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REDD+ Overview in Peru: Understanding its Failure through a Forest  
Governance Assessment

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*“In conservation, where positive outcomes are rarely articulated, difficult to achieve, and often impossible to measure to any degree of certainty, fads may be particularly prevalent. The skipping from fad to fad may not reflect the introduction of something truly novel, as such, but rather a repackaging of an old approach, which may or may not have had some beneficial effect, into something perceived as new.”*

*(Redford et al., 2013, p. 437)*

## **Abstract**

While deforestation rates continue to increase in Peru, REDD+ -which stands for “reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries”- has emerged as the mainstream mechanism to mitigate Climate Change through forest conservation under a results-based payment scheme. Launched in Peru since 2008, its implementation has unveiled that institutional weaknesses within the forestry apparatus jeopardize the success of the program. From a forest governance approach, this study analyzes to what extent REDD+ goals have been achieved and what could be failing. Based on an assessment of the latest official data on Peruvian forests loss, virtual surveys to measure stakeholders' perception on forest governance, and interviews to specialists, the study points to a double failure. On the one hand, REDD+ has been unable to reduce emissions from deforestation; on the other hand, the low perception levels of forest governance principles (participation, transparency and accountability) reveal poor legitimacy of REDD+ among relevant organizations. Interestingly, results show that perceived levels of accountability were much lower than perceived levels of participation, which calls into question the quality of the participation processes themselves. Results also indicate unequal participation of stakeholders; indigenous organizations do not consider to have effectively participated in REDD+, unlike cooperation organizations and research institutions. Gender disparities have also been noticed; female respondents perceive REDD+ process two times less transparent and five times less accountable than male respondents. The study concludes with some recommendations to enhance forest governance.

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## List of Acronyms

AIDER	Research and Integral Development Association
CBDR	Common but Differentiated Responsibilities
CC	Climate Change
CfRN	Coalition for Rainforest Nations
CIFOR	Center for International Forestry Research
CO <sub>2</sub>	Carbon Dioxide
COP	Conference of the Parties
DAR	Rights, Environment and Society NGO
ENBCC	National Strategy for Forests and Climate Change
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FCPF	The Forest Carbon Partnership Facility
FIP	Forest Investment Program
FONAM	National Environmental Fund
GHGs	Greenhouse Gases
Gt. CO <sub>2</sub> eq	Gigatonnes of Carbon Dioxide equivalent
ha	Hectares
INDCs	Intended National Determined Contributions
IPCC	International Panel on Climate Change
LULUCF	Land use, land-use change and forestry
MAAP	Monitoring of the Andean Amazon Project
MINAGRI	Peruvian Ministry of Agriculture
MINAM	Peruvian Ministry of Environment
NDCs	National Determined Commitments
NGO	Non-Government Organization
R-PIN	Idea Note for Readiness
R-PP	Readiness Proposal
REDD+	Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in

developing countries, and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks.

SERFOR	National Forestry Service and Wild Fauna
SERNANP	National Service for Natural Protected Areas
SIS	Safeguard Information System
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
USD	United States Dollar
WWF-Perú	World Wildlife Fund office in Perú

## **Introduction**

Since 1992, when the parties in Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit agreed that Climate Change is a concern that demanded immediate action, forests have increasingly been positioned at the center of the debate since deforestation is the "second-leading cause of climate change after burning fossil fuels and accounts for nearly 20% of all GHG emissions" (FAO, 2018b, p. 15). Furthermore, global reports indicate that 2016 and 2017 reached record levels of forest loss.

In this sense, COP11 in 2005 saw the birth of RED, a global, technical and financial effort to tackle deforestation. Over the years, the program took shape and gained greater responsibilities. In 2007 its name changed to REDD and in 2009 the term was finally coined as REDD+, standing for "Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries, and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks" (UNFCCC, 2010, p. 11).

Peru has a great importance for this initiative since it has 13% of the Amazon forest, the second country with the biggest share, only after Brazil; but this percentage is decreasing annually. For the 2001-2014 period, 1,653,129 ha of Amazonian humid forests disappeared at an average annual rate of 118,080,10 ha. For 2014, data shows a growing rate and a higher slope in relation to the last 4 years (MINAM, 2016a, p. 16).

To date, the country has several experiences with the implementation of REDD+ at different scales and levels, which are being integrated through the nested approach established to progressively form the national REDD+ framework. However, the progress of this program has depended on the strength of the institutions working on forests issues, as well as the capacity to effectively govern them. It has been reported that forest governance in Peru is far from having a good performance, which generates slowness in obtaining results and frustration on stakeholders.

Under the framework of forest governance, which describes the way in which people and organizations govern and regulate forests, this research has the central objective of understanding why REDD+ has not been able to reduce deforestation, through the collection of information directly from the implementers, the application of virtual perception surveys and interviews with specialists.

The thesis is divided into 6 chapters. The first two state the state of the art in environmental and institutional terms in which the program is immersed. Basically, the most recent official data on forest loss globally and nationally are presented; and subsequently the global climate architecture developed by the UNFCCC through the COPs, detailing the evolution of REDD+.

The third chapter makes a theoretical review and proposal of forest governance as an ideal framework and technical tool. The studies at international and national level that have attempted to answer the same question of the present study are also detailed.

The fourth chapter presents the methodological framework. It details the central problem, the research question and the different stages that were necessary to respond to the apparent inability of REDD+ to reach the goals that were initially proposed.

The fifth and sixth chapters report the results of the surveys and interviews. Making use of the concepts and previous studies proposed in the previous chapters, results cross between the different variables studied, which indicate deficiencies in terms of gender gaps, participation, transparency and accountability. This allows us to conclude that the program does not have legitimacy among the stakeholders.

This thesis represents an authentic effort to contribute to forestry studies focused on environmental policies in Peru. It is becoming increasingly necessary to conduct evidence-based research that demonstrates that any program that aims to improve the ecosystem and forestry quality of a nation needs roots among the diverse organizations and citizens linked to the forests.

## 1. Environmental State of Art: Climate Change<sup>1</sup> and Forests

### 1.1. Global and Peruvian Forests Synthesis

Our planet has gone through radical temperature changes. However, it is the atmosphere that, in addition to providing us with the oxygen we breathe, settles the conditions for a balanced temperature of the planet. The gases that inhabit the atmosphere, which we know as Greenhouse Gases (GHGs), helps regulate the temperature of the earth's surface.

GHGs regulate the temperature by blocking the long waves of energy from the sun on the planet earth; so, when the sun emits rays, the GHGs retain the heat and then returns to space in the form of infrared radiation. The greater the presence of these gasses in the atmosphere, the infrared radiation is prevented from being expelled to space; this causes the atmosphere and the earth to continue heating up. This is what is known as the greenhouse effect.

One of the most important GHGs is CO<sup>2</sup>, which is mainly a gas produced by the burning of fossil fuels (such as oil and its derivatives). The power plants that provide energy and its subsequent anthropogenic use emit CO<sup>2</sup> into the atmosphere. Historically, this has been the principal example where human being generates CO<sup>2</sup> in his daily life, among common habits such as washing, eating, and transporting.

Therefore, because of the direct and indirect human activity, climate change represents an alteration of global atmosphere composition and natural climate variability over time (UN, 1992, p. 7).

Global amount of GHGs emissions are slowing in growth, but have shown an increase (0.5%) in 2016, accounting for 49.3 Gt CO<sup>2</sup> eq. This amount does not include land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF), this indicator normally express the emission's share for deforestation and forests degradation, because of its high levels of inter annual variations and methodological uncertainty (Olivier *et al.*, 2017, p. 8).

One of the most important concerns for CC is the global forest; its importance for mitigation strategies is central to organize the backbone priorities within the global

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<sup>1</sup> In this thesis, Climate Change and its acronym CC will be used interchangeably.


environmental and political agenda<sup>2</sup>. Let us do a short description of the current situation, over a global and local scale, regarding forests and the GHG emissions.

*Global Synthesis*

Forests play a structural role in the GHG concentration dynamics. Roughly, they soak-up 2 Gt. CO<sup>2</sup> eq. each year; therefore, they represent a leading mitigation and adaptation option with high cost-effective carbon-sequester ability (IPCC, 2014).

In the latest report on The State of World’s Forests (FAO, 2018a), it is stated that “deforestation is the second-leading cause of climate change after burning fossil fuels and accounts for nearly 20% of all GHG emissions” (FAO, 2018a, p. 15).

**Chart 1:** Global Tropical Tree Cover Loss, 2001-2017 (Millions of Hectares)



*Source: WRI (2018)*

By 2015, global forests accounts for almost 4 billion hectares. Through the 1990-2015 period, global forest cover declined 3.1% (FAO, 2015), but between 1990–2000 and 2010–2015 periods, “global forest net area loss has slowed by more than 50%” (FAO, 2015, p. 16). As seen in Chart 1, by 2016, global tree cover loss reached new record rates with 29.7

<sup>2</sup> Especially for developing countries, where happens to exist a clear correlation between forest cover loss and poverty (Sunderlin *et al.*, 2007; Miyamoto *et al.*, 2014; Keenan *et al.*, 2015).

million hectares (51% more than 2015), mainly due to an increase in forest fires and LULUCF<sup>3</sup> (WRI, 2018).

It is worth noting that, usually, discussions over CC tend to be confined over CO<sub>2</sub> sequester. But the latest research on noncarbon effects of deforestation shows that the major impact arise when factors beyond CO<sub>2</sub> are taken into account: the liberation of other GHGs, earth's albedo, the "radioactive forcing" effect, surface roughness or evapotranspiration (Wolosin & Harris, 2018). During 2015, 2016 and 2017, noncarbon GHG emissions have shown faster growth than CO<sub>2</sub>, but still they account for only 28% in total emissions (Olivier *et al.*, 2017, p. 4).

### *Peruvian Synthesis*

South America is a severely affected region by CC, with high climate variability and increasingly exposed to extreme events, verified in growing annual precipitation trends, anomalous warming and extreme rainfalls that favors landslides and unexpected social-ecological losses (IPCC, 2014, p. 27).

The region is virtually dissected by the Andes mountain chain, which separates the Pacific from the Atlantic watersheds. Such a division, generates incalculable biodiversity and ecological richness, but also represents an ancient and fertile territory for intensive agriculture. Increase on this activity has been reported to be the main reason for deforestation and land degradation, yet the region has multiple stressors (IPCC, 2014, p. 1504).

Both Central America and South America, represents 69% of the total world deforestation by 2010. Brazil is certainly the country accountable for the highest deforested area (FAO, 2015), followed by Bolivia, Venezuela, and Argentina. In this sense, Amazonian deforestation has received special attention due to rampant rates of forest loss.

Perú owns 13% of the Amazon forest, the second country with the biggest share, only after Brazil, and the ninth country with the highest forest coverage in the world. This represents

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<sup>3</sup> LULUCF emissions inclusion within global quantification for 2016 increases the total figure in 4.1 Gt. CO<sub>2</sub> eq., turning an equivalent of 53.4 Gt. CO<sub>2</sub> eq. (Olivier *et al.*, 2017). Not including this factor makes the trend in global CO<sub>2</sub> (Carbon Dioxide) emissions flat and almost stationary, over 2016 and 2015 (Olivier *et al.*, 2017, p. 4).

a vast territory where pressure over land materializes in competing uses, based on global and local demands for food, energy, and minerals (IPCC, 2014, p. 1513).

In addition, socio-economic conditions and poverty are reported to be directly correlated to the country's deforestation rates (Sunderlin *et al.*, 2007; Zwane, 2007; Choumert *et al.*, 2013; Joshi & Beck, 2017).


Peruvian natural forests represent the biggest ecosystem with a 56% share of national territory. They are classified in Amazonian humid forests (68,188,726 ha, 53.06%), coastal stationary dry forests (3,674,364 ha, 2.86%) and Andean forests (220,173 ha, 0.17%) (MINAM, 2015b); therefore, Amazonian humid forests represent 94.06% of total national forests area.

By 2017, Peruvian population reached 31,237,385 habitants, whereof 332,975 are directly forest-dependent (INEI, 2018). Ecosystem services and conservation efforts are crucial not only for forest-dependent communities, but for voluntary isolated and initially contacted indigenous population (Población Indígena en Aislamiento Voluntario y Contacto Inicial), which are considered to be transcendent actors in national existing forest policies (MINAM, 2016a, 2017b).

Peru is considered to be a “High Forest – Low Deforestation” country (IPCC, 2014). The National Strategy for Forests and Climate Change (ENBCC) developed a study during the 2001-2014 period, showing that 1,653,129 ha of Amazonian humid forests were deforested at an average annual rate of 118,080,010 ha. For 2014, data shows a growing rate and a higher slope in relation to the last 4 years (MINAM, 2016a, p. 36). Overall, the increasing tendency of annual deforestation shown in Chart 2 is evident.

During the same period, almost 3.5% of Peruvian deforestation is attributed to non-human causes, for instance, forest-to-water-bodies conversions linked to river channel's movement. This losses are highly relevant because their increase follows the imminent pace of global CC (MINAM, 2015b).

**Chart 2:** Annual loss of Peruvian Amazonian Humid Forests between 2001-2014 (in hectares)



Source: MINAM (2015d).

In 2017, 143 425 ha were deforested, some higher than the average annual rate of 2001-2014 period, but the lowest net loss was between 2012-2017 period and there was a considerable fall of 13% respecting 2016 (Finer *et al.*, 2018).

**1.2. Peruvian Deforestation Dynamics**

In 2015, MINAM tasked an independent study to AIDER, a Peruvian environmental NGO, to analyze the agents, causes and spatial patterns of Amazonian deforestation, for the 2001-2013 timeframe. The study was part of the National Reference Levels document, presented to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in the context of the National Determined Contributions (NDCs) (MINAM, 2015d).

