   |
| AFIRMAÇÃO 4: A praxe não é positiva nem negativa, nem útil nem inútil, e eu nem concordo nem discordo com ela |   |
| AFIRMAÇÃO 5: A praxe é algo negativo e inútil, com que eu discordo, e que devia ser criticada |   |
| AFIRMAÇÃO 6: A praxe é algo muito negativo e muito inútil, com que eu discordo muito, e que deve ser desencorajada |   |
| AFIRMAÇÃO 7: A praxe é algo extremamente negativo e extremamente inútil, com que eu discordo absolutamente, e que deve ser proibida |   |
Appendix 2
Materials used in Experiment 1
SONDAGEM SOBRE A PRAXE ACADÉMICA

Como sabe, a praxe é um tema que tem levantado alguma polémica, tratando-se, ao mesmo tempo de um dos aspectos mais marcantes da vida académica tanto no interior como no exterior da Universidade.

No quadro de um grupo de estudos acerca de diferentes aspectos da vida universitária, estamos a conduzir um inquérito acerca do que os estudantes das várias faculdades da Universidade do Porto pensam acerca da praxe.

Numa primeira fase deste inquérito, pedimos a uma amostra de 50 estudantes da Faculdade de Psicologia e de Ciências da Educação-UP [vs. Faculdade de Direito da UP] que das frases escritas na página seguinte, indicassem aquela que melhor traduzia a sua opinião acerca da praxe. Nesta segunda fase pretendemos validar os resultados desse inquérito. Por isso, se foi um dos que respondeu à primeira fase, POR FAVOR NÃO RESPONDA A ESTA.

ANTES DE VIRAR A PÁGINA, pedimos-lhe que responda a um pequeno número de questões, que não lhe tomarão muito tempo. Não precisa de se identificar. As suas respostas são anónimas e confidenciais e serão utilizadas apenas com fins estatísticos. Desde já agradecemos a sua colaboração.

FACULDADE QUE FREQUENTA:
ANO DE ESTUDOS:
CURSO:
ANOS DE FREQUÊNCIA:
IDADE: anos
SEXO:

INDIQUE NAS ESCALAS SEGUINTE QUAL É A SUA OPINIÃO GERAL ACERCA DA PRAXE (em cada escala, marque uma cruz no quadrado que melhor traduz a sua opinião)

DE UMA MANEIRA GERAL, A PRAXE É UMA COISA
MUITO POSITIVA  MUITO NEGATIVA

DE UMA MANEIRA GERAL, A PRAXE É UMA COISA
MUITO ÚTIL  MUITO INÚTIL

DE UMA MANEIRA GERAL, A MINHA POSIÇÃO EM RELAÇÃO À PRAXE É DE
CONCORDÂNCIA ABSOLUTA  Discordância Absoluta

DE UMA MANEIRA GERAL, A PRAXE DEVIAM SER
OBRIGATÓRIA  PROIBIDA

DE UMA MANEIRA GERAL, EM TERMOS DAS SUAS OPINIÕES ACERCA DA PRAXE OS ALUNOS DESTA FACULDADE SÃO

EM SUA OPINIÃO, QUAL É A PERCENTAGEM DE ALUNOS DESTA FACULDADE QUE SÃO GLOBALMENTE A FAVOR DA PRAXE? %
EM SUA OPINIÃO, QUAL É A PERCENTAGEM DE ALUNOS DESTA FACULDADE QUE SÃO GLOBALMENTE CONTRA A PRAXE?

Page 2

Abaixo figuram as mesmas afirmações que apresentamos já aos 50 estudantes que constituíram a amostra da FPCE-UP [vs. FDUP]

*Version 1: Norm-Validating condition

| AFIRMAÇÃO 1: A praxe é algo extremamente necessário e extremamente útil, com que eu concordo absolutamente, e que deve ser obrigatória | A | B |
| AFIRMAÇÃO 2: A praxe é algo muito positivo e muito útil, com que eu concordo muito, e que deve ser encorajada | 3 | 0 |
| AFIRMAÇÃO 3: A praxe é algo positivo e útil, com que eu concordo, e que devia ser bem vista | 4 | 0 |
| AFIRMAÇÃO 4: A praxe não é positiva nem negativa, nem útil nem inútil, e eu nem concordo nem discordo com ela | 6 | 0 |
| AFIRMAÇÃO 5: A praxe é algo negativo e inútil, com que eu discordo, e que devia ser criticada | 17 | 0 |
| AFIRMAÇÃO 6: A praxe é algo muito negativo e muito inútil, com que eu discordo muito, e que deve ser desencorajada | 16 | 0 |
| AFIRMAÇÃO 7: A praxe é algo extremamente negativo e extremamente inútil, com que eu discordo absolutamente, e que deve ser proibida | 2 | 0 |
| =50 |

POR FAVOR LEIA COM ATENÇÃO:

Na coluna A, em frente a cada afirmação, pode ver o número de alunos da FPCE-UP [vs. FDUP] que, de entre os 50 interrogados, afirmaram concordar com essa afirmação, discordando das restantes. Por favor observe esses números.

Na coluna B, em frente a cada afirmação encontra-se um círculo:
- Inscreva um sinal de mais (+) no círculo correspondente à afirmação que melhor traduz a sua opinião acerca da praxe.
- Inscreva um sinal de menos (-) no círculo correspondente à afirmação a partir da qual está em desacordo.
*Version 2: Norm-Undermining condition*

**AFirmação 1**: A praxe é algo extremamente necessário e extremamente útil, com que eu concordo absolutamente, e que deve ser obrigatória

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**AFirmação 2**: A praxe é algo muito positivo e muito útil, com que eu concordo muito, e que deve ser encorajada

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<td>16</td>
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**AFirmação 3**: A praxe é algo positivo e útil, com que eu concordo, e que devia ser bem vista

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<td>17</td>
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</table>

**AFirmação 4**: A praxe não é positiva nem negativa, nem útil nem inútil, e eu nem concordo nem discordo com ela

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<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
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<td>6</td>
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**AFirmação 5**: A praxe é algo negativo e inútil, com que eu discordo, e que devia ser criticada

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**AFirmação 6**: A praxe é algo muito negativo e muito inútil, com que eu discordo muito, e que deve ser desencorajada

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<td>3</td>
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**AFirmação 7**: A praxe é algo extremamente negativo e extremamente inútil, com que eu discordo absolutamente, e que deve ser proibida

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<th>B</th>
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**Por favor leia com atenção:**

**Na coluna A**, em frente a cada afirmação, pode ver o número de alunos da FPCE-UP [vs. FDUP] que, de entre os 50 interrogados, afirmaram concordar com essa afirmação, discordando das restantes. Por favor observe esses números.

**Na coluna B**, em frente a cada afirmação encontra-se um círculo:
- Inscreva um sinal de mais (+) no círculo correspondente à afirmação que melhor traduz a sua opinião acerca da praxe.
- Inscreva um sinal de menos (-) no círculo correspondente à afirmação a partir da qual está em desacordo.

**Page 3**

Apresentamos-lhe agora algumas questões para finalizar este pequeno questionário. Por favor leia cada questão com atenção e marque uma cruz na casa da escala correspondente a cada uma delas que melhor traduz a sua opinião.

**Qual é a sua opinião acerca dos alunos da FPCE-UP [vs. FDUP] que deram a resposta acerca da praxe que você assinalou com o sinal de mais (+) na coluna B da página anterior?**

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<tr>
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<th>Muito Positiva</th>
<th>Muito Negativa</th>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>São Bons Colegas</td>
<td>São Maus Colegas</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Muito Solidários</td>
<td>Nada Solidários</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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*Por favor leia com atenção:* 

**Na coluna A**, em frente a cada afirmação, pode ver o número de alunos da FPCE-UP [vs. FDUP] que, de entre os 50 interrogados, afirmaram concordar com essa afirmação, discordando das restantes. Por favor observe esses números.

**Na coluna B**, em frente a cada afirmação encontra-se um círculo:
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- Inscreva um sinal de menos (-) no círculo correspondente à afirmação a partir da qual está em desacordo.

**Page 3**

Apresentamos-lhe agora algumas questões para finalizar este pequeno questionário. Por favor leia cada questão com atenção e marque uma cruz na casa da escala correspondente a cada uma delas que melhor traduz a sua opinião.

**Qual é a sua opinião acerca dos alunos da FPCE-UP [vs. FDUP] que deram a resposta acerca da praxe que você assinalou com o sinal de mais (+) na coluna B da página anterior?**

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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Muito Positiva</th>
<th>Muito Negativa</th>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>São Bons Colegas</td>
<td>São Maus Colegas</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Muito Solidários</td>
<td>Nada Solidários</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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*Por favor leia com atenção:* 

**Na coluna A**, em frente a cada afirmação, pode ver o número de alunos da FPCE-UP [vs. FDUP] que, de entre os 50 interrogados, afirmaram concordar com essa afirmação, discordando das restantes. Por favor observe esses números.

**Na coluna B**, em frente a cada afirmação encontra-se um círculo:
- Inscreva um sinal de mais (+) no círculo correspondente à afirmação que melhor traduz a sua opinião acerca da praxe.
- Inscreva um sinal de menos (-) no círculo correspondente à afirmação a partir da qual está em desacordo.

**Page 3**

Apresentamos-lhe agora algumas questões para finalizar este pequeno questionário. Por favor leia cada questão com atenção e marque uma cruz na casa da escala correspondente a cada uma delas que melhor traduz a sua opinião.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>EM SUA OPINIÃO, EM QUE MEDIDA ESTAS PESSOAS PODEM CONTRIBUIR PARA A COESÃO OU HARMONIA ENTRE OS ESTUDANTES DA FACULDADE A QUE PERTENCEM?</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td>MUITO</td>
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<tr>
<th><strong>EM SUA OPINIÃO, QUAL É A IMAGEM QUE ESTAS PESSOAS DÃO DOS ALUNOS DA FACULDADE A QUE PERTENCEM?</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td>MUITO BOA</td>
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<tr>
<th><strong>QUAL É A SUA OPINIÃO ACERCA DOS ALUNOS DA FPCE-UP [vs. FDUP] QUE DERAM UMA DAS RESPOSTAS ACERCA DA PRAXE QUE VOCÊ ASSINALOU COM O SINAL DE MENOS (-) NA COLUNA B DA PÁGINA ANTERIOR?</strong></th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MUITO POSITIVA</td>
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<tr>
<th><strong>SÃO BONS COLEGAS</strong></th>
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<th><strong>MUITO SOLIDÁRIOS</strong></th>
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<th><strong>EM SUA OPINIÃO, EM QUE MEDIDA ESTAS PESSOAS PODEM CONTRIBUIR PARA A COESÃO OU HARMONIA ENTRE OS ESTUDANTES DA FACULDADE A QUE PERTENCEM?</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td>MUITO</td>
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<tr>
<th><strong>EM SUA OPINIÃO, QUAL É A IMAGEM QUE ESTAS PESSOAS DÃO DOS ALUNOS DA FACULDADE A QUE PERTENCEM?</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MUITO BOA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 3
Materials used in Experiment 2
Na folha de aferição do teste APT foi-lhe apresentada informação sobre o estilo de percepção a que você pertence.