The 9 conclusions generated in the study guides the path for government actions towards deforestation in the country. They will be described as follows:

- (1) 25 alarming fragments of forest loss were identified in the Amazon, they showed accumulated activity associated with roads and river axis.

(Bax *et al.*, 2016, pp. 84, 85)(2, 3) Ecological fragmentation is driven by direct productive characteristics causes, mainly agricultural (95%); after deforestation, land-use turned to secondary vegetation (38.40%), agriculture (32.80%), pastures (24.30%), mining (3.60%), bare soil (0.40%), other lands (0.40%) and artificial lands (0.20%) (AIDER, 2015).

Most of this forest loss is concentrated in small 5 ha units, the sum of them accounts for 82% of total accumulated deforestation<sup>4</sup>. This has led to an official and widely accepted explanation for deforestation: Agriculture, mainly migratory and small-scale (IPCC, 2014; UNFCCC, 2015b; MINAM, 2015b, 2017b).

This reasoning turns to be confusingly emblematic. In the first place, it directly blames the migrants of Amazonian territory –exculpating other powerful groups; secondly, it misleads deforestation’s actors-dynamics, which could include from small-scale migratory agriculture to pastures or mining (as AIDER’s (2015) research shows); and thirdly, the information upon which it is originally based refers only to specific parcel sizes, not to the total deforested area (Ravikumar *et al.*, 2017).

Other recent report comes from the MAAP project, an initiative from Amazon Conservation Association and Amazonian Conservation (ACCA) (Finer & Novoa, 2017). Eight deforestation hotspots are identified and, again, the main drivers are small-scale agriculture and cattle grazing, while *latent* drivers are big-scale agriculture and highway construction –which we could easily call *institutionalized deforestation*.

Discriminating between *who*, *why* and *where* deforestation is occurring is crucial for policy design. Most of the time, small-scale deforestation is driven by subsistence agriculture, where 68.9% is for self-consumption and mainly started in secondary forests (AIDER, 2015), which evolves in a relatively stable pattern of land-use, ending up in diversified crop fields, pastures or agro forestry (Pinedo-Vasquez *et al.*, 2002).

Such conversions are usually driven by credit offers, locally popular future benefits offered by palm-oil companies and government organisms (Bennett *et al.*, 2018), or opportunities that surges from commodities’ global boom-periods -including

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<sup>4</sup> Literature review shows variation in this matter. AIDER (2015) research indicates an 88% accountable for small-scale fragmented defforestation; while Finer and Novoa (2017) propose an 80% figure.

cocaine production and traffic (Salisbury & Fagan, 2011; Bax & Francesconi, 2018, p. 100).

(4) As already mentioned, economical factors (such as PBI or income) represents a transversal driver for deforestation and are statistically correlated, specially for *cash crops* like coffee, cocoa and palm-oil, which, in parallel, receives “subsidies, incentives and tax exemption” (Pirard & Belna, 2012, pp. 67, 68).

(5) In the near-future term, it is expected the construction of new highways that will increase the agricultural frontier in the low-forest, divergent to historical high-forest occupation.

(6) Also, attributed to growing investment availability, agent’s capacity to clear forests in middle-range patches (3.0 - 19.9 ha) is continuously increasing, divergent to small-scale patches (<0.5 ha) previously stated.

(7) International commodity prices play an important role as well. *Cash crops*, meat and gold are increasing their share in national economy’s primary sector and deforestation causes; as their prices in international markets rise, local incentives proportionally rise (MINAM, 2015d, p. 24).

(8, 9) Finally, governance dynamics regarding decentralization policies and immigration fluxes represents serious difficulties for enhancing environmental improvements. On one side, provincial government has received more competencies regarding forests management, what is perceived as a drawback because of the lack of technical capacities and rampant corruption; on the other side, low-forest immigration from the Andes fosters the pronounced inequalities of opportunities between the regions of the country.

## 2. Institutional State of Art: Climate Change Agreements, REDD+ and Peruvian uptakes

After reviewing the environmental reality of forests, the following chapter provides a chronological description of the international institutional evolution of climate change and deforestation.

Let us do a retrospective of the relevant COP's and how this apparatus has shaped its decisions towards what we call REDD+ today ("Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries, and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks" (UN-REDD+, 2016)).

### 2.1. COPs and REDD+ as the Solution

It all starts in 1992, with the Earth Summit celebrated in Rio de Janeiro. Among the Convention on Biologic Diversity (UNCBD) and the Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD), the UNFCCC was signed.

The latter is the treaty of importance for this research, because it paves the way for the design and implementation of mechanisms that stabilize GHGs concentration in the atmosphere. In this Convention it was specified that although there is no scientific certainty *that human activity* generates and increases its concentration, the matter must be dealt with anyway.

In 1994, Perú recognizes the UNFCCC and becomes an official party. It establishes the first step that enforces the nation to formulate and apply national programs for CC mitigation.

From then on, it is agreed to have annual meetings, called the Conference of the Parties (COP's). In 1995, the first COP held in Berlin, set that countries must reach agreements to accomplish the necessary measures and instruments so CC -linked to economic growth, and sustainable development- could be stopped (UNFCCC, p. 5).

In 1997, Kyoto Protocol is proposed, coming into force in Perú in 2005 and ratified in 2009. Among its various measures, the Article 3/1 called to reduce CO2 emissions from industrialized countries in less than 5% below 1990 levels (UNFCCC, 1998, p. 3), as well as article 11/b that calls for green-technology transfer finance, in order to enable poor countries to take over the *full incremental costs* of CC mitigation (UNFCCC, 1998, p. 11).

This international agreement failed. There are many ways to explain this; one of them is because the way industrialized countries must reduce emissions didn't received much support between Annex I countries, mainly USA and China. This is commonly known as the *structural problem*. An alternative standpoint was given by Napoli (2012) using Olson's (1965) research on the *collective action problem*.

Departing from a cost-benefit analysis, Napoli explains that parties will only agree to reduce emissions if short-term net benefits from abatement were positive in a national basis; in detriment of pollution reductions for global benefit in the long run. While benefits of reducing emissions are perceived in long terms and costs are needed in short terms, some states seeking for global CO2 abatement find incentives to hang from others efforts, also known as *free riding*.

“...until the *collective action problem* is overcome, *structural* adjustments in future agreements (...) will have little effect on pollution emission reductions.” (Napoli, 2012, p. 1)

Because of this failure, in 2005 Montreal's COP11, new proposals were presented, one of them was RED mechanism (without “+”): a way in which industrialized countries could reduce emissions from deforestation, based on the principle of “*common but differentiated responsibilities*” (CBDR) (UN, 1992, p. 9) and applying the concept of *compensated reduction*, proposed by Brazilian and Indonesian researchers in a famous editorial essay (Santilli *et al.*, 2005)<sup>5</sup>. The central idea of RED was to reward people who conserve or restore forests as a way to reduce emissions, very close to the PES (Payment for Ecosystem Services) conception.

In parallel, RED was proposed as a way that developing countries could integrate the carbon market by selling credits, strengthening CO2 storage value ahead of industrial values (Brunner *et al.*, 2010).

In 2007 Bali's COP13, RED's focus expanded and the FCPF<sup>6</sup> joined with then-UN-RED (United Nations REDD Programme) started to support countries towards the program

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<sup>5</sup> This concept, or instrument –as the authors called it–, would increase political empowerment of poor countries, who holds large amounts of carbon storage, in climate negotiations, allowing tropical countries taking real charge of national deforestation.

<sup>6</sup> The FCPF is a climate fund created with donations from 15 countries and administered by the World Bank that supports preparatory activities and payment for performance of the REDD+ mechanism. For the preparation activities, also known as readiness process, the FCPF provides the countries participating in the

readiness. After several workshops happening after COP11 and the tool gaining momentum, specialists discussed about the mechanism broader scope. A relevant actor such as the Coalition for Rainforest Nations (CfRN) –integrated by tropical countries and already active in COP11 decisions-, recommended the inclusion of forest degradation as a big cause of emissions, as well as new funding procedures. With lots of criticism regarding the abandonment of a simple tool turning into a more technically complex one, finally, RED became REDD<sup>7</sup>.

In consequence, at 2008 Poznan's COP14, Peruvian then-Minister of Environment, Antonio Brack, pledged to conserve 54 million hectares of tropical forests; a year later, in 2010, the Forest Conservation Program (*Programa Bosques*) emerges as one of the principal environmental policy of Perú (MINAM, 2010b). Ten years after COP14, the National Norm of Forest Conservation for CC Mitigation was given to regulate and enforce Brack's commitment.

COP14 saw the early stages of REDD+ coming. Elements like forests' sustainable management, conservation and carbon stocks enhancement were included in the mechanism, equalizing the avoidance of deforestation and forest degradation. The plus sign aimed to add co-benefits to the mechanism, amplifying the scope of the countries who wanted to participate not only in forestry *hard* issues, but also in development related-demands.

By the same year in Perú, the Peruvian REDD+ Group ("*Grupo REDD+ Perú*") was created. It is now the most active and prominent social participation platform concerning REDD+ in the country. The first meeting of this group was held on February 20, 2008, where several institutions from the public and private sector and NGO's –surprisingly no indigenous organizations- gathered in WWF-Perú to discuss the baseline proposal of avoided deforestation in Peruvian Amazonia.

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fund with a donation of up to 3.8 million dollars. More than 30 countries participate in this fund and Peru is one of them. The preparation process within the FCPF has three phases: a) R-PIN (Idea Note for Readiness), Peru presented it in 2008; b) Preparation Proposal for "Readiness" (R-PP), Peru presented in 2011; c) Preparation Package (R-Package), Peru has not submitted it yet (DAR, 2013).

<sup>7</sup> Following Bottcher *et al.* (2009) analysis on the change, the authors argued that this represented a big increase in costs and technical complexity. As REDD framework design depended heavily on carbon monitoring quantification costs, deforestation is easier and less expensive to calculate than degradation (p. 12).

Months later, more actors from indigenous groups became part of *Grupo REDD+* and DAR (an important NGO which mainly works towards climate justice in Peru). Also in 2008, Perú subscribed to Paraguay's submission for UNFCCC, arguing that existing institutional capacities were insufficient and a *nested approach* -starting with sub-national initiatives and progressive blending- was necessary, in order to combine accounting and crediting methods, while strengthening local participation (Allan & Dauvergne, 2013, p. 1316).

Perú incorporated into FCPF readiness process by presenting the Idea Note for Readiness (R-PIN), elaborated by the Environmental Ministry (MINAM) and National Environmental Fund (FONAM). Also, an alliance between important environmental NGO's developed decentralized workshops in provinces that ended up in the Tarapoto Declaration, a national agreement gathering central government, provincial governments, civil society, indigenous organizations, funding representatives, research institutions and interested companies (Che Piu & Menton, 2013, p. 44).

In 2009 Copenhagen's COP15, REDD was officially recognized as a fundamental tool to reduce emissions. A consensus was reached regarding the financial resources mobilization from Annex I to non-Annex I countries -USD 30 billion for 2010-2012 and USD 100 billion for 2020 (UNFCCC, 2010, p. 7)-, and the call on countries to use official guidelines of IPCC (International Panel on Climate Change) to quantify GHGs emissions. COP16's Decision 1 also defines REDD+ with a national policy approach, in order to strengthen the mechanism's legitimacy and permeability towards already established national climate policies and initiatives.

There are differing views regarding this new approximation. Centralizing forest governance, on one side, can increase abatement of GHGs with lower costs, albeit exposed to more bureaucracy (Angelsen, 2008); on the other side, a national approach can bolster the weakening of local institutions, increasing forest loss and continuing historical interactions with forest-dependent communities (Sandbrook *et al.*, 2010).

Despite many doubts, the national approach got support. As a result, in 2009, MINAM created the REDD+ Technical Group ("*Grupo Técnico de REDD+*") and designed *Grupo REDD+ Perú* as the coordinator to support the Readiness Proposal (R-PP) to FCPF finance and apply to a Forest Investment Plan (FIP) as a pilot country.

In 2010 Cancun's COP16, REDD complemented its goals. REDD officially became REDD+ with the formal adherence of new components, co-benefits, not just (1) "Reducing emissions from deforestation" and (2) "Reducing emissions from forest degradation", but also (3) "Conservation of forest carbon stocks", (4) "Sustainable management of forests" and (5) "Enhancement of forest carbon stocks" (UNFCCC, 2011, p. 12).

For example, Chile, who doesn't have major forests, can now be able to accede REDD+ finance by planting trees, enhancing its national carbon stocks (5). Perú is not likely to increase its carbon stocks, but can conserve them and reduce deforestation and forest degradation. The idea is to open the possibilities for countries and allow them to participate by choosing one of the five components.

Among the relevant outcomes in COP16, early definitions of the safeguards were given, agreeing that each country must design the respective information system, mainly to inform how indigenous peoples and forest-dependent population are being protected from risky social-environmental consequences derived from REDD+; and the phased approach, which adopts a three-step implementation of REDD+.

As already mentioned, in 2010 the MINAM approved the *Programa Bosques*. The preparation of this policy uncovered several forestry challenges; one of them was the overhauling of how existing CC initiatives could adapt to this new architecture. By that time, as said by C. Ochoa (personal communication, February 7, 2018), Peru already had pilot projects and a lot of uncertainty was perceived between the related institutions, regarding a methodology that clearly defines how to nationally apply REDD+. This will not be solved until 2013 in Warsaw's COP19.

In parallel, during 2010, then-President of Perú, Alan García, ratified the zero net deforestation goal towards 2021, before the 65th UN General Assembly. This effort represented reducing total national GHG emissions in 47.5% (MINAM, 2010a).

In 2011 Durban's COP17, more guidelines referring to financing paths, safeguards and reference levels were settled. Mostly explained in decision 12/CP.17 (UNFCCC, 2012, p. 16), finance could be disbursed from several sources, grounding REDD+ as a market-based mechanism which could deliver results-based projects; safeguards should have specific ways of reporting, depending on national conditions and capacities; and reference

levels -which didn't have specific methodologies at the time- received essential basis for clear measurement, reporting and verification (MRV), keeping coherence with country's inventories of anthropogenic GHGs emissions (UNFCCC, 2012, p. 17).

Regarding Perú, an important meeting was held in Lima, where an Exploratory Mission from FIP representatives looked for a closer approach between authorities, national institutions and multilateral banks, concerning the elaboration of the National Forest Investment Strategy and the FIP's Consultation for the Mechanism focused on Indigenous Peoples, which resulted in the Pachacamac Declaration (Che Piu & García, 2011, p. 11). These meetings guided MINAM to wedge national efforts into international requirements for REDD+ funding, giving multilateral banks the certainty that Perú was walking through the right path.

After several revisions of the R-PP from FCPF, workshops between *Grupo REDD+ Perú*, MINAM and AIDSESEP (Inter-Ethnic Association for Peruvian Jungle Development), R-PP document was finished. During the 8th meeting of the Committee of Participants of the FCPF, held from March 23 to 25 in Da Lat, Vietnam, the allocation for Peru was approved for USD 3.6 million from the Readiness Fund for REDD+, after the government of Peru presented the document and announced the agreements reached by the above mentioned institutions (DAR, 2013).

In 2012, Doha's COP18 covered more MRV and REDD+ financing issues (UNFCCC, 2013). The official UNFCCC entity in charge of MRV issues is the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA). Related to this, some criticisms were reported due to the fact that the carbon quantification systems, MRV's frameworks and the national reference systems were worked incompletely (The REDD Desk, 2015).

In this sense, the design of an appropriate standard for carbon storage verification represented a central discussion, because disproportionate transaction costs may undermine REDD+ goals and co-benefits (CIFOR, 2008, p. 118). Another issue was discussed under the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA), regarding the necessary institutional arrangements, new ways of finance and new approaches towards sub-national initiatives for result-based payments (UNFCCC, 2013).

Initiatives towards forests monitoring in Perú has been disperse. Information about deforestation dynamics comes from isolated institutions and researches, using different

methodologies and timeframes. By 2016, six entities distributed along MINAM and SERFOR (National Forestry and Wild Fauna Authority) were in some way linked to forest monitoring, generating isolated data and guided by different regulation (Capella, 2016, p. 15).

This started to change with the already mentioned *Programa Bosques*, started in 2015, where yearly deforestation data –solely for humid Amazonian forests- is presented for 2000-2014 period (MINAM, 2016a, p. 37). The same year, MINAM and SERFOR implemented the Forest Cover Monitoring module, the main institutional initiative for this matter.

The module yearly provides information segmented in 5 sub-modules: (1) Forests and Forests Loss, (2) Early Alert, (3) Degradation, (4) Land-use change, and (5) Reference Scenario (MINAM, 2015c). This could only be achieved by the mandatory data requirements stated across all the above mentioned agreements for REDD+.

The year 2013 was a watershed for REDD+. June saw giant steps in Bonn, at the inter-session meetings of UNFCCC that paved the way “to addressing the drivers of deforestation and forest degradation; modalities for national forest monitoring systems; and the timing and frequency of presentations of summary information on how safeguards are being addressed and respected” (The REDD Desk, 2015, p. 11).

Warsaw’s COP19 is perceived as the most significant milestone for the mechanism because it finally explains what is REDD+, what is needed to accomplish it and if a country is actually doing it.

Under a joint effort, the SBSTA –in charge of methodological aspects-, the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) –in charge of the institutional arrangements-, and the main COP platform –in charge of the results-based finance aspects-, generated the Warsaw Framework for REDD+, which comprehend a synthesized framework of application, called the REDD+ Rulebook.

COP19 consolidated the requirements and institutional arrangements’ guidance towards REDD+. According to Cancun Agreements, countries must elaborate (1) National Action Plans or Strategy, the only requirement fully developed in Peru<sup>8</sup>; (2) National reference level for forest emissions and/or a national forest reference level, or provisionally, sub

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<sup>8</sup> The action plan is the ENBCC (MINAM, 2016a).

national levels; (3) National forest monitoring system; and (4) a system to provide information on the way in which the corresponding safeguards are being addressed and respected.

This should fit into the three-phase approach, already agreed in Cancun, which progressively implements the mechanism upon the national circumstances and capacities, (1) *Readiness*, (2) *Demonstration*, and (3) *Implementation*.

Phase 1 has to do with the design of the requirements and institutional arrangements mentioned above. Phase 2 basically tests the designed policies -eventually requiring third-parties auditory-, capacity building, institutional re-arrangements and legal clarity regarding forests management. Phase 3 is the final stage which every country wants to achieve, because its where “countries can access results-based payments when they have completed the reporting, assessment and analysis processes under the UNFCCC” (UN-REDD+, 2016, p. 3)

In 2014, Lima’s COP20 wasn’t fruitful as the previous COP. There were no formal agreements, but important discussions regarding non-market benefits, safeguards and non-market mechanisms, partially shined the path to COP21.

Non-carbon benefits relate to all the efforts done in political, institutional and social-environmental terms that do not involve direct carbon abatements. The discussion was about if this kind of efforts should represent CC direct interventions –so they can further be taken as results for payment, and thus be monetized (The REDD Desk, 2015, p. 15).

Related to safeguards, the main concern is how to harmonize UNFCCC’s general conception of safeguards with each country’s particular framework on human rights, land rights, indigenous people’s agreements and consultation methods. What was stated in Lima was that every country must share common elements of reporting each party’s progress in a Safeguard Information System (SIS), which required further guidance (Corbera, 2017, p. 504). Either way, no agreement was reached.

Non-market mechanisms –ways of discourage emissions away from monetary retributions- was championed by Bolivian representatives. Their recommendations encourage countries to adopt alternative and holistic approximations to CC mitigation, “beyond the scope of REDD+” (The Plurinational State of Bolivia, 2012, p. 10), considering Indigenous People’s conception of nature, away from viewing natural resources solely as carbon stocks, but

from an interdependent relation framework, materialized in the “Law of Mother Earth and Integral Development for Living Well” (Bolivian Plurinational Legislation Assembly, 2012). This turned into a concrete but polemic proposition, named the Joint Mitigation and Adaptation (JMA) mechanism (The Plurinational State of Bolivia, 2012).

Albeit the lack of strong and compulsory agreements in COP20, it was agreed that each party must propose prior COP21 their Intended National Determined Contributions (INDCs) (UNFCCC, 2015b, p. 28), or domestic reactions to CC, according to what each country considers to be applicable.

After Lima, The Paris Agreement, drafted and signed in 2015 and 2016, respectively, tried to correct Kyoto Protocol massive failure. It essentially says that countries cannot maintain a way of development that contributes to the increase of global average temperature in more than 2 °C. Actually, parties should pursue “efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C” (UNFCCC, 2015a, p. 2).

COP21 received member states’ INDCs, what after ratification became no longer ‘intended’, but plain NDCs. They represent a highly valuable resource to measure how countries are configuring their efforts upon deforestation and forest degradation (Bhan *et al.*, 2017), as well as shows measurable aggregates to quantify the progress towards global 2°C limit (UNFCCC, 2015a, p. 3). From this Conference until today, nothing has changed regarding the technical requirements and the necessary institutional architecture for implementing REDD+.

## **2.2. A Critical Perspective for REDD+’s Evolution**

With the basic promise to reduce deforestation’s carbon emissions and forest degradation in developing countries, UNFCCC launched REDD+ as an incentive embedded in the “ecosystem services payments”, developed to financially reward pre-industrial and under-developed countries for their efforts to reduce GHGs emissions from forests (CDSA, 2017).

In order to further understand REDD+ governance sequences in the light of governance principles, it is important to overhaul the evolution of CC agreements from a critical perspective. For this purpose, we have adapted Cipler’s (2017) five phases of global climate governance in table 1.

**Table 1:** Phases of Global Climate Governance

Phase	Guiding principles
Agreed Awareness Phase	Global Agreement
Liberal Environmentalism	CBDR (UN, 1992). Polluter pays Cost-effectiveness Inclusive Multilateralism
Kyoto 1997 Protocol	Institutionalization of a regulatory framework
Copenhagen 2009 Accord	Pledge and review Shared Unaccountability Voluntary Action
Durban 2012 Negotiations	Informal Bilateral and Minilateral Agreements

Source: Own elaboration, based on adapted information from Cipler and Roberts (2017).

The first phase initiates with Stockholm conference in 1970, establishing a public concern about the protection of ecosystems, calling governments to engage into a common effort to preserve human environment. Every country understood this goal individually, upholding self-determined rights and perceptions of development. This agreement pledged for financing aid from north to south countries' group as a way to redeem responsibilities on climate impacts.

The second phase starts with 1992 UNFCCC's debate and approval in Rio de Janeiro, where the Brundtland Report took global attention with the idea of a harmonized economic growth and environmental commonality. UNFCCC cleared the responsibilities of Climate Change problem founded upon the ideas of "polluter pays" and "equity" related to mitigation budget. The structural decision-making format was based on the obligation of all the convention parties to work collectively and be represented within an inclusive multilateralism.

The third phase started with 1997's Kyoto Protocol. Through this phase, an international emission trading program was designed and implemented, "offsetting" carbon responsibilities through Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects.

Kyoto Protocol replacement for Copenhagen Accord leveraged unprecedented civil society participation, replacing Annex 1 countries full responsibility for reducing emissions to "voluntary mitigation actions". CBDR principle was reduced, responsibility was no longer in the global north and now every party must shoulder CC mitigation, lacking specific duties. This is called shared un-accountability: "the agreement required that no one was required to act at any certain level" (Cipler & Roberts, 2017, p. 152).

Durban Negotiations accepted Kyoto Protocol failure, agreeing to adopt a new 2015 framework enforced in 2020. New forms of pledges were implemented, like INDCs (introduced in Warsaw-2013 and worked in Lima-2014), and USA-China joint pledge, signifying a shift on how mitigation efforts should be decided.

After 48 years since Stockholm conference, Cipler and Roberts (2017) phases shows us an evolution of shifts that concludes in a major difficulty to “prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” (UN, 1992, p. 9), materialized in the parties’ incapacity to attain the 1.5 °C limit.

### **2.3. Peruvian REDD+ Status<sup>9</sup>**

Let us now make a jump and take a closer and summarized look to what Peru has done through the last decade and how it is today. As mentioned, Peru has acceded to 3 major international funds with the goal of promoting policies and actions towards the reduction of deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+), and improving the terrestrial regulation.

The country is a (1) REDD+ pilot actor to prepare a FIP; (2) member of the FCPF through the R-PP submission in 2014<sup>10</sup>; and, since 2015, (3) a signatory of the Joint Declaration of Intention (DCI), a multilateral agreement of cooperation between Norway and Germany.

We already know that the Warsaw Framework in COP19 consolidated the modalities to implement the 4 cornerstones of REDD+: (1) national strategies, (2) forest-emissions reference levels, (3) national forest monitoring system and (4) SIS (UNFCCC, 2013). Thereupon, this same order will be used to describe the Peruvian progress on REDD+ readiness.

Perú has an action plan or REDD+ Strategy, the ENBCC, approved in June, 2016 through a supreme decree. In 2003, Peru already had a National Strategy for Climate Change; one of the resulting policies was precisely the ENBCC. Its elaboration started in 2015, the participative process was held in the same year and approved, like said, in 2016. The focal point for UNFCCC regarding REDD+ in Peru is *Programa Bosques*, which is under the

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<sup>9</sup> For this chapter, part of the information collected from the interview with Peruvian REDD+ specialist Claudia Ochoa will be added since it represents updated information that is not found in the literature reviewed.

<sup>10</sup> This finance framework for REDD+ readiness has requirements the preparation of a SESA and an ESMF, mostly they prepare institutional and social grounding for safeguards.

control of the General Direction of Climate Change, Desertification and Hydrological Resources of the MINAM.

Research and readiness of Peruvian reference levels started between 2013 and 2014, it was nationally socialized by the end of 2015 and, “a day before Christmas Eve” –as said by Claudia Ochoa (personal communication, February 7, 2018) - in December, 29, submitted to the UNFCCC. Respective observations arrived in august, 2016; they were answered and re-submitted the same month. Finally, the formal UN compliance was received in November, 2016.

By the date, MRV requirement is not ready. It implicates an august inter-institutional coordination that needs to be activated. It goes through *Programa Bosques* –as the focal point, CC Direction of MINAM, SERFOR, MINAGRI (National Agriculture Ministry). In lower degree, it is also required the participation of other institutions like OSINFOR (Supervisor Organism of Forest Wood Sources) and SENACE (National Service of Environmental Certification) –which by this year is expected to receive competencies to regulate agricultural and forestry projects. Peruvian safeguards system must be designed with a unified, organized and coherent approach, towards the fulfillment of the social requirements that this fund demands.

Safeguards system readiness is not yet ready either. The REDD+ Safeguards Roadmap (MINAM, 2017a) indicates that 4 indicative activities must be adopted: (1) interpretation and conceptualization of safeguards, (2) process of designing and implementing a SIS, (3) processes of participation and capacity building of actors, and (4) a process of communication of information to the UNFCCC.

According to Grupo REDD+ Perú (2017) and M. Ruiz (Personal Communication, June 6, 2018), in the way to accomplish the SIS (the second activity of the mentioned roadmap), 3 products have been already done: SESA (Social Environmental Strategic Assessment), REDD+ actions, ESMF (Environmental Social Management Framework); the only product left to do is the informatics system (SIS) itself.