Nesta segunda fase da aferição do teste APT pedimos-lhe que responda às questões que se seguem, que estão divididas em três cadernos. Antes de começar a responder, leia a explicação que se segue.

(O exemplo que se segue serve para ilustrar como deve dar a sua resposta a cada pergunta do questionário.)

**Exemplo:** Se a pergunta fosse:

“Em que medida acha que é importante apanhar sol?”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nada importante</th>
<th>Muito importante</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

- Se achasse que é mesmo muito importante apanhar sol, colocaria a cruz na 7ª casa a contar da esquerda;
- Se achasse que não era mesmo nada importante apanhar sol, colocaria a cruz na 1ª casa a contar da esquerda;
- Se achasse nem muito nem pouco importante apanhar sol, colocaria a cruz na 4ª casa.

Assim, tem sempre 7 possibilidades de resposta diferentes. Quanto mais a sua opinião se aproximar de um dos extremos da escala, mais próximo dele deve colocar a cruz.

Por favor, **não se esqueça de responder a todas as perguntas.** Se não o fizer, não será possível ter em conta o seu questionário.

Coloque **uma e só uma cruz** em cada pergunta.

1. Em que medida acha que o teste APT acertou relativamente ao seu estilo perceptivo?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provavelmente errou</th>
<th>Provavelmente acertou</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

2. Em que medida lhe agrada pertencer ao seu estilo perceptivo?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agrada-me pouco</th>
<th>Agrada-me muito</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

3. Gosta de ser uma pessoa com estilo perceptivo do tipo Abstracto-Pictórico?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gosto pouco</th>
<th>Gosto muito</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

4. Em que medida se identifica com o seu estilo perceptivo?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nada</th>
<th>Muito</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

5. Em que medida sente que pertence ao estilo Abstracto-Pictórico?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gosto pouco</th>
<th>Gosto muito</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
POR FAVOR LEIA COM ATENÇÃO O QUE SE SEGUE:

Neste estudo de aferição do teste APT existe uma terceira fase em que se vão realizar sessões de discussão sobre alguns dos temas acerca dos quais você deu a sua opinião na primeira fase. Nessas sessões, procura-se obter mais informação sobre os valores ético-morais dos dois estilos perceptivos.

Para podermos decidir acerca das pessoas que participarão nas sessões da terceira fase, pedimos-lhe que responda às perguntas que se encontram neste caderno.

Para lhe permitir responder a essas perguntas, apresentamos-lhe as respostas dadas por duas pessoas que são do estilo perceptivo Abstracto-Pictórico [Picto-Experiencial].
6. Relativamente à pessoa A que lhe apresentámos, pedimos-lhe que responda às seguintes questões:

6.1. Qual é a sua opinião acerca dessa pessoa?

   Negativa  [ ]  [ ]  [ ]  [ ]  [ ]  Positiva

6.2. Em sua opinião esta pessoa é:

   Desagradável  [ ]  [ ]  [ ]  [ ]  [ ]  Agradável

6.3. Qual é a imagem que esta pessoa dá do estilo perceptivo a que você também pertence?

   Muito má imagem  [ ]  [ ]  [ ]  [ ]  [ ]  Muito boa imagem

6.4. Em sua opinião, a pessoa A deve ser:

   Má pessoa  [ ]  [ ]  [ ]  [ ]  [ ]  Boa pessoa
   Insensível  [ ]  [ ]  [ ]  [ ]  [ ]  Sensível
   Mau colega  [ ]  [ ]  [ ]  [ ]  [ ]  Bom colega
7. Relativamente à **pessoa B** que lhe apresentámos, pedimos-lhe que responda às seguintes questões:

7.1. Qual é a sua opinião acerca dessa pessoa?

| Negativa | Positiva |

7.2. Em sua opinião esta pessoa é:

| Desagradável | Agradável |

7.3. Qual é a imagem que esta pessoa dá do estilo perceptivo a que você também pertence?

| Muito má imagem | Muito boa imagem |

7.4. Em sua opinião, a **pessoa B** deve ser:

| Má pessoa | Boa pessoa |
| Insensível | Sensível |
| Mau colega | Bom colega |

7.5. Se vier a participar na terceira fase com esta pessoa, em que medida estará disposto(a) a convencê-la a mudar de opinião?

| Nada | Muito |


As perguntas seguintes destinam-se a melhorar a apresentação de estudos a realizar no futuro, assim como a preparar uma apresentação dos resultados deste estudo. Por favor, responda o mais claramente possível a cada uma delas:

1. Qual é o seu estilo perceptivo?  
   - Abstracto-Pictórico  
   - Picto-Experiencial

2. A que estilo perceptivo pertencem as pessoas cujas respostas lhe foram apresentadas?  
   - Abstracto-Pictórico  
   - Picto-Experiencial

3. Qual foi a afirmação escolhida pela pessoa A de entre as sete possíveis?
   
   1  2  3  4  5  6  7

4. Qual foi a afirmação escolhida pela pessoa B de entre as sete possíveis?
   
   1  2  3  4  5  6  7

5. Segundo os resultados até agora obtidos, qual dos dois estilos perceptivos parece ter um nível de valores ético-morais mais elevados?
   - Abstracto-Pictórico  
   - Picto-Experiencial  
   - Obtiveram resultados semelhantes

6. Diga nas suas próprias palavras quais são os objectivos deste estudo?
Appendix 4
Materials used in Experiment 3 – SESSION 1
Nesta investigação pretende-se realizar a aferição para a população portuguesa do **Inventário de Valores – Versão Reduzida**. Na sua versão mais extensa (Fennigan, 1987), este inventário é composto por um total de 25 questões, na sua maioria sob a forma de dilemas, as quais foram reduzidas a 5 na versão reduzida (*Value Inventory – Short Version*; Karl Fennigan, 1994). Uma vez estabelecidos os valores padrão, este permite conhecer com elevada precisão o nível de desenvolvimento moral de cada indivíduo.

Estudos recentes de Bernstein e Jones (1993, 1997) indicam que, de entre outros factores, o tipo de formação escolar superior pode estar relacionado com os comportamentos e atitudes que as pessoas exibem na sua vida quotidiana. No entanto, não existe certeza sobre este aspecto. Esta investigação tem também como objectivo saber se existe de facto alguma relação entre os padrões éticos e morais das pessoas e o tipo de formação escolar superior. Para tal, estamos a realizar a investigação com estudantes do curso de Medicina Dentária e do curso de Psicologia Clínica do ISCS-N.

No processo de aferição de qualquer instrumento de avaliação, é imprescindível caracterizar a amostra a que se recorre, no maior número de características possível. Para tal, nas páginas que se seguem, pedimos-lhe que responda a um conjunto de questões a seu respeito.

As suas respostas são totalmente anónimas e confidenciais. Apenas serão utilizadas para fins estatísticos.

Contudo, é nosso objectivo proporcionar a cada uma das pessoas que se voluntaria a participar nesta investigação os seus próprios resultados. Assim, por forma a manter o seu anonimato, pedimos-lhe que inscreva um **código** em alguns dos cadernos de resposta que vai utilizar. Este código pode ser o que bem entender, mas convém que não permita a identificação do seu autor.
**AFERIÇÃO DO V.I.-S.V**

**INSTITUIÇÃO DE ENSINO QUE FREQUENTA:**

**CURSO QUE FREQUENTA:**

**ANO QUE FREQUENTA:**

1º ☐ 2º ☐ 3º ☐ 4º ☐ 5º ☐ 6º ☐

**Nº DE ANOS NO ENSINO SUPERIOR:**

________ Anos

**IDADE:**

________ Anos

**SEXO:**

Masculino ☐ Feminino ☐

---

**POR FAVOR INDIQUE A SUA OPINIÃO EM CADA UMA DAS ESCALAS SEGUINTE**

(Em cada escala, marque apenas uma cruz no quadrado que melhor traduz a sua opinião. Não se esqueça de que pode usar qualquer um dos quadrados. Quanto mais próximo colocar a cruz de um dos pólos da escala mais a sua opinião está próxima dele.)

**PARA MIM, FREQUENTAR UM CURSO SUPERIOR É UMA COISA:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NADA IMPORTANTE</th>
<th>☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐</th>
<th>MUITO IMPORTANTE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**GOSTO DE SER ALUNO DO CURSO DE MEDICINA DENTÁRIA.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DISCordo COMPLETAMENTE</th>
<th>☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐</th>
<th>CONCORdo COMPLETAMENTE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**ÀS VEZES SINTO QUE SERIA MELHOR ESTAR NOUTRO CURSO, POR EXEMPLO O DE PSICOLOGIA CLÍNICA.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DISCordo COMPLETAMENTE</th>
<th>☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐</th>
<th>CONCORdo COMPLETAMENTE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**EM QUE MEDIDA LHE AGRADA PERTENCER AO CURSO DE MEDICINA DENTÁRIA.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGRADA-ME POUCO</th>
<th>☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐</th>
<th>AGRADA-ME MUITO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**EM QUE MEDIDA LHE AGRADAVA PERTENCER AO CURSO DE PSICOLOGIA CLÍNICA.**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGRADAVA-ME POUCO</th>
<th>☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐</th>
<th>AGRADAVA-ME MUITO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**EM QUE MEDIDA SE IDENTIFICA COM O CURSO DE MEDICINA DENTÁRIA.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IDENTIFICO-ME POUCO</th>
<th>☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐</th>
<th>IDENTIFICO-ME MUITO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**EM QUE MEDIDA SE IDENTIFICA COM O CURSO DE PSICOLOGIA CLÍNICA.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IDENTIFICO-ME POUCO</th>
<th>☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐</th>
<th>IDENTIFICO-ME MUITO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

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**POR FAVOR VERIFIQUE SE RESPOndeU A TODAS AS PERgUNTAS**
Appendix 4 (Cont.)

Materials used in Experiment 3 – SESSION 2
Assinale abaixo qual é o seu curso:

Medicina Dentária □
Psicologia Clínica □
Como certamente se recordará, nesta investigação procuramos averiguar se existe relação entre os padrões éticos e morais das pessoas e o seu tipo de formação escolar superior.

Como acabamos de o(a) informar, os resultados obtidos na primeira fase com os alunos do curso de Medicina Dentária e do curso de Psicologia Clínica do ISCS-N, permitiram-nos obter uma caracterização preliminar das pessoas dos dois cursos em termos do seu nível de valores ético-morais médio.
Nesta investigação existe uma terceira fase em que se vão realizar sessões de discussão sobre alguns dos temas acerca dos quais você deu a sua opinião na primeira fase, no Inventário de Valores de Fennigan. Nessas sessões, pretenderemos obter mais informação sobre os valores ético-morais dos dois cursos.