A more detailed analysis of the institutional architecture on REDD+ in Peru will be presented in chapter 3, on the state of Forest Governance in Peru.

### **2.3.1. Nested Approach**

Peru opted for a nested approach to implement REDD+, which was presented jointly with other countries to the SBSTA in 2007. The nested-approach MRV system, with the forest-emissions reference levels, was implemented at regional and local levels (MINAM, 2017b) in such a way that it allows accounting for GHG emissions and removals at a national level.

In this context, many countries are carrying out Early Actions at the local and sub-national levels. The nested approach allows encouraging this type of early exercises and inserting them in broader schemes, whether they are held in sub national governments of the national government, once these are fully developed.

Today, the concept of "nesting" sub national REDD+ activities in broader national frameworks is frequently mentioned in related discussions. Countries such as Peru and Guatemala have proposed a nested scheme for REDD+ and have begun to implement it (Conservación Internacional, 2009).

Under this approach, in 2011, 35 projects were reported in Peru, 34 at the stage of design and 1 in underway (Che Piu & García, 2011); in the current year, 30 projects were reported, of which 25 are underway, 2 are planned, 2 have already been completed and 1 has been abandoned. According to ID-RECCO (International Database on REDD+ Projects linking Economic, Carbon and Communities data), the ultimate database for REDD+ projects around the world, Peru is among the countries with the largest number of projects (Simonet et al., 2018). In 8 years, forest area conserved by REDD+ projects jumped from 0.98 million hectares in 2011 to 7.03 million hectares in 2018.

## **3. Forest Governance**

In the first place, governance can be described as the mechanisms, processes and institutions that determines how power is exercised, how decisions are made on matters of public interest, and how citizens articulate their interests, exercise their rights and fulfill their obligations and mediate their differences (Sangita, 2002).

Despite this, Forest Governance is still a generic term and is used to describe the way in which people and organizations govern and regulate forests. Better definitions are those that mention the way rights and benefits of forests are assigned and accessed, including planning, monitoring and control of their use, management and conservation (FAO, 2010).

Good forest governance emerges as a change in the vision of the functions and responsibilities of the Government *vis-à-vis* other stakeholders. It is a change from the old style of governance where the central government champions a new conceptual understanding in which several actors are the ones who co-govern.

The improvement of forest governance facilitates the implementation of policies and instruments for deforestation avoidance. In this sense, analyzing in detail what this means allows an even more effective refinement. The following paragraphs will describe the three principles on which forest governance is based, and on which this study assumes that without full compliance of them, no environmental policy will be effective.

Forest governance leads to the harmonization of policies and the strengthening of the institutional framework, norms and information of the forestry sector with the participation of public and private actors.

#### *Participation*

Participation not only implies that every stakeholder must be effectively incorporated into decision-making, but also included in the implementation and evaluation processes. It also implies that informed and organized actors can actively intervene, directly or indirectly, in the design, formulation, implementation and evaluation of public policies (FAO & PROFOR, 2011, p. 15). This participation must occur according to the legal framework and established procedures. It must be considered that the right to participate in public affairs is a human right.

#### *Transparency*

Transparency represents the government's willingness to disclose its actions and be subject to the scrutiny of those administered. It is a two-way road: on the one hand, the government makes information public, corresponding to its actions and decisions; on the other, the citizen may request it when he considers it necessary (FAO & PROFOR, 2011, p. 16). Then, adequate mechanisms are required for the dissemination of government actions and for the attention to the requirements of the administrated<sup>11</sup>.

#### *Accountability*

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<sup>11</sup> In Peru there is a legal framework on transparency and access to public information. In the case of REDD+, the Cancun Agreement's safeguards for REDD+ indicate that transparent national forest governance structures must be established.

Accountability demands that all public structure respond for the decisions and actions they perform in the exercise of power delegated. It is based on the responsibility that political actors have towards all members of society for their actions and decisions. This requires that such decisions and actions comply with the current legal framework and respond to the genuine public interest (FAO & PROFOR, 2011, p. 16).

### **3.1. REDD+ Governance in Perú**

As mentioned, the causes of deforestation are diverse and categorized as direct or indirect. The prioritization of the indirect causes of deforestation is complicated, since it represents structural factors that are difficult to identify locally and generally act together, but their origins and effects can be identified in the way forest policies are implemented.

In this sense, forest governance is an enabling condition for forests conservation. Practical experience and several empirical evaluations of programs to reduce deforestation and degradation indicate that the implementation of REDD+ requires the existence of a governance structure at national and regional levels, allowing the application of management instruments (Young & Bird, 2015).

Precisely, one of the means of implementation of the ENBCC to achieve quality of institutions and good governance is based on the reinforcement and articulation of regional and local forest governance to control deforestation and forest degradation and to reinforce awareness of forest conservation (MINAM, 2015b, p. 52).

In addition, the ENBCC emphasizes how political and institutional factors (mainly, lack of policy coherence, weak forest governance and institutional coordination) directly affects economic factors (undervaluation of forests, opportunity costs of competitive uses), land use and sustainable technological-conversion (limited technical assistance, use of technology, and poor access to credit) and interact frequently with different actors (mainly small farmers and large agro industrial landowners, on the margins of forests to cause deforestation and forest degradation).

Likewise, Peru have sought to create an institutional framework for REDD+, which would be based on the Climate Change Strategy, the Inter-institutional Group for climate change management, the National Forestry System and the R-PP document (MINAM, 2015b). Table 2, extracted from the R-PP (MINAM, 2017b), presents the state and non-state entities whose competences are linked to the development of REDD+.

**Table 2:** State and Non-state Entities Linked to REDD+

Institution	Dependencies <sup>12</sup>
MINAM	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- General Directions: Dirección General de Cambio Climático, Desertificación y Recursos Hídricos (DGCCDRH).</li> <li>Dirección General de Ordenamiento Territorial (DGOT).</li> <li>Dirección de Evaluación, Valoración y Financiamiento del Patrimonio Natural (DGEVFPN).</li> <li>Programa Nacional de Conservación de Bosques para la Mitigación del Cambio Climático (PNCBMCC).</li> <li>- Servicio Natural de Áreas Naturales Protegidas (SERNANP).</li> <li>- Organismo Estatal de Fiscalización Ambiental (OEFA).</li> </ul>
MINAGRI	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Dirección General Forestal y de Fauna Silvestre (DGFFS).</li> <li>- Dirección General de Infraestructura Hidráulica (DGIH).</li> <li>- Dirección General de Asuntos Ambientales Agrarios (DGAAA).</li> <li>- Programa de Desarrollo Productivo Agrario Rural (AGRORURAL).</li> <li>- Programa de Compensaciones para la Competitividad (AGROIDEAS).</li> <li>- Instituto Nacional de Innovación Agraria (INIA).</li> <li>- Sistema Nacional Forestal (SINAFOR).</li> </ul>
Provincial Governments	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Unidades de Gestión Forestal y de Fauna Silvestre.</li> <li>- Dirección Regional Agraria (DRA).</li> <li>- Gerencias Regionales de Recursos Naturales y Gestión del Medio Ambiente (GRRNGMA).</li> </ul>
Ministry of Economy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Unidad de Cambio Climático within the Dirección General de Asuntos de Economía Internacional, Competencia y Productividad.</li> </ul>
Ministry of External Affairs	Chancellery
Presidency of the Council of Ministers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Organismo de Supervisión de los Recursos Forestales (OSINFOR).</li> <li>- Centro Nacional de Planeamiento Estratégico (CEPLAN).</li> </ul>
Ministry of Culture	Vice Ministerio de Interculturalidad.
Ministry of Energy and Mines	
Ministry of Transports and Communications	
Ministry of Foreign Commerce and Tourism	
Technical Group for REDD+ of the National CC Commission.	
Peruvian REDD+ Group	
REDD+ Indigenous Platform	
Committee of Forest Management and Wildlife	
Municipal Environmental Commissions	

<sup>12</sup> Most of the names in the Dependencies section will be exposed in Spanish in order to maintain fidelity with Peruvian institutions. The names that are used subsequently in the content of this work will appear translated in parenthesis. Also, the cases in which no dependencies are presented is because, in fact, there are none, the institution itself represents the articulator.

Regional Environmental Commissions	
Environmental Funds	FONAM
NGO's	
Firms	
Universities and Research Centers	
Peasant Groups	
Indigenous Representation Organizations	

*Source: (MINAM, 2017b)*

In terms of the necessary legal and institutional arrangements, since June 2015, Perú has a specific regulation of REDD+ with the enactment of Law No. 30215 (Law on Mechanisms for Payment for Ecosystem Services), which opened a clearer picture of what will be the regulation of ecosystems' services in the country.

Likewise, what REDD+ seeks is to reduce deforestation and forest degradation in a multisectoral and inter institutional manner ; it is precisely for this reason that major forest powers have been transferred to regional governments (such as the granting of rights over their respective forest and wildlife resources, and the approval of forest management plans).

It should be noted that the application of laws for the forestry sector has been mainly oriented towards the traceability of timber production, which includes pre-established mechanisms and procedures that allow tracing (historically) the location and trajectory of the product, from the origin throughout the production chain, using various tools (SERFOR, 2016).

### **3.2. REDD+ Forest Governance Studies**

A review of the most relevant studies was carried out, in order to know what has been produced departing from the Forest Governance approach on REDD+. However, given the enormous amount of literature available in the last years linked to REDD+, a selective mention of researches was held, in order to focus on those that are linked more precisely to the goal of the thesis. It is worth mentioning that the theoretical focuses and geographical scales in which each of the documents and papers had shaped their objects of study are varied.

This section has been divided initially under a geographical criterion with a comprehensive thematic scale. In the second place, some of the main studies carried out in Peru will be

mentioned. Finally, in order to have references of perception studies of REDD+ forest governance -evaluation that is also carried out in this research-, the last section will address the ones carried out at global and national levels.

### **3.2.1. Broad Forest Governance Studies and REDD+**

The publication “*Voz y opción: Abriendo la puerta a la democracia ambiental*” (Joseph Foti, 2008) made a cross-country research -including Peru- in order to analyze the progress of environmental democracy making use of the principles of governance (transparency, participation and accountability). It was concluded that states have advanced in terms of legal policies, land-rights and opportunities to access information; however, the progress has been very slow, which demonstrates the enormous challenge of making transformational changes towards an effective commitment to climate democracy.

Anne Larson, a well-known researcher in REDD+ issues, currently working for the Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) in Peru, conducted a study with a focus on land-tenure (Larson *et al.*, 2013). Through an analysis of discourses, the main goal was to evaluate how REDD+ acts as a threat or opportunity for local rights and land tenure. Among the results, albeit the program can foster land securing for local communities, the state remains in a contradiction between discourse and action. Similarly, Myers *et al.* (2018) conducted a research in Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Tanzania and Vietnam. It sought to explain why conservation projects such as REDD+ failed to include notions of representative justice. According to the paper, this failure generates *messiness* in the systems and principles of governance within local communities, delegitimizing the essence of the projects.

Likewise, Seymour *et al.* (2018) carried out a national and sub-national review of cases in all countries with REDD+ projects, in order to systematize the main lessons of what was experienced up to 2014. The study concluded that the program represents an option to reinforce forest governance in terms of transparency and public participation like no other conservation program has done before, but major changes will only be seen after the last phase of the program (Results-Based Payments) is activated. A similar conclusion was given by Larson and Petkova (2011), by saying that the positive reform opportunities that REDD+ offers can only be achieved if the government and the international community strengthen their investment in institutional purposes now; this effort today would determine the success of the program in a long-term.

### 3.2.2. REDD+ Forest Governance Studies in Peru

The studies on forest governance linked to REDD+ in Peru have been carried out under different perspectives, objectives and geographical scales. They can be divided into three large groups, (1) comprehensive, (2) institutional and (3) legal.

Two studies, one made by Che Piu and García (2011) and the other by Che Piu and Menton (2013), overview the governance situation of REDD+ in Peru under a fairly comprehensive focus. Both strategically assess the main stakeholders, power levels, implementation processes, challenges and opportunities that the program maintains in the country. These studies offered an integral reflection on the needs and impacts of REDD+ in Perú. They share the idea that there is weakness in the institutional architecture linked to forests processes, as well as in the management capacities and in the levels of transparency and access to information.

Another two studies analyze various projects carried out in Peru using an institutional and comparative perspective, one and another in the central jungle. The first one done by Hajek *et al.* (2011) is a comparative assessment of 12 projects in the south-eastern Amazon region that seeks to understand the possible collisions and links that may arise between forms of government suggested by REDD+ and the existing emerging architectures of local forest management. The second study done also by Scriven (2012), examines existing institutional arrangements of local communities in the central jungle region (*Yanachaga-Chemillen* National Park's buffer zone) and how state and non-state actors cope with the change in land use.

Again, the spots of coincidence point to the institutional weakness of the government's forest management and, consequently, the importance of generating hybrid (where the interests of all types of actors are included) and related (observed in the REDD+ credit value chain a form of social and environmental innovation) institutional logics.

In parallel, three studies deal with the legal aspect of REDD+. First, at a very early stage of REDD+ in the country, Capella and Sandoval Díaz (2010) design a normative and institutional proposal for the application of REDD (without the plus element) projects in Peru, identifying at the same time some examples of forest areas where they could be implemented. The second study done by Peña Alegría (2014) carefully describes how Peruvian legislation understands forest resources in REDD+ projects, as well as the carbon

market and its legislative possibilities to give the program a logical position under the national legal framework. Finally, Wieland Fernandini and Sousa (2015) makes an overview of the distribution of powers through the different levels of forestry-responsible institutions, land use, and how this legal-institutional landscape could affect the implementation of REDD+ in Peru.

The abovementioned studies share the idea that Peru has implemented REDD+ as an attractive initiative to avoid the liberation of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions and at the same time to comply with its commitments on climate change. However, its legal framework must be carefully observed as it still has serious deficiencies that deserve special treatment. One of the main concerns which should have priority is the problem of ownership of carbon storage, given the historical conflicts between state and indigenous communities.

While this thesis is written, the bylaw (rules of procedure) of the Framework Law on Climate Change is being socialized by MINAM through regional working groups, research groups and indigenous organizations. The purpose of this process is to clarify the institutional and functional framework for REDD+. It is expected that after this process, the program will be fully appropriated by those who are related to the reduction of emissions and removals of GHGs in forests nationwide at every scale of governance.

### **3.2.3. Forest Governance Perception Studies**

Eight perception studies have been identified regarding REDD+ forest governance, conducted between 2012 and 2018 in countries of Central Africa and Asia-Pacific, such as Indonesia, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, Panama, Zambia and Peru.

Without trying to deepen in their specific methodologies, the central concern of these studies focused on collecting perceptions directly from involved stakeholders. They could be divided into three categories, corresponding to the scope of analysis, the quality of forest governance, clarity on REDD+ concepts and the challenges and opportunities of REDD+. In this case, we will use a geographical criterion to detail the objectives and results of these studies.

Two studies were done in Papua New Guinea with the goal of assessing the quality of REDD+ forest governance. The first, carried out by Leggett and Lovell (2012), under the exposition of ethnographic information, has reported an asymmetry in power relations between local elites and landowners. This followed in communities' distrust upon the

project and developed local incapacity to get involved in a legitimate way, so that there was no credibility in its implementation and the value of the carbon credit was at risk.

The second study done by Cadman *et al.* (2016) and developed in Papua New Guinea, was done within a comparative framework with Nepal. Through online surveys and workshops with stakeholders, 11 governance principles were assessed. Respondents from both countries rated under Likert scale the principles of inclusiveness and resources with the highest and lowest values of effectiveness; likewise, principles assigned with the highest priority of application were those mentioned above, as well as transparency and accountability. It is highlighted that certain clusters of principles may be more suitable for assessing and applying good REDD+ governance, since the study shows complex results and multiple linkages.

Meanwhile, two evaluations were conducted on the African continent in 2014 and 2018. The first study focused on evaluating the discourses on adaptation and mitigation, as well as the level of understanding of different climate concepts related to REDD+ by 138 stakeholders (Tiani *et al.*, 2014). They “...are struggling to understand the key concepts of climate change” (Tiani *et al.*, 2014, p. 10), this leads to the individualization of the understanding of the basic elements and goals of REDD+, which allow to conclude that a diversity of perceptions would generate the impossibility of a successful implementation of the program. The second study applied in Zambia, was done by Musole Kwenye and Chunda-Mwango (2018). Six forest governance principles were evaluated in 3 communities, where a very low level of perception of the quality of governance was evidenced, especially for accountability and equity principles. It is concluded that the necessary reforms to this type of results should not be confined to the directly forest area, but to sectors that could have indirect responsibilities, such as the justice system, production or agriculture ministries.

The next two studies have been conducted in countries from the Asia-Pacific region - composed of responses from an undetermined number of countries (T. Cadman & Maraseni, 2012) and in Panama (Peterson St-Laurent *et al.*, 2013).

The first study seeks to evaluate 11 indicators on the quality of forest governance between two groups of countries, the Global South and the Global North. This comparison is observed through 3 identical surveys, distributed over three consecutive years. This

division, according to the authors, could help to suggest what perception donor countries would have in relation to recipient countries. In this sense, one of the most outstanding results of the work is the high quality rating of the governance given by the Global South, different from that given by the Global North. This could indicate that the countries receiving REDD+ financing are more optimistic of the program than their counterparts. It stands out that the great majority of the results are located in the middle ranges of perception, being the great exception the principle of inclusion or participation.

The study made in Panama focuses on the evaluation of perceptions in the so-called "colonists farmers", which in other words are those farmers who have migrated from other cities to "colonize" forest areas. As mentioned in previous chapters, one of the main drivers of deforestation is shifting cultivation, which deforests in small plots. This research acquires greater importance for this thesis, given that the respondents are 'responsible' for deforestation; similar pattern is met by the "colonists" in Peru.

The results reflect a clear difference in perception by types of organization. Respondents from the government perceive REDD+ as a possibility to improve the legal forest system, control over foreground resources and a stable funding opportunity. While the farmers ("colonists") express their concern about the distribution of benefits and the potential negative consequences that the program can bring in terms of land titling. It is concluded that the perceptions vary according to the geopolitical origin and cultural origin that the social group or the respondent possesses.

In Peru, only one perception study on forest governance linked to REDD+ has been carried out, done by Che Piu (2014) and mainly focusing to Civil Society, since 70% of the participants in the survey indicated that they were non-governmental actors (civil society, indigenous peoples, entrepreneurs, etc.), the remaining 30% was identified as Government actors. Results showed a predominantly negative perception in terms of transparency and access to information, and slightly positive in terms of participation. The author suggests that transparency and access to information is an area in which greater efforts are still required to improve the governance of REDD+ in Peru.

#### 4. Evidencing REDD+ Incapacity through the Forest Governance Approach

This chapter explains the problem and the question that arises from the information previously presented, as well as the tools and process held to answer it.

##### 4.1. The Problem and the Question

As reported, deforestation rates in global and Peruvian tropical forests shows increasing trends. During 2001-2014 period, 1,653,129 ha of Amazonian humid forests were deforested, at an average annual rate of 118,080,10 ha (MINAM, 2016a; Finer *et al.*, 2018).

To address this problem, Peruvian government has leveraged enormous efforts to stop the rampant disappearance of forests and its drivers (MINAM, 2010b, 2015b, 2016a, 2016b, 2017b), one of the most popularized tools for it is REDD+. It was seen as a potential quadruple win, forests loss alleviation, co-benefits for poverty reduction and households development, improved forest governance and biodiversity conservation (CIFOR, 2008), but after more than 10 years of the program's implementation, as deforestation rates indicates, the objective has not been achieved.

It is true that the country is yet not in the phase in which communities are financially rewarded for avoided deforestation (Results-Based Payments). But the unprecedented finance delivered to the national readiness phase, initiated 10 years ago, as well as the institutional arrangements that have been done -including legal frameworks, forests monitoring and safeguards systems design- could have triggered *some* kind of changes in forest loss trends, but no such thing has happened.

Therefore, the question that this thesis intends to answer rises alone: Why deforestation has not been reduced in Perú, after 10 years of REDD+ implementation? For this purpose, since this program is not an impartial conservation project, but a functioning form of forest policy that owes to a global environmental government process already presented, forest governance<sup>13</sup> will be used as a point of departure and theoretical approach to give an answer. Based on the literature review and primary data collection, it is expected to evidence gaps in the three governance principles within REDD+ implementation in Peru.

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<sup>13</sup> Understood as the capacities and actions in which institutions regulates and administers forests (FAO, 2018b, p. 69)

This research brings the governance issue to the fore, by asking the very implementers and stakeholders their perceptions about the Peruvian reality of the governance principles regarding REDD+.

## **4.2. Methodological Framework**

The process of collecting primary information was based on the use of virtual surveys and interviews. During January and February, a field trip to Peru was done in order to make direct contact with the mapped institutions and conduct on-site interviews with the specialists who agreed to meet, as well as to attend the meetings of the Peruvian REDD+ group.

### **4.2.1. Implementation of the Virtual REDD+ Perception Survey**

A survey was applied to a sample of individuals from the most relevant institutions. The purpose was to assess the state of governance of the national REDD+ process in Peru, mainly from the point of view of Civil Society, understood as citizens who act in an organized manner to make decisions in the public sphere. These citizens are considered to have interests or rights that may be negatively or positively affected by REDD+ activities.

In this sense, we understand perception as the process by which one selects, organizes and interprets stimuli, to give meaning to something in a subjective, selective and temporal way. Different stakeholders may have different interests, so their experiences of participation, transparency and accountability in REDD+ processes may generate different interpretations and predispositions.

The perceptions of the respondents should not be judged as correct or incorrect, but rather as the opinion of the actors, and therefore valid. They are an indicative reference of the concerns and interests of the actors, and they provide us with an opportunity to begin attending them.

The survey was elaborated in Google Forms (Annex 1), it has 11 questions of which 10 are obligatory and 1 is optional (the last one), these asks for the respondents e-mail address to subsequently receive the systematized survey's data. It is divided in 3 sections, (1) General Information, (2) Forest Governance and (3) Contact.

For questions 8, 9 and 10 a minimally modified Likert scale was used (totally disagree, disagree, neither agree or disagree, agree and totally agree) due to the addition of a sixth

option (none). The propositions were expressed in a positive way to avoid that the survey could lead to negative perceptions.

#### **4.2.1.1. General Information**

This section is composed by 4 questions regarding gender (closed to 1 option), kind of organization (9 options including 1 free to fill, open to select a maximum of 3 options), region of work (closed to 1 option), and the experience in REDD+ (closed to 1 option and filter question). The latter question worked as a filter, no experience in REDD+ was reported, no further questions of the program were asked, section 2 was skipped and the respondent was automatically directed to section 3.

The reason for this exception was because the survey sought to collect REDD+ forest governance perceptions strictly from individuals with a minimum of experience on the program to enhance data legitimacy. It is worth to anticipate that only 1 of the 40 respondents reported no experience.

#### **4.2.1.2. Forest Governance<sup>14</sup>**

The second section addresses forest governance perceptions on REDD+ and it is divided in its three principles or sub sections, (2.1) Participation, (2.2) Transparency and (2.3) Accountability; with 4, 1 and 1 questions, respectively. The reason why there are more questions in the Participation sub section is because, in order to interpret the level of participation, it is imperative to know which are the national participation processes, spaces and forms where respondents have incurred; each of these 3 elements gives important information about how stakeholders relate to REDD+ and explains the kind of actions that organizations and individuals have had with it.

The selection of these three governance principles requires a justification, since other studies consider more governance principles that have not been included for this work. On the one hand, it is clear that governance is not limited to these three principles and it could not be concluded that if the perceptions are not positive, there is no governance; the selection of the principles chosen for this research are aimed at evaluating mainly the level of participation of mapped stakeholders in the different processes, spaces and forms. Also, it was considered that participation is a historical problem in Peru and is currently part of the main demands of indigenous representation organizations and civil society groups, as

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<sup>14</sup> To ease the comprehension of each principle, a short definition is presented in the header.

well as much of the efforts of the Peruvian state to improve what it understands by Governance (SERFOR, 2016).

For their part, the principles of transparency and accountability act as linked characteristics to participation that provide strength and meaning to the operation of the first principle.

These three principles, precisely, act as interdependent indicators of the legitimacy of the state as they speak of the structure and processes of action related to what is generated by REDD+. Other governance indicators propose, for example, "substantive values" (Buchanan & Keohane, 2006), which include principles like human rights or happiness; while the latter allude to *moral* characteristics of governance, the chosen ones point towards *performative* factors of governance.

On the other hand, the possibility of including a greater number of *performative* indicators of good forest governance was limited to the capacity to gather information. Surveying from abroad and virtually limits the number of responses that can be received, so it was decided to design a concise and direct survey, following, as stated above, the same principles that the government conceives what is good governance.

Also, the options proposed for questions 5, 6 and 7 were carefully selected after reviewing official documents (MINAM, 2015a, 2017a, 2018b) and previous similar studies (Leggett & Lovell, 2012; Che Piu, 2014; Atmadja & Sills, 2016), based on the frequency and importance attributed to them, but they are certainly not the only ones.

Question 5 addresses the formal national processes in which the respondent has participated to implement REDD+ in Perú. 5 options were originally proposed, including 1 free to fill (limited to choose one option). To ensure question's clearness, a specific description was stated under the question: "*if you have participated in more than one, choose the process that you think has contributed the most*".

Question 6 addresses the spaces of participation or platforms where respondents have incurred. 7 options were originally proposed including 1 free to fill (limited to choose 3 options). Question 7 addresses the ways in which respondents has participated, this could be done in a passive (consulting information, attending meetings, participating in workshops) or active ways (elaborating documents or participating in political discussions). This previous two-folded categories are not presented in the survey, but used for the

systematization stage. Question 8 requests for the respondent's perception on the participation principle.

In the same way, questions 9 and 10 directly request the respondent's perceptions on transparency and accountability, respectively.

The last section has a single question related to the email address, in case the respondent wishes to receive the systematized information of the study.

#### **4.2.2. Sampling Strategy**

The process to achieve sample's representativeness among REDD+ relevant organizations in Peru was held in 3 phases (organization's mapping, categorization and liaison) and followed a non-probabilistic method or sampling by convenience, used when an online survey is leaved open to be filled by, in this case, the mapped actors and institutions, as well as the individuals who were encouraged to do so by the firsts. Non-probabilistic sampling was also used because of the available time and financing resources.

Next, the process carried out to select the sample of respondents will be detailed.

A possible problem with this method is that it is not possible to determine the probability with which each respondent has the possibility of being included in the sample, making it difficult to carry out statistical inferences. However, as mentioned by Fricker (2012, p. 200) this type of sampling can be used in research in other ways, such as for the development of hypotheses or to define ranges of alternatives, precisely what is intended in this study, taking into account that the objects of analysis are perceptions.

##### *Mapping of Organizations*

Who has been taken as a sample? The literature review produced an overview of the institutions involved and potentially involved in Peruvian REDD+ arena. Several kinds of documentation was assessed, considering peer-reviewed papers and institutional reports (Hajek *et al.*, 2011; Che Piu, 2014; Menton *et al.*, 2014; Wieland Fernandini & Sousa, 2015; Kowler *et al.*, 2016), official documents (MINAM, 2015a; Grupo REDD+ Perú, 2017) and attendance records from socialization workshops of forests policies directed by Futuro Sostenible (2018), a consultant organization contracted by MINAM's *Programa Bosques*, as part of the readiness phase of REDD+ during 2015, 2016 and 2017.