Para podermos decidir acerca das pessoas que participarão nas sessões da terceira fase, pedimos-lhe que responda às perguntas que se encontram neste caderno.

Para lhe permitir responder a essas perguntas, apresentamos-lhe as respostas dadas na primeira fase a uma das questões do Inventário de Valores de Fennigan, por dois alunos do curso de Medicina Dentária.

Obviamente, para garantir a total confidencialidade das respostas eliminámos todas as informações que possam identificar estes alunos. Assim, estão apenas identificadas como A ou B.

Pedimos-lhe, então, que examine atentamente as cópias das respostas destes dois alunos.
Agora que já analisou as cópias das respostas dos alunos A e B, pedimos-lhe que responda às perguntas que se seguem.

Relativamente ao Aluno A que lhe apresentámos, pedimos-lhe que preencha a informação seguinte para evitar problemas na introdução dos dados.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>O Aluno A pertence a qual dos dois cursos?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Medicina Dentária</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Qual é a sua opinião acerca desse aluno?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Negativa</th>
<th>Positiva</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Má pessoa</td>
<td>Boa pessoa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Em que medida considera que, no decurso da terceira fase do estudo, este aluno pode afectar aquilo que os outros podem pensar dos alunos de Medicina Dentária?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Muito negativamente</th>
<th>Muito positivamente</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Em sua opinião, qual é a imagem que este aluno dá do curso de Medicina Dentária?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Muito má imagem</th>
<th>Muito boa imagem</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Em sua opinião, o Aluno A deve ser uma pessoa:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Desonesta</th>
<th>Honesta</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egoísta</td>
<td>Altruísta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hipócrita</td>
<td>Sincera</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invejosa</td>
<td>Generosa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insensível</td>
<td>Sensível</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mau colega</td>
<td>Bom colega</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nada solidário</td>
<td>Muito solidário</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desleal</td>
<td>Leal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

POR FAVOR VERIFIQUE SE RESPONDEU A TODAS AS QUESTÕES
Relativamente ao **Aluno B** que lhe apresentámos, pedimos-lhe que preencha a informação seguinte para evitar problemas na introdução dos dados.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>O <strong>Aluno B</strong> pertence a qual dos dois cursos?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Medicina Dentária</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Qual é a sua opinião acerca desse aluno?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Negativa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Má pessoa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Em que medida considera que, no decurso da terceira fase do estudo, este aluno pode afectar aquilo que os outros podem pensar dos alunos de Medicina Dentária?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muito negativamente</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Em sua opinião, qual é a imagem que este aluno dá do curso de Medicina Dentária?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muito má imagem</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Em sua opinião, o <strong>Aluno B</strong> deve ser uma pessoa:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Desonesta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egoísta</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hipócrita</td>
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<tr>
<td>Invejosa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Insensível</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mau colega</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nada solidário</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desleal</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Se vier a participar na terceira fase com este aluno, em que medida estará disposto(a) a convencê-lo a mudar de opinião?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nada</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Por favor verifique se respondeu a todas as questões.
As perguntas seguintes destinam-se a melhorar a apresentação de estudos a realizar no futuro, assim como a preparar uma apresentação dos resultados deste estudo. Por favor, responda o mais claramente possível a cada uma delas:

De acordo com os resultados até ao momento obtidos, qual dos dois cursos apresenta nível de valores ético-morais superior?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Psicologia Clínica</th>
<th>Medicina Dentária</th>
<th>Não foi possível determinar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

A que curso pertence o **Aluno A** que lhe apresentámos:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Psicologia Clínica</th>
<th>Medicina Dentária</th>
<th>Não se lembra</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

A que curso pertence o **Aluno B** que lhe apresentámos:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Psicologia Clínica</th>
<th>Medicina Dentária</th>
<th>Não se lembra</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Na questão do inventário de valores, qual foi a afirmação escolhida pelo **Aluno A** de entre as sete possíveis?

1. □ □ □ □ □ □ □

Na questão do inventário de valores, qual foi a afirmação escolhida pelo **Aluno B** de entre as sete possíveis?

1. □ □ □ □ □ □ □

Como descreveria este estudo nas suas palavras?

________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________

POR FAVOR VERIFIQUE SE RESPONDEU A TODAS AS QUESTÕES
Appendix 5
Materials used in Experiment 4
SONDAGEM SOBRE A PRAXE ACADÉMICA

Como sabe, a praxe é um tema que tem levantado alguma polémica, tratando-se, ao mesmo tempo de um dos aspectos mais marcantes da vida académica tanto no interior como no exterior da Universidade.

No quadro de um grupo de estudos acerca de diferentes aspectos da vida universitária, estamos a conduzir um inquérito acerca do que as pessoas em geral e os estudantes das várias faculdades da Universidade do Porto pensam acerca da praxe e da vida académica em geral.

Numa primeira fase deste inquérito, pedimos a uma amostra composta por estudantes da Faculdade de Ciências (FCUP) e da Faculdade de Letras (FLUP) e por pessoas que não são estudantes que dessem a sua opinião acerca da praxe académica. Nesta segunda fase pretendemos validar os resultados desse inquérito. Por isso, se foi um dos que respondeu à primeira fase, POR FAVOR NÃO RESPONDA A ESTA.

ANTES DE VIRAR A PÁGINA, pedimos-lhe que responda a um conjunto de questões, que não lhe tomarão muito tempo. Não precisa de se identificar. As suas respostas são anónimas e confidenciais e serão utilizadas apenas com fins estatísticos. Desde já agradecemos a sua colaboração.

FACULDADE QUE REPRESENTA:

CURSO:

ANO QUE FREQUENTA:  
1º ano  2º ano  3º ano  4º ano  5º ano

Nº DE ANOS NA UNIVERSIDADE:  ____ Anos

IDADE:  ____ Anos  
SEXO:  
Masculino  Feminino

POR FAVOR NÃO PASSE À PÁGINA SEGUINTE SEM VERIFICAR QUE RESPONDEU A TODAS AS QUESTÕES
INDIQUE NAS ESCALAS SEGUINTE QUAL É A SUA OPINIÃO SOBRE SEMANA DE RECEPÇÃO AO CALOIRO E SOBRE A VIDA UNIVERSITÁRIA EM GERAL (Em cada escala, marque uma cruz no quadrado que melhor traduz a sua opinião. Não se esqueça de que pode usar qualquer um dos quadrados).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARA MIM, FREQUENTAR UM CURSO SUPERIOR É UMA COISA</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NADA IMPORTANTE</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>GOSTO DE SER ALUNO DA FCUP.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DISCordo COMpletamente</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TENHO LAÇOS FORTEs COM A MINHA FACULDADE.</th>
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<tr>
<td>DISCordo COMpletamente</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>IDENTIFICO-ME COM A MINHA FACULDADE.</th>
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<tr>
<td>DISCordo COMpletamente</td>
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<tr>
<th>VEJO-ME COMO UM MEMBRO DA MINHA FACULDADE.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DISCordo COMpletamente</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

POR FAVOR NÃO PASSE À PÁGINA SEGUINTE SEM VERIFICAR QUE RESPOndeU A TODAS AS QUESTÕES
 Por favor leia com atenção:

Neste momento já conhecemos os resultados da primeira fase deste estudo relativos às pessoas que não são estudantes universitários. Estes resultados mostram que a clara maioria dessas pessoas não estudantes são a favor da praxe académica.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>ESTE RESULTADO, DEIXOU-O(A):</th>
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<td>NADA DESILUDIDO(A)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAL DISPOSTO(A)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MUITO SATISFEITO(A)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MUITO DESILUDIDO(A)</td>
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<td>BEM DISPOSTO(A)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Abaixo apresentamos-lhe afirmações sobre as quais tiveram que se pronunciar essas pessoas não estudantes, mas também os estudantes das duas faculdades que participaram na primeira fase do inquérito. Por favor, leia-as com atenção.

**AFIRMAÇÃO 1:** A praxe é algo extremamente negativo e extremamente inútil, com que eu discordo absolutamente, e que devia ser proibida

**AFIRMAÇÃO 2:** A praxe é algo muito negativo e muito inútil, com que eu discordo muito, e que devia ser desencorajada

**AFIRMAÇÃO 3:** A praxe é algo negativo e inútil, com que eu discordo, e que devia ser criticada

**AFIRMAÇÃO 4:** A praxe não é positiva nem negativa, nem útil nem inútil, e eu nem concordo nem discordo com ela

**AFIRMAÇÃO 5:** A praxe é algo positivo e útil, com que eu concordo, e que devia ser bem vista

**AFIRMAÇÃO 6:** A praxe é algo muito positivo e muito útil, com que eu concordo muito, e que devia ser encorajada

**AFIRMAÇÃO 7:** A praxe é algo extremamente necessário e extremamente útil, com que eu concordo absolutamente, e que devia ser obrigatória

Em frente a cada afirmação encontra-se um círculo, pedimos-lhe que:
- Coloque um sinal de mais (+) no círculo correspondente à afirmação que melhor traduz a sua posição em relação à praxe.
- Coloque um sinal de menos (-) no círculo correspondente à afirmação com que você mais discorda em relação à praxe.

Por favor coloque apenas um sinal de mais (+) e um sinal de menos (-).

Na página seguinte, pedimos-lhe, em primeiro lugar, que dê a sua opinião acerca dos estudantes que responderam que a afirmação que melhor traduziu a opinião deles em relação à praxe é a afirmação que você assinalou com o sinal de mais (+). Depois, pedimos-lhe a sua opinião acerca daqueles estudantes cuja opinião em relação à praxe corresponde à afirmação que você assinalou com o sinal de menos (-).

**Por favor não passe à página seguinte sem verificar que respondeu a todas as questões.**
POR FAVOR LEIA COM ATENÇÃO:

Neste momento já conhecemos os resultados da primeira fase deste estudo relativos às pessoas que não são estudantes universitários. Estes resultados mostram que a clara maioria dessas pessoas não estudantes são contra a praxe académica.

ESTE RESULTADO, DEIXOU-O(A):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NADA SATISFEITO(A)</th>
<th>MUITO SATISFEITO(A)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NADA DESILUDIDO(A)</td>
<td>MUITO DESILUDIDO(A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAL DISPOSTO(A)</td>
<td>BEM DISPOSTO(A)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Abaixo apresentamos-lhe afirmações sobre as quais tiveram que se pronunciar essas pessoas não estudantes, mas também os estudantes das duas faculdades que participaram na primeira fase do inquérito. Por favor, leia-as com atenção.