##### *Categorization of Organizations*

Based on this information, 8 categories of organizations were determined as a first step to visualize to whom the survey should be addressed. Categorization took into account the following kinds of criteria, (1) the sector from which institutions come from (public, private and civil society) and geographical scope (international, and national). A detailed list of the institutions is presented in Annex 2.

**Table 3:** Amount of Organizations by Category

Government	20
Research	6
Civil Society	2
Indigenous Representative Organization	17
National NGO	14
International NGO	27
Donor and/or Technical Cooperation	21

*Source: Own preparation, based information from multiple publications (Hajek et al., 2011; Che Piu, 2014; Menton et al., 2014; AIDER, 2015; Wieland Fernandini & Sousa, 2015; Kowler et al., 2016; Grupo REDD+ Perú, 2017; Futuro Sostenible, 2018).*

*Liaison with Organizations*

After having systematized and categorized the organizations, the e-mails were collected from institutional web pages, attendance records and personal contacts. In order to request the institutions to fill the virtual survey, a model of letter (Annex 3) was made to standardize the petition and subsequently send it to the contacts.

Taking into account the extreme difficulty to engage with all the Peruvian organizations involved in REDD+ in such a short time, two kinds of non-probability sampling types were needed to achieve quantitative homogeneity between organization’s samples<sup>15</sup>. In a first stage (between March 24 and May 24, 2018), *Snowball* and *Judgment Sampling* were used, since the letter of request asked for the individual to fill and share the form among contacts with REDD+ experience.

By the end of May, the number of answers of the organization’s categories did not reach homogeneity and it was decided to move on to a second stage of the survey sending, in order to equal the categories with less answers to the one that got the most, which was the

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<sup>15</sup> Representativeness in non-probabilistic samples is usually established according to quotas that are proportional to the population of each sub group. But, given that the surveys collected information of a subjective nature, in this case, representativeness is determined by the quantitative homogeneity among sub groups.

Indigenous Representative Organization category (5 answers). Between May 24 and June 30 of the same year, *Judgment sampling* was used to equal the number of answers from the 7 remaining organizations, by doing direct phone calls to institutions from the mapped organizations and formally asking to answer the quantity of surveys needed.<sup>16</sup>

#### **4.2.3. Interviews**

To complement the data collected from the surveys, 3 non-structured interviews were done to 2 Peruvian REDD+ consultant and researcher, and 1 Portuguese REDD+ researcher (via Skype), in relation to the subjects in which the interviewees were specialized.

Likewise, in order to present the thesis research and ask the specialists to interview them, a model of letter (Annex 4) was made to standardize the petition. The topics discussed were not exclusively about forest governance, but also about REDD+ related issues as presented in the discussed subjects of table 5.

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<sup>16</sup>The organizations that were contacted at this stage were randomly selected using Microsoft Excel Sort Range Randomly tool.

**Table 4:** Detail of Interviews and Meetings

<b>Date of Interview or Meeting</b>	<b>Name (Duration of meeting)</b>	<b>Organization, Position and Area of Expertise</b>	<b>Subjects discussed</b>
29 Jan, 2018	Claudia Ochoa (1h35min)	- Independent, Consultant, - Legal specialist on issues of forests, climate change and renewable energy.	International climate agreements, Peruvian REDD+ evolution, jurisdictional and nested approaches, Brazilian REDD+.
23 May, 2018	Maria Vasconcelos (35min)	- Instituto Superior de Agronomia (ISA) - PhD, REDD+ Project Manager, - Geographical information and REDD+ international projects.	Voluntary carbon markets, community's incentives, social sensitization on conservation issues, non-carbon benefits for local involvement on REDD+, transparency, accountability, local institutional weakness, difficulties and motivations to implement REDD+.
6 Jun, 2018	Mirko Ruiz (1h2min)	- Conservation International – Peru (CI), - Program Officer, - Specialist in REDD+ Safeguards Systems.	National safeguards elaboration process, forest governance situation in Peruvian arena.

*Source: Own elaboration.*

**5. Results and Discussion**

The virtual survey of perceptions regarding REDD+ Forest Governance (which in the Google form was titled as “*Quick Perception Survey about REDD+ Governance in Peru*”) was voluntarily filled by 40 individuals, during March and June of 2018. Its results will be presented following the same division established in the virtual form.


At the same time, these sections will be used to include related content extracted from the interviews directed to the specialists. Subsequently, the information collected exclusively from the interviews will be presented.

**5.1. General Information of Survey’s Respondents**

*Gender*

The virtual survey did not looked for a gender balanced sample, despite this, results close to parity can be observed, with 40% of the respondents reporting being women. The only type of organization with respondents from a single gender was Research, only with males.

**Chart 3:** Question 1 (“Gender?”)




*Source: Own elaboration based on data from the Survey*

*Organizations by Categories*

An important condition to generate deductions from a representative sample of the relevant Peruvian organizations involved in REDD+ is to have the same number of respondents per category of organizations. As shown, 5 responses were obtained for each of the 8 types of mapped organizations.

**Chart 4:** Question 2 (“What is the type of organization of which you are part?”)




*Source: Own elaboration based on data from the Survey*

### Region of Work

Since REDD+ started to be implemented in Peru, organizations located at different regions and scales started to take part on it.

**Chart 5:** Question 3 (“What is the region where you work?”)



*Source: Own elaboration based on data from the Survey*

21 respondents, just over half of the total, reported to be working at a national level, followed by a group of 6 individuals who works in Lima, the Peruvian capital. 12


respondents correspond to the cluster of Amazonian regions (Ucayali, Amazonas -the Brazilian province-, San Martin and Madre de Dios).

Gender distribution in relation to the region where the respondents works (question 3) also shows relevant differences, of the 21 individuals that reported working at a national level, only 6 were female; while the remaining group that worked at the regional level showed greater parity (10 women and 8 men).

When looking closer to the responses of those who work at the national scale, the Peruvian REDD+ Group represents the most important participation space with 63%. As well as the totality of respondents from the Government, who also reported to work at the same scale. The cluster of the Amazonian regions, which gathers 12 respondents, is the space where 4 of the 5 respondents from the Indigenous Representation Organization works, - the remaining one works in Lima.

*Experience on REDD+*

**Chart 6:** Question 4 (“Do you have any experience in REDD+?”)



*Source: Own elaboration based on data from the Survey*

Question 4 worked as a filter to confirm that the answers are legitimized by some kind of experience on REDD+. Only one male respondent from a Research organization who works in Amazonas, Brazil reported not to have any experience.

*Forest Governance*

The second section of the survey evaluates the perceptions of the governance principles regarding REDD+. Beyond this, 3 more questions were added in the participation


principle, in order to know the processes, spaces and forms in which the respondent incurred during his experience.

*Processes of Participation*

According to M. Ruiz (Personal Communication, June 6, 2018), REDD+ participation has been slowly incremental. In the early stage of the program, around 2007, the state did not have any roadmap to follow, stakeholder’s involvement was very limited and technical capacity was scarce even for MINAM, which only gained prominence and power over time.

In general, the different national entities with forestry competences were not clear about the objective of the program, there were different visions and the financing was insufficient. The importance of being part of formal processes for the implementation of REDD+ in Peru not only resides in the political formality of including the population, but also in generating a kind of internalization of the benefits that arise from the conservation of forests carbon stocks and avoiding deforestation. Ruiz follows, there may be funding and political lobbying of the program, but if there is no real involvement of local and civil communities, there is no appropriation of the project and it loses its meaning.

**Chart 7:** Question 5 (“What are the national REDD+ processes in which you have incurred?”)



*Source: Own elaboration based on data from the Survey*

In terms of the Peruvian formal processes, this question from the survey originally offered 4 options, related to the processes of preparation and revision of the R-PP, FIP, SIS and the execution of Early Actions, which represent 87% of responses. The remaining 13% corresponded to 2 options added by respondents, Reference Levels development (3 answers), “other” (1 answer) and 1 individual who reported not having participated in any process.

33.3% of the responses report having participated in the REDD+ Early Actions, which indicates it is the current process with greater importance. Instead, processes such as the Development and/or Review of the R-PP (15.1%) and the Investment Plan for FIP (23.4%), which although in previous evaluations were the most important (Che Piu, 2014), today they show less attendance .


13 of 15 respondents, who answered having participated in the R-PP and FIP, work mainly in Lima and at the National Level. This could indicate that such processes tend to be centralized in the capital and not in the Amazonian regions, where the national program or the REDD+ Early Actions are being executed.

The voluntary –or private- market projects (as those tested in REDD+ Early Actions phase) deserve a separate mention given the level of relegation of the aspect of participation. In the experience of Maria Vasconcelos (Personal Communication, 23 May, 2018), the VERRA protocol, which works as a MRV standard and was applied in projects in Africa, does not have very specific measures on the inclusion of local communities.

For this protocol to be put into practice, only the technical part is required, unlike jurisdictional programs (such as the nested approach of Peru), which are implemented by the IDB (International Development Bank) or the FCPF and do have a requirement the implementation of safeguards systems and benefit sharing mechanisms.

### *Spaces of Participation*

**Chart 8:** Question 6 (“What are the participation spaces that you have incurred?”)




*Source: Own elaboration based on data from the Survey*

72% of those surveyed indicate having participated in the Peruvian REDD+ group, 23% in some REDD+ regional platform, 20% in the REDD+ indigenous platform, 15% in technical, regional and municipal commissions, and 13% in other spaces.

This question allowed to choose up to 3 options, 15 individuals chose more than one option (of which 5 individuals reported having participated simultaneously in the Peruvian REDD+ group and the Regional REDD+ platform). Other 5 alternative participation spaces were mentioned (13% of the responses) such as the MINAM Safeguards Committee, the FIP process committee (3) and a pilot project.

*Forms of Participation*

**Chart 9:** Question 7 (“What have been the ways in which you have participated?”)




*Source: Own elaboration based on data from the Survey*

The forms or mechanisms used by the participants of the survey to intervene in the REDD+ processes have a relatively homogeneous distribution. The most frequent form was the preparation of documents (32.1%), followed by technical workshops (23.1%), political discussion events (17.9%), informative meetings (15.4%) and consulting information (11.5%). Since this question also allowed choosing up to 3 options, the most frequent association (6 respondents) was the attendance to technical workshops with preparation of documents.

*Perception of Participation*

**Chart 10:** Question 8 (“I believe that the REDD+ processes in which I have incurred have been participatory”)



*Source: Own elaboration based on data from the Survey*

60% of the respondents Agreed and Completely Agreed that their participation was taken into account, that is, that their participation has been effective. However, 31% of respondents reported that they neither agree or disagree, which indicates a high degree of uncertainty and does not allow to firmly conclude that the principle of participation is fully met<sup>17</sup>. This pattern of uncertainty coincides with other perception studies regarding REDD+ governance done in Africa and Central America (T. Cadman & Maraseni, 2012; Musole Kwenye & Chunda-Mwango, 2018).

In terms of gender distribution, the proportion of men who consider REDD+ processes transparent is more than twice the proportion of women (18.8% versus 43.4%).

If data is analyzed by type of organizations, it can be useful to generate two clusters of answers, one that groups the levels of Likert 1, 2 and 3 (the undecided, those who disagree and totally disagree, 15 answers), and a second that groups the levels 4 and 5, the ones that


<sup>17</sup> However, the neutral responses should not be understood as an impartial perception of the actors, but rather as a situation in which they cannot respond in any of the other two senses.

agree and completely agree (23 answers); the first cluster mainly contains individuals from the national and public sector (Civil Society, Government and Organizations of Indigenous Representation), while the second cluster mainly contains individuals from the international and private sector (National NGOs, Consultant and Donor Organizations and Technical Cooperation).

This indicate that organizations of a public scope and national scale -grassroots communities and government respondents- do not consider that there is effective participation in REDD+, unlike organizations of private and international scale, who do perceive that the principle of participation in REDD+ governance is fully met.

*Perception of Transparency*

**Chart 11:** Question 9 (“I believe that the REDD+ processes in which I have participated has been transparent”)



*Source: Own elaboration based on data from the Survey*

In relation to the principle of transparency, there is no clear trend towards any option. The group of respondents who strongly disagree and disagree (14) almost equals the group that agrees and completely agrees (13). As in the principle of participation, it is also a highlight the degree of uncertainty reflected in the 10 respondents who answered not agreeing or disagreeing with respect to whether the REDD+ processes in which they participated were transparent.


The most visible trends of transparency by type of organization show that all respondents from the government are in the cluster of answers from Likert scale level 4 and 5. On the other hand, in the cluster for levels 1, 2 and 3, we mainly find respondents from indigenous representation organization and consultants.

In the interview with M. Ruiz (Personal Communication, June 6, 2018), the specialist stated that, despite REDD+ not being a transparent process, there is pressure from civil society to ask for information. In his experience, several times information has been requested to MINAM, in some cases, the waiting time exceeded one year of waiting.

For M. Vasconcelos (Personal Communication, 23 May, 2018), the reason why there is no transparency in some private market projects is not because there is a will to hide or need to maintain power, but rather because there is a strong institutional and technological incapacity to guarantee it. Institutions are very weak and do not have organizational or archival capacities that allow transparency practices.

*Perception of Accountability*

**Chart 12:** Question 10 (“I believe that the REDD+ processes in which I have participated has been accountable”)



*Source: Own elaboration based on data from the Survey*

Although with slight differences, perception of transparency in REDD+ processes shows a negative trend. 44% of the answers indicate that they disagree and strongly disagree there is transparency, 21% agree there is, and a considerable 31% remains neutral or undecided.