AFIRMAÇÃO 1: A praxe é algo extremamente negativo e extremamente inútil, com que eu discordo absolutamente, e que devia ser proibida

AFIRMAÇÃO 2: A praxe é algo muito negativo e muito inútil, com que eu discordo muito, e que devia ser desencorajada

AFIRMAÇÃO 3: A praxe é algo negativo e inútil, com que eu discordo, e que devia ser criticada

AFIRMAÇÃO 4: A praxe não é positiva nem negativa, nem útil nem inútil, e eu nem concordo nem discordo com ela

AFIRMAÇÃO 5: A praxe é algo positivo e útil, com que eu concordo, e que devia ser bem vista

AFIRMAÇÃO 6: A praxe é algo muito positivo e muito útil, com que eu concordo muito, e que devia ser encorajada

AFIRMAÇÃO 7: A praxe é algo extremamente necessário e extremamente útil, com que eu concordo absolutamente, e que devia ser obrigatória

Em frente a cada afirmação encontra-se um círculo, pedimos-lhe que:
- Coloque um sinal de mais (+) no círculo correspondente à afirmação que melhor traduz a sua posição em relação à praxe.
- Coloque um sinal de menos (-) no círculo correspondente à afirmação com que você mais discorda em relação à praxe.

Por favor coloque apenas um sinal de mais (+) e um sinal de menos (-).

Na página seguinte, pedimos-lhe, em primeiro lugar, que dê a sua opinião acerca dos estudantes que responderam que a afirmação que melhor traduzia a opinião deles em relação à praxe é a afirmação que você assinalou com o sinal de mais (+). Depois, pedimos-lhe a sua opinião acerca

POR FAVOR NÃO PASSE À PÁGINA SEGUINTE SEM VERIFICAR QUE RESPONDEU A TODAS AS QUESTÕES
Por favor leia cada questão com atenção e, em cada uma delas, coloque uma cruz na casa da escala que melhor traduz a sua opinião.

### Qual é a sua opinião sobre os alunos da FCUP [vs. FLUP] que deram a resposta acerca da praxe que você assinalou com o sinal de mais (+) na página anterior?

| Negativa  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Positiva  |
|-----------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| São maus colegas  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | São bons colegas  |
| São desleais  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | São leais  |
| São nada solidários  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | São muito solidários  |

Em sua opinião, em que medida estas pessoas podem contribuir para a coesão ou harmonia entre os estudantes da FCUP [vs. FLUP]?

| Nada  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Muito  |
|-------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|

### Qual é a sua opinião sobre os alunos da FCUP [vs. FLUP] que deram a resposta acerca da praxe que você assinalou com o sinal de menos (-) na página anterior?

| Negativa  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Positiva  |
|-----------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| São maus colegas  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | São bons colegas  |
| São desleais  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | São leais  |
| São nada solidários  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | São muito solidários  |

Em sua opinião, em que medida estas pessoas podem contribuir para a coesão ou harmonia entre os estudantes da FCUP [vs. FLUP]?

| Nada  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Muito  |
|-------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|

Por favor não entregue sem verificar que respondeu a todas as questões.
Appendix 6
Materials used in Experiment 5
SONDAGEM SOBRE A PRAXE ACADÉMICA

Como sabe, a praxe é um tema que tem levantado alguma polémica, tratando-se, ao mesmo tempo de um dos aspectos mais marcantes da vida académica tanto no interior como no exterior da Universidade.

No quadro de um grupo de estudos acerca de diferentes aspectos da vida universitária, estamos a conduzir um inquérito acerca do que as pessoas em geral e os estudantes das várias faculdades da Universidade do Porto pensam acerca da praxe e da vida académica em geral.

Numa primeira fase deste inquérito, pedimos a uma amostra composta por estudantes da Faculdade de Ciências (FC-UP) e da Faculdade de Letras (FL-UP) e por pessoas que não são estudantes que dessem a sua opinião acerca da praxe académica. Nesta segunda fase pretendemos validar os resultados desse inquérito. Por isso, se foi um dos que respondeu à primeira fase, POR FAVOR NÃO RESPONDA À ESTA.

ANTES DE VIRAR A PÁGINA, pedimos-lhe que responda a um conjunto de questões, que não lhe tomarão muito tempo. Não precisa de se identificar. As suas respostas são anónimas e confidenciais e serão utilizadas apenas com fins estatísticos. Desde já agradecemos a sua colaboração.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FACULDADE QUE FREQUENTA:</th>
<th>ANO QUE FREQUENTA:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CURSO:</td>
<td>Nº DE ANOS NA UNIVERSIDADE:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>SEXO:</td>
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<p>| | |</p>
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<tr>
<td>Anos</td>
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</table>
INDIQUE NAS ESCALAS SEGUINTE QUAL É A SUA OPINIÃO ACERCA DA PRAXE E DA VIDA UNIVERSITÁRIA EM GERAL (Em cada escala, marque uma cruz no quadrado que melhor traduz a sua opinião. Não se esqueça de que pode usar qualquer um dos quadrados.)

NA MINHA FACULDADE, A PRAXE É
- Pior do que nas outras
- Melhor do que nas outras

DE MANEIRA GERAL, A PRAXE É UMA COISA
- Extremamente negativa
- Extremamente positiva

DE MANEIRA GERAL, A PRAXE É EXTREMAMENTE INÚTIL
- Nada
- Extremamente útil

DE MANEIRA GERAL, NA INTEGRAÇÃO DOS NOVOS ALUNOS, A PRAXE É UMA COISA
- Nada
- Extremamente importante

A MINHA POSIÇÃO EM RELAÇÃO À PRAXE É DE
- Discordância absoluta
- Concordância absoluta

Page 3

Leia cada questão com atenção e, em cada uma delas, coloque uma cruz na casa da escala que melhor traduz a sua opinião.

PARA O DESENVOLVIMENTO DE UM PAÍS, A UNIVERSIDADE É:
- Nada importante
- Muito importante

PARA MIM, FREQUENTAR UM CURSO SUPERIOR É UMA COISA:
- Nada importante
- Muito importante

GOSTO DE SER ALUNO DA MINHA FACULDADE.
- Discordo completamente
- Concordo completamente

TENHO LAÇOS FORTES COM A MINHA FACULDADE.
- Discordo completamente
- Concordo completamente

IDENTIFICO-ME COM A MINHA FACULDADE
- Discordo completamente
- Concordo completamente

É IMPORTANTE PARA A IMAGEM DE UM PAÍS TER ENSINO SUPERIOR DE QUALIDADE RECONHECIDA.
- Discordo completamente
- Concordo completamente

VEJO-ME COMO UM MEMBRO DA MINHA FACULDADE.
- Discordo completamente
- Concordo completamente

TODOS OS INDIVÍDUOS DEVIAM PODER FREQUENTAR O ENSINO SUPERIOR.
- Discordo completamente
- Concordo completamente
POR FAVOR LEIA COM ATENÇÃO:

Os resultados da primeira fase deste estudo foram conclusivos relativamente à opinião das pessoas que não são estudantes universitários em relação à praxe académica. Tendo em conta as respostas das pessoas que participaram no inquérito, os resultados mostram que a clara maioria dessas pessoas não estudantes são a favor da praxe académica.

ESTE RESULTADO, DEIXOU-O(A):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NADA SATISFEITO(A)</th>
<th>MUITO SATISFEITO(A)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NADA DESILUDIDO(A)</td>
<td>MUITO DESILUDIDO(A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAL DISPOSTO(A)</td>
<td>BEM DISPOSTO(A)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Abaixo apresentamos-lhe afirmações sobre as quais tiveram que se pronunciar essas pessoas não estudantes, mas também os estudantes que participaram na primeira fase do inquérito. Por favor, leia-as com atenção.

AFIRMAÇÃO 1: A praxe é algo extremamente negativo e extremamente inútil, com que eu discordo absolutamente, e que devia ser proibida
AFIRMAÇÃO 2: A praxe é algo muito negativo e muito inútil, com que eu discordo muito, e que devia ser desencorajada
AFIRMAÇÃO 3: A praxe é algo negativo e inútil, com que eu discordo, e que devia ser criticada
AFIRMAÇÃO 4: A praxe não é positiva nem negativa, nem útil nem inútil, e eu nem concordo nem discordo com ela
AFIRMAÇÃO 5: A praxe é algo positivo e útil, com que eu concordo, e que devia ser bem vista
AFIRMAÇÃO 6: A praxe é algo muito positivo e muito útil, com que eu concordo muito, e que devia ser encorajada
AFIRMAÇÃO 7: A praxe é algo extremamente necessário e extremamente útil, com que eu concordo absolutamente, e que devia ser obrigatória

Em frente a cada afirmação encontra-se um círculo branco, pedimos-lhe que:
- Coloque um sinal de mais (+) no círculo correspondente à afirmação que melhor traduz a sua posição em relação à praxe.
- Coloque um sinal de menos (-) no círculo correspondente à afirmação com que você mais discorda em relação à praxe.

Por favor coloque apenas um sinal de mais (+) e um sinal de menos (-).

Na página seguinte, pedimos-lhe, em primeiro lugar, que dê a sua opinião acerca dos estudantes que responderam que a afirmação que melhor traduzia a opinião deles em relação à praxe é a afirmação que você assinalou com o sinal de mais (+). Seguidamente, pedimos-lhe a sua opinião acerca daqueles estudantes cuja opinião em relação à praxe corresponde à afirmação que você assinalou com o sinal de menos (-).
POR FAVOR LEIA COM ATENÇÃO:

Os resultados da primeira fase deste estudo foram conclusivos relativamente à opinião das pessoas que não são estudantes universitários em relação à praxe académica. Tendo em conta as respostas das pessoas que participaram no inquérito, os resultados mostram que a clara maioria dessas pessoas não estudantes são contra a praxe académica.

ESTE RESULTADO, DEIXOU-O(A):

<table>
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<tr>
<th>NADA SATISFEITO(A)</th>
<th>MUITO SATISFEITO(A)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NADA DESILUDIDO(A)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>BEM DISPOSTO(A)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Em frente a cada afirmação encontra-se um círculo branco, pedimos-lhe que:
- Coloque um sinal de mais (+) no círculo correspondente à afirmação que melhor traduz a sua posição em relação à praxe.
- Coloque um sinal de menos (-) no círculo correspondente à afirmação com que você mais discorda em relação à praxe.

Por favor coloque apenas um sinal de mais (+) e um sinal de menos (-).

Na página seguinte, pedimos-lhe, em primeiro lugar, que dé a sua opinião acerca dos estudantes que responderam que a afirmação que melhor traduzia a opinião deles em relação à praxe é a afirmação que você assinalou com o sinal de mais (+). Seguidamente, pedimos-lhe a sua opinião acerca daqueles estudantes cuja opinião em relação à praxe corresponde à afirmação que você assinalou com o sinal de menos (-).
Por favor leia cada questão com atenção e, em cada uma delas, coloque uma cruz na casa da escala que melhor traduz a sua opinião.

**QUAL É A SUA OPINIÃO ACERCA DOS ALUNOS DA FC-UP [vs. FL-UP] QUE DERAM A RESPOSTA ACERCA DA PRAXE QUE VOCÊ ASSINALOU COM O SINAL DE MAIS (+) NA PÁGINA ANTERIOR?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NEGATIVA</th>
<th>POSITIVA</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SÃO MAUS COLEGAS</td>
<td>SÃO BONS COLEGAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SÃO DESLEAIS</td>
<td>SÃO LEAIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SÃO NADA SOLIDÁRIOS</td>
<td>SÃO MUITO SOLIDÁRIOS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**EM SUA OPINIÃO, EM QUE MEDIDA ESTAS PESSOAS PODEM CONTRIBUIR PARA A COESÃO OU HARMONIA ENTRE OS ESTUDANTES DA FACULDADE A QUE PERTENCEM?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NADA</th>
<th>MUITO</th>
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</table>

**QUAL É A SUA OPINIÃO ACERCA DOS ALUNOS DA FC-UP [vs. FL-UP] QUE DERAM A RESPOSTA ACERCA DA PRAXE QUE VOCÊ ASSINALOU COM O SINAL DE MENOS (-) NA PÁGINA ANTERIOR?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NEGATIVA</th>
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<tr>
<td>SÃO MAUS COLEGAS</td>
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<td>SÃO NADA SOLIDÁRIOS</td>
<td>SÃO MUITO SOLIDÁRIOS</td>
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</table>

**EM SUA OPINIÃO, EM QUE MEDIDA ESTAS PESSOAS PODEM CONTRIBUIR PARA A COESÃO OU HARMONIA ENTRE OS ESTUDANTES DA FACULDADE A QUE PERTENCEM?**

| NADA | MUITO |
Appendix 7
Materials used in Experiment 6
SESSION 1:

a. Stimulus presented in the “A thematic-Perception Test”.

[Images of various drawings and illustrations related to the thematic-perception test]
b. Response sheets of the “Athematic-Perception Test”.

FACULDADE DE PSICOLOGIA E DE CIÊNCIAS DA EDUCAÇÃO
UNIVERSIDADE DO PORTO

TESTE DE PERCEPÇÃO-ATEMÁTICA
A.P.T.
(ATHEMATIC-PERCEPTION TEST)
- Lavinsky & Fassbender -
versão para investigação
Estudos recentes de A. Bernstein e D. Jones (1993, 1997) mostram que é possível que o tipo de percepção esteja relacionado com as reações das pessoas na sua vida quotidiana. No entanto, não existe certeza sobre este aspecto. O objectivo deste estudo é saber qual é a relação entre os padrões éticos e morais das pessoas e o tipo de percepção a que pertencem. Para tal, pedimos-lhe que respondam ao Teste de Percepção-Atemática (Athematic-Perception Test) desenvolvido nos trabalhos de A. Lavinsky e D. Fassbender (1982, 1984), e que procuramos aferir para a população universitária portuguesa. Este teste permite detectar, sem margem para dúvidas, a qual de dois tipos de percepção opostos você pertence. Esses dois tipos são: a Percepção Abstracto-Pictórica (Tipo AP) e a Percepção Picto-Experiencial (Tipo PE).

---

POR FAVOR, COMECE POR ESCREVER O SEU CÓDIGO PESSOAL NO ESPAÇO RESERVADO PARA ESSE EFETO.

O CÓDIGO PESSOAL DEVE SER COMPOSTO POR LETRAS, NÚMEROS OU SÍMBOLOS (PODE TAMBIÉM SER UMA PALAVRA) SÓ DE SI CONHECIDA E QUE NÃO POSSA, POR COINCIDÊNCIA, SER UTILIZADA POR MAIS NINGUÉM.

CÓDIGO PESSOAL
(usufrua letras, números ou símbolos):

---

O TESTE É COMPOSTO POR 2 TAREFAS.

1. TAREA DISCRIMINATIVA: ESTA TAREA VAII PERMITIR DETERMINAR EXACTAMENTE A QUAL DOS DOIS TIPOS DE PERCEPÇÃO-ATEMÁTICA VOCÊ PERTENCE.

2. TAREA DE TIPICIDADE: ESTA TAREA VAII PERMITIR DETERMINAR EM QUE MEDIDA VOCÊ É UMA PESSOA MUITO OU POUCO TÍPICA DO SEU TIPO DE PERCEPÇÃO-ATEMÁTICA.

---

por favor, não pague à página seguinte sem ter lido bem as instruções e sem ter preenchido o seu Código Pessoal

---

PARA CADA IMAGEM, ESCREVA A SUA RESPOSTA NO LOCAL APROPRIADO. DEVE MARCAR UMA CRUZ (X) NA CASA CORRESPONDENTE À FIGURA QUE VIU MAIS IMEDIATAMENTE (para que a sua inclusão num Tipo de Percepção-Atemática seja exacta, é importante que responda de forma totalmente espontânea).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IMAGEM Nº 1:</th>
<th>UM COELHO [ ]</th>
<th>UM PATO [ ]</th>
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</table>
|             | Conseguir ver outra(s) figura(s) na imagem? Se sim, diga qual(ais)?  
|             | Resposta:__________________________|

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IMAGEM Nº 2:</th>
<th>UM SAXOFONISTA [ ]</th>
<th>UMA CARA [ ]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
|             | Conseguir ver outra(s) figura(s) na imagem? Se sim, diga qual(ais)?  
|             | Resposta:__________________________|

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>IMAGEM Nº 3:</th>
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<th>UM CORRIMÃO [ ]</th>
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|             | Conseguir ver outra(s) figura(s) na imagem? Se sim, diga qual(ais)? 
|             | Resposta:__________________________|

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>UMA CARA [ ]</th>
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|             | Conseguir ver outra(s) figura(s) na imagem? Se sim, diga qual(ais)?  
|             | Resposta:__________________________|

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<tr>
<th>IMAGEM Nº 5:</th>
<th>PESSOAS A DESCER [ ]</th>
<th>SETAS [ ]</th>
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|             | Conseguir ver outra(s) figura(s) na imagem? Se sim, diga qual(ais)? 
|             | Resposta:__________________________|

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<tr>
<th>IMAGEM Nº 6:</th>
<th>UM CANDELABRO [ ]</th>
<th>DOIS PERFIS [ ]</th>
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</table>
|             | Conseguir ver outra(s) figura(s) na imagem? Se sim, diga qual(ais)? 
|             | Resposta:__________________________|

não váte esta página antes de receber indicação para isso
NA TAREFA SEGUINTE VAMOS APRESENTAR-LHE UMA SEQUÊNCIA DE CINCO IMAGENS. ESTAS IMAGENS SÃO DE DOIS TIPOS: 3 IMAGENS COM PONTOS E 2 IMAGENS COM FIGURAS SEM SIGNIFICADO.

NO CASO DAS IMAGENS COM PONTOS PEDIMOS-LHE QUE ESCRIVA UM NÚMERO CORRESPONDENTE À SUA ESTIMATIVA DA QUANTIDADE DE PONTOS QUE VIU NESSAS IMAGENS.

NO CASO DAS RESTANTES IMAGENS PEDIMOS-LHE QUE INDIQUE COMO PREFERE COMPLETAR A IMAGEM.

ATENÇÃO: AS IMAGENS COM OS PONTOS SÃO APRESENTADAS MUITO RAPIDAMENTE, POR ISSO REQUEDEM O MÁXIMO DE ATENÇÃO.
TAL COMO NA TAREFA ANTERIOR, O MAIS IMPORTANTE É QUE RESPOnda DE FORMA ESPONTÂNEA. NESTE TESTE NÃO EXISTEM RESPOSTAS CERTAS OU ERRADAS.
TAREFA DE TIPICALIDADE

PARA CADA IMAGEM, ESCREVA A SUA RESPOSTA NO LOCAL APROPRIADO.

**IMAGEM Nº 1:**
Faça uma estimativa do número de pontos que acabou de observar?
Resposta: ____ Pontos

**IMAGEM Nº 2:**
Faça uma estimativa do número de pontos que acabou de observar?
Resposta: ____ Pontos

**IMAGEM Nº 3:**
Faça uma estimativa do número de pontos que acabou de observar?
Resposta: ____ Pontos

**IMAGEM Nº 4:**
Ordene as 4 hipóteses abaixo desde a que prefere mais (1) à que prefere menos (4) para completar a sequência? Coloque o número no quadrado respectivo.

![Imagem de quatro quadrados com sombreamentos diferentes]

1 2 3 4

**IMAGEM Nº 5:**
Como completar essa imagem? Desenhe a sua resposta no quadrado abaixo. Os dois traços correspondem aos pontos por onde deve unir a figura.

![Imagem de um retângulo com traços]
c. Coding-sheet of the “Athematic-Perception Test”.

FACULDADE DE PSICOLOGIA E DE CIÊNCIAS DA EDUCAÇÃO
UNIVERSIDADE DO PORTO

FOLHA DE AFERIÇÃO

PROTOCOLO Nº: ___________ DATA (dia/mês/ano): ___/___/___

PONTUAÇÃO DISCRIMINATIVA:

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<td>GENERALIZAÇÃO INTER-ITEM</td>
<td>ELIMINAÇÃO PSICO-SENSORIAL</td>
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TIPO: AP PE

PONTUAÇÃO DE TIPICALIDADE:

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MÉTRICO:

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</table>

SÍNTESE DOS RESULTADOS:

Você é uma pessoa com percepção-atemática do estilo:

Abstracto-Pictórico  Picto-Experiencial

INFORMAÇÕES PESSOAIS:

A sua pontuação no teste APT revela o seguinte:

O codificador:  O verificador:

d. Response sheets of the “Value Inventory – Short Version”.

FACULDADE DE PSICOLOGIA E DE CIÊNCIAS DA EDUCAÇÃO
UNIVERSIDADE DO PORTO

INVENTÁRIO DE VALORES - versão reduzida
V.I. - S.V.
(VALUE INVENTORY – SHORT VERSION)
- K. Fennigan, 1994 -
versão para investigação

Pedimos-lhe que responda às seguintes questões, assinalando com uma cruz (X) a opção de resposta que melhor corresponde à sua opinião pessoal sobre o tema. Marque apenas uma cruz.

No caso de estar indeciso(a) relativamente a mais do que uma afirmação, marque ainda assim a que melhor traduz essa posição pessoal.

No final de cada página encontra outras três questões relativamente a cada um dos cinco assuntos abordados.

Não há respostas certas ou erradas. O que lhe pedimos é que responda de forma espontânea.
QUESTÃO I:

1. Quem faz um aborto, tira deliberadamente a vida a alguém, por isso devia pagar na mesma moeda.

2. Quem faz um aborto deliberadamente, devia ser julgado criminalmente como qualquer outro homicida.

3. A lei devia proibir totalmente o aborto, quaisquer que sejam as circunstâncias.

4. O aborto devia ser permitido unicamente quando está em causa a vida da mãe.

5. O aborto devia ser permitido unicamente nos casos em que possa haver danos físicos ou psicológicos para a criança.

6. As leis que restringem a prática do aborto deviam ser abolidas, já que a decisão cabe à mãe.

7. Toda e qualquer mulher que pretenda abortar, seja qual for o motivo, deveria receber apoio médico pago pelo estado.
**QUESTÃO II:**

1. Quem tem um familiar com SIDA deve colocá-lo imediatamente fora de casa e recusar qualquer contacto futuro.

2. Quem tem um familiar com SIDA deve pô-lo imediatamente fora de casa, mas admitir visitas curtas.

3. Quem tem um familiar com SIDA deve interná-lo numa instituição de apoio.

4. Quem tem um familiar com SIDA deve colocá-lo a viver numa parte separada da casa, separando a roupa e louça.

5. Quem tem um familiar com SIDA deve viver normalmente, tendo o cuidado de separar louça, roupa e artigos de higiene pessoal.