In terms of gender distribution of this perception, the proportion of men who consider REDD+ processes accountable is 5 times higher than that of women (34.7% versus 6.3%), in other words, female respondents tend to perceive REDD+ less accountable than men.

The distribution of the answers in relation to the types of organizations shows that every respondent from the government perceive accountability in REDD+ processes.

In relation to the region of work, the cluster of respondents working in Amazonian regions (12), with the exception of one answer, chose levels 1, 2 and 3 of the Likert scale, the same happens with those who work in Lima. Unlike those who reported working at the National level, they agree and fully agree that REDD+ processes are accountable.

The Peruvian REDD+ group, the most frequent participation platform among respondents (72%), reported two times more disagreeing and completely disagreeing (12) than those who reported agreeing and completely agreeing, but always accompanied by a high degree of uncertainty verified in the group of those who do not agree or disagree (9).

### *Contact*

Even though the survey was anonymous, the majority opted for the possibility to not identify them. 10 of the 40 respondents prefer not to identify themselves by filling the email box, and 8 of them reported to be from private organizations, such as a consultant, international and national NGO and research -the remaining 2 answers where both from a civil society organization.

One hypothesis for the absence in identification could reside in the fact that REDD+ is an active process and organizations are still working in the program, so participants ought to take special care of possible reactions among their peers by avoiding identified opinions.

## 6. Conclusive Remarks

### 6.1. Participation without Accountability

What is it that offers certainty for an environmental policy to benefit the population? According to the World Development Report (World Bank, 2017), the answer lies in effective governance, which -beyond socially legitimizing a policy- provides strength and certainty that this will have positive consequences on social and environmental well-being.

But effective governance is met when population perceives that there is a minimum level of inclusion in decision-making, access to information and institutions that provide voice and accountability to society. These elements, clearly, are interdependent and operate under a complex dynamic of trade-offs.

On the one hand, participation in Peru has been implemented and at the same time demanded insistently. One of the main examples of this occurred with the implementation of the law of the right to prior consultation to Indigenous Peoples issued in 2011. This generated an unprecedented national dialogue, where platforms of interaction between the different levels of government were held. Without doubt, for the country it was a big step in terms of climate inclusion.

Likewise, the framework law on climate change has also generated a process of important dialogue at institutional and regional level through the "Participatory Process for the Elaboration of the Regulations of the Framework Law on Climate Change", which began on May 10 of this year (MINAM, 2018a). To date, a multi-stakeholder, multi-thematic and decentralized process, and subsequent validation and approval of the rules of procedure with social workshops continue to be applied.

Accountability, on the other hand, is related to narratives of representation that a person or social group upholds over –in this case- the government, which, in some way, looks after the interests or provides protection to the group. In this point, Peru has a tradition of having a political system of representation in crisis, characterized by corrupt cadres entrenched mainly in the legislative powers and political parties.

Even more, if it is about the governance and presence of the state in Amazonian regions, the situation of political representativeness is chronically absent. Both indigenous representation organizations and the remaining urbanized population which do not identify

with indigenous demands live politically and geographically isolated from what happens in the coastal region, where power is centralized.

The results of the survey reflect this collision between absence and presence of said governance principles. In a context where the actors are part of the decisions, but nobody knows who is responsible for what, the population cannot find a voice in those who are supposed to represent them, the relationship between the population and the state is not horizontal and the decisions are not legitimate.

This generates failed governance, where inclusion is an illusion. That is, if there is disagreement with any political process, the social group has no way to be heard, or even know that they can be and, finally, representation does not exist. Participation ends up being a mere formality and an action of moral entitlement that bureaucratically provides formal acceptance to the projects that are being implemented.

As already mentioned in sub chapter 3.3.3, in the REDD+ forest governance perception studies review, similar results are observed in assessments carried out in Zambia (T. Cadman & Maraseni, 2012; Musole Kwenye & Chunda-Mwango, 2018) and slightly to the assessment done in Perú (Che Piu, 2014).

In the case of Zambia, the principle with the highest level of perception was participation, while the principle of accountability almost equals the least perceived. This country's institutional needs, despite being geographically and culturally far, are similar to those in Peru. The need to establish obligations in the authorities to respond to their actions, to take initiatives of representation and to generate horizontal relationships -not top-down-, is critical in both countries. There is no need to ask, already, why in both countries REDD+ is not working.


A state that applies forest governance unsuccessfully and -even worst- *pretends* to be based on trust -where there is effective interaction between actors and policies are generated bottom-up- has high possibilities of generating top-down government relations.

## **6.2. In Conservation, Motivation Matters (specially for Indigenous Communities)**

Organizations closest to the forest, those who know it the most (Indigenous representation organization and civil society), that is, the organizations that should have the

highest participation, access to information and capacity to supervise the activities of the authorities, are the ones who least perceived them.

**Chart 13:** Cumulative Perceptions of Governance Principles by Type of Organization)



*Source: Own elaboration based on data from the Survey*

When comparing the accumulated perceptions of the three principles of governance, between indigenous organizations and the government, the difference is abysmal. There is a clear lack of confidence from the latter group and, consequently, a demotivation by REDD+. This indicates a huge communication gap and a challenge in terms of Peruvian forest governance.

Civil society (in what concerns the respondents to the survey) also presents extremely low accumulated levels of perception among the three principles; even more than indigenous organizations if the option of neither agree or disagree is considered as a negative perception.

It is important to mention that civil society organizations incur in participation spaces of much greater political incidence and institutional hierarchy, such as the Peruvian REDD+ Group, FIP Directive Committee, Development of the Investment Plan for FIP; unlike Indigenous representation organizations which mainly participates in REDD+ Indigenous

platforms, a space of participation that has no weight in the decisions of the high political level, no effective recognition in relation to the REDD+ Early Actions projects nor has participated with importance during the readiness phase<sup>18</sup>.

Following this pattern, REDD+ is not on track to succeed. The good performance of this program, depends much more on political factors -related to the level of representation that forest user groups have in negotiation processes- than on technical ones (Lederer, 2012). The capacities of political incidence should, at least, reflect a greater balance in their distribution upon types of organizations.

### **6.3. Gender Disparity**

The results obtained by the survey related to the gender issue, demand a specific section. Gender disparities regarding perceptions of governance are worrisome. Results of the survey showed that female population perceives that REDD+ processes are two times less transparent and 5 times less accountable than for male population. This coincides with a series of sexist and exclusionary patterns found in other REDD+ assessments (Larson *et al.*, 2018).

An alternative interpretation of these results could be based on the fact that female respondents might be more aware of the lack of transparency and accountability, generating a gender-differentiated critical sense about the processes, at least more than male respondents.

It is a global agreement, materialized in the SDGs (United Nations Sustainable Development Goals) and Safeguards implementation, that the fight against climate change and the loss of forests must be an inclusive process. At the same time, there are critical concerns related to the level at which this inclusion takes women into account.

REDD+ must be sensitive and responsive in its activities related to gender equity. The National Strategy on Climate Change, which provides the guidelines for REDD+ in Peru, recognizes as a means of implementation that the high vulnerability of poor populations and 'groups at risk' must be considered. For this, it is mentioned that a gender approach must be applied to deal with Climate Change and implemented in conservation projects, such as REDD+.

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<sup>18</sup> This lack of consideration of indigenous platforms in the R-PP was strongly criticized by the World Bank and the Rainforest Alliance (Rainforest Foundation, 2010).

#### 6.4. Has Peruvian REDD+ failed?

As already mentioned, one of the pillars of REDD+ is the generation of the Safeguards System. This is designed to primarily protect the rights of indigenous communities, guaranteeing their access to participation (materialized in the Law of Prior Consultation to Indigenous or Native Peoples). This indispensable requirement is presented in the Cancun Agreement, ratified in the Warsaw Framework for REDD+ and represents the core of local governance guarantee for community forest user groups.

This has been largely insisted on because, in effect, socio-environmental conflicts in tropical countries, especially those with a greater amount of forest cover, suffer from historical abuses in relation to the projects implemented inside their territories and, simultaneously, being subject to a series of conservation tests; the contemporary one is REDD+, but the previous one was *Payment for Ecosystem Services*, previously *community-based conservation*, and so we can do a retrospective of conservation *fads* (Redford *et al.*, 2013), each one repackaging the previous.

In Peru, socio-environmental conflicts represent 72.5% of the total national conflicts reported during 2017; this tendency is repeated throughout almost all republican life. Natural resources in Peru represent an issue of conflict, the government -as a focal point for REDD+- has a great responsibility both generating and solving them.

In this sense, the national REDD+ program and the REDD+ Early Actions received a mandate they must respect, a specific framework to follow, which is the obligation to involve all stakeholders, especially indigenous communities.

According to the results of the virtual survey on forest governance related to REDD+ applied to a representative sample of individuals with experience in the program, the respect for safeguards, specifically those related to transparency and accountability, that is, the pillars of forest governance, are not being successfully implemented to the most important stakeholders, forest dependent peoples.

As reported by the interviewees, overtaking an evaluation of results at this point, without having the FCPF process active (Results-based Payments phase) can be risky.

Still, for this research, already having 10 years of the program REDD+ in Perú, an evaluation is needed. The conclusion is that Peruvian REDD+ is a double failure. On the one hand, the inability to stop deforestation and degradation of forests is verified in the

first chapters by simply collecting the latest official data on national forest cover loss –rates of forest loss are incremental-; and on the other hand, the inability to implement the program under the principles of participation, transparency and accountability, verified by the results of the surveys and interviews conducted for this research.

## **6.5. Future Considerations**

### *Opportunities from the sideline*

As results shows, indigenous peoples remain on the sidelines. All of them, since the preparation phase, must be properly informed and the necessary conditions must be provided for effective representation. However, the political process of REDD+ in Peru shows difficulties.

The existence of spaces of participation such as the Peruvian REDD+ Group, the regional REDD+ Platform or the regional environmental commissions has not yet been adequately exploited. The agreements reached between MINAM and Indigenous Organizations done for the ENBCC, as well as with the REDD+ Group, represent an opportunity to enrich the program implementation processes and incorporate a wide variety of actors.

The coordinated work between the Government, the private sector, civil society and indigenous organizations for the incorporation of their requests in the R-PP and the FIP can be reactivated as an important gesture that contributes to the rebuilding of trust between the abovementioned instances.

A more determined effort is required from Peru to make REDD+ decision-making processes more transparent, as well as to make authorities accessible to all stakeholders.

### *Additional Issues to be addressed by REDD+*

There are sidelines issues that have not yet been addressed directly by REDD+ in Peru: the impact of REDD+ in biodiversity, the contabilization of forest fires in MRV systems and the consequences of a carbon market in Perú.

The first is a critical issue for a mega diverse country like Peru, which is highly dependent on its biodiversity, whether for the livelihoods of its indigenous peoples or for many of its economic activities. However, this is not addressed with the necessary depth. In the future, more research will be required to understand not only the impacts of REDD+ on biodiversity but also on the importance of biodiversity to maintain carbon storage.

In that sense, the increase in forest fires, mainly due to the loss of humidity in certain periods, has increased the vulnerability of the forests. Efforts to prevent deforestation by human activities can be ruined by forest fires that can generate emissions that have been avoided for a long time and even high cost. This new risk is not being incorporated into the analysis and debate on REDD+ and, therefore, the necessary capacities to deal with it are not being incorporated either.

Finally, the incorporation of the carbon market that comes with REDD+ is being accepted without further discussion, AIDSEEP leads almost alone the concern. This has not been a matter of discussion, but postponing it can be very serious, since the architecture of REDD+ will finally have certain local and national consequences if the market is considered or not<sup>19</sup>. Related to this, another concern is the possibility that developed countries can use the reduction of emissions achieved by REDD+ to offset their emissions. Addressing these and other issues is necessary to ensure the efficiency of the program in the future.

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<sup>19</sup> This concern is also verified in the sense that the most common projects in Peru have been those of the private market, belonging to the testing phase of REDD+ Early Actions, which apart from operating directly for the carbon market, does not observe clear mechanisms of participation.

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
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## Annexes

### Annex 1: Virtual Survey

#### Presentation of the Survey



**Encuesta Rápida de Percepción  
sobre Gobernanza REDD+ en el Perú**

Desde ya, muchas gracias por su interés en responder esta encuesta de percepción. Mi nombre es Diego Espejo, geógrafo peruano-brasileño actualmente realizando la tesis de maestría en Economía y Gestión Ambiental (Universidad de Porto, Portugal) sobre el estado de la iniciativa REDD+ en el Perú.

El objetivo de esta encuesta -con duración alrededor de 10min- es conocer su percepción (esencialmente personal y anónima) sobre los aspectos de gobernanza ligados a esta iniciativa que procura reducir las emisiones de carbono forestal en nuestro territorio.

Si es de su interés descargar los resultados, le invito a dejar su correo al final de la encuesta; con seguridad la data recolectada servirá como insumo valioso para futuras investigaciones.

Finalmente, le agradecería infinitamente si pudiera difundir esta encuesta entre su red de contactos que hayan participado en algún proceso REDD+, con el fin de enriquecer la cantidad y diversidad de la muestra.

**SIGUIENTE** Página 1 de 4

Nunca envíe contraseñas a través de Formularios de Google.

The image shows a digital survey form with a white background and a dark green header. The title is 'Encuesta Rápida de Percepción sobre Gobernanza REDD+ en el Perú'. Below the title, it says 'Obligatorio' in red. The section is titled '1. Información General'. There are four questions, each with radio button options. At the bottom, there are 'ATRÁS' and 'SIGUIENTE' buttons, a progress bar, and the text 'Página 2 de 4'.

## Encuesta Rápida de Percepción sobre Gobernanza REDD+ en el Perú

Obligatorio

### 1. Información General

(1) ¿Cuáles es su sexo? \*

Mujer

Hombre

(2) ¿Cuáles es el tipo de organización de la cual forma parte? \*

Gobierno

Investigación

Sociedad Civil

Organización de representación indígena

ONG Nacional

ONG Internacional

Donante y/o Cooperación Técnica

Consultora

Ninguna

Otras: \_\_\_\_\_

(3) ¿Cuáles es la región en la que trabaja? \*

La Oroya

Lima

Ucayali

San Martín

Cusco

Madre de Dios

Piura

Nacional

Otras: \_\_\_\_\_

(4) ¿Tiene alguna experiencia en REDD+? \*

Sí

No

ATRÁS SIGUIENTE

Progress bar: [Blue segment] [Grey segment]

Página 2 de 4

\*Obligatorio

## 2. Gobernanza Forestal

Esta sección busca conocer su percepción sobre REDD+ en base a conceptos como la participación, transparencia y rendición de cuentas.

### 2.1 Participación

- El término se entiende mejor considerando su opuesto, que es la toma de decisiones unilateral desde los organismos públicos o privados, sin ningún tipo de acción o consideración con los grupos implicados o interesados por estas decisiones. (Proceso de Consulta y Participación para la Elaboración de la Estrategia Nacional REDD+ Panamá. 2013)  
- La 'Participación Plena y Efectiva' significa una influencia verificable por parte de todos los sujetos de derecho relevantes y grupos de partes interesadas que desean participar durante un proceso REDD+, e incluye consultas y consentimiento libre, previo e informado. (Extraído del Glosario de términos REDD+. <https://goo.gl/BkEi6T> - 2018)

(5) ¿Cuáles son los procesos nacionales de REDD+ en los que ha participado? \*

(En caso haya participado en más de uno, escoja el proceso que considere haya contribuido más)

- Elaboración y/o revisión del R-PP
- Elaboración del Plan de Inversión del FIP
- Elaboración del Sistema de Información de Salvaguardas REDD+
- Acciones tempranas REDD+
- Otros:

(6) ¿Cuáles son los espacios de participación en los que ha incurrido? \*

- Grupo REDD+ Perú (mesa nacional)
- Grupo Técnico de REDD+ de la Comisión Nacional de Cambio Climático
- Mesa REDD+ Indígena
- Mesa REDD regional
- Comisiones Ambientales Regionales y Municipales
- Comités de Gestión Forestal y de Fauna Silvestre
- Otros: \_\_\_\_\_

(7) ¿Cuáles han sido las formas en las que ha participado? \*

- Consultando información
- Reuniones informativas
- Talleres técnicos
- Elaboración de documentos
- Eventos de discusión política
- Ninguna
- Otros: \_\_\_\_\_

(8) Percepción sobre su participación en REDD+ \*

De acuerdo a la afirmación, escoja la opción que considere.

	Muy en desacuerdo	En desacuerdo	Nide acuerdo ni en desacuerdo	De acuerdo	Muy de acuerdo	Ninguna
Considero que los procesos REDD+ en los que he incurrido han sido participativos.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

## 2.2 Transparencia

La transparencia hace referencia a que las decisiones tomadas y su cumplimiento se hacen de manera que sigue las reglas y regulaciones. También significa que la información está disponible gratuitamente y directamente accesible para aquellos que se verán afectados por tales decisiones y su aplicación. También significa que se proporciona suficiente información a través de medios fácilmente comprensibles (Citizens as partners, 2001). (Extraído del Glosario de Términos REDD+. <https://goo.gl/BkEi6T> - 2018)

(9) Percepción de Transparencia en REDD+ \*

De acuerdo a la afirmación, escoja la opción que considere.

	Muy en desacuerdo	En desacuerdo	Nide acuerdo ni en desacuerdo	De acuerdo	Muy de acuerdo	Ninguna
Considero que los procesos REDD+ en los que he participado han sido transparentes.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

## 2.3 Rendición de Cuentas

La rendición de cuentas hace referencia a la garantía que deben ofrecer las instituciones públicas y privadas a tomar responsabilidad por sus acciones y decisiones, en el marco de la preparación o implementación de una iniciativa REDD+.

### (10) Percepción de Rendición de Cuentas en REDD+ \*

De acuerdo a la afirmación, escoja la opción que considere.

Muy en desacuerdo    En desacuerdo    Ni de acuerdo ni en desacuerdo    De acuerdo    Muy de acuerdo    Ninguna

Considero que los procesos REDD+ en los que he participado han 'rendido cuentas'.

ATRÁS

SIGUIENTE

Página 3 de 4

## Encuesta Rápida de Percepción sobre Gobernanza REDD+ en el Perú

### Contacto

Si desea recibir la información sistematizada de esta investigación, por favor escriba su correo electrónico.

Tu respuesta

ATRÁS

ENVIAR

Página 4 de 4

**Annex 2: Detailed list of the Mapped Institutions by Category.**

<b>Government</b>	<b>Research</b>
GORE Madre de Dios	Instituto de Investigación Andino y de Derecho Ambiental (IIADA)
GORE San Martín	Instituto de Investigaciones sobre la Amazonía Peruana (IIAP)
Dirección de Gestión Estratégica Ambiental	Instituto del Bien Común (IBC)
Autoridad Regional Ambiental del Gobierno Regional de San Martín	Instituto Nacional de Investigación Agraria (INIA)
GORE Ucayali	Universidad Nacional de San Martín
OEFA	<a href="#">Centro Amazónico de Antropología y Aplicación Práctica - CAAAP</a>
PNCB	
PROFONANPE	
SERFOR	
SERNANP	
Viceministerio de Desarrollo Estratégico de los Recursos Naturales	
Viceministerio de Políticas Agrarias, Ministerio de Agricultura y Riego	
Comisión Nacional de Cambio Climático	
Mesa Regional de Loreto	
Mesa Regional de Madre de Dios	
Mesa Regional de Piura	
Mesa Regional de San Martín	
Mesa Regional de Ucayali	
OSINFOR	
OEFA	

<b>Civil Society</b>	<b>Indigenous Representative Organization</b>	<b>National NGO</b>
Grupo REDD+	AIDSESP	ACCA
Grupo Técnico de REDD (GTREDD)	Centro de Culturas Indígenas del Perú (CHIRAPAQ)	AIDER
	COICA	AMPA
	CONAP	APECO
	FENAMAD	CEDIA
	Consejo Harakbut, Yine y Matsigenka (COHARYIMA)	Centro para la Sostenibilidad Ambiental (CSA)
	Consejo Indígena de bajo Madre de Dios (COINBAMAD)	CIMA
	Asociación Forestal Indígena de Madre de Dios (AFIMAD)	DAR
	Ejecutor de Contrato de Administración de la Reserva Comunal Amaraeri (ECA-RCA)	DRIS
	ASOCIACION NACIONAL DE EJECUTORES DEL CONTRATO DE ADMINISTRACION DE RESERVAS COMUNALES DEL PERU (ANECAP)	Fundación Peruana para la Conservación de la Naturaleza (PRONAURALEZA)
	Federación de Comunidades Shawis del Armanayacu (FECOSHARMA)	GREENOXX
	COORDINADORA DE DESARROLLO Y DEFENSA DE LOS PUEBLOS INDÍGENAS DE LA REGIÓN SAN MARTÍN (CODEPISAM)	Se Perú
	FEDERACION REGIONAL INDIGENA AWAJUN DEL ALTO MAYO (FERIAAM)	SERVINDI
	FEDERACION REGIONAL INDIGENA SHAWI DE SAN MARTIN (FERISHAM)	SPDA
	Federación de Pueblos Indígenas Kechwas de la Región San Martín (FEPIKRESAM)	
	Consejo Étnico de los Pueblos Kechwas de la Amazonia (CEPKA)	
	Federación de Comunidades Nativas Jebero (FECONAJE)	

<b>International NGO</b>	<b>Donor and/or Technical Cooperation</b>	<b>Consultant</b>
Agencia de Investigación Ambiental (EIA)	Agencia de Cooperación Internacional del Japón (JICA),	Asesorandes
Alianza para el Clima	Agencia de Estados Unidos para el Desarrollo Internacional (USAID)	Carbon Decisions International (CDI)
Asociación Suiza para la Cooperación Internacional (Helvetas)	Agencia Noruega de Cooperación al Desarrollo (NORAD)	Libélula
Biodiversidad y Comunidad (CCBA)	Agencia Suiza para el Desarrollo y la Cooperación (COSUDE)	Terra Carbon
Centro de Información Bancaria (BIC)	Banco Alemán de Desarrollo (KFW)	Winrock International
Centro Mundial de Agroforestería (ICRAF)	Cooperación Alemana al Desarrollo (GIZ)	
CIFOR	FIP	
Conservación Internacional (CI)	Gobierno de Alemania	
Fondo de Defensa Ambiental (EDF)	Gobierno de Finlandia	
Forest Trends	Gobierno de Japón	
Fundación Gordon y Betty Moore	Gobierno de Noruega	
FUNDECOR (Costa Rica)	Gobierno de Suiza	
Global Witness	Gobierno de USA	
Grupo Katoomba	Iniciativa para la Conservación de la Amazonía Andina (ICAA)	
Instituto Alemán de Desarrollo (DIE)	Organización de Naciones Unidas para la Agricultura y la Alimentación (FAO)	
Instituto Carnegie	Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (PNUD)	
Instituto de Investigación Ambiental de la Amazonía (IPAM)	Servicio Forestal de los Estados Unidos (USFS)	
Museo Field de Chicago	FCPF	
Naturaleza y Conservación Internacional (NCI)	ONU-REDD	
Organización para Estudios Tropicales (OET)	REDD+ Partnership	
Programa para los Pueblos de los Bsoques (FPP)	Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (BID)	
Rainforest Alliance		

Sociedad para la Conservación de la Vida Silvestre (WCS)		
Sociedad Zoológica de Francfort (SZF)		
The Nature Conservancy (TNC)		
WRI		
WWF-Perú		

### Annex 3: Letter Model to Request the Filling of the Virtual Survey.

Universidade do Porto  
R. Dr. Roberto Frias 464. Porto, Portugal.  
Mayo, 2018.

Estimado Sr. o Sra.,

Desde ya, agradezco su interés en esta encuesta de percepción sobre REDD+ en el Perú. Mi nombre es Diego Espejo, geógrafo peruano-brasilero, actualmente realizando la tesis de maestría en Economía y Gestión Ambiental (Universidad de Porto, Portugal) sobre el estado de la iniciativa REDD+ en el Perú.

Le escribo con la intención de pedirle encarecidamente 10 minutos de su tiempo. Mi objetivo es conocer su percepción (esencialmente personal y anónima) a través de una encuesta virtual sobre aspectos de gobernanza forestal ligados a esta iniciativa, que procura reducir las emisiones de carbono forestal en nuestro territorio.

Si es de su interés descargar los resultados, le invito a dejar su correo al final de la encuesta. Con seguridad la data recolectada servirá como insumo valioso para futuras investigaciones.

Finalmente, le agradecería infinitamente si pudiera difundir esta encuesta entre su red contactos dirigidos a los que hayan participado en algún proceso REDD+, con el fin de enriquecer la cantidad y diversidad de la muestra.

Agradezco una vez más su tiempo e interés en participar de esta investigación.

Atentamente,



Diego Espejo Ordonio.



PONTIFICIA  
UNIVERSIDAD  
CATOLICA  
DEL PERU

**U. PORTO**  
FEP FACULDADE DE ECONOMIA  
UNIVERSITY OF PORTO

Annex 4: Letter Model to Request an Interview with the specialist.

\_\_\_\_\_, 2018.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Lima, Perú.

Estimado Sr./Sra. \_\_\_\_\_,

Ante todo un cordial saludo para usted. Mi nombre es Diego Espejo Ordonio, geógrafo peruano-brasilero, actualmente realizando la tesis de maestría en Economía y Gestión Ambiental (Universidad de Porto, Portugal) sobre el estado de la iniciativa REDD+ en el Perú.

Mi investigación realiza un análisis crítico a la esencia y evolución de este mecanismo que busca reducir las emisiones por deforestación y degradación forestal. Postulo que esta iniciativa de solución parte desde la misma racionalidad con la cual se genera el problema, es decir, REDD+ es funcional a una lógica de mercado que dificulta implementar reformas transformacionales, necesarias para detener los motores reales de la deforestación y toda la problemática que la circunda.

A partir de lo anterior, y considerando su experiencia como \_\_\_\_\_, para los fines de mi investigación se torna imprescindible conocer su opinión acerca de REDD+, más precisamente sobre los aspectos relacionados a la gobernanza forestal en la Amazonía peruana y, por supuesto, su experiencia desde \_\_\_\_\_ con respecto al tema.

La entrevista duraría como máximo una hora, podríamos realizarla por Skype apenas usted lo disponga. De la misma forma, podría entrevistar a algún otro funcionario que usted considere pertinente y designe.

Quisiera también compartir con usted que, en complemento a las entrevistas, estoy también difundiendo una encuesta virtual rápida (de máximo 10 minutos), a la cual también lo invito a participar. Le agradecería infinitamente si pudiera ayudarme a difundir esta encuesta entre su red de contactos, dirigida a quienes hayan participado en algún proceso REDD+. Al final del proceso de recojo de información, la data será de libre acceso y devuelta a las instituciones que así lo pidan, sirviendo como valioso insumo en futuras investigaciones y proyectos.

Agradezco una vez más su tiempo. Si está dispuesto a compartir su experiencia en REDD+, tenga a bien comunicarse conmigo por correo electrónico a [diego.espejo@pucp.com](mailto:diego.espejo@pucp.com).

Atentamente,



*Diego Espejo Ordonio.*

*Tesista en la Universidad do Porto - Portugal*



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DEL PERÚ