6. Quem tem um familiar com SIDA deve continuar a viver com ele sem qualquer tipo de discriminação.

7. Quem tem um familiar com SIDA deve encorajá-lo o mais possível a ignorar os riscos da sua doença para poder desfrutar o máximo de prazer na vida.
QUESTÃO III:

1. Os homossexuais deviam ser exilados para um local próprio, de forma a não constituir perigo para as pessoas normais.

2. Os homossexuais deviam receber o tratamento adequado à sua doença.

3. Os homossexuais deviam tentar esconder a sua tendência.

4. Embora sejam pessoas normais, os homossexuais deviam ser ajudados a encontrar um melhor caminho.

5. Apesar da sua escolha, os homossexuais, como quaisquer outras pessoas, têm o direito de escolher a vida sexual que bem entenderem.


7. A homossexualidade é uma realidade indiscutível das sociedades atuais, como tal, os homossexuais deviam estar representados no governo.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questão 4:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Os meus colegas não me despertam o mínimo interesse, e suporto-os apenas porque posso sempre vir a beneficiar dos seus apontamentos.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Às vezes é preciso passar por cima dos outros para obter bons resultados na escola.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Arrependo-me sempre de emprestar os meus apontamentos aos outros, porque eles podem vir a tirar a mesma nota do que eu.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Só partilho os meus apontamentos com quem me possa ser útil quando eu precisar.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Só partilho os meus apontamentos com o meu grupo restrito de amigos.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Para mim é importante sermos capazes de nos ajudarmos uns aos outros e partilhar apontamentos entre todos.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Vou sempre às aulas de modo a ter bons cadernos para todos os colegas.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
QUESTÃO V:
Como procederia se caminhasse pela rua e encontrasse uma carteira de pele, com dinheiro e documentos do proprietário?

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Ficava com a carteira e o dinheiro para mim e destruía os documentos para não haver a menor hipótese de se saber que eu a tinha encontrado.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Ficava com a carteira e o dinheiro para mim, mas ia deixar os documentos num lugar onde tivesse a certeza que alguém ia encontrá-los.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Tirava algum dinheiro para mim e punha tudo o resto num sitio onde alguém encontrasse a carteira e a devolvesse ao proprietário.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Agarro na carteira e ia metê-la numa caixa do correio de uma casa qualquer ali perto.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Agarro na carteira e deixava-a num lugar onde o proprietário a pudesse procurar. Por exemplo, um café ou outro local público ali perto.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Agarro na carteira e logo que possível ia entregá-la no posto de polícia mais perto.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Deixava todos os meus compromissos pessoais desse dia e tratava de encontrar o proprietário a todo o custo para lhe dar a carteira.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Obrigado pela sua colaboração.
SESSION 2:
e. “Booklet 1”

AFERIÇÃO DO TESTE A.P.T.
- Caderno 1 -
AFERIÇÃO DO TESTE A.P.T.
- Caderno 1 -

Na folha de aferição do teste APT foi lhe apresentada informação sobre o estilo de percepção a que você pertence.

Nesta segunda fase da aferição do teste APT pedimos-lhe que responda às questões que se seguem, que estão divididas em três cadernos. Antes de começar a responder, leia a explicação que se segue.

(O exemplo que se segue serve para ilustrar como deve dar a sua resposta a cada pergunta do questionário.)

**Exemplo:** Se a pergunta fosse:

"Em que medida acha que é importante apanhar sol?"

| Nada importante | | | | | | | | Muito importante |
|-----------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|

Se achasse que é mesmo muito importante apanhar sol, colocaria a cruz na 9ª casa a contar da esquerda;

Se achasse que não era mesmo nada importante apanhar sol, colocaria a cruz na 1ª casa a contar da esquerda;

Se achasse nem muito nem pouco importante apanhar sol, colocaria a cruz na 5ª casa.

Assim, tem sempre 9 possibilidades de resposta diferentes. Quanto mais a sua opinião se aproximar de um dos extremos da escala, mais próximo dele deve colocar a cruz.

Por favor, **não se esqueça de responder a todas as perguntas.** Se não o fizer, não será possível ter em conta o seu questionário.

Coloque **uma e só uma cruz** em cada pergunta.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pergunta</th>
<th>Opções</th>
<th>Vazio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Em que medida acha que o teste APT acertou relativamente ao seu estilo perceptivo?</td>
<td>Provavelmente errado</td>
<td>Provavelmente acertou</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Em que medida lhe agrada pertencer ao seu estilo perceptivo?</td>
<td>Agradava-me pouco</td>
<td>Agradava-me muito</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Em que medida lhe agradaria pertencer antes ao estilo perceptivo Picto-Experiencial?</td>
<td>Agradava-me pouco</td>
<td>Agradava-me muito</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gosta de ser uma pessoa com estilo perceptivo do tipo Abstracto-Pictórico?</td>
<td>Gosto pouco</td>
<td>Gosto muito</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gostaria de ser uma pessoa com estilo perceptivo do tipo Picto-Experiencial?</td>
<td>Gosto pouco</td>
<td>Gosto muito</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Em que medida se identifica com o seu estilo perceptivo?</td>
<td>Nada</td>
<td>Muito</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Em que medida se identifica com o estilo perceptivo Picto-Experiencial?</td>
<td>Nada</td>
<td>Muito</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gosta do seu estilo perceptivo?</td>
<td>Gosto pouco</td>
<td>Gosto muito</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gosta do estilo perceptivo Picto-Experiencial?</td>
<td>Gosto pouco</td>
<td>Gosto muito</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Por favor, veja se respondeu a todas as perguntas.

---

**Obs.:** A tabela acima representa uma tradução contida, mas a intenção original é que o respondente marque as opções que mais se adequadem para cada questão.
AFERIÇÃO DO TESTE A.P.T.
- Caderno 2 -
POR FAVOR LEIA COM ATENÇÃO O QUE SE SEGUE:

Neste estudo de aferição do teste APT existe uma terceira fase em que se vão realizar sessões de discussão sobre alguns dos temas acerca dos quais você deu a sua opinião na primeira fase. Nessas sessões, procura-se obter mais informação sobre os valores ético-morais dos dois estilos perceptivos.

Para podermos decidir acerca das pessoas que participarão nas sessões da terceira fase, pedimos-lhe que responda às perguntas que se encontram neste caderno.

Para lhe permitir responder a essas perguntas, apresentamos-lhe as cópias das respostas dadas por duas pessoas que também participaram na primeira fase do estudo, a uma das questões do Inventário de Valores de Fennigan.

Obviamente, para garantir a total confidencialidade das respostas eliminamos todas as informações que possam identificar essas pessoas. Assim, estão apenas identificadas como Pessoa A ou Pessoa B, e para cada uma tem de analisar tanto a sua folha de aferição como a resposta que deu a uma das questões do inventário de valores.

Pedimos-lhe, então, que examine atentamente as cópias que se seguem.
Agora que já analisou as cópias da folha de aferição e da sua resposta a uma das questões do inventário de valores de Fennigan, tanto da Pessoa A como da Pessoa B, pedimos-lhe que responda às perguntas que se seguem.

Relativamente à **Pessoa A** que lhe apresentamos, pedimos-lhe que preencha as informações seguintes para evitar problemas na introdução dos dados.

**A Pessoa A pertence a que tipo de percepção-atemática?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abstracto-Pictórico</th>
<th>Picto-Experiencial</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Em termos da sua representatividade no tipo de percepção-atemática a que pertence, a Pessoa A é:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fortemente representativa</th>
<th>Moderadamente representativa</th>
<th>Fracamente representativa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Em sua opinião, a Pessoa A deve ser:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Desonesto</th>
<th>Egoísta</th>
<th>Invejosa</th>
<th>Insensível</th>
<th>Mau colega</th>
<th>Honesto</th>
<th>Altruísta</th>
<th>Generosa</th>
<th>Sensível</th>
<th>Bom colega</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Relativamente à Pessoa B que lhe apresentámos, pedimos-lhe que preencha as informações seguintes para evitar problemas na introdução dos dados.

**A Pessoa B pertence a que tipo de percepção-atemática?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abstracto-Pictórico</th>
<th>Picto-Experiencial</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Em termos da sua representatividade no tipo de percepção-atemática a que pertence, a Pessoa B é:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fortemente representativa</th>
<th>Moderadamente representativa</th>
<th>Fracamente representativa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Em sua opinião, a Pessoa B deve ser:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Desonesta</th>
<th>Honesta</th>
<th>Egoísta</th>
<th>Altruísta</th>
<th>Invejosa</th>
<th>Generosa</th>
<th>Sensível</th>
<th>Bom colega</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td></td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**POR FAVOR VERIFIQUE SE RESpondeu A TODAS AS QUESTÕES**
AFERIÇÃO DO TESTE A.P.T.
- Caderno 3 -
Aferição do Teste A.P.T.
-Caderno 3-

As perguntas seguintes destinam-se a melhorar a apresentação de estudos a realizar no futuro, assim como a preparar uma apresentação dos resultados deste estudo. Por favor, responda o mais claramente possível a cada uma delas:

**Qual é o seu estilo perceptivo?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abstracto-Pictórico</th>
<th>Picto-Experiencial</th>
<th>Não se lembra</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

De acordo com os resultados preliminares, qual dos dois estilos de imaginação-atemática apresenta nível de valores ético-morais superior?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>O Abstracto-Pictórico</th>
<th>O Picto-Experiencial</th>
<th>Não foi possível determinar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

A que estilo perceptivo pertence a Pessoa A:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abstracto-Pictórico</th>
<th>Picto-Experiencial</th>
<th>Não se lembra</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Em termos da sua tipicidade no estilo perceptivo a que ela pertence, a Pessoa A é:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fortemente típica</th>
<th>Moderadamente típica</th>
<th>Fracoamente típica</th>
<th>Não se lembra</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A que estilo perceptivo pertence a Pessoa B:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abstracto-Pictórico</th>
<th>Picto-Experiencial</th>
<th>Não se lembra</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Em termos da sua tipicidade no estilo perceptivo a que ela pertence, a Pessoa B é:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fortemente típica</th>
<th>Moderadamente típica</th>
<th>Fracoamente típica</th>
<th>Não se lembra</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Na questão do inventário de valores, qual foi a afirmação escolhida pela Pessoa A de entre as sete possíveis?

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 

Na questão do inventário de valores, qual foi a afirmação escolhida pela Pessoa B de entre as sete possíveis?

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
Appendix 8
Materials used in Experiment 7
a. Stimulus presented in the “Athematic-Perception Test”.
b. Response sheets of the “Athematic-Perception Test”.

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TESTE DE PERCEPÇÃO-ATEMÁTICA
A.P.T.
(ATEMATIC-PERCEPTION TEST)
- Lavinsky & Fassbender -
versão para investigação
Estudos recentes de A. Bernstein e D. Jones (1993, 1997) mostram que é possível que o tipo de percepção esteja relacionado com as reacções das pessoas na sua vida quotidiana. No entanto, não existe certeza sobre este aspecto. O objectivo deste estudo é saber qual é a relação entre os padrões éticos e morais das pessoas e o tipo de percepção a que pertencem. Para tal, pedimos-lhe que responda ao Teste de Percepção-Atemática (Athematic-Perception Test) desenvolvido nos trabalhos de A. Lavinsky e D. Fassbender (1982, 1984), e que procuramos aferir para a população universitária portuguesa. Este teste permite detectar, sem margem para dúvidas, a qual de dois tipos de percepção opostos você pertence. Esses dois tipos são a Percepção Abstracto-Pictórica (Tipo AP) e a Percepção Picto-Experiencial (Tipo PE).

POR FAVOR, COMECE POR ESCRIVER O SEU CÓDIGO PESSOAL NO ESPAÇO RESERVADO PARA ESSE EFEITO.

O CÓDIGO PESSOAL DEVE SER COMPOSTO POR LETRAS, NÚMEROS OU SÍMBOLOS (PODE TAMBJÉM SER UMA PALAVRA) SÓ DE SI CONHECIDA E QUE NÃO POSSA, POR COINCIDÊNCIA, SER UTILIZADA POR MAIS NINGUÉM.

CÓDIGO PESSOAL
( utilize letras, números ou símbolos):

O TESTE É COMPOSTO POR 2 TAREFAS.

1. TAREFA DISCRIMINATIVA: ESTA TAREFA VAI PERMITIR DETERMINAR EXACTAMENTE A QUAL DOS DOIS TIPOS DE PERCEPÇÃO-ATEMÁTICA VOCÊ PERTENCE.

2. TAREFA DE TÍPICALIDADE: ESTA TAREFA VAI PERMITIR DETERMINAR EM QUE MEDIDA VOCÊ É UMA PESSOA MUITO OU POUCO TÍPICA DO SEU TIPO DE PERCEPÇÃO-ATEMÁTICA.

por favor, não passe a página seguinte sem ter lido bem as instruções e sem ter preenchido o seu Código Pessoal.
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UNIVERSIDADE DO PORTO

TAREFA DISCRIMINATIVA

PARA CADA IMAGEM, ESCREVA A SUA RESPOSTA NO LOCAL APROPRIADO. DEVE MARCAR UMA CRUZ (X) NA CASA CORRESPONDENTE À FIGURA QUE VIU MAIS IMEDIATAMENTE (para que a sua inclusão num Tipo de Percepção-Atemática seja exacta, é importante que responda de forma totalmente espontânea).

**IMAGEM Nº 1:**
- UM COELHO [ ]
- UM PATO [ ]
Conseguiu ver outra(s) figura(s) na imagem? Se sim, diga qual(ais)?
Resposta: ___________________________

**IMAGEN Nº 2:**
- UM SAXOFONISTA [ ]
- UMA CARA [ ]
Conseguiu ver outra(s) figura(s) na imagem? Se sim, diga qual(ais)?
Resposta: ___________________________

**IMAGEM Nº 3:**
- SEIS PERFIS [ ]
- UM CORRIMÃO [ ]
Conseguiu ver outra(s) figura(s) na imagem? Se sim, diga qual(ais)?
Resposta: ___________________________

**IMAGEM Nº 4:**
- DUAS CARAS [ ]
- UMA CARA [ ]
Conseguiu ver outra(s) figura(s) na imagem? Se sim, diga qual(ais)?
Resposta: ___________________________

**IMAGEM Nº 5:**
- PESSOAS A DESCER [ ]
- SETAS [ ]
Conseguiu ver outra(s) figura(s) na imagem? Se sim, diga qual(ais)?
Resposta: ___________________________

**IMAGEM Nº 6:**
- UM CANDELABRO [ ]
- DOIS PERFIS [ ]
Conseguiu ver outra(s) figura(s) na imagem? Se sim, diga qual(ais)?
Resposta: ___________________________
NA TAREFA SEGUINTE VAMOS APRESENTAR-LHE UMA SEQUÊNCIA DE CINCO IMAGENS. ESTAS IMAGENS SÃO DE DOIS TIPOS: 3 IMAGENS COM PONTOS E 2 IMAGENS COM FIGURAS SEM SIGNIFICADO.

NO CASO DAS IMAGENS COM PONTOS PEDIMOS-LHE QUE ESCREVA UM NÚMERO CORRESPONDENTE À SUA ESTIMATIVA DA QUANTIDADE DE PONTOS QUE VIU NESSAS IMAGENS.

NO CASO DAS RESTANTES IMAGENS PEDIMOS-LHE QUE INDIQUE COMO PREFERE COMPLETAR A IMAGEM.

ATENÇÃO: AS IMAGENS COM OS PONTOS SÃO APRESENTADAS MUITO RAPIDAMENTE, POR ISSO REQUEREM O MÁXIMO DE ATENÇÃO.
TAL COMO NA TAREFA ANTERIOR, O MAIS IMPORTANTE É QUE RESPONDA DE FORMA ESPONTÂNEA. NESTE TESTE NÃO EXISTEM RESPOSTAS CERTAS OU ERRADAS.
TAREFA DE TIPICALIDADE

PARA CADA IMAGEM, ESCREVA A SUA RESPOSTA NO LOCAL APROPRIADO.

**IMAGEM Nº 1:**
Faça uma estimativa do número de pontos que acabou de observar?
Resposta: _____ Pontos

**IMAGEM Nº 2:**
Faça uma estimativa do número de pontos que acabou de observar?
Resposta: _____ Pontos

**IMAGEM Nº 3:**
Faça uma estimativa do número de pontos que acabou de observar?
Resposta: _____ Pontos

**IMAGEM Nº 4:**
Ordene as 4 hipóteses abaixo desde a que prefere mais (1) à que prefere menos (4) para completar a sequência? Coloque o número no quadrado respectivo.

```
□ □ □ □
```

**IMAGEM Nº 5:**
Como completaria esta imagem? Desenhe a sua resposta no quadrado abaixo. Os dois traços correspondem aos pontos por onde deve unir a figura.

```
□ □ □ □
```
c. Coding-sheet of the “Athematic-Perception Test”.

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UNIVERSIDADE DO PORTO

FOLHA DE AFERIÇÃO

PROTOCOLO Nº: ________ DATA (dia/mês/ano): ___/___/___

PONTUAÇÃO DISCRIMINATIVA:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISOMORFISMO</th>
<th>DERIVAÇÃO RAMIFICATÓRIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GENERALIZAÇÃO INTER-ITEM</td>
<td>ELIMINAÇÃO PSICO-SENSORIAL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TIPO: AP PE

PONTUAÇÃO DE TIPICALIDADE:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONSISTÊNCIA DE ALOCAÇÃO</th>
<th>INSERÇÃO PRO-PERCEPTIVA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RAMIFICAÇÃO PICTORIAL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MÉTRICO: 1-20 21-50 51-75 76-95 96-100

SÍNTESE DOS RESULTADOS:

Você é uma pessoa com percepção-atemática do estilo:

- Abstracto-Pictórico
- Picto-Experiencial

INFORMAÇÕES PESSOAIS:

A sua pontuação no teste APT revela o seguinte:

O codificador: ____________________ O verificador: ____________________

d. Response sheets of the “Value Inventory – Short Version”.
Pedimos-lhe que responda às seguintes questões, assinalando com uma cruz (X) a opção de resposta que melhor corresponde à sua opinião pessoal sobre o tema. Marque apenas uma cruz.

No caso de estar indeciso(a) relativamente a mais do que uma afirmação, marque ainda assim a que melhor traduz essa posição pessoal.

No final de cada página encontra outras três questões relativamente a cada um dos cinco assuntos abordados.

Não há respostas certas ou erradas. O que lhe pedimos é que responda de forma espontânea.
**QUESTÃO I:**

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1.</strong> Quem faz um aborto, tira deliberadamente a vida a alguém, por isso devia pagar na mesma moeda.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2.</strong> Quem faz um aborto deliberadamente, devia ser julgado criminalmente como qualquer outro homicida.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3.</strong> A lei devia proibir totalmente o aborto, quaisquer que sejam as circunstâncias.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4.</strong> O aborto devia ser permitido unicamente quando está em causa a vida da mãe.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5.</strong> O aborto devia ser permitido unicamente nos casos em que possa haver danos físicos ou psicológicos para a criança.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>6.</strong> As leis que restringem a prática do aborto deviam ser abolidas, já que a decisão cabe à mãe.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>7.</strong> Toda e qualquer mulher que pretenda abortar, seja qual for o motivo, deveria receber apoio médico pago pelo estado.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QUESTÃO II:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Quem tem um familiar com SIDA deve colocá-lo imediatamente fora de casa e recusar qualquer contacto futuro.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Quem tem um familiar com SIDA deve pô-lo imediatamente fora de casa, mas admitir visitas curtas.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Quem tem um familiar com SIDA deve interná-lo numa instituição de apoio.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Quem tem um familiar com SIDA deve colocá-lo a viver numa parte separada da casa, separando a roupa e louça.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Quem tem um familiar com SIDA deve viver normalmente, tendo o cuidado de separar louça, roupa e artigos de higiene pessoal.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Quem tem um familiar com SIDA deve continuar a viver com ele sem qualquer tipo de discriminação.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Quem tem um familiar com SIDA deve encorajá-lo o mais possível a ignorar os riscos da sua doença para poder desfrutar o máximo de prazer na vida.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Questão</td>
<td>Descrição</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Os homossexuais deviam ser exilados para um local próprio, de forma a não constituir perigo para as pessoas normais.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Os homossexuais deviam receber o tratamento adequado à sua doença.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Os homossexuais deviam tentar esconder a sua tendência.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Embora sejam pessoas normais, os homossexuais deviam ser ajudados a encontrar um melhor caminho.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Apesar da sua escolha, os homossexuais, como quaisquer outras pessoas, têm o direito de escolher a vida sexual que bem entenderem.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>A homossexualidade é uma realidade indiscutível das sociedades actuais, como tal, os homossexuais deviam estar representados no governo.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**QUESTÃO IV:**

1. Os meus colegas não me despertam o mínimo interesse, e suporto-os apenas porque posso sempre vir a beneficiar dos seus apontamentos.

2. Às vezes é preciso passar por cima dos outros para obter bons resultados na escola.

3. Arrependo-me sempre de emprestar os meus apontamentos aos outros, porque eles podem vir a tirar a mesma nota do que eu.

4. Só partilho os meus apontamentos com quem me possa ser útil quando eu precisar.

5. Só partilho os meus apontamentos com o meu grupo restrito de amigos.

6. Para mim é importante sermos capazes de nos ajudarmos uns aos outros e partilhar apontamentos entre todos.

7. Vou sempre às aulas de modo a ter bons cadernos para todos os colegas.
QUESTÃO V:
Como procederia se caminhasse pela rua e encontrasse uma carteira de pele, com dinheiro e documentos do proprietário?

1. Ficava com a carteira e o dinheiro para mim e destruía os documentos para não haver a menor hipótese de se saber que eu a tinha encontrado.
2. Ficava com a carteira e o dinheiro para mim, mas ia deixar os documentos num lugar onde tivesse a certeza que alguém ia encontrá-los.
3. Tirava algum dinheiro para mim e punha tudo o resto num sitio onde alguém encontrasse a carteira e a devolvesse ao proprietário.
4. Agarrava na carteira e ia metê-la numa caixa do correio de uma casa qualquer ali perto.
5. Agarrava na carteira e deixava-a num lugar onde o proprietário a pudesse procurar. Por exemplo, um café ou outro local público ali perto.
6. Agarrava na carteira e logo que possível ia entregá-la no posto de polícia mais perto.
7. Deixava todos os meus compromissos pessoais desse dia e tratava de encontrar o proprietário a todo o custo para lhe dar a carteira.

Obrigado pela sua colaboração.
SESSION 2:
e. “Booklet 1”

AFERIÇÃO DO TESTE A.P.T.
- Caderno 1 -
Na folha de aferição do teste APT foi-lhe apresentada informação sobre o estilo de percepção a que você pertence.

Nesta segunda fase da aferição do teste APT pedimos-lhe que responda às questões que se seguem, que estão divididas em três cadernos. Antes de começar a responder, leia a explicação que se segue.

(O exemplo que se segue serve para ilustrar como deve dar a sua resposta a cada pergunta do questionário.)

**Exemplo:** Se a pergunta fosse:

```
“Em que medida acha que é importante apanhar sol?”
Nada importante  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] Muito importante
```

- Se achasse que é mesmo muito importante apanhar sol, colocaria a cruz na 9ª casa a contar da esquerda;
- Se achasse que não era mesmo nada importante apanhar sol, colocaria a cruz na 1ª casa a contar da esquerda;
- Se achasse nem muito nem pouco importante apanhar sol, colocaria a cruz na 5ª casa.

Assim, tem sempre 9 possibilidades de resposta diferentes. Quanto mais a sua opinião se aproximar de um dos extremos da escala, mais próximo dele deve colocar a cruz.

Por favor, não se esqueça de responder a todas as perguntas. Se não o fizer, não será possível ter em conta o seu questionário.

Coloque uma e só uma cruz em cada pergunta.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pergunta</th>
<th>Opções</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Em que medida acha que o teste APT acertou relativamente ao seu estilo perpectivo?</td>
<td>Provavelmente errou</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Em que medida lhe agrada pertencer ao seu estilo perpectivo?</td>
<td>Agradava-me pouco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Em que medida lhe agradaria pertencer antes ao estilo perpectivo Picto-Experiencial?</td>
<td>Agradava-me pouco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gosta de ser uma pessoa com estilo perpectivo do tipo Abstracto-Pictórico?</td>
<td>Gosto pouco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gostaria de ser uma pessoa com estilo perpectivo do tipo Picto-Experiencial?</td>
<td>Gosto pouco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Em que medida se identifica com o seu estilo perpectivo?</td>
<td>Nada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Em que medida se identifica com o estilo perpectivo Picto-Experiencial?</td>
<td>Nada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gosta do seu estilo perpectivo?</td>
<td>Gosto pouco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gosta do estilo perpectivo Picto-Experiencial?</td>
<td>Gosto pouco</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Por favor veja se respondeu a todas as perguntas.
AFERIÇÃO DO TESTE A.P.T.
- Caderno 2 -
POR FAVOR LEIA COM ATENÇÃO O QUE SE SEGUE:

Neste estudo de aferição do teste APT existe uma terceira fase em que se vão realizar sessões de discussão sobre alguns dos temas acerca dos quais você deu a sua opinião na primeira fase. Nessas sessões, procura-se obter mais informação sobre os valores ético-morais dos dois estilos perceptivos.

Para podermos decidir acerca das pessoas que participarão nas sessões da terceira fase, pedimos-lhe que responda às perguntas que se encontram neste caderno.

Para lhe permitir responder a essas perguntas, apresentamos-lhe as cópias das respostas dadas por duas pessoas que também participaram na primeira fase do estudo, a uma das questões do Inventário de Valores de Fennigan.

Obviamente, para garantir a total confidencialidade das respostas eliminamos todas as informações que possam identificar essas pessoas. Assim, estão apenas identificadas como Pessoas A ou Pessoas B, e para cada uma tem de analisar tanto a sua folha de aferição como a resposta que deu a uma das questões do inventário de valores.

Pedimos-lhe, então, que examine atentamente as cópias que se seguem.
Agora que já analisou as cópias da folha de averiguação e da sua resposta a uma das questões do inventário de valores de Fennegan, tanto da Pessoa A como da Pessoa B, pedimos-lhe que responda às perguntas que se seguem.

Relativamente à **Pessoa A** que lhe apresentamos, pedimos-lhe que preencha as informações seguintes para evitar problemas na introdução dos dados.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A Pessoa A pertence a que tipo de percepção-atemática?</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abstracto-Pictórico</td>
<td>Picto-Experiencial</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Em termos da sua representatividade ao tipo de percepção-atemática a que pertence, a **Pessoa A** é:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fortemente representativa</th>
<th>Moderadamente representativa</th>
<th>Fracamente representativa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

A resposta da **Pessoa A** no inventário de valores deixou-o(a):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nada satisfeito(a)</th>
<th>Muito satisfeito(a)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nada desiludido(a)</td>
<td>Muito desiludido(a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mal disposto(a)</td>
<td>Bem disposto(a)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Em que medida considera que, no decurso da terceira fase do estudo, esta pessoa pode afectar negativamente aquilo os outros podem pensar das pessoas do estilo Abstracto-Pictórico [vs. Picto-Experiencial]?

| Nada | Muito |

Em que medida considera que, no decurso da terceira fase, esta pessoa pode representar uma ameaça para a boa imagem das pessoas do estilo Abstracto-Pictórico [vs. Picto-Experiencial]?

| Nada | Muito |

Em sua opinião, qual é a imagem que esta pessoa dá do estilo perceptivo Abstracto-Pictórico [vs. Picto-Experiencial]?

| Muito má imagem | Muito boa imagem |

**POR FAVOR VERIFIQUE SE RESpondeu A TODAS AS QUESTões**
Em sua opinião, a Pessoa A deve ser:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Desonesta</th>
<th>Honestamente</th>
<th>Honesta</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egoista</td>
<td>Altruista</td>
<td>Altruista</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hipócrita</td>
<td>Sencera</td>
<td>Sencera</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invejosa</td>
<td>Generosa</td>
<td>Generosa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insensível</td>
<td>Sensível</td>
<td>Sensível</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mau colega</td>
<td>Bom colega</td>
<td>Bom colega</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

POR FAVOR VERIFIQUE SE RESPONDEU A TODAS AS QUESTÕES
Relativamente à **Pessoa B** que lhe apresentamos, pedimos-lhe que preencha as informações seguintes para evitar problemas na introdução dos dados.

### A Pessoa B pertence a que tipo de percepção-atemática?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abstracto-Pictórico</th>
<th>Picto-Experiencial</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Em termos da sua representatividade ao tipo de percepção-atemática a que pertence, a **Pessoa B** é:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fortemente representativa</th>
<th>Moderadamente representativa</th>
<th>Fracamente representativa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### A resposta da **Pessoa B** no inventário de valores deixou-o(a):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nada satisfeito(a)</th>
<th>Muito satisfeito(a)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nada desiludido(a)</th>
<th>Muito desiludido(a)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mal disposto(a)</th>
<th>Bem disposto(a)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Em que medida considera que, no decurso da terceira fase do estudo, esta pessoa pode afectar negativamente aquilo os outros podem pensar das pessoas do estilo Abstracto-Pictórico [vs. Picto-Experiencial]?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nada</th>
<th>Muito</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Em que medida considera que, no decurso da terceira fase, esta pessoa pode representar uma ameaça para a boa imagem das pessoas do estilo Abstracto-Pictórico [vs. Picto-Experiencial]?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nada</th>
<th>Muito</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Em sua opinião, qual é a imagem que esta pessoa dá do estilo perceptivo Abstracto-Pictórico [vs. Picto-Experiencial]?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Muito má imagem</th>
<th>Muito boa imagem</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**POR FAVOR VERIFIQUE SE RESPONDEU A TODAS AS QUESTÕES**
Em sua opinião, a Pessoa B deve ser:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Desonesta</th>
<th>Honesta</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egoísta</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hipócrita</td>
<td>Sincera</td>
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<tr>
<td>Invejosa</td>
<td>Generosa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insensível</td>
<td>Sensível</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mau colega</td>
<td>Bom colega</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Por favor verifique se respondeu a todas as questões.
AFERIÇÃO DO TESTE A.P.T.  
- Caderno 3 - 
As perguntas seguintes destinam-se a melhorar a apresentação de estudos a realizar no futuro, assim como a preparar uma apresentação dos resultados deste estudo. Por favor, responda o mais claramente possível a cada uma delas:

**Qual é o seu estilo perceptivo?**

- Abstracto-Pictórico
- Picto-Experiencial
- Não se lembra

**De acordo com os resultados preliminares, qual dos dois estilos de imaginação-atemática apresenta nível de valores ético-morais superior?**

- O Abstracto-Pictórico
- O Picto-Experiencial
- Não foi possível determinar

**A que estilo perceptivo pertence a Pessoa A:**

- Abstracto-Pictórico
- Picto-Experiencial
- Não se lembra

Em termos da sua tipicalidade no estilo perceptivo a que ela pertence, a Pessoa A é:

- Fortemente típica
- Moderadamente típica
- Fracamente típica
- Não se lembra

**A que estilo perceptivo pertence a Pessoa B:**

- Abstracto-Pictórico
- Picto-Experiencial
- Não se lembra

Em termos da sua tipicalidade no estilo perceptivo a que ela pertence, a Pessoa B é:

- Fortemente típica
- Moderadamente típica
- Fracamente típica
- Não se lembra

**Na questão do inventário de valores, qual foi a afirmação escolhida pela Pessoa A de entre as sete possíveis?**

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

**Na questão do inventário de valores, qual foi a afirmação escolhida pela Pessoa B de entre as sete possíveis?**

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.